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D EPARTM EN T O F D EFEN SE

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL

DEFENSE PROGRAM

AN N UAL REPO RT TO CO N GRESS

April 2007

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April 2007

It is our responsibiit to proide our Warfihters the best capabiit and support in the w

remains a nation at war. The Armed Forces of the United States are enaed in a oba war on t

simutaneous deterrin further attacks on Americans here at home. In doin so, our miit

chaenes, but one in particuar—the threat posed b weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—

reatest chaenes.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is pursuin a comprehensie strate to counter this thre

of this strate is to buid readiness for current and future chaenes. The Chemica and Bio

Proram (CBDP) is a critica component supportin both the nationa strateies and DoD

proram exists to proide chemica and biooica defense capabiities in support of the oa

of our nationa miitar strateies, ensurin that the Department’s operations are unconstrainor biooica effects.

To effectie execute this proram, the Department is dependin upon continued conressi

three priorit areas:

• Stabe fundin for the Transformationa Medica Technooies Initiatie to fu expo

science and technoo innoation necessar to successfu counter future enetica

biooica weapons.

• Adequate on-term inestment in the Research, Deeopment, Test, and Eaua

infrastructure to enhance our RDT&E capabiities, incudin the modernization and c

aboratories and test faciities to ensure we deeop adanced countermeasures aain

emerin chemica and biooica threats.

• Consistent resources for the oera proram itsef to ensure that, ear after ear, we a

the improed defensie capabiities essentia to ensure our miitar can operate in an

unconstrained b chemica or biooica weapons.With the support of the President, the Secretar of Defense, and Conress, we hae deeoped

an interated CBDP to best sere the Nation, to buid readiness for current and future cha

sustain our armed forces in time of war.

To continue counterin the existin and future threat from hostie WMD and to me

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CBDP Strategic Context A Nation at War

Four Challenges: Traditional, Irregular, Catastrophic, DisruptiveExpanding Risks froma World in Conflict

Vision: Ensure DoD Operations AreUnconstrained by CB Effects

Mission: Provide CB Defense Capabilitiesin Support of the NationalMilitary Strategies

Four Overarching Program Goals

Risk: Adversaries pursuingCB WMDi l d

Future CB DefenseCapabilities

Current CB DefenseCapabilities

PurPoSe oF the rePortThe Chemica and Biooica Defense Proram (CBDP)

proides U.S. forces the best capabiit and support in

the word. The CBDP is a ke component of nationa and

defense strateies aimed at defendin the nation from thehostie use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—

particuar chemica and biooica (CB) weapons—

aainst U.S. citizens, miitar forces, friends, and aies.

The CBDP seeks to ensure that Department of Defense

(DoD) operations are unconstrained b chemica and/or

biooica effects b proidin CB defense capabiities to

buid readiness for current and future chaenes. (see

Figure 1.)

The proram depends on support in three priorit

areas:

(1) Stabe fundin for the Transformationa Medica

Technoies Initiatie (TMTI);

(2) Adequate on-term inestment in the Research,

Deeopment, Test, and Eauation (RDT&E)infrastructure, incudin aboratories and test

faciities; and

(3) Consistent, predictabe, and sustained resource

ees for the CBDP.

This annua report of the Departme

Chemica and Biooica Defense Proram

the Department is executin the CBDP

the context for a manaement frameworidentif and baance inestment prioriti

oer time. The report proides detaied i

assessments reardin:

(1) the oera readiness of the armed

in a CB warfare enironment, ao

undertaken and onoin pans to

readiness; and

(2) the requirements for the CB

requirements for trainin, detecti

equipment, decontamination equip

prophaxis, and treatment of casu

from the use of CB weapons.

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StrategiC Context

STRATEgIC REAlITy

We are a nation at war. For the foreseeabe future, theCBDP anticipates expandin risks (see Figure 2) from

a word in confict, fueed primari b these oba

driers:

• Increasin competition for imited resources,

particuar in underdeeoped reions with

rapid rowin popuations that creates interna

dispacements, refuee fows and humanitarianemerencies.

• Expandin reach of often amorphous nonstate actors

(terrorist oranizations, crimina ans, reiious

fanatics, ethnic roups, etc.), a increasin

operationaized b oba communications and

financia resources, and a actie seekin to expoit

societies weakened b ineffectie oernance.

• Persistent obstruction fro

North Korea, Cuba, and

exercise infuence on the

sowin phsica chaos and p

PREMISE

The United States possesses

capabiities. In response, ad

chemica-biooica-radiooica

WMD as a comparatie cheap

disproportionate infuentia too

asmmetrica or to attack the With the suppor t of the President, th

the Congress, we have developed an

integrated program to best serve the

for current and future challenges, an

time of war.

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ACTIvE PlAyERS

A wide spectrum of opposin and supportin actors

direct affect the CBDP:

• Atagoists. Roue states such as North Korea

and Iran hae WMD prorams desined both as an

asmmetrica counter to the U.S. and as a source

of iicit reenue. Simiar, inteience reportin

consistent documents the interest of terrorist

roups such as A Qaeda in obtainin chemica,

biooica, and radiooica materias in order to

infict disproportionate pschooica and phsica

impact on the United States and our aies. Eennomina friend states, such as India and Pakistan,

seek the perceied prestie offered b WMD,

notab nucear weapons. Whie no sine antaonist

offers an insurmountabe obstace, in areate the

constitute a dauntin and eer-eoin probem set

for the CBDP to manae.

• Protagoists. The United States and its Westernpartners, particuar North Atantic Treat

Oranization (NATO) countries, are essentia

united in opposition to the further spread of WMD

technoo and resources, despite bein in occasiona

disareement about preferred tactics and strate.

Internationa bodies, such as the United Nations

(UN) and the European Union, are aso enera

smpathetic, if often not particuar operationaeffectie. Within the executie branch, there is

comprehensie presidentia and departmenta

eadership that proides detaied uidance and

resources to pursue WMD defense in enera and the

CBDP in particuar. DoD’s Tota Force approach to

the CBRN defense mission creates sner between

Actie and Resere components. In sum, the CBDP

has sinificant aies, but eneratin efficient unit

of effort amon them is a chaene.

PASSIvE CONSTRAINTS

compex, more interreated with of

areas of responsibiit, and more c

transnationa networks and priat

oba scope of the CB threat neces

muti-atera cooperation to presen

unified response to proiferation andthe cited compexit of the wor

it difficut for the CBDP to ma

internationa poic interation,

deeopment (R&D), or financia b

a situation which is exacerbated

who expoit their membership in

oranizations to actie undermicooperation.

• Differet Perspectives. Anothe

created b the differin priorities an

of arious U.S. oernment branch

ments, which ma impede effecti

cooperation and burden-sharin. Fo

miitar ma emphasize preenti

support of miitar operations, whie c

ma focus on effectie responses to te

As a resut of these different pers

emphasizes pretreatments and acci

therapeutics, and ma hae differe

architectures to support miitar op

than ciiian ife.

• Competig Fiscal Priorities. T

the United States is forecast to ma

one of the hihest popuation row

deeoped countries ranin betw

1.0 percent, but it aso has an ai

necessitatin expanded on-term

nondefense heath care, socia seri

Within DoD, the requirement to prand medica care for miions of retir

simiar financia demands. Further

to simutaneous transform and re

forces whie prosecutin conentio

in Iraq and Afhanistan and uncone

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-National Budget. The Office

of the Secretar of Defense,

Comptroer, projects 2007

Defense spendin wi be 3.9

percent of gross Domestic

Product (gDP), continuina downward trend. Defense

resources hae not kept pace

with the rowth in gDP.

Between 1968 and 2005, gDP

increased oer 300 percent

(from $3.7 to $11 triion), whie

defense spendin increased on62 percent, (from $358 to $523

biion). (See Figure 3.)

Defense Budget. The buin

power of DoD wi decine b

approximate $92 biion oer

the next ten ears, accordin to a U.S. defense

industr consensus forecast. After adjustin for

infation, DoD’s raw spendin power is expected

to decine b about $80 biion oer the next

fie ears aone. Additiona, much of nationa

defense fundin is committed to sustainin

peope, maintainin ita infrastructure, and

preparin equipment for combat

depoment. As a resut, annua

fundin for inestment accountsmust compete with these other

equa pressin priorities. (See

Figure 4.) Aso, accordin to

projections in its 2007 budet

proposa, DoD pans to reduce

its spendin for R&D from $72.5

biion this ear to $71.2 biion

in 2011. After infation is taken

into account, this is a cut of 11.6

percent from 2006.

-

-F 3. DD oy s pc

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CBDP Budget. The CBDP receied $1.5 biion in

fisca ear 2007 (Fy07), an increase of $84 miion

aboe the initia budet request. Athouh this is

encourain reconition of the importance of CBD

to nationa securit, future proram fundin must

be simiar stabe and insuated from the broadneatie fundin trends cited aboe. Continued

support for the Fy08 President’s Budet Request

for the CBDP wi be a ke part of the nationa

strateies to counter the threats from CB weapons.

(See Figure 5.)

-

the Challenge

Toda’s enironment of oba confict is not unique. The

human strue for power and infuence remains muchthe same as it has been throuhout histor. What haschaned, and chaned dramatica for the worse, is theexpandin roster of antaonists who hae access to, or

who are actie seekin, WMD with the capacit to infictcatastrophic damae. It is this increasin danerousstrateic context that ies the CBDP its particuarurenc to our nation. Of a the forms of WMD, CBweapons are amon the cheapest and easiest to producequick and to depo with the reatest ikeihood for

catastrophic effect. The chaene is compounded b theease of disseminatin knowede reated to deeopinWMD, increasin the dua-use nature of technooies,and the rapid technooica adancements that continue toower the threshod for acquirin WMD, and deeopin

noe threats throuh arious techniques, incudinenetic enineerin. Thus, reeant impications for the

CBDP are as foows:

• The nation wi continue to be enaed in a onstrue of continuous, eoin confict aainstadersaries empoin irreuar catastrophic and

• In particuar, units that hae been d

aaiabe for empoment need C

and trainin to be read for immedi

from the U.S.’s power projection

Therefore, the CBDP must pro

defensie capabiities in support o

miitar strateies and force enerat

• Buidin capabiities to manae r

U.S. forces are read to meet curr

WMD chaenes remain paramo

stabe fundin for the TMTI; a

term inestment in the RDT&E

incudin aboratories and test

consistent, predictabe, and susta

ees for the CBDP.

• Faiure to inest in the riht CBDP

b improin doctrine, trainin, m

peope, faciities, and infrastructurerisk for our nation. The abiit of

respond to new and emerin thre

dependent on continued support of

awareness of reoutionar adance

and technoo (S&T) such as ene

F 5 Cc d BcP

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ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT

Chapter 1 describes the accomplishments, processes,

and issues related to overall program management andoversight.

Chapter 2 provides information on medical andnon-medical CB defense requirements and research,

development, and acquisition programs. This chapteroutlines plans and strategies for the developmentand acquisition of capabilities in each of the programcommodity areas, including contamination avoidance,individual protection, collective protection, modeling

and simulation, decontamination, medical chemical

and biological defense, and research, development, andacquisition efforts to address homeland defense andprovide for force protection. This chapter also providesa description and assessment of the test and evaluation

infrastructure of the CBDP, including an overview of thecapabilities and limitations of the current infrastructureand proposed investments that began with the FY06

budget to improve the infrastructure.Chapter 3 provides an analysis of DoD’s CB defenselogistics posture. The analysis reviews the status of quantities, characteristics, and capabilities and limita-tions of all fielded CB defense equipment, industrial baserequirements, procurement schedules, and problems

encountered. Annex H provides detailed logistics data.

Chapter 4 assesses and documents the status of CBdefense education, training, exercises and doctrineconducted by the Services, individually and jointly, in

order to ensure the readiness of the Armed Forces. Eachof the Services’ training standards and programs areincluded. In accordance with Section 1702 of Public Law103-160 (the FY94 National Defense Authorization Act),

CB warfare defense training activities of

been consolidated at the U.S. Army Chem

Annexes A through G provide detaile

on Joint- and Service-unique CB defen

including contamination avoidance, bio

systems, information systems, protecti

ination, medical programs, and hom

and installation protection program

supplements Chapter 3 and provides de

data. This annex reflects the logistics st

of FY06. Assessments were conducted d

determine the specific warfighter requi

on the warfighting requirements and addrequirements for force protection, conseq

ment, and homeland security. Detaile

are provided for systems and equipment

fielded, are in production, or are under

Annex I provides a summary of funds

budgeted, and expended by the DoD C

provides a statement regarding chemical

defense programs involving human subje

by 50 U.S. Code Section 1523. As detaile

no such testing has been conducted in ov

and none is planned. Annex K provides

the status of DoD efforts to implement

Weapons Convention, which was ratified

States and enforced as of 1997. This anne

a summary of plans and activities to proviother countries in response to an appeal b

Party to the Chemical Weapons Conventi

Article X of the Chemical Weapons Conve

provides the text of the congressional lang

this report. Annex M provides a list of the

and abbreviations used throughout this re

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E x E c u t i v E

S umma r y

It is our responsibiit to proide our warfihters the bestcapabiit and support in the word. America remains a

nation at war. The armed forces of the United States are

enaed in a oba war on terror whie simutaneous

deterrin further attacks on Americans here at home.

In doin so, our miitar faces man chaenes, but

one in particuar—the threat posed b weapons of mass

destruction (WMD)—is amon our reatest.DoD is pursuin a comprehensie strate to counter this

threat. The purpose of this strate is to buid readiness

for current and future chaenes. The Chemica and

Biooica Defense Proram (CBDP) is a critica

component supportin both the nationa strateies and

department’s strateies. The proram exists to proide

chemica and biooica defense capabiities in support of

the oas and objecties of our nationa miitar strateies,

ensurin that DoD operations are unconstrained b

chemica or biooica effects.

To effectie execute this proram, the department

depends on continued conressiona support in three

priorit areas:

• Stabe fundin for the Transformationa MedicaTechnooies Initiatie (TMTI) to fu expoit

the adanced science and technoo innoation

necessar to successfu counter future enetica

enineered biooica weapons.

• Ad t t i t t i th RDT&E

• Consistent resources for the oerato ensure that, ear after ear, we a

the improed defensie capabiiti

ensure our miitar can operate in an

unconstrained b chemica or bioo

With the support of the President, th

Defense, and the Conress, we hae

resourced an interated CBDP to best seto buid readiness for current and future

to sustain our armed forces in time of wa

To continue counterin the existin and fut

hostie WMD and to meet the critica op

of our miitar, the department requires

the resources requested in the proram b

This report is proided in accordance with

Section 1523. (The compete reportin

is detaied in Annex L.) The report

accompishments, initiaties, manaemen

of the CBDP, as we as strateies and

deeopment and acquisition of capabiitie

proram commodit areas for the near t

and far term; a description and assessmprorams and infrastructure; an anasis

oistics posture; and CB defense educ

exercises, and doctrine.

This report aso demonstrates compi

g t P f d R t A

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(50 U.S. Code, Section 1522), the CBDP has interated

research, deeopment, and acquisition (RDA) funds into

defense-wide accounts that are oerseen b a sine

office within the Office of the Secretar of Defense.

The CBDP ision is to ensure DoD operations

are unconstrained by chemical and biological effects. The proram’s mission is

to provide chemical and biological defense

capabilities in support of the national

military strategies. The ision and

mission statements uide the proram,

and its actiities and are supported b

four corporate oas:

Goal 1: Proide CB defense capabiities to

the warfihter to reduce near-

term operational risk.

Goal 2: Reduce force management risks

throuh enhanced joint CB defense education,

trainin, and exercises.

Goal 3: Deeop transformationa CB defense

technooies to reduce future challenges risk

to DoD operations and forces.

Goal 4: Reduce institutional risk b improin DoD

CB defense manaement practices – become a

hih-performance oranization.

These oas refect the CBDP’s impementation of DoD’s baanced scorecard concept, which proides

a manaement and oersiht framework to baance

inestment priorities aainst risks oer time.

The CBDP budet request for F

An oeriew of the budet is pro

request focuses on reducing th

increasin resources for the

base. The CBDP seeks to ensu

are unconstrained b chemeffects b proidin c

defense capabiities to bu

and future chaenes. T

support in three priorit

for the TMTI; (2) adequate

the RDT&E infrastructure,

and test faciities; and (3) con

sustained resource ees for

The CBDP empos mu

processes to monitor per

prorammatic adjustments.

Prorammin, Budet and Execu

to ensure proram performance

impemented. The CBDP annua

we as assessments b the Join

CBRN Defense aso pa ke ro

materie soution’s proress is m

specific performance oas and

ears, and the resuts of the data

aainst performance oas, oper

oas, and the oera CBDP m

support the objectie of fiedinequipment to our miitar forces

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COMPEllINg NEEDS

Transformation

To achiee its objecties in response to oba CB threats,

the U.S. miitar must continue the transformation

process. The Transformation Planning Guidance of Apri

2003 cas for transformationa business and pannin

practices.Transformation chaenes incude manaement

of defense, speed of mass (ife and mobiit) and

information, fisca barriers, aues, and attitudes. The

principes of jointness and deeopin an adaptabe and

responsie miitar carr oer into CB defense.

It is extreme difficut to coect reiabe inteience

on WMD prorams and actiities, which are coseuarded secrets. The preaence of dua-use technooies

and eitimate ciiian appications means CB research

efforts are eas to concea and difficut to detect and

monitor. Based on the demonstrated ease with which

uncooperatie states and nonstate actors can concea

WMD prorams and reated actiities, the United States,

its aies, and its partners must expect further inteienceaps and surprises. Consequent, the United States must

coupe responses to known and aidated threats with an

aressie and adaptie capabiit deeopment process

that anticipates potentia noe and emerin threats.

Science and Technology

CB de

new c

techno

and c

threats,

netica

weapon

fundin

from p

S&T to

heai

for futusustaini

in current force protection ees. The Fy

Budet reinforces this effort. The TMTI i

pe scientific approaches to deier broad-

apeutics, enomic sequences of known th

response countermeasure capabiities. T

critica step in S&T efforts to defend and

the daners of future CB threats. Additio

science and technoo incude the Tr

Countermeasures Technooies Initiatie

focuses on the phsica (nonmedica) asp

fense, and the Nanotechnoo Initiatie

cuts medica and phsica CB defense. T

initiaties address needs for adanced te

detection, indiidua protection, informand decontamination capabiities. The n

wi reduce future risks in the future b

biities that wi defeat enetica enine

threats and other as et unknown threats

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DoD ChemiCal anD BiologiCalDeFenSe Program PerFormanCePlan

DoD’s manaement priorities often focus on responses

to near-term operationa threats. A ke purpose of theperformance pan is to shift the emphasis to a more

anticipator approach that incorporates other factors

into a comprehensie risk manaement framework. The

baanced scorecard concept proides a risk manaement

framework that demonstrates compiance with thegoernment Performance and Resuts Act and incudesoperationa risks, whie aso addressin additionachaenes that defense manaers must consider to baanceinestment priorities aainst risks oer time. DoD hastaiored the baanced scorecard concept to four broad

areas of risk manaement with performance manaementmeasures, a of which support the department’s ision,mission, and oas and ensure an interated coectionof sstems and capabiities in order to reduce oera

proram risk. DoD pursues an inestment strate thatseeks to reduce oera proram risk b baancin risk in

each of the foowin areas.

• Operational risk stems from factors shapin theabiit to achiee miitar objecties in a near-termconfict or other continenc. Within the CBDP, this

incudes inestments in procurement and adanceddeeopment to address near-term needs. This isrepresented b Budet Actiities 4, 5, and 7 andprocurement accounts.

• Force management risk resuts from issues

affectin the abiit to recruit, retain, train, andequip sufficient numbers of quait personneand sustain the readiness of the force whie itaccompishes its man operationa tasks. Force

manaement risk addressessustainment of fieded sstemdefense education and train b eements of arious operaccounts of the miitar dep

loistics Aenc, and the DResources for force manaewithin the budet of the CBDcoordinates with the Sericeto ensure interation betweand sustainment and force m

• Future challenges risk deri

the abiit to inest in new cnew operationa concepts defeat mid- to on-term mi

the CBDP, this incudes ine Joint Capabiit Technooreated efforts to address mThis is represented b Bud

• Institutional risk resuts fr

abiit to deeop manaemmetrics, and contros that uand promote the effectie oestabishment. Within theinestments in manaementeffectie and efficient use of

incudin inestment in inf

research, deeopment, anrepresented b Budet Acti

As iustrated in Figure 6 , reduc

ma reduce tota proram riskresource constraints, inestment

to make trade-offs amon differe

that ensures baance or reduces t

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The increased compexit of modern warfare demands

that CB defense equipment be fieded in the most cost-

effectie and expeditious manner possibe. Furtherin

that compexit, the eoin threat enironment cas

for a capabiities-based approach that requires identifin

capabiities that U.S. miitar forces wi need to conducta rane of miitar operations. Put simp, determination

of each specific adersar’s intentions and capabiities

ma not be possibe, underscorin the need to smart

baance oera proram risk.

vISION, MISSION OF THE CBDPThe ision statement (Figure 7 ) proides focus and

direction for CB defense RDT&E, and acquisition

efforts. This ision encompasses a wide rane of miitar

enironments and missions. These rane from traditiona

battefied force-on-force combat to homeand defense

and cii support operations, and incude specia

operations, anti-terrorism, force protection, consequence

manaement, and other stabiit operations. Utimate,

the ision is focused on outcomes. That is, an effectie

CB defense capabiit wi be one that faciitates the

conduct of a DoD operations, in spite of a compex and

aried CB threat, reardess of the rane of operationa

enironments.

F 7. CBDP Vs

The ision is not focused on an specific chemica or

biooica threat. Whie it is focused on those CB aents

that ma be empoed intentiona, it addresses cassica

threat aents as we as noe and emerin threats. The

(QDR), the Department has refined its

Construct to better refect the nature of

and tasks. In addition to norma for

sustainment and trainin actiities, this up

force pannin construct cas for U.S. fo

to do the foowin:

• Defend the homeand

• Preai in the war on terror and co

operations

• Conduct and win conentiona camp

In each area, the Force Pannin Constru

actiities that the department conduct

(stead-state) and those it conducts perio

The CBDP’s mission (Figure 8) is t

capabiities needed to support miitar

each of these areas for arious durations.

within the DoD CBDP aim to proide U

the best equipment to ensure their su

mission accompishment on an future bachemica or biooica aents ma be emp

F 8. CBDP mss

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ChemiCal anD BiologiCalDeFenSe goalS anD FunDing

CBDP CORPORATE gOAlS

The CBDP corporate oas used in Figure 9 are a ke

eement in proidin a means to estabish proress in

fufiin the proram’s mission.

F 9. CBDP Cp gs

Corporate oas proide the broad framework needed

b the CBDP to meet warfihter requirements for CB

defense operationa capabiities. These oas proide

strateic proram direction for the deeopment,

acquisition, and fiedin of CB defense equipment whiereducin acquisition costs and time of deeopment.

Figure 9 defines the corporate oas (and proides a

summar of the ke focus areas that support these oas.)

To impement the oas of the proram, the CBDP

k h d

b chemica and/or biooica e

defense capabiities to buid rea

future chaenes. The proram

three priorit areas: (1) stabe

(2) adequate on-term inest

infrastructure, incudin aboratand (3) consistent, predictabe,

ees for the CBDP.

JOINT CBRN DEFENSE FU

CONCEPTS AND OPERAT

CAPABIlITy gOAlSThe Joint Staff Joint Requirem

Defense (JRO-CBRND) compe

Assessment (CBA) of Joint CBR

operationa capabiities durin

proides a structured process th

nationa securit strateies and d

In addition, it brins the procesCapabiities Interation and

(JCIDS)—the Department’s pr

deeopin sstem requirements

is on the passie defense port

WMD mission, as outined in

Strate for Combatin WMD

are bein conducted for consequradiooica and nucear defense.

three ears.) Joint warfihter C

requirements are diided into f

areas—Sense, Shape, Shied, and

Figure 10 . These functiona areas

network of capabiities to suppo

capabiities for Sense incude re

and identification (contaminatiincudes information sstems; Sh

and coectie protection, and m

pretreatments; and Sustain inc

restoration, and postexposure m

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


F 10. J CBrn Ds eb Ccp d Spp C Cp

SenSe ShaPe ShielD SuS1. P Dc(Cc, Bc,d rdc)

2. Sd- Dc(Cc, Bc,d rdc)

4. id ey W

5. Bspcm

6. Bspc ayss

7. rspy d ocPc

8. Pcs Pc

9. epdy Ccv Pc

11. idvdDc

12. eqpDc

13. Fd S

CBRN defense operationa capabiit oas, as defined

in the 2005 CBA, are ained under the four functiona

concept areas (Figure 11). Assessments are under wa todetermine whether additiona oas ma be needed, or

if existin oas need to be taiored to support eoin

mission areas, incudin consequence m

homeand securit. Specific projects and p

adanced deeopment and procurementwith one or more of the operationa oa

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


CBDP FunDInG

As iustrated in Figure 12, the tota CBDP inestment

for Fy08 is $1.570 biion. In Fy07, the department

restructured funds within this inestment portfoio. The

Fy08 proram continues the inestment and focuses on

reducing the future challenges risk b increasin resources

for the S&T base. The oera proram risk optimizes a

baance amon the competin needs of the department.

To impement the oas of the proram, the CBDP seeks

to ensure that DoD operations

chemica and/or biooica effect

and biooica defense capabiitie

current and future chaenes. Th

support in three priorit areas: (

TMTI; (2) adequate on-term ininfrastructure, incudin aborat

and (3) consistent, predictabe,

ees for the CBDP.

Note: Homeand Defense incudes: Instaation Protection Proram, Miitar Mai Screenin Proram, and the W

“Other” incudes: Duwa Proin ground funds; Joint Concept Deeopment and Experimentation Proram; m joint oranizationa offices; Joint Test Infrastructure Workin group; laborator Infrastructure; test equipmenscience and technoo funds that ma be appicabe to two or more of the functiona areas.

F 12. FY08 Psd’s Bd rqs CBDP

Ss $308.111

Sp $91.415

Sd $488.676

Ss $101.223

hd Ds $86.418

o $494.406

CB Ds P t $1,570.249

(Dollars in Millions)

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


The inestment in the Shied capabiit area incudes

the TMTI inestment. Inestment in the Sense area was

decreased due to a dea in the procurement of future

biooica standoff detection sstems, and homeand

defense aso decreased, due to a reduction in fundin for

the Instaation Protection Proram.

SUMMARy OF KEy

PERFORMANCE METRICS

Measuring Progress Toward Operational Goals(Operational Risk)

The inestment in RDA is critica to the successfu

impementation of nationa securit and miitar

strateies for combatin WMD, the oba war on

terrorism, and homeand securit. At the end of Fy06,

there were 38 prorams of record within the CBDP.

For Fy07, 37 of these prorams are projected (from

an annua perspectie) to be on track to meet proram

cost, schedue, and performance parameters. This annua

assessment, conducted b the Joint Pro

Office for Chemica and Biooica D

CBD), incorporates the consideration of

foowin cateories:

• Cost

• Schedue

• Performance

• Fundin

• Contracts

• Tes

• lo

• Pro

• Man

• Inte

The department is makin oera pr

acquisition prorams, as iustrated in Fconsequent, is makin proress toward

capabiities for U.S. forces. Table 1 ius

across the broad rane of capabiities

comprehensie approach to manain ris

F 13. Sy Ss acqs Ps Dss ov P

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


tb 1. Sy Ss acqs Ps Dss ov

JPm Ccv Pc

Spbd Ccv Pc Sys (SCPe)

J Ccv Pc eqp (JCPe)

Ccvy Pcd Fd hsps (CPFh)J epdy Ccv Pc (JeCP)

Cc Bc Pcv S (CBPS)

JPm gd

ayc lby Sys (alS)

ufd Cd S (uCS)

is Pc P (iPP)

JPm idvd Pc

J Svc a Cw msk (JSam)

J Svc lw id S tcy (JSliSt) esb

J Svc msk lk ts (JSmlt)

J Svc Cc ev Svvby msk (JSCeSm)

J Pcv acw esb (JPaCe)

J Svc g Pps msk (JSgPm)

JPm nBC C avdc

J Svc lw Sd Cc a Dc (JSlSCaD)

J Cc a Dc (JCaD)

Syk nBC rc Vc (nBCrV)

J Svc l nBC rcssc Sys (JSlnBCrS)

J Cc Bc rdc a W m (JCBraWm)

m93/m93a1 nBC rc Vc (Fox)

JPm i Syss

J ecs md (Jem)

J op ecs Fd (JoeF)J W d rp nwk (JWarn)

JPm C-B mdc Syss

a Vcc adsbd (aVa)

rcb B a/B Vcc (B)

Sp Sys

P Vcc

Sk eps rdc Ps as CW as (SerPaCWa)

J Bc a idfc & Dsc Sys (JBaiDS)

advcd acvs Sys (aaS)

ipvd nv a t Sys (inatS)

pBscv

Bscv ic ii

JPm D

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


F 14. ms Dcss

The oera ratin of each proram is assessed b JPEO-

CBD and is based on a ariet of factors taiored to the

indiidua proram. The oera assessment is based

on whether the prorams are on track (reen), facin

potentia or actua probems (eow), or hae major

weaknesses (red) compared to requirements defined inthe Acquisition Proram Baseine (APB) document for

each proram.

The ast majorit (81%) of the prorams are on track

to meet defined and approed proram requirements.

On six prorams are identified as hain potentia or

actua probems. Howeer, appropriate soutions to these

probems are within the Joint Proram Manaer’s abiitto soe. For exampe, two of these prorams—the

Joint Warnin and Reportin Network (JWARN) and

the Joint Effects Mode (JEM)—are at risk as a resut

of the deiberate decision to snchronize the schedues

and panned fiedin of these prorams with the Joint and

Serice command and contro prorams with which the

must interface. The reainment caused schedue deas

in the short term, but wi resut in en

performance and interation.

One proram—Joint Serice lihtw

Chemica Aent Detector (JSlSCAD)

weaknesses. Whie JSlSCAD represents a

oer current fieded capabiities, it imitations in its performance durin

resut, JSlSCAD requirements are bein

to determine whether the proram shou

support of modified requirements or

options (incudin proram canceatio

appropriate. The proram decision wi b

the Joint Requirements Oersiht CounciRDT&E proress within the proram

within Figure 14. The predominance

enterin/competin Operationa Testin

conductin a Miestone C Decision Reie

Fy07 indicates sinificant near-term pr

competion and product fiedin.

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


In addition to monitorin proress b trackin proramsof record, other assessments of DoD’s current and

projected CBD capabiities took pace. In Auust 2005,

the Joint Requirements Office (JRO) competed the

report Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

Defense (CBRND) Functional Needs Analysis/Functional

Solution Analysis. This report, aso referred to as the CBA,

is structured in accordance with the Chairman of the

Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01D, Joint

Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The

2005 CBRND CBA was coordinated with the serices

and the Combatant Commands and was approed b

the Joint Requirements Oersiht Counci (JROC).

materie soutions. Based on naticentered on a common joint wa

anases initiate the forma deeop

capabiities, to incude the identi

of requirements necessar to in

acquisition. The requirements

anasis of existin joint force

doctrine, oranization, trainin

and education, personne, and

capabiities and deficiencies.

Table 2 proides a summar of th

This assessment proides a summ

ees of U S forces and panned

1. J Svc Cc ev Svvby

msk

2. J Svc g Pps msk

3. J Svc Dc Sys - S Sc

4. J Svc Ps Dc Sys/

rcv Sk Dc l (rSDl)

5. J Bc a idfc & Dscs

Sys

6. J Svc msk lk ts

7. J ecs md Bck i

8. J Svc l nc, Bc,

rcssc Sys

9. F Svvby pd

10. Syk nBC rcssc

11. ayc lby S (

12. Bfd a-is D

an/PrS9 (Fue 2QFY06)

13. mb Dc assss

(mDarS) (1QFY07)

14. JSliSt Bck 2 gv up

15. av Fw Sys

Fw Sys (iFS) (FY07

16. J Svc acw msk (J

F 15. CBDP Cpby Fds (FY06 d FY07)

In Fy06 and Fy07, 16 new capabiities are or wi be

fieded to the operationa forces. These capabiit

uprades rane across the spectrum of nucear, biooica,

and chemica defense and incude major detection,

decontamination, medica, warnin and prediction, and

indiidua protection capabiities. Acquisition fexibiit

and customer focus within the p

iustrated in Figure 15. Conc

of record eents and deeopme

capabiit has been enerated du

immediate needs of operationa f

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


capabiit performance and reducin oera proram

deficiencies. The assessment proides an eauation of

CBRN defense:

b Operational Area —Sense, Shape, Shied, and Sustain

b Level of War —Strateic Nationa, Strateic Theater,

Operationa, and Tactica1

and b Time —current, near term/midterm (Fy06-11), and

far term (Fy12-20)

In quaitatie terms, reen, amber, and red tpica

indicate the foowin about the capabiities within each

area:

G “g” dcs cpby p

sk dsd sdd(s).

A

“ab” dcs p cpby p sk dsdsdd(s).

R “rd” dcs cpby p sk dsdsdd(s).

A summar of the resuts of the 2005 CBRN Defense

CBA is shown in Table 2. The oera capabiit in eachoperationa area is rated as amber throuh the far term.

1 As defined b the Uniersa Joint Task list (UJTl), the strateicee of war is diided into two subees: strateic nationa, whichencompasses DoD, serice, and interaenc tasks, and strateictheater, which encompasses combatant command tasks. Estabishin

Whie the oera ratins do not chane

term, the assessments are based on curren

capabiities that wi aow U.S. forces to

current and projected threats, respectie

as capabiities improe, the must c

transformin threats.

Additiona, this tabe proides an aremateria and non-materia actiities. The

and directs research, deeopment, a

of materia soutions whie eerain

approaches. For exampe, inadequate doc

ma ower the ratin for a task, een if m

exist. One exampe of this is found in a

inoes protectin indiiduas from CBRCBA notes that DoD operations incre

U.S. and non U.S. ciiians who pa an im

supportin U.S. forces and therefore mu

Howeer, miitar doctrine and trainin

not desined to ensure that the unpreced

of ciiians that were empoed in ear 2

operations aainst Iraq were adequate

CBRN defense. The information that report detais the arious measures bein t

shortfas identified in the JROC CB

resource ees, as detaied in the Fy

Budet Request, and conressiona suppor

tb 2. JroC Cpby Bsd assss CBrn Ds

t b 3 JSto CBD P a CB D t

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


Logistics and Training Capabilities (Force Management Risk)

Critica CB defense capabiities for the warfihter are

proided throuh the operations and sustainment (O&S)

accounts of the miitar departments, in addition to the

RDA funds of the CBDP.Logistics Risks Assessments

areproided in Chapter 3 of this report. These assessments

proide information on capabiities in stock and aaiabe

to the warfihter at the end of Fy06 and panned for

future ears.

Data on personne trainin and

education is proided in

Chapter 4 of this report.

Additiona information on

exercises, trainin standards,

and reated CB defense trainin

actiities is aso detaied. A ke

aspect of the proram is the

Developing and Deploying TCapabilities (Future Challeng

The CBDP addresses risks from fu

research conducted in the S&T b Joint Science & Technoo Office fDefense (JSTO-CBD) conducted

of the science and technoo prassessment of Defense TechnooThe resuts are summarized in Ta

JSTO pane identified DTOs CB.4exceent performance areas.

Durin 2007, the DoD wi be pha

as the basis of science and techno

Two ke measures wi incude (1reiews and (2) a measure of the transitioned. One of the ke mthe science and technoo basand transition of adanced capa

deeoper for eentua producti

tb 3. JSto-CBD P assss CB Ds tcy

Defense Technology Objective Pa

CB.35 Sd B as Dc

CB.37 CB a W m

CB.42 ev F asCB.45 S-Dy ms

CB.46 rcb rc Vcc

CB.50 lw id CB Dc

CB.51 lw lv CW a eps

CB.53 Wd-a a rcssc Cc as

CB.54 tpy Sp

CB.55 CB hzd ev Pdc

CB.56 mdy BW a Dc d Dscs SyssCB.57 nd nv a mdc Css

CB.58 Ws d es eq ecps Vcc

CB.59 tpc Ss B ns

CB.60 Vcc tcs Fvs eps

CB.61 advcd a Pfc Sys

CB.62 hzd Pdc w nwcs

CB.63 tpc Ss Fvs ic

CB.64 Dc/assss gcy ed Bs

t b 4 a & P d t t d JPeo CBD

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


tb 4. ac & Pd tcs tsd JPeo-CBD

C Ps ts d ev

FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY06 FY07 FY0

Dc 1 0 2 0 0 3 0

i Syss 1 5 4 1 0 0 0Pc 0 2 6 0 0 1 3

Dc 0 1 1 0 0 0 2

t a Sccs 1 0 0 0 0 4 0

Dscs (Syss) 4 4 4 4 0 0 0

Dscs (assys) 0 8 8 8 0 0 0

Dscs (hdw) 0 2 2 0 0 0 0

Ps 1 0 2 1 0 0 0tpcs 0 0 2 0 0 0 0

ts 8 14-18 23-27 6-10 0 8 5

A ke prorammatic decision of the 2006 QDR

(Quadrennia Defense Reiew) was the direction to

impement a $1.5 biion Transformationa Medica

Technooies Initiatie (TMTI) oer Fy07–11 to

deeop broad-spectrum medica countermeasures

aainst the threat of enetica enineered bioterror

aents. The TMTI focuses on broad-spectrum defenses

aainst intraceuar bacteria pathoens and hemorrhaic

feers. The TMTI buids on efforts started in Fy06 as

a resut of the Enhanced Pannin Process. It shifts the

inestment baance to reduce future risks and decrease

oera proram risk b maintainin a baance amoncountermeasures aainst near- and far-term threats.

Additiona initiaties wi incude deeopin adanced

detection and deterrent technooies and faciitatin

fu-scae cii-miitar exercises to improe interaenc

pannin for compex homeand securit continencies.

In a parae effort, the S&T proram

wi initiate pans for the inestiationinto nanotechnoo, biotechnoo,

information technoo, and conitie

sciences (NBIC) in an effort to adance

CB defense capabiities throuh

reoutionar and innoatie areas of

concept to CB defense capabiities to pr

semi-fixed faciities. Up to one-third of th

funds wi direct support technooie

cuttin initiatie.

Improving Management Practices(Institutional Risk)

Manain institutiona risk deas with f

the abiit to deeop manaement pract

metrics, and contros that use resou

and promote effectie operations. Fo

manaement actiities that are bein pur

institutiona risk.

Streamlining the decision process — C

this report describes the CBDP’s ma

oersiht structure. The most sinifican

manaement structure was the proram

that was approed on Apri 22, 2003. Thi

streamined the decision process b reduc

of Miestone Decision Authorities (MD

to one. From Apri 22, 2003, throuh

Defense Acquisition Executie (DAE)

impemented throuh a taiored index of

a Specia Interest proram in accordance with DoD infrastructure were interated w

8/9/2019 Extract 2007


F 16. mj ts evs

a Specia Interest proram in accordance with DoD

Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2. This MDA authorit was

further deeated b the AAE to the JPEO-CBD on June 7,

2006. In Ju 2006, the CBDP impemented an aternatie

reiew process, which is detaied in Chapter 1.

Program Balance — Annex I of the annua report of the CBDP proides information on RDA fundin.

DoD annua reiews the proram budet to ensure

that proram actiities are baanced amon science &

technoo, adanced deeopment, and procurement

to ensure technoo transitions as we as to ensure

capabiities are bein deeoped to address near-term,

midterm, and far-term operationa needs.Improving Test & Evaluation Infrastructure — Chapter 2

of this annua report proides information on the DoD

test and eauation (T&E) infrastructure. In the Fy07

President’s Budet Submission, budet needs for the T&E

infrastructure were interated w

Based on technoo needs and

restructured acquisition pro

the T&E capabiities to execute

prorams were time and fundin

technooies coud be demonstin snchronization with the T&E

proram miestones were based

on the financia resources, but

T&E resources needed to execute

iustrates the sinificant number

b the CBDP and occurrin at a

operationa testin (OT), dee

combined test eents, and cinisstems requirin Food and Dru

approa).

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extract 2007

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