International Journal of Intercultural Relations 34 (2010) 661–669

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International Journal of Intercultural Relations

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Facework in Syria and the United States: A cross-cultural comparison

Rebecca Merkina,∗, Reem Ramadanb,1

a Baruch College-CUNY, 1 Bernard Baruch Way, New York, NY 10010, United Statesb Damascus University, Department of Management, Al-Baramkeh St., Damascus, Syria

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 23 May 2010

Keywords:Face and faceworkCollectivismPower distanceMasculinityUncertainty avoidanceCross-cultural communicationSyrian communicationValue survey moduleVSM 94

a b s t r a c t

“The first rule when communicating with people from the Arab world is not to let themlose face” said J. Al-Omari. Face or one’s social identity is cultural. A face threat is a situationwhich threatens to create a loss of face. When experiencing face-threats people guard theirface with facework – behavioral actions enacted to protect one’s face. Since facework variesacross cultures, this study analyzed how cultural collectivism, power distance, masculin-ity, and uncertainty avoidance influence direct, indirect, competitive, cooperative, hostile,and ritualistic facework in Syria and the United States, employing a MANCOVA designwith gender as the covariate. Significant findings (n = 336) showed that: (a) US Americansreported using more direct, competitive, and hostile facework strategies than Syrians while(b) Syrians reported using more indirect, cooperative and ritualistic facework strategiesthan US Americans (c) US American facework strategies corresponded to individualistic,weak power distance, masculine, and low uncertainty avoidance cultural dimensions whileSyrian facework corresponded to collectivistic, high-power distance, moderately mascu-line, and high uncertainty avoidance and (d) VSM 94 results showed Syria to be moreindividualistic than Hofstede’s original rankings.

© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

On May 3, 2003, Colin Powell directly addressed Syria and stated that the days of the cozy deals and of winking andnodding at Syrian support for certain groups that are security threats to the United States were over. He then presentedSyria with a list of U.S. direct demands that was nothing short of breathtaking (Timmerman, 2003). The direct language usedby the US during this confrontation was face threatening and preceded a break in relations between the US and Syria.

Recently, after a four-year break, the Obama administration decided to send an ambassador to Damascus. This is anoteworthy development because it shows that the US recognizes Syria’s regional importance (Searle, 2009) and is, in effectgiving face to the Syrians. In fact, Presidential spokesman Robert Gibbs said that President Obama’s decision was aimed atfulfilling his promise to show more US engagement in the Arab world (Hurst, 2009). This gesture was reciprocated by Syria’sleader, who sent a July 4th message praising President Obama and invited him to visit Syria (Ghattas, 2009). It is clear thatrecent events highlight the importance of the relationship between the US and Syria.

In order to establish mutually positive relationships with the Arab world, however, understanding and sensitivity tothe concept of face or personal dignity in Arab culture is essential (Harris, Moran, & Moran, 2004) because the loss of facecould cause communication to break down completely (Gross & Stone, 1964). Facework – actions taken to maintain or gain

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 212 312 3732.E-mail addresses: Rebecca.Merkin@baruch.cuny.edu (R. Merkin), Reem.Ramadan@gmail.com (R. Ramadan).

1 Tel.: +1 963 11 2124855/944 420000.

0147-1767/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.ijintrel.2010.05.006

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face – is used to prevent oneself from losing face. Facework is carried out in all negotiations between countries when apossible face-threatening act – messages that challenge the image we want to project – arises. However, the type of faceworkstrategies employed during interactions varies by culture (Ting-Toomey, 1988, 2005).

For example, US Americans regard honest speaking positively. This is evidenced by the legendary story of George Wash-ington cutting down the cherry-tree and admitting it. Most Arabs hearing this story, however, would regard anyone admittingtheir guilt as compromising their integrity (or face) (Naffsinger, 1964). The values and rationales that underlie people’s reac-tions are an aspect of national character, a factor of importance in estimating the likely courses of action in dealing face toface with people from different cultures (Hofstede, 1980; Naffsinger, 1964). Understanding the concept of facework acrosscultures could help define areas of potential communication mishaps and give insight into stated and unstated attitudespresent underneath the surface when communication is taking place between the US and Syria. Thus, the purpose of thisstudy is to investigate the influence of culture on facework used in response to face threats in Syria and the US in order toincrease understanding and improve future communication between our cultures. This will be accomplished by analyzingfacework via Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural dimensions.

1.1. Examining facework using cultural dimensions

Understanding Hofstede’s (2001) cross-national differences helps prevent intercultural miscommunication (Meeuwesen,van den Brink-Muinen, & Hofstede, 2009) in a more important way than understanding socio-political disagreements becausefundamental cultural differences can influence people‘s understanding of another. In particular, Hofstede’s (1980, 2001)cultural dimensions explain the shared views individuals acquire by growing up in a particular country. These dimensionsinclude individualism–collectivism, power distance, masculinity/femininity, and uncertainty avoidance.

Hofstede’s (2001) theory of cultural dimensions has been the most widely used in analyses of phenomena pertaining todifferent cultures (e.g., Arrindale et al., 2003; Vishwanath, 2003). Despite some criticism (e.g., Baskerville, 2003; Goodstein,1981; McSweeney, 2002; Spector, Cooper, & Sparks, 2001), Hofstede’s model has been validated in numerous replicationstudies (e.g., Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Hoppe, 1991; Merkin, 2006a; Shackleton & Ali, 1990; Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars,1996; Smith et al., 2005; Vishwanath, 2003). Moreover, Hofstede’s cultural indices have been utilized in hundreds of studiesexploring the effects of culture in numerous areas (Taras et al., 2010). The large number and the noteworthy consistency ofresearch methodology across these studies justify using Hofstede’s framework for studying cross-cultural facework.

This article is divided into sections on the basis of the effects of Hofstede’s specific cultural dimensions and faceworkcommunication that tends to result from being a member of a particular culture. The particular facework strategies that makeup the hypotheses of this paper were decided upon on the basis of Hofstede’s (1980) assertions in Culture’s Consequences.Overall, it is argued that in the context of a potential face-threat, cultural factors will play a major part in determining thefacework that people in the US and Syria choose to manage their face.

1.1.1. Individualism–collectivism and power distance as predictors of faceworkOne’s culture affects one’s conception of self (Chang & Holt, 1994; Morisaki & Gudykunst, 1994). Losing face is painful

because face is an expression of one’s inner self. For this reason, the self is the starting point in the conceptualization peoplehold of their face. The self, one’s inner identity, is the lens through which people perceive their world and organize theirbehavior (Swann, 2005). Ones self is reflected in one’s face, which is one’s social identity acted out in a dynamic self-regulatinginteractive environment.

A number of researchers (de Mooij, 1998; Hofstede, 2001; Inkeles & Levinson, 1997) point out that cultural conceptionsof the self include the relationship between the individual and society, which is reflective of individualistic and collectivisticvalues. These cultural conceptions are carried out behaviorally through facework strategies. For example, cultural memberswho are individualistic tend to use more direct facework strategies while cultural members who are more collectivistictend to use more indirect facework strategies (Cocroft & Ting-Toomey, 1994; Cocroft, 1992; Ting-Toomey, 1988). Directcommunication is frank and clear-cut while indirect communication involves hints, compliance, oblique suggestions, orambiguous message strategies (Gao, 1998; Holtgraves, 1997; Lin, 1997). Ting-Toomey (2005) posits that face is a universalconcept, while the specific meanings of face may vary across cultures. Thus, facework reflects cultural influences on theinner self.

Ting-Toomey (2005) pointed out that power distance should also be considered as a separate cultural dimension whenexplaining facework; but power distance and collectivism are also correlated. Specifically, individuals from high-powerdistance cultures tend to be more collectivistic and individuals from low-power-distance cultures tend to be more individual-istic (Hofstede, 1991). While individualism–collectivism refers to how individuals identify with their group, power-distancerelates to differences in equality perceptions between people.

Hofstede (1980) ranked Syria as a highly collective culture. The identity of people from collectivistic cultures is inter-connected with their social groups, otherwise known as their ingroups (Triandis, 1987). In general, members of collectivecultures tend to communicate differently with their ingroups than with their outgroups (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1987).Ingroups are “groups of interdependent people who interact over a substantial period of time, and who can be identifiedby others as group members” (Triandis, 1987, p. 266); and outgroups consist of everybody else. Social relationships in col-lective cultures tend to be predetermined by those defined as part of one’s ingroup. Within collective ingroups, there is atacit understanding about the inclusiveness of ingroup relationships that provides ingroup members with mutual support

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(Triandis, 1987). Members of collective societies view those regarded as their outgroups, however, with either indifferenceor antagonism (Triandis, 1987).

According to Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca (1988), in collective societies, people “are trained to cooperatewith members of a few ingroups and to compete with everyone else” (p. 60). In the context of intercultural conflict, Neuliepand Speten (2007) found that the degree to which one uses the ingroup as a standard to judge outgroups is positivelycorrelated with ethnocentrism and one’s positive self-image. Furthermore, during intercultural conflict, as ethnocentrismincreases, respect and concern for the intercultural relationship diminishes (Neuliep & Speten, 2007). This could also be thecase in the context of embarrassment facework.

In fact, findings show that members of collective ingroups are so interconnected, they tend to be only concerned withthe other’s (i.e., their ingroup’s) face to the exclusion of their independent self which is of no concern to them (Ting-Toomey,1988). This is because collectivists have interdependent selves (Morisaki & Gudykunst, 1994). For example, the defense ofcollectivists’ face extends to their ingroups. Thus, not only do they defend their own face in social interactions, they alsodefend the face of others (Goffman, 1955). Consequently, when third parties are present, inappropriate communication onthe part of one ingroup member could cause other ingroup members to lose face because of their mutual interdependence.

Face is of particular importance to Arab cultures (Al-Omari, 2008; Naffsinger, 1964). As a result of their increased sen-sitivity to face threats, collectivists are also more likely to use evasion and ambiguity in face-threatening situations (Bull,2008). This is because ambiguous indirect communication can prevent the exposure to face threats caused by use of explicitlanguage. For example, Al-Omari (2008) suggests to US Americans that if they want a straight answer from a Syrian, it isnecessary to request it repeatedly but politely.

In the individualistic and low in power distance (Hofstede, 2001) US, people tend to view themselves as separate fromtheir social group. As a result, individualists, who are concerned with both their own face and the other’s face (Ting-Toomey,1988) tend to speak honestly and directly (Ting-Toomey, 2005). In turn, individualism has been shown to be connectedto direct styles of communication (e.g., Cocroft & Ting-Toomey, 1994; Gudykunst, 2005; Lindsley & Braithwaite, 1996) asopposed to descriptions of collectivistic indirect communication (Ting-Toomey, 1988, 2005). Consequently, the followinghypotheses are posed:

Hypothesis 1. US Americans will use more direct facework than Syrians.

Hypothesis 2. Syrians will use more indirect facework than US Americans.

While Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimension scores show that the US is both individualistic and low in power distance, Syr-ian citizens besides being collective, also have a high-power distance. Both individualism–collectivism and power-distancedimensions of culture are important predictors for understanding cross-cultural facework (Merkin, 2006b; Oetzel et al.,2001). In particular, high-power distance has been associated with indirect and cooperative facework (Merkin, 2006b). Thisis because cultures high in power distance tend to be more authoritarian and tend to stress conformity and submissive-ness (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, when it is necessary for people from power-distance cultures to interact with others, theyengage in obedient, peaceful, cooperative communication strategies that compromise or collaborate with others (Kirkbride,Tang, & Westwood, 1991).

People in high-power-distance societies also tend to accept inequality in the allocation of power and human rights(Hofstede, 2001). Not surprisingly, findings show that those with high-power-distance orientations also tend to be lessresponsive to unfair treatment and less likely to voice concerns over inequality, preferring more cooperative indirect modesof communication (Brockner et al., 2001; Merkin, 2006b).

Cooperative strategies are reassuring, extra considerate communication that demonstrate deference and respect. Thistype of communication helps smooth over potentially face-threatening events. One manner in which obedience mightbe expressed is via deferential or agreeable cooperative communication strategies. It is widely known that a preferencefor obedient, conforming, and cooperative communication is also related to collectivism (Hofstede, 2001; Offermann &Hellmann, 1997). Given Hofstede’s (2001) description of the preferences of those from high-power-distance cultures forcooperative exchanges and given the positive correlation between high-power distance and collectivism, it is reasonablethat individuals from high-power-distance cultures would prefer using cooperative facework strategies to smooth overdifficult face-threatening situations. Thus, the following hypothesis is posed:

Hypothesis 3. Syrians will use more cooperative facework than US Americans.

Unlike members of high-power-distance cultures, people from low-power-distance cultures view the world as just(Furnham, 1993). Therefore, injustice is simply not expected in low-power-distance cultures (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey,1988; Matsumoto, 1989). As a result, when confronted with an unjust situation, people from low-power-distance culturesdo not readily accept the status quo, but rather engage in more active communication, feeling more in control of their fate(Fetchenhauer, Jacobs, & Belschak, 2005). People from low-power-distance cultures (who are also individualistic) believe inindividual freedom of expression (Matsumoto, 1989) and emphasize clarity, which, to them, indicates integrity (Fry, 1991).Thus, by definition, members of low-power-distance cultures also value equal power distributions across different socialroles (Ting-Toomey, 2005). Moreover, they assume that equals can communicate directly with each other and say what is ontheir minds, even if it risks damaging the relationship at hand (Kim, Sharkey, & Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1995). For example,Kopelman and Olekalns (1999) describe Australians, who are low in power distance, as egalitarian individualists who care

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about honesty, truth, and transparency, and who, therefore, tend to be direct and blunt in their speech acts, favor argument,and can be confrontational if necessary, none of which need be damaging to the relationship. In contrast, foreigners aregenerally advised to avoid ever causing an Arab to lose face (Harris et al., 2004) In addition, individualistic direct and clearcommunication is considered inappropriate and may be offensive to those from collectivistic societies generally (Hofstede,2001).

1.1.2. Masculinity–femininity as predictors of faceworkSocial science researchers (e.g., de Mooij, 1998; Hofstede, 2001; Inkeles & Levinson, 1997) point out that cultural concep-

tions of the self include the individual’s concept of individualism and masculinity. Given that the self is expressed throughface (Goffman, 1955, 1967), it follows that masculinity should also influence facework communication (Hofstede, 1980,1991; Inkeles & Levinson, 1997). Hofstede (1980, 2001) ranked Syrian culture as masculine; however, its masculinity rank-ing is lower than the masculinity ranking of the US. In addition, the high-power distance of Syrian culture should militateagainst typically masculine facework such as displays of assertiveness, for example. This would indicate that those from theUS are more likely to demonstrate more classically masculine characteristics such as emphasizing performance, ambition,things, power, and assertiveness (Hofstede, 2001).

Competitive facework strategies are communications designed to enable an actor to rise above the target as in beingbetter, more successful, or winning against the target. Hostile facework strategies are disconfirming, impatient, inconsideratecommunications that demonstrate disregard or lack of respect for the target. Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt (2005) foundmasculinity to be negatively associated with acquiescent response behavior and positively associated with extreme responsestyles (e.g., hostility). Given the masculine focus on competition and “strength” (Hofstede, 2001), the concomitant use ofboth competitive and hostile strategies appears to be likely. Thus, the following hypotheses are posed:

Hypothesis 4. US Americans will use more competitive facework than Syrians

Hypothesis 5. US Americans will use more hostile facework than Syrians

1.1.3. Uncertainty avoidance as a predictor of faceworkCultural uncertainty avoidance refers to the degree to which people in a culture strive for specificity (e.g., through

ritualistic communication), so that they will perceive as little uncertainty as possible (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). In particular,uncertainty avoidance influences how communication receivers interpret whether a sender’s message is a violation of face(Merkin, 2006a). For example, receivers with high uncertainty avoidance perceive others’ messages through a filter. First,they reduce uncertainty; then they attend to the message. If there is too much initial uncertainty present, they will not beable to focus on the message at all because of the distraction caused by uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Merkin, 2006a).

To manage uncertainty, those from high uncertainty avoidance cultures tend to use more predictable ritualistic com-munication (Merkin, 2010). (For example, members of high uncertainty avoidance cultures could project their face usingritualistic facework communication behaviors such as a strong handshake.) Ritualistic facework strategies are repetitiveactions that create predictability in interactions. Ritualistic facework is primarily used during greetings and leave taking,though depending on the cultural mores, can be used for meetings and ceremonies of various kinds.

Resembling many Arab countries, Syrians have high uncertainty avoidance, which indicates a need for stability and aresistance to change (Hofstede, 1980, 2001). Hofstede (1991) points out that people with a strong need to reduce uncertaintyalso tend to be less likely to trust others. Moreover, particularly when a relationship is new and perceived as stressful,negotiators with high uncertainty avoidance also tend to have a higher need for clear structured signals (Hofstede, 1989)and predictable ritualistic communication (Merkin, 2006a). Thus, given previous findings, the following hypothesis is posed:

Hypothesis 6. Syrians will use more ritualistic facework than US Americans.

2. Methods

2.1. Participants

This study followed Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) specifications that the best way to operationalize culture is to use matchingsamples. Matching subjects on as many characteristics as possible reduces the possibly of competing effects from demo-graphics, thereby isolating the cultural effects of the predictor. For this reason, in this study, attempts were made to matchsubjects on demographic characteristics such as age, education, and gender. The participants were all college students study-ing in their home countries within the same age range. Specifically, the mean age of the Syrian sample was 22 and the meanage for the US sample was 20. In addition, the mean education level of the Syrian and US samples was matched at 14 years ofeducation. Finally, students were less matched on sex in the US and Syrian samples because the US sample was dominatedby women while the Syrian sample was dominated by men. Thus, the possible influence of gender was controlled for bymaking gender a covariate.

Hofstede (1994) pointed out that his Value Survey Questionnaire requires a sample size of 50 per country. The samplesize necessary for adequate power in the hypotheses using multivariate analyses is between 58 subjects per group (Lauter,1978) and 70 per group (Cohen, 1988). Both samples had more than 70 participants. The Syrian sample (n = 95) came from a

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University in Damascus. In the Syrian sample 27 were women and 68 were men. The US sample (n = 241) came from a largeMidwestern University. In the US sample, 150 were women and 91 were men.

In order to assure that the VSM calculations were calculated with a matched sample, a second data collection was carriedout with a similar student population in Syria. Specifically, an additional 20 women filled out the VSM questionnaire. Thisassured that a more accurate interpretation of Syrian VSM scores was undertaken.

2.2. Design and statistical procedures

Hypotheses were tested by means of a MANCOVA design with country as the independent variable, gender as the covari-ate, and direct, indirect, cooperative, competitive, hostile, and ritualistic facework strategies as the dependent variables.Students were requested by their professors, in classes in their home countries, to read a vignette representing a face-threatening situation and rate direct, cooperative, competitive, hostile, and ritualistic strategies in terms of likelihood ofuse. The cross-cultural predicament presented was pretested with a group of 30 students; and college professors who wereexperts in intercultural communication were consulted as to the predicament’s cross-cultural face validity. Each respondentwas presented the following scenario: “Imagine you are in a foreign country as a tourist and are currently visiting with anacquaintance from this foreign country. (You met this afternoon in the museum.) This acquaintance invites you out for din-ner. While dining in a fancy restaurant, you accidentally knock over your glass of fruit juice. It shatters and your drink goeseverywhere, including onto your acquaintance’s shirt. Everyone in the restaurant sees this.” US participants received thequestionnaire in English and Syrian respondents received the questionnaire in Arabic. The Arabic questionnaire was back-translated separately to assure the translation’s validity (Brislin, 1986). Respondents were asked to respond to the itemson a 5-point Likert scale. A demographic questionnaire also was included to assure that the respondents were matched. Asecond set of 20 women were given the VSM questionnaire in their classes in Syria.

2.3. Instrumentation

As suggested by Hofstede (1994), cultural dimensions were operationalized by country. Besides operationalizing cultureby country, Hofstede’s Value Survey Module (VSM 94) which allows for the calculation of index scores for cultural dimensions(Hofstede, 1994) was also used to see if scores were different from Hofstede’s (1980) original rankings. The VSM consists offour-item questionnaire sections on each of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.

Cocroft’s (1992) construction of response items for direct and indirect strategies were used because Cocroft (1992) andCocroft and Ting-Toomey (1994) were able to successfully utilize these response items with Japanese and US respondents.An example of an indirect questionnaire item is I would express my regrets indirectly.

Cooperation and competitive strategies were operationalized in this study by using the Cooperative/Competitive Strat-egy Scale (CCSS; Simmons, Tucker, & King, 1988), which measures the motivation to use competitive, cooperative, and/oravoidance strategies to achieve success. This 24-item scale contains three independent subscales. Each item is followed byfive response options ranging from always (5) to never (1). Although the CCSS was scored by adding all responses withinthe three subscales and computing the aggregate average for each subscale, this study employed the cooperative and com-petitive subscales only. Test–retest reliability for the Cooperative subscale has been reported at .75 (Simmons et al., 1988).Construct validity was also established by Ward (1993), who confirmed the factor structure of the Simmons et al. (1988)scale with an independent sample of employed adults.

Hostility strategies were measured by Buss and Durkee’s (1957) irritability subscale of their Hostility Inventory. Thisscale’s reliability was tested during a pilot study and its reliability was .72. The Buss–Durkee Hostility Inventory (BDHI; Buss& Durkee, 1957) is a widely used measure of hostility. The BDHI is composed of 66 items and seven hostility subscales. Atotal measure of hostility is assessed by this scale by summing the seven hostility subscale scores. The original scale itemsare in true–false form; however, in the current study, participants rated each item on a five-point Likert scale to obtain aninterval level measure of hostility.

Merkin (2004) constructed a scale to measure ritualistic facework strategies to measure Hofstede’s description of theeffects of uncertainty avoidance. Face validity for this scale was established by a group of four professors who were expertsin intercultural communication. Merkin (2004) found a test–retest reliability of .81 and construct validity evidence for thisscale.

3. Results

Differences in Syrian and US facework were tested by means of a MANCOVA design with country as the independentvariable, gender as the covariate, and direct, indirect, cooperative, competitive, hostile, and ritualistic facework strategiesas the dependent variables. For reliabilities of both US and Syrian facework strategies, see Table 1. Overall results showedthat multivariate analysis was warranted because the multivariate main effect for culture was significant (Wilks’ � = .089;F[6,317] = 538.93, p < .0001, �́2 = .91). Hypotheses 1 and 2, that Americans reported the intent to use more direct faceworkstrategies (M = 1.75, SD = .53) than Syrians (M = 1.64, SD = .50) and Syrians would report using more indirect facework strate-gies (M = 17.95, SD = 4.12) than their US counterparts (M = 2.84, SD = .54) were substantiated. In addition, Hypothesis 3, thatSyrians would use more cooperative facework (M = 2.16, SD = .51) than US Americans (M = 1.89, SD = .50) was also substanti-

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Table 1Reliabilities for dependent variables.

United States Syria

Dependent variable Reliability N Reliability N

Indirect .78 240 .70 95Direct .60 240 .68 95Cooperation .74 240 .70 95Competitive .71 240 .68 95Hostile .72 240 .71 92Ritualistic .72 240 .71 91

Table 2Analysis of variance summary between the US and Syria.

Facework strategies F Eta2 p

Direct 4.97 .015 .026Indirect 2847.84 .898 .0001Cooperation 13.41 .040 .0001Competitive 92.40 .223 .0001Hostile 53.24 .142 .0001Ritualistic 31.83 .090 .0001

Table 3Hofstede’s and VSM rankings.

US Syria

VSM 94 1980 Rank Study 1 Study 2

VSM 94 VSM 94 1980 Rank

Individualism 140 91 84 84 38Masculinity 79 62 41 47 53Power distance 39 40 103 45 80Uncertainty avoidance 80 46 90 88 68

ated. Results supported Hypothesis 4, that Americans would use more competitive facework strategies (M = 2.36, SD = .47)than Syrians (M = 1.67, SD = .64) as well. Moreover, Hypothesis 5, that Americans would use more hostile facework strategies(M = 3.37, SD = .61) than Syrians (M = 2.76, SD = .85), was supported. Finally, significant results showed that Syrians reportedthe intent to use more ritualistic facework (M = 3.93, SD = .66) than US Americans (M = 3.51, SD = .65), showing support forHypothesis 6. In short, all hypotheses tested were substantiated. Specific univariate results of the hypotheses tested aresummarized in Table 2. The covariate effect of sex was also significant (Wilks’ � = .925, F[6,317] = 4.27, p < .0001, �́2 = .08).

Finally, Hofstede’s VSM 94 yielded four index scores for individualism, masculinity, power distance, and uncertaintyavoidance which were calculated as a confirmation measure (see Table 3). The VSM scores are a rank order determination ofcountries when compared to other countries and are not directly comparable to Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) country rankingsbecause they are not on the same scale. Thus, the VSM scores are not country rankings. In general, VSM score rankingsbetween the US and Syria and in tune with Hofstede’s original country score rankings. However, Syria’s individualism VSMrankings showed a smaller difference between the US and Syria than was originally found using the range between Hofstede’scountry scores (i.e., 140–84 = 56 as opposed to 140–38 = 102) indicating that while still more collective than the US, Syriaappears to be more individualistic than in the past. Finally, VSM results indicated that balancing the Syrian sample for genderfundamentally changed the power-distance score (i.e., from 103 to 45).

4. Discussion

4.1. Implications and future research

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influence of culture on facework used in response to embarrassing facethreats in Syria and the United States in order to increase understanding and improve future communication betweenour cultures. The present findings substantiating Hypotheses 1, 4, and 5 indicate that US Americans prefer using directexpressions and can compete and communicate in a hostile manner to manage their face, as corroborated by previousresearch (e.g., Merkin, 2006a, 2006b; Ting-Toomey, 2005). Results substantiating Hypotheses 2, 3, and 6, however, showthat Syrians prefer using indirect, cooperative and ritualized communication when faced with a face-threatening situation.It is clear that the communication needs in both the US and Syria appear to differ; indicating that culture needs to be takeninto account when Americans and Syrians interact with each other. This study is the first of its kind in that it makes a cross-

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cultural comparison of face and facework during a time of face threat in the US and Syria, a previously unexamined culture,as opposed to past research which has primarily focused on comparisons between US and Asian facework.

Hofstede (1980, 2001) classified Syrians as being collective, having a high-power distance, being moderately masculine,and moderately high in uncertainty avoidance. In contrast, Hofstede (1980, 2001) classified US Americans as individualistic,having a low-power distance, being masculine, and low in uncertainty avoidance. For the most part, Hofstede’s originalranking of Arab countries corresponded to the calculated VSM 94 results in this study for both Syria and the US.

Although for the purposes of this study culture was calculated by country, as designated by Hofstede’s (1980) study, VSM94 results were calculated according to Hofstede’s (1994) formula, as a control to see if discrepancies might better informresults. While in most cases the US and Syria’s VSM rankings were similar to Hofstede’s original rankings, the differencesbetween Hofstede’s country score rankings and calculated VSM score rankings with regard to individualism–collectivismscores showed a smaller difference between the US and Syria than Hofstede (1980) had originally found. This indicates thatwhile Syria is still more collective than the US, Syria also appears to be more individualistic than in the past.

This may be due to globalization. Recently, reports specify that as more Syrian expatriates return to their country fromabroad, that they push new trends and demand the services and cuisine they have been used to abroad. For example, sushiis now deemed the height of sophistication in Damascus, and is becoming de rigueur for the capital’s upper class. The Syrianoutlook is expanding in that flatbread and hummus may no longer do for Syria’s elite population (“International” 2010). Thistype of acculturation could indicate more individualistic leanings than previously on the part of the Syrians in accordancewith global trends towards individualism (Arnett, 2002; Stevenson & Zusho, 2002). Future research should investigate thisaspect of Syrian culture further because this could inform future dealings between Syria and the US.

Finally, VSM results indicated that balancing the Syrian sample for gender fundamentally lowered the power-distancescore (i.e., from 103 to 45). It could be that overall this is reflective of Syrian culture. Alternatively, it is possible that Syria’sfemale population has a lower power distance than the male population. However, further testing is needed using data froman additive individualism scale because the VSM 94 is exclusively a ranking tool.

In general, the results of this study showed that while controlling for gender, culture is likely to influence the preferredfacework strategies (i.e., direct, indirect, cooperative, competitive, hostile, and ritualistic) that people use in response tofeeling a face threat. In particular, in response to face threats, Syrians scored higher than those from the US in their preferencefor indirect, cooperative, and ritualistic facework, while US Americans showed a preference for direct, competitive, and hostilefacework.

This study’s findings indicate that both the US and Syria could improve with a better understanding of each other’spreferred facework communication. One possible solution to establish greater similarity of minds would be for those fromthe US to tone down the directness of their communication when communicating with Syrians. This appears easier thansuggesting to high-power-distance Syrians not to feel offended when their Pavlovian response would be shock over whatthey perceive to be offensive.

For example, when Colin Powell referred to Syria as a “terror supporter” (Schweid, 2003), this direct and hostile com-munication could have been viewed as face threatening by the Syrians and subsequently ignored. Many sources report thatthe first rule when communicating with people from the Arab world is not to let them lose face (e.g., Al-Omari, 2008; Harriset al., 2004; Patai, 2007). Therefore, the suggestion is made for those from the low uncertainty-avoidance US to take extrastrides to moderate their direct communication when communicating with Syrians.

In addition, because ritualistic communication is on the whole quite significant to Syrians, it would be useful for USAmericans to become familiar with Syrian rituals. Another constructive idea for US Americans, who are used to direct literalcommunication, is to be aware that ritualistic communication is wrought with nuances and subtle cues. As a result, USAmericans could do with greater mindfulness to unspoken meanings in their communication with Syrians. US Americanswould also do well to be aware that Syrians are more likely to conceal their intentions and feelings given their perceptionsof what they consider to be appropriate communication.

On the other hand, for Syrians about to engage in meetings with US Americans, it would be noteworthy to be aware thatUS Americans can sometimes communicate in ways that are seemingly harsh to Syrians, who are not used to the aggressivecommunication styles favored by US Americans. Although the US habitual use of direct expression may seem disrespectfuland gruff to the uninitiated, if Syrians are warned and have greater expectations of possibly being on the receiving end ofan intentionally or unintentionally overly explicit communication style, such offenses could be managed. The results of thisstudy were based on propositions from Hofstede’s (2001) theory of cultural dimensions. These findings provide importantimplications for the concepts of face and face management during meetings between the US and Syria in the future.

4.2. Limitations

Because this study necessitated the use of a cross-cultural sample, there could be some validity issues in the translationof the English questionnaire despite the care taken to assure that the translation was accurate. The same could be true withregard to the thorough back-translation undertaken for the purpose of this study.

This study operationalized culture by country as initiated by Hofstede (1991). Although there is support for this form ofmeasurement, others dispute Hofstede’s cultural methodology (e.g., Baskerville, 2003; Goodstein, 1981; McSweeney, 2002;Spector et al., 2001). Furthermore, VSM 94 measurements indicated that the Syrian sample in this study scored higher onindividualism than Hofstede (1980) previously predicted. However, the Syrian sample’s rankings still scored more collective

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than the US respondents, providing support for the country-level findings. In addition, we were limited to the gendercomposition available to us. Though a second data collection took place to even out the sample, a larger sample overallwould have helped provide more definitive results.

Finally, using self-report data has limitations as well as strengths. The disadvantage of self-reports is that respondentsare not actually executing the behaviors they are reporting but rather are reporting the behaviors they would intend tocarry out. While cross-cultural negotiations are not exactly the same context as the scenario used in this study, respondentsdid indicate what their preferred facework would be when given an embarrassing face threat. Self-report literature is notcompletely isomorphic with reality, but can give useful guidelines that can be followed up on and used for future research.The self-report method has the advantage, however, of being able to measure information that is in respondents’ mindsand not readily available using observational techniques. Then again, traditionally, facework studies have been carried outusing this method (Cocroft & Ting-Toomey, 1994; Imahori, 1994; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Oetzel et al., 2001) becauseit is difficult to measure phenomena that exist inside a person’s mind using other methodologies. Questionnaires werealso anonymous, and the samples were matched on possible confounding demographic characteristics. Thus, despite thedrawbacks above, self-report measures were used. Despite methodological limitations, this study filled a need to investigatethe more specific context of communication in Arab cultures to facilitate global interactions of the future.

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