fabrizio amerini - pragmatics and semantics in thomas aquinas

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011 DOI: 10.1163/156853411X590453

Vivarium 49 (2011) 95-126 brill.nl/viv

vivarium

Pragmatics and Semantics in Thomas Aquinas

Fabrizio AmeriniUniversità di Parma

AbstractThomas Aquinas’s account of the semantics of names is based on two fundamental distinctions: the distinction between a name’s mode of signifying and the signified object, and that between the cause and the goal of a name’s signification, i.e. that from which a name was instituted to signify and that which a name actually signifies. Thomas endows names with a two-layer signification: names are introduced into lan-guage to designate primarily conceptions of extramental things and secondarily the particular extramental things referred to by such conceptions. On such a ‘conceptual-istic’ account of names’ signification, Thomas recognizes that a generic acquaintance with external things is a sufficient condition for imposing names to signify things. Fol-lowing this intuition, Thomas at times dwells on the role that pragmatic factors such as the common usage of names by a linguistic community (usus loquendi) and the speakers’ intention (intentio loquentium) play in explaining both the formation and semantic function of conventional language. This paper will focus on what Thomas had to say about such factors.

KeywordsMedieval Semantics, Medieval Pragmatics, Thomas Aquinas, Names, speaker’s inten-tion, linguistic usage

Preface

Thomas Aquinas’ view of the semantics of natural-kind terms has been the sub-ject of many important studies.1 Although his thought has been reconstructed

1) For an introduction to the medieval views of the semantics of natural-kind terms, see P.V. Spade, ‘The Semantics of Terms’, in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzman-A. Kenny-J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), 188-97, and Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, URL=http://www.pvspade.com/Logic/docs/thoughts.pdf (1996). For an introduction to Aquinas’s semantics in particular, one

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with great accuracy, some points of difficulty remain. Among others, it is still debated whether Thomas advocated a merely intensional or rather an extensional account of natural-kind terms’ signification, that is, whether he promoted an internalist or externalist semantic theory. At first glance, Thomas seems to favor an internalist explanation of the semantics of natural-kind terms such as ‘man’ or ‘stone’ to the extent that, he says, such terms sig-nify conceptual contents in the first instance. As Thomas makes clear at the beginning of his Commentary on Peri hermeneias, natural-kind terms or com-mon names are chosen conventionally to signify primarily our conceptions of extramental things and only secondarily, through signifying such conceptions, are they said to signify the particular things of the outer world.2 The admis-

may see G. Klima, ‘Thomas Aquinas on the Meaning of the Words’, Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 3-4 (1984), 298-312, and ‘The Semantic Principles Underlying St. Thomas Aquinas’s Meta-physics of Being’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 5 (1996), 87-141; E.J. Ashworth, ‘Significa-tion and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy’, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991), 39-67; R. McInerny, Being and Predication: Thomis-tic Interpretations (Washington D.C., 1986); C. Panaccio, ‘From Mental Word to Mental Lan-guage’, Philosophical Topics 20 (1992), 125-47; H.J.M. Schoot, ‘Aquinas and Supposition: the Possibilities and Limitations of Logic in divinis’, Vivarium 31 (1993), 193-225; E.C. Sweeney, ‘Supposition, Signification, and Universals: Metaphysical and Linguistic Complexity in Aqui-nas’, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 42.3 (1995), 267-90. For the context of Aquinas’s semantics, see G. Pini, ‘Species, Concept and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century,’ Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8.2 (1999), 21-52; and Id., ‘Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries’, Vivarium 39 (2001), 20-51. 2) Cf. Expositio libri Peryermenias, I, 2, in Opera Omnia I* 1, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Rome-Paris, 1989), 10-1,88-112: “Circa id autem quod dicit: ‘earum que sunt in anima passionum’, consid-erandum est quod passiones anime communiter dici solent appetitus sensibilis affectiones, sicut ira, gaudium et alia huiusmodi, ut dicitur in II Ethicorum; et uerum est quod huiusmodi pas-siones significant naturaliter quedam uoces hominum, ut gemitus infirmorum et alia similia, ut dicitur in I Politice. Set nunc sermo est de uocibus significatiuis ex institutione humana, et ideo oportet passiones anime hic intelligere intellectus conceptiones quas nomina et uerba et ora-tiones significant, secundum sentenciam Aristotilis: non enim potest esse quod significent inme-diate ipsas res, ut ex modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen ‘homo’ naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus, unde non potest esse quod significet inmediate hom-inem singularem. Vnde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam ydeam hominis separatam; set, quia hec secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sentenciam Aristo-tilis, set est in solo intellectu, ideo necesse fuit Aristotili dicere quod uoces significant intellectus conceptiones inmediate, et eis mediantibus res.” See also Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, q. 7, a. 6. In the first part of the paper (I), for the sake of brevity, by ‘names’ I shall refer to natural-kind terms. In the second part of the paper (II), instead, I shall extend this term to other classes of terms, taking it as equivalent to the more generic ‘terms’. This should cause no confusion.

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sion of a two-layer signification of names may be taken as meaning that names fundamentally serve a connotative rather than a denotative function. Under closer inspection, however, some aspects of this semantic view call for clarifi-cation. In particular, since it is controversial that Aquinas understood signified conceptions as some sort of mental replacement of the forms of extra-mental things rather than as the extramental things’ forms themselves qua existing in the mind, it is not certain that Thomas favored a purely internalist explanation of the semantics of names.

This paper reconsiders Aquinas’ view of the semantics of names by illustrat-ing how, according to Aquinas, pragmatic factors—especially, common usage and the speakers’ intention—can interplay with the ordinary semantic func-tion of names. In the first part of the paper, I propose an outline of Aquinas’ view of the semantics of names. In the second part, I focus on the relationship between semantics and pragmatics in Aquinas.

I. Part One: Semantics

Thomas’ view of the semantics of names follows from two fundamental dis-tinctions: (1) that between a name’s mode of signifying and the signified object, and (2) that between the cause and the goal of a name’s signification. As we shall see below, the first distinction enables Thomas to endow names with connotative force, while the second distinction enables him to endow them also with denotative power.

1. The Distinction between the Mode of Signifying and the Signified Object

(1) The first distinction, that between a name’s mode of signifying and the signi-fied object,3 is a result of the strong relation that, for Thomas, holds between semantics and cognition, a relation that, as we saw, Thomas stresses in his Commentary on Peri hermeneias. Since Thomas assumes that names signify primarily conceptions of extramental things, the way in which things are

3) See e.g. Scriptum super I Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2; d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; d. 23, q. 1, a. 1. On the formation of the modes of signifying, see especially In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. On such a first distinction and its background, see I. Rosier, ‘Res significata et modus signifi-candi: Les implications d’une distinction médiévale’, in S. Ebbesen (ed.), Geschichte der Sprach-theorie. III: Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und Mittelalter (Tübingen, 1995), 135-68, esp. 150-2 (on Aquinas). See also L. Valente, ‘Cum non sit intelligibilis, nec ergo significabilis. Modi sig-nificandi, intelligendi ed essendi nella teologia del XII secolo,’ Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 11 (2000), 132-94.


conceived is of crucial importance for clarifying the way in which names sig-nify. Specifically, this distinction says that our mind makes a substantial con-tribution to determining the mode of signifying of names. On the one hand, one can imagine that a given community of language-speakers has imposed names above all for talking about the extramental world: when we learn the meaning of a name such as ‘man’ or ‘stone’, we learn that such a name is used to talk about a certain kind of extramental thing, namely men and stones, respectively. Quite naturally, names have been introduced into language to name external things and nothing else; a proof of this is that our supposed community of language-speakers has reserved a special class of names for nam-ing items other than external things. Words like ‘concept’ or ‘mind’, for instance, have been tasked with referring to mental items. Thomas occasion-ally emphasizes this point by saying that ordinary science deals with things and not with concepts, or that real sciences and rational sciences do not over-lap each other.

On the other hand, however, since the only way for speakers to be acquainted with external things (and then to name them) is to experience them, it follows that things can be signified only in the way they can be experienced. Thus, if the function of names is to refer to things, they can achieve this function only by virtue of a meaning, which is intended to telescope our natural acquain-tance with things. Thomas summarizes this aspect of his doctrine by the often-invoked dictum ‘as we know things so we name them’ (non possumus aliquid nominare nisi secundum quod intelligimus).4

The relation between signification and cognition must be kept in mind in order to address correctly Aquinas’ account of the semantics of names. Such a relationship is the hallmark of Aquinas’ view. Let us consider it more closely. For Thomas, a language-speaking community normally makes use of universal (concrete or abstract) names for talking about the particular extramental things. By such names a community of language-speakers means to refer ulti-mately to things existing in the outer world. Nonetheless, since in the world no universal entity can be found, it follows that in their case the mode of sig-nification (i.e. a universal, concrete or abstract, mode of signifying things) prevents universal names from designating things directly—unless one endorses a Platonic perspective and argues for the mind-independent exis-tence of universal beings. Aquinas often expresses this idea by stressing that the modes of signification of names parallel the modes of understanding of the

4) Cf. e.g. In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1; Sum. theol., I, q. 18, a. 2 (see below, note 26); I, q. 32, a. 2; Compendium theologiae, I, ch. 24; De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 11.


mind but not the modes of being of the things.5 The relation between signifi-cation and cognition also fits with another feature of Thomas’ conception of human language, that is, the idea that human beings were compelled to elabo-rate a language because they lived in a social community, so they needed a system of conventional and shared symbols to communicate their personal knowledge of the world to each other.6

In the light of this distinction, there is no doubt that Thomas intends signi-fication as a semantic relation of referring which brings linguistic names to extra-linguistic things: not however directly to the things existing in reality but to those aspects of things that have been selected, gathered and unified by the mind. Thomas’ view of the two-layer signification of names should be understood therefore as a complex semantic procedure. Names signify primar-ily (or immediately, or directly) a mental item from which one can obtain information about the collection of extramental things that instantiate such a primarily signified item.7 This is to say that, although names have been intro-duced into language to name things, they name things qua instances of a cer-tain kind, namely things of a certain kind or, what amounts to the same for Thomas, a certain kind of things. The reason for this inference—i.e. from naming a thing of a certain kind to naming a certain kind of thing—is that, given the way Thomas accounts for the mechanisms of human intellectual cognition, cognizing a particular thing means knowing what a thing is. In other words, we cognize intellectually a thing when we know something about a thing, that is, we cognize a thing A when we know that A is, say, B. But the ‘What is it?’ procedure, applied to a particular thing, always ends with the kind of that thing, thus we can be said to cognize intellectually a particular thing only when we arrive at knowing the kind under which that thing falls, i.e. of which kind the thing is, and the kind is thought of as something uni-versal in character.

5) See e.g. Expositio libri Metaphysicorum, VII, lec. 1, edd. M.-R. Cathala-R.M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome, 1964), n. 1253; Summa theologiae, I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2; De potentia, q. 7, a. 2, ad 7.6) Cf. Expositio libri Peryermenias, I, 2, 9-10, 25-48.7) Occasionally, Aquinas calls the two items, respectively, the formally and materially signified object. See e.g. De potentia, q. 9, a. 4, ed. P.M. Pession (Turin-Rome, 1965), 232-3: “Sed scien-dum, quod aliquid significat dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, et alio modo materialiter. Formali-ter quidem significatur per nomen ad id quod significandum nomen est principaliter impositum, quod est ratio nominis; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid compositum ex corpore et anima rationali. Materialiter vero significatur per nomen, illud in quo talis ratio salvatur; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid habens cor et cerebrum et huiusmodi partes, sine quibus non potest esse corpus animatum anima rationali.”


According to this procedure, one should not be surprised to discover that Aquinas takes the following expressions as equivalent: ‘to signify a thing according to a certain conception’ and ‘to signify a certain conception of a thing’. As E. Jennifer Ashworth pointed out,8 one can find texts where Aqui-nas says that if two names signify the same thing according to different concepts or senses (rationes) they are not synonymous because they signify two different concepts or senses of one and the same thing. Such texts seem to be scarcely consistent in so far as Thomas says that names signify things and that, at the same time, they signify concepts. But they are so only in appearance, because for Thomas names can signify things only qua end-products of the process of intellectual cognition, i.e. only qua cognized things. The fact that at the end of the process of intellectual cognition of a particular thing, we always reach a universal kind explains why a language-speaking community employs univer-sal names for talking about particular things. Applying this scheme to a con-crete case, we have that names such as ‘animal’ and ‘man’ can both signify Socrates, for example if we say “this is an animal” or “this is a man” indicating Socrates. The reason is that signifying Socrates qua man or animal by using the words ‘man’ or ‘animal’, is for Thomas equivalent to signifying man or ani-mal, namely a thing made in such-and-such a way, of this or that kind. So when one states “Socrates is a man” or “Socrates is an animal”, one means that Socrates and every other thing substantially similar to it is a thing of the spe-cific kind-man or of the more generic kind-animal. It must be said neverthe-less that ‘man’ and ‘animal’ signify Socrates according to different concepts or meanings, respectively qua man and qua animal, and this is why Thomas says they are not synonymous.

For Thomas, in conclusion, stating that names signify things and that they signify concepts turns out to be the same. The reason is that names signify both things and concepts, because things can be signified only after they have been conceived and only qua conceived. Thus, if names are said to signify princi-pally concepts of things, this must be taken to mean that they signify things qua conceived. Thomas reaches this conclusion by combining two ideas con-cerning concepts: first, the idea that concepts are natural likenesses (simili-tudines) of external things, and as such they are able to refer back immediately to the things from which they have been derived, and second, the idea that concepts express precisely the way things, once conceived, can exist in the mind. Like cognizing, signifying may be seen therefore as an intrinsically

8) For the reference, see above, note 1.


intentional or referential process: signifying a particular thing by a universal name amounts to signifying something universal about a particular thing.

At this point, one may draw some conclusions. It is clear that, for Thomas, the process of cognition of a thing above all impinges on the mode of signi-fication of a name, since such a mode mirrors the mode of understanding. But at the same time, it is also clear that the mode of signification contributes to constructing the signified object to a certain degree, and so one may fur-ther conclude that the process of cognition also plays a role in fixing the refer-ence of a name. Take for instance the names ‘man’ and ‘humanity’. Neither ‘man’ nor ‘humanity’ directly signifies a particular extramental thing, as was said. What do, then, they signify? Aquinas often repeats that both signify the same thing and that this is the form of humanity (i.e. being a rational ani-mal). Nonetheless they signify it in different ways: ‘humanity’ signifies the form of humanity in the abstract, i.e. excluding explicitly the accidents of man from its signification; as a result, it signifies the form of humanity as a part (ut pars, per modum partis) of man and then as a form; ‘man’ instead signifies the form of humanity in the concrete, that is, relative to a given man: although ‘man’ does not include explicitly the accidents of man in its signification, nonetheless it does not exclude explicitly them, so it signifies the form of humanity as a whole (ut totum, per modum totius) and then as if it were a concrete substance. In particular, ‘man’ signifies the form of human-ity as concretized in a generic subject or, what seems to amount to the same for Thomas, the generic subject of the form of humanity. As we saw, the logically universal mode of signifying of ‘man’ prevents Thomas from stating that ‘man’ signifies directly a particular thing of the external world; now we can add that its grammatically concrete and substantive mode of signifying nevertheless allows Thomas to affirm that ‘man’ signifies what it signifies as if it were a per se existing thing in the external world.9 Thomas is here applying

9) See e.g. In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), 770: “quod significatur concretive, significatur ut per se existens, ut homo vel album. Similiter de ratione abstracti duo sunt, scilicet simplicitas, et imperfectio; quia quod significatur in abstracto, significatur per modum formae.”; also d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. An inverse situation occurs in the case of accidents (see Exp. Met., VII, lec. 1, nn. 1253-1255). It must be said, though, that things are much more complicated than as presented here. Leaving aside the problem of the semantics of abstract names like ‘humanity’, it is not always clear whether, for Thomas, (1) a concrete common name such as ‘man’ principally signifies the form of humanity—and, in this case, whether ‘man’ signi-fies it (1a) as an inhering form (i.e. the humanity of a given supposit) or (1b) as if it were a sepa-rately subsisting thing (i.e. a supposited humanity)—or (2) ‘man’ principally signifies the bearer of the form of humanity (habens humanitatem). Sometimes Thomas seems to regard (1) and (2)


a qualification he can find in Aristotle. In the fifth chapter of the Categories, Aristotle clarified that the name of every secondary substance (like ‘man’) signifies the substantial quality of a substance (quale quid ), although it seems to signify a determinate substance (hoc aliquid ) because of the grammatical form of the expression.10 On the account of this qualification, one may ascribe to Thomas the conviction that the modes of signifying of names determine the signified objects to a certain degree, in so far as they signify the substan-tial features of a thing as if such features were a separately subsisting thing. This is to say that the modes of signifying of names give rise to a linguistic or semantic ontology which not always overlaps the ontology of the outer world.11 As Thomas usually expresses himself, no reification is involved in significa-tion. Obviously, this qualification has effect on the supposition of names as well.12 Since there does not exist in the world things signified directly by names—although extramental things are what are ultimately referred to by names: these are what Thomas calls ‘signified things’ (res significatae)—, it follows that names first and above all signify the conceptual contents that are derived from the things, what could be called the concept or ‘sense’ of a name

as equivalent (see e.g. Sum. theol., III, q. 4, a. 3). For more on this point, see my forthcoming Mental Representation and Semantics. Two Essays in Medieval Philosophy. In general, on the semantics of concrete terms (especially concrete accidental terms), see S. Ebbesen, ‘Concrete Accidental Terms. Late Thirteenth-Century Debates about Problems Relating to such Terms as ‘album’,’ in N. Kretzmann (ed.), Meaning and Inference in medieval Philosophy. Studies in Mem-ory of Jan Pinborg (Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1988), 107-174 (rep. in Topics in Latin Philoso-phy from the 12th-14th Centuries. Collected Essays of Sten Ebbesen, [Farnham, England-Burlington, USA, 2009], vol. 2, ch. 8, 109-152). 10) See e.g. Quaestiones disputatae de anima, q. 1; Exp. Met., VII, lec. 13.11) Cf. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, ed. Mandonnet, 532-3: “Cum enim dicitur, quod nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate, non intelligitur qualitas et substantia proprie, secundum quod logicus accipit praedicamenta distinguens. Sed grammaticus accipit substan-tiam quantum ad modum significandi, et similiter qualitatem; et ideo, quia illud quod signi-ficatur per nomen significatur ut aliquid subsistens, secundum quod de eo potest aliquid praedicari, quamvis secundum rem non sit subsistens, sicut albedo; dicit, quod significat subs-tantiam, ad differentiam verbi, quod non significat ut aliquid subsistens. Et quia in quolibet nomine est considerare id a quo imponitur nomen, quod est quasi principium innotescendi, ideo quantum ad hoc habet modum qualitatis, secundum quod qualitas vel forma est princi-pium cognoscendi rem.”12) See e.g. In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 2; d. 5, q. 1, a. 1 d. 34, q. 1, a. 2; In III Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; Sum. theol., I, q. 39, a. 4; De unione verbi, a. 1, ad 12; De 108 articulis, q. 8.


(ratio nominis) or even its ‘meaning’ (significatum)13—which Thomas says precede each historical language.14

In his works, Thomas seems to make no appreciable distinction between the phrase ‘signified thing’ (res significata) and the term ‘meaning’ (significatum).15 The latter is only more extended than the former since it is employed to refer not only to the thing that is signified but also to what is signified about a thing. In most cases Thomas uses ‘signified thing’ and ‘meaning’ interchangeably. Nonetheless, as E. Jennifer Ashworth again pointed out, there are texts where Thomas takes the term ‘meaning’ (significatum) to express more precisely the signified thing in so far as it is considered as resulting from the mode of sig-nification and the phrase ‘signified thing’ (res significata) to express the thing in so far as it is considered as independent of such a mode. According to these shades of meaning, Thomas holds that different meanings and consequently different linguistic formulas expressing those meanings can be associated with one and the same signified thing,16 as well as that different signified things may correspond to one and the same meaning. Finally, different modes of sig-nification can generate what Thomas at times calls different co-significations,17 while a name’s meaning is what establishes the linguistic features of a name as expressed by the grammar of an historical language. This is what Thomas also calls the propriety of speech ( proprietas locutionis).18

13) Cf. Quaestio disputata de unione Verbi, a. 2, ad 4; Scriptum super I Sententiarum, d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, ed. Mandonnet, 535-6: “Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod cum in nomine duo sint, modus significandi, et res ipsa significata, semper secundum alterum potest removeri a Deo vel secundum utrumque; sed non potest dici de Deo nisi secundum alterum tantum. Et quia ad veritatem et proprietatem affirmationis requiritur quod totum affirmetur, ad proprietatem autem negationis sufficit si alterum tantum desit, ideo dicit Dionysius, quod negationes sunt absolute verae, sed affirmationes non nisi secundum quid: quia quantum ad significatum tantum, et non quantum ad modum significandi.”; Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 2, a. 1, ad 11; De poten-tia, q. 8, a. 2, ad 7; Sum. theol., I, q. 39, a. 4.14) See In III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 1, q.la 3, ad 1; also De veritate, q. 10, a. 3; Sum. theol., I, q. 93, a. 7, ad 3.15) See e.g. the text quoted above, note 13.16) Cf. e.g. Summa contra Gentiles I, ch. 98; In II Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 5; Sum. theol., I-II, q. 53, a.2, ad 3; Exp. Met., VII, lec. 1 and lec. 5.17) Cf. e.g. Quodlibet IV, q. 9, a. 2.18) Cf. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, ed. Mandonnet, 536: “. . . et secundum talem rationem significatam in nomine, magis attenditur veritas et proprietas locutionis, quam quantum ad modum significandi, qui datur ex consequenti intelligi per nomen.” See also In III Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 1.


Concluding our analysis of the first distinction, we may say that Aquinas clearly advocates internalist semantics, to the extent that the meanings of names are supposed to exist only in our mind. At the same time, Thomas does not renounce realism in semantics, for the meanings of names are nonetheless taken as summarizing real features of things. Meaning is what determines the reference of a name and at the same time is what names primarily refer to. Names principally signify meanings, although they name the things that are signified by way of such meanings. There is no room for discussing at greater length here the function of naming in Aquinas’s semantics. For our purpose, it suffices to note that Thomas does not draw any sharp distinction between signifying and naming. Although naming seems to perform a more referential function than signifying (and sometimes it does), Thomas actually regards naming as a function semantically equivalent to ‘expressing or being a sign of a concept’, just like signifying. In fact, like the process of signifying, Thomas also relates the process of naming a thing to the process of cognizing that thing: if we cognize imperfectly a thing, we name it imperfectly. Similarly, we can name by one word things that are really distinct in the world as well as give different names to one single thing according to the different concepts that we can derive from it.19

2. The Distinction between the Cause and the Goal of Signification

(2) The idea that signification serves first of all a connotative function is occa-sionally related by Thomas to the distinction between signification and sup-position of names, between that which a name signifies and that for which a name stands or supposits in a proposition.20 This distinction closely relates to the second foundational distinction of Thomas’ semantics mentioned above, namely that between the cause and the goal of a name’s imposition, a distinc-tion that Thomas especially inherits from Albert the Great. This latter leads us to the conclusion that, for Thomas, names not only serve a connotative func-tion but also a denotative one.

As Thomas usually says, that from which (id a quo) a name has been imposed to signify does not coincide with what (id quod ) a name actually signifies.21

19) See e.g. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1; De veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 10; Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 8; q. 108, a. 5; De potentia, q. 9, a. 9. For other references, see above, note 4, and below, note 26.20) See De potentia, q. 9, a. 4.21) See e.g. In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, ed. Mandonnet, 559: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in significatione nominis duo sunt consideranda, scilicet id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum imponitur.” As is known, this second distinction has


Following the tradition, Thomas calls the former a property or quality ( propri-etas or qualitas) while calling the latter a subject or substance (subiectum or substantia): that is, a name has been imposed to signify on the basis of a thing’s property or quality but it does not signify that property or quality, but the subject or substance of such a property or quality.22 This distinction clearly leads us to identify the goal of a name’s imposition—what a name has been imposed to signify—with the name’s reference and the cause with the occa-sion for the name’s imposition. According to this distinction, the interpreter is legitimate to say that, for Thomas, names fulfill not only a connotative func-tion but also a denotative one.

With respect to this distinction, though, one must proceed with caution because Thomas seems to change his mind between earlier and later works. In his early writings, Thomas softens the distinction between the cause and the goal of a name’s signification, in so far as he identifies the cause of a name’s imposition with the signified object itself and the goal of a name’s significa-tion with the supposit (suppositum).23 In some texts dating to the end of his career, Thomas emphasizes such a change by arguing for the possibility of attaching different names to a thing according to whether they are associated to the starting-point or the end-point of the process of imposing names on things.24

The clash between earlier and later works, however, is only apparent. Already in the Commentary on the Sentences, Aquinas recognized that the thing’s properties or qualities on which a name’s imposition is based are merely the occasion or the cognitive principle guiding us to impose a name to

a long story. It traces back to grammarians such as Priscian and it is employed at least by Por-phyry and Gilbert of Poitiers. For the history of this second distinction, see J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1972) and, more recently, L. Valente, Logique et théologie. Les écoles parisiennes entre 1150 et 1220 (Paris, 2008).22) See e.g. In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 5, exp. text.; Exp. Per., I, ch. 4, in Opera Omnia I* 1, 22,137-42: “unum nomen imponitur ad significandum unum simplicem intellectum; aliud autem <est> id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, ab eo quod nomen significat; sicut hoc nomen ‘lapis’ imponitur a lesione pedis, quod non significat, ad significandum conceptum cuiusdam rei.” Note that the dichotomy quality/substance has first of all semantical and epistemological rather than metaphysical significance (see above, note 11).23) See In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, and especially In III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3.24) See e.g. Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 11, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen ‘qui est’ est magis proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen ‘Deus’, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. Sed quan-tum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturam divinam.”


signify that thing.25 Such texts allow the inference that, for Thomas, a lan-guage-speaking community normally imposes names on the basis of a natural acquaintance with external things and that at the very beginning such an acquaintance is likely approximate, since, Aquinas says, it depends on appar-ent and macroscopic properties of things.26 But once imposed, names signify a certain kind of thing rather than the properties that have occasioned the imposition of those names. So the fact that the original imposition of names depends on a primordial acquaintance with external things and that such an acquaintance is likely approximate has an important consequence for the semantics of names. When a linguistic community imposes a name to signify a thing, it imposes a name to signify precisely a thing characterized by a defi-nite collection of essential properties that are thought of as causally responsible for the accidental, apparent and macroscopic properties from which the impo-sition initially stemmed. At the onset, such a collection of essential properties may be even completely unknown to the community imposing this name. What really matters, however, is that the community based the imposition of this name on the stipulation that a causal link holds between such an alleged collection of essential properties and the accidental properties that the thing exhibits.

If one pursues this line of argument, he/she can explain the apparent con-flict in Thomas’ works in two possible ways, and both consist in qualifying what Aquinas says in his earlier and later works. First, one could note that, in those passages from the Commentary on the Sentences where the signified object is not identified with what a name has been imposed to signify, Thomas seems to be interested above all in distinguishing between signification and supposi-tion. This is the reason why he states that names signify the properties from which they have been imposed (since names are supposed to signify a collec-

25) See e.g. In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3 (see above, note 11); d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, ed. Man-donnet, 559: “Contingit autem quandoque quod substantia alicujus rei nominatur ab aliquo accidente quod non consequitur totam naturam de qua nomen illud dicitur; sicut lapis dicitur ex eo quod laedit pedem, nec tamen omne laedens pedem est lapis, vel e converso. Et ideo judi-cium de nomine non debet esse secundum hoc a quo imponitur, sed secundum id ad quod sig-nificandum instituitur.”26) Cf. In III Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6; Sum. theol., I, q. 18, a. 2: “Et inde est quod ex his quae exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a proprietati-bus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad significandas essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie.”


tion of essential properties), while they stand for the particular bearers of such properties. Alternatively, one could stress that in the later works Thomas seems rather to be interested in classifying names: in some cases the cause and the goal of a name’s imposition coincide (like in the case of accidental terms such as ‘white’), in other cases they do not coincide (like in the case of substantial terms such as ‘stone’).27 Whatever the case may be, a possible reconciliation of the two views can be given by Thomas’ key distinction between the imposition of a name with respect to us and the imposition of a name with respect to the thing. Take the name ‘man’. With respect to the thing, ‘man’ has been imposed on the basis of the feature that finalizes the essential properties that the name sums up and signifies; in the case of a man, this is the specific differ-ence ‘rational’ and such an item is also what is primarily signified by the name ‘man’. But since Thomas assumes that the essential differences of things are normally unknown to us28, it follows that, in practice, speakers attach names to things by moving from some of their accidental properties, with which they

27) See e.g. Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod signifi-candum nomen imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens pedem, sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne laedens pedem esset lapis.”; and a. 8: “Respondeo dicendum quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam rei ex proprietatibus vel opera-tionibus eius cognoscimus, ita substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius opera-tione vel proprietate, sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua actione eius, quia laedit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus, albedo, et huius-modi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus idem est quod nomen significat, et id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum.”; De potentia, q. 9, a. 3, ad 1. A similar distinction, although formulated for abstract and concrete names, already occurs in In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3. 28) Cf. e.g. De ente et essentia, ch. 4. For other occurrences of this claim, see In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 6; De veritate, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8; q. 10, a. 1, ad 6 ; In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, q.la 1, ad 1; De potentia, q. 9, a. 2, ad 5; De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 11, ad 3; Sum. theol., I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 7; Sentencia libri de anima, I, ch. 1; Exp. Met., VII, lec. 12; Expositio super De generatione, I, lec. 8. Here I leave aside two possible complications: first, Aquinas’ claim that the essential differences are unknown to us frequently ( frequenter, multoties) or sometimes (quandoque, interdum) but not always; second, Aquinas’ claim that, despite their being unknown in themselves, the essential differences of things can be known somehow, i.e. by inference from the accidents. For an exten-sive discussion of these claims, see my forthcoming Mental Representation and Semantics. For emphasis on the importance of this condition for the semantics of names, see R. Pasnau, ‘Abstract Truth in Thomas Aquinas’, in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy, ed. H. Lagerlund (Aldershot, 2007), 33-63, esp. 54 ff., and G. Pini, ‘Scotus on Knowing and Nam-ing Natural Kinds’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (2009), 255-72.


are naturally acquainted but which are not what is primarily signified by the imposed names. Thus, while ‘man’ in itself signifies primarily the specific dif-ference of animality (i.e. rationality), on which its imposition is based, with respect to us ‘man’ does not signify the accidental properties, causally depend-ing on rationality, from which we imposed the name ‘man’ to signify rational beings, but precisely those rational beings.29 Significantly, it is according to this distinction that Thomas differentiates the signification of a name from its etymology.30 Unfortunately, Thomas does not give many examples for eluci-dating the above-described procedure of imposition of names, except for the well-known case of ‘stone’ (lapis). Nonetheless such an example is useful for summarizing Thomas’ position and for solving the apparent clash between his earlier and later works. Clarifying such a procedure will also help us to address correctly Thomas’s pragmatic views. What happens in the case of ‘stone’?

A warning however is required here. Since Aquinas does not dwell on the details of the procedure of imposition, we can only conjecture how Aquinas would have reconstructed the mechanism. Following however the example of ‘stone’, we can imagine that a certain community of Latin speakers has pro-ceeded in this way: It sees for the first time a thing of a certain kind that has, among others, the property of hurting the foot (laedere pedem). Such a thing shares this property with a lot of other things, such as iron or wood, but the

29) Cf. e.g. De veritate, q. 4, a. 1, ad 8, in Opera Omnia XXII, I, 2, ed. A. Dondaine (Rome, 1970), 121-2,330-49: “Ad octavum dicendum, quod nomen dicitur ab aliquo imponi duplic-iter: aut ex parte imponentis nomen, aut ex parte rei cui imponitur. Ex parte autem rei nomen dicitur ab illo imponi per quod completur ratio rei quam nomen significat; et hoc est differentia specifica illius rei. Et hoc est quod principaliter significatur per nomen. Sed quia differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae, quandoque utimur accidentibus vel effectibus loco earum, ut in VIII Metaphysicae dicitur; et secundum hoc nominamus rem; et sic illud quod loco differentiae essentialis sumitur, est a quo imponitur nomen ex parte imponentis, sicut lapis imponitur ab effectu, qui est laedere pedem. Et hoc non oportet esse principaliter significatum per nomen, sed illud loco cuius hoc ponitur. Similiter dico, quod nomen verbi imponitur a verberatione vel a boatu ex parte imponentis, non ex parte rei.”; and ad 11.30) Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., II-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 2: “Ad secundum dicendum quod aliud est etymo-logia nominis, et aliud est significatio nominis. Etymologia attenditur secundum id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, nominis vero significatio attenditur secundum id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Quae quandoque diversa sunt, nomen enim lapidis imponitur a laesione pedis, non tamen hoc significat; alioquin ferrum, cum pedem laedat, lapis esset.”; In I Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2. For emphasis on a possible asymmetry in the case of God between the imposition and the signification of names, see In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3; Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 6; De veritate, q. 4, a. 1; Quaestiones de malo, q. 1, a. 5, ad 19; Compendium theologiae, I, ch. 27; In IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3 and d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3, for the difference between first and second imposition of names.


Latin-speaking community decides to assume that property as the distinguish-ing feature of such a thing, to the point that it imposes the name ‘stone’ (lapis) to signify precisely that thing. More precisely, by ‘stone’ the Latin-speaking community wants to designate a thing made in such a way that it is able to account for the property of hurting the foot. In the case of ‘stone’, the Latin-speaking community has therefore taken two steps: first, having isolated a recurrent property, it has chosen a name able to express it: this first step is summarized by the etymology of the name ‘stone’; second, it has attached such a name to the thing, for referential purposes. Presumably, at the outset the Latin-speaking community did not know anything definite about what a stone essentially is, nonetheless it knew that by ‘stone’ it meant to refer to a thing exhibiting some definite apparent and macroscopic properties (a certain form and color, a certain hardness, and so on). Once the procedure of imposition is achieved, the name ‘stone’ rigidly designates a thing of a certain kind, but at the same time it expresses, albeit confusedly and implicitly, the characteristics of the kind to which that particular thing belongs. The kind under which stones fall must be explanatory of the accidental properties that stones exhibit.

Aquinas does not say whether the same mechanism also governs the impo-sition of names in the case of living beings. It probably does, given some of Thomas’ typical claims—recall, for example, Thomas’ tenets that, as men-tioned above, the essential differences of a thing are unknown to us31, and that in the external world nothing distinct corresponds to the genus and the dif-ferentia of a definition but only an empirically unknowable causal principle of them.32 The fact that the cause and the goal of a name’s imposition refer to different items of Thomas’ ontology has an important corollary for our argu-ment. Keep in mind that, for Thomas, the modes of signifying depend on the modes of understanding rather than on the modes of being; this entails that such modes of signifying do not bear a one-to-one correspondence with the modes of being. As was seen, a community of speakers imposes names on the basis of an original acquaintance with things, and names are somehow subor-dinated to this primitive knowledge.33 At the outset, our acquaintance with things is intuitive and pre-scientific, but the generic character of our first knowledge of things does not impede the act of attaching names to things, for

31) See above, note 28.32) Cf. e.g. De ente et essentia, ch. 2; Exp. Met., VII, lec. 5.33) Cf. Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 35, ed. C. Pera-P. Marc-P. Caramello (Turin-Rome, 1961), 46, n. 300.


a generic knowledge is a sufficient condition for imposing a name to signify a thing. Such a sufficiency rests on the causal connection holding between the mind and the world, a connection that determines our first cognitive control on things.34

Combining therefore the two distinctions we have illustrated above, we may conclude that, for Thomas, names function as shorthand for a collection of essential properties which they signify (i) first, as if such a collection were a separately subsisting thing (or as if it were exhibited by a separately subsisting thing) and (ii) second, as if such a collection were the explanatory principle of the macroscopic properties that occasioned the imposition of names. If I am right, the above reconstructed mechanism is what allows Thomas to endow names with both connotative and denotative force. This mechanism holds in the case of concrete common names such as ‘man’ as well as in the case of abstract common names such as ‘humanity’.

A last thing must be noticed. Although names signify a collection of essen-tial properties as if it were a separately subsisting thing, nonetheless knowing what a name signifies does not amount to knowing definitely all the properties summarized by it. Take the case of the name ‘man’. We know what ‘man’ signifies precisely when we know that ‘man’ signifies a thing of a certain kind or even a certain kind of thing, namely a man (i.e. a rational animal), and not when we know what the essential features of the kind-man are. The reason is that names state only implicitly what their definitions state explicitly (i.e. ani-mality and rationality). This means that, once names are imposed, our knowl-edge of the essential properties of the things signified by those names can be specified or revised across time, consequently the definitions of names as well can undergo a process of updating. Names, though, never cease to designate the things to which they have been imposed. Knowing what a name signifies, therefore, precisely amounts to knowing this referential fact (i.e. that a name signifies a certain kind of thing, a thing of a certain kind), although the condi-tions for a name to be able to signify that thing are given by the meaning of the name, which is expressed by its definition. Specifically, definition is for

34) As a result, for Thomas, since names can be associated to different knowledge, it follows that by names speakers can signify a thing more definitely than they can understand it by concepts (see Sum. theol., III, q. 60, a. 6). In contrast, because of such a causal link, speakers cannot signify definitely a thing that they never experienced (Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 30). In his Commentary on Peri hermeneias (I, ch. 1), Thomas also adds that such a causal relationship would be a sufficient condition for living if men were naturally solitary animals, since concepts are natural likenesses of things.


Aquinas the linguistic counterpart of our knowledge of the essential properties of the things that names signify.

In conclusion, according to Thomas’ semantics of names the original impo-sition establishes both the denotation of a name, what Thomas calls the signi-fied thing (res significata), and its connotation, what Thomas calls the meaning (significatum) or the concept or sense of a name (ratio nominis).35 In particular, the meaning of a name is what we express by way of a definition. This rigid and intrinsic designative capacity of names, which is not altered by gram-matical or syntactical modifications of names,36 is what Aquinas, in the wake of tradition, calls the proper signification of a name (significatio propria) or the semantic virtue or force of speech (virtus sermonis, virtus nominis), i.e. the lit-eral meaning of the words.

II. Part Two: Pragmatics

The pattern of analysis we have elaborated for natural-kind terms may be extended also to other names. It must be said, however, that the semantic function of names is much more difficult to explain in the case of names sig-nifying abstract or non-existing entities, actions or emotions, states of affairs, and the like. Still, Thomas seems to think that the semantics of names can be explained in all of these cases by resorting to the same principle: names signify things qua conceived (whatever such things are), so the meaning or sense of a name plays a key role in determining the reference of the name; at the same time such a meaning turns out to be what is primarily signified by the name. If names are always imposed to signify things qua conceived, then there is room for considering some pragmatic factors that can interact and hence influence the formation and the semantic function of names. Such factors intervene in the construction of the semantical structure of conventional lan-guages, and the appeal to them is useful especially when names occur in a dialogic context. Aquinas is quite elusive about such factors, but he seems to regard two of them as particularly significant for a complete account of the semantics of names. They are (i) first, the speaker’s intention (intentio

35) For the connection between imposition of names and their meanings, compare De veritate, q. 14, a. 3, with De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 1. For the difference between meaning and mode of sig-nification, see Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 30. On the asymmetry between modes of being and modes of understanding, see Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 34, and Expositio libri Posteriorum, II, ch. 6 (for the cognition of non-beings).36) See e.g. In I Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.


loquentis), and (ii) second, the common usage or linguistic custom (usus/con-suetudo loquendi). These factors are important for explaining some phases of a name’s story: the acquisition of a name, its ordinary use by a social commu-nity, the truth-conditions of the propositions in which it occurs. Let me con-sider each of these factors in turn.

2.1. The Common Usage (usus loquendi)

While speakers impose names on things after selecting some of their character-istic features, as was said, Thomas is of the opinion that, in a given language-speaking community, names are not normally acquired in this way but by way of learning. Learning is a process of transmission of knowledge from father to child or from master to pupil. With respect to the person who acquires knowledge, Thomas usually presents learning as the progressive specification of an initially generic knowledge. The fact that names are normally acquired by learning implies that there can be a semantic gap between the meaning that a name possesses in force of its primitive imposition and the meaning that it possesses when it is learnt (the ‘original meaning’ and the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a name, respectively). In general, the ordinary process of acquisition of names tends to mirror the way a given language-speaking community at the outset attached names to things. In fact, Thomas describes the psychological development of the individual knowledge and use of a conventional language by way of Aristotle’s example of children, who at the beginning call every man ‘father’ and only subsequently are they able to distinguish and recog-nize correctly their own father.37 Thomas seems to introduce this example to underline two things: first, that the process of imposition is not re-proposed whenever we learn to use a name, and second, that nonetheless both the pro-cess of imposition and that of learning follow the same way, proceeding from indeterminate to determinate knowledge.

Across time, Thomas observes, a name can undergo a process of extension38 or restriction39 of its original meaning, so by learning names are transmitted

37) Cf. e.g. Expositio libri Physicorum, I, lec. 1; Sum. theol., I, q. 85, a. 3; In II Sent., d. 20, q. 2, a. 2; Super De caelo, I, lec. 24.38) Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., I, q. 67, a. 1: “Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui, uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. Sicut patet in nomine visionis, quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus; sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius sensus, extensum est hoc nomen, secundum usum loquentium, ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum.”39) Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., I-II, q. 35, a. 2, ad 1. The same holds for propositions, which Thomas endows with a signification of their own. On the difference between the signification of names and propositions, see In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 3, ad 7; Exp. Per., I, ch. 6.


with a more extended or restricted semantic content. Normally, the process of stabilization of a name’s meaning takes a long time and for this reason it can give rise to cases of miscomprehension or, worse, to heretical positions,40 and even end with a radical distortion of the original meaning.41 However it may be, a language-speaking community receives names already provided with a meaning and transmit them to other speakers. This mechanism of learning and transmission of semantic information explains why Thomas often invokes common usage as the first filter for discriminating correct from incorrect (erroneous or idiomatic) utilizations of names. But how do speakers proceed when, once having learned names, they begin to use them? Aquinas gives conflicting indications about this point. At first glance, Thomas’s thought about common usage seems inspired by what sounds as a genuinely pragmatic principle, namely that names signify what the majority of a language-speaking community means to signify by those names.42 Thomas often introduces this principle by citing Aristotle’s dictum from the Topics that names must be used according to the way in which most speakers use them (nominibus utendum est ut plures).43 This dictum has two implications. First, when we learn a name, Thomas seems to suggest that we learn to use it in accordance with the con-ventions of a given linguistic community. What is more, Thomas seems to require that speakers must always conform to the linguistic custom of the social community of which they are members, so they are expected to avoid any idiomatic or arbitrary use of names. Second, the above dictum allows us to conclude that, for Thomas, when we learn a name, we learn to use it even if we do not know what the name properly signifies or whether something real corresponds to it in the physical world. This amounts to the admission that we acquire our linguistic competencies and abilities always by way of learning, i.e. in a social context. Nonetheless the fact that we learn to use names within a linguistic community does not guarantee that the ordinary meaning of names,

40) See Sum. theol., I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 3; also I, q. 29, a. 4.41) See Sum. theol., II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consuetum est quod nomina a sui prima impositione detorqueantur ad alia significanda, sicut nomen medicinae impositum est primo ad significandum remedium quod praestatur infirmo ad sanandum, deinde tractum est ad significandum artem qua hoc fit.”42) See Expositio libri Posteriorum, I, 4, in Opera Omnia I* 2, ed. R.-A. Gauthier (Rome-Paris, 1989), 19,110-6: “Est autem hec recta manifestatio diffinitionis: diffinitio enim est ratio quam significat nomen, ut dicitur in IV Methaphisice; significatio autem nominis accipienda est ab eo quod intendunt communiter loquentes per illud nomen significare, unde et in II Topicorum dicitur quod nominibus utendum est ut plures utuntur.” 43) See the previous note. See also In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, q.la 1; De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, and q. 17, a. 1; Quodlibet V, q. 4; De 36 articulis, a. 9, ad arg.; Exp. Post., I, ch. 4; Super De caelo, I, lec. 5 and 20; II, lec. 8 and 12; III, lec. 8. The source is Aristotle, Topics, II, 2, 110a15-19.


what is learned, is also what must be followed. As was said, sometimes ordi-nary meaning and original meaning do not overlap, so one must scrutinize accurately a name’s semantics by discerning each supplementary and stratified meaning, on the way to discovering the original meaning. But obviously, there are also cases in which the original meaning is not what must be taken up. Thomas considers different cases, although in passing.

In general, names retain their original meaning in the ordinary one. This happens because, Thomas acknowledges, names are imposed on the basis of conceptions that are natural likenesses of things, so the original meaning of names is the outcome of a natural inclination that leads us to attach names to things (quod observatur communiter apud omnes, videtur ex naturali inclina-tione provenire).44 So, despite their being chosen conventionally, names are supposed to respect the causal and natural relationship linking the mind to the world. For this reason, names tend to preserve their original meaning through-out their history, and this meaning is commonly received and shared by the speakers of a given linguistic community. There are however cases where orig-inal and ordinary meaning diverge,45 and in these cases interpreting names and propositions requires an accurate scrutiny of the common usage. In such cases, interpreting names and propositions for the most part amounts to discerning the original meaning of names. According to Thomas, Aristotle also assumed common usage as the starting-point for his philosophical investigations,46 so even in interpreting Aristotle one is called to consider carefully common usage.

If, on the one hand, the process of extension or restriction of a name’s original meaning confers to a name a certain semantic stability within a com-munity of speakers, on the other hand, such a process imports equivocation into language. In his works, Aquinas realizes this point by noting that equivo-cation is related to the signification of names rather than to supposition.47 In particular, equivocation is closely connected to the different linguistic codes with respect to which the signification of a name can be assessed—for instance if we are speaking properly or commonly, literally or metaphorically, or according to specific areas of the linguistic community, such as according to the theologians or to the philosophers.48 Ascertaining the linguistic code is a

44) See In De caelo, I, lec. 2.45) Cf. In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, q.la 1. 46) See e.g. Expositio libri Ethicorum, IV, ch. 12, and VIII, ch. 9; Super De caelo, I, lec. 2, and lec. 20; Sum. theol., I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3.47) Cf. e.g. Quaestio de unione Verbi, a. 2, ad 4; especially Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 10, ad 1.48) Cf. Quaestiones disputatae de malo, q. 2, a. 2.


prerequisite condition if one aims to disambiguate the propositions where equivocal terms occur. Since we follow common usage especially in what con-cerns the signification of names,49 this means that we receive equivocal names from a linguistic community,50 so our principal task in interpreting conven-tional language is precisely disambiguating the propositions in which names occur, for example by assigning a correct supposition to names or by distin-guishing the different meanings imported by names.51 Let me give an example. In his Commentary on the Heavens Thomas records three possible descriptions of ‘heaven’ (caelum), and according to each of them he gives three possible accounts of what heaven is. In such cases, the signified object of the term ‘heaven’ (i.e. the heaven) does not change; nonetheless different descriptions can be associated to it. It is worth noting that, for Thomas, common usage settles each of these descriptions.52 A clarification of these different descrip-tions is therefore needed for making sense of the propositions in which the name ‘heaven’ occurs.

The equivocity in the common usage of names explains why Aquinas often contrasts the speakers’ common usage against some other forms of usage such as properly speaking—which depends on the literal meaning of the words or virtue of speech (virtus sermonis)—, Aristotle’s usage, or some technical usage,53

49) Cf. De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, in Opera Omnia XXII, I, 2, 124,136-45: “Unde verbum si proprie accipiatur in divinis non dicitur nisi personaliter, si autem accipiatur communiter poterit etiam dici essentialiter. Sed tamen quia, ‘nominibus utendum ut plures’ secundum Philosophum, usus maxime est aemulandus in significationibus nominum, et quia omnes sancti communiter utun-tur nomine verbi prout personaliter dicitur, ideo hoc magis dicendum est quod personaliter dicatur.”50) Cf. De veritate, q. 17, a. 1, in Opera Omnia XXII, II, 515-6,178-98: “Et huius distinctionis haec videtur esse ratio quia cum conscientiae sit aliquis actus, circa actum autem consideretur obiectum, potentia, habitus et ipse actus, invenitur quandoque aliquod nomen quod ad ista quatuor aequivocatur, sicut hoc nomen intellectus quandoque significat rem intellectam, sicut nomina dicuntur significare intellectus, quandoque vero ipsam intellectivam potentiam, quan-doque vero habitum quendam, quandoque etiam actum. In huiusmodi tamen nominationibus sequendus est usus loquendi, quia ‘nominibus utendum ut plures’, ut dicitur in II Topicorum. Istud quidem secundum usum loquentium esse videtur ut conscientia quandoque pro re cons-cita accipiatur, ut cum dicitur dicam tibi conscientiam meam, id est quod est in conscientia mea. Sed potentiae vel habitui hoc nomen attribui proprie non potest sed solum actui in qua signifi-catione sola concordant omnia quae de conscientia dicuntur.”51) For a clear example, see Sum. theol., III, q. 16, a. 7.52) See Super De caelo I, lec. 20.53) In Super II Epistolam ad Corinthios lectura, IV, 5, Thomas opposes linguistic custom (consue-tudo loquentium) to Aristotle’s linguistic usage, while in In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, q.la 1, he opposes custom to the usage of Saints; in In IV Sent., d. 25, q. 3, a. 1, q.la 1, ad 4, Thomas


such as the philosophical and theological usage.54 Thomas gives different case studies but in all of them common usage is seen as the touchstone of any other uses. Since common usage regulates the linguistic custom of a given commu-nity of speakers, it helps us to assess correctly all cases that diverge from com-mon usage. Sometimes such divergences carry philosophical significance. An important example, for Thomas, is the philosophical language used by the Platonists. Aquinas notes that the Platonic practice of introducing idiomatic prefixes or suffixes endowed with philosophical significance is due to the fact that commonly universal names are not introduced into language to signify universal things, given that names reproduce our natural acquaintance with the external world and in the world no universal entity can be found. So the Platonists needed to introduce a linguistic device for relating universal names to universal things.55

If in most cases the proper signification of names must be preferred to com-mon usage and any divergence from common usage must be explained, there are also cases where, Thomas acknowledges, common usage must be preferred. This usually happens in theology, and especially when theological words are translated from one language into another. In the prologue to the Contra errores Graecorum, Thomas illustrates the latter case. Consider the Greek term ‘hypostasis’ and the Latin term ‘substantia’. Thomas points out that they have exactly the same meaning (both signify a subsisting thing), nonetheless they cannot be translated into each other.56 The reason is that in theology names

opposes ‘commonly speaking’ to ‘properly speaking’. For other oppositions, see In III Sent., d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, and In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, q.la 2. 54) Cf. In III Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1; In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 4, q.la 1.55) Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., I-II, q. 49, a. 2, ad 3; Exp. Per., I, 10, in Opera Omnia I* 1, 52,208-25: “Ad designandum diuersos modos attributionis adinuente sunt quedam dictiones que possunt dici determinationes seu signa quibus designatur quod aliquid de uniuersali hoc uel illo modo predicetur. Set, quia non est communiter ab omnibus apprehensum quod uniuersalia extra sin-gularia subsistant, ideo communis usus loquendi non habet aliquam dictionem ad designandum illum modum predicandi prout aliquid dicitur de eo in abstractione a singularibus; set Plato, qui posuit uniuersalia extra singularia subsistere, adinuenit quasdam determinationes quibus desig-naretur quomodo aliquid attribuitur uniuersali prout est extra singularia, et uocabat uniuersale separatim subsistens extra singularia, quantum ad speciem hominis ‘per se hominem’, uel ‘ipsum hominem’; et similiter in aliis uniuersalibus.”56) Cf. e.g. Super Decretales, 1; Contra errores Graecorum, I, pr., in Opera Omnia XL, ed. H.-F. Dondaine (Rome, 1967), 71,45-65: “Secundo quia multa quae bene sonant in lingua graeca, in latina fortassis bene non sonant, propter quod eandem fidei veritatem aliis verbis Latini confiten-tur et Graeci. Dicitur enim apud Graecos recte et catholice quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres hypostases; apud Latinos autem non recte sonat si quis dicat quod sunt tres substantiae, licet hypostasis idem sit apud Graecos quod substantia apud Latinos secundum


must be employed according to the usage of the speakers and Greek- and Latin-speakers are accustomed to use such names in a sensibly different manner.57 In this case, it is common usage that dictates the rule.

Hence, common usage is regularly followed in theology. Take the case of the phrase ‘Holy Spirit’. One can propose different semantic accounts of its meaning. On the one hand, if the phrase ‘Holy Spirit’ is taken according to the semantic virtue of speech, it may refer to each Person of the Trinity, for in this case it is understood as a grammatical combination of two terms, i.e. a substantive plus an adjective; but if it is taken according to the new imposition of the Catholic Church, then it may refer only to the third Person of the Trin-ity, because in this case the phrase ‘Holy Spirit’ is equivalent to a sort of defi-nite description of one single name (circumlocutio unius nominis). The same happens for other names, such as ‘Person’: according to the semantic virtue of the name it signifies a certain essence (i.e. an individual substance of rational nature), but according to the usage of the Catholic Church—a usage intro-duced to defend Catholic orthodoxy against heretics—it signifies a relation.58 Both these examples show that common usage must be scrupulously followed in theology, even if the ordinary meaning of a name can be the result of a series of subsequent impositions that render the name ambiguous or polysemic.

proprietatem vocabuli, nam apud Latinos substantia usitatius pro essentia accipi solet, quam tam nos quam Graeci unam in divinis confitemur; propter quod sicut Graeci dicunt tres hypostases nos dicimus tres personas . . . Unde ad officium boni translatoris pertinet ut ea quae sunt catholi-cae fidei transferens servet sententiam, mutet autem modum loquendi secundum proprietatem linguae in quam transfert.” For other cases, see Sum. theol., I, q. 68, a. 4; De potentia, q. 10, a. 1, ad 8; Exp. Met., V, lec. 2. For a justification of such different linguistic practices, see Super Evan-gelium S. Ioannis lectura, ch. 1, lec. 1.57) Cf. De potentia, q. 9, a. 1, ad 2; Sum. theol., I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hypostasis, apud Graecos, ex propria significatione nominis habet quod significet quod-cumque individuum substantiae, sed ex usu loquendi habet quod sumatur pro individuo ratio-nalis naturae, ratione suae excellentiae.”58) See e.g. In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1, ed. Mandonnet, 268: “Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc quod dico, Spiritus Sanctus, potest dupliciter considerari: vel quantum ad virtutem vocabulorum, et sic convenit toti Trinitati prout sumitur in virtute duarum dictionum; vel quantum ad impositionem Ecclesiae, per quam hoc impositum est ad significandum unam per-sonam, quasi circumlocutio unius nominis, propter defectum vocabulorum, quia linguae nos-trae deficiunt a narratione Dei; et sic proprie convenit Spiritui sancto.”; Sum. theol., I, q. 29, a. 4: “hoc nomen ‘persona’ simpliciter, ex virtute vocabuli, essentiam significet in divinis, sicut hoc nomen Deus, et hoc nomen sapiens, sed propter instantiam haereticorum, est accommodatum, ex ordinatione Concilii, ut possit poni pro relativis; et praecipue in plurali, vel cum nomine partitivo, ut cum dicimus tres personas, vel alia est persona patris, alia filii. In singulari vero potest sumi pro absoluto, et pro relativo.”


Anyway, these examples also show that one needs an understanding of how the original meaning of a name enrolled into its ordinary meaning if one wants to disambiguate correctly the propositions in which such a name occurs.59

In philosophy the situation is less dramatic and Thomas usually reconciles the common usage with the literal meaning. Philosophical terms, such as ‘idea’,60 ‘intellect’,61 ‘consciousness’,62 ‘word’,63 ‘virtue’,64 ‘free will’,65 and the like, have modified their semantics across time; as a result, Thomas notes, they are used to designate different things. According to which meaning one is inclined to match to the name, one can set forth different philosophical treat-ments of the notions meant by such terms. However, Thomas seems to be of the opinion that the main task of the philosopher is to dig into the semantical spectrum of those terms and to discover their proper signification or original meaning. In philosophy, not common usage but the original meaning seems to play the most prominent role.

In conclusion, Aquinas considers the process of acquisition of names as a multifarious phenomenon. We learn how to use names within a language-speaking community. In particular, names are used according to how most speakers use them, and this entails that at the outset we manage names with-out knowing definitely their meanings. In a subsequent phase, linguistic cus-tom must be considered more closely in order to disambiguate and interpret correctly ordinary propositions. Although names are introduced into language for a referential purpose, names are supposed to designate things only when a meaning is matched to them. Matching a meaning to a name is a complex

59) See Thomas’ precisions in In I Sent., d. 21, q. 2, a. 2, exp., ed. Mandonnet, 526-7. See also In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 1; In IV Sent., d. 25, q. 3, a. 1, q.la 1, ad 4; Sum. theol., I, q. 31, a. 4, ad 2; I, q. 83, a. 2; De potentia, q. 9, a. 4.60) Cf. In I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Mandonnet, 839-40: “Idea enim dicitur ab ‘eidos’, quod est forma; unde nomen ideae, quantum ad proprietatem nominis, aequaliter se habet ad prac-ticam et speculativam cognitionem; forma enim rei in intellectu existens, utriusque cognitionis principium est. Quamvis enim secundum usum loquentium idea sumatur pro forma quae est principium practicae cognitionis, secundum quod ideas exemplares rerum formas nominamus; tamen etiam principium speculativae cognitionis est, secundum quod ideas contemplantes for-mas rerum nominamus.”; De veritate, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3; q. 3, a. 3.61) Cf. e.g. De veritate, q. 17, a. 1 (see above, note 50).62) Cf. e.g. De veritate, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2; Sum. theol., I, q. 79, a. 13.63) Cf. e.g. In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, q.la 1; De veritate, q. 4, a. 1.64) Cf. e.g. In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, q.la 1.65) Cf. e.g. In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1; De veritate, q. 24, a. 4 and ad 13; Sum. theol., I, q. 83, a. 2.


procedure that depends on our intellectual cognition of things. A name’s meaning can change across time, so the appeal to linguistic custom is a first step to discriminating correct from incorrect (especially idiomatic) utilizations of names and propositions. In theology, following linguistic custom is prefer-able, while in philosophy the literal meaning is considered by Aquinas as the principal element.

2.2. The Speaker’s Intention (intentio loquentis)

Unlike the first pragmatic factor (i.e. common usage), Thomas does not dwell at length on the second pragmatic factor mentioned at the beginning of this paper, viz. the speaker’s intention. Probably, the reason is that, on the one hand, the intention of individual speakers seems irrelevant for explaining the semantics of names: the meaning of names depends on the linguistic conven-tions of a language-speaking community and such conventions are beyond the control of an individual; on the other hand, since the intention of the majority of speakers regulates the common use of names, this second pragmatic factor can be reduced to the first to a certain degree. However it may be, the mean-ing of a name seems to be, for Aquinas, the outcome of the interconnection of external and internal factors. For one thing, the meaning of words depends on circumstances outside us, such as the social or physical environment. We do not have the ability to change arbitrarily the meaning of words or to name things that we have never known. The meaning stemming from our primor-dial acquaintance with things is what we called the original meaning, which establishes the proper signification of names. For another thing, though, the meaning of words is the upshot of what most of a language-speaking com-munity means by such words. This is what we called the ordinary meaning of words. The original meaning, as said, can undergo a process of extension or restriction over time. Variations in the meaning of words can therefore occur, and in most cases they depend on the intention with which names are used by a community of speakers. Knowing such an intention may be of some utility for understanding66 or disambiguating propositions,67 although it is obvious that the reference to the speakers’ intention must not be counted among the

66) Cf. De potentia, q. 7, a. 5, ad 4.67) Cf. Sum. theol., I, q. 13, a. 10, ad 1. On the background of this pragmatic factor, see C. Marmo, ‘A Pragmatic Approach to Language in Modism,’ in Geschichte der Sprachtheorie, 169-83; I. Rosier, ‘Eléments de pragmatique dans la grammaire, la logique et la théologie médiévales,’ Histoire Epistémologie Langage 20.1 (1998), 117-32.


truth-conditions of propositions—unless one is proposing a pragmatic assess-ment of the consequences of a given speech act.

Thomas deals with the speaker’s intention on a few occasions. For our argu-ment, two cases are worth noting in so far as they show two possible ways of understanding the link between proposition and speaker’s intention: the first understanding concerns the relationship between what a proposition states and what we meant to state by such a proposition; the second understanding, instead, concerns the relationship between what a proposition states and what a propositions means.

The first link emerges in the Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 10, a. 7, where Aquinas explains how to settle a theological disputation. Thomas notes that in a theological disputation some constraints concern the speaker and others the hearer. On the side of the hearer, one should consider carefully the degree of instruction, while on the side of the speaker, one is called to take into account the intention.68 In this case, the intention of the speaker is invoked to assess correctly the ethical consequences of a theological disputation.

The speakers’ intention was already invoked as a condition in the Summa theologiae, I, q. 13, a. 2, to exclude that, when one predicates something F of God, one means either to remove from God whatever is non-F or, alterna-tively, to express the causal role played by God with respect to the creatures’ being F. For instance, Thomas denies that, when we say “God is wise”, we mean either that God does not have the characteristics of non-wise beings or that God is the cause of created beings’ wisdom. For Thomas, when one pred-icates F of God, one means to attribute to God precisely the property of being F, although it is attributed to God in an imperfect and analogical way. Hence, the speakers’ different intentions can serve as the basis for different accounts of the predication in divinis.

In a different context, the appeal to the speakers’ intention obviously plays a role in ethical or sacramental matters where the classification of sins69 or of

68) Cf. Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 10, a. 7: “Respondeo dicendum quod in disputatione fidei duo sunt consideranda, unum quidem ex parte disputantis; aliud autem ex parte audientium. Ex parte quidem disputantis est consideranda intentio. Si enim disputet tanquam de fide dubitans, et veritatem fidei pro certo non supponens, sed argumentis experiri intendens, procul dubio peccat, tanquam dubius in fide et infidelis. Si autem disputet aliquis de fide ad confutandum errores, vel etiam ad exercitium, laudabile est. Ex parte vero audientium considerandum est utrum illi qui disputationem audiunt sint instructi et firmi in fide, aut simplices et in fide titu-bantes. Et coram quidem sapientibus in fide firmis nullum periculum est disputare de fide. Sed circa simplices est distinguendum . . .”69) Cf. e.g. Sum. theol., II-II, q. 75, a. 1.


value of sacraments70 is carried out precisely according to such a pragmatic factor. But leaving aside such theological cases, for our interest in Aquinas’ semantics it is worth noting that Thomas illustrates the speaker’s intention at greater length when he classifies the fallacious arguments depending on a lie. An important case is when a hearer believes to be true what a speaker falsely tells him.71 In this case, the speaker’s intention serves to discriminate what Thomas calls, in the wake a long-standing tradition, the material truth/falsity of a proposition from its formal truth/falsity. If we apply to Thomas a distinc-tion in pragmatics current today, that, roughly, is, that between what is stated by a proposition and what is meant by a proposition, we can say that material truth/falsity occurs when the true/false is stated but not meant by a proposi-tion, while formal truth/falsity occurs when the true/false is meant as well as stated by a proposition. Thus, if we utter a false proposition while meaning to utter a true proposition, we have uttered a materially false, but a formally true, proposition.72

This distinction has two important consequences for our argument.First, albeit implicitly, Thomas presents the speaker’s intention as the prin-

cipal instrument for conferring ethical, pragmatic or performative value to some speech acts. As Thomas observes in the Summa theologiae, if we utter a false proposition while meaning to utter a true proposition we are in a (ethi-cally) lesser serious situation than if we utter a true proposition while meaning to utter a false proposition.73

70) Cf. e.g. In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 2, aa. 1-4; Sum. theol., II-II, q. 72, a. 2.71) Cf. e.g. In III Sent., d. 38, q. 1, aa. 1-2.72) Cf. Sum. theol., II-II, q. 110, a. 1: “. . . Si ergo ista tria concurrant, scilicet quod falsum sit id quod enuntiatur, et quod adsit voluntas falsum enuntiandi, et iterum intentio fallendi, tunc est falsitas materialiter, quia falsum dicitur; et formaliter, propter voluntatem falsum dicendi; et effective, propter voluntatem falsitatem imprimendi. Sed tamen ratio mendacii sumitur a for-mali falsitate, ex hoc scilicet quod aliquis habet voluntatem falsum enuntiandi. Unde et menda-cium nominatur ex eo quod contra mentem dicitur. Et ideo si quis falsum enuntiet credens illud verum esse, est quidem falsum materialiter, sed non formaliter, quia falsitas est praeter intentio-nem dicentis. Unde non habet perfectam rationem mendacii, id enim quod praeter intentionem est, per accidens est; unde non potest esse specifica differentia. Si vero formaliter aliquis falsum dicat, habens voluntatem falsum dicendi, licet sit verum id quod dicitur, inquantum tamen huiusmodi actus est voluntarius et moralis, habet per se falsitatem, et per accidens veritatem. Unde ad speciem mendacii pertingit.”73) Cf. Sum. theol., II-II, q. 110, a. 1, ad 1: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unumquodque magis iudicatur secundum id quod est in eo formaliter et per se, quam secundum id quod est in eo materialiter et per accidens. Et ideo magis opponitur veritati, inquantum est virtus moralis, quod aliquis dicat verum intendens dicere falsum, quam quod dicat falsum intendens dicere verum.” See also Sum. theol., II-II, q. 98, a. 1, ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod actus morales


Second, the reference to the speaker’s intention allows an extension of the ontological domain according to which propositions can be interpreted and then verified. Here a certain caution is needed, for at least two reasons: first, because Aquinas actually does not say anything new, since such a typology of truth often recurs in the tradition; second, because Aquinas does not deep into the distinction between material and formal truth/falsity, nor does he draw any noteworthy consequence from it. Nevertheless, on the account of Thomas’ examples, an interpreter may say that two different accounts of truth recur in Aquinas. A given proposition ‘p’ can be said to be materially true or false according to a correspondence theory of truth: in fact, ‘p’ is materially true or false if and only if p is or is not the case. Thus, if, for example, Socrates is run-ning, the proposition “Socrates is running” is materially true, while the prop-osition “Socrates is not running” is materially false. But a given proposition ‘p’ can be said to be formally true or false only according to a pragmatic account of truth: in fact, ‘p’ is formally true or false only if the speaker’s intention is to utter ‘p’ and to mean that p is or is not the case. Thus, in our example, if Socrates is running, the proposition “Socrates is running” is formally true in two cases: i) if one means to utter such a proposition and knows that it is materially true (i.e. if one knows that Socrates is running); or ii) if one means to utter such a proposition and means that it is true, even though one does not know exactly if it is materially true. If these cases do not occur, the proposition is formally false. From this pragmatic point of view, it is clear that the relation that a proposition bears to the speaker’s intention is more significant than the relation it bears to the world. This explains why Thomas at times calls the formal truth/falsity ‘per se truth/falsity’ and the material truth/falsity ‘per accidens truth/falsity’. In both cases we have a relationship of correspondence. But in the first case, the correspondence in play is that between a proposition and an extramental state of things, while in the second case, it is that between a proposition and a mental state.74

procedunt a voluntate, cuius obiectum est bonum apprehensum. Et ideo si falsum apprehenda-tur ut verum, erit quidem, relatum ad voluntatem, materialiter falsum, formaliter autem verum. Si autem id quod est falsum accipiatur ut falsum, erit falsum et materialiter et formaliter.”74) As one could expect, medieval authors deal with this second relationship especially in the context of the discussions concerning the lie or the classification of moral virtues and vices depending on language. I owe this information to Costantino Marmo. For details and refer-ences, I refer to his ‘Una semantica del verbo nella grammatica e nella teologia tra XIIe XIII secolo,’ in A. Maierù-L. Valente (eds.), Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Lan-guage. Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval logic and Semantics. Rome, June 11-15, 2002, 185-206, esp. 189-94.


Thomas applies the distinction between material and formal falsity in a few theological cases. The most significant case I found recurs in his Commentary on the Gospel of John. Commenting on chapter 8, verset 55, Thomas wonders whether Christ could have stated that he does not know the Father even if, in fact, he knows that he knows the Father. Thomas explains that Christ could have pronounced materially such a sentence—“I do not know the Father”, even knowing that he knows the Father—, but not formally, because it is impossible for Christ to want to pronounce the false. Thus, if Christ had pro-nounced such a sentence, he would have pronounced a materially false sen-tence but a formally true sentence, in so far as he would have pronounced the false without meaning to pronounce the false. Accordingly, the conditional proposition stated by Christ “If I pronounced it, I would have been a liar” is possible and valid, for it is a formally good consequence although both the antecedent and the consequent are impossible.75

There is a second interesting case concerning the intention of the speaker that I would like to signal. It reveals the second link mentioned above, namely that between what a proposition states and what a proposition means. It occurs in Thomas’s Commentary on Peri hermeneias, when treating the interpre-tation of singular categorial propositions. When we formulate a singular prop-osition with existential import (de secundo adiacente) such as “Socrates is”, Aquinas observes, we mean that Socrates exists and the proposition states pre-cisely this fact, i.e. the existence of Socrates. When we formulate a categorial singular proposition (de tertio adiacente) such as “Socrates is white”, we do not mean that there exists a white Socrates but that whiteness inheres in Socrates, and the proposition states precisely this fact, i.e. the inherence of whiteness in Socrates. In both cases, the proposition states the fact that we meant to state by way of such a proposition: the existence of Socrates in the first case and the inherence of whiteness in Socrates in the second case. In a certain sense, in this second case we have an inversion with respect to the previous case, because in

75) Cf. Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura, ch. 8, lec. 8, ed. R. Cai (Turin-Rome,1952), n. 1285: “Ideo dicit Si dixero; quasi diceret: sicut vos dicentes scire eum, mentimini; ita ego si dixero me nescire, cum sciam eum, ero similis vobis mendax. Unde haec similitudo sequitur a contrario, ut sit similitudo in mendacio; quia sicut isti mentiuntur dicentes se scire eum quem nesciunt; ita Christus esset mendax, si diceret se nescire quem novit. Sed dissimilitudo est in cognitione: quia isti non cognoscunt, Christus vero scit eum. Sed numquid potuisset Christus hoc dicere? Potuis-set quidem verba proferre materialiter, sed non intendere exprimere falsitatem: quia hoc non potuisset fieri nisi per inclinationem voluntatis Christi ad falsum, quod erat impossibile, sicut impossibile erat eum peccare. Nihilominus tamen conditionalis est vera, licet antecedens et con-sequens sit impossibile.”


the case of categorial singular propositions existence is presupposed or meant by the proposition but not expressly stated, while in the case of existential singular propositions the existence is both expressly stated and meant.76 But in another sense, this case differs from the previous one, because it shows that not always does what we meant to state by a proposition entirely coincide with what a proposition actually means. In fact, in the case of the proposition “Socrates is white”, we mean only that whiteness inheres in Socrates, but such a proposition is true not only if whiteness inheres in Socrates but also if Socrates exists. In other words, even though the existence of Socrates is not expressly stated by “Socrates is white”, such a proposition implicitly means it, since the existence of the subject must be counted among the truth-conditions of a singular categorial proposition. Thus, in the case of categorial singular propositions there is a gap between what we mean by a proposition and what a proposition means. What a proposition means collects all the truth-condi-tions of the proposition, that is, whatever is explicitly stated or implicitly meant by the proposition. What we mean to state by a proposition instead identifies, semantically speaking, only the fact that the proposition literally states. Unfortunately, Thomas does not say enough about this subtle distinc-tion. It remains, however, that even in this case the appeal to the speaker’s intention is important; specifically, it serves to prevent us from getting gener-alized paraphrases of categorial singular propositions into existential singular propositions.

Conclusion

In Aquinas’s works no comprehensive treatment of pragmatics can be found, only some scattered observations which must be brought together. Nonethe-less Thomas pays a certain amount of attention to two pragmatic factors, i.e. (i) the common usage and (ii) the speaker’s intention. Thomas seems to con-sider common usage as the starting-point of any serious semantic analysis of language and, in most cases, as said, he proceeds to contrast the virtue of

76) Cf. Exp. Per., II, 2, in Opera Omnia I* 1, 88,35-46: “Ad cuius euidenciam considerandum est quod hoc uerbum ‘est’ quandoque in enunciatione predicatur secundum se, ut cum dicitur: ‘Sortes est’, per quod nichil aliud intendimus significare quam quod Sortes sit in rerum natura; quandoque uero non predicatur per se, quasi principale predicatum, set quasi coniunctum prin-cipali predicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto, sicut cum dicitur: ‘Sortes est albus’: non enim est intentio loquentis ut asserat Sortem esse in rerum natura, set ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc uerbo ‘est’.”


speech, depending on the original imposition of names, against the common usage of names, which establishes the ordinary meaning of them. Names do not lose their original meaning when they occur in a more linguistically struc-tured context. What changes in such cases is the supposition of names. Nev-ertheless the context can impinge on the signification of propositions, for the context can influence the meaning that we associate with the names occurring in it. Viewed in this way, the two pragmatic factors are important for Thomas. While common usage gives preliminary information about the semantics of names as well as the linguistic codes with respect to which propositions have to be disambiguated, referring to the speaker’s intention can be useful for interpreting and verifying propositions—although the intention of speakers (or the relationship that a proposition has with it) must not be counted among the truth-conditions of propositions. In fact, if someone utters a false proposi-tion meaning however to utter a true proposition, the proposition is false and not true, at least materially, as was said.77

The speaker’s intention especially plays a role in explaining such phenom-ena as the multiplication of names, equivocation, what Aquinas calls the for-mal truth/falsity of propositions, and the metaphorical, ironical or improper uses of language (every time words are not taken according to their literal meaning).78 The speaker’s intention is finally important—but this is a differ-ent story—for assessing the performative value of the acts of uttering, like what happens in the case of sacramental acts introduced by linguistic formu-las. In this latter case, the appeal to the speaker’s intention is decisive when an act of incorrect pronunciation of the formula is concerned, since a modifica-tion at the beginning of the sacramental formula (unlike a modification at the end of the sacramental formula) can modify or even nullify the entire meaning of the formula.79 Nonetheless Thomas is of the opinion that the use of

77) Cf. In III Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 1.78) See especially Super I Epistolam ad Corinthios, XI, 2. See also In III Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; Super De divinis nominibus, ch. 4, lec. 9.79) Cf. In IV Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, q.la 2, ad 6; also Sum. theol., III, q. 60, a. 7, ad 3. For more on this aspect of Aquinas’s semantics, see I. Rosier, ‘Signes and sacraments. Thomas d’Aquin et la grammaire speculative,’ Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 74 (1990), 392-436; I. Rosier-A. de Libera, ‘Les enjeux logico-linguistiques de l’analyse de la formule de la consécra-tion eucharistique,’ Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin 67 (1997), 33-77; and I. Rosier, ‘Intentions, Conventions, Performativity. Medieval Discussions about Sacramental For-mulas and Oaths,’ Hersetec (Journal of Hermeneutic Study and Education of Textural Configura-tion) 3.1 (2009), 1-14. More generally, on the relationship between language and Eucharistic formulas, see again I. Rosier, La parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire et la sémantique au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1994), and La parole efficace: Signe, rituel, sacré (Paris, 2004).


performative verbs or a performative assessment of propositions does not sub-stantially modify the semantic virtue of names. For example, if I promise to do a thing in the future, my promise does not alter the meaning of the words and the temporal indexation of the sentence but limits itself to put a constraint on the things my promise turns on and therefore it has effect on the act itself of promising.80

In conclusion, the impression is that Thomas reserves scarce attention to pragmatics. He advocates a fundamentally anti-pragmatic account of the sig-nification of names. All the same, he does not omit considering some prag-matic factors—viz. common usage and the speakers’ intention—when he accounts for the equivocation of names or for the distinction between formal and material truth-conditions of propositions.

80) Cf. In IV Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 1.

fabrizio amerini - pragmatics and semantics in thomas aquinas

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