f. nielsen

Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern SocietiesAuthor(s): Franois NielsenSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 133-149Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095405Accessed: 21/07/2009 13:08

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TOWARD A THEORY OF ETHNIC SOLIDARITY IN MODERN SOCIETIES *

FRAN(OIS NIELSEN University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Ethnic resurgences in modern societies are examined within the framework of a general model of collective action, of which ethnic collective action is a particular instance. Social trends associated with industrialization may affect groups in such a way that ethnicity becomes a more convenient basis for mobilization than others, e.g., class. In such cases, ethnic solidarity is a natural outcome of development. Historical scenarios associated with this possibility are discussed.

It has become commonplace to point out that contemporary resurgences of ethnicity in modem societies, particularly as a basis for political demands, constitute a paradox with respect to long-established currents of sociological thought. The surprise caused by ethnic resurgences in such advanced countries as Great Britain (Hechter, 1975), France (Beer, 1980), Canada (Olzak, 1982) and Belgium (Nielsen, 1980) comes because they seem to challenge the basic predictions of the structuro- functionalist (e.g., Lipset and Rokkan, 1967:1-64), Marxist (Marx, 1964; Beer, 1980:42-43) and even human ecological traditions (Park, 1950). These views concur in predicting that modernization will bring about a decrease in the importance of ethnic distinc- tions' (see, e.g., Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Hechter, 1975; Beer, 1980; Nielsen, 1980). In order to capture the common thrust of these perspectives, the present paper expands the terminology of Hechter (1975) and uses the term diffusion-erasure. The diffusion-erasure model implies that the salience of ethnicity should decrease as modernization diffuses over a culturally heterogeneous population. While the model may have merit in many historical instances, it is obviously inadequate to explain the more spectacular instances of ethnic resurgences in some of the most advanced industrial societies. To explain these unexpected occurrences, two competing views have re- ceived attention from sociologists: the reactive-ethnicity model, as illustrated by the

* Direct all correspondence to: Frangois Nielsen, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1982 World Congress of Sociology in Mexico City, August 1982. I wish to thank Jacques Delac- roix, Eric Leifer, Joane Nagel, Anthony Oberschall, Susan Olzak, Rachel Rosenfeld and two anonymous reviewers for useful advice.

1 The meaning of "modernization" will be discussed below.

work of Hechter (1975, 1978); and the competition model discussed by Hannan (1979), among others.2

Hechter (1975) proposed explaining the per- sistence of ethnic solidarity in modern societies within the framework of the reactive-ethnicity model. In this view, ethnic solidarity is a reac- tion of the culturally distinct periphery against exploitation by the center. Reactive solidarity occurs when there is a cultural division of labor, or a pattern of structural discrimination such that "individuals are assigned to specific types of occupations and other social roles on the basis of observable cultural traits or markers" (Hechter, 1974:1154). With cultural division of labor, ethnic boundaries tend to coincide with lines of structural differentiation, and ethnic solidarity is increased. The greater this coincidence, and the relative disadvantage of the peripheral population, the greater the likelihood of solidarity.3

The competition model of ethnic resurgences is based on the same premise as the functionalist one: as culturally heterogeneous populations become industrialized, the spread of a market economy, increasing bureau- cratization and other aspects of modernity entail the precedence of universalistic criteria that cut across the traditional system of as-

133

2 I do not include in this discussion explanations of ethnic resurgences based on mechanisms of rising expectations (see, e.g., Beer, 1980: Ch. 3). Mech- anisms of rising expectations are relevant mainly to the short-term dynamic aspects of ethnic mobilization, and are therefore compatible with both the reactive and competition theories.

3 See also Hechter (1978). This is a simplified description of the reactive-ethnicity model. As noted by Ragin (1976) and Nielsen (1980), it is not as incompatible as it may seem with the functionalist view (e.g., Smelser, 1969:52). It is also possible to argue that reactive ethnicity is compatible with a Marxist perspective, although little is known of Marx's or Engels's thinking on ethnic issues (Beer, 1980:42-43).

American Sociological Review, 1985, Vol. 50 (April: 133-149)

134 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

cribed statuses. As modernization affects distinct ethnic groups more homogeneously, as- signments of individuals to occupations and the distribution of societal rewards in general tend to be made increasingly on the basis of rational and achieved criteria that crosscut ethnic boundaries. It does not follow that ethnic dis- tinctions become irrelevant, however. The crucial element of such a situation is that members of different groups find themselves increasingly in a position to compete for the same occupations and the same rewards. The competitive tensions are manifested by a heightening of solidarity within the groups involved. This diffusion-competition explanation of ethnic resurgences in modern societies has been discussed, for example, by Hannan (1979), Nielsen (1980), Ragin (1979) and Olzak (1982).4

The reactive ethnicity and the diffusion- competition models associate ethnic resurgences in modern societies with very different kinds of structural arrangements. In the reactive-ethnicity approach, resurgences are more likely when there is a cultural division of labor such that members of one group are restricted to subordinate and unrewarding social positions. The greater the economic inequalities between groups, the greater the likelihood of status group (ethnic) solidarity (Hechter, 1975:43). The competition model, on the other hand, predicts that resurgences will occur precisely where the cultural division of labor breaks down and group inequalities di- minish, because members of different groups are then more likely to compete for the same resources.

The recent literature on ethnicity contains a number of attempts to assess the merits of one model or the other in a variety of empirical instances (see Hechter, 1975; Ragin, 1979; Nielsen, 1980; Olzak, 1982; Beer, 1980; Portes, 1984). The literature as a whole suggests that both the reactive ethnicity and competition models have some merits in specific countries and time periods.5 One major purpose of this

paper is to go beyond this dilemma by proposing a more comprehensive theory of ethnic resurgences that would allow for both processes to take place. The next section presents more specific purposes, definitions of major concepts, and additional considerations relevant to the scope of the discussion.

GOALS, DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE One assumption pervading most social science discussions of collective action is that individuals tend to organize for collective action on the basis of characteristics that are important in terms of their own fate and lifestyle. For example, in modem societies the occupational status of an individual is the major determinant of his or her consumption pattern and way of life. Therefore, according to this assumption, one would expect occupation to become the major basis of political alignment in a normal state of affairs. This reasoning underlies the diffusion-erasure perspective. Ethnic resurgences are viewed as somehow accidental, the result of a singularity in development (Smelser, 1969:52; Nielsen, 1980:78).

The premise is much more problematic than is commonly realized, because there is no guarantee that a social categorization that largely determines the lifestyle of its members is also the best vehicle for collective action. If the assumption is discarded, it is possible to explain ethnic collective action as the result of mechanisms that are inherent in the process of modernization. The emergence of collective action based on ethnicity may be the most natural outcome under certain conditions in developed societies even though, and perhaps especially when, ethnicity becomes a weaker predictor of individual lifestyle. Locating the origins of ethnic resurgences in mechanisms that are intrinsic to modernization is not a logical requirement for such a theory, but it has aesthetic appeal and would seem to have face plausibility in view of the ubiquity of the phenomenon. An elaboration of this theme is one purpose of this paper. It will be done through the development of a series of propositions that relate various consequences of modernization to prospects for ethnic resurgences.

Another purpose of the article is to argue that ethnic solidarity and its unexpected resurgence in modem societies are forms of collective action. As such, they are better under-

4However, the central intuition that the intensity of ethnic solidarity within a group is a function of the degree to which members of different groups compete for the same resources has been developed in other contexts and under different labels by a variety of writers, including Park (1950), Deutsch (1953), Lieberson (1961), Harris (1964), Van den Berghe (1967), Barth (1969), and Bonacich (1972). Barth's (1969: Introduction) exposition of the competition model is particularly general. In the sociological literature, variants of the competition model are commonly associated with Bonacich's "split labor market" or Van den Berghe's "paternalistic versus competitive" terminologies.

5 In Belgium, for example, the circumstances of

the rise of the Flemish movement after World War II support the competition model. However, the reactive model appears as a better explanation of the movement before the war (Nielsen, 1980). Ragin (1979) finds similar period differences in the bases of ethnic mobilization in Great Britain.

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY 135

stood when placed in the framework of a general theory of collective action. Elements of such a general theory that are necessary for our purposes are presented in the next section. The propositions relating dimensions of modernization to ethnic collective action will be particular specifications of this more general model.

Central concepts are defined first in this section, although the meaning of "solidarity" will be discussed later. In this paper the term modernization will be defined as "all the long-term changes associated with industrialization," where industrialization refers to "increasing reliance on inanimate sources of energy and the machines powered by them" (Lenski and Lenski, 1982:445-46). Modernization therefore denotes social trends such as the spread of education, the growth of government, the shift from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors, in addition to changes in purely tech- nological aspects of production.6 The theory of ethnic solidarity presented later is restricted to modern, or industrialized, societies. (See Nagel and Olzak [1982] for an attempt to explain ethnic resurgences in both modern and developing societies.)

An ethnic group is defined as (Barth, 1969:11) "a population that has a membership that identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguished from other categories of the same order." Identifi- cation is presumed to be made on the basis of racial or cultural markers such as language, religion or customs. This choice of a definition implies that ethnicity, at least to the extent of casual recognition of ethnic differences by the populations involved, precedes solidarity.7 Barth's definition is minimal, in the sense that many attributes usually associated with ethnicity such as biological self-perpetuation, shared values and bounded interactions are treated as variables to be explained rather than as definitional requirements.

Despite their differences, the diffusion- erasure, reactive ethnicity and competition

models are all structural theories in the sense that they seek the causes of ethnic solidarity among exogenous characteristics of the social structure, such as the existence of a cultural division of labor, a split labor market or the extension of the market economy (see Hechter et al., 1982, for further discussion of structural theories). The model proposed in this paper belongs to the same category of theories. However, structural explanations of ethnic solidarity are incomplete because they largely ignore possible feedback effects on solidarity due to efforts by the central government to regulate or institutionalize ethnic divisions. The issue is the extent to which structural theories are affected by the omission of auton- omous political processes. To illustrate the problem, Figure 1 depicts a more general model of ethnic solidarity than will be developed further in this paper.

The model should be general enough to be noncontroversial. Structural theories, even though they disagree in their particulars, correspond to (causal) link 1 in the Figure, and deal with the direct effects of demographic, economic and other social-structural factors on solidarity. Political-incorporation theories corresponding to link 2 emphasize the effects of solidarity on the polity as governments adjust their structure to accommodate (or repress) ethnic divisions. The conflict resolution literature in political science emphasizes this causal link. An example is the consociational democracy model (e.g., Lijphardt, 1968). Fi- nally, mechanisms pertaining to link 3 have been called the "political construction of ethnicity" by Nagel (1979, 1982). She argues that the recognition of ethnicity as a legitimate basis for political organization by the central government renders prior ethnic divisions more permanent, increases group solidarity, and also promotes new mobilization by for- merly unrecognized groups lest they be ex- cluded from an ethnically defined polity. An example of such mechanisms is the emergence of a "native American" ethnicity as a result of the activities of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Nagel, 1982; see also Nagel and Olzak, 1982; Lauwagie, 1979).

Considering a simplified model consisting only of links 1, 2, and 3, it appears that structural theories are not very sensitive to a neglect of links 2 and 3. Even if political incorporation and political-construction activities take place, a structural theory may still be viewed as a nonspurious reduced model of the effects of structural factors on ethnic solidarity that simply does not separate direct effects from indirect ones through state activities.8

8 Political-construction theories that do not control for structural factors are more sensitive to specifica-

6 The use of modernization in this sense clearly implies no endorsement of so-called "modernization theory" (Lenski and Lenski, 1982:403-404; Chirot and Hall, 1982:81-83), the view that obsolete attitudes, values and institutions are responsible for the problems of developing countries. The discussion does assume, however, roughly similar outcomes of development. This assumption might be qualified in some cases, for example, late-industrialized countries such as Russia and Japan (Chirot, 1977:76-83).

7This assumption is made for simplicity, not to deny the possibility that new ethnicities can be created by the mobilization process. Such emergences, as opposed to resurgences, of ethnicity are discussed by Nagel and Olzak (1982).


Link 4

Exogenous characteristics of the social structure Link 1 (e.g., cultural division of (Structural theories) Ethnic labor, increased competition,

_) solidarity etc. Opinions differ.)

Link 2 Link 3 (Political in- (Political con-

N corporation struction theories) Is >theories)

Link 5 ! Official recognition of ethnicity by the state

Figure 1. Extended Model of Ethnic Solidarity and a Typology of Theories

However, structural theories may be biased by the failure to control for links 4 and 5. Solidar- ity directly affects the social structure (link 4) when, for example, ethnic strife leads to substantial population shifts. Official recognition affects the social structure (link 5) when, say, the occupational distribution is changed by an affirmative action effort. All structural theories have to assume that, within their relevant context and time frame, links 4 and 5 can be neglected in a first approximation. The structural model presented in this paper shares this assumption.

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY AS A FORM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION Solidarity in the context of ethnicity has been used in a variety of senses in the literature (see the review by Olzak, 1983:356-57). Here the term is used in a sense close to the dictionary definition (Random House, Sense 2) of "community of interests, feelings, purposes, etc.," with an emphasis on purposes. A specific definition of ethnic solidarity that is empirically practical requires two elements:

1. the formulation of specific goals or claims defined on the membership of the ethnic group as opposed to, or in contradistinction with, other groups in the society;

2. a degree of ideological and organizational mobilization of group membership for the im- plementation of these claims.

The first part of the definition requires the existence of a program of some sort for the

tion bias, since an apparent correlation between official recognition of ethnicity and solidarity may have been produced entirely through links I and 2, with no political-construction effect.

ethnic group, even though only a minority of members may support it initially. The formulation of goals might be indicated by the release of manifestoes, the emergence of an issue, the airing of grievances.9 The degree of mobilization might be measured as the percentage of votes for an ethnic party, the amount of violence related to ethnic strife (e.g., bombings, arrests, casualties), and other expressions of discontent such as graffiti, posters, and ethnic jokes (see Hechter, 1975; Nielsen, 1980; Beer, 1980, for examples of these measurement strategies). The expression "in contradistinction with" in the first part of the definition is necessary because claims on the basis of ethnicity are often neutral with respect to other groups in the system. A movement for the independence of Quebec is in principle neither opposed nor favorable to the goal of equal rights for women. The goal of independence is defined on the basis of being a Quebecois in contradistinction with being a woman (as opposed to a man). The second part of the definition, in terms of "degree of mobilization," is deliberately quantitative to take into account varying intensities of mobilization.

The definition of ethnic solidarity just presented assumes preexisting ethnic identities, as noted above. However, it is minimal in the sense that it does not presume other structural characteristics of an ethnic group, such as a common language, a propensity to endogamy, a closed network of interactions, that may well

9 One might view the formulation of goals or claims in itself as part of the mobilization process. This would be justified theoretically, but it is practical to keep these two elements separate because they are usually measured empirically from different sources.


facilitate the expression of solidarity but are not intrinsic parts of it. These characteristics are best treated separately as possible causes of solidarity. IO The minimal definition of ethnic solidarity can obviously be adapted to solidarity on bases other than ethnicity by simply changing the criterion of group membership. For example, the women's movement would be characterized by claims defined on gender and a degree of mobilization of the female population. It is an instance of gender solidarity. The essential elements of other forms of solidarity would still be the formulation of group-specific claims and the mobilization of the membership in view of implementing these claims. The definition of ethnic solidarity, therefore, emphasizes that it should be viewed as a particular form of collective action (see Hechter et al., 1982; and Nielsen, 1978a, for elaborations of that view).

The view that ethnic solidarity is only one among many possible forms of collective action has strong implications for a theory of ethnic resurgence in modem societies. The crucial articulation is that individuals in society have available a large variety of identities." Each one of them can be used to distinguish

subsets of the population. In principle, each identity can be chosen as the basis for the formulation of claims or goals, and an attempt can be made to mobilize members of the subset in view of implementing these goals. In other words, each subset is a potential solidary group. Mobilization of the members means that they allocate some of their resources, such as time, energy, money, votes, psychological commitment and physical courage, to the collective effort.12 But social identities in a population can be nested, crosscutting or overlapping. There are identities based on occupation, with various degrees of inclusiveness from the local workshop to professional associations and class identifications; family or kinship loyalties; identities corresponding to residence in territorial units of various sizes (the block, the village, the South, the nation); social dis- tinctions based on biological, demographic, or physical characteristics (gender, age, weight, skin color). As noted by Hannan (1979), identities based on culture often constitute a complex structure in which subsets are delineated by differential emphasis on various cultural components. Dialects within a larger linguistic group, for example, correspond to nested identities. Religion can cut across the boundaries of several language groups. Since the total amount of resources an individual is able to devote to collective action is necessarily finite, potential solidary groups compete for the participation of their members. Within this framework, the question of the origins of ethnic resurgences may be reformulated as follows: "Under what conditions does ethnicity in modern societies compete successfully for the participation of members with other forms of solidarity?"

To illustrate this abstract framework, con- sider the hypothetical case of a Belgian woman in her early thirties who lives in the small village in Flanders where she was born, some thirty kilometers from Brussels. Her mother tongue and home language is Flemish, but she speaks French well enough to carry on ordi- nary conversation. She goes to Brussels by train every morning to work at the large chocolate factory near the train station, where she operates one of the automatic machines that wrap the chocolate-covered candies. Her husband is a civilian mechanic in the Army assigned to the maintenance and repair of tank engines at a base near Brussels. In the workshop, he is informally viewed as the specialist

10 This simplified definition is also agnostic as to whether ethnicity, because of shared fundamental values, is a distinctive, primordial identity. Here the issue is ethnic collective action, so that the definition of solidarity has a purely behavioral emphasis. Ethnicity is viewed as one basis for mobilization among many possible ones. Primordial aspects of ethnicity are important to the extent that common symbols, shared values, emotional attachment affect the ability of the group to recruit participation resources from members in competition with alternat- ing bases for mobilization. This possibility is discussed below. Ethnicity may be primordial, but it is trivially true that sharing the same ethnicity does not prevent intense conflict among members of a group.

11 Stone's definition of identity discussed by Stryker (1980:60), "one has an identity when one is placed as a social object by others in the same terms that one appropriates and announces for oneself," as well as Barth's (1969) conception of ethnicity pre- suppose a structured role relationship. Identity is used here in an extended sense to include objective characteristics of individuals (markers) that are potential identities in Stone's sense but do not cur- rently serve to structure role relationships. Resi- dency in geographical areas that do not communicate is one example. In terms of Stryker's (1980:61) conception of a salience hierarchy of identities, such markers are identities with no salience. Assessing the effect of prior identity salience on solidarity (as defined here) is delicate. While it seems plausible that prior identity salience facilitates solidarity, emergent ethnic solidarities develop on the basis of identities with little or no prior salience (e.g., "native American"; see Nagel, 1982). These issues deserve further study beyond the scope of this paper.

12 This description corresponds to the modem view on collective action, Oberschall's (1973:28) "resource management" or McCarthy and Zald's (1977) "resource mobilization" perspective. See Jenkins (1983) for a review.


in the repair of the clutches of the aging American-made tanks that are constantly fail- ing' because they are used to train draftees. Her three children go to the local primary school, but there are plans to send the eldest daughter next year to the Catholic school near by. Both she and her husband are devout Catholics. Part of the constellation of social identities in which this woman participates is represented in Fig- ure 2.

iff

Figure 2. Some Overlapping Identities of the Belgian Woman Described in the Text

It is not difficult to list circumstances in which each one of these overlapping identities might become activated, in the sense that she would be more willing to participate in collective action on that basis.' 3 As a member of the working class, she may be sensitive to a variety of issues such as a proposed increase in retire- ment benefits, the amount of paid vacation per year, a revision in the promotion schedule in the chocolate company. She agrees with the Socialist party on these issues and may be tempted to vote for them, which is one way to participate in collective action on the basis of her blue-collar identity. But she is also Catho- lic. That identity may be activated if, for example, there is a bill in Parliament to reduce government subsidies to private schools. Since her eldest daughter is going to a private Catho-

lic school next year, this could directly affect her tuition. The Catholic party is opposed to the bill, and she might vote for them just for that. At work, she is frustrated by the strict division of labor between men and women, especially concerning the taffy makers. They are all men and are paid much more than she is for ajob that is not very difficult. It is not the fault of the company. There is an old contract with the candy-makers union, of which the taffy makers are members. It is the union that does not admit women. On the other hand, her husband has been passed over for promotion to shop supervisor, despite his seniority, in favor of a French-speaking colleague. He is very angry and has been pressuring her to join the Volksunie, the Flemish party.

It would not be difficult to imagine circumstances in which other identities of the Flemish woman would become salient for her. Every individual in society is in a similar situation of having to choose how to allocate limited participation resources to potential solidarity groups corresponding to one of multiple identities. Individual decisions in that respect are typically the result of a very complicated interplay of circumstances. The possibility of a macro-sociological theory of collective action in general, and a theory of ethnic resurgences in particular, depends on finding systematic relationships between structural characteristics of a society and the success of a particular potential solidary group in recruiting participation resources from the social environment.'4 I will refer to this capacity of a group to recruit resources as the carrying capacity of participation of the group in the social environment.'5 The rest of this section is de-

13 The activation of an identity in this way is similar to an increase in salience, or "probability of invo- cation," in Stryker's (1980:61) salience hierarchy framework. However, the conative ("I want") rather than cognitive dimension of an identity is crucial here. This is related to the discussion of interests below.

14 The expression "a group recruits participation" is used metaphorically here and in the rest of the paper to indicate that structural conditions are such that individuals tend to allocate their limited participation resources to that group rather than others of which they are potential members. The expression refers to the aggregate manifestation of individual behavior. It does not imply that the group necessarily "acts" in any meaningful sense. An organization associated with the group, however, might be said to act in a real sense. This is related to the distinction between social movement and social movement organization made by McCarthy and Zald (1977).

'5 The term carrying capacity is used to emphasize the fact that any one group does not always succeed in actually recruiting all of its carrying capacity of participation. This is because mobilization takes time, and because the group competes with others for the participation of members. These dynamic aspects of competition for participation are discussed in Nielsen (1978b). The model of the carrying capacity of participation may be viewed as the comparative statics part of an ideal model of collective action that would include the relevant dynamics.


Structure of events in the social system

j___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ _-_- --- --- ---- ------- -

--------------------------__

! !

+ Size of latent group Potential control

I _ \ \ over events

I \ +Xx \|+ I Resources of latent group Homogeneity of individual interests

| + \\_ Carrying capacity of participation l

+I

Potential entrepreneurs tonal entrepreneurspotentialI

i P

Figure 3. Model of the Carrying Capacity of Participation of a Solidary Group

voted to proposing a simple model of the carrying capacity of participation of a potential solidary group.

The model assumes that any potential solidary group is composed of individual actors characterized by a set of interests defined with respect to events in the social system. For example, the proposed reduction of subsidies to private education, a rise in the price of monthly railway passes, the failure of her husband to obtain a promotion are all events that affect the interests of the Belgian woman described above. The distribution of interests of the individual members of a subset of the population sharing a common social identity is crucial for the carrying capacity of solidarity based on this identity. In turn, the distribution of interests of the potential members of a solidary group depends on the structure of events in the system, the systematic ways in which events such as political decisions affect groups in the population. Figure 3 depicts the way in which interests of individual members of the subset are translated into participation given a particular event structure. The carrying capacity of participation in a solidary group is presented as dependent on three main characteristics of the latent group: the organizational potential of the membership; the homogeneity of interests of members with respect to events; and the potential control by the group over events.

The organizational potential of the latent

solidary group refers to the relative ease with which the group can tap resources of members and allocate them to collective pursuits. If, as Olson (1965) argues, collective action is primarily organizational, the organizational potential is an important ingredient of the carrying capacity of participation in a solidary group. The potential is high when members can be organized with low expenditures of resources. This may depend on obvious technical factors such as the geographical dispersion of the membership, the quality of communication channels, the sharing of a common language. If the latent group is already characterized by a dense network of smaller organizations, re- cruitment of participation may proceed more effectively through the federation of blocks (Von Eschen et al., 1971; Oberschall, 1973: Ch. 4). The organizational potential may also depend on ideological factors, such as shared symbols that can be used to construct an effec- tive group ideology. For example, ethnicity may be richer in shared symbols such as songs, emblems, pageantry than, say, a professional association, and better able to arouse the romantic feelings of members.

The impact of a form of collective action, or its "strategic efficacy" (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975:9), depends primarily on the extent to which organized action modifies the utilities of individual actors.16 The impact of a collective

16 For simplicity, the relationship between individual interests and group mobilization is treated as

140 AMk.RICAN SQCbT(CT O(iCATl pRVTFW

effort on individual utilities is high if it secures much control over the outcome of events, if these events are important for members, and if outcomes affect interests of members in homogeneous ways. The potential impact of collective action captures two distinct elements: the potential control by the group over events and the homogeneity of interests of members with respect to these events. Potential control is the extent to which the group would influence events, given a certain amount of participation. Potential control and organizational potential are independent concepts. A group could have high potential control but fail to mobilize because of communication difficulties, for example. Homogeneity of interests is the degree of similarity of the ways in which events affect the utilities of individual actors. Despite the logical difficulties associated with such operations, it is necessary to think of the homogeneity of interests as weighted by the relative importance of events and the relative importance of actors. Thus, an equal increase in the importance of an event for all members of the group is viewed as increasing the homogeneity of interests of the group.17

The three intermediate variables, the organi-

zational potential, the homogeneity of interests and the potential control, depend on structural characteristics of the latent group. Some of the most important relationships between structural characteristics and the three intermediate variables are also summarized in Fig- ure 3. The model postulates a positive effect of the amount of resources in the latent group on both the potential control over events and the organizational potential. Resources comprise money, talents, free time, and control by individuals over events. The concept is applied on a per capita basis. Resources are therefore independent of the sheer size of the latent group.

The size of the latent group affects positively its potential control over events. In a representative system, size corresponds to electoral strength. In more violent situations, physical force depends directly on number. However, the size of the latent group has a negative effect on both the homogeneity of interests of members and the organizational potential. These assumptions follow from obvious and not so obvious reasons. Everything else constant, the likelihood that members have divergent interests with respect to events increases with the size of the membership. However, larger latent groups also have lower organizational potential. One reason may be simply that a large group is more dispersed geographically. A large group is also more likely to be what Olson (1965) calls a "latent" group (in contrast with my more general use of this term), that is, one in which no individual would benefit so much from the collective good that s/he is ready to bear the cost of collective action alone. Mem- bers of a "latent" group have no natural incen- tive to organize and would rather be "free rid- ers." Therefore, a latent group with a large membership typically has a lower organizational potential.

Finally, the model postulates a positive effect of the presence of potential entrepreneurs on the organizational potential. Potential entrepreneurs are individuals who are not com- mitted to the pursuit of collective goods defined on other group boundaries, or whose individual prospects in existing organizations are poor. They constitute potential recruits as leaders of the group. The availability of such individuals increases the organizational potential of a latent group.

The model depicted in Figure 3 applies in principle to every potential solidary group, every subset of a population sharing a common social identity. The next section considers the mechanisms by which modernization affects the parameters of the model for various groups by modifying either the structure of events or the composition of the group.

unproblematic. This is not to ignore the paradox of collective action and Olson's (1965) rigorous crit- icism of the traditional assumptions on group formation. It can be shown that the relationships postu- lated in the model still hold even though collective action is the by-product of an organization that exists primarily to provide selective incentives to par- ticipating members (Nielsen, 1978b). The utilitarian emphasis of the model does not imply that individuals participate in collective action for individual- rational motives only. Emotional, nonutilitarian motives certainly play a role (Wilson, 1978: Ch. 7; Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Marwell, 1982). The model is based on two assumptions concerning this issue. First, participation in collective action will not last if the collective outcomes obtained or sought go against individual interests of members. Substantial homogeneity of interests is a necessary, but not suf- ficient condition for participation. Second, whatever nonrational feelings motivate humans to participate have to be allocated to a group. It is assumed that structural features of a group that facilitate convinc- ing members of their common (individual) interests are the same that facilitate the mobilization of their more emotional feelings. (See Margolis [1982] for a promising attempt to integrate utilitarian and group- directed motives in the social psychology of collective action.)

17 A better formalization of the concept, which would involve assumptions about interpersonal comparisons of utilities, is beyond the scope of this paper. See Coleman (1973a) for an attempt to define an aggregate measure of utility by weighing individual utilities by the control of an actor over events.

141 ETHNIC SOLIDARITY

ETHNIC SOLIDARITY AND MODERNIZATION Some of the propositions discussed in this section are attempts to identify aspects of modernization that affect the carrying capacity of participation of ethnic solidarity directly, and indirectly by reducing the appeal of collective action on alternative (competing) bases. Two caveats are necessary. First, the propositions below are intended to summarize central re- sults of the discussion, not to constitute a for- mal deductive system. The propositions have different logical statuses: some are historical generalizations, some relate a historical trend to the general model of collective action, some are relatively specific empirical statements. This informal style of presentation is chosen because a more axiomatic treatment would have to rely on a reasonably complete decomposition of this complex set of processes. Such a decomposition is beyond the scope of this paper. The propositions are only intended to reorganize and clarify previous theoretical ap- proaches and empirical findings concerning ethnic collective action, and to provide a framework for future research.

Second, the perspective chosen is purely de- velopmental, in the sense that only secular trends associated with modernization are con- sidered. In such a simplified form, the model cannot explain shorter-term fluctuations in ethnic mobilization that are observed in many instances. Explanations of such fluctuations are likely to depend on country-specific tactical factors that are hard to incorporate at this level of generality. The failure to explain higher-frequency fluctuations is a common feature of models that are first approximations to reality.'8

This paper follows the approach recom- mended by Barth (1969: Introduction), in which the focus is on the formation and maintenance of ethnic boundaries rather than on the content

of culture. However, it is not possible to ignore the massive impact of modernization on cultural diversity. Insofar as ethnic solidarity utilizes cultural markers to circumscribe the potential membership, cultural diversity is important in this context. In an early but thor- oughly modern treatment, Deutsch (1953) de- scribes the aggregate consequences of the better-known effect of modernization on culture, the progressive assimilation of the dominant culture by the population of the periphery. Less well researched, but no less significant, is the process by which assimilation occurs within the peripheral culture, as the network of interactions widens and individuals of the periphery experience more contacts outside their local setting. When the peripheral culture is made up of many local variations within a larger cultural group, as is typically the case, this leads to homogenization and a reduction in cultural diversity. In some instances, such as Belgium and Norway (Haugen, 1968), homogenization is carried out deliberately by innovators. It often involves the standardiza- tion of the language and the manufacture of a glorious past complete with battles and heroes. The spread of education contributes to this process. A major consequence of homogenization is that the relative sizes of culturally distinct groups increase. The first proposition summarizes this outcome.

Proposition 1. Modernization often entails a decrease of the cultural diversity within the periphery. This reduction in diversity entails an increase in the relative sizes of groups distinguishable by cultural markers in the social system.

Modernization, as defined earlier, typically entails progress in communication technology, transportation and the response time of large- scale news media. Modernization reduces the cost of organizing a large group of individuals. This trend may be formulated in terms of the model of collective action presented earlier.

Proposition 2. Modernization reduces the negative effect of size on the organizational potential of a group, and therefore increases the carrying capacity of participation of large groups.

Hannan (1979:266) proposes a useful distinction between two aspects of modernization. Polity modernization is defined as "the degree to which organizational mechanisms exist and function to bring the interests of members to bear upon the formulation and ad- judication of political issues." State modernization, by contrast, refers to the degree to which a single center constitutes the forum in which those issues are formulated and settled.

Polity modernization often corresponds to

18 An anonymous reviewer correctly emphasized this point. Ethnic solidarity may, for example, tem- porarily decrease due to a resurgence in the importance of class, itself a result of current economic conditions. Such competition processes are consistent with the model of solidarity. Ragin and Davies (1981) use this argument to explain the decline of the Celtic parties in Great Britain during the late 1970s. Ethnic solidarity may also appear to decline because of tactical decisions by the groups involved. In Bel- gium, the rise of the Flemish party may have been arrested in the 1970s in part by the breakup of nonethnic parties into separate linguistic wings, which permitted each wing to also emphasize regional issues and regain lost voters (Hill, 1974). Such a fluctuation constitutes a reexpression, rather than a decline, of ethnic solidarity.

142 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW the expansion of the franchise to more individuals in the society. The franchise is a resource that can be used to control events. In a representative system, the size of the membership of a group corresponds to potential electoral strength and greater control over the outcome of events. Therefore, one would expect polity modernization to increase the carrying capacity of participation of large groups. State modernization, the process by which an increasing number of important events come under the jurisdiction of higher-level instances of decision making, has similar consequences. Insofar as more important events are defined and settled at the top of the decision structure, and a representative system of some sort is operational, the potential control of a group is enhanced by the size of its membership. How- ever, the carrying capacity of participation of large groups may increase with state modernization even in the absence of polity modernization. Coleman (1973b) argues that organizations that attempt to implement collective goals have to adjust their mode of operation so as to compete successfully for outcomes with other organizations in the system. Hannan (1979) extends Coleman's argument by sug- gesting that the centralized state itself constitutes a powerful organization. Solidary groups willing to challenge its power must choose commensurate forms of collective action. A large membership means there are a variety of resources that can be used to affect state decisions and secure control over events (see Nagel and Olzak, 1982, for an elaboration of this view as a more general "principle of isomorphism"). Since polity and state modernization may not occur to the same degree, this discussion is summarized as two separate propositions.

Proposition 3. Polity modernization increases the positive effect of size on potential control by a group over events.

Proposition 4. State modernization (centralization) increases the positive effect of size on potential control over events.

Propositions 2, 3 and 4 describe mechanisms by which modernization increases the carrying capacity of participation of solidary groups with a large potential membership. In combination with Proposition 1, this means that modernization may make collective action on the basis of an inclusive definition of ethnic membership more attractive. However, ethnicity is by no means the only criterion that can be used to define large subsets of a population. A subset circumscribed by gender, for example, com- prises roughly half the population and is therefore large in any society. The propositions that follow will differentiate among groups with a large potential membership.

One social identity that can be used to circumscribe a large group in the population is class. Class membership is determined by the position of the individual within the system of production and exchange. When populations with heterogeneous cultures are progressively incorporated within the modern system of production, the potential membership of a class- based solidarity group becomes culturally heterogeneous. Cultural heterogeneity of the potential membership entails at least a reduction in the organizational potential of the group. Overcoming cultural barriers is costly. The additional cost may originate from technical reasons (e.g., linguistic differences) or ideological ones (e.g., the difficulty of using existing powerful symbols in constructing the class ideology when these symbols vary across cultures).

Proposition 5. When modernization incorpo- rates populations that are culturally heterogeneous, it decreases the organizational potential of groups defined by broad occupational lines.

The diffusion-competition model of ethnic solidarity briefly reviewed in the introduction to this paper can be cast in terms of the general model of collective action. The model suggests that ethnic solidarity and conflict are more intense when individuals of different ethnic groups are in a position to compete for the same occupations, resources, statuses and rewards. Modernization entails the extension of a rational labor market in which individuals are allocated to occupations on the basis of universalistic criteria. Therefore, the likelihood of competition between members of different ethnic groups for the same occupations increases. One important aspect is the spread of education. With an educational certificate, members of various groups can compete for the same positions. Competition between members of different ethnic groups makes the utilities of individuals more sensitive to events that may give a competitive edge to all individual members of an ethnic group as opposed to others. State modernization, with the centralization of decision-making activities, makes the occurrence of such events more likely, and so does the move away from occupations with a local focus such as agriculture and mining. The competition argument can be summarized in the terminology of the model of collective action as the following proposition.

Proposition 6. Extension of the rational labor market increases the homogeneity of interests of members of an ethnic group and its carrying capacity of participation (Competi- tion theory).

Hechter (1975: Ch. 2) discusses the possible roles of elites within the culturally distinct pe-


riphery. Individual members of a culturally subordinate group who achieve high-status occupational roles may either reconsider their ethnic identity and pass into the dominant group, or seek incremental improvement for their group within the existing political structure, or reactively assert the value of their culture and organize solidarity. (Ragin [1980] discusses such strategies further in the context of Celtic nationalism in Britain.) The outcome is likely to depend on the rate of modernization of the peripheral population. Any social order is presumably characterized by a particular set of selection mechanisms that regulate access by individuals to positions of power or au- thority. The channels of power in the traditional and modern social orders are likely to differ. When modernization of the peripheral population proceeds quickly, the leadership structure inherited from the traditional order may not correspond to what would have re- sulted from the new rules of the game. A blue- collar worker who would have no political am- bition in the traditional system may become a successful trade-union official in a position to contend for power at the national level. When the top positions are occupied by incumbents of the old regime, the dissatisfied candidates for power have no alternative but to organize solidarity on the basis of new boundaries. These potential entrepreneurs in the peripheral population may choose ethnicity as the vehicle of their ambitions. Beer (1980) finds from a survey of leaders of ethnic movements in France that they have experienced more up- ward social mobility than the rest of the population. He views this finding as evidence in favor of his thesis that rapid social change causes anomie, and that espousing the ethnic cause represents a search for identity, "a means of assuaging feelings of dislocation re- sulting from rapid social change and the experience of rapid social mobility" (Beer, 1980:91). An alternative explanation is that their ac- tivism is due to a structural imbalance, the incapacity of the traditional elite to absorb the new crop of candidates for power. Further examples of the role of leaders in ethnic movements are discussed by Breton (1978) and Rothschild (1981).

Proposition 7. Rapid modernization of the periphery upsets the traditional mechanisms of elite formation, produces potential entrepreneurs and increases the organizational potential of ethnicity.

It was argued above that state modernization, with its "mushrooming state apparatus" (Smelser, 1969:46), increases the impact on individual actors of events at the higher levels of decision making. There is an evolution not only in the volume but in the nature of these events.

Decisions at the state level may affect homogeneous categories of the population defined by universalistic criteria. A minimum-salary law is an example. These events affect individuals regardless of their place of residence. However, growing interference by the state in resource producing and other daily activities may also lead to the occurrence of events that affect homogeneously individuals residing in the same geographical area, regardless of their other statuses. This situation may occur when modernization entails an increase in the average size of economic units. State modernization implies increased control by the state of the survival value of these large economic units. The state can boost an ailing enterprise through subsidies, influence its behavior through regulations, and distribute large government contracts. The fate of a large economic unit usually affects the interests of a large number of individuals in the area where it is located. It is true for individuals who depend directly on the unit for their subsistence and for those who benefit indirectly through the mul- tiplier effect. A government decision on au- tomotive safety concerns many people in De- troit, and not only those directly involved with the production of automobiles.

The synchronization of interests of individuals residing in the same area can occur also through the growth of what Adam Smith calls the natural activities of the state. These are activities that cannot be performed through the free interplay of market mechanisms. A decision to build a freeway in a particular place is likely to affect the residents in similar ways, irrespective of occupational categories. In the terminology of the general model, such events increase the homogeneity of interests of individuals residing in the same geographical area. Whenever ethnic groups occupy distinct territories, geographical patchiness of state decisions increases the homogeneity of interests in the potential membership of solidarity groups defined on ethnic lines.'9

19 This point is well made by Rothschild (1981:43). Belgium offers a clear example of the interaction of ethnic concentration and patchiness of government decisions. Any action with any regional implications, such as a project to develop the port at Zeebrugge, to build a nuclear reactor in the French-speaking South, even a choice to buy French or American planes for the Air Force because the former would be assem- bled in a plant in Walloonia, immediately becomes an ethnic issue. In many cases the situation is more complicated. In the United States, for example, blacks do not occupy a single connected territory, like the Flemings in Belgium, but are concentrated in certain locations such as the inner cores of cities. A typical patchy event such as a decision on where to base new missiles may not affect ethnic solidarity. The relevant events, such as the allocation of urban

144 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Proposition 8. When ethnic groups occupy

distinct territories, state modernization and the increased geographic "patchiness" of centralized decisions increase the homogeneity of interests of members of an ethnic group and its carrying capacity of participation.

Modernization is commonly associated with a progressive differentiation of roles and statuses. The explosive growth of registers of occupational titles captures this phenomenon. The carrying capacity of participation of solidarity groups based on broad occupational identities such as class should decrease with differentiation of the potential membership. The higher levels of decision making are able to generate events that affect homogeneously individuals in a given occupational category. Differentiation increases the difficulty of for- mulating coherent claims over events that would benefit all individuals in a broad occupational category. The consequence is that the homogeneity of interests of members within a class is reduced. A social-democratic party which defines its potential membership as individuals who are salaried workers can recruit a more unanimous support when the potential membership is composed almost entirely of unspecialized blue-collar workers than when the latent group includes a large proportion of employees and the manual workers themselves are scattered into a variety of specialties (Form, 1982). Differentiation increases the heterogeneity of individual interests within broad categories of individuals defined by any criterion. The argument is only valid for solidary groups that rely on the size of their membership for control over events. Groups willing to sacrifice the advantage of size in potential control can keep interests of potential members homogeneous by restricting the participation basis of the group. This means that the solidary group adopts a specialist strategy.20

Proposition 9, which summarizes this discussion, is consistent with explanations of ethnic solidarity based on a logic of overlapping cleavages, such as the discussion of Smelser (1969) and Hechter's (1975) cultural- division-of-labor model. These explanations assume that a group that is distinguishable on

cultural lines and that has a membership that engages in similar occupations is more likely to become solidary. They assume the converse of Proposition 9. Low differentiation within the group entails the homogeneity of individual interests and a greater likelihood of solidarity.

Proposition 9. Modernization entails the occupational differentiation of the membership of any large group, which decreases the homogeneity of interests of members and the carrying capacity of participation. This effect is particularly strong for groups defined on broad occupational lines.

Deutsch (1969:26) use a marginal-return argument to articulate the relationship between wealth and political violence. He argues: "All past history [of violence] deals with situations where most incomes were so low that the marginal utility of an increment in income was high enough to offer reinforcement for the learning of violent habits, or of violent action for or against change. We do not know in practice, but we must assume, in theory, that there could be income levels where the marginal utility of an additional increment in economic income might be lower than the individual and social costs of violence. We do not know just how high this 'peace level' of income is, but we have some theoretical reasons to believe that there ought to be such a level, unless we throw out the complete principle of declining marginal utility of economic goods." Lenski (1966) uses a similar argument to predict a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of resources in modern societies. A general increase in wealth means for the dominant class a lower induce- ment to defend a less useful fraction of its privileges.

The marginal-return argument may be directly applied to the dynamics of solidarity. The carrying capacity of participation of a solidary group is low if the return to organizational efforts on that basis is expected to be low. Mobilization on the basis of class usually succeeds in pushing the system close to the realization of the welfare state, in which the state often provides for such things as social security, minimum wages, the incorporation of labor contentions into the legal system, so- cialized health care and free education. The very success of class-based politics decreases the marginal return of collective action organized on class lines. Individuals may find that it is more profitable to allocate efforts to collective action on the basis of some other parti- tioning of the population. Bell (1975) discusses the effect of the embourgeoisement of the working class on ethnic resurgences. He as- serts (1975:157): "The reduction in class senti- ment is one of the factors one associates with the rise of ethnic identification." The following

renewal funds, are geographically patchy in a different sense. They affect homogeneously residents in a category of locations.

20 A solidary group with a specialist strategy relies on small size, homogeneous interests and low cost of organization for its success. A group with a gener- alist (or size-directed) strategy, on the other hand, relies mostly on the size of its membership for control over events. It can tolerate greater heterogeneity of interests and, usually, lower resources. The distinction between specialists and generalists is discussed further in Nielsen (1978b).


proposition summarizes the logic of this argument in more general terms.

Proposition 10. The success of groups defined by broad occupational criteria may decrease the marginal return offurther collective action on that basis. This increases the carrying capacity of participation of groups defined by alternative boundaries, including ethnicity.

Michels's (1919) study of democratic organizations suggests that success of a collective movement depends to a large extent on the internal differentiation of its membership. A composition of the potential membership that reflects more closely the distribution of roles, occupations, and talents in the system as a whole enhances the organizational potential of the group. Organization is easier when the group can tap individuals already trained to fulfill a variety of specialized functions that are necessary for collective action. Internal differentiation also increases the potential control of the group over events. Control over events may take the form of incremental action at all levels of the social structure, such as a mutual help network. The more functionally heterogeneous the potential membership, the further the group can reach in the social structure to influence events. Functional heterogeneity of the potential membership constitutes a resource for collective action that increases the carrying capacity of participation of a group.

Hawley (1968) develops similar ideas in a general human ecological framework by distin- guishing between communities and "categoric units." The criterion for membership in a categoric unit is the possession of a common characteristic, so that members in a unit are of the same functional type and occupy equiva- lent positions in the power hierarchy (Hawley, 1968:333): "groups of elders, the medieval guilds, labor unions, professional associations, and associations of manufacturers are examples of categoric units. A social class is at most a loose form of categoric unit." Hawley (1968:334) argues that it is inherently difficult for categoric units to organize for collective action: "So long as it retains its pure categoric form . . . such a unit can do little more than react to circumstances affecting it. Nor can it have more than a transitory existence, since in order to engage in positive action of any kind and to attain some measure of permanence, it must develop at least a core of specialists." In other words, in order to engage in collective action, a categoric unit must acquire some of the internal differentiation characteristic of a community.

This discussion suggests that the ascriptive nature of ethnicity constitutes an asset for collective action. Ethnicity is attributed irrespec-

tive of the achieved status of the individual. Therefore, a subset of the population defined on ethnic lines may in principle correspond to a representative sample of the various roles, occupations and statuses in the social system as a whole. By contrast, occupation is the very criterion of membership for groups based on class. Therefore, the potential membership of a class-based solidarity group is inherently less differentiated occupationally. The organizational potential and the potential control of the group are correspondingly lower. Paradoxically, the advantage of ethnicity or any ascribed status as a basis for collective action lies in its total arbitrariness from a functional or technical point of view.

Proposition 11. The more functionally differentiated the potential membership of a group, the greater its organizational potential and its potential control over events. Ethnic groups have a greater capacity of differentiation than classes.

As modernization diffuses more homogeneously, the incorporation of culturally distinct populations within the modem system of production and exchange is bound to increase the share of economic resources they have available. Economic resources are a useful ingredient for both organization and control over events (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

Proposition 12. Modernization of a culturally distinct group increases its share of economic resources. This increases the organizational potential and the potential control of the group.

ETHNIC RESURGENCES: SOME HISTORICAL SCENARIOS The propositions developed in the previous section, although restricted to secular trends associated with modernization (see footnote 18), suggest mechanisms by which a carrying capacity of participation for ethnic solidarity might be created by modernization in the social environment. However, as emphasized before, it is necessary to analyze ethnic solidarity in the context of competition between groups for participation (Nielsen, 1978b), so that one should discuss the effects of modernization on ethnic solidarity together with effects modernization has on other forms of solidarity that are likely to compete for the resources of the same individuals. Of particular interest is a comparison of the fates of three broad categories of collective movements in modern societies, since each one has predominated historically at some period of time and location. These are

1) solidarity based on small scale and local identities such as the family, kinship, and micro-units of residence;


2) solidarity based on class identification, or any broadly defined occupational criterion;

3) ethnic solidarity, especially those movements based on an inclusive definition of ethnicity (Bell, 1975:143) that have startled social observers. The general model of collective action and the specific propositions presented earlier provide some guidance as to what may have happened historically.2'

First, Propositions 2, 3 and 4 suggest that an increased premium is associated with size for the potential impact of a form of solidarity, and that modernization makes organizing a large membership less difficult. The patchy effect of some central decisions typically synchronizes individual interests over areas that are larger than the traditional units of organization such as a village (Proposition 8). At this point in the process, modernization leads to a general decrease in the carrying capacities of participation of small-scale, local, potential solidary groups. The carrying capacities of size- directed groups correspondingly increases. This conclusion agrees with the description proposed by Hannan (1979) of the progressive elimination of locally based solidarities.22

Once traditional small-scale loyalties are weakened, class-based solidarity is one candi- date for a size-directed strategy. It may attain spectacular success at one stage of the industrialization and modernization process for many of the reasons that are traditionally advanced, such as the concentration of workers in urban areas, the similarity of their fate with corresponding homogeneity of interests and the amount to be gained from new legislation that is class oriented. The many occurrences of this phenomenon could be related to the general model of collective action proposed earlier, but it is not the purpose of this paper to do so. However, modernization may also entail a parallel decrease in cultural diversity (Proposi- tion 1). At that stage, the average size of groups distinguishable on a cultural basis increases, and this leads to an interesting situation in which ethnicity is able to compete with class for participation of the overlapping mem-

21 Other forms of collective action such as the women's movement, specialized lobbies and ter- rorism could be explained along similar theoretical lines. These topics are beyond the scope of this paper.

22 This trend is likely to affect mostly traditional units of organization, such as the village. Other groups with a small potential membership, such as professional lobbies, may be enhanced by modernization because the homogeneity of interests of members and the resources at their disposal make up for their small size.

berships in the category of groups with a size- directed strategy.23

Several elements may influence the outcome of such a contest. Both contenders, class- based and ethnicity-based solidarity, have larger carrying capacities of participation because the size of their potential memberships increases the impact of collective action (Prop- ositions 3 and 4) and communication technology makes mobilization possible (Proposition 2). Both are progressively handicapped by greater internal differentiation of roles and statuses, since differentiation entails a lesser homogeneity of interests of members (Propo- sition 9). However, internal differentiation also increases the organizational potential and potential control of both groups (Proposition 11). As modernization spreads more homogeneously over culturally distinct groups, the potential membership of ethnic solidarity becomes more functionally differentiated than the potential membership of class solidarity and Proposition 11 implies a greater impact of collective action based on ethnicity. The carrying capacity of participation for ethnic solidarity is enlarged by several other mechanisms. When ethnic groups occupy distinct territories, the patchy effect of state decisions increases the homogeneity of interests of the potential members (Proposition 8). Increased competition for resources between members of different ethnic groups increases the homogeneity of interests within a group (Prop- osition 6). Modernization of culturally heterogeneous groups makes mobilization on the basis of class more difficult (Proposition 5). This decreases the carrying capacity of class- based solidarity. Success of collective action on a class basis also reduces the marginal return of further participation (Proposition 10). Mobilization of the periphery increases the number of uncommitted elites and the organizational potential of ethnic solidarity (Proposi- tion 7). Finally, modernization increases the share of economic resources allocated to the periphery and increases the potential impact of ethnic solidarity (Proposition 12).

23 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, the model implies that the outcome of competition in a given society is likely to depend on the relative sizes of the working class and the ethnic groups present. One would expect ethnic mobilization to be more successful in a society like Belgium, where major ethnic groups are large relative to the working class, than in Great Britain, where they are small, because in the latter ethnicity is handicapped in size-directed competition. Such considerations lead to testable predictions in a comparative framework. Further research should explore the effect of size, taking into account such complicating factors as the degree of centralization of the polity and electoral laws.


These mechanisms suggest a historical scheme of the evolution of participation in various solidarity groups in a poly-ethnic society. Modernization first eliminates collective action on the basis of small-scale and local cleavages (Hannan, 1979). Solidarity based on class is most successful at intermediate stages of development and when distinct cultural groups of the periphery are not yet completely integrated within the modem system of production and exchange. Further modernization and homogenization of the socioeconomic system over the entire territory increases the carrying capacity of participation of ethnic solidarity, especially on the basis of an inclusive definition of ethnicity with syncretic ideological trappings, and this is the type of event that is labeled a resurgence of ethnicity by observers. From the point of view of the model developed in this paper, of course, this constitutes a natural evolution of the system of political alignments in a modernizing society. Ethnicity seems to reappear as salient, although it is often a very different kind of ethnicity than in the past, simply because it becomes a more efficacious basis for collective action relative to other possible bases, including class alignments.24

The model of collective action also helps to assess various elementary theories of ethnicity in modem societies discussed in the introduction. These 'theories can be viewed as em- bedded in the general model, in the sense that their predicted outcomes are compatible with it given the right conditions. The cultural-division- of-labor model, for example, can be translated into the terminology of the propositions of the previous section. If there is a cultural division of labor such that individuals are assigned to certain categories of occupations on the basis of cultural markers, members of an ethnic group will have similar occupations and the homogeneity of their interests will be presumably high. In a cultural division of labor, the peripheral group is restricted to occupations that entail low rewards and prestige, so that their organizational potential is low and they have few resources to influence events in the system. The explanation for solidarity, then, rests in a crucial way on the homogeneity of interests of members of the peripheral group, since other conditions of the group would tend to reduce its potential to organize, at least with respect to the general model.

The competition model, on the other hand, depicts a situation in which the peripheral

group begins to participate in the modem system on a more equal basis, so that the resources available increase. Ethnicity becomes more salient when the peripheral group is be- coming wealthier and more differentiated occupationally, so that more members are competing with members of the core and the organizational potential of the periphery increases, sometimes simply because they have more lawyers. This occurs despite the decrease in occupational homogeneity and the corresponding loss in homogeneity of interests. Here, reasons other than the similarity of economic conditions are viewed as predominant.

These two theories differ by the emphasis they attach to various trends associated with the development process. Therefore, one might argue that they are not incompatible in principle, and that it is even possible that one theory is more correct in the case of one country as compared with another, or even for one country in the case of one historical period and not another, depending on which trends have major causal effects in the situation. If this is the case, one would expect to find instances in which each model is appropriate, in the sense that the social correlates of ethnic solidarity differ from one social system to another and over time. This is exactly what the empirical evidence available suggests. In the case of Great Britain, the work of Hechter (1975) and Ragin (1979) shows that the cultural-division-of-labor model does apply roughly during one period, and the competition model afterwards. A similar pattern seems to hold for Flemish nationalism before and after World War II (Nielsen, 1980). Quebec nationalism and its social correlates has evolved in similar ways (see Olzak, 1982). These examples mean that different causes become predominant at different points in time in these instances. This is the theoretical spirit which the model of collective action and de- rived propositions have attempted to illustrate.

24 Even though an ethnic resurgence may be spectacular, it can coexist with a continued salience of class. Great Britain is a case in point (Hechter, 1975; Ragin, 1979, 1980).

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Article Contentsp.133p.134p.135p.136p.137p.138p.139p.140p.141p.142p.143p.144p.145p.146p.147p.148p.149

Issue Table of ContentsAmerican Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. i-iv+133-272+I-XVIFront Matter [pp.i-iv]Errata: Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment, or Ideological Refinement? [p.iv]Errata: Comparative Social Mobility Revisited: Models of Convergence and Divergence in 16 Countries [p.iv]Toward a Theory of Ethnic Solidarity in Modern Societies [pp.133-149]State and State Expenditure: Determinants of Social Investment and Social Consumption Spending in the Postwar United States [pp.150-165]Unequal Organizations or Unequal Attainments? An Empirical Comparison of Sectoral and Individualistic Explanations for Aggregate Inequality [pp.166-180]The Rise of the West [pp.181-195]Dependent Development in Black Africa: A Cross-National Study [pp.195-207]On the Functions of Social Conflict Among Children [pp.207-223]Marital Coital Frequency and the Passage of Time: Estimating the Separate Effects of Spouses' Ages and Marital Duration, Birth and Marriage Cohorts, and Period Influences [pp.224-241]How Work Roles Influence Perception: Structural-Cognitive Processes and Organizational Behavior [pp.242-252]Research NotesDoes Arrest Really Deter Wife Battery? An Effort to Replicate the Findings of the Minneapolis Spouse Abuse Experiment [pp.253-262]Changes in the Employment Activities of New Parents [pp.263-272]

Back Matter [pp.I-XVI]

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