f-35 jsf: wrong place, wrong time
DESCRIPTION
An assessment of the tactical, strategic, and economic value of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. This paper advocates a strategic shift from conventional warfare and major weapons systems procurement to irregular warfare and the further development of existing technologies.TRANSCRIPT
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The Joint Strike Fighter Program: Wrong Place, Wrong Time
Anthony F. Hillen Master of Arts: Security Studies Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University May 2008
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Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 3
The Joint Strike Fighter Program ................................................................................................................ 5
The F-35 Lightning II...................................................................................................................................... 9
US Strategic Policy and Asymmetric Warfare ........................................................................................ 14
A Fighter Lost in Time? ................................................................................................................................ 19
The Right Stuff: Tactical Capabilities in Unconventional Warfare ................................................ 22
Qualification ..................................................................................................................................................... 28
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 30
Appendix A .......................................................................................................................................................... 33
Appendix B ........................................................................................................................................................... 34
Appendix C ........................................................................................................................................................... 35
Appendix D........................................................................................................................................................... 37
Appendix E ........................................................................................................................................................... 38
Appendix F ........................................................................................................................................................... 39
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Introduction
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program began in the early 1990s as a result of
the restructuring and integration of a number of tactical aircraft procurement and
technology development initiatives. According to the Pentagon’s Defense
Procurement, Acquisition Policy and Strategic Sourcing (DPAP) office, the program
seeks to produce a versatile new combat aircraft with reduced life-cycle costs.1 Now
referred to as the F-35 Lightning II, the JSF has been touted as an “affordable multi-
role fighter with precision engagement capabilities and the flexibility to conduct joint
operations well into the future”.2 The F-35 is undoubtedly a highly advanced and
formidable weapons platform; however, the aircraft was designed for tactical and
strategic scenarios no longer relevant in today’s geopolitical environment.
Since September 11th 2001, the American military and political establishments
have increasingly stressed the importance of adapting to twenty-first century security
challenges. Nevertheless, instead of producing weapons that exploit the United States’
relative technological superiority and expand its tactical advantages in unconventional
warfare, the military is developing weapons systems designed to combat peer-
competitors in major theater warfare.
In light of the United States’ official strategic emphasis on non-traditional
military threats, one can only wonder why the government continues to spend billions
1 http://jsf.mil/f35/f35_background.htm - Accessed 03/21/2008 2 Ibid.
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of dollars in taxpayer’s money developing weapons systems for a bygone era. The F-
35 program is an exercise in fiscal irresponsibility masquerading as a project of great
tactical and strategic import to the United States’ national security.
This paper argues that the F-35 Lightning II was originally designed for the Cold
War and immediate post-Cold War geopolitical environment. As official policies and
strategic priorities began to shift, so did the aircraft’s ostensible purpose. The Joint
Strike Fighter Program illustrates how bureaucratic assumptions and institutional
cultures can have a more significant influence on the development of major weapons
platforms than actual tactical or strategic military requirements.
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The Joint Strike Fighter Program
The main focus of this analysis is to determine whether the F-35 is being
developed for conventional major-theater warfare, in contradiction of the United
States’ official strategic policy. A secondary point of inquiry involves determining
whether armament and avionics upgrades to existing aircraft could render the
development of a new platform with redundant tactical capabilities little more than a
needless squandering of the US defense budget.
This paper poses a number of financial, tactical, and strategically important
questions. The F-35 is designed around assumptions and general modes of thinking
dating back to the Cold War. At the behest of the platform’s corporate developers
and the DoD itself, the US military will be forced to integrate new technologies with
existing weapons systems and tactical doctrines, a concept historically anathema to the
combat effectiveness of military organizations.3
In three steps, this project aims to demonstrate that the development of the F-
35 contradicts the United States’ general strategic policy, and does not confer any
significant advantage over existing tactical combat aircraft in non-traditional warfare.
After a brief history of the aircraft’s genesis, I provide evidence that the United States’
official strategic policies emphasize the development of weapons for “asymmetric”
warfare. However, since most wars are by definition asymmetric, this paper will refer to
3 Hall, B. Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology and Tactics, Johns Hopkins University Press; New Edition (12/18/2001).
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such conflict as idiosyncratic or unconventional warfare. The second section argues that
the F-35 is designed for major-theater operations against a peer competitor, and not
to combat unconventional threats to US national security. In the final section of the
paper, I contend that existing aircraft possess capabilities similar, if not identical, to
those of the F-35.
The general idea behind the Joint Strike Fighter program is to develop a
versatile and cost-effective tactical combat aircraft. The program intends to produce a
platform capable of achieving economies of commonality and scale in order to reduce
the aircraft’s per-unit cost.4 The JSF is designed to be highly flexible in terms of both
mission capabilities and future technological developments. Long-term plans for the
JSF platform include an electronic-warfare version; unmanned variants; and the
incorporation of directed-energy weapons, such as high-energy lasers capable of
intercepting ballistic missiles,5 6
In December 1994, Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and
Northrop Grumman were awarded Concept Definition and Design Research
(CDDR) contracts. For the duration of their fifteen-month contracts, each company
refined their Preferred Weapons System Concept (PWSC) designs and subjected them
4 Selinger, M. “F-35 Trumps F/A-22 in Latest Defense Department Budget Battle”, Aviation Week, 1/4/2005. 5 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008. 6 http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/abl/news/2001/033001.html - Accessed 5/1/2008.
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to a number of risk reduction assessments, including powered short take-off and
vertical landing (STOVL) tests, engineering analyses, and wind tunnel tests.7
All four contenders chose the F119 Pratt & Whitney (P&W) engine to power
their test aircraft. Accordingly, P&W received a $4 billion contract to develop the F-
135 propulsion system in November 1995. The JSF program’s acquisition strategy
stipulates the simultaneous development of two functionally interchangeable engine
designs. The Pratt & Whitney system was to compete with a similar propulsion system
designed by General Electric (GE). The competition was initially scheduled to begin
in 2011 and continue for the duration of the JSF program to mitigate development
risks. Nevertheless, the General Electric contract is scheduled to be terminated,
largely due to persistent budget overruns. Although P&W is undoubtedly delighted
with this turn of events, the cancellation of the GE contract is unlikely to benefit the
aircraft.
DPAP has come to the conclusion that funding an alternate engine program at
a cost of $3.5 billion to $4.5 billion is an unnecessary expenditure. However, a
competitive strategy could result in savings equal to or greater than the engine’s life
cycle costs in a sole-source scenario.
[The] GAO’s updated cost analysis suggests that a savings of 9 to 11 percent – about 2 percent less than what GAO estimated last year – would recoup that investment. Competition on the JSF engine program could yield savings of at least that much. Further, non financial benefits in terms of better engine performance and reliability, more responsive contractors, and improved
7 http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jsf.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008.
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industrial base stability are more likely outcomes under a competitive environment than under a sole-source strategy.8 In May 1996, the Department of Defense officially designated the JSF program
as an Acquisition Category I program (ACAT I); a defense project categorization
implying at least $355 million9 in research, development and evaluation costs.10 Prime
contractors submitted Concept Demonstration Phase (CDP) proposals a month later,
recommending potential prototype aircraft. By early 1997, Lockheed Martin and
Boeing were awarded the CDP contract, McDonnell Douglas was eliminated, and
Northrop Grumman merged its team with Lockheed Martin and British Aerospace.11
On October 26th 2001, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Edward C.
Aldridge announced the Pentagon’s decision to continue the JSF program by initiating
the next phase of its development: System Development and Demonstration (SDD).
Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of the Air Force, James Roche, declared Lockheed
Martin the winner of the fly-off competition and the $19 billion development
contract.12
8 Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008. 9 (based on fiscal year 1996 constant dollars) 10 United States Code of Law, Title 10, Subtitle A , Part IV , Chapter 144, Article 2430 11 http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_jsf.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008 12 http://www.jsf.mil/history/his_f35.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
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The F-35 Lightning II
The Joint Strike Fighter, now known as the F-35 Lightning II, remains in the
SDD phase of development. The project is focused on developing a multi-role strike
platform, capable of meeting the operational requirements of the United States’ Air
Force, Navy and Marine Corps, while simultaneously maintaining an affordable flyaway
cost.13
There are currently three variations of the F-35, each designed to cater to the
specific needs of the individual service branches. The Air Force’s F-35A is optimized
for air-to-ground attacks; intended to replicate the close-air-support capabilities of the
A-10 Thunderbolt II and the mission profile versatility14 of the venerable F-16. The F-
35B is the Marine Corp’s short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the
JSF, slated to replace the AV-8B Harrier. Finally, the Navy’s F-35C variant is
optimized for carrier-based operations and intended to replace the F/A-18 Hornet.
13 With regard to aircraft procurement and acquisition, “flyaway cost” refers to a firm unit price. 14 Tthe ability to conduct a wide range of mission types.
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According to its developers, the F-35 offers numerous advantages over existing
platforms. These advantages generally fall under the categories of increased
survivability, lethality, supportability, and affordability. Lockheed Martin asserts that
in addition to its on-board countermeasures, the F-35’s reduced radio frequency and
infrared signature greatly enhance its survivability. The integration of sophisticated
sensor arrays increases the pilot’s situational awareness, and ensures the accurate
delivery of munitions, thus contributing to the platform’s general lethality.
Proponents of the JSF program argue that the aircraft’s combat capabilities are
enhanced by its supportability characteristics; primarily it’s reduced “logistics
footprint” and increased sortie generation rate. Finally, advocates somewhat
controversially suggest that the United States’ numerical strength and military force
structure can be improved by the F-35’s reduced development and procurement costs.
However, this seems highly unlikely, especially given the JSF program’s steadily
increasing funding requirements.
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According to detractors, the JSF program’s complications are primarily due
repeated design compromises and persistent budget overruns. The F-35’s weight has
been a constant problem over the course of its development.15 However, according to
the DoD, recent design changes have made this less of a problem than it once was.16
Furthermore, the F-35 is not as technologically sophisticated as Lockheed Martin and
the DoD allege. The Joint Strike Fighter has been advertised as a template for next
generation strike aircraft, yet the F-35 does not feature cutting-edge technologies such
as supercruise or thrust vectoring, nor does it possess stealth characteristics even
remotely comparable to the F-22. 17 18
Despite repeated denials by the DoD and its primary contractors, recurrent
delays, cost increases, and budget overruns have plagued the JSF program since its
initiation.19 With regard to the F-35’s procurement costs and development timetable,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has stated that the program has
repeatedly exceeded its budget and continues to remain behind schedule.20 According
to the latest GAO report on the JSF program, Lockheed Martin “has extended
manufacturing schedules several times, but test aircraft delivery dates continue to slip.
15 Butler, A. and Wall, R. “Cost and Effect”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 4/2/2007, Vol. 166, Issue 13. 16 “With Weight Issues Resolved, F-35 Focus Turns to Production”, Lockheed Martin, Press Release. 11/14/2004 17 http://www.jsf.mil – Accessed 5/2/2008 18 Fulghum, D. “Stealth Rules”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 6/18/2007, Vol. 166, Issue 23. 19 “U.S. Government Report Shows Decreased Costs for F-35 Program”, Lockheed Martin, Press Release. 4/8/2008 20 Appendix A
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The flight test program has barely begun, but faces substantial risks with reduced
assets as design and manufacturing problems continue to cause delays that further
compress the time available to complete development."21
One potential explanation for these delays is that the program’s management
reserves are being spent at a rate faster than anticipated, due to shifting design
requirements and inefficient prototype manufacturing.22
To replenish this reserve, DOD officials decided not to request additional funding and time for development at this time, but opted instead to reduce test resources… While DOD reports that total acquisition costs have increased by $55 billion since a major restructuring in 2004, GAO and others in DOD believe that the cost estimates are not reliable and that total costs will be much higher than currently advertised. Another restructuring appears likely – GAO expects DOD will need more money and time to complete development and operational testing, which will delay the full-rate production decision and the fielding of capabilities to the warfighter.23
According to the GAO’s most recent estimates (as of March 2008), the F-35’s
procurement and acquisition costs are nearing $1 trillion.24
The JSF program’s rising cost does not only affect the United States. The F-35
is more than just a DoD procurement and acquisition initiative, it is also cooperative
international effort. Compared to other tactical combat aircraft, the F-35’s initial
development phase has been characterized by an unprecedented level of international
21 Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DoD Add to Program Risks, GAO-08-388, March 2008. (p.3) 22 Appendix F 23 Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008. 24 Sullivan, M. Government Accountability Office. Joint Strike Fighter: Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks, GAO-08-569T, 3/11/2008.
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cooperation. However, due to the recurrent technical setbacks and steadily increasing
development costs, two of the United States’ principal JSF development partners, the
United Kingdom and Australia, have become remarkably reticent in terms of their
commitment to the F-35.
Despite being the only “Level 1” international partner associated with the
program, the UK has made it abundantly clear that its commitment to the F-35 hinges
on the United States’ acquiescence to a number requests. Most importantly, the UK
wants assured access to sensitive JSF-related technologies, specifically its stealth
capabilities and the source code for its supportability and avionics systems.25 This
recent shift in policy could indicate that the UK is no longer certain that the program
will be followed through to completion, opting instead to recoup the $2.5 billion it
invested in the JSF program by securing proprietary access to the aircraft’s hardware
and software.
The UK is not the only international partner having second thoughts about the
JSF program. After contributing over $144 million to the program, the Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF) is uncertain of the F-35’s viability as a mainstay weapons
platform. Australia’s decision to purchase “F/A-18 Super Hornets as interim
25 Barrie, D. and Butler, A. “Lightning Strikes Out”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10/1/2007.
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replacements for its much larger F-111 strike bombers [shows] just how nervous it is
about Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.”26
US Strategic Policy and Asymmetric Warfare
Compared to the geopolitical climate fifty years ago “the visible distinction
between war and peace is less clear” in the 21st Century.27 The DoD has referred to
the on-going military transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of
military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts,
capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect
against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps
underpin peace and stability in the world.”28
According to official policy documents such as the Pentagon’s Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) and the Whitehouse’s National Security Strategy (NSS), the
US has been increasingly focused on unconventional warfare. The Bush
administration’s post-9/11 focus on asymmetric threats merits a thorough 26 Perrett, B. “RAAF Hedges JSF Bet with Super Hornet”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1/2/2007. 27 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.75). 28 “Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach,” U.S. Dept. of Defense, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf
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examination of the F-35’s pertinence to the United States’ contemporary strategic
orientation. Furthermore, by delineating the F-35’s intended role in the idiosyncratic
conflicts that characterize the modern battlefield, its relevant capabilities can be more
easily compared to existing tactical combat aircraft.
The 2006 NSS and QDR provide ample evidence of Washington’s shift in
strategic guidance. In an attempt to enhance the United States’ national security in the
21st century, the NSS emphasizes several policy foci relevant to the F-35’s
development. First, according to the 2006 edition of the NSS, the Department of
Defense is instructed to support initiatives that “adapt and build to meet new
challenges”.29 The 2006 NSS also states that in addition to its traditional military
orientation, the DoD’s contemporary transformational efforts should focus on
addressing asymmetric, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges.30
Asymmetric challenges include state and sub-state actors that employ terrorism
as a means of countering the United States’ relative conventional military advantages.
In addition to terrorism and insurgency, asymmetric threats to regional security
include transnational organized crime, maritime piracy and international drug
trafficking. According to the NSS, the acquisition or employment of chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons by state or sub-state actors constitute a catastrophic
challenge. In contrast, disruptive challenges seek to undermine the United States’ relative
29 United States of America, National Security Council. National Security Strategy, 2006 (p.43). 30 Ibid. (p.44).
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military advantage by employing innovative technologies and capabilities, including
cyber-warfare and biotechnology, or directed energy weapons such as electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) and high-power microwave (HPM) devices.31
Rather than concentrating on traditional combat operations, the Pentagon’s
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) encourages shifting the DoD’s emphasis
“from focusing primarily on traditional combat operations toward greater capability to
deal with asymmetric challenges”.32 The 2006 QDR emphasizes the development of
long-range strike capabilities. For example, “the Air Force has set a goal of increasing
its long-range strike capabilities by 50% and the penetrating component of long-range
strike by a factor of five by 2025. Approximately 45% of the future long-range strike
force will be unmanned.”33
According to the QDR, the DoD should be focused on developing intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies.34 The report specifically mentions
increasing the United States’ “investment in unmanned aerial vehicles to provide more
flexible capabilities to identify and track moving targets in denied areas”.35 JSF
contractors and the DoD assert that in addition to using the F-35’s advanced sensors
to collect ISR information, the F-35 can also be used to generate electronic warfare
effects “such as false targets and other misleading data [which can] be fired as a data
31 Ibid. (p.44). 32 United States of America, Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.46). 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. (p.55). 35 Ibid. (p.57).
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stream into the radars and sensors of other aircraft, missiles and air defense arrays at
ranges of 100 miles or more”.36 However, JSF advocates often neglect to mention that
the F-35 does not provide anything resembling the stand-off capabilities, or relatively
low cost (expendability) of unmanned aerial vehicles. For example, the MQ-9 Reaper,
with a payload capacity of 3,800 pounds, the ability to loiter for fifteen hours, and a
per-unit cost of approximately $14 million, undoubtedly trumps the F-35 in terms of
cost effectiveness.37
The QDR states that “the future force will define ISR needs by sensor or type
of intelligence needed rather than the platforms that carry the sensors or the medium
in which they operate”.38 Compared to manned fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) represent a more dynamic and cost-effective method of conducting
electronic warfare (EW) and gathering ISR information, yet the F-35 is nevertheless
being developed as an alternative to the capabilities provided by UAVs.39 40
In addition to official statements in policy documents such as the QDR and
NSS, key political leaders have repeatedly opined that future military conflicts will be
unconventional in nature and that UAVs will be a primary asset in such wars. In a
speech delivered at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, defense secretary Robert
Gates stated that “lives are going to be saved” by increasing the number of UAVs in
36 Fulghum, D. “Stealth Rules”, Aviation Week and Space Technology. 6/18/2007, Vol. 166, Issue 23. 37 http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=6405&page=5 - Accessed 4/17/08 38 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.55). 39 http://www.lockheedmartin.com/capabilities/net_centric_solutions/battlespace_awareness/index.html -
Accessed 4/17/2008 40 Defense Industry Daily, “Supersonic SIGINT: Will F-35, F-22 Also Play EW Role?”. 10/24/2005
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the United States’ arsenal. In the same speech, Secretary Gates also asserted that
“asymmetrical conflict will be the dominant battlefield for decades to come, and that
procurement [policies] have to focus on that reality”.41
Without the necessary security clearance, one can only speculate why the Joint
Strike Fighter program remains fully funded, despite Washington’s political emphasis
on developing long-range, unmanned strike capabilities. One potential explanation is
that the F-35 is intended to eventually form the chassis for the Joint Unmanned
Combat Air System (J-UCAS). “In fact, the F-35 is being designed with the data links
necessary for this role”.42 The J-UCAS platform is intended to be an “unmanned
long-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-refueled to provide a greater
standoff capability, expand payload and launch options, and increase naval reach and
persistence.”43
41 http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1231 42 Aboulafia, R. “Fighter Makers Reassess Options”, Aviation Week, 3/1/2004. 43 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006 (p.46).
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A Fighter Lost in Time?
The F-35 is designed for conventional combat against a peer-competitor. As a
fifth generation fighter aircraft, the F-35’s primary advantage over fourth generation
“legacy” platforms resides in its design characteristics, specifically its structural design,
stealth capabilities, avionics, and armament. These very traits suggest that the F-35 is
intended to fight an enemy possessing a level of technical sophistication relatively
comparable to that of the United States.
The F-35 is intended to be “four times more effective than legacy fighters in
air-to-air engagements; eight times more effective than legacy fighters in prosecuting
missions against fixed and mobile targets; three times more effective than legacy
fighters...in Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy
Air Defenses (DEAD) missions; [and] about the same in procurement cost as legacy
aircraft.”44 However, for the purpose of addressing unconventional challenges, this
increase in technical sophistication is largely unnecessary.
44 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
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Few nations or sub-state actors possess the radar or target acquisition
technologies necessary to reliably counter the stealth capabilities of the F-117
Nighthawk or the B-2 Spirit. Nevertheless, the F-35 has been designed to create a radar
cross section (RCS) lower than the F-117 and comparable to that of the B-2.
According to most sources, the F-35 has an RCS equivalent to a metal golf ball
(approximately 0.0015 meters squared).45 The technologies and design traits generally
responsible for the F-35’s relatively small RCS include its integrated airframe,
advanced component materials, axisymmetric nozzle, and internal weapons bay.
In designing the F-35’s airframe, specifically its wing and tail segments,
Lockheed Martin used “planform alignment”, a stealth-enhancing technique that
creates identical sweep angles in the leading and trailing edges of the aircraft’s wing
and tail surfaces.46 Nevertheless, compared to the impressive stealth characteristics of
platforms such as the B-2 Spirit or the F-22 Raptor, Lockheed Martin would be hard-
pressed to justify the amount of time and money that has been devoted to the
development of the F-35’s stealth characteristics.
The F-35’s sophisticated avionics suite includes multi-mission Active
Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar; Distributed Aperture System (DAS)47;
Electro-Optical and Targeting System (EOTS)48; and the Helmet Mounted Display
45 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008 46 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008 47 Appendix B 48 Appendix C
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System (HMDS) 49. Although these systems generally increase the aircraft’s
survivability, the advantage they provide over existing avionics systems only present
themselves when pitted against relatively technologically advanced adversaries. For
example, the AESA radar, DAS, EOTS and HMDS systems are designed to increase
the F-35’s combat effectiveness against long-range air and ground targets such as
fighter aircraft, bombers, helicopters, and tanks. However, such weapons systems are
unlikely to be available to less-developed states and sub-state actors such as terrorists
and militant insurgents.
The F-35’s armament is best suited for use against weapons unlikely to be in
the possession of sub-state actors, specifically advanced tactical combat aircraft.
Lockheed Martin has made design compromises that sacrifice the F-35’s ability to
attack ground targets in favor of air-to-air capabilities. In addition to assorted air-to-
ground weapons, the F-35 is designed to carry AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range
Anti-Aircraft Missiles (AMRAAM) and AIM-132 Advanced Short Range Anti-Aircraft
Missiles (ASRAAM). 50 The F-35’s stealth characteristics rely greatly on the aircraft
carrying its weapons internally, but its two internal bays are only capable of carrying
one 2000 pound class weapon and one AMRAAM/ASRAAM per bay.51 Beyond that,
49 Appendix D 50 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008 51 Appendix E
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additional weapons must be attached to the external centerline pylon or outer
hardpoints; diminishing the aircraft’s stealth characteristics.52
Tactical Capabilities in Unconventional Warfare
Idiosyncratic, or unconventional, conflict typically involves sub-state actors in
localized theaters of operation. A successful unconventional warfare platform should
be adept at providing close air support (CAS), conducting precision air-to-ground
strikes, or collecting ISR data. The F-35 is often characterized as an ideal weapons
system with which to combat unconventional threats due to its supposed ISR, CAS
and air-to-ground attack capabilities.53 However, aircraft already in the United States’
arsenal are equally, if not more, capable of providing such functions.
A-10 F/A-18 E/F F-16 E/F MQ-9 B-2 F-35
Function Close Air
Support
Multirole
Fighter
Multirole
Fighter
Unmanned
Hunter/Killer
Multirole
Heavy Bomber
Multirole
Fighter
Payload 16,000 lbs 17,750 lbs 20,000+ lbs 3,800 lbs 40,000 lbs 15,000 lbs
Range 800 miles 1,600+ miles 2,400+ miles 3,700 miles 6,400 miles 1,600 miles
Cost $13 million $57 million $30+ million $14 million $1 billion54 $100 million55
52 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008 53 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008 54 (Unlike the F-35, at least 21 aircraft already exist and flyaway cost is unlikely to increase significantly)
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The F-35A is intended to conduct ground strike and close air support missions,
yet the Air Force already possesses several aircraft with those capabilities. The A-10
Thunderbolt II and MQ-9 Reaper are proven CAS platforms that can be acquired for a
fraction of the F-35’s anticipated cost. The A-10 Thunderbolt II, developed by
Fairchild-Republic during the 1970s, has repeatedly demonstrated its military value in
a number of operations since its official fielding in 1977, but truly distinguished itself
as a CAS platform during the first Gulf War.
A-10 Targets During “Operation Desert Storm” Confirmed Kills Tanks 987 Artillery 926 APCs 501 Trucks 1,106 Command Vehicles 249 Military Structures 112 Radars 96 Helicopters (Air to Air) Bunkers Scud Missiles Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command Post Frog Missiles SAMs Fuel Tanks Fighters (Air to Ground)
2 72 51 50 28 11 9 8 10
Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/a-10-history.htm
Since the United States is unlikely to become involved in an unconventional
conflict in which the enemy possesses capabilities more sophisticated than Saddam
55 2005 estimate.
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Hussein’s pre-1991 military force, it stands to reason that the A-10 is sufficiently
capable of providing CAS for unconventional operations well into the 21st century.
The MQ-9 Reaper (formerly known as the RQ-9 Predator-B) is an unmanned
aerial vehicle produced by General Atomics for the Air Force and the Navy. The MQ-
9 is a tactically flexible, remotely piloted medium to high altitude aircraft capable of
loitering in place for extended periods of time. According to the Air Force,
[t]he MQ-9's primary mission is as a persistent hunter-killer against emerging targets to achieve joint force commander objectives. The MQ-9's alternate mission is to act as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance asset, employing sensors to provide real-time data to commanders and intelligence specialists at all levels.56
UAVs such as the MQ-9 have an excellent track record in supporting special
operations and performing a wide variety of tasks applicable to unconventional
operations; from conducting air-to-ground attacks to collecting ISR data.57
Since the F-22 Raptor has effectively established itself as the world’s
uncontested air-superiority fighter, the Air Force would like to see the F-35A excel in
air-to-ground attack missions, a notable weakness of the F-22 platform. However, the
JSF program’s repeated delays and continuously escalating development costs
predicate a reassessment of the F-35’s relative value in idiosyncratic warfare. Two
aircraft in particular stand out as viable alternatives to the F-35 in terms of their
ground attack capabilities: the F-16E/F Fighting Falcon and the B-2 Spirit.
56 http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6405 – Accessed 4/18/2008 57 “Air Force's hunter-killer UAV now flying in Afghanistan”, United States Air Force, Press Release. 10/11/2007
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Lockheed Martin’s “Block-60” F-16E/F multi-role tactical combat aircraft is
the most sophisticated variant of the F-16 platform originally developed and fielded
by General Dynamics in 1978. The F-16E/F features upgraded avionics suits, AESA
radar capabilities and conformal fuel tanks that increase its stealth characteristics and
operational radius. Compared to the F-35, the F-16 can carry a larger weapons
payload and can be fitted with a greater variety of ordinance.
Northrop Grumman’s B-2A Spirit stealth bomber is a highly capable air-to-
ground attack platform. In addition to its remarkable stealth characteristics, the B-2’s
operational radius and payload capacity make it a formidable aircraft in just about any
type of conflict. The B-2 has a range of approximately 6,400 miles, allowing the
aircraft to be launched from the continental United States and strike targets around
the world with minimal refueling, and its two internal weapons bays allow it to carry
50,000 pounds of ordinance.
In addition to broader strategic objectives, the Navy and Marine Corps plan to
use the F-35B and F-35C to gain tactical advantages in ground attack and ISR
missions. However, with respect to conducting unconventional warfare operations,
other platforms are equally capable. The Navy’s preeminent carrier-based aircraft, the
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, would provide virtually identical advantages in
unconventional warfare as the F-35C, including CAS, SEAD/DEAD, and ISR
capabilities.
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The primary benefit of employing alternative platforms such as the F-16, B-2,
A-10, F/A-18, and MQ-9 in unconventional warfare is that they already exist. The
services do not need to deal with delays in procurement or acquisition and the
development costs have already been paid. Furthermore, the upgrade and
maintenance expenses have been accounted for, whereas in the F-35 such long-term
costs have yet to be precisely determined.
One could make the argument that legacy aircraft are out of date and need to
be replaced by newer systems in order to stay ahead of potential peer-competitors.
However, the United States continues to successfully operate weapons systems much
older than the A-10 or the F/A-18. For example, the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress was
introduced in 1955, while the Navy’s CVN-68 Nimitz class supercarrier was first
commissioned in 1975. The B-52 and CVN-68 remain in service due to regular
upgrades to critical systems, modifications which allow them to remain militarily
effective. Similarly upgrading platforms such as the A-10 and F/A-18 will allow them
to remain effective well into the 21st century. For example, upgrades to the A-10
include
[…] precision engagement modification, which adds upgraded cockpit displays, moving map, hands on throttle and stick, digital stores management, LITENING and Sniper advanced targeting pod integration, situational awareness data link or SADL, GPS-guided weapons, and upgraded DC power. Precision engagement modified aircraft are designated as the A-10C.58
Meanwhile, the latest iteration of the venerable F/A-18, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet,
58 http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=70 – Accessed 4/18/2008
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[…] is highly capable across the full mission spectrum: air superiority, fighter escort, reconnaissance, aerial refueling, close air support, air defense suppression and day/night precision strike missions. Compared to the original F/A-18 A through D models, Super Hornet has longer range, an aerial refueling capability, increased survivability/lethality and improved carrier suitability.59 Another common argument is that high-budget development programs such as
the F-35 are necessary in order to keep the United States’ defense industry
technologically competitive and up to date, vis-à-vis potential peer-competitors. This
is an incredibly weak argument, primarily because the aforementioned avionics and
munitions upgrades to extant aircraft facilitate capabilities identical to the F-35. Ipso
facto, upgrading legacy aircraft provides the defense industry with technological
expertise similar to that derived from the development of fifth generation platforms
such as the Joint Strike Fighter.
Given enough time and money, the F-35 could eventually become a valuable
asset in unconventional warfare. However, the US is currently involved in several
different idiosyncratic conflicts around the world and aircraft presently in the United
States’ arsenal are capable of providing similar, if not identical capabilities to those of
the F-35. In light of the persistent technical concerns, budget overruns, and
production delays associated with the JSF program, alternative weapons systems
deserve serious consideration.
59 http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1200&ct=1 – Accessed 4/18/2008
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Qualification
Despite its many flaws, the F-35 should not be underestimated as a
revolutionary tactical combat aircraft. The F-35 is designed for combat against a
relatively technologically sophisticated enemy; a highly improbable scenario in the
contemporary geopolitical environment. However, it would be strategically imprudent
to categorically dismiss the possible resurgence of a hostile peer competitor in the
future, especially given the 10-15 year procurement-acquisition cycles involved with
purchasing new tactical combat aircraft.
Michael Wynne, the Secretary of the Air Force, contends that the United States’
current strategic focus on unconventional warfare does not absolve the DoD of its
obligation to prepare for geopolitical environments characterized by other types of
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conflict. Despite the F-35’s escalating development cost, Secretary Wynne’s position is
that he does not want to “leave the President bereft of a warm fifth-generation fighter
line if the world should go in a different direction"60
Another fact worth mentioning is that while the F-35’s stealth characteristics
may appear paltry in comparison to those of the F-2261, the F-35 is impressively
stealthy compared to the majority of tactical combat aircraft. With an RCS of about
0.0015 meters squared, the F-35 is truly remarkable; especially when one considers
that the RCS of a Russian MiG-29 is approximately five meters squared.62
60 Fulghum, D. and Butler, A. “JSF Cost Could Jump 35% If Congress Cuts Production”, Aviation Week, 9/17/06. 61 The F-22’s RCS is between 0.0001 and 0.0002 meters squared. 62 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-design.htm - Accessed 3/27/2008
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Conclusion
The United States’ current vision of military transformation is utterly
dependent on high-tech weaponry instead of soldiers, and the F-35 exemplifies this
mode of thinking. Arguably, the concepts of military transformation and overstretch
are inextricably connetcted. Only in light of a potential second war in the Middle East,
this time with Iran, has the US military establishment become cognizant of the real
dangers associated with eliminating redundancy in favor of specialization. The F-35
does not confer any significant tactical advantage over existing weapons platforms.
Aircraft such as the A-10, F-16 and F/A-18 provide overlapping capabilities, and
remain as relevant in the current geopolitical environment as they did at the height of
the Cold War. US policy makers would do well to remember that in war, redundancy
is an inherently valuable trait.
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The F-35 is a product of the DoD’s revolution in military affairs, a misguided
effort to apply contemporary business practices (such as total quality management, velocity
management and just-in-time logistics) to warfare in pursuit of cost efficiency.
Unfortunately, the practical effect of this search for efficiency is that each individual
service now provides essentially the same function: the ability to identify and destroy
targets from great distances, creating precisely the type of redundancy that the
Pentagon’s procurement and acquisition policies sought to avoid. Despite
congressional efforts to enlarge the military, bureaucratic gravitation within the DoD
toward Rumsfeld’s vision of transformation was overwhelming, eschewing a larger
and more redundant military in favor of a smaller and supposedly more efficient one.
Instead of producing weapons that exploit the United States’ relative
technological superiority and expand its tactical and strategic advantage in
unconventional warfare, the military is developing weapons designed to combat a
peer-competitor in major theater warfare. Rather than embracing the tactical
advantages offered by overlapping weapons systems, the DoD isolated the various
tactical characteristics that brought the US military so much success in the early post-
Cold War period and attempted to combine them all into a single platform, effectively
nullifying the battlefield advantages provided by redundant capabilities, while
simultaneously creating unrealistic operational requirements. For example, although
the very notion of amalgamating a lumbering, heavily armored CAS platform and a
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highly agile dogfighter may seem highly unrealistic, it epitomizes the intended purpose
of the Joint Strike Fighter.
The authorization process associated with procurement and acquisition
projects is severely flawed. Despite the United States’ official shift in strategic
emphasis toward unconventional conflict, the military-industrial complex continues to
produce weapons designed for the Cold War, and the F-35 is a patent example of this
mentality. American strategic prerogatives and the development initiatives of the
defense industry should not be at odds. If the military and political establishment
deems the F-35 worthy of tens of billions in taxpayer dollars, it should ensure that the
United States’ grand national strategy accurately reflects the rationale behind that
decision, rather than using dubious tactical and strategic equivocations to validate the
development of major weapons systems post-hoc.
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Appendix A
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Appendix B
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Figure 1 (Courtesy of http://www.jsf.mil/images/f35/f35_technology_das.jpg)
Appendix C
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Appendix D
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Appendix E
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Appendix F
Appendix 4