factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion
TRANSCRIPT
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Factors to be Considered in
the Exercise of Discretion By Joseph P. Whalen (Saturday, July 25, 2015)
I. INTRODUCTION
While perusing various immigration-related cases, I came upon
Ifeyhewen Badidi v. Loretta Lynch, No. 14-60155 June 25, 2015 (5th Circuit
Summary Calendar) and was drawn to this passage:
"...We reach the merits of Badidi’s claim that the BIA erred in
denying his request for a continuance pending the appeal of the
denial of his I-130 petition. The BIA determined that the IJ had
properly denied Badidi’s continuance request, given that the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Service had denied the I-130
petition. This determination is in accord with the record, which
indicates that the I-130 petition was denied due to numerous
discrepancies in the couple’s answers to questions designed to
establish the authenticity of their marriage. Badidi’s conclusory
assertions regarding this issue do not establish a likelihood of
success in challenging USCIS’s determination, or that the denial of
a continuance was an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Ahmed v.
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 438-39 n.3 (5th Cir. 2006); Matter of
Hashmi, 24 I & N. Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009) (listing factors to be
considered in assessing whether to grant a continuance due to a
pending petition)...."
Given the fact that the granting or denial of a request for a
continuance is vested solely in the sound discretion of an Immigration
Judge (IJ), the denial of a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Such a review is not without a proper framework in that the BIA and courts
have addressed the factors to be considered in deciding upon such a request.
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II. PERTINENT PRECEDENTS
In Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785 (BIA 2009), the BIA held:
(1) An alien's unopposed motion to continue ongoing
removal proceedings to await the adjudication of a pending
family-based visa petition should generally be granted if
approval of the visa petition would render him prima facie
eligible for adjustment of status. Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N
Dec. 653 (BIA 1978), followed.
(2) In determining whether good cause exists to continue
such proceedings, a variety of factors may be considered,
including, but not limited to:
(1) the Department of Homeland Security's response
to the motion to continue;
(2) whether the underlying visa petition is prima facie
approvable;
(3) the respondent's statutory eligibility for
adjustment of status;
(4) whether the respondent's application for
adjustment merits a favorable exercise of discretion;
and
(5) the reason for the continuance and any other
relevant procedural factors.
Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F. 3d 433 (5th Cir. 2006), stated in note 3 [Slip
Op. P. 12]:
3 In other words, had Ahmed received his labor certification
and completed the very first step in this process, he would
still have needed an employer, presumably American Rags,
to file an employment-based visa petition on his behalf with
DHS, and he would have needed that visa petition to have
been approved. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A), discussed supra.
Only then would he have been eligible for the discretionary
removal relief contemplated by § 1255(i). [INA § 245(i)]
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Matter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 1978), held:
(1) Rule that reopening of proceedings will be denied absent
a prima facie showing that the statutory requirements for
relief have been met must be reexamined as to adjustment of
status in view of the amendment of 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(2)
permitting an adjustment application, filed with a visa
petition, to be retained if later approval of the petition would
make a visa available at time of filing.
(2) 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(2), permitting simultaneous filing of an
application for adjustment of status and a visa petition,
applies both before and after the issuance of an Order to
Show Cause.
(3) Service1 policy permits a prima facie qualified beneficiary
of a visa petition to remain in the United States pending final
adjudication of the petition and an adjustment application.
(4) Unless clear ineligibility is apparent in the record, the
Board shall generally grant motions to reopen in cases
involving an application for adjustment of status filed
simultaneously with a visa petition pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
245.2(a)(2), notwithstanding the fact that the petition has not
yet been adjudicated.
(5) An immigration judge may, in his discretion, grant a
motion to reopen or a request for a continuance of a
deportation hearing pending final adjudication of a visa
petition filed simultaneously with an adjustment application
under 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(2) where a prima facie approvable
visa petition and adjustment application have been submitted
to him. Matter of Kotte, Interim Decision 2634 (BIA 1978)
clarified.
1 “Service” refers to “Legacy” INS and the functions now under the auspices of three DHS immigration agencies. ICE and CBP are law enforcement components (like immigration police) while USCIS adjudicates benefits requests. The adjudicators are similar to occupations from “case workers” to “administrative magistrate judges”, all of whom are seeking the likely truth of the applicant/petitioner/beneficiary’s qualifications and eligibility for the benefit sought in an inquisitorial adjudicative framework.
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Matter of Kotte, 16 I&N Dec. 449 (BIA 1978), held, as follows:
(1) Where a visa petition, filed prior to the commencement of
deportation proceedings, to accord the respondent third-
preference status, had not been approved at the time of the
deportation hearing, the Board of Immigration Appeals
concluded that the immigration judge was not required to
continue deportation proceedings pending adjudication of
respondent's visa petition by the District Director.
(2) In deciding that the respondent did not possess an
approved visa petition and that, therefore, he was statutorily
ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, the Board of Immigration
Appeals concluded that neither it nor the immigration judge
had authority to determine the respondent's qualifications
for third-preference status and that jurisdiction in this matter
rested solely with the District Director and Regional
Commissioner.2
(3) Notwithstanding the amendment of section 245(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act by Pub. L. 94-571,
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976
(October 20, 1976), and the amendment of 8 C.F.R.
245.2(a)(2) making adjustment of status contingent upon the
availability of a visa on the date of, ting rather than on the
date of approval of an application, there is no absolute right
to a continuance of the deportation hearing, at which
adjustment is sought, to a date after the District Director has
adjudicated a pending third-preference visa petition.
In my routine perusal of immigration-related cases from the Circuit
Courts of Appeals, I happened upon one that included a few lines that I
thought would add to this article. The case is Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch,
2 Back in 1978, the initial visa petition decisions were rendered by INS, an agency within DOJ. DOJ also contained other components including, the Immigration Courts and BIA. Original jurisdiction to decide visa petitions shifted to USCIS, within DHS, when INS was abolished and its functions were folded into DHS on March 1, 2003.
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__F.3d__ (5th Cir. 2015) No. 14-60546 July 21, 2015, which contains the
following gem:
“… II. Ramirez-Mejia’s Parole Into the United States
Ramirez-Mejia also argues that [8 U.S.C.] Section 1231
(a) (5) is inapplicable to her because it only applies to aliens
who reentered the United States illegally. She last entered
the country under a grant of parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (d) (5). Thus, she argues that the government, by
paroling her into the United States to determine whether she
was eligible for “withholding of removal only,” displaced her
prior illegal reentry and rendered her eligible for asylum.
The argument is imaginative but errant.
The Immigration and Nationality Act gave the
Attorney General authority to exercise discretion in granting
parole and to place “such conditions as he may prescribe” on
the parolee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d) (5) (A). Even though that
statute remains unchanged, parole authority now resides
with the DHS.1
Additionally, parole does not create an entitlement to
remain in the United States: “when the purposes of such
parole . . . have been served the alien shall forthwith return
or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the
United States.” Id. Regulations provide further requirements
and procedures for parole. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5.
Ramirez-Mejia was granted parole for the purpose of
pursuing withholding of removal and CAT protection.
Though her presence in the country was with the permission
of the DHS, we see no basis for concluding that her
authorized presence overrode the effect of her earlier illegal
entry. Nothing about the grant of temporary parole to
pursue relief cancels the relevance of her earlier illegal
reentry after having been removed. She thus remains subject
to the provisions of Section 1231(a)(5).”
____________________________________________________
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“1 It seems agreed that authority over granting parole was
transferred from the Attorney General to the DHS in 2002 as a result of
the Act that created the DHS; we need not trace the statutory route of the
transfer here. See Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I. & N. Dec. 257, 261 & n.1
(BIA 2010). One reference to the authority of the DHS Secretary is in 6
U.S.C. § 202(4), which provides that the Secretary is to establish and
administer rules governing parole.”
Id. Slip Op. at pp. 8-9
Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I. & N. Dec. 257, 261 & n.1 (BIA 2010),
held:
(1) Conditional parole under section 236(a)(2)(B) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B)
(2006), is a distinct and different procedure from parole
under section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(A) (2006).
(2) An alien who was released from custody on
conditional parole pursuant to section 236(a)(2)(B) of the Act
has not been "paroled into the United States" for purposes of
establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under section
245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006).
III. ADDITIONAL CASE-LAW & RESOURCES
The above cases have precedential value and are binding, as applicable,
but there are also many non-precedential case decisions out there that,
while not binding, may be persuasive. Although both the BIA and AAO
issue the vast majority of their respective case decisions as unpublished,
non-precedents, it is AAO that routinely posts them, albeit, redacted,
sometimes to the point of total uselessness. Following, is an excerpt that is
anything but useless. On the contrary, this near ubiquitous blurb contains a
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useful listing of direct, on-topic precedent decisions containing, inter alia,
lists of factors to be considered in discretionary waiver cases.
“The Board has also held that the common or typical results
of deportation, removal and inadmissibility do not constitute
extreme hardship, and has listed certain individual hardship
factors considered common rather than extreme. These
factors include: economic disadvantage, loss of current
employment, inability to maintain one's present standard of
living, inability to pursue a chosen profession, separation
from family members, severing community ties, cultural
readjustment after living in the United States for many
years, cultural adjustment of qualifying relatives who have
never lived outside the United States, inferior economic and
educational opportunities in the foreign country, or inferior
medical facilities in the foreign country. See generally
Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. [560] at 568 [(BIA
1999)]; Matter of Pilch, 21 I&N Dec. [627] at 631-32 [BIA
1996)]; Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. [880] at 883 [(BIA 1994)];
Matter of Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245, 246-47 (Comm'r 1984);
Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88, 89-90 (BIA 1974); Matter of
Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810, 813 (BIA 1968).
However, though hardships may not be extreme when
considered abstractly or individually, the Board has made it
clear that "[r]elevant factors, though not extreme in
themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in
determining whether extreme hardship exists." Matter of O-J-
O-, 21 I&N Dec. 381, 383 (BIA 1996) (quoting Matter of Ige,
20 I&N Dec. [880] at 882 [BIA 1994)]). The adjudicator "must
consider the entire range of factors concerning hardship in
their totality and determine whether the combination of
hardships takes the case beyond those hardships ordinarily
associated with deportation." Id.
Aug202010_07H6212.pdf, at p. 4.
Another factor to be considered is the effect that one case or
proceeding has upon others. This next excerpt from a non-precedent
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AAO Appeal Dismissal describes one such situation where the outcome
of one case dictated the outcome of another. This particular example
comes from a non-precedential I-212 decision.
In a separate decision, we dismissed an appeal of the denial
of the applicant's Form I-601. In Matter of Martinez-Torres,
the Regional Commissioner held that an application for
permission to reapply for admission is denied in the exercise
of discretion to an alien who is mandatorily inadmissible to
the United States under another section of the Act, and no
purpose would be served in granting the application. 10 I&N
Dec. 776 (Reg. Comm. 1964). As the applicant is inadmissible
under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i)3 of the Act and his waiver
application was denied, no purpose would be served in
granting the applicant's Form 1-212.
JUL022015_02H4212.pdf, at p. 3.
IV. DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS
While waivers4 are an easy example of discretionary decisions for
purposes of this essay, there are other applications and petitions that have a
discretionary element. For now, I will leave the readers on their own to
follow the hyperlinks above for more in-depth research into the various lists
3 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Inadmissible aliens (a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States: (6) Illegal entrants and immigration violators (C) Misrepresentation (i) In general Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this chapter is inadmissible. 4 See a variety of categories of AAO non-precedent decisions on various waiver Appeals here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.
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of factors to be considered in discretionary waiver decisions. Aside from
waivers and requests for continuances, supra., the classic example of a
major discretionary decision is the I-485, Application to Register Permanent
Residence or Adjustment of Status (AOS).
No alien has any entitlement or; legally enforceable right; to be granted
adjustment of status. After demonstrating prima facie eligibility, (such as
visa availability, financial ability, sponsorship, employment, etc… and basic
admissibility), the final answer is, that it is ultimately a discretionary
decision. That decision is vested by statute in either the Attorney General
(through IJs and the BIA) or the Secretary of Homeland Security (through
USCIS). Congress gave that discretion to those Executive Branch Officials
and could take it away, but has not done so. As clarified in Matter of Patel,
17 I&N Dec. 597 (BIA 1980); Affirmed In Part; Reversed and Remanded In
Part; [Patel v. INS, 638 F. 2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980)], “The grant of an
application for adjustment of status under section 245 is a matter of
administrative grace. An applicant has the burden of showing that
discretion should be exercised in his favor.” At p. 601.
Patel was following along in a series of at least four prior decisions and
also noted the following. “[W]here adverse factors are present, it may be
necessary for the applicant to offset those factors by a showing of unusual
or even outstanding equities.” Id. [Emphasis added.] Patel and its
antecedents list numerous factors to be considered in rendering the
judgment in discretionary adjustment of status cases. Patel relied, in part
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upon: Matter of Marques, 16 I&N Dec. 314 (BIA 1977); Matter of Leung, 16
I&N Dec. 12 (DD 1976)5; Matter of Arai, 13 I&N Dec. 494 (BIA 1970); Matter
of Ortiz-Prieto, 11 I&N Dec. 317 (BIA 1965). I wish you the best in your
further research. The various cases that are listed, linked, and discussed
herein are just the tip of the iceberg, there are thousands more. It may be
useful to consult the indices found in the DOJ-EOIR Virtual Law Library.
The United States Code [U.S.C.] is a consolidation and codification by
subject matter of the general and permanent laws of the United States. An
excellent resource has been prepared by the Office of the Law Revision
Counsel of the United States House of Representatives (OLRC) and easily
found online at http://uscode.house.gov/. I like the version of the Code of
Federal Regulation found online known as the e-CFR. Finally, the “one stop
shop” for many federal laws, regulations, cases, and various federal
publications is by the Government Printing Office (GPO) website at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
V. ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, & OBSERVATIONS
Ahmed v. Gonzales, Hashmi, Garcia, Kotte, Ramirez-Mejia, Castillo-
Padilla, and Patel, etc…, make clear a number of pertinent points. I will
begin with what is most poignant in my opinion and then list some other
items in no particular order, unless you can find one.
5 This case was decided by a District Director, probably New York City District Office, and is often incorrectly attributed to the BIA.
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There has long been a separation between benefits
adjudications (rewards) and law enforcement &
removal proceedings (punishments).
That division of powers and responsibilities was
more muddled in the past but has become much
clearer over the last several decades.
The roles of benefits and enforcement agencies
become clearer through even a casual perusal of
various actions taken across all three branches of
our government, including:
o Executive actions via notice-and-comment
rulemaking and administrative precedents,
both of which seek a practical application of
and for legislation and interpretations thereof;
then later reinforced through;
o Judicial interpretations, which may mean
finding the executive branch to be acting ultra
vires, or the legislative branch to have passed
a law that is unconstitutional; and
o Legislative changes, which sometimes codify
and other times overrule executive branch
actions and/or judicial branch interpretations.
o Change is the Most Stable Constant. The three
items above illustrate how each branch of our
government can and does exercise its
Constitutional powers and duties in our
system of checks and balances. It is that
system that nurtures an ever-expanding
refinement of the powers and duties of the
various actors within immigration law
matters.
o Note: I have observed that courts more often
tend to find the executive to be acting ultra
vires, which is when the action is beyond the
legal authority to act, while mandamus is rare.
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o The opposites from ultra vires are when:
(1.) A duty owed is unduly delayed or
withheld. A court may exercise the
extraordinary remedy of issuing a writ of
mandamus which is a court order to the
government agency instructing it to
perform its duty forthwith. OR
(2.) An agency may choose to exercise its
innate authority to delay or withhold
enforcement of the law to its full extent;
this is known as prosecutorial discretion.6
Bodies of case-law exist in order to guide
Adjudicators and other Immigration Officers, or
Immigration Judges in the performance of their
duties and promote uniformity in decision-making.
The numerous and highly variable situations
routinely encountered by DHS Officers or IJs often
require an exercise of sound judgment in fact-
finding and reconciling those facts with the
applicable law via an inquisitorial adjudication.
Mixed questions of fact and law rely heavily upon
sound judgment and an appropriate exercise of
discretionary authority.
Where there is no statutorily assigned discretionary
authority allowing the agency to grant a benefit or
relief, in their discretion, then no discretion may be
exercised. See Matter of Polidoro, 12 I&N Dec. 353
(BIA 1967), which concluded: “The argument of
counsel has been noted. The issue in visa petition
proceedings is not one of discretion but of eligibility.
The appeal will be dismissed.” At p. 354.
6 More discussion of this topic will follow below.
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Alternative options or courses of action exist. The
law includes specific assignments and/or delegations
of discretionary authority.
One such course of action is judicious inaction via
the standardized use of Prosecutorial Discretion.
Prosecutorial Discretion merely means that, while
no unauthorized grant of a benefit or relief is made,
the harsher punitive measures available under the
law are not pursued, as a matter of policy.
A Cabinet-Level Official may delegate their
discretionary authority but dictate, direct, and limit
how it may be exercised by issuing regulations,
policy memos, interpretations, declarations, edicts,
or directives.
Administrative Precedent Decisions and formal
Policy Memoranda are very popular means to
express an agency’s viewpoints and put the intended
publics on notice of those viewpoints/interpretations.
The law includes statutory entitlements which do
not contain any discretionary elements. In such
cases, if eligibility is demonstrated, then the benefit
or relief is bestowed and may not be withheld.
The best example of an entitlement is a claim to
citizenship. Citizens may not be deported.
The law includes statutory preclusions which do not
contain any discretionary authority. In such cases, if
the condition precedent exists, then either the
reward is denied and/or the assigned penalty is
imposed or carried-out. This may include denial of
benefits and/or relief; detention; or denial of
voluntary departure, etc…
Additional penalties may include inadmissibility or
removal, and may entail temporary or permanent
bars to admissibility or eligibility for some benefit
or form of relief.
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Many penalties, such as inadmissibility might be
subject to a discretionary waiver or other form of
relief such as adjustment of status to that of an alien
admitted for permanent residence.
Certain individuals might be eligible for a waiver of
a ground of inadmissibility or deportation, and some
waivers may only be available in conjunction with
an application for a benefit.
The most common “discretionary decision” situation
encountered by IJs and USCIS Adjudicators are I-
212 and/or I-601 waiver application in combination
with I-485 adjustment applications.
The above situation has a counterpart is asylum and
refugee cases, or withholding of removal, the form
numbers and procedures are different and tailored
to similar but distinct sections of law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion need only be
considered if there is actually any discretion available to exercise in the first
place. Our Constitution gives Congress with the power to set immigration
and nationality rules through legislation. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, of
the Constitution informs us, in pertinent part, that “The Congress shall
have Power … To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization …
throughout the United States;” Congress set the first such “Rule” via the
Naturalization of 1790 and has kept tweaking the law ever since. Congress
tends to be very strict in setting its immigration related rules. When they
wish to “pass the buck”, they grant discretionary authority to the executive
branch or courts. Until the Department of Homeland Security was created,
the Attorney General was the main delegate of discretion. Now, there are
more cabinet level officials who have some discretion, the Secretary of DHS
has the most discretion now.
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There is legislation pending in both houses of Congress as I write.
Most of what is introduced in Congress dies in committee so don’t hold
your breath in anticipation. The last major change to immigration law was
in the mid-1990s and the last major nationality law change was in 2000. The
Homeland Security Act which was passed after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, was more involved with beefing-up security measures,
reorganizing and restructuring than in making real “substantive” changes
to criteria relating to benefits under the law. There were some “reactionary
changes” when we were in “panic mode”. For purposes of this essay, the
latter are of little relevance. Minor adjustments to the interpretation of this
body of law can come from administrative bodies (AAO and BIA) or the
federal Courts of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Currently, the case I find
most controversial is from the Second Circuit. In Morales-Santana v. Lynch,
___F. 3d___(2nd Cir. 2015) [No. 11-1252 (2nd Cir. July 8, 2015)]; the three-
judge panel sought fit to declare as unconstitutional, legislation that has
been repeatedly upheld since it was passed in 1952. I personally cannot see
USCIS or the Department of Justice accepting that decision without a fight.
In that it is so recent, it is too soon to tell. As of this writing, there is still
time for the government to file a request for rehearing en banc or certiorari
to the Supreme Court. We’ll see.
Dated this 25th day of July, 2015
X
/s/ Joseph P. Whalen
That’s my two-cents, for now!
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EXTRAS!
General Interest Articles:
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/position-paper-settled-v-unsettled-
collateral-estoppel-or-topple-signed
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/position-paper-on-inconsistencies-
incompetence-and-obfuscation
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/bifurcated-analysis-on-appellate-review
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/common-law-master-servant-relationship-
not-master-slave-or-indentured-servant
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/sometimes-the-only-thing-worth-reading-
is-the-footnotes
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/smoke-and-mirrors-and-premature-
whining-and-cases
General Interest Items:
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/fatima-mohamed-v-rosemary-melville-et-
al-no-072750-8th-cir-2008-tps-not-basis-to-reopen-for-i485pdf
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/jd-a-minorv-uscis-chicago-asylum-
mandamus-complaint-june-12-2015
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/what-is-the-motivation-for-an-ice-agent-to-
do-anything-about-eb5
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/basic-scheduling-and-procedures-order-dc-
district-july-13-2015
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http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/2015-cis-ombudsman-annual-report
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/rules-of-practice-and-procedure-for-
administrative-hearings-before-the-dol-office-of-administrative-law-judges-
5192015
Employment-Based:
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/balca-en-banc-decisions-as-of-feb-11-
2004pdf
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/matter-of-muhammad-imran-butt-26-in-
dec-108-bia-2013
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun08201501b6203-7th-mtrr-for-eb3-
admin-asst-in-sole-proprietor-retail-business
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun01201501b4203-eb1c-2-yrs-away-
from-employer-disqualifies-bene
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun012015-01-d7101-l1b-remand-new-
decision-shall-be-certified-to-aao
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/jiangshan-xiao-et-al-v-jeh-johnson-et-al-no-
1441332-5th-cir-7915pdf
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/arvind-gupta-v-headstrong-inc-
2014lca00008-alj-january-21-2015
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http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-may01201501b5203-debarred-entity-
must-be-denied
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EB-5:
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/considerations-for-the-eb5-entrepreneur-
as-opposed-to-an-eb5-investor
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/sec-v-vineet-kalucha-et-al-complaint-and-
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http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/in-the-matter-of-ireeco-llc-and-ireeco-
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http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/california-blue-sky-regional-center-
designation-and-approval
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-may012015-08-d2101-eb5-paralegal-
as-h1b-dismissed
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/immigrant-investor-petitions-aao-non-
precedents-posted-as-of-may-28-2015
Citizenship, Naturalization, & Related:
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/a-case-on-point-in-derivative-citizenship
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/moralessantana-v-lynch-f-3d2nd-cir-2015-
no-111252-2nd-cir-july-8-2015-published-citizenship-law
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun25201501e2309-n600-sustained-
long-overdue-dose-of-good-sense
e-mail: [email protected] Page 19 of 19
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jul02201504e2309-stepchild-not-
eligible-to-derive-usc-unless-as-an-adopted-child
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun09201501e1316-n470-mistates-the-
law-again
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jun03201501e2309-n600-sustained-
jamaican-legitimation-invokes-matter-of-cross-includes-jsca-of-1976
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/united-states-v-jammal-no-312cv07925-
sdwva-filed-feb-9-2015-entered-feb-10-2015-affd-4th-cir-june-9-2015
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/hamid-kamara-v-loretta-lynch-f3d5th-cir-
2015-no-1360807-may-18-2015-derv-citz-clarified
Misc.
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/ifeyhewen-badidi-v-loretta-lynch-no-
1460155-june-25-2015-summary-calendar
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/mazariegos-v-holderlynch-f3d-1st-cir-
2015-no-141431-june-24-2015
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/usa-v-arturo-gonzalezf3d5th-cir-2015-no-
1440344cr0-june-23-2015-ak47
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/in-the-matter-of-armin-shir-mohammadi-
docisb-export-prohibition-order-june-18-2015
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/aao-jan27201501l7202-remand-cuban-
adjustment-act-with-extras
http://www.slideshare.net/BigJoe5/medinanunez-v-lynch-f3d9th-cir-2015-no-
1470657-june-8-2015