FBI Perspective:Addressing Synthetic Biology

and Biosecurity

Edward H. YouSupervisory Special AgentBioterrorism ProgramCountermeasures Unit IFBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate

July 9, 2010

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)

Reinforce norms of safe and responsible conduct

Obtain timely and accurate insight on current and emerging risks

Take reasonable steps to reduce the potential for exploitation

Transform the international dialogue on biological threats

July 2006

FBI consolidated all WMD operations into the new WMD Directorate

1. Countermeasures and Preparedness

2. Investigative and Operations

3. Intelligence Analysis

Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate

Build national and international bioterrorism threat detection, identification, and reporting capabilities

Improve bioterrorism assessment and investigative capabilities

Enhance bioterrorism scientific, industry, and academic outreach

Bioterrorism Prevention Program Goals

Challenges

• Bridging the gaps and addressing misperceptions and misconceptions between law enforcement/USG and industry/research community

– Distinctly different cultures– Rapid development of technologies– Requires education and awareness training

• Balance between maintaining homeland security while maintaining openness in Life Sciences

– FBI understands this need to support this balance– FBI Outreach meant to foster openness while keeping

labs and scientific research secure

How to engage communities regarding biosecurity?

FBI Synthetic Biology Tripwire Initiative

• Partnership with the U.S. synthetic biology industry to report suspicious requests for genetic sequences– Reporting mechanism in place between

participating industry leaders and FBI field office WMD Coordinators

– Shared best practices with Germany and Canada during bilateral meetings (2009)

Industry very happy that problem of “who to call” was resolved

Federal Register /Vol. 74, No. 227 / Friday, November 27, 2009

Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers

1. Customer Screening Recommendations

2. Sequence Screening Recommendations

3. Government Notification Recommendations

“Building Bridges Around Building Genomes”

FBI Synthetic Biology Conference

August 4 - 5, 2009 San Francisco, California

International Industry Workshop on Synthetic Biology

November 03, 2009 in Cambridge, MA  (USA)

1. Focused on tangible results for the improved biosecurity of DNA synthesis services

2. Finalized the Code of Conduct with the approval of all participating industry players

FBI, UN BWC, and U.S. Dept. of State attended workshop

•Presented FBI Synthetic Biology Tripwire Initiative

1,200 Attendees

26 Countries

100 Universities

FBI Biosecurity Workshop (U.S. Dept. of State, UN BWC)

FBI Outreach Booth

“Learn about FBI Outreach: Promoting Responsible Research & Career Opportunities”

A symposium to learn about do-it-yourself biology (DIYbio), open source science, at home medical genetics, bio-art and DNA chemistry, citizen science and novel ethical engagements with science at the cutting edge

Amateur Biology Outreach

UN Crime & Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) Synthetic Biology and Nanobiotechnology

Risk and Response Assessment

• Engaged experts from government agencies, international organizations, academia/research, the security community, and the private sector

• Focused on present and future biosecurity implications of advances in synthetic biology and nanobiotechnology

• Propose possible response and mitigation measures

May 3-4, 2010

The 3 I's: Learning through Collaboration, Connection and Community … Advancing Bioscience and Security

• First biosecurity conference organized by FBI WMD Directorate in partnership with the Massachusetts Society for Medical Research (MSMR) attended by:

• Institutional Biosafety Committee Members• Institutional Review Board Members• Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee Members

• Focused on how the research and security communities can work together in addressing biosafety and biosecurity

FBI-MSMR Biosecurity Conference

Dual Use?

Exploitation?Physical Security?

CULTURE OF RESPONSIBILIT

Y

Proper Handling of Materials?

THREAT Scientific CommunityFBI

The Role of the FBI

Mitigating the Potential Risks: •Outreach•Partnership•Effective Policy Making

THANK YOU

Edward H. YouSupervisory Special AgentBioterrorism ProgramCountermeasures Unit IFBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate