facing the 'counterrevolution'. romanian responses to the hungarian crisis of 1956

8/3/2019 Facing the 'Counterrevolution'. Romanian Responses to the Hungarian Crisis of 1956

1/69

Facing the `counterrevolution`. Romanian responses to theHungarian crisis of 1956

Emanuel Copila,Teaching AssistantPolitics department, Faculty of Political Science, Philosophy andCommunication Studies, West University of Timioara,

AbstractFor the Soviet Union, the Hungarian revolution from the fall of 1956 represented probablythe most important challenge it had to face since the Nazi invasion during the Second WorldWar. The popular democracies were also threatened by it to a great extent; evenindependent Yugoslavia, a true model for the Magyar insurgents, agreed with Khrushchevs

plan of sending Soviet troops to Budapest and forcefully reinstating communism in Hungary.This study focuses on the Romanian reaction towards the event, outlining the actions and themotives which determined the latter rebel of the socialist camp to prove itself, in thatturbulent autumn, Moscows most worthy ally.

Key words: de-Stalinization, Hungarian revolution, foreign policy, revolutionaryvigilance, socialist camp1

IntroductionEvery communist regime, far from abolishing the conflict between socialclasses, which it actually gives conflicting dimensions, ends up bringing to thefore a new class. Eclectic, encompassing various social categories (also asclassical classes, such as the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the peasantry,invested by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries with an inexistent consistency anduniformity in the real world, non-ideological), the new class does not

1 The documentation for this article was partially facilitated by an AMPOSDRU scholarship,obtained trough the following grant: Investeste n oameni! FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN,Programul Opera;ional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013, proiectulSTUDIILE DOCTORALE FACTOR MAJOR DE DEZVOLTARE AL CERCETRILORSOCIO-UMANE SI UMANISTE. Parts of this study will be used for further research.


2/69

POLITICAL STUDIES FORUM

68

precede the revolution, but is formed as its consequence. In other words,unlike previous revolutions, decisively influenced by a social group or another,in rising, the communist revolution made post-facto the class that legitimizes itand that, at least theoretically, should have put into practice. Here is asubstantial invalidation of the Leninist ideological postulate according to whicha revolution emerges as a result of the working class efforts, which allies ornot, depending on local conditions, with other classes, usually with therevolutionary peasantry.

The new class, warns Milovan Djilas, is not to be mistaken for theCommunist Party that facilitates its existence. The two sides are in a symbioticrelationship whose polarity gradually changes, moving in a more or less rapidrhythm from the political to the social level. Thus, after the revolution, whenthe new class begins its existence, it is inferior to the party; as communistpromises reveal their unlikelihood, the party falls into obscurity, while the newclass prospers. The party makes up the class, but the class grows and usesthe party as a basis. The class grows stronger, while the party becomes weaker;this is the inevitable fate of every communist party in power (Djilas: 1957, 40).

The roots of the new oligarchy are found mainly in the workers environment.Therefore, the new class will monopolize the proletariat and, through it, the whole society, imposing a monopoly whose main component is theintellectual one. Advantaged by the economic policies specific to communistleaderships, focused on the development of heavy industry, the new classmanages from an administrative point of view this process being in a constantexpansion (Idem, 37-47). But we can extend the new class beyond thickbureaucracies of Leninist regimes, where Djilas places it; outside of publicadministration officials, the unquestionable foundation of the new class, itmay also include members of the police, elite workers, teachers, or students. Inother words, anyone who has something to gain or owes its ascending socialposition to the communist system.

In the autumn of 1956, Hungarians rose against this new class and the partythat subtended it. Against the communism imposed by force by the Soviets, adecade earlier. Against ideological, economic, political and cultural oppressionto which it was systematically subjected by a despotic and without legitimacy


3/69


69

autocracy. Against the chains that instead of disappearing, as argued Marx and,later on Lenin, had become increasingly worse.

What happened in Hungary as a result of the de-Stalinization process? AndorHorvath suggests that the phrase national democratic insurgence is mostappropriate to describe the tumultuous protests of Hungarians in thatmemorable year. In the strict sense of the word, they were not (...) arevolution, says Horvath, since the objective was the reformation, and notthe overthrowing of the regime (Horvath in Jela, Tismneanu: 2006, 120). It istrue that the original aspirations of the protesters were rather reformist, but, asthe situation escalated, they became downright revolutionary. I think, and willtry to argue in this section of the essay, that Hungarians have done in 1956 agenuine revolution, even if it never broke through of under a relentless failure.Ephemeral in length and in political weight, the Hungarian revolution hadinstead an invaluable symbolic significance.

According to the dictionary of sociology edited by Oxford University Press,revolutions are events during which the entire political and social order isreversed, usually by violent means, and rebuilt on new principles, with newleaders (Marshall: 2003, 475 ). Although Imre Nagy was not a new leader,the fact that he declared Hungarys neutrality announcing the UN of its

withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization and, moreover, restored,even if for a short time, a genuine multi-party political system all its actionstranscend the logic of changes within the system, outlining the moment ofan anti-system movement. In consequence, it can be said that Imre Nagystarted as reformer and ended as a revolutionary (Tismneanu: 1999, 86),admittedly because of the pressure of events rather than on his own initiative;however, his personal merits and the revolutionary character of the Hungarianprotests cannot be denied (Tismneanu in Jela, Tismneanu : 2006, 146). Ofcourse, Nagy was a convinced communist, and his background includes plentyof black spots, as we are to learn. But the fact that in the twelfth hour hejoined the revolution rather than fight it gives him an undeniable prestige.

The restoration of the multiparty system in Hungary, although only for a fewdays, was more radical than in Poland. Here, although they continued toexist until the end of the regime, the non-communist political parties wereintegrated into a national front designed to give the appearance of political


4/69


70

diversity, actually a surrogate of it and a mechanism for the emasculation ofthose parties. In Hungary, on the other hand, Nagy pursued the democraticcooperation of parties, as they existed in 1945 (my italics) (Meray: 2000, 263;Pop: 2002, 85, Zinner: 1956, 454). Therefore, not in a national front, but inan independent manner, based on relations of mutual equality. What happenedin Hungary is thus a revolution, even if a short-lived one and unfortunatelyborn under the sign of failure.

The itinerary of a failed revolutionStalins death has resulted in substantial changes in the Hungarian politicalelite, directly proportional to the crystallization process of the new leadershipin Moscow. The Secretary General of the Hungarian Workers Party (MDP),

who, as customary during the Stalinist leadership, was also the prime minister,was nicknamed, a defining aspect for his political and ideological orientation,Stalins favorite pupil. Mtys Rkosi had subjected Hungary to an irrationalmassive program of rapid industrialization, whose economic effects were felt infull at the social level. Consequently, MSZPs popularity and of communism ingeneral were at minimum levels.

In June 1953, Rkosi is forced, pressured by the Soviets, to stop leading thegovernment in favor of Imre Nagy. Known as a moderate and reformistcommunist, who made his apprenticeship in the Comintern, he had beenremoved in 1948 from his position as Minister of Agriculture, as aconsequence of Rkosis direct machinations. This undoubtedly rebound forthe MSZPs Secretary Generals political career has not continued, as waslikely, by minimizing his role also at the party level. Conversely, highly able andadaptable (incidentally, he knew eight languages), the tireless Rkosi waited forthe right time, to which he facilitated its emergence by numerous backstagemaneuvering, only to regain in 1955 the presidency of the government.However, one year after this success, as we will see, his political career will endabruptly, just months before the outbreak of protests in Budapest. Rkosi willbecome one of the victims of the de-Stalinization policy, being undesirableboth for the Hungarian society and for the new leadership in Moscow (Brogan:1990, 122-123; Rainer: 2006, 292-293).

Imre Nagy strongly launched towards the implementation of the neweconomic course. The amounts invested in agriculture, domestic and food


5/69


71

industry were increased, while reducing hyper-centralized management of theeconomy and increasing the importance and decisional weight of localinstitutions. However, the party apparatus was dissatisfied with the neweconomic orientation. The former prime minister, after a formal approval ofthe new course principles and of the collective leadership, began to issue veiledcriticism about the increasing number and activities of kulaks (wealthy or

very wealthy peasants, responsible in Marxist view for promoting capitalism invillages); another criticism aimed at reducing revolutionary vigilance amongthe proletariat (Brzezinski: 1971, 215-216).

But Nagy was determined to carry out the economic and social reforms.Denouncing the Stalinist monopoly on Marxist-Leninist science, heattributed it with serious theoretical errors, which had repercussions on theglobal social development and on the fight between the two systems, andfinally on the fate of socialism itself. The new process did not represent adeviation from Marxism-Leninism, as it had been accused, but its continuationand development. Highly important, the new course, Nagy claimed, did notpropose new strategic tasks for the MDP; these, the shaping of theeconomic foundations of socialism and building socialism in Hungary, and, ingeneral, the communist world were unchangeable. A step towards buildingsocialism, the new course was still very important and had to be metunconditionally. What did it consist of? In the establishment of ever closerrelations in the exchange of goods between towns and the countryside,between socialist industry and the system of small farms producing for themarket, easing the transition towards a socialist system of farms producing at alarge scale. In Hungary, the implementation prerequisites of the new course

were from afar inconsistent; however, its need for the ideological finality of theregime and for earning the peoples confidence in this process was, at least forNagy, obvious.

The basic requirements and specific features of the transitionperiod economic policy (new rate, m. n.) was either non-existent inHungary, or partially accomplished in part because of our economicpolicy lacked a scientific basis in Marxist-Leninist analysis, and alsobecause, as a consequence, we simply copied Soviet methods applied toa much larger scale in building socialism, thus eliminating entiredevelopment phases. This is why Hungary needed a New Course (in


6/69


7/69


8/69


74

Finally, these errors gave the enemy an opportunity to attackoverly broad. In their totality, the mistakes I have committed in themost important position of the Party work have caused seriousshortcomings in our overall socialist development.

It fell into my tasks to hold the lead role in rectifying thesemistakes. If rehabilitation has sometimes been slow and withintermittent breaks, if a certain recrudescence was observed last year inthe liquidation of the cult of personality, if criticism and self-criticismtogether with the collective leadership have developed slowly, ifsectarian and dogmatic orientations were not controlled stronglyenough then, for all these, undoubtedly, the primary responsibilitybelongs to me, as First Secretary of the Party (Zinner: 1956, 338-342).

Further, the MDP wanted to be connected to the de-Stalinization processthrough three major reforms. The first one was raising the living standards of

workers, followed by increasing the productive security of the workingpeasantry, and, finally, improving the social and cultural circumstances of

working people (Idem, 348). Regarding the last point, things will progressivelyturn to a disturbing twist.

Thus, the Petfi circle which, similar to the Fourfold Circle Club in Poland,had extended throughout the country, favored with aplomb Imre Nagy and thereformist measures that he had initiated. Students, dissatisfied intellectuals and

workers began to make common cause against the Stalinist elite in theHungarian leadership (Brzezinski: 1971, 222). Just before the protests inPoznan, the circle members initiated a large-scale protest against Rakosi andNagys resettlement to power. The MDP First Secretary renounced to arrestNagy and some hundreds of his important supporters only following directSoviet pressures (Durschmied: 2003, 380; Fontaine: 1993, 304). Laszlo Rajksrehabilitation in March and a series of amnesties and limited administrativedecentralizations failed to develop into an outlet for the societys grievances.Instead, Rajks reburial a Stalinist no better than Rakosi, executed in 1949after a Stalinist trial that centrally aimed Titos compromise turned into amajor public event, bringing together tens of thousands of people (FranoisFejt advances the figure of 300,000 participants) in a silent, but veryexpressive, protest against the leaders in Budapest (Brzezinski: 1971, 223;Fejt: 1979, 120).


9/69


75

Rakosis replacement by Ern Ger had no effect; on the contrary, bysubstituting a Stalinist with another, the population requirements for authenticpolitical reforms had not been satisfied, but rather mocked at. Moreover, itseemed that the Soviet Union itself was offering its endorsement for thereform of Hungarian communism. Eventually accepting Gomu;ka as leaderof the PUWP and Poland, which the Hungarian press considered having ahistoric importance, Moscow seemed not to be opposed to the de-Stalinization of popular democracies. Amnesties decreed in the spring of

1956 by Rkosi had an unexpected effect: they had contributed, by the returnof many party members abusively imprisoned in previous years, to demoralizethe MDP. Last but not least, confusion increasingly pushed through the army,a comprehensive aspect for the easiness with which it took the insurgents sideduring the revolution. Gradually, officers and military cadets identifiedthemselves with anxious intellectuals, going down to take part in clubsdiscussions, writes Zbigniew Brzezinski (1971, 225-227).

Even intellectuals convinced of the correctness of Marxism, as Gyrgy Lukcs,acknowledged that, for Hungarian citizens, it was more unpopular than ever.

Welcoming the 20th Congress of the CPSU, before whom no debate was

possible, the Hungarian philosopher advocated for the democratization of thepolitical and intellectual life with the help of constructive polemics. The returnto Leninism, he warned still, must be made by Leninist methodology, asLenin can be transformed as much as Stalin into a citing and dogmatismfigure. Unfortunately, Lukcs noted, there are forces ready to impress thisdirection to the Twentieth Congress (sic!), and it is the duty of everycommunist his debt to the socialist revolution, his debt in honor of Marxism,

which unites us as Marxist philosophers and intellectuals to take a standagainst it at the first outset (Lukcs: 1991, 88-93). The Hungarian revolution

will, however, exceed the ideology proposed by Lukcs. He will be deportedtogether with Imre Nagy in Romania, because he actively supported him in the

tempestuous days during late October and early November. He will return ayear later in Hungary, where he will make his self-criticism, remaining loyal tothe regime until the end of his life.

*


10/69


76

Students, intellectuals, workers, party members, military personnel: the socialpicture was thus complete. In mid-October, in Szeged, an independent studentassociation had been established, which fought for a democratization of social,political, economic and intellectual life, increasingly less compatible with theexistence of the Hungarian communist regime. The news of WadysawGomukas confirmation, who symbolized for Poles what Nagy meant for thehopes of reform in Hungary, in the position of PUWPs Prime Secretaryarrives in Hungary a day after the date it became official: October 21.Encouraged, the students propose a list of demands and a demonstrationmarch through the streets of Budapest, which will start on October 23 and willbe, by the strong support given by workers, the moment of the HungarianRevolution outbreak (Rainer: 2006, 298-299; Pop: 2002, 77; Korda: 2006, 92).

Among the students requirements, fourteen in total, which had now beenassumed by the remaining protesters, were: the MDPs leadership renewal,Government reshuffle and inclusion of comrade Imre Nagy among itsmembers, respecting national sovereignty and the principle of not interferingin internal affairs, the Red Armys withdrawal from Hungarian territory,substantial economic restructuring, public trials for Rkosi and his maincollaborator, former Defense Minister Mihly Farkas, modifications to themilitary uniforms and the return to the national emblem from the Kossuthera, Total freedom of opinion and press freedom, removing Stalins statue,the symbol of tyranny and oppression, from Budapest, and, finally,Complete solidarity of Hungarians (Meray: 2000, 43-44).

The government will learn about the students plan to take to the streets.Confused, the members of the MDPs Political bureau who has just returnedfrom Yugoslavia, where they tried to convince Tito of the good faith of thenew Hungarian leadership, Rkosi being considered by the latter as one of thegreatest personal enemies and also one of the East European leaders mosthostile to the Yugoslav version of socialism will prohibit the manifestation(Fejt: 1979, 122). In vain. Gathering around the statue of Jozef Bem, thePolish general who played a critical role during the Hungarian revolution of1848, the demonstrators then headed towards the Parliament square, chantinganti-communist slogans and demanding that Nagy speak to them. Theirnumbers increase as more and more workers and even soldiers guarding public


11/69


77

buildings joined them, reaching approximately 200-250,000. On the way, partof the demonstrators will go to Stalin square to destroy the statue erected in hishonor five years earlier, while another part headed to the radio broadcastingbuilding, wanting to disseminate the 14 points on the air to the whole country(Pop: 2002, 78). The conflictogenous potential was fully fueled by Gerhimself, in whose name, in that same evening, the Radio Broadcasting willtransmit a defiant and offensive release concerning the demonstrators and theobjectives that they sought. Here is a relevant passage from the declaration ofthe MDPs first secretary:

The main task of the enemies of our people today is trying toundermine the working class power, weakening the alliance between

workers and peasants, undermining the leading role of the workingclass in our country, and shaking our peoples confidence in its party the Hungarian Workers Party; trying to weaken our countrys closelinks of friendship, the Hungarian Peoples Republic, with othercountries that build socialism, in particular between Hungary and thesocialist Soviet Union. They try to weaken our partys relations linkingour party with the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union,Lenins Party, the 20th Congress Party.

They revile a bunch of slander against the Soviet Union. Theyassume we trade with the Soviet Union on unequal positions, that ourrelations with the Soviet Union would not be initiated on an equalfooting, and that our independence should be defended not against theimperialists, but against the Soviet Union. All these are brazen lies,hostile propaganda which does not contain on ounce of truth (Zinner:1956, 403).

For the crowds morale, these words were imprudent, if not even unconscious.Next, Ger recognized that some problems had made their place in therelationship between the party and the society, and announced, as soon aspossible, a MDP Central Committee plenary session meant to debate them andto find a solution. Until then, however, a particularly vigilance is necessary toprevent hostile elements to obstruct the efforts of our Party, of the workingclass and working people, and to clarify the situation (sic!). Calling for theunity and cohesiveness of the party (not only for ideological reasons, butprobably because of the awareness of its organizational weakness and the


12/69


78

danger of disintegration that threaten it), Ger declared himself strongly infavor of socialist democracy, rhetorically warning against the catastrophiceventuality of the restoration of capitalism in Hungary.

The party unity was always greatly needed. Without unity, ourParty would not have been able to defy the criminal terror of theHorthyst fascism over a quarter-century. Without the unity of our Partyand the working class, popular democracy could have prevailed in ourcountry, and the working class allied with the peasantry would not havegained power. This unit, the Party, the working class and workingpeople unity must be guarded as the light of our eyes. Let us encourageour Partys organizations, in a disciplined manner and in full unity, tooppose any attempt to create havoc, nationalistic poisoning, andchallenge.

Fellow workers! Workers! We must honestly admit that thequestion now is whether we want a socialist democracy and bourgeoisdemocracy. Do we want to build socialism in our country or to rupturesocialism building, and then to open doors for capitalism? Will youallow the working class power, of the worker-peasant alliance, to beundermined, or will you rise with determination, disciplined and incomplete unity, with all working people, to defend the workers powerand the success of socialism? (Idem, 406 - 407)

In those moments of confusion, members of the Hungarian security guardingthe building opened fire on the crowd, instigated after the MDP leadersuninspired speech that ended with the disappointing message The Party Unityfor Socialist Democracy. Progressively armed by the soldiers who hadchanged sides, the insurgents responded in the same manner. The Radiobuilding was captured after an uninterrupted siege. The new troops that weresupposed to defend it either changes sides or refused to fight for the detestedsecurity service members. On the other hand, an issue that facilitated theoccupation of the building by the revolutionary was that the powerrepresentatives messages began to be sent from elsewhere (Lakihegylocality); therefore, the strategic importance of this objective was greatlydiminished, especially because, after the intervention of Soviet tanks, it couldbe regained at any time and with minimal loss (Meray: 2000, 159-166). The


13/69


79

Hungarian Revolution had become irreversible (Granville: 2002, 536-537;Korda: 2006, 94-95; Meray: 2000, 111, 145 pop: 2002, 78-79).

On the issue of arming revolutionaries, observations made by historian AdrianPop are interesting. He considers the ease with which protesters gained, indifferent circumstances, access to firearms suspicious, reaching theconclusion that the KGB, in collaboration with its Hungarian pendant,

V, acted on the express orders of Khrushchevs Stalinist opponents,interested in producing a situation of chaos in Hungary to demonstrate thelimits and drawbacks of de-Stalinization and compromise, namely of thepolitical neutralization of CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev (Pop: 2002,79-80). Such a hypothesis, however attractive and plausible it might seem atfirst glance, has not so far been validated by credible documentary sources.Consequently, its adoption as one of the premises of escalation of theHungarian revolution seems to be at least improper.

Meanwhile, Nagy, who had just returned from a vacation, fully placed himselfunder the party power, to which he had been readmitted a few days back(Meray: 2000, 114; Zinner: 1956, 388-389). He will eventually be called at theparty headquarters, where Ger, with an evident dissatisfaction, asked him toaddress the crowd in the Parliament square to temper it and to prevent a

violent outcome. Something the former prime minister will not hesitate to do.Emerging from the main balcony of the building that was headquarters of thelegislature, Nagy, after finally being recognized and allowed to speak, will starthis speech a terminological inertia that thwarted and annoyed the huge rally.Comrades!, he called them, with the unpleasant surprise of being booedintensely. The stirred crowd, sensitized by events, rather tired, still oscillatingbetween fear and hope, expected, no doubt, that he addressed it withFriends or Hungarians, words that would have met the true state of mind(Meray: 2000, 117). After settling clamor, Nagy urged for calm and the peacefulreturn of demonstrators to their homes. But in vain. His modest display,contrasting greatly with the dynamic speeches, presence of mind and self-mastery that Gomuka had demonstrated in similar circumstances did notconvince the crowd. Clashes with security forces continued until morning.

The next day, Nagy was reinstated as prime minister. Simultaneously, followingthe hail that Ger made the previous day, Soviet troops stationed in Hungary


14/69


80

initiated the first action against the insurgents. Demonstrating the MDPleaderships inability to correctly assess the seriousness of the situation and theincreasing drift of the party itself, Ger will make public, in terms with which

we are already accustomed, the Hungarian government request for militaryassistance from the Soviet troops.

Attention! Attention! The condemnable attacks ofcounterrevolutionary gangs during the night (October 23 to 24, m.n.)have created an extremely serious situation. Bandits penetratedfactories and public buildings and killed many civilians, members ofnational defense forces and fighters of the state security organs.

Government bodies have not reconciled with the bloody andcondemnable attacks and, accordingly, have requested the aid, underthe terms of the Warsaw Pact, of the Soviet formations stationed inHungary. The Soviet formations, coming to meet the governmentsrequests, are taking part in restoring order.

The government appeals the capitals residents to remain calm,to condemn the bloody disorder triggered by counterrevolutionarygangs and to support everywhere the Hungarian and Soviet troopsseeking to maintain order. The liquidation of counterrevolutionarygangs is the most sacred cause of all Hungarian honest workers, of thepeople and of the Motherland. At this point, we are concentrating allour powers in the direction of this task (Zinner: 1956, 409).

Trying to limit the magnitude of armed violence and devastation that began tospread throughout the country, Nagy will address during the same day aproclamation to the Hungarian nation, which, besides the call to end armed

violence, advocated for the deep democratization of Hungarian public life,for the achievement of a Hungarian way corresponding to our nationalcharacteristics in building socialism and, above all, for a radical improvementof living conditions of workers (Idem, 410). One can observe the attention

with which the Prime Minister chooses the words by which he addressed therevolutionaries: people of Budapest, or Friends, Hungarians!. The detestedcomrades almost disappears, being strategically framed by terms with afamiliar sounding, non-ideological: Hungarians, comrades, friends! (Idem,409-411). Also Nagy insists on the national dimension of the message he


15/69


81

sends, in the less feasible attempt to overcome the destructive chaos that hadinstalled itself on the Hungarian capital streets.

Proving, in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, his inability to properly managethe situation, Ger is replaced by Janos Kadar. By then one of the secretariesof the Central Committee of the MDP, he is known for his moderate political-ideological orientation. Demonstrating empathy, to a certain extent, towardsthe demonstrators, Kadar said that The demonstration of a section of theyouth that began peacefully and in which most participants had honest goalsdegenerated in several hours into an armed attack against state power and thePeoples Democracy in accordance with the intentions of the anti-popular andcounterrevolutionary elements which have interfered in the mean time (Idem,415). Consequently, the armed forces response was thus more than justified.

The intervention of Soviet troops on October 24 was, strictly in militaryterms, less effective. Without a fitting support from the infantry, Soviet tanks

were relatively easy targets for mainly young demonstrators, armed withgrenades and Molotov cocktails. Then, Soviet soldiers were not familiarized

with the operations theater, and most maps they had received were at least tenyears old, a period within which many street names were changed. It can beargued that the presence of the Red Army on the streets of Budapest had theopposite effect of the one predicted by MDPs leadership: it potentiated thedemonstrators strong anti-Russian and anti-Soviet feelings, also provokingnew large scale protests (Pop: 2000, 1982-1983).

Concerning the Soviet intervention, Nagy showed an ambivalent behavior,even Stalinist at times. He advised, which is understandable, the Hungariantroops not to oppose in any form the Soviet peacekeepers, and did notprotest when Ger appealed to leadership in Moscow in this respect.Moreover, on October 25, he even spoke in favor of increasing the number ofSoviet effectives that acted in Budapest (Granville: 1995a, 23; Crampton: 2002,328). The central figure actions of the Hungarian revolution misled manyprotagonists and, later, researchers of the event, thus giving him qualities hedid not possess. We must not forget that, between 1930 and 1944, Nagy waspolitically active in Moscow. As a member of Cominform, acting under theconspiratorial name of Volodya, he provided information about almost twohundred people, among which Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, Poles,


16/69


82

Germans or Austrians. Fifteen of them died in prison or before a firing squad. Also, in 1951, when Janos Kadar, in turn, was imprisoned and subjected toextreme torture (his testicles were crushed), Nagy approved in writing thearrest and implicitly the punitive measures to which his party colleague hadbeen subjected to. It is not excluded that Nagy, once he fell into disgrace in1948, has been shielded from the fate of Rajk, Kostov, or, to a lesser extent,Gomu;ka, due to the protection given by persons belonging Stalinsentourage himself (Granville: 1995b, 34-35; Granville: 2002, 544). Thus, oncemore, if necessary, the inconsistency of the dichotomies native communists

or patriots, moderate and reforms oriented, and Moscow communists,foreigners and responsible for the use of Stalinist methods is demonstrated.

Another important figure of the Hungarian revolution, this time less known, isthat of Colonel Pl Malter. In the last days of October, after being instructedby Kadar to suppress counterrevolutionary actions, he changes sides to theinsurgents, putting into practice an organized and, as much as possible,coordinated defense against Soviet troops. With five tanks, but having theadvantage of knowing the arms deposits both of the army and of the securityforces, the colonel has made a major contribution, if not to an impossible winagainst the Soviets, who temporarily withdrew the troops at the end of the

month, then at least to the euphoric mood of those memorable days. In him,writes Erik Durschmied, the movement found its military leader. But soonthe situation will take a dramatic turn. After the restoration of the multipartyand declaring Hungarys neutrality, a delegation led by Malter met with Sovietrepresentatives to negotiate a new form of relations between the two sides.Not suspecting the trap that had been set for them, all delegation members

were arrested. Until the summer of 1958, nobody heard anything about itsleader, when his execution was briefly announced, together with that of ImreNagy (Durschmied: 2003, 376-440; Fontaine: 1993, 321-322; Korda: 2006, 156;

Andrew, Gordievski: 1994, 301).

On the streets of Budapest the fighting continued despite permanent appealsfrom the authorities to restore peace and the resumption of daily activities,without which the city was literally paralyzed. However, not all inhabitants ofthe Hungarian capital were taking part in the hostilities. There were endlesslines in front of bakeries, and being part of such a group required no lesscourage than when engaging in combat activities. The risks of those who


17/69


83

waited to buy bread to turn into collateral casualties were very high. In suchcases, which were not rare at all, the victim was simply moved elsewhere. Noone risked to losing their place and returning home without bread (Mironov:2006, 471-509). Here is a type of heroism that is not observed at all in literaturecentered on the Hungarian Revolution that of Budapest housewives who,unlike combatants, were directly exposed to shooting, but who, withoutlooking for cover, had as a priority the supplying of their families (Fontaine:1993, 325).

Meanwhile, Nagys attitude is increasingly converging with revolutionarydemands. Across the country, in cities like Gyr or Debrecen, workersorganize their own councils, called ironically anti-Soviet Soviets, makingregional committees through which they demanded free elections, the

withdrawal of Soviet troops, the neutrality of Hungary and the released fromprison of Cardinal Jzsef Mindszenty, a symbol of Hungarian anti-communism, imprisoned in 1949 (Crampton: 2002, 328). More under thepressure of events than on his own initiative, Nagy will gradually put intopractice these measures. He began by affirming, in October 25, when streetfight amplified, the withdrawal of the Red Army from Hungary, an event that

will be consumed, only in appearance, a few days later.

As President of the Council of Ministers, I am announcing thatthe Hungarian Government will initiate negotiations concerning therelations between the Peoples Republic of Hungary and the SovietUnion, among others concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forcesstationed in Hungary, under the Hungarian-Soviet friendship, theproletarian internationalism, equality between Communist parties andsocialist states, and national independence.

I am convinced that the Hungarian-Soviet relations built onthese foundations will provide a solid basis for a true and sincerefriendship between our peoples, for our national progress and oursocialist future. Recalling the Soviet troops whose intervention infighting was made necessary by the vital interests of our socialist order

will be made immediately after the restoration of peace and order. The government will show a deep generosity in the spirit of

reconciliation and understanding and will not impose martial lawagainst those who resorted to arms without the intention to overthrow


18/69


84

our peoples democratic regime and against those who cease fightingimmediately and will hand over the weapons. This applies to all, allyoung people, workers, and armed forces personnel. (Zinner: 1956,417-418).

After two days, Nagy will form a new government (Peoples Patriotic Front)to continue implementation of reforms and restore control of the situation(Crampton: 2002, 328). But street fighting still went on, as the polarization of

what could inappropriately in that context be called the Hungarian politicalelite. Some wanted to moderately continue the reforms, accepting that therevolution had a legitimate basis, while others cataloged the insurrection ascounterrevolutionary calling for its defeat by any means possible.

Trying not to further inflame the atmosphere, the Szabad Np newspaper,which was suspended briefly, but had resumed its appearance, recognized thejustified grievances of the population, which in October 23 manifested for theimplementation of fair, national and democratic reforms. However, it

warned against bad elements who took part in the demonstration at thefirst outset. They have committed armed excesses, especially after the fightingoutbreak. The accusations continued. They rose against our PeoplesDemocracy. They killed innocent people, unarmed, and prisoners, evenengaging, if we were to give credence to the article, in looting and theft fromshops (Zinner: 1956, 425-427).

Meanwhile, Nagy had issued a cease-fire order, which, however, had no effect.Regarding the ideological meaning of events, it was firmly against catalogingthem as counterrevolutionary. The demonstrations, even if at times had beeninfiltrated by counterrevolutionary elements, were the expression of theHungarian workers will for democracy, dignity and living conditions, if notcompatible with the aspirations of the socialist ideal, then at least decent.

The government condemns the views which argue that thepresent formidable movement is a counterrevolution. Without doubt,as always happens in times of large popular movements, thismovement, too, was used by criminal elements to undermine it and tocommit common crimes. It is also a fact that reactionary and


19/69


85

counterrevolutionary elements have penetrated the movement tooverthrow the peoples democratic regime.

But it is also indisputable that, in these agitations, a greatnational and democratic movement, embracing and unifying all ourpeople, developed with a great force. This movement aspires to ensureour national freedom, independence and sovereignty, to advance oursociety, our economic and political system towards democracy forthat is the only foundation of socialism in our country. This great movementhas exploded due to the serious crimes committed during the recenthistorical period.

The situation was further aggravated by the fact that, until theend, the leadership [of the Party] did not decide to separate itself, onceand for all, of the old and criminal policy. This, above all, has led to thetragic fratricidal war in which so many patriots have died on both sides(my italics) (Idem, 429).

Later, after the imposition of house arrest at the villa in Snagov, Nagys viewon the subject will be radicalized. Explicitly condemning the great powerRussian chauvinism, the Hungarian politician will blame those who arestubborn enough to see the Hungarian Revolution a counterrevolution ofignoring Marxism itself and of trying to restore the old Stalinist subordinationin the relations between countries, peoples and Communist parties. Not theHungarian people, but those who are incriminating it, Nagy concludes, are thereal counterrevolutionaries. And continues rhetorically: Can a popularmovement in which the working class, the former main representative ofnational interests, in addition to armed struggle, uses such a characteristic

weapon for it, the weapon of the general strike, of passive resistance, thespecific and tested weapon of workers, be seen as a counterrevolution? Inaddition to workers, even the vast majority of inferior members of the MDPhave actively participated to the street fighting, which makes Nagy ask himselfagain: Is it counterrevolution the peoples movement or struggle or themost desperate armed struggle in which is involved all the working class ledby hundreds of thousands of communists? (Nagy: 2004, 79).

A few days after creating the new government, the Soviet contingents withdrawal from Hungary is announced. It was, however, a manipulativemovement made by Moscow that, sending its representatives in Budapest,


20/69


86

sought to mislead Nagy, mainly through official statements on the absence ofany interference in internal affairs of socialist states and on respecting theegalitarian bases of the relationship between them (Zinner: 1956, 485-489).

When, on October 30, he announced the restoration of the multiparty system,followed two days later by the declaration of Hungarian neutrality by waivingmembership of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Idem, 453-454, 463-464) the Soviet plan for a second military intervention was already materialized,being put in place the morning of November 4. The Hungarian revolution

would be crushed by a huge military force, 2,000 tanks and 60,000 troopsmethodically eliminating a significantly lower resistance in all respects (Pop:2002, 91).

The same day that Hungary declared neutrality, the First Secretary Janos Kadarannounced the formation of a new communist party on the ruins of the formerMDP. It was called the Hungarian United Socialist Party (HUSP), callingamidst its lines workers, peasants, and intellectuals to fight for the socialistfuture of our people. Making known its solidarity with other political parties(in that context, there could be no alternative), HUSP required theovercoming of the danger of a damaging counterrevolution and called at theaid of the government for external support (Zinner: 1956, 464-467), knowing,of course, that this fraternal aid had already been set in motion. Thenotification of the establishment HUSP was not done in Budapest, becauseKadar mysteriously quit the scene a few days before, and would not return inthe Hungarian capital until November 7 to reconfigure, in Soviet parameters,the Hungarian communism (Granville: 1995, 27). Thus, the HUSP firstsecretary, after initially asserting the Hungarians grievances will now move tothe other side, directly and even in a vilifying manner condemning theHungarians fight for a better life, which could be built up outside the Sovietsphere of influence. The power of truth will conquer Kadar and his comrades,as well as all those behind them and covering their treachery, willprophetically write Nagy, while he was in captivity in Snagov (Nagy: 2004,120). However, more than three decades will pass until the desideratum of theiconic figure of the Hungarian revolution will be put into practice.

The second Soviet intervention was not caused by assertion of Hungarianneutrality. Conversely, Nagy resorted to this move because he knew that thecountry was invaded (Crampton: 2002, 331), probably seeking to terminate


21/69


87

any legal basis of Moscows aggression, which now had no justification for itsintervention under the principles of the military Treaty that the communistcountries had signed in Warsaw the last year (Pop: 2002, 87). No matter howloyal to the Soviet Union, Nagy was overtaken by events and was no longertrustworthy for Moscow. Also, he made the statement when the consequencesof the Soviet decision for a new military involvement had become apparent bythat the army sent in Hungary was not withdrawing, but increasing its numbers(Granville: 1995, 27; Bks: 2006, 332).

A particularly controversial aspect of the 1956 events in Hungary lies in therole played by the West. One of the main myths that persist in this regard isthat of direct military support that the United States could have granted theHungarians, helping them to get out from under the Soviet hegemony andcreating a hole inside the Iron Curtain. Thats not true. Washington morallysupported the Hungarians struggle, not getting involved beyond this level. Theexisting geopolitical situation, the Cold War, made the risk of any conflictbetween the superpowers to escalate uncontrollably to a nuclear catastrophepossible, perhaps even a third world war, which more highly disadvantageousto both parts (Bks: 2006, 322). President Dwight Eisenhower was explicit inthis regard, publicly stating, Nothing did disturb the American people somuch that the events in Hungary. Our heart was with the Hungarians and wedid everything possible to soften their suffering. But, Eisenhower insists, Imust emphasize the following fact: the United States never encouraged andnever will encourage defenseless population open riots against superiorforces (Meray: 2000, 311; also see Korda: 2006, 103-104).

Unfortunately, this was not true. Radio stations like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America incited demonstrators in protests and announced armedsupport from the West, namely from the United States. The situation went sofar as clear advice was given to rebels to give new claims and causemistrust against Imre Nagy and his government (Idem: 2000, 231; Pop:2002, 1992-1993). The brochures later distributed on the populardemocracies territories to process the revolution have fully insisted on thispoint (The counter-forces role ...: 1958, 11-21). Henry Kissinger explained:Although Radio Free Europe was a station funded by the U.S. government, it

was led by an independent board of directors which did not receive formalinstructions from the administration (Kissinger: 2003, 486). But this does not


22/69


88

exonerate him of the responsibility he bears in the unnecessary extension ofthe tragedy and of the need to pertinently obtain information beforeencouraging gullible and saturated with Western triumphalist propagandaHungarians to a suicidal resistance.

International attention on the Hungarian revolution was overshadowed by acrisis that the western world simultaneously experienced, namely the event thathas remained known in history as the Suez crisis. Nasser, Egypts leader at thattime, decided, following an unfulfilled promise made by Washington to helpmodernize the canal, its nationalization. The United States decided to use thisgesture to punish Egypts receptivity to Soviet advances, however notmaterialized in any way until then. Nationalizing the channel to gain fromtaxation of all vessels which were to cross it, Nasser directly touched thecolonial interests of Great Britain and France. These, together with Israel,initiated a military incursion to win control of the channel. The United States

will publicly admonish this action, which will therefore fail. It was the first timesince World War II when the West had to deal with a resounding domesticconflict.

Moscow offered to join efforts with those of Washington to address the crisis,a proposal promptly rejected by the Eisenhower administration, which wouldhave thus seen as damaged its international prestige (Kissinger: 2003, 474).Instead, the Soviets took advantage of the synchronization of the two conflictsto resolve as quickly and discreetly as possible the one in its geopolitical area.Moreover, Kremlin gained even a moral support through the Suez crisis: whyshould the Red Army activity be condemned on Hungarian territory whenBritain and France proceeded exactly the same in Egypt? (Korda: 2006: 104) Inaddition, Moscow was given the opportunity to draw Nasser towards thecommunist world and strengthen some relatively modest diplomatic relationsuntil then, taking advantage of the weaknesses and inconsistencies with whichthe United Nations finally addressed the Suez crisis (Martelli: 2006, 26;McCauley: 1981, 777-800; Hoffman: 1957, 446-469). Faced, in the SecurityCouncil, with a resolute condemnation of hostility and a decision ofceasefire, London and Paris will gradually withdraw troops from Egypt,

which were, by the end of December, substituted by the U.N. BlueHelmets. The fact that led to the greatest extent towards this outcome was,

writes Alfred Grosse, the brutal financial pressure of the American


23/69


89

government, which initiated a systematic devaluation of the pound campaign,placing in circulation enormous sums of this currency on the internationalmarket (Grosser: 1999, 199-200).

Eventually, the Soviets would have intervened anyway in Hungary the riskthat the revolutionary spark would reignite Poland and possibly other populardemocracy was unacceptable to Khrushchev whatever might havehappened or not in Egypt (Bks: 2006, 324). Romania, like other socialiststates, condemned the imperialist intervention in Egypt, consideringNassers position completely justified. Besides the fact that, at that time, it didnot want to draw Moscows attention by adopting a dissenting position,Bucharest initiated economic relations with Egypt, from where it began toparticularly import leather, cotton or exotic fruits and vegetables, providing inexchange industry and agriculture know-how, Diesel engines and other electronicproducts. Consequently, there was an increasing interest in growing anddeveloping economic relations between the two parts (Stanciu: 2004, 84-89).It is estimated that over 2,500 Hungarians and about 700 Soviet troops diedduring the Hungarian revolution. The disproportion is even greater when itcomes to the number of wounded: around 20,000 in the first case, respectively,1,500 in the second (Granville: 2004, 97, 99). One must take into account alsothe disproportion between manpower and equipment of the combatants:several tens of thousands of professional soldiers, properly equipped, certainlyfaced fewer opponents and much less well equipped. However, militaryoperations have lasted considerably longer than anticipated by Marshal IvanKonev, the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact (Idem, 98).

The revolutionaries fighting against the regime revived by the fraternal aid ofthe Soviet Union, now led by First Secretary Janos Kadar, will continuesporadically until January 1957. In Budapest, armed conflicts ended earlier, inmid-November. The Hungarian Revolution was over. But its ghost will hauntthe international Communism spectrum until annus mirabilis 1989, when therevolutions then produced in Eastern Europe had in it an essential referenceand an impressive moral inspiration.

*


24/69


90

While Soviet tanks crushed the upright bold resistance of the Budapest peopleon the morning of November 4, Imre Nagy, together with his family and fewclose friends, sought and obtained political asylum at the Yugoslav embassy.

After about three weeks of uncertainty and negotiations in which he finallysucceeded to obtain the promise he could return safely home, him and allthose accompanying him will be arrested immediately after leaving the embassybuilding and, under Soviet escort, were initially transported to a military schoolfrom where, the next day, they were sent to Romania. Bucharest had a centralrole in conducting the whole operation, which will be considered in anothersection of the study. I am interested here primarily on Nagys sense of whathappened in Hungary at the end of the remarkable year 1956.

So let us give him the floor to learn how the evacuation of the Nagy grouptook place in reality, a group of politicians with heterogeneous opinions,in no way an organized group, as the Soviet and Eastern European presssuggested (Hegeds, Somlai in Rusan: 2000, 610) from the building of the

Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, after the Ministry of Defense, led now byFerenc Mnnich had made a bus available for the refugees.

On November 22, 1956, at 6 P.M., the bus arrived in front ofthe Yugoslav Embassy.

The Yugoslav military attach, full of indignation, told us thatthe bus driver is Russian and that there were other passengers, too. Isaid that in those circumstances we will not get on the bus. After that,the two officers of the Hungarian police entered the premises of theEmbassy and informed us that, following Mnnichs orders, they willcare for our transport home. We then started to get on the bus. They

wanted to take me by large car, Zis type, but I refused and got on thebus along with others.

While we were taking our seats on the bus, one of theHungarian police officers gave the show away and said that, beforegoing home, we will go to Mnnich who wishes to speak to us.

I immediately got off the bus, I did not allow it to startanymore and started to give arguments to the Soviet commanders who

were there in their position, as well as to the Soviet Embassyinterpreter that he got on the bus, too. I called from the Yugoslav


25/69


91

embassy building Ambassador Soldatici, to whom I communicatedwhat had happened and I asked him to clarify the issue with MnnichFerenc.

The Ambassador, there in the street, protested against theRussian presence and interference and referred to the agreementbetween the Yugoslav and Hungarian governments (by which Nagyand his companions could not be compelled to go where they wantedafter leaving the embassy, m.n.).

For safety, he ordered the first secretary of the YugoslavEmbassy, Georgevici, and the military attach to go on the bus andaccompany us all home. We started.

Soon, we saw that they were not taking us home. Once westarted, in front and in the back of the bus appeared Soviet tanks withsmall guns in firing position. A few minutes later, we arrived in front ofthe Soviet city commandment on the Ajtai-Drer road. Here they gotout the two officials mentioned and security of the bus was taken bySoviet soldiers.

(...) After a pretty long ride, under the escort of the twoarmored vehicles, we arrived at the military school bearing the name ofRkoczy Ferenc II. Here we were now prisoners. We were forbidden totalk among ourselves or to enter one in the other ones room. Thecorridors were guarded by armed sentries. It was clear that we are inthe hands of the Soviet security bodies (Nagy: 2004, 104-105).

Shortly after the seizure made under the direct patronage of Moscow, ValterRoman, member of the PMR that Nagy had met several times in Moscow inthe early 40s, tried to persuade him to accept a temporary domicile in Romania,until the normalization of political relations with Hungary. The former primeminister peremptorily refused, surely fearing a prolonged Soviet investigation

with a foreseeable ending. I said that they can drag me out from Hungary byforce, because they have enough power for it, but they will never get myconsent (Idem, 105).

The next day, the Nagy group members were flown to Bucharest, where theyreceived a fixed residence in a Snagov resort villa. Their situation was notenviable: we were deported, under armed guard and under the supervision ofthe Security, isolated from the outside world, isolated from each other, with a


26/69


92

very incomplete political information (no radio, only a few newspapers) (Idem,107). Informative notes were written in Hungarian and then translated intoRomanian. The personnel and equipment used for monitoring the Hungarianpoliticians and their families were not distinguished by professionalism.Natural sounds, like coughing, were destroying the recordings. Furthermore,the prisoners eventually managed to establish a relatively easy means ofcommunication, by which they deceived their supervisors for long periods oftime. Written slips were hidden for long periods of time, unnoticed by theagents, although they regularly raided apartments and clothing. (Hegeds,Somlai in Rusan: 2000, 610). Now, Nagy will have the time to think long onthe events that have changed his life. He will theorize two understandings ofthem. The first, assumed by Ger and his acolytes with the Soviet leadership,consisted of violent repression, with typical Stalinist means of popularmovements, invariably characterized by the name of counterrevolutionary.

Then, there was a second possibility for the interpretation of the Hungarianrevolution as a revolutionary popular movement which, to be successful,must be guided by the party to the peaceful, balanced and humandevelopment towards socialism (Idem, 75).

Being, of course, in the favor of the latter, Nagy argued that if he would havewon, which was, as noted, downright impossible, the Hungarians insurgencywould have given back to the ideas of socialism, democracy, independenceand sovereignty what had been kidnapped by Stalinism, namely their truespirit, their Marxist essence (Idem, 117). The rebarbative methods used by theSoviet Union during Stalins reign in the name of broadening andstrengthening of the revolutionary ideal have resulted in a painful contradictionbetween, on one hand, the national independence, respectively, on the otherhand, the attractiveness and applicability of socialism. This is the essence ofthe Hungarian tragedy, says Nagy. The fundamental purpose of theHungarian revolution was to seek and find the reconcilement of thiscontradictory situation and to achieve unity of the two ideas (Idem, 118).

In terms of Moscows arbitrary involvement in the events taking place inBudapest, Nagy tenably appreciated that the Soviets preferred a weakenedHungary, dependent on Soviet tutelage and used as a warning to any pro-independence tendencies that would have risen among popular democracies(Idem, 121-122). Moreover, the former Prime Minister considered, the


27/69


93

ideological and political monopoly of the CPSU, which held in full dependenceboth the party as well as the entire country, has obstructed the MDPscooperation with the people to clarify internal problems. Consequently,Soviet interference was the main reason of the disaster in Hungary, wherethe party was not, as the Kadar government propaganda said, assailed by thecounterrevolutionaries, but stayed on the oppositions side which hastherefore represented the overwhelming majority of the party and thusbecame legitimate (Idem, 126, 124).

For the bloody turn of the October protests, the responsibility belongsabsolutely and entirely to the Soviet Union. Moscow should take this intoaccount, thinks the former premier, similar situations that had happened on theterritories of some popular democracy in recent years. First, the workersriots that occurred shortly after Stalins death in East Berlin, then the socialtensions that had taken place in the summer of 1956 in Poland and Hungary,respectively. All these signaled that the disastrous political mistakes of theCPSU will lead to a series of catastrophes (Idem, 84). Despite the alarmsignals represented by these popular movements for Soviet power, it isdoubtful that they would have had a premonitory role, anticipating theHungarian tragedy, especially since the situation in Poland did not degenerateinto the real war that took place on the streets of Budapest. Nagy generalizeshere beyond scientific acceptability. All the above revolutionary outbreaks haveoccurred and have developed in different circumstances and under the actionof similar factors, but not identical. The particularities of each of these casesreflect its singularity. The sources of the disaster in Hungary lies, besides theSoviet factor, at least to the same extent in the decisions or lack of decisionsmade by the MDPs leadership in those critical moments, as I will further try toargue. Even Nagy admitted that in the last moment, because of the vigorousand resolute action of Polish leaders, the CPSU and the Soviet governmentbacked out, so armed struggle could be avoided. What did Hungary lack totransform into a second Poland? A party and a party leadership able to cope

with the crisis. Only the unity of Polish comrades, the unity of the partyleadership, the party and government unity and their fearlessness made themilitary intervention of Soviet troops not to take place (Idem, 87). AndGomu;kas political flair, I might add, what his Hungarian counterpart neverhad.


28/69


94

Next, Nagy acknowledges the Poznan riots role over the soaring tensions inBudapest. The events in Hungary have occurred under the influence of eventsin Poland, from a feeling of deep sympathy for the Polish partys attitude andtowards the Polish independence tendency. They were augmented by thediscretionary intervention of Soviet military units, and in no case by the so-called counterrevolution orchestrated by the imperialists; through theirattitude, but this time Under the pretext of proletarian internationalism, theSoviets actually restored a historic juncture from the nineteenth century,centered on the Russian czarism ambitions, namely the Holy Alliance,formed after the Napoleonic wars by Austria, Hungary and Imperial Russia. Inother words, a holy socialist alliance was reinstated, led, like its predecessor,by the hegemonic tendency of Moscow (Idem, 141-142). Nagy surprises herebecause he definitely speaks against naming the Hungarian revolution acounterrevolution, while, in the last days of October, he maintained that ithad, however, been infiltrated by reactionary and counterrevolutionaryforces. (Zinner: 1956, 429). Perhaps he was aware that he had nothing to lose,apart from his integrity.

A little known aspect of the political biography of former prime minister, andone which, among others I will deal with later on, makes him no honor, lies inhis unconcealed form of anti-Semitism he expressed towards what he calledthe Rkosi clique. Including, in addition to Stalins favorite pupil, severalprominent members of the MDP, Ger, Farkas, Rvai, Kovcs, Ngrdi, theclique was responsible in Nagys view of worsening economic relations withneighboring friendly countries as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania.Regarding relations with the last of these countries, the litigious matter of

Ardeal prevailed. In 1947, at the Paris Peace Conference, instead of putting theissue in the socialist spirit, Rkosi pushed it to bourgeois nationalism, thusfundamentally preventing the opportunity to resolve it. Not only ininternational relations but also in domestic affairs the Rkosi cliquecommitted errors and abuses which seriously harmed the Hungarys interests,thought Nagy. Undoubtedly, the decisive role was played by the fact that they

were Jews and, furthermore, Jew coming from Moscow. They turned awayfrom the masses, which in turn, despising them, have expressed their hatred ofthem, have believed them to be some foreign agents who were not able tobecome representatives of Hungarian national interests and even lessrepresentatives of Hungarian national feelings. Trying to overcome that


29/69


95

obstacle, Rkosi Jewish clique wanted to be more nationalist than theHungarians themselves and thus damaged the country immensely (Nagy:2004, 97-98).

Certainly, Nagys arguments give at first sight credit to the theory that operateswith the distinction of native communists, patriots, but prevented to do theright thing by Moscow communists, aliens, and often Jews. Althoughembraced by some of those who are its object of study, the theory is no less

valid. Let us remember that Nagy spent the 1930-1944 period in Moscow,returning in Hungary with the Red Army. How could he then accuse Rkosi ofbeing a Muscovite? Internal disputes in the East European communistparties in the postwar era have never been conducted between campsestablished by this criterion. There were no native and Muscovitecommunists, non-Stalinist and Stalinist ones. All, without exception, were loyalto Stalin, even Nagy, even if he turned out to be less dogmatic than othercolleagues of his. Didnt Lavrenti Beria, the dreaded NKVD leader, becomethe first, shortly after the death of the Generalissimo, to seek economic andpolitical reforms of such a scale that scared even the reformist Khrushchev?

And then, of what consisted Rkosi and Gers Jewishness and how did itreflect in the political behavior of the two? What prevents us to place Nagysfailure to resolve the Hungarian crisis peacefully on the fact that he was born aReformed Christian? At a careful analysis, interior conflicts within communistparties were articulated by more volatile, heterogeneous groups, being in aconstant dynamic. Their main criterion of differentiation was neither nationalnor ideological, but personal. Therefore, the power struggle was chaotic, withthe conflicting sides not clearly defined as they continually reshaped accordingto fluctuant affinities or animosities that animated their protagonists. (Shafir:1985, 35).

On calling the Soviet troops to restore order in October 23, Nagy exculpates.At that time, I was not a P.B. member (Political Bureau m.n.), nor agovernment member. This measure was requested by Ger by phone toKhrushchev, who proceeded accordingly. Only a few days later was theofficial request of the Hungarian Government to be assisted by the Moscowmilitary made, and Nagy, who, as we remember, was reinstated as primeminister one day later, on November 24, was asked to sign it. Which Irefused, he continues. Later, even Kadar admitted that it was not right for


30/69


96

them to ask me to sign that document, because then not I, but Hegeds wasPresident of the Council of Ministers, the de jureresponsibility for that requestthus belonging to the latter (Nagy: 2004, 145).

Finally, Nagy was convinced that if, once in front of Radio Broadcastingbuilding, the crowds demand to air the fourteen points that will soon becomethe revolutions program would have been satisfied, or if, immediately after thespeech in Parliament square, he would have addressed those who surroundedthe Radio Broadcasting building, letting them know that the leadership was

willing nationally make public their claims, those who were there would havereceived the idea with huge enthusiasm, would have calmed down and thus thebloody events that followed would have been prevented. If this did nothappen, it is the responsibility of the Political Bureau, firstly of Ger Ern andHegeds Andrs. If Nagy would have begun his appeal in front of thedemonstrators again with Comrades!, I am not sure he would have had theanticipated success. On the same tone, he continues saying that the point of

view according to which the attack against the Radio was acounterrevolutionary action well prepared, organized in advance, does notcorrespond to reality and is an ordinary lie (my italics). Accusing the MDPsleaders abstaining to participate in meetings with revolutionaries, besideshimself, Nagy will conclude that they have betrayed their mission and haveshown cowardice and an unworthy conduct for some communist leaders.The behavior of the Political Bureaus members in the events in October is ashameful stain and marks the moral bankruptcy of the party leadership (my italics),he will stubbornly write. The verdict? In Hungary, the communist leaders havecontributed the least to defend socialism. It is an irreparable moral disaster. And these moralcadavers dare now to speak about Nagy Imre governments treason(my italics) endedextremely virulent the former prime minister his last pages of notes fromSnagov. All major decisions that this government had taken were in directcontinuity with the aspirations of the Hungarian people, tirelessly repeatedNagy, including, or especially, the proclamation of Hungarian neutrality by

withdrawing from the Warsaw Treaty Organization (a measure which heinitially opposed) (Idem, 169-171; Granville, 2002, 546).

However easy was it for Nagy to give credit retroactively by supersizing theconnections between the decisions of the cabinet he was leading and therevolutionaries requirements trying to correct himself in a position of the


31/69


97

moral hero of the event, his merits for taken some resounding importantdecisions even pressured by the streets rather than by his own persuasion,cannot be denied. But was Nagy really convinced, in the solitude andmeditative ambient in Snagov, by the moral bankruptcy of the communistsystem itself, not only of certain of their leaders? From his notes it is clear thatthe answer is no, although the question cannot be provided with a clearanswer. Therefore, a complex historical figure like himself must be approached

with analytical caution and great care for detail. Otherwise, we are more likelyto risk missing the encounter, even unavoidably incomplete and distorted bytime and the gradually blurring of the context, with the one that was ImreNagy.

*

For better overall comprehension of the events in 1956 in the socialist camp,particularly instructive is the comparison between the two revolutionaryoutbreaks: Poland and Hungary. There are several good outlined reasonsbecause of which the riots in Poznan and subsequently in Warsaw have notturned in the Budapest revolution and vice versa. They can be grouped intotwo categories: the nature of requests, namely the character and behavior ofleaders during the protests.

Thus, if the requirements of the Poznan workers were mainly economic, with aless pronounced political component, in Budapest happened just the opposite.

The fourteen requests of the Hungarian revolutionaries were primarily political,and only secondly had an economic sideline, therefore being more difficult tosatisfy by a communist regime, in which all other aspects of social life aresubordinated to politics. Then, Edward Ochab and PUWP Political Bureau

were present in the country ever since the beginning of turmoil, thus havingtime to become familiar with them and provide a somewhat appropriateresponse. Ger and his colleagues, on the other hand, were in Yugoslavia to

win Titos goodwill and trust, leaving domestic issues in the background. Werecall that they returned to the country just the day large-scale protests hadstarted and, instead of making efforts, as their Polish counterparts did,demonstrating a certain understanding, if not sympathy, towards the causes ofthe peoples dissatisfaction, Gers broadcast speech inflamed spirits evenmore, by showing contempt, condescension and a total inability to grasp the


32/69


98

phenomenons potential that the MDP was facing. Furthermore, Polish leadersdid not call for military aid from Moscow. This issue was not even raised, whileGer appealed this method of solving the problem on the first evening,

without even trying to surmount the difficulties encountered by own means(Granville: 2002, 528-529).

The differences list continues. While the Hungarian army fraternizedspontaneously with the revolutionaries, the Polish military forces, dominatedby Soviet officers, faced this deficiency only in the beginning, and even thensporadically. Ultimately, cynically claimed Suslov and Mikoyan, Moscowsrepresentatives to Budapest, the Hungarian demonstrators were fired at verylate, thus allowing them to organize and muster up courage. In Poland,protests were met with fire from an early stage, which more likely contributedto the deterrence of many of those on the streets to persevere in facing theregime (ibid., 536-539).

The personal factor is crucial in the political equation of events consumed in1956 in the communist world. Imre Nagy had, compared to Gomu;ka, amuch more subdued political instinct, being instead better preparedtheoretically. But argumentative eloquence, even if in the spirit of Marxism-

Leninism, will be of no use to Nagy in those moments. Conversely, it can beconcluded that bookishness (an orientation based on excessive theorizing ofrevolutionary problems, thus unaware of reality) disadvantaged him. Then,the Polish first secretarys presence and self mastery, who, himself a worker byprofession, knew how to manage and moderate the crowd gathered on thestreets of Warsaw and whose position was much less stable than generallybelieved positively impressed the leadership in Moscow, Khrushchevbecoming in time one of his best personal friends. Not the same can be saidabout Nagy, who, despite his charisma, completely and irretrievably lostcontrol of the situation.

The most important difference between Poland and Hungary in 1956 is,however, one of international nature. Gomu;ka, fearing Germanysrevanchism and being aware that, without Moscows guarantees, it could notmaintain Polands postwar western border, which now comprised a large partof former East Prussia, has never committed the fatal imprudence to actaccording to the requests concerning Polands proclamation of neutrality and


33/69


99

its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Even if the Soviets had decided tointervene for the second time in Hungary before Nagy did so, the HungarianPrime Ministers gesture could only reinforce their belief that they actedproperly (Idem 543-563; Nagee; Donaldson: 1988, 227 - 229).

After 1956, the PUWP gradually began to restrict civil liberties that it set up todeal with protests and mitigate them. In relations with Moscow it will begin toshow a growing degree of autonomy, which, unofficially, will justify especiallybased on domestic considerations, namely the Poles traditional anti-Russianfeelings (Skilling: 1964, 13). At the conference of communist parties held inMoscow the next year, the Polish delegation displayed an attitude ofunprincipled concessions towards imperialist circles, renouncing the classicalLeninist thesis that postulated the imperialisms implosion due to its internalcontradictions, being motivated by the unwillingness to compromise its traderelations with some Western countries, which had started promisingly. Also,the Poles did not manifest as critically as the other communist parties againstrevisionists, a concept which referred to the Yugoslavian comrades. They,as we are to see, had an ambivalent attitude towards the Hungarian revolution,

which once more affected the relations between Belgrade and Moscow,although not at the same intensity as during the Tito-Stalin conflict.Dogmatism should have been considered as hazardous as revisionism tointernational communism, Polands representatives argued, who also did notapprove the thesis about the Soviet Unions role at the head of socialistcountries and as a center of unity of the international communist movement(Ctnu: 2004, 28).

Hungary, on the other hand, had a different evolution, if not even opposed tothe Polish one. Minimizing the memory of the revolution as main objective,HUSP first secretary introduced certain limited economic and culturalconcessions, which, however, were not constant, varying according to the shortand medium term objectives of the regime. But he did not respect his promiseto show leniency and mercy to former anti-communist combatants, and thepolitical trials, deportations, arrests, and secret executions, reminiscent ofRkosis Stalinist regime, once again came to the fore front. Also, the partyitself had undergone major metamorphoses: it bureaucratized itself, to be assure as possible of the support of its members, united, and of the repressionexerted on former revolutionary, and gradually distanced itself from the


34/69


100

population, getting more and more the characteristics of a religious sect.Internationally, on the other hand, Kadar remained one of the most loyal alliesof the Soviet Union (Vli: 1966, 86-107). He owed his political position toKhrushchev personally, therefore looking so as to avoid any possibledissatisfaction of Moscow, unlike Gomu;ka, which had the partys support,and, partially, that of the people. The revolution of 1956 will, however,continue to be for Kadar and for the party he led an unexplainable moment,

whose impossible surmounting will be a permanent tare for Hungariancommunism, until the moment its inglorious end.

The climax of revolutionary vigilance. Romanian Peoples Republicand the Hungarian revolutionFor the PMRs leadership, Stalins death did not amount to the overcoming ofits political heritage. Conversely, Gheorghiu-Dej and his henchmen, deeplytributary, both ideologically and politically, to Stalins Weltanschauung, tried tolimit as much as possible the impact of political disputes within the upperechelons of the CPSU on the stability and cohesion of the Romanianleadership. Post-Stalinism and de-Stalinization were for RPR, in Kenneth

Jowitts words, a latent period of learning and docility, marked by someinternal changes lacking of enthusiasm and by growing concerns about the

intentions of the Soviet hegemon; however, it cannot be said But, like StephenFischer-Galai says, that in this period the foundation of the futureindependence from the early 60s has been established (Jowitt: 1971, 167;Shafir in Schpflin: 1986, 364-365; Fischer-Galai in London: 1966, 265;Fischer-Galai: 1998, 157). It is true that the leaders in Bucharest sought tosecure a larger room for maneuver, but Soviet rule in the communist world

was affirmed convincingly at every public event. And secondly, Romania,through its permanent membership in the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, canonly be considered an autonomous or dissident voice within the socialist bloc,in no case an independent one. In absence of frictions with the Comecon, RPR

would probably have become another Poland: national-communist inside and,

despite some occasional opinions not endorsed by Moscow, indisputably loyalto the proletarian internationalism goals on the outside.

Of all the Eastern Europe governments, the Romanian one was least affectedby de-Stalinization seizures, wrote Ghi Ionescu, which was a sign of apathyand weakness of the PMR. Disadvantaged by the very weak, almost


35/69


101

nonexistent, social influence available, but also by the absence of a genuineMarxist culture to raise its ideological level and to provide a somewhat decentappearance to its scientific displays, the PMR, paradoxically, proved to be,especially because of those causes, more capable than other East Europeanparties to cope with the challenges entailed by de-Stalinization. If it wouldhave had some roots in people, if it would have been at all sensitive to trendsin public opinion and the fight would have been fought with original ideas,specific to relevant national issues, then surely it would have been more visiblyaffected. Relying solely on a politically primitive instinct and on a totaldependence on Moscow let us not forget that, before 1945, PCR was the

weakest and most disorganized Eastern European communist party (Tnase:2006, 42) the communist party of Romania remained concerned about onlyone thing to stay in power (Ionescu: 1994, 291-292). In other words, theshock of de-Stalinization was not perceived in RPR at an ideological level;

valuably, it was not, as for other communists, a sudden and painful turn, adeviation from the true legacy of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and, ultimately,it had not who to disappoint; legitimized only by a ideological surrogate, thepolitical elite in Bucharest, made in an overwhelming proportion of people

with an education that did not exceed four elementary classes, was simplyscared of the new Soviet orientation, being exclusively concerned with theassociated precautions that would have allowed it to survive this test, onlyperceived as shocking politically.

Post-Stalinism includes several international events which will leave their markon the entire evolution of Romanian communism. In 1955, the Soviet Unionand Austria signed, ten years after the end of the Second World War, the peacetreaty by which the latter became a neutral state. Consequently, Soviet troopsare withdrawn from its territory and the need to keep them in Romania andHungary, countries in which the Red Army contingent kept logisticalconnections with the troops from Austria, disappears. But to counter thepotential threat of NATO, a military organization that emerged in 1949,Moscow decided to create a similar organization with many of the Communiststates. Thus, appears the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), a bodyjustifying the Red Armys presence within the territories of brotherly statesby the need to counter possible threats from the imperialist camp (Idem,263-264). Then, after years of repeated failures that had frustrated the regime,emphasizing its external and internal insecurity, the RPR is finally admitted to


36/69


102

the UN (Ionescu-Gur: 2006, 1969-1980; Nistor: 2006, 236; Georgescu: 1993,144). Within this organization, Bucharest would prove to be a very activesupporter of the Soviet Union between the late 50s and early 60s (Weiner:1984, 1940-1941), again contradicting theories that place the germinationperiod of the Romanian dissidence against the socialist camp in the post-Stalinist period.

A clear indication of disorientation produced by the new mutations in theKremlins political equation in Bucharest lies in the lateness of the organizationof the second Congress of PRM. Delayed nearly four years under variouspretexts, the event, made in autumn 1955, dedicated Ghoerghiu-Dejs return tothe party prime secretary position, since, starting with April 1954, that position

went to Gheorghe Apostol, a close friend of the Romanian dictator (Ionescu:1994, 266, Fischer-Galai: 1998, 162-163; Deletant: 2001, 192-193; Troncot:2006, 126). The PRM leader resorted to this stratagem directly influenced bythe metamorphoses that happened in Soviet leadership. If, in September 1953,Nikita Khrushchev became first secretary of the CPSU, the prime ministerposition did not fell onto him no more, like it happened in the Stalinist period,but to Gheorghi Malenkov, a Politburo member, oriented towards reforms

whose amplitude scared Khrushchev himself. He managed to overthrow himin 1955 and to appoint in his place Nikolai Bulganin, docile executor ofKhrushchevite orders. Gheorghiu-Dej did not overlook the significance of thisgesture, which suggested an embellished return to the concentration of politicalpower in the hands of a single governor, as had happened before 1953.Consequently, he became once more, formally, the first secretary of the PMR,assigning the position of prime minister to his close friend Chivu Stoica(Ionescu: 1994, 66; Fischer-Galai: 1967, 54; Betea: 1997, 127).

A detail that escapes many specialty analyses is that, until the PMRs SecondCongress, Dejs position was more precarious than generally considered. Some

American and British officers in Bucharest have noted this, and thecondescending attitude some Soviet officials showed the PMRs first secretary.Only after Khrushchev asserted himself against his political competitors, andpressed by very important international issues such as signing the treaty ofneutrality with Austria and the WTO creation, he assured, at least temporarily,Gheorghiu-Dej that he will keep his position, during a visit to Bucharest onlyafter obtaining this assurance the Romanian leader felt confident enough toorganize the congress (ru: 2005, 456-457; Fischer-Galai: 1967, 51). But the


37/69


103

main test to convince Moscow of his loyalty was passed by Gheorghiu-Dejduring the Hungarian revolution, a circumstance in which he proved to be veryeager and docile in supporting by any means possible the Red Army that wascrushing Hungarian insurgents, especially since the Bucharest regime wasamong the direct beneficiaries of Soviet intervention (Tismneanu: 2005, 191).

The new effects were being felt in Romania from an economic rather thanpolitical point of view. The Soviets were displeased with the disproportionateemphasis that the PMR placed on heavy industry to the detriment ofagriculture or consumer industry. The Danube-Black Sea Canal project wasalso criticized, and halted shortly following those complaints. The SovRoms(economic enterprises with mixed capital, Romanian and Soviet, and whosebenefits were fully assimilated by Moscow) are liquidated starting with 1954.Making the Soviet leaders more or less directly responsible for the economic

weaknesses it recorded, RPR will require a significant financial loan

facing the 'counterrevolution'. romanian responses to the hungarian crisis of 1956

Documents