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Alfarabi's Book of Rhetoric : An Arabic-English Translation of Alfarabi's Commentary onAristotle's RhetoricAuthor(s): Lahcen E. EzzaherSource: Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Autumn 2008), pp.347-391Published by: University of California Presson behalf of the International Society for the Historyof RhetoricStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/rh.2008.26.4.347.

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Lahcen E. Ezzaher

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Rhetorica, Vol. XXVI, Issue 4, pp. 347391, ISSN 0734-8584, electronic ISSN 1533-8541. 2008 by The International Society for the History of Rhetoric. All rights re-served. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce articlecontent through the University of California Presss Rights and Permissions website,at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/RH.2008.26.4.347.

AlfarabisBook of Rhetoric:An Arabic-English Translation of AlfarabisCommentary on AristotlesRhetoric

Abstract: What follows is an Arabic-English translation of Alfarabis

short commentary on Aristotles Rhetoric. This is the first Englishtranslation of a significant medieval Arabic text made available to

English-speaking scholars in rhetoric, philosophy, and logic.

Keywords: Alfarabi,Book of Rhetoric, Aristotle, Arabic rhetoric

Introduction

Standard historical accounts of western rhetoric generallyintroduce medieval rhetoric as part of a largely unbrokenchain of a unified rhetorical tradition that spans a period

of twenty-five hundred years. The character of medieval rhetoricitself is represented as a fixed, homogeneous, ethnocentric, and self-referential body of texts made available to students of rhetoric inmeticulously constructed anthologies, the most notable of which is

The Rhetorical Tradition, a newly revised anthology edited by PatriciaBizzell and Bruce Herzberg.1 For example, except for a vague pass-ing mention of the introduction into Europe of Arab scholarshipon classical learning, especially the teachings of Aristotle, Bizzelland Herzberg present medieval rhetoric as a natural out-growth of

1Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, eds.,The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from

Classical Times to the Present(2nd edition, Boston, MA: Bedford Books, 2001).

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R H E T O R I C A348

classical rhetoric and give no indication of the commentaries of Al-farabi (870950), Avicenna (9801037), and Averroes (11261198) on

AristotlesRhetoric.2

However, historians of rhetoric George Kennedy and James Mur-phy have drawn attention to important rhetorical traditions lyingoutside the traditional texts of western rhetoric. In Classical Rhetoricand Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times,Kennedy recommends that the Hebrew and Arabic rhetorical tradi-tions should not pass unnoticed.3 In his essay, The Historiographyof Rhetoric: Challenges and Opportunities, James Murphy opens upmany possibilities for those who want to look at other cultures and

rhetorical traditions, pointing out that the interest many Europeanand American historians show in the Greek-Roman tradition has of-ten led them to overlook Arabic rhetoric which in some instances,as he acknowledges, actually served as a bridge between Hellenicand European rhetoric.4

The bridge that Murphy acknowledges is in effect a signifi-cant historical moment of discontinuity in the complex chain ofknowledge that western histories tend to ignore. MurphysMedievalRhetoric: A Select Bibliography and also his Renaissance Rhetoric: A

Short-Title Catalogue, in fact, include some important informationon works by Muslim scholars such as Alfarabi, Averroes, and Al-Baqillani.5 Of particular significance is the reference Murphy makesin his Rhetoric in the Middle Ages to the contribution of medieval Mus-lim commentators such as Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, whosecommentaries on AristotlesRhetoricreintroduce[ed] the work intothe main stream of Western life.6

In an engaging article titled Rewriting the Middle Ages: SomeSuggestions, critic David Aers suggests that we need to rewrite

the history of the Middle Ages, generally presented to us as a har-monious world unified by one coherent system of Christian dogmathat includes uncontested doctrines of gender, sexuality and social

2Bizzell and Herzberg,The Rhetorical Tradition, p. 439.3George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from

Ancient to Modern Times(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 194.4James J. Murphy, The Historiography of Rhetoric: Challenges and Opportu-

nities,Rhetorica1 (1983): 18 (p. 6).5James J. Murphy,Medieval Rhetoric: A Select Bibliography(Toronto: University of

Toronto Press, 1971);Renaissance Rhetoric: A Short-Title Catalogue(New York: Garland,1981).

6James J. Murphy,Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory FromSaint Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 91.



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AlfarabisBook of Rhetoric 349

order.7 Aers calls for a history that exposes the contradictions, theconflicts, and any discernible forces of changes that lie beneath what

he describes as a seemingly homogeneous, uncontested clerical tra-ditionembeddedinastaticcultureandheproposesthatweabandonall models that present the Middle Ages as a static culture.8

Such lines of argument proposed by Murphy and Aers should en-courage us to suggest that expanding the traditional canon of rhetoricto include the Arabic medieval commentary tradition on AristotlesRhetoricin rhetoric programs will broaden the domain of the disci-pline. It will offer a new cultural dimension to the reading of theAristotelian tradition in the sense that it will involve the juxtapo-

sition of a Christian European world view with an Arabic-Islamicworld view. As a result, students of rhetoric will get to appreciatethe medieval rhetorical tradition even more in the sense that theywill have a chance to find that a route from Athens to the medievalEuropean universities of Paris and Oxford leads through the courtsof Baghdad and Cordoba. As critic Carolyn Prager explains in herarticle Blak as a Bla Mon: Reflections on a Medieval English Imageof the Non-European, by the beginning of the twenty-first century,one-third of the American student population will be composed of

African Americans, Hispanics, American Indians, or Asians in ad-dition to other minority groups.9 Prager believes that the increasingdiversity of American students will inevitably pose serious chal-lenges both inside and outside the academic discourse communityas regards the debate over the rationale for the study of westerncreative representations. She concludes:

If we believe that the study of older European literature is important,then we must find ways to engage student interest other than throughrecourse to traditional arguments about the intrinsic and universal value

of the best of these works, however defined.10

This increasing awareness of the importance of multiculturalism inacademic discourse communities makes legitimate the claim that themedieval Arabic commentary tradition on the Rhetoric merits seriousattention in the debate over the history of the discipline.

7David Aers, Rewriting the Middle Ages: Some Suggestions,JMRS18.2 (1988):22140 (p. 221).

8Aers, Rewriting the Middle Ages, p. 239.9Carolyn Prager, Blak as a Bla Mon: Reflections on a Medieval English Image

of the Non-European, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Studies 12 (1990): 4357(p. 54).

10Prager, Blak as a Bla Mon, p. 54.



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Traditional accounts of the history of the Arabic-Islamic worldtell us that when the Arab Muslims first marched on the Roman

Empire in around AD 650, they conquered Syria, Egypt, North Africa,some parts of Asia Minor, and the southern Roman provinces. Underthe Umayyads, who were centered in Damascus, the Arab Muslimsin AD 664 continued their conquest, sweeping over North Africauntil they reached the Atlantic. They crossed the Mediterranean Sea,conquered Spain, and moved northward until they reached Poitierswhere they were defeated in AD 732.

When the Abbasids came to power in the ninth century AD, theyestablished their dynasty in Baghdad, which became in less than fifty

years the center of a worldwide culture. After a troubled period ofwars, the Arab Muslims devoted their time and wealth to the studyof various branches of knowledge under Harun al-Rashid (786809)and his son al-Mamun (786833), whose empire was a good placefor a fruitful dialogue between East and West. The Abbasid dynastyhosted an important cultural diversity which, according to Rom Lan-dau, was nicely molded into an amalgam that constituted a newArab-Muslim identity.11 Following the Prophet Muhammads well-known tradition, which urges Muslims to seek knowledge even as

far as China, Muslim scholars in effect sought knowledge from theneighboring cultures of the Mediterranean. Thus during the reignof Harun al-Rashid, who entertained good diplomatic relations withCharlemagne, exchanging gifts and embassies with the Europeanmonarch, the Muslim empire was open to the West. Thus the Ab-basid caliphs palace in Baghdad was a house of learning in whichscientists, theologians, musicians, and poets made tremendous con-tributions in the arts, letters, and science.

Harun al-Rashids son and successor al-Mamun, who was a

zealous lover of philosophical discourse and a generous patron ofthe arts and sciences, continued his fathers work by establishingin Baghdad the famous Bayt al-Hikma (House of Wisdom), whichcombined a library, an academy, and a translation department. InKitab al-Fihrist, which is a comprehensive tenth-century survey ofIslamic culture, chronicler Ibn al-Nadim tells us the story of a dreamal-Mamun once had of Aristotle and which deserves to be mentionedbecause of its significance:

Al-Mamun dreamed of a man of a fair complexion, imbued

with life, with a broad brow and joined eyebrows . . ., a man of goodqualities .... Al-Mamun explained: I felt awe in his presence and

11Rom Landau,Islam and the Arabs(New York: Macmillan, 1959), 53.



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asked: Who are you? He said: I am Aristotle. I was overjoyed tosee him and said: Oh, wise man, can I ask you something? He said:

Do. I asked: What is beauty? He said: What reason judges tobe beautiful. I asked: What else? He said: What the Law judgesto be beautiful. I asked: What else? He said: What the generalpublic judges to be beautiful. I asked: What else? He said: Thereis nothing else. [Translation mine]12

Al-Mamun was evidently elated by Aristotles visit, especiallywhen the Greek philosopher brought with him a sophisticated intel-lectual instrument to help the caliph prevent the collapse of a youngIslamic state that was torn in those times by internal conflict among

various theological schools, such as the Asharites, the Manawites,and so forth. From this story, the implication seems to be that forthe Islamic state to be beautiful, it must necessarily be based onreason, the Law, and public consensus.

Greek cultural influence was very important during the reign ofal-Mamun, and as a consequence, many Greek philosophical andscientific texts were translated into Arabic. Thus, through Baghdad,into North Africa and in Spain flowed a Greek philosophical tradi-tion, dressed in Arabic-Islamic cultural terms, that was to awaken the

European Renaissance. Also during this period, the Arabic-Islamicculture was heterogeneous, for it assimilated other non-Arab cul-tures, namely those of the Persians, the Turks, the Latins, the Andalu-sians, and the North Africans. In effect, the Arabic-Islamic works inastronomy, theology, mathematics, and medicine made the names ofAlfarabi, Avicenna, Averroes, and Ibn Hazm occur frequently in theworks of medieval and Renaissance scholars such as Roger Baconand Thomas Aquinas.

In the department of translation (Bayt al-Tarjama) in Baghdad, nu-

merous works were translated from Greek, Persian, Syriac, Hebrew,Aramaic, and Ethiopian into the Arabic language. Music, art, ar-chitecture, grammar, mathematics, medicine, astronomy, chemistry,and several other branches of learning were studied and cultivatedin this House of Wisdom. Nearly all the philosophical works ofAristotle, together with the Neo-Platonic commentaries on themwere translated into Arabic. Historian Irfan Faqih gives a histori-cal justification for this period of enlightenment in al-Mamuns ed-ucation when he explains that al-Mamun was trained at an early

age by the most competent scholars of the time and that he ac-quired proficiency in scholastic theology and various social sci-

12Ibn Al-Nadim.Kitab al-Fihrist, ed. Riza (Teheran: Dar Al-Masira, 1988), 30304.



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ences, which ultimately provided him with a philosophical bentof mind.13

From the ninth century till the eleventh century, Muslim andChristian translators and commentators, many of whom were Neo-Platonist scholars showing great admiration for Greek philosopherslike Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, were actively involved in thetransmission of Greek thought into Arabic. For example, al-Kindi(801866), who was known to the West by the Latinized versionof his name Alkindus, was appointed by a number of Abbasidcaliphs to oversee the translation of Greek works in philosophy,medicine, and astrology into the Arabic language. Other philoso-

phers, such as Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes, based their com-mentaries and treatises on translations already available to them inArabic.

The noted medieval translators who rendered Greek works fromSyriac translations into Arabic were Yahya ibn al-Bitriq (770830),Hunayn ibn Ishaq (809877), his son Ishaq ibn Hunayn (845910),and Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunus (870940). The translations into Ara-bic of Porphyrys Introduction (Eisagoge), Categoriae, De Interpretatione,Analytica Priora, Analytica Posteriora, Topica, Sophistica, Rhetorica, Poet-

ica, Physica, De Generatione et Corruptione, Liber Animae, Liber Sensus etSensati, Liber Animalium, Metaphysica, and Ethica, as well as PlatosRepublic, were mostly done by these Syriac-Christian scholars. Inhis bibliographical work Kitab al-Fihrist, Ibn al-Nadim paid tributeto them and called them the encyclopedists, thus emphasizing thedisciplinary character of translation and its important contribution incultural production. Commenting on the effects of this cultural activ-ity on Greek philosophy in general and Aristotles work in particular,scholar of Renaissance humanism Paul Oskar Kristeller acknowl-

edges that Aristotle attained in medieval Arabic-Islamic culture anauthority and doctrinal preponderance that he had never possessedin Greek antiquity to the very end.14

In the twelfth century, most Latin translations from the Greekcame through the Norman kingdom of Sicily. As Carolyn Pragernotes, the Sicilian court under Roger II of Sicily around 1152 was aplace frequently visited by famous English scholars such as Adelardof Bath and John of Salisbury. The work of these scholars, Pragermaintains, served as an important conduit of knowledge about

13Irfan Faqih,Glimpses of Islamic History(Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1979), 258.14Paul Oskar Kristeller,Renaissance Thought and Its Sources(New York: Columbia

UP, 1979), 35.



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Greek and Arabic culture to Europe in general and to England inparticular.15

The school of translation in Toledo in Spain was yet another im-portant center in the West actively involved in the rendering intoLatin of the Arabic translations and commentaries. Hermannus Ale-mannus did most of the translations of the Arabic commentaries byAverroes and Alfarabi on Aristotles PoeticsandRhetoric into Latinbetween 1243 and 1256. In a very informative essay titled Pratiquede la traduction en Espagne au Moyen Age: les travaux toledans,translator and critic Clara Foz describes the Toledan population inthe twelfth and thirteenth centuriescomposed of Spaniards, Arabs,

and Jewsas a rich multilingual and multicultural environment thatoffered an important site for dialogue among diverse cultures.16 Fozinforms us that Latin was introduced later in Toledo after AlphonseVI conquered the city. This rich linguistic and cultural contact inmedieval Spain should have an important implication in our under-standing of medieval history in the sense that it defeats the existingview of medieval western society as something essentially Europeanand Christian. Foz explains:

Thus Toledo, a great center of Arabic culture, became, with the retakingof territory by the Christians in 1085, a meeting point between the Orientand the Occident, the latter lagging behind culturally and scientificallyin comparison with the former. [Translation mine]17

Thus a careful study of the complex character of the textual transmis-sion of Aristotles treatises on theRhetoricand thePoeticsfrom Greekinto Arabic and then into Latin, for example, would certainly open upnew horizons for fruitful research in rhetoric and literature programs.The inclusion of such works will constitute a tremendous contribu-

tion to the history of rhetoric and poetics in the Humanities becauseit will indicate a good appreciation of the academic effort that Arabic-Muslim philosophers demonstrated by working closely with Greekcommentators such as Themistius and John the Grammarian, withwhom they engaged in an academic debate over Aristotles works.

Most biographies indicate that Abu Nasr Alfarabi was born inthe district of Farab (Turkestan) in 870. Although his family was

15Prager, Blak as a Bla Mon, cited in n. 9 above, p. 52.16Clara Foz, Pratique de la traduction en Espagne au Moyen Age: les travaux

toledans, in Roger Ellis, ed., The Medieval Translator II (London: Westfield, 1991),2943 (p. 29).

17Foz, Pratique de la traduction, p. 30.



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Muslim, he received his education in philosophy and logic undertwo well-known Nestorian masters of logic in Baghdad. The first one

was Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunus (870940), who translated AristotlesPosterior Analyticsinto Arabic from a Syriac translation by Ishaq ibnHunayn. Abu Bishr Matta also rendered into Syriac the Poeticsandthe Sophistics. The second one was Yuhanna ibn Hailan (860920),who was knowledgeable in philosophy, Christian theology, and logic.Alfarabi was also a contemporary of Yahya ibn Addi (893974), whotranslated Categories, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations from Syriacinto Arabic. It is worth pointing out that these Nestorian masters oflogic and philosophy, who knew Syriac and Arabic, had inherited

the Christian Neo-Platonic tradition handed down to them by thelast representatives of the school of Hellenistic Alexandria. Thiseducational background puts Alfarabi, to use Nicholas Rescherswords, in the position of a continuator of the logical work of theSyrian Christian logicians.18

Alfarabi knew Turkish, Persian, Kurdish, and Arabic. He did notknow Syriac or Greek, but still he is considered in Islamic philoso-phy the first to have rendered Greek logic into Arabic, for he broughtAristotles logical scheme close to the Arabic-Islamic mind, which

made him known as the Second Teacher, after Aristotle, who wasknown in Arabic-Islamic philosophical circles as the First Teacher(al-Muallim al-Awwal). Alfarabi was also known for his talent in mu-sic theory, for he composed a monumental piece titledThe Great Bookof Music (Kitab al-Musiqa al-Kabir). He traveled extensively aroundthe Islamic world, visiting academic circles of linguists, dialecticians,literary critics, and commentators on Greek philosophical works inBaghdad, Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo. He received benefits at thecourt of Sayf al-Dawla (d. 967), the Hamadani ruler of Aleppo and a

great patron of the arts and letters. After a lengthy stay in Aleppo,where he wrote and taught, he went to Damascus with his patron,where he died in 950.

In his monumental work on the Aristotelian tradition, Alfarabi isparticularly concerned with the universality of logic. For example, inhis introduction to his short commentary on Aristotles Prior Analyt-ics, he explains: to follow in [Aristotles] footsteps in this regard is toexplain the canons found in his books to the people of every art and ofevery science and to the scholars in every age by means of examples

18Nicholas Rescher, Al-Farabs Short Commentary on Aristotles Prior Analytics(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963), 19.



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which are familiar to them.19 For Alfarabi, just as scientific truth isunique and universal, so is the end of logic, for despite the differences

of time, place, and people, it reaches one universal truth. It is worthmentioning that in addition to his interest in Aristotle, Alfarabi alsodrew upon Plato and Plotinus and the result of this intellectual effortis a synthesis of diverse philosophical views based on his notion ofthe unity of philosophy. This explains his concern with reconcilingPlatos philosophical ideas with those of Aristotle, and ultimatelyreligion with philosophy. Alfarabi closes his treatise The Attainmentof Happinessby drawing the readers attention to the following con-clusion: So let it be clear to you [the reader] that, in what they [Plato

and Aristotle] presented, their purpose is the same, and that theyintended to offer one and the same philosophy (I, sec. 64). The sameidea is reiterated in the opening section ofThe Philosophy of Aristotlewhen he states: Aristotle sees the perfection of man as Plato seesit and more (III, sec. 1). The notion of the unity of philosophy wouldlater be the basis of the intellectual effort of Avicenna and Averroes.As to the relation between religion and philosophy, Alfarabi bringsthe two together by presenting the philosopher as the supreme rulerand lawgiver whose duty is to teach and lead his people to happi-

ness by his mastery of theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moralvirtues, and practical arts (I, sec. 1).Alfarabi was aware of the deep divisions in the Islamic state and

his effort to reconcile Aristotle with Plato was motivated by his con-cern for establishing unity. The Islamic world was more complex anddiverse and multicultural. And since Alfarabi believed in the unityof the human mind, the unity of philosophy, according to his view,will pave the way for the unity of reason and revelation, and ulti-mately the future of the Islamic state depends on this unity. Thus we

can recognize three levels of this reconciliation: Plato and Aristotle,Greek philosophy and the Islamic faith, and reason and revelation.The third level is the most significant one since it announces theunity of a political state that stands on both reason and religion. Thisintellectual effort clearly made Alfarabi earn the reputation of thefounder of Islamic philosophy.

In his book Kitab Ihsaal-Ulum (The Book of the Enumeration ofSciences), which is a sort of encyclopedia in which he gives a briefaccount of all branches of art and science, Alfarabi classified Aris-

19Muhsin Mahdi, trans.,Alfarabis Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle(New York: TheFree Press of Glenco, 1962).



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totles works into two categories.20 In the first one, he listed eightstudies, each corresponding to a treatise by Aristotle:Categoriae,De

Interpretatione, Analytica Priora, Analytica Posteriora, Topica, Sophistica,Rhetorica, andPoetica. Following the late Alexandrian commentatorson Aristotle, Alfarabi treated the Rhetoric and the Poeticsas part ofAristotlesOrganon. That Alfarabi included theRhetoricand thePoet-icsin this first category is quite significant because, as Deborah Blackexplains, AristotlesOrganonrepresented the main source of logicalspeculation for the philosophers of the Middle Ages, and was a majorinspiration for their epistemological doctrine as well.21 In the secondcategory, Alfarabi put Aristotles books on physical matters and also

included the three books onMetaphysics, Ethics,andPolitics.In this short commentary on Aristotles Rhetoric, Alfarabi is re-constructing a Greek text for a Muslim-Arabic speaking audience,and so in his reading of Aristotles treatise he does not follow itword for word. Rather he looks for appropriate topics and issuesand treats them as totally independent of their cultural context. Thusthose issues and topics are immediately put in a new context witha new meaning. Knowing that he is dealing with a text from a paganculture, Alfarabi picks and chooses what he deems useful from the

Aristotelian corpus. He treats logic as an instrument totally indepen-dent of who is speaking and of its cultural context. Logic is seenhere as a universal instrument free of ideology. But this instrumentis manipulated for ideological purposes. It is put side by side withrevelation to clear the Islamic state from any internal contradictionsand strife that threaten to bring it down.

The commentary (al-Sharh) is indeed a significant metaphor inthe philosophical project of Alfarabi. In his lexical work, Lisan al-Arab,Ibn Manzur (d. 1311) devotes an entry to the various meanings of the

word al-Sharh (explication). First, al-Sharh and al-Tashrih meanto dissect. Also al-Sharh means, among other things, to open.One can of course assume that the primary text is at the outset closedto the Muslim philosopher, given the fact that he did not read Greekor Syriac and that he could only work from an Arabic translation of aSyriac translation of a Greek text. But the word al-Sharh suggests inthis sense that the role of the commentator is to open the primarytext. The word al-Sharh occurs in a number of verses in the Quran to

20Abu Nasr Alfarabi,Kitab Ihsaal-Ulum(The Book of the Enumeration of Sciences)(Beirut: Dar wa Maktabat al-Hilal, 1996).

21Deborah L. Black, Logic and Aristotles Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval ArabicPhilosophy(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 1.



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express the meaning of openness of the heart.22 For example, in thechapter Al-Anam (6:125): Those whom Allah (in His plan) willeth

to guide, He openeth their breast to Islam. In the verse al-Sharh(94:1): Have We notopenedthee thy breast? In the verse al-Zumar(39:22): Is one whose heart Allah has opened to Islam, so that hehas received Enlightenment from Allah (no better than one hard-hearted)? In this sense, opening the scope of the text necessarilyimplies roominess to accommodate new ideas, new digressions, andnew audiences. In this context, to open and guide the Greek text to aMuslim-Arabic speaking audience, Alfarabi creates a new linguisticand cultural space for it so that it can adapt to the Arabic language

and culture and this operation makes the Greek text even larger thanit originally is.InThe Order of Things,Michel Foucault suggests several terms to

describe the intimate relation between the text and the commentary:adjacency, proximity, juxtaposition, resemblance, convenience, con-junction, and adjustment. What these terms imply is a sense of contactzone, or, to use Abdelkebir Khatibis term, a third way between aclassical Greek text and a medieval Arabic-Muslim commentary.23 Acommentary takes the place of the primary text, but before it does

that, it has to create a space of adjacency with the primary text. There-fore, both the commentary and the primary text become convenientin the sense that they come close enough to one another and createa relation of juxtaposition. Foucault informs us that adjacency is notan exterior relation between things, but the sign of a relationship,obscure though it may be.24 In this context, what the commentarystrives to achieve is a relation of resemblance to the primary text.Foucault explains that resemblance always seeks to become doubleas soon as one attempts to unravel it.25 A commentary stands con-

venient to the primary text and adjusts itself to the primary text.The commentary also ensures continuity by prolonging the textsline of argument into the future, and at the same time it interruptsthat continuity by seeking to replace the primary text itself and actsas its double. In this case, the commentary almost seeks to efface theprimary text by being a sort of transition from the primary text tothe criticism of that text.

22Holy Quran. Text, Translation and Commentary, trans. Yusuf Ali (Beirut: Daral-Arabiyya, 1968).

23Abdelkebir Khatibi,Maghreb Pluriel(Paris: Denoel, 1983), 50.24Michel Foucault,The Order of Things(New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 18.25Foucault,The Order of Things, p. 18.



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This translation is based on an excellent critical edition preparedby Langhade and Grignaschi, who used two manuscripts recently

discovered: manuscript N0 812 of Hamidiye Library in Istanbul andmanuscript N0 231, TE 41, of the University of Bratislava Library.26

In their critical edition, titled Al-Farabi: Deux ouvrages inedits surla rhetorique, Langhade and Grignaschi included punctuation andparagraph division to make the text clear to read. In my effort torender the Arabic text into English, I have frequently resorted totheir French translation for help, especially when I arrived at somepassages in which Alfarabis style seemed very obscure.

Alfarabis commentary may be divided into the following sec-

tions:

I. Introduction

Alfarabi defines rhetoric as a syllogistic art the purpose of whichis persuasion. He also compares persuasion with teaching in thedemonstrative arts. Persuasion is a sort of opinion and has to havean object of opposition, either more or less, apparent or hidden.

II. Things That Cause the End of Belief and Certainty

In this section, Alfarabi engages in a discussion of the views ofthe ancients on the notion of certainty and draws the conclusion thatit is not possible that we have two opposite beliefs about the samething at one and same time.

III. Opinion Is of Two Types

Alfarabi identifies two types of opinion: one for which a persondoes not know an opposite. Alfarabi gives a number of examples toillustrate this case. As to the other type of opinion, the person knowsthe opposite.

IV. Strong Opinion

Alfarabi explains that strong opinion in every person is one towhich there is no opposite.

26J. Langhade and M. Grignaschi, eds., Al-Farabi: Deux ouvrages inedits sur larhetorique(Beyrouth: Dar El-Mashreq, 1971).



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V. Definition of Doubt

Alfarabi defines doubt as a moment when the soul stops betweentwo opposite opinions, resulting from two things that are equal inclarity and firmness. He also mentions the ancients (most probablythe sophists) who relied on rhetorical means only until Aristotle camealong and was the first to possess the means by which he frameduniversal laws, arranged in a technical manner, and which he firmlyput in logic.

VI. Composition of the Enthymeme

Alfarabi defines an enthymeme as a statement composed of twojoint premises that we use by omitting one premise.

VII. The Example

Alfarabi explains that the example has the force of a syllogismand can be used for persuasive purposes.

VIII. Three Types of Listeners

Alfarabi breaks the audience into three types: those we want topersuade, the opponent, and the judge.

IX. The Opponent

The opponent may be real or apparent. The usefulness of theopponent is to make the arguments the speaker advances more

persuasive.

X. Conditions for Being a Judge

Alfarabi discusses some conditions that allow for fairness in judg-ing a case, the most important of which is the ability to distinguishwell which one of the two opposing arguments is more persuasive.

XI. The Importance of the Enthymeme

Alfarabi recognizes the importance of the moral excellence ofthe speaker, but he also argues that if moral excellence is not wellestablished, the speaker will need arguments to show his superior



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moral character by means of which he aims to persuade his au-dience. The speaker can only achieve that goal by means of the

enthymeme.

XII. The Sign and the Proof

Alfarabi identifies two types of signs: one in which the commonterm is more general than the predicate and the subject altogether.In the second one, the common term is more particular than thepredicate and the subject altogether.

XIII. The Most Authentic Proof

For Alfarabi, the most authentic proof is one by whose existencesomething must necessarily exist. The types of proofs vary accordingto the types of causes.

XIV. Comparison

In this section, Alfarabi discusses the composition of comparison

and shows that comparison is almost an enthymeme or a syllogism.

XV. Conclusion

Alfarabi closes his commentary with words of praise to God.

Translation

In the Name of Allah the Merciful, the CompassionateRhetoric is a syllogistic art, the purpose of which is persuasionin all ten categories. What happens in the mind of the hearer as aresult of persuasion is the ultimate goal of the acts of rhetoric.

Persuasion is an opinion. In general, opinion is the belief thatsomething is or is not; what we believe may be different from thething itself.

When certainty of truth of one of two things that are relatedto one another is not attained, it is then an object of research. The

truth of everything that is an object of research is then unknown.If it is said that opinion is not the belief in the truth of what can beproved untrue, but rather the belief in what cannot be proved untrue,then that is not opinion, but certainty, and that there was an error innaming it. Also in belief, there must be either truth or untruth both



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in affirmative or negative propositions. Assent may concern whatcannot be other than itself. And that is science.

In the art of rhetoric, persuasion is similar to teaching in thedemonstrative arts. It is akin to the knowledge that a learner ac-quires through learning. The attention a listener pays to a speaker,his willingness to persevere and his reflection on what is said, allthese are similar to learning. The meaning of the word al-qanaa(contentment) has been transposed to render this meaning from tobe content with something, like a portion of it or a frugal part ofit, even if it is possible to obtain more of it. In fact, when people meetin their transactions and livelihood, they are content to believe each

other in what they are discoursing about and to refer to one anotherssayings, to the point that they call this a science.Opinion and certitude both share the meaning that they are a

point of view. To have a point of view is to believe that somethingis or is not. It is a genus to them both and they are its species.The issues about which people discourse and express their pointsof view are either necessary or possible. Of things necessary, someare absolutely necessary; others are necessary at certain times, andbefore those times, it was possible for them to exist or not to exist.

We attribute to these the word contingent. Certitude exists innecessary propositions only. It seems there are various types ofcertitude according to various types of necessary propositions. Thusthere is what is absolutely certain and what is certain at a givenmoment of time and ceases to be certain. As to possible propositions,there is absolutely no certitude in them. I do not mean that ourknowledge of the possible is a possible that is not certitude; I onlymean that if something can possibly exist or not exist in the future, itwill not be possible for us to know for sure if it exists or does not

exist. Thus our belief that something can possibly exist is absolutelynot certitude.In general, persuasion and opinion may be about the different

types of what is necessary and about what is possible. The termpossible has in the first place two meanings: the first one refers tothe unknown, the meaning of which necessarily implies the searchfor that which is right to study. The second one refers to one of theaspects of the existence of several future matters. Our ignorance ofwhat does not yet impose which of the two opposites to the object

of research is the appropriate and the true is what is possible fromour part only, and is not a concept that exists in the matter outside ofus. The possible that is requisite in opinion is not the possible thatsignifies something existing for the matter itself outside of the soul; itis the possible that signifies something (possible) from our part only.



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This means that we do not know if that which we believe correspondsto the thing that exists or not. Because the matter is inseparable from

something that comes to the soul from outside, opinion becomes as ifthere were ignorance in it tied to a science: our belief is such becauseit depends on what happens to the soul from outside; in that case, it islike a science; our belief in it that we are not certain that what is in oursouls corresponds to the matter outside of the soul is like ignoranceof the correspondence between our belief and the existing matter.This concerns the existence of that which is necessary and possiblefrom our part. There is also what consists, in a certain manner, ofpossibility, like when we say: Zaid is standing. As long as he is

standing, this is, during this time, necessary; whereas before, it waspossible that this could be or could not be.As to pure necessity, which is not vitiated with any possibility, it

is not possible for the same person, at the same time, to have bothopinion and certainty about it. But as to necessity, which is vitiatedwith possibility, it is possible that the same person at the same timewill have both opinion and certainty about it. In effect, this personmay have certainty about its existence in the present and opinionabout its existence in the future. The cause of our ignorance is that

we have formed an opinion about pure necessity from our part; asto necessity that is vitiated with something, this opinion is from ourpart while it exists in the present, and from its part while it exists inthe future, because it can or cannot exist according to our opinionand belief.

Opinion can be strong, and it can be weak. It can be of the type inwhich a person does not feel opposition, and it can also be of thetype in which a person feels opposition and is able to bring it eitherwith himself or when he is discoursing with other people. Opinion is

strong when there is less opposition, and it is weak when there ismore opposition. That a person feels opposition does not diminishpersuasion.

Every person reinforces persuasion in dealing with others orannuls it by thorough examination or forgiveness by what he judgesmore useful. If he benefits from the lowest degrees of persuasion,he does not go any further. If he finds that the lowest degree ofpersuasion does not help him achieve what he wants, he will examineit thoroughly and reinforce it. If he finds that it will be more helpful

to nullify something from it, he will oppose it, knowing its power.Persuasion, even when we reach a more assertive matter in it,has to have an object of opposition, either more or less, apparent orhidden. That which opposes opinion may be hidden from the partof the person who believes and discusses, and it may be hidden from



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the part of the matter being discussed. This is due to the fact thata point of view may encounter several oppositions whose role is to

guide a person and draw his attention to the error of his point of view,either in part or entirely, and to the truth of what should be believed.He is not aware of these oppositions, either because he is negligentand prefers to be mentally idle, or because he is too preoccupiedwith the necessities of life to examine thoroughly those oppositions,or because he is preoccupied with the exclusive study of a type ofmatters other than the type of matter in which he is not aware ofopposition, or because of a mental deficiency, which is due eitherto his young age and which disappears, or to a natural disposition

which does not disappear. The strength of his natural dispositionto understand things that are normally understood by syllogismsmay be limited to a degree, or it may be limited to a certain type ofthings only. If he were to aim past that limit, either in everything orin a certain type of matter, his strength would weaken. Strength isweakened with exhaustion caused by the study of previous matters.

If he had started considering this and had examined it with allhis power, he would have pulled out its opposites, the way thingshappen with physical strength. When a person examines something

and has a point of view about it, and pursues that point of view to thelimit of his strength, and no opposition to that point of view appearsto him, nor the truth of its opposite, because of the fact that whatis opposed to his point of view is hidden from his perspective, thenhe has proved the truth of that point of view according to his ability.

The opposite can also be hidden with respect to the matter itself,for reasons and states in the matter, like when the opposites aretaken from things which are meant to be observed and tested, andthe person encounters an obstacle that prevents him from observing

and testing them, either because they are distant in time and space,or because of another obstacle. For example, when, in the study ofanimal anatomy, we need to observe several internal animal organs,but cannot possibly do that, either because of lack of equipment, orbecause the Law does not permit us to do that.

Sometimes oppositions are vague and to detect them, the personneeds additional strength borrowed from another art that he doesnot possess; or the error in the universal proposition is so subtle andthe oppositions to it are so few. When a person does not perceive any

opposite to a point of view and knows that this opposite is hidden tohim only from his perspective, he must suspect that point of viewand not trust it completely.

It is difficult for a person to know from which side a vagueopposite comes, whether from his side, or from the side of the matter



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itself. Also a person is far from suspecting himself in his beliefs, forhe trusts his point of view, especially when the opposite does not

appear to him, after he has desired for long what he believes.The surest opinion is determined in relation to each person, notin relation to itself. The surest opinion is one that a person has put allhis effort in studying it and has not encountered any opposition to it,or has dismantled any opposition to it. His belief becomes absolutelyfree of any opposition, especially if he does not suspect his mind inthat.

It was in this manner that the ancients justified their points ofview in speculative matters. They would look for the appropriate

syllogism and when they found it, they would make of it a point ofview. Then they would pursue that point of view and seek out itsoppositions and contrast it to its opposite. When they did not findany opposite, or found opposites that they were able to dismantleand refute, they would then adopt that point of view and believeit was true. This was regarding the point of view of each particularperson.

As to solid opinions, inquiry about them is achieved throughdialectical means more than through rhetorical means; however, this

does not guarantee that they correspond to the truth of the matter.

Things That Cause the End of Belief and Certainty

There are various things that cause the end of belief: death; thatis, when the person who believes dies; or corruption of the mind;or forgetfulness; or forgetfulness of proof; or the end of the matterabout which there was belief, through destruction, or transformationinto the opposite of what it had been, or a fallacy that gets into it and

which the person who believes does not detect, or a true oppositethat shows him the error of his belief. The same with certainty: itends with the death of the person who believes, the corruption ofhis mind, or his forgetfulness. But it does not cease with the endof the matter or the end of opposites, as has been shown in Kitabal-Burhan (The Book of Proof) [Posterior Analytics]. Considered in anabsolute manner, of the properties of certainty, when it occurs, is thatit never ends as long as the person who believes is sane and his mindis sane. However, temporary certainty ceases with the end of the

matter, or when it changes into its opposite, despite the fact that theperson who believes is sane and his mind is sane. Of the propertiesof opinion, there is the fact that it can end in the future, despite thesanity of the person who believes, the sanity of his mind, and theintegrity of the matter, and without forgetting it.



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In sum, every belief that is acquired at a certain time and whichcan end in the future by opposition is an opinion. And every belief

that stood for a while and then ended by opposition was an opinionbefore it ended. And the person who held that belief did not feel thatit was an opinion.

Some ancients raised the question about the subject of point ofview that is particular to each individual person and said: Are youconfident that the points of view in which you believe today, youare not going to turn away from them and embrace their opposite?A similar question: Did you not have a point of view in the pastwhich you believed was true? And then you turned away from it so

that its opposite has become today what its opposite was yesterday?What guarantee do you have that you are not going to turn awayfrom this point of view in favor of its first opposite? There are othersimilar questions among these ancient issues. The purpose of allthese was simply to show that such points of view were opinionsand insufficient in speculative matters, by means of which pointsof view were at the level of certainty, and that they should not beconsidered of the level of certainty.

Insufficient answers have been suggested to these questions

because of their poor knowledge of the ways of certainty. Thus someof them said: I do not turn away from this specific point of view aslong as I am in this state of mind. This is not an answer to makehis points of view certain, because there is no difference between thisstatement and the following one: I do not turn away from them[points of view] as long as I do not know of an opposite that willdestroy them, or as long as the proofs that make them appear truein my mind are not proved wrong. Such is the state of opinions.For when an opposite to an opinion does not appear, that opinion

is like certainty for the person who believes it.Others among the ancients thought that there should not be ananswer to this question and that it should be dropped because it wasa false question. Earlier they had claimed that these questions andother similar ones involved the invalidation of the point of view ofevery person asking questions with the aim of invalidating the pointof view of another person, and that they made invalid all points ofview and did not allow a person to have any point of view. Not toallow this is impossible, since every person has a point of view, to

the extent that when someone says: There is absolutely no pointof view, his statement is a point of view. These ancientsclaim thatsuch questions must be dropped and are not worth answering, for thereasons that they suggested, and also their claim that the questionsare invalid because they are related to the points of view of the person



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who raises questions about them are erroneous and absurd, becauseif the points of view of the questioner were all opinions and if he

felt or admitted they were opinions, they would not turn against himand invalidate his points of view. The questioner will have simplycommitted to the implications of his questions, before he asks thosequestions. His aim is to show that to the person who does not feel oracknowledge that his points of view, as they are, are indeed opinions,but thinks that they are certainty or makes people believe that theyare certainty. Moreover, the questioners points of view, if they werecertainty, or there was an element of certainty in them, they wouldnot turn against him by invalidating his points of viewbecause

certainty can never be removed by an oppositeor by invalidatingeach particular point of view or all the points of view or the points ofview of everyone, but they are only invalidated for the person whodoes not see or acknowledge, regarding points of view in this state,that they are opinion and should remain opinion. As to the personwhose point of view is certainty, or an opinion that he acknowledgesis an opinion, these questions do not invalidate his point of view.

Why do such questions not deserve an answer? Does this notresemble the case in which a statement widely known authenticates

a proposition, and a syllogistic statement authenticates its opposite,to the degree that the widely known statement and the syllogisticstatement oppose each other? Does this not resemble the case inwhich there are two syllogistic statements, one of which implies theopposite of what the other implies? Do we reject one of the twostatements? Do we not listen to it or to the person using it in hisdiscourse? Are we going to be content and say that there is anotherproof here to confirm what that statement invalidates? And then wewill look for ways to make it invalid and show the place of error

in it, if there is an error, by using the testimony of someone againstthe truth of a point of view, by his fame and by the testimony ofother people on his behalf. As to the other argument by a syllogisticstatement against the truth of the opposite of that statement, it is likethe opposition of two proofs, one of which implies the opposite ofwhat the other one implies. The same with the issue brought up by aperson who asks: Is it possible that what you believe in a matteris different from what the matter is? He only means by that: Is itpossible that what you believe in a matter is in opposition to what the

existence of the matter is outside the soul or not? By this question,we seek to prove also, in such points of view as these, that they areopinions and not certainty.

Some of those who test their points of views in speculativematters by stretching them further to the point that they do not



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find any opposites against them exaggerate the value of their pointsof view to confess that they are opinions, but when they contemplate

the matter, they find that their points of view are such, or that theyare not certain that such points of view are in opposition to what theexistence of the matter is. They respond to the question by givingthe illusion that their opinions are certainty, and they reject by theirviews what the questioner wants to impose. They do this by referringto the words used by the questioner and not to the meaning of thewords in the questioners mind.

And if someone asked them: Is it possible that what someonebelieves to be such or not such is in opposition to what he believes?

they would provide a vague answer that gives the illusion that theirpoint of view is certainty, which is: It is not possible that what Ibelieve to be such or not such is different from what I believe. Thisis an ambiguous statement that can be used in different ways, oneof which is that the meaning of the statement It is not possible isthat it is not in the capacity or power of his mind to believe in thatthing differently from what he has believed, given the fact that hehas done his best to find true the opposite to his point of view, andthat he has not found it true. This is not an answer that will make

his point of view a certainty, even if he was sincere.It is also probable that he means by It is not possible (that itis not possible) that the belief of a person that something is such isidentical to his belief that it is not such. This does not mean anythingmore than two opposites cannot be identical to the same thing. Thisanswer also does not prevent the point of view from being oppositeto the matter itself. This was exactly the object of inquiry from thepart of the questioner, and they have not answered no by one ofthe two opposites of the question; they have only pushed away what

the question aimed to imply.It is also probable that the ambiguous statement It is not possi-ble means that it is not possible that when we believe that somethingis such, we believe in that thing itself at one and same time that itis not such. In such case, there is nothing more than this: that it is notpossible that we have two opposite beliefs about the same thing atone and same time. This is an answer about something different fromwhat they have been asked.

Opinion Is of Two Types

There are two sorts of opinion. One for which a person doesnot know an opposite, either because he did not look for it at all; orhe did not examine it; or he did not try to find one; or because he



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attempted to find an opposite, but did not find one. Or because herefuted, according to his ability, whatever opposite he encountered.

As to the other type of opinion, the person knows the opposite. Theopinion whose opposite is known relates to a particular person, ora particular group, or to all, at a certain time; or it relates to a personor a group at a certain time. It is not impossible that the opposite ofa point of view is hidden from a person at a certain time and appearsto him at another time, or that it appears to another person at thattime or after that time. The same thing goes with the group. It is notimpossible also that a point of view, which is commonly known toeveryone, is such that no one among them is aware of its opposite,

and that some of them recognize that opposite at a later time.

Strong Opinion

Strong opinion in every person is one to which there is noopposite. This type has various degrees: the weakest is one of whichwe do not know the opposite, because we have not looked for one, fornegligence, inattentiveness, distraction, or good faith. The strongest isone we have worked hard to examine and compare with its opposite

and refute whatever opposites we have found.An opinion that has more support than opposition prevails. Anopinion whose support is less,or less apparent, and whose oppositionis more, or more apparent, is called doubt and suspicion and isdiscarded. An opinion whose support is equal to its opposition innumber and clarity is used with its opposite in the arts of conjecture,27

not that they are used in one thing at one time, but in two differentsituations and two different times; and from such opinions doubtand confusion may result, whenever they are used in sciences and

we are not aware of what falsehood they may contain.

Definition of Doubt

Doubt is when the soul stops between two opposite opinions,resulting from two things that are equal in clarity and firmness. Equalfirmness is when the two opinions are equal in the necessity of theconsequence of what is deduced from each one of them and that theyare equal regarding the necessity or the possibility of their existence.

Their clarity is equal when they are commonly known, or when aperson knows about them, or has an opinion about them in an equal

27Cf. Plato,Philebus55e.



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manner. And if a person does not have an opinion on either one ofthe opposite propositions, this calls for research and it is not a doubt.

An opinion is authentic when it is an object of inquiry and isexamined until we do not sense any opposite to our point of view.This may be done by rhetorical as well as dialectical means. A personis aware of rhetorical means before he is aware of dialectical meansbecause he is used to rhetorical means since childhood and since hisfirst experience observing first things that a person can see. As todialectical means, he is aware of them later. Demonstrative meansare even less apparent than dialectical means, because a person isalmost not aware of them spontaneously. Philosophers in antiquity

used in their study of speculative matters rhetorical means for a longperiod of time because they were not aware of any other means, untilthey finally became aware of dialectical means, and as a result, theyrejected rhetorical means in philosophy and used dialectical meansinstead. Several of these philosophers used sophistry and continuedto use it until Plato, who was the first to become aware of demon-strative means, for he distinguished them from dialectical, sophistic,rhetorical, and poetic means. However, he only distinguished themone from the other in usage, in diverse disciplines, and according to

what spare time and higher instinct advise, without prescribing anyuniversal laws for them. Aristotle did this in his [Kitab al-Burhan]Book of Proofand its canons [Posterior Analytics].

In fact, Aristotle was the first to possess these means, for whichhe framed universal laws, arranged in a technical manner, and whichhe firmly put in logic. Philosophers refused since then the old waysthat the ancients used in speculative matters as a means of seekingcertainty. They used dialectic in mathematics, sophistry for tribu-lation and warning, and they used rhetoric in the general matters

common to all the arts, namely those matters in which we cannotuse a method proper to an art without the other arts. Thus rhetoricis common to all the arts and it is for teaching the public severalspeculative matters, and for teaching a person who is not versed in aparticular art those things that are proper to this art, whenever heneeds that, and also in the discourses used for civic matters.

The arts of conjecture are those from which opinions are obtainedin their topics that have been determined. Those are rhetoric, pru-dence, and practical arts, such as medicine, agriculture, navigation,

and other similar arts. Each of these arts, except rhetoric, works hardand pursues what is right in everything that a person has to do orwhere he has to do it. The right point of view is a sort of true opinion.Each of these arts has a special topic. He only invents what is right orpersuades in its special topics. Rhetoric is a separate art.



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In fact, rhetoric has been instituted for persuasion only, not forreflection, nor even for discovering the matter about which one

persuades. The other arts of conjecture use reflection in discoveringthe thing that is their object of persuasion. Rhetoric does not have aspecial domain for persuasion; but we look for persuasion in all typesof matters. Also the business of rhetoric is the invention of opinionseither in the domain where there are opinions, that is the thingspossible in themselves, or in the domain where there is certainty, thatis the things necessary. From the other arts we only have opinion inmatters of opinion, not certainty, since their topics are about thingspossible.

Each of these arts is used in a persons reflection when he seeksto discover the right point of view in what he should do in suchand such thing concerning a particular topic, which is governed bythe laws that he has acquired from his art only. When he wants topersuade others, if those others are versed in his art and have thesame degree of knowledge of the laws governing that art, the meansthat he has available is to use, in order to persuade, those same lawsby which he discovered that right point of view. If they are not versedin his art, he will need to use rhetoric, which is common to all. He will

not use the particular method of that art, unless it is agreed that thatart is also common to all. If he is not able to follow the method thatis common to all and wants to persuade others, he will commission arhetorician to do the job for him.

As to rhetoric, it uses, for persuasion, the means common to all,since it aims at persuasion in all types of matters. It does not useparticular means, except when those are also common to all. That iswhy it is possible to use persuasion in medical matters, not by themeans that are particular to a doctor, but by those means that are

shared between the doctor and those who are not doctors. The samegoeswitheachoftheotherarts.Thatiswhyit[rhetoric]hasthepowerto persuade all people in all matters. That is why when someone whoprofesses an art, speculative or practical, aims at correcting one of thepoints of view that he has discovered by his art to someone who isnot versed in that art, does not have free time or is not fit to studythat art, he will need to be a rhetor, or commission a rhetor.

A point of view that is prior and shared is a point of view that,when it suddenly presents itself to a person, will appear as it is, before

the person conducts any inquiry about it. To conduct an inquiry abouta point of view is for a person to search, with all his capacity, thethings that reinforce and strengthen that point of view. If he findsthose things, his point of view will be stronger and he will growconfident in it. If he encounters things that are opposite to his point



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of view, he will seek to refute them. If he refutes them, his initialpoint of view will confirm itself. If they are not refuted, he either

totally rejects his initial point of view, or his attention is drawn bythe opposites regarding his initial point of view to the condition orconditions that may have been neglected in the first place. This iswhat we mean by examining the initial point of view.

Rhetoric has this in common with dialectic and sophistic, for theyall proceed with investigation and as a consequence false points ofview are exposed.

Composition of the Enthymeme

An enthymeme is a statement composed of two joint premisesthat we use by omitting one of the two joint premises. It is calledan enthymeme because the person using it hides certain premisesand does not declare them; he also uses it in relation to the speakersknowledge of the premises that he has omitted. The enthymemebecomes persuasive in the common apparent point of view onlybecause of an omission, and without that omission, it will not bepersuasive.

The Example

We have an example when we verify the existence of somethingin a certain matter so that we bring out the existence of that thingin a similar matter. The public calls an example a syllogism. Ineach of these two [the enthymeme and the example], the businessof the premises, considered by themselves, by their number andtheir composition, is persuasion in the initial common point of view,

whether they are real syllogisms or apparent syllogisms.In the other arts of conjecture [that produce opinion], the numberof premises and the composition of propositions by means of whichthe right point of view is invented and which are persuasive mustbe syllogistic in truth and when they are tested. This way, rhetoricis also different from the other arts of conjecture. Therefore, if theorator wants to persuade an audience in a matter that belongs toone of these other arts, he must avoid, the moment he is persuadingin that matter, the method that is particular to that art; instead, he

must use the method according to the initial common point of view.A point of view may be prior to each in particular, and this one theorator must not use in anything of his art. A point of view may also becommon to an entire nation, shared among its members, and properto them only.



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Three Types of Listeners

Listeners are of three types: those we want to persuade, theopponent, and the judge. Those we want to persuade, either theyhave started the dispute and demand that the speaker persuade themin a given matter, or the speaker started the dispute, demanding thatthe others accept something or listen to what he has to say. The goalof the person demanding persuasion is to hear the arguments so thathe hears an argument that confirms a matter that he likes or to acceptthe most effective argument from two opposed arguments.

The Opponent

The opponent is either an adversary who stands up against thespeaker whose discourse aims to persuade the listener, impedingpersuasion, or an apparent adversary, examining what the speakersays and giving profound thought to what the speaker advances.His intention is to make the arguments the speaker advances morepersuasive.

Conditions for Being a Judge

Oneoftheconditionsforbeingajudgeistheabilitytodistinguishwell which one of the two opposing arguments is more persuasive.It is clear that the manner in which the judge addresses each of thetwo opponents is different from the manner in which they addresseach other. A judge who does not conform well to what judges usemay well become a hostile opponent, and this happens when heuses in his discourse by which he judges one of the adversaries the

arguments which each of the adversaries use with the other. Thisis why a person who does not have the ability to conform to thecondition of judgment must not be raised to the status of judge.

If the argument of one of the opponents about an issue wasless persuasive because of the weakness of that opponent, and if thejudge had things about the issue by which he could reinforce theargument of that opponent, so that it could become more persuasive,and if he [the judge] wanted to judge for that opponent by what heknew to be persuasive about that matter, not by what was apparent

in the argument of the opponent, that would be a place for doubt.Will he judge according to what is apparent from the argument ofthe opponent, or according to what he knows about the force ofpersuasion in that matter? But if the judge is judge in that matteronly according to those two opponents, he must not judge according



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to what he knows about the matter without the two opponents. If heis judge in that matter according to the matter itself, or according to

what is considered good in the city, or according to what is betterfor the two opponents in addition to what is good in the city, andwhat he knows is the best, he will judge according to what he knowsin that matter.

All this must be known from the position of the judge exercisinghis power of judgment. It must be known from his rank in thejudiciary. At that moment what is entrusted to the judge from thejudgment in this case will be according to the rank of the judge.By what power and by what faculty and art a person becomes

judge between two opponents by means of rhetoric is what we willsummarize as follows: Of the things that constitute persuasion wehave enthymemes and examples. The status of the enthymemes inrhetoric is like the status of proofs in the sciences and syllogisms indialectic. The enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism and the exampleis a rhetorical induction.

The enthymeme is a proposition composed of two joint premisesand gives us by itself, first according to the apparent point of view,persuasion about the conclusion resulting from the premises. It be-

comes persuasive since the speaker hides one of the two premisesand does not state it. For this reason, it is called the enthymeme orthat which is hidden, since the fact of hiding one of its two premiseshas been the reason for making it persuasive.

The Importance of the Enthymeme

We do not call enthymemes the dialectical proofs and syllogisms,when they are used in discourses and books; most of the time, one of

the two premises is deleted for the sake of brevity or because what isdeleted is apparent to the listener. These are not called enthymemes.There is also the moral excellence of the speaker and the faulty

character of the opponent standing against him. This is one of thethings that cause belief in the words of the speaker. It helps achieveexcellent persuasion even if the speaker does not use with it en-thymemes or examples or any other thing, except that he gives pureand simple information about the issue, after he has established him-self a good reputation of moral excellence among his audience and

his opponent has been exposed for his lack of moral excellence. Ifhe uses enthymemes and examples with moral excellence, his wordswill be more persuasive and more acceptable to his audience. If hismoral excellence is not well established, he will need arguments toshow his superior moral character and the lack of moral excellence in



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his opponent, and he will also need to present the thing by meansof which he aims to persuade his audience.

People often make mistakes and use all this in the sciences,especially when they oppose their opponents in their points of view,as Galen did when he wanted to refute the views of his adversaries.He proceeded by showing the superiority of his moral character overthe character of his adversaries in the matter about which he wascontradicting them.

The orator may also seek to show the superiority of his moralcharacter and the faulty character of his adversaries, not in the matteraboutwhichheisspeaking,butheshowshissuperiormoralcharacter

and the faulty character of his adversaries in other things that areoutside of the matter about which they are discoursing, as Galen didwhen he showed his superior moral character by talking about theexcellent moral character of his father and his country and the lack ofmoral excellence in his opponents by mentioning the lack of moralexcellence in their ancestors and countries. In fact, he mentioned thisin his book hilatu al-bar [literally The Artificeof Convalescence/On the Natural Faculties]whenherefutedThalesthedoctorbyevokingthe base character of his fathers profession. Also in the last book of

his treatise regarding the views of Hippocrates and Plato where herefuted Mendaberius who had critiqued something from his treatise.He showed the base moral character of Mendaberius by saying thathe grew up in a village far from the big cities; whereas he showedhis superior moral character by saying that he lived in Greater Rome,which, as many poets had said, was the small world.

There is also the appeal to the emotions of the audience whosehearts lean toward believing the speaker and not his opponent. Fromthere comes the appeal to the judge and the audience to be in favor of

the speaker and not the adversary. From there also comes the attemptto firmly implant in the soul of the opponent an emotion that willweaken his stance against the speaker and his opposition to him,such as a burst of anger that will distract him. From there finallycomes the speakers effort to influence the soul of the listener heaims to persuade by provoking some emotions so that the listener ispersuaded, such as flattery, anger, pity, cruelty, or any other emotionthat the speaker will believe will succeed at that time.

This type of modes of persuasion is more effective in reinforcing

views and arguments in the souls of the listeners, in producingenthusiasm and fanaticism, and in making the character and viewsof the speaker more imposing, to the degree that the souls of thelisteners will yield. The views that the speaker will advance willassert themselves to the point that they reach the degree of certainty.



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This type is oratorical, but it may also be used in sophisticdiscourses. The dialecticians themselves may have used it, either

by mistake from their part, or by sophism.There is also the stirring of the audience and the incitement oftheir points of view so that they believe what he [the speaker] saysby moral propositions. These are arguments that urge them to followcertain moral values, even if they do not have such values, that makethem identify with those who know and emulate the acts of virtuousand knowledgeable people, even if they do not possess any of thosethings. This type is oratorical. It may be used in sophistic discoursesand is never used in dialectic, except by mistake or by sophism.

Galen has often used it when he says that they can understand mydiscourse, appreciate it, and accept it only those who are clever andfavor the truth; those who have never been inclined by nature tofollow any whims; those whose minds have not been spoilt by falseviews and other such arguments. We find this kind of discourse inspeeches addressed to the public and in books written by severalancient and modern scholars.

There is also the aggrandizement of the issue, or its diminution,or its embellishment, or its defamation. If the speaker glorifies what is

true and good in his speech and belittles what is false and bad, and ifhe magnifies what is false and bad in the discourse of his opponents,his argument will be well received and that of his opponents willbe rejected. This mode is used in sophistic. In dialectic, it is used bymistake or by sophism.

There is also the falsification and distortion of the opponentsargument to make it appear offensive and easy to refute, such as whena speaker shoots down several of his opponents arguments anddistorts their meanings, or when he smoothly slips the opponents

arguments in the places where they are allowed to be. This mode isalso powerful in consolidating points of view in the souls, especiallywhen emotions, such as fanaticism and zeal, and sympathy and loveare detrimental.

There are also written testimonies. A person in whose favor thesetestify needs to reinforce them; whereas his adversary needs to showthat they are forged if he can, or interpret them to the advantageof his own arguments. As to the use of testimonies by a speaker tosupport his claim, you will find it more in the books of many of those

who turned to the sciences incorrectly, or to multiply their proofs,as Galen did when he attempted to show that the sensual appetiteswere in the liver and based his claim on the fact that there was atradition in their country to punish the lecherous by removing hisliver; and also as some ancients did when they attempted to prove



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that the soul never died and that it continued to live after it left thebody because there was a tradition to visit the tombs.

There are also witnesses, as when a person takes as a witnessanother person whose words he trusts, or a group of people hetrusts, whenever they give their testimony, or when the things theyare supposed to say reinforce his argument and prove the argumentsof his adversary wrong. Galen maintained in his book Akhlaq al-Nafs (Characters of the Soul) that reason was in the brain, using as atestimony the expression people use when they refer to an idiot bysaying: He is brainless. He also maintained that courage was in theheart, using the expression people use when they described someone

as a coward: He has no hea

farabi-commentary on rhetoric

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