Attitudes About Corruption In

India and Bangladesh A Method

Combining Measurement With

Impact

(DHAKA DECEMBER 2014)

Conference on Political Economy

Accountability and Governance

Wendy Olsen University of Manchester

Overview of Talk 1 Approaches to measuring

attitudes

Norms roles attitudes beliefs

desires

2 Transparency Internationalrsquos

approach

3 Attitudes a measurement error

approach

Introduction

The SEM approach (World Values

Survey)

Findings for Bangladesh Vs India

4

Linear regression results

5 Conclusions2 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

The author Wendy

Olsen

works in social statistics

at the University of

Manchester

Her writings can be

found online at

httpstaffprofileshuman

itiesmanchesteracukP

rofileaspxId=WendyOl

sen2ampcurTab=4

Quick access on

twittercom as

Sandhyamma

Overview of Talk 1 Approaches to measuring

attitudes

Norms roles attitudes beliefs

desires

2 Transparency Internationalrsquos

approach

3 Attitudes a measurement error

approach

Introduction

The SEM approach (World Values

Survey)

Findings for Bangladesh Vs India

4

Linear regression results

5 Conclusions2 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

The author Wendy

Olsen

works in social statistics

at the University of

Manchester

Her writings can be

found online at

httpstaffprofileshuman

itiesmanchesteracukP

rofileaspxId=WendyOl

sen2ampcurTab=4

Quick access on

twittercom as

Sandhyamma

General

approaches to

measuring

attitudesThree Broad Schools of

Thought

Norms roles attitudes beliefs desires

King et al argue that we need to use

anchoring vignettes

This presumes a latent lsquothingrsquo which is the

core attitude in question

WE CALL THIS A SOCIAL NORM

KING errs toward individualist wording

Empirical reality for instance is one of the phrases they

use

the core attitude in question

3 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

A stylized fact about India Regional variations occur in the womenrsquos labour-force participation rate

INDIA EPW 2012

Figure 1 State

Variations in

FLFP

Questions about corruption in India and in Bangladesh Is

there a latent factor of corruption which we could study

coherently

Both countries

are high on

corruption low

on transparency

Relative to Italy

and UK

however

Bangladesh

has very strong

honesty norms

Key Findings

Thanks to

Priyanka Vyas

who made this

map

Significant

differences

between states in

the attitude about

the justifiability of

corruption

Variations in Patriarchy and would they

matter for attitudes to corrupt practices

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

6

India WVS Sample 76 Hindu

Andre Beteille in Uberoi Ed Family Kinship and Marriage in India

ldquoThe family plays a crucial part in the socialization of its children Indians of all classes have a markedly conservative attitude toward both marriage and parenthoodrdquo pg 438

Perhaps this is too universalistic

Bangladesh WVS Sample 91 Muslim

Case study of a rural informal worker from Comilla

General points made by Farah Deeba Chowdhury Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study 2013 (The University Press Dhaka)

Three Broad

Schools of

Thought

Norms roles and attitudes

1) idealised psychometric approaches eg Schwartz see the World Values Survey

2) realist approach capabilities school and Bourdieuvian lsquodomainsrsquo with habitus and doxa in each domain creating tensions

Therefore we can test for class-based or ethnic-based differences of the measurement model parameters (group test)

These would suggest that there are differences in the shape of the distribution of the attitudes surrounding the general social norm by class

3) GAD integrates feminism with the Bourdieuvian class-contrast approach

GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

All WOMEN are not alike

All PEOPLE do not agree7 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

1) Inadequate

2) 2+3 agreeable

Empirical Literature Review

Della Porta and Vannucci Empirical Papers - WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

8

Theory of corruption

Moral costs higherlower

Resistance to corruption is

a mutable moral wall

Institutionalised loyalty norms support corrupt behaviour and can create a feedback loop

Transparency International Accountability and transparency are the opposite of corruption

(they form barriers to it)

Wang-Sheng Lee (IZA 2013)

20 Eurozone countries

Microdata 43300 cases

Important to seek adventures mediates the gendered lsquocan justify bribersquo outcome

Parboteea et al (IJCCM 2005)

WVS data shows GB France Italy Hungary and Germany all higher lsquocan justify bribersquo than India (no data Bangladesh)

Comparing Bangladesh India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

9

Attitudes about corruption were analysed repeatedly

in the World Values Survey

Attitudes to corruption will differ depending on both

onersquos hopes and ethics and onersquos constraining or

enabling economic factors

We can combine answers to questions about lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to

which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a

chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Muthen amp Muthenrsquos MPLUS software

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

10

Useful but so is STATA now I used MPLUS

The results are similar to a classical scale (adding up 10rsquos)

SPSS can also do a simple factor analysis

The factor

can be an

independent

variable or a

dependent

variable

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

A stylized fact about India Regional variations occur in the womenrsquos labour-force participation rate

INDIA EPW 2012

Figure 1 State

Variations in

FLFP

Questions about corruption in India and in Bangladesh Is

there a latent factor of corruption which we could study

coherently

Both countries

are high on

corruption low

on transparency

Relative to Italy

and UK

however

Bangladesh

has very strong

honesty norms

Key Findings

Thanks to

Priyanka Vyas

who made this

map

Significant

differences

between states in

the attitude about

the justifiability of

corruption

Variations in Patriarchy and would they

matter for attitudes to corrupt practices

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

6

India WVS Sample 76 Hindu

Andre Beteille in Uberoi Ed Family Kinship and Marriage in India

ldquoThe family plays a crucial part in the socialization of its children Indians of all classes have a markedly conservative attitude toward both marriage and parenthoodrdquo pg 438

Perhaps this is too universalistic

Bangladesh WVS Sample 91 Muslim

Case study of a rural informal worker from Comilla

General points made by Farah Deeba Chowdhury Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study 2013 (The University Press Dhaka)

Three Broad

Schools of

Thought

Norms roles and attitudes

1) idealised psychometric approaches eg Schwartz see the World Values Survey

2) realist approach capabilities school and Bourdieuvian lsquodomainsrsquo with habitus and doxa in each domain creating tensions

Therefore we can test for class-based or ethnic-based differences of the measurement model parameters (group test)

These would suggest that there are differences in the shape of the distribution of the attitudes surrounding the general social norm by class

3) GAD integrates feminism with the Bourdieuvian class-contrast approach

GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

All WOMEN are not alike

All PEOPLE do not agree7 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

1) Inadequate

2) 2+3 agreeable

Empirical Literature Review

Della Porta and Vannucci Empirical Papers - WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

8

Theory of corruption

Moral costs higherlower

Resistance to corruption is

a mutable moral wall

Institutionalised loyalty norms support corrupt behaviour and can create a feedback loop

Transparency International Accountability and transparency are the opposite of corruption

(they form barriers to it)

Wang-Sheng Lee (IZA 2013)

20 Eurozone countries

Microdata 43300 cases

Important to seek adventures mediates the gendered lsquocan justify bribersquo outcome

Parboteea et al (IJCCM 2005)

WVS data shows GB France Italy Hungary and Germany all higher lsquocan justify bribersquo than India (no data Bangladesh)

Comparing Bangladesh India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

9

Attitudes about corruption were analysed repeatedly

in the World Values Survey

Attitudes to corruption will differ depending on both

onersquos hopes and ethics and onersquos constraining or

enabling economic factors

We can combine answers to questions about lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to

which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a

chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Muthen amp Muthenrsquos MPLUS software

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

10

Useful but so is STATA now I used MPLUS

The results are similar to a classical scale (adding up 10rsquos)

SPSS can also do a simple factor analysis

The factor

can be an

independent

variable or a

dependent

variable

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Questions about corruption in India and in Bangladesh Is

there a latent factor of corruption which we could study

coherently

Both countries

are high on

corruption low

on transparency

Relative to Italy

and UK

however

Bangladesh

has very strong

honesty norms

Key Findings

Thanks to

Priyanka Vyas

who made this

map

Significant

differences

between states in

the attitude about

the justifiability of

corruption

Variations in Patriarchy and would they

matter for attitudes to corrupt practices

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

6

India WVS Sample 76 Hindu

Andre Beteille in Uberoi Ed Family Kinship and Marriage in India

ldquoThe family plays a crucial part in the socialization of its children Indians of all classes have a markedly conservative attitude toward both marriage and parenthoodrdquo pg 438

Perhaps this is too universalistic

Bangladesh WVS Sample 91 Muslim

Case study of a rural informal worker from Comilla

General points made by Farah Deeba Chowdhury Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study 2013 (The University Press Dhaka)

Three Broad

Schools of

Thought

Norms roles and attitudes

1) idealised psychometric approaches eg Schwartz see the World Values Survey

2) realist approach capabilities school and Bourdieuvian lsquodomainsrsquo with habitus and doxa in each domain creating tensions

Therefore we can test for class-based or ethnic-based differences of the measurement model parameters (group test)

These would suggest that there are differences in the shape of the distribution of the attitudes surrounding the general social norm by class

3) GAD integrates feminism with the Bourdieuvian class-contrast approach

GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

All WOMEN are not alike

All PEOPLE do not agree7 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

1) Inadequate

2) 2+3 agreeable

Empirical Literature Review

Della Porta and Vannucci Empirical Papers - WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

8

Theory of corruption

Moral costs higherlower

Resistance to corruption is

a mutable moral wall

Institutionalised loyalty norms support corrupt behaviour and can create a feedback loop

Transparency International Accountability and transparency are the opposite of corruption

(they form barriers to it)

Wang-Sheng Lee (IZA 2013)

20 Eurozone countries

Microdata 43300 cases

Important to seek adventures mediates the gendered lsquocan justify bribersquo outcome

Parboteea et al (IJCCM 2005)

WVS data shows GB France Italy Hungary and Germany all higher lsquocan justify bribersquo than India (no data Bangladesh)

Comparing Bangladesh India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

9

Attitudes about corruption were analysed repeatedly

in the World Values Survey

Attitudes to corruption will differ depending on both

onersquos hopes and ethics and onersquos constraining or

enabling economic factors

We can combine answers to questions about lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to

which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a

chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Muthen amp Muthenrsquos MPLUS software

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

10

Useful but so is STATA now I used MPLUS

The results are similar to a classical scale (adding up 10rsquos)

SPSS can also do a simple factor analysis

The factor

can be an

independent

variable or a

dependent

variable

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Variations in Patriarchy and would they

matter for attitudes to corrupt practices

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

6

India WVS Sample 76 Hindu

Andre Beteille in Uberoi Ed Family Kinship and Marriage in India

ldquoThe family plays a crucial part in the socialization of its children Indians of all classes have a markedly conservative attitude toward both marriage and parenthoodrdquo pg 438

Perhaps this is too universalistic

Bangladesh WVS Sample 91 Muslim

Case study of a rural informal worker from Comilla

General points made by Farah Deeba Chowdhury Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study 2013 (The University Press Dhaka)

Three Broad

Schools of

Thought

Norms roles and attitudes

1) idealised psychometric approaches eg Schwartz see the World Values Survey

2) realist approach capabilities school and Bourdieuvian lsquodomainsrsquo with habitus and doxa in each domain creating tensions

Therefore we can test for class-based or ethnic-based differences of the measurement model parameters (group test)

These would suggest that there are differences in the shape of the distribution of the attitudes surrounding the general social norm by class

3) GAD integrates feminism with the Bourdieuvian class-contrast approach

GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

All WOMEN are not alike

All PEOPLE do not agree7 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

1) Inadequate

2) 2+3 agreeable

Empirical Literature Review

Della Porta and Vannucci Empirical Papers - WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

8

Theory of corruption

Moral costs higherlower

Resistance to corruption is

a mutable moral wall

Institutionalised loyalty norms support corrupt behaviour and can create a feedback loop

Transparency International Accountability and transparency are the opposite of corruption

(they form barriers to it)

Wang-Sheng Lee (IZA 2013)

20 Eurozone countries

Microdata 43300 cases

Important to seek adventures mediates the gendered lsquocan justify bribersquo outcome

Parboteea et al (IJCCM 2005)

WVS data shows GB France Italy Hungary and Germany all higher lsquocan justify bribersquo than India (no data Bangladesh)

Comparing Bangladesh India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

9

Attitudes about corruption were analysed repeatedly

in the World Values Survey

Attitudes to corruption will differ depending on both

onersquos hopes and ethics and onersquos constraining or

enabling economic factors

We can combine answers to questions about lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to

which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a

chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Muthen amp Muthenrsquos MPLUS software

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

10

Useful but so is STATA now I used MPLUS

The results are similar to a classical scale (adding up 10rsquos)

SPSS can also do a simple factor analysis

The factor

can be an

independent

variable or a

dependent

variable

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Three Broad

Schools of

Thought

Norms roles and attitudes

1) idealised psychometric approaches eg Schwartz see the World Values Survey

2) realist approach capabilities school and Bourdieuvian lsquodomainsrsquo with habitus and doxa in each domain creating tensions

Therefore we can test for class-based or ethnic-based differences of the measurement model parameters (group test)

These would suggest that there are differences in the shape of the distribution of the attitudes surrounding the general social norm by class

3) GAD integrates feminism with the Bourdieuvian class-contrast approach

GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT

All WOMEN are not alike

All PEOPLE do not agree7 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

1) Inadequate

2) 2+3 agreeable

Empirical Literature Review

Della Porta and Vannucci Empirical Papers - WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

8

Theory of corruption

Moral costs higherlower

Resistance to corruption is

a mutable moral wall

Institutionalised loyalty norms support corrupt behaviour and can create a feedback loop

Transparency International Accountability and transparency are the opposite of corruption

(they form barriers to it)

Wang-Sheng Lee (IZA 2013)

20 Eurozone countries

Microdata 43300 cases

Important to seek adventures mediates the gendered lsquocan justify bribersquo outcome

Parboteea et al (IJCCM 2005)

WVS data shows GB France Italy Hungary and Germany all higher lsquocan justify bribersquo than India (no data Bangladesh)

Comparing Bangladesh India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

9

Attitudes about corruption were analysed repeatedly

in the World Values Survey

Attitudes to corruption will differ depending on both

onersquos hopes and ethics and onersquos constraining or

enabling economic factors

We can combine answers to questions about lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to

which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a

chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Muthen amp Muthenrsquos MPLUS software

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

10

Useful but so is STATA now I used MPLUS

The results are similar to a classical scale (adding up 10rsquos)

SPSS can also do a simple factor analysis

The factor

can be an

independent

variable or a

dependent

variable

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Empirical Literature Review

Della Porta and Vannucci Empirical Papers - WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

8

Theory of corruption

Moral costs higherlower

Resistance to corruption is

a mutable moral wall

Institutionalised loyalty norms support corrupt behaviour and can create a feedback loop

Transparency International Accountability and transparency are the opposite of corruption

(they form barriers to it)

Wang-Sheng Lee (IZA 2013)

20 Eurozone countries

Microdata 43300 cases

Important to seek adventures mediates the gendered lsquocan justify bribersquo outcome

Parboteea et al (IJCCM 2005)

WVS data shows GB France Italy Hungary and Germany all higher lsquocan justify bribersquo than India (no data Bangladesh)

Comparing Bangladesh India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

9

Attitudes about corruption were analysed repeatedly

in the World Values Survey

Attitudes to corruption will differ depending on both

onersquos hopes and ethics and onersquos constraining or

enabling economic factors

We can combine answers to questions about lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to

which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a

chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Muthen amp Muthenrsquos MPLUS software

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

10

Useful but so is STATA now I used MPLUS

The results are similar to a classical scale (adding up 10rsquos)

SPSS can also do a simple factor analysis

The factor

can be an

independent

variable or a

dependent

variable

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Comparing Bangladesh India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

9

Attitudes about corruption were analysed repeatedly

in the World Values Survey

Attitudes to corruption will differ depending on both

onersquos hopes and ethics and onersquos constraining or

enabling economic factors

We can combine answers to questions about lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to

which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a

chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Muthen amp Muthenrsquos MPLUS software

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

10

Useful but so is STATA now I used MPLUS

The results are similar to a classical scale (adding up 10rsquos)

SPSS can also do a simple factor analysis

The factor

can be an

independent

variable or a

dependent

variable

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Muthen amp Muthenrsquos MPLUS software

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

10

Useful but so is STATA now I used MPLUS

The results are similar to a classical scale (adding up 10rsquos)

SPSS can also do a simple factor analysis

The factor

can be an

independent

variable or a

dependent

variable

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

THE SUM OF FOUR

SCALES

1 Can Justify Bribe

Etc

2002 2006 WVS

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

11

World Values Survey

0

02

04

06

08

De

nsity

0 10 20 30 40cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 21529

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

5 10 15 20 25 30cheatjust

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 04767

Kernel density estimate

Figure 3 Justifiability of Cheating in IndiaFigure 2 Justifiability of

Cheating in Bangladesh

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

These are strongly

correlated

Scale of 1-10 for each

variable

You can create a

classical scale

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

12

Four Variables Used in a Factor Analysis for Bangladesh World Values Survey 2002

And India WVS 2006

hellipto estimate the social norm that corruption can be justified measured by these 4 indicators

You can justify taking a bribe

You can justify cheating on tax

You can justify cheating on benefits from government

You can justify cheating on a transport cost

Does not vary much by class or education

The difference by Country is much larger with Country giving an R-squared of 23 for the Factor as Dependent Variable

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Strong Cross

Correlations

Cheatbenjust

cheatbusjust06794

cheattaxjust

06423 07344

bribejust05751 06756 07623

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

13

Findings

The mean of a latent factor for attitude to corruption was 42 in

India 39 45 is the confidence interval at 95 but in

Bangladesh the mean was -013 with a narrow confidence

interval -014 to-012

The weighted cases are brought down to 1500 per country giving

these proportions

Students 12

Rural 22

Female 44

Educ years estimated 78 years

The subjective social class averages 265 on a scale 1-5 with

5=Upper Class Thus the average is between working and middle

class This had no correlation with attitude to bribery

76 Hindu in India

7 Hindu in Brsquodesh

915Muslim in Bangladesh

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

BANGLADESH 2001 INDIA 2006

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

14

Bangladesh

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Coefficient of Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

In gender norms

education is

strongly

associated with

more egalitarian

norms

In attitudes to the

justifiability of

bribery and

cheating however

education and

class were not key

explanatory

factors

SEM approach

A Created a factor for traditional vs

egalitarian (modern) norms existing at

social level about womenrsquos appropriate

roles

DHS variables

Bangladesh 2007 and 2011

India NFHS 20056

There were strong state-wise differences

The lower-income states have more

traditional norms excepting those with the

high Womenrsquos Labour Force Participation

15 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Figure 4 Summary of Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

16

HIGHER GNI

PER CAPITA

LOWER GNI

PER CAPITA

MORE

JUSTIFABLE

TN UP

MP

JH

BIHAR

LESS

JUSTIFIABLE

AP

Delhi

Kerala

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Hypotheses of This Paper

Locality differences in corruption index average values reflect a mixture of factors

Seeking harmonised and refined measurement is not the only aim

It is also important to respond to differences in the causes of change in norms

We will in future measure changes in the real constraining or enabling factors and

change in the norms over time

ACCEPTING THAT BRIBERY CAN BE JUSTIFIED

At the moment our summary is females less than males

No class difference overall no education difference overall

Bangladesh residents less accepting (totally against it)

Indian 7 say it definitely can be justified and 5 donrsquot know

The more modernised states have LESS ACCEPTANCE OF JUSTIFIABILITY17

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

18

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

Figure 5 Latent Factor Using Four Indicators for the

Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

How the Scale

Works

India

Higher values = those

who say it can be justified

to pay a bribe or

otherwise cheat the

government

Bangladesh

Great homogeneity

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

19

05

115

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15 2f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 01283

Kernel density estimate

02

46

De

nsity

-5 0 5 1 15f1

kernel = epanechnikov bandwidth = 00480

Kernel density estimate

of

the

Res

pon

dent

s

Is

On

The

Verti

cal

Scal

e

Figures 6 amp 7 Justifiability of Bribery amp Cheating in India amp Bangladesh 2002

2006

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Bangladesh

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

20

Banglade

sh

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit N

Faridpur -020 000 56

Kishoregan -020 000 etc

Coxes Bazaar -020 000

BrahmanBaria -020 000

Habiganj -020 000

Chudanga -020 000

Nator -020 000

Mymensingh -019 001 -020 -017

Sylhet -018 001 -021 -016

Sirajganj -017 002 -020 -014

Jhenaidah -016 002 -020 -011

Chittagong -014 002 -018 -010

Rangpur -013 003 -018 -008

Comilla -012 003 -017 -007

Feni -011 004 -019 -004

Dhaka -008 002 -012 -004

Barisal -007 003 -012 -001

Rajshahi -005 005 -014 004

Tangail -004 004 -011 004

Sherpur -002 005 -013 009

Gaibandha 008 005 -002 018

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

India

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

21

India

Mean

Justifiabi

lity of

Cheating

Standard

Error of

Estimate

Lower

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Upper

Confiden

ce

Interval

Limit

Coefficie

nt of

Variation N

Gujarat -014 001 -017 -011 -11

Assam -003 005 -012 006 -167

Orissa 000 005 -010 009 -1550

AP 002 003 -004 009 140

Kerala 005 005 -006 015 111

Rajasthan 018 004 010 026 22

Karnataka 026 005 017 036 18

Delhi 027 008 011 043 31

Punjab 036 009 019 053 24

Haryana 042 008 026 059 20

West Bengal 047 004 039 054 8

Chhatisgarh 050 012 026 073 24

UP 051 003 045 057 6

MP 061 005 052 070 8

Maharashtra 065 006 053 077 9

Bihar 066 006 054 078 9

Jharkhand 084 009 065 102 11

TamilNadu 089 004 082 096 4

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Labour Supply Differences in the Degree

or Even Absence of Shrinkage of Female LFP

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by LFP6 Declining

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Andhra Pradesh 760 797 725 656

Arunachal Pradesh 1000 740 713 642

Goa 673 567 355 426

Gujrat 750 751 765 626

Haryana 882 873 755 631

Himachal Pradesh 847 887 840 786

Jammu amp Kashmir 829 896 590 552

Karnataka 684 736 774 550

Kerala 556 479 506 457

Maharastra 783 793 730 603

Manipur 640 608 619 547

Meghalaya 741 798 783 703

Mizoram 853 677 739 753

Nagaland NA 731 794 686

Punjab 869 803 744 604

Tamil Nadu 766 773 771 598

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365

Total (both those going UP and DOWN) 688 712 707 648

Total Female Rural LFPR 15 to 64 by

LFP6 States Showing a Rise

State 19831993-94 2004-05 2011-12

Assam 520 559 599 666

Bihar 612 597 627 634

Madhya Pradesh 762 803 790 779

Orissa 582 631 676 602

Rajasthan 770 868 845 755

Sikkim 617 528 617 738

Tripura 171 242 230 543

Uttar Pradesh 616 646 661 652

West Bengal 606 701 716 719

Pondicheri 686 701 606 365Total 688 712 707 648

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Regression T-Tests Kolmogorov-Smirnov

Tests Showhellip

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

23

Linear regression Number of obs = 3501

F( 4 3496) = 31596

Prob gt F = 00000

R-squared = 0230

Dep Var Latent Justifiability of Taking Bribe or Cheating

f1 | Coef Std Err t Pgt|t| [95 Conf Interval]

rural | -1107588 0243446 -455 0000 -1584899 -0630276

female | -0546155 0172899 -316 0002 -0885149 -0207161

hindu | -0991072 0269871 -367 0000 -1520193 -0461951

country | 6442233 0251678 2560 0000 5948782 6935683

_cons | -0873473 0103564 -843 0000 -1076526 -067042

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

3 GROUPS

lsquowhether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which you are not entitledrsquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transportrsquo

whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chancersquo

lsquowhether it can be justified to accept a bribersquo

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

24

Workshop Activity

Briefly classify your own attitudes tocorruption by answering the fourquestions on a scale of 1 to 10

1= CAN NEVER JUSTIFY IT

10 = CAN ALWAYS JUSTIFY IT

Add up your score to make a

CLASSICAL SCALE

Factor analysis with MPLUS is similar

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Gender Relevance

Women in Bangladesh

and in India are expected

(more than men) to

conform be submissive

hellip to be silent

hellip to be appreciative of

what causes others to do

things which offend the

womanrsquos own honour

hellip to not defend her

honour yet work toward it

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

25

PURPOSES OF THE WORKSHOPS

SENSITISATION

DIVERSITY-REALISATION

GROWTH OF TOLERANCE

AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUEIMPROVED AWARENESS OF WHAT THE ISSUES ARE

The constraining factors

The things that enable anti-corruption

Whether corruption or bribery can be good

How we deal with disagreements

Dealing with the issue constructively

Alternatives to violence over this issue

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

RESOLUTIONS

We aim to develop our

ideas scientifically

We aim also to

disseminate good ideas

as we go along in the

research

This is known as lsquoimpactrsquo

(Not the same as

Participatory research)

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

26

Any factor analysis can be followed up

by workshops that involve

stakeholders such as policymakers

and representatives of business in a

dialogue KETSO post-it notes or

simple tape-recorded focus groups

can be used to gather up differences

of opinion

A PREVIOUS TRIAL WAS FELT A

SUCCESS

Profound differences of opinion Nondash

each norm has a surrounding aura of

disagreement about competing

ROLES

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Substantive Conclusions

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

27

The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh but variations of a significant kind across states of India using World Values Survey

Possible desirability bias in Bangladesh survey situation

Transparency International ranks Bangladesh as highly corrupt in practice

The pattern of labour force participation is that it is RISING in India in the same states that have weaker disapproval of cheating the public sector or paying bribes

Eg BIHAR UTTAR PRADESH and JHARKHAND

Most modernised higher-average-income states have less willingness to approve cheating the public sector but also have had shrinkage of womenrsquos labour force participation

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

References

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

28

Borsboom Denny Gideon J Mellenbergh and Jaap van Heerden (2003) The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables Psychological Review 1102 203ndash219 DOI 1010370033-295X

Della Porta Donnatella and Alberto Vannucci (2004) The Hidden Order of Corruption An Institutional Approach London Ashgate

Della Porta D and A Vannucci(2005) ldquoCorruption as a Normative Systemrdquo CIES ndashISCTE conference paper May URL httphomeiscte-iulpt~ansmdCC-DellaPortapdf Accessed Dec 2014

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Womenrsquos Political Participation in Bangladesh An Empirical Study UPL Monograph Series Dhaka The University Press Ltd

Kabeer Naila Lopita Huq and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of ldquoMissing Womenrdquo In South Asia Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh Feminist Economics httpdxdoiorg101080135457012013857423 1-26

Khattak Saba Gul Kiran Habib and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Dhaka The University Press Ltd

King G And J Wand (2007) ldquoComparing Incomparable Survey Responses Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettesrdquo Political Analysis 1546-66

Lee Wang-Sheng and Cahit Guven (2013) Engaging in Corruption The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level IZA Working Paper No 7685

Parboteea et al (2005) ldquoDoes National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behavioursrdquo IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement 52 123-138

Uberoi P ed (1998) Family Kinship and Marriage in India Oxford in India Readings Delhi OUP

Acknowledgements

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in

Comparative Context

29

Thank you to Mr Nathan Khadaroo Research Assistant Manchester 2014 Prof Simeen Mahmud BRAC Institute for Government and Development Dhaka and Prof AmareshDubey JNU Centre for the Study of Regional Development Delhi and Indian Institute for Dalit Studies This research was funded by the ESRC DFID Poverty Alleviation funds as a research grant 2014-2017

Wendy Olsen

Reader in Socio-Economics

Social Statistics

University of Manchester

Manchester M13 9PL

UK

0044 161 275 3043

EMAIL wendyolsenmanchesteracuk