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In Federalist No. 1, Hamilton listed six topics to be covered in the subsequent articles:
1. "The utility of the UNION to your political prosperity" – covered in No. 2 through No. 14
2. "The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union"—covered in No.
15 through No. 22
3. "The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed to the
attainment of this object"—covered in No. 23 through No. 36
4. "The conformity of the proposed constitution to the true principles of republican
government"—covered in No. 37 through No. 84
5. "Its analogy to your own state constitution"—covered in No. 85
6. "The additional security which its adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of
government, to liberty and to prosperity"—covered in No. 85.[26]
#1
Federalist No. 1 (Federalist Number 1) is an essay by Alexander Hamilton. It was published on
October 27, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius. This paper provides the outline for the rest and
argues for the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation.
Contents
[hide]
1 Response to Anti-Federalists
2 Opposition to The Articles of Confederation
3 Political Discord
4 Rejecting the Current Government
5 Supporting the New Constitution
6 A series of concepts
7 References
8 External links
Response to Anti-Federalists[edit source | edit beta ]
Federalist No. 1 introduces a series of essays published in the Independent Journal, the New-
York Packetand the Daily Advertiser as a response to Anti-Federalist opposition to the
proposed US Constitution. After the Constitutional Convention of 1787 the new Constitution was
sent to the various states for ratification in September 1787. Anti-Federalists essays condemning
the document began to surface later that month, quickly followed by the Federalist efforts of
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.
Opposition to The Articles of Confederation[edit source | edit beta ]
The essay is highly critical of the government in place at the time, though, it does not take the
form of a diatribe. Eloquently written, yet manifestly biased, Federalist No. 1 heaps praise upon
the Constitution as an efficient system of government. Hamilton is quite aware of his own bias:
You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of them, that [these
ideas] proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own
to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your
interest to adopt it.
Hamilton is keenly aware not only of his own bias, but also those of others. In fact, Federalist No.
1, as an introductory essay, can be interpreted mainly as an attempt to impress upon readers that
opinions will always contain bias when it comes to important matters such as this. Hamilton
writes:
Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests,
unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a
thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.
The investigation of particular types of bias is quite sophisticated. Hamilton identifies not only
those with a venomous bias, but also the plethora of people who, while their intentions are good,
exhibit an unmistakable bias. In fact, he claims even those who believe themselves to be
impartial often have hidden biases:
It cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may
hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable —
the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears.
More importantly, the discussion of bias actually introduces a key theme of the Federalist as a
whole, the relation of motive and reason in politics. Hamilton, as Publius, argues that political
motives are irrelevant to the truth of arguments made in their behalf. Arguments stand or fall of
their own weight and can neither be enhanced nor diminished by knowledge of the motives that
gave rise to them. The irrelevance of motives to the truth of arguments is one of the main reasons
why the authors of these papers choose to use a pseudonym.
Political Discord[edit source | edit beta ]
Hamilton, predicting the initial Anti-Federalist response would continue, correctly foresaw the US
Constitution as a polarizing issue. In reference to those who would oppose the Constitution, he
claimed that "A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose." According to Hamilton:
An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the
offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.
This prediction has proven false, with hardly any discussion about the Papers (and the
known Anti-Federalist Papers) continuing to this day. Hamilton maintained that he held a genuine
duty to the citizens, in setting them on their guards against a barrage of political spin:
I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from
whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare.
Rejecting the Current Government[edit source | edit beta ]
The essay's major thrust is to impress upon citizens that the system which was in place prior to
the Constitution was not worth keeping. Many would view this as a tall order; it can be hard to
convince someone to replace something, unless it is entirely broken. Hamilton never
underestimated the gravity of the decision people were faced with. He met it head on in his
introductory prose:[1]
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country,
by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are
really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they
are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be
any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the
era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this
view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
Supporting the New Constitution[edit source | edit beta ]
As a consequence of encouraging people to reject the old system, Hamilton supported the new
Constitution, at all costs. He went so far as to say the only viable alternatives were either a
ratification of the Constitution or a complete dissolution of the existing Union. This conclusion was
justified by referring to the Anti-Federalists, who claimed the 13 members of the Union had
already made for an unwieldy system and that governance had to take place by breaking down
federal government into smaller, regional chunks. Hamilton thought this view so pernicious and
outlandish that he encouraged its propagation, so all citizens could see how bizarre the Anti-
Federalist's views were (bizarre according to Hamilton, that is).
A series of concepts[edit source | edit beta ]
Hamilton outlines six key concepts discussed in the Federalist Papers:
1. The utility of the Union to prosperity
2. The insufficiency of the existing confederation to preserve the Union
3. The necessity of a government as powerful as that proposed, to meet this object
4. The conformity of the proposed Constitution with the true principles
of Republican government
5. The Constitution's analogy to various state Constitutions.
6. The additional security a Constitution will provide to the preservation of government in
those states, and to the preservation of liberty and property.
Federalist No. 2
Federalist No. 2 is an essay by John Jay, the second of the Federalist Papers. It was published on October 31, 1787
under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 2 is the first of four
papers by Jay discussing the protection of the United States from dangerous foreign influence, especially military force. It
is titled, "Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence."
The question[edit source | edit beta ]
The American War of Independence had been a difficult conflict for the American forces, and despite the eventual victory
it was clear that the new country was not on a level, militarily, with European nations, especially Britain and France, which
were the two European powers exercising major influence along theNorth Atlantic coastline. There was significant
concern among Americans that one of the European powers would attempt to return the United States to colonial status
or otherwise limit American sovereignty. In Federalist No. 2, Jay strove to demonstrate that a strong Union of the
American states would provide the best opportunity for defense.
Jay's argument[edit source | edit beta ]
Jay begins by noting that his paper is in response to politicians who have lately rejected the previously "uncontradicted
opinion that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly united."
He borrows ideas from the early English Enlightenment thinkers John Locke and Thomas Hobbes about the need to
mediate human affairs to secure peace and prosperity. Jay argues that in order to "vest it [the national government] with
requisite powers," the "people must cede to its some of their natural rights." Throughout this paper, the central idea is
Union and it is justified as being evident given the American people's cultural similarities in background, language and
religion.
Jay argues that the benefits of Union against foreign wars are immense.
To address the prevailing concern about the nature of the newly proposed Constitution, Publius begins by noting that the
Articles of Confederation, though established with the public good in mind, lacks the proper deliberation that was present
at the convention in Philadelphia. Furthermore he relates the current situation of the convention to that of the 1774
congress that drafted the Declaration of Independence, and how it too was attacked wrongfully by opponents who seek to
aggrandize themselves at the expense of the public good. He concludes with a warning, saying that if the Constitution
fails to be ratified, the nation's union would be jeopardized, and so too its greatness.
Federalist No. 3From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Federalist No. 3, titled The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence, is an
essay by John Jay, the third of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November 3, 1787 under
the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. This is the second of four essays
by Jay on the utility of the Union in protecting Americans against foreign aggression and meddling.
Jay had earlier acted as ambassador to Spain and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, leading to his focus on international
relations.
Summary of the argument[edit source | edit beta ]
As a whole, the earliest Federalist Papers argued for the utility of the Union, stating that a strong national government was
more desirable than a diverse group of weaker local governments without national leadership. In No. 3, Jay argues that a
strong national government could better preserve peace. He states that a "united America" would be less likely to provoke
other nations to attack. For instance, it would be better able to uphold the terms of an international treaty. Additionally, the
United States would be less likely to engage in "direct and unlawful violence": whereas states immediately bordering
foreign territories may act "under the impulse of sudden irritation," the national government will be safer, since its "wisdom
and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested."
Jay also argues that, in the event of an international conflict, a foreign power would be more likely to come to terms with a
united America. He observes that, in 1685, Genoa was forced to send its national leadership to France to ask pardon
from Louis XIV; Jay questions whether France would have demanded such tribute from any "powerful nation." Thus a
"strong united nation" could better preserve the peace, since it would find it easier to settle causes of war.
Federalist No. 4From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Federalist No. 4 is an essay by John Jay, the fourth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November 7, 1787
under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It is the third of four
essays by Jay discussing the protection of the United States from dangerous foreign influence, especially military force. It
is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence."
Summary of the argument[edit source | edit beta ]
Jay argues that a singular government speaking for all states would serve as a greater deterrent to military interference by
foreign nations than a system of government where each state is given complete control over its affairs.
John Jay believes that one Union would react better than many states with their own governments. For example, with one
body speaking for the nation there would be no arguments over troop placements or treaties. Furthermore a singular army
and navy appears a much less inviting target to invaders than the individual army of a one state by itself. Suppose if this
one state were to be attacked, who's to say whether the other states would respond? With a single government that
problem would be avoided.
Federalist No. 5
Federalist No. 5 is an essay by John Jay, the fifth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November 10, 1787
under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It is the last of four essays
by Jay discussing the protection of the United States from dangerous foreign influence, especially military force. It is titled,
"The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence."
Summary of the argument[edit source | edit beta ]
In this paper, Jay argues that the American people can learn a lot from the troubles Great Britain had when it was divided
up into individual states. When divided, envy and jealousy ran rampant. Try as you might to make each nation-state equal,
eventually one will begin to grow more powerful than the others (assumed by Jay to be the north), they in turn will grow
jealous and distrustful of each other. Alliances with different nations may be forged by different states, tearing America
apart at the seams. A single nation would be 'joined in affection and free from all apprehension of different interests' and
as such a much more formidable nation.
Federalist No. 6
Federalist No. 6 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November 14,
1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. Arguing for the
importance of the Union to the well-being of Americans, Hamilton addresses a theme continued in Federalist No. 7: the
danger of dissension among the states if they remain without a strong federal government. No. 6 is titled "Concerning
Dangers from Dissensions Between the States."
In Federalist No. 6, Hamilton enumerates different instances of hostility among nations, and suggests that should the
States remain separate, such hostilities will befall them as well. However, mutual commercial interest will bring the States
together and keep them in a peaceful accord. He concludes that nations that exist as neighbors will be natural enemies of
one another, unless brought together in a confederate republic with a constitution which will promote harmony through
commercial interests rather than competition.
Federalist No. 7
Federalist No. 7 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventh of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November
15, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. Arguing for the
importance of the Union to the well-being of Americans, Hamilton addresses a theme begun in Federalist No. 6: the
danger of dissension among the states if they remain without a strong federal government. No. 7 is titled "The Same
Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States."
Federalist No. 8
Federalist No. 8 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the eighth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November
20, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. In it, Hamilton
argues for the utility of the Union to the well-being of Americans, specifically addressing the negative consequences if the
Union were to collapse and conflict arise between the states. It is titled, "Consequences of Hostilities Between the States."
Essay Synopsis[edit source | edit beta ]
If the states do not unify into a single nation there will be a perpetual cycle of conflict between neighboring states. Their
alliances or dis-unions create circumstances similar to European nations, where the cycle of aggression between
neighboring nations creates the need for domestic armies and fortifications. Additionally, if not unified populous states,
motivated by greed might plunder weaker states for their resources.
The motivation for a union is safety, being aware though that no matter how great the nation's commitment to liberty
freedoms are compromised in order to achieve protection. The physical damage of armed conflict compels nations to
implement a military deterrent and in doing so an overly militaristic culture diminishes the civil and political rights of the
people. "To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free."
The new Constitution does not prohibit standing armies and it's inferred that a perpetual army will exist. The frequency of
conflict and the need for defense will necessitate a ready armed force for defense. And by its nature a militaristic state
strengthens the executive arm (from which a monarchy could emerge). War increases executive authority at the expense
of the other branches of government.
Extreme defense would likely give rise to oppressive government practices.
Observing history; the livelihood of citizens cause the population to be ill suited for war. A varied workforce necessitates
the development of a profession of soldiers who would be distinct from the body of the citizens.
"The military state becomes elevated above the civil." Nations that don't have a full-time army are less likely to oppress
citizens. The leaders of nations prone to invasion must maintain defensive forces, however frequently this militarism
infringes upon the citizen's rights or weakens their sense of entitlement of those rights; the continental nations of Western
Europe were examples of this.
Also, a Union of states would act as a deterrent from aggression by nearby Foreign colonies.
Federalist No. 9
Federalist No. 9 (Federalist Number 9) is an essay by Alexander Hamilton and the ninth of theFederalist Papers. It was
published on November 21, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were
published. Federalist No. 9 is titled, "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection." The same
subject is continued in the subsequent paper by James Madison, Federalist No. 10.
Publius' argument[edit source | edit beta ]
A major aspect of Federalist No. 9 is Hamilton's response to the common Anti-Federalist argument based on the theories
of Montesquieu, who wrote famously in his The Spirit of the Laws that "it is natural to a republic to have only a small
territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist." The Anti-Federalisttook his arguments to mean that the federal Union was
bound to fail. Hamilton responded that if Montesquieu were taken literally, then since he was thinking of dimensions far
smaller even than those of the states, the Americans would have to split themselves into "an infinity of little, jealous,
clashing tumultuous commonwealths." More seriously, Hamilton contends that the confederated federal system described
in the proposed Constitution would not suffer as Montesquieu predicted because of its confederated, rather than
centralized, design. He further argues that Montesquieu himself proposed a confederation of republics as the solution.
Federalist No. 10
Federalist No. 10 (Federalist Number 10) is an essay written by James Madison and the tenth of theFederalist Papers,
a series arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. It was published on November 22, 1787 under the
pseudonym, Publius, the name under which all of the Federalist Papers were published. Federalist No. 10 is among the
most highly regarded of all American political writings.[1]
No. 10 addresses the question of how to guard against "factions", or groups of citizens, with interests contrary to the rights
of others or the interests of the whole community. Madison argued that a strong, big republic would be a better guard
against those dangers than smaller republics—for instance, the individual states. Opponents of the Constitution offered
counterarguments to his position, which were substantially derived from the commentary of Montesquieu on this subject.
Federalist No. 10 continues a theme begun in Federalist No. 9; it is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Utility of the
Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection". The whole series is cited by scholars andjurists as an
authoritative interpretation and explication of the meaning of the Constitution. Jurists have frequently read No. 10 to mean
that the Founding Fathers did not intend the United States government to be partisan.
Background[edit source | edit beta ]
Prior to the Constitution, the thirteen states were bound together by the Articles of Confederation, which was essentially a
military alliance between sovereign nations used to fight the Revolutionary War. Congress had no power to tax, and as a
result was not paying the debts left over from the Revolution. Madison, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin and others
feared a break-up of the union and national bankruptcy.[2] Like Washington, Madison felt the revolution had not resolved
the social problems that had triggered it, and the excesses ascribed to the King were now coming from the state
legislatures. Shays' Rebellion, an armed uprising in Massachusetts in 1786, was therefore but an extreme example of
democratic excess in the aftermath of the War.[3]
A national convention was called for May 1787, to revise the Articles of Confederation. Madison believed that the problem
was not with the Articles but the state legislatures, and so the solution was not to fix the articles but to restrain the
excesses of the states. The principal questions before the convention became whether the states should remain
sovereign, whether sovereignty should be transferred to the national government, or whether a settlement should rest
somewhere in between.[4] By mid-June it was clear that the convention was drafting a new plan of government around
these issues—a constitution. Madison's nationalist position shifted the debate increasingly away from a position of pure
state sovereignty, and toward the compromise.[5] In debate on June 26, he said that government ought to "protect the
minority of the opulent against the majority" and that unchecked, democratic communities were subject to "the turbulency
and weakness of unruly passions".[6]
Publication[edit source | edit beta ]
September 17, 1787 marked the signing of the final document. By its own Article Seven, the constitution drafted by the
convention needed ratification by at least nine of the twelve states, through special conventions held in each state. Anti-
Federalist writers began to publish essays and letters arguing against ratification,[7] and Alexander
Hamilton recruited James Madison and John Jay to write a series of pro-ratification letters in response.[8]
Like most of the Anti-Federalist essays and the vast majority of the Federalist Papers, No. 10 first appeared in popular
newspapers. It was first printed in theDaily Advertiser under the name adopted by the Federalist writers, "Publius"; in this
it was remarkable among the essays of Publius, as almost all of them first appeared in one of two other papers:
the Independent Journal and the New-York Packet. Federalist No. 37, also by Madison, was the only other essay to
appear first in the Advertiser.[9]
Considering the importance later ascribed to the essay, it was reprinted only on a limited scale. On November 23, it
appeared in the Packet and the next day in theIndependent Journal. Outside New York City, it made four appearances in
early 1788: January 2 in the Pennsylvania Gazette, January 10 in the Hudson Valley Weekly, January 15 in the
Lansingburgh Northern Centinel, and January 17 in theAlbany Gazette. Though this number of reprintings was typical for
the Federalist, many other essays, both Federalist and Anti-Federalist, saw much wider distribution.[10]
On January 1, 1790, the publishing company J. & A. McLean announced that they would publish the first 36 of the essays
in a single volume. This volume, titled The Federalist, was released on March 2, 1788. George Hopkins' 1802 edition
revealed that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay were the authors of the series, with two later printings dividing the work by
author. In 1818, James Gideon published a third edition containing corrections by Madison, who by that time had
completed his two terms as President of the United States.[11]
Henry B. Dawson's edition of 1863 sought to collect the original newspaper articles, though he did not always find the first
instance. It was much reprinted, albeit without his introduction.[12] Paul Leicester Ford's 1898 edition included a table of
contents which summarized the essays, with the summaries again used to preface their respective essays. The first date
of publication and the newspaper name were recorded for each essay. Of modern editions, Jacob E. Cooke's 1961 edition
is seen as authoritative, and is most used today.[13]
The question of faction[edit source | edit beta ]
Federalist No. 10 continues the discussion of the question broached in Hamilton's Federalist No. 9. Hamilton there
addressed the destructive role of a faction in breaking apart the republic. The question Madison answers, then, is how to
eliminate the negative effects of faction. He defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or
majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the
rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community".[14] He identifies the most serious
source of faction to be the diversity of opinion in political life which leads to dispute over fundamental issues such as what
regime or religion should be preferred.
However, he thinks that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution
of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society". [15] He
saw direct democracy as a danger to individual rights and advocated a representative democracy in order to protect what
he viewed as individual liberty from majority rule, or from the effects of such inequality within society. He says, "A pure
democracy can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will be felt by a majority, and
there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. Hence it is, that democracies have ever been
found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as
they have been violent in their deaths".[16]
Like the anti-Federalists who opposed him, Madison was substantially influenced by the work of Montesquieu, though
Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the question addressed in this essay. He also relied heavily on the philosophers
of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially David Hume, whose influence is most clear in Madison's discussion of the types
of faction and in his argument for an extended republic.[17][18]
Madison's arguments[edit source | edit beta ]
Madison first assessed that there are two ways to limit the damage caused by faction: either remove the causes of faction
or control its effects. The first, destroying liberty, would work because "liberty is to faction what air is to fire", [19] but it is
impossible to perform because liberty is essential to political life. After all, Americans fought for it during the American
Revolution. The other option, creating a society homogeneous in opinions and interests, is impracticable. The diversity of
the people's ability is what makes them succeed more or less, and inequality of property is a right that the government
should protect. Madison particularly emphasizes that economic stratification prevents everyone from sharing the same
opinion. Madison concludes that the damage caused by faction can be limited only by controlling its effects.
He then argues that the only problem comes from majority factions because the principle of popular sovereignty should
prevent minority factions from gaining power. Madison offers two ways to check majority factions: prevent the "existence
of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time" or render a majority faction unable to act. [20] Madison
concludes that a small democracy cannot avoid the dangers of majority faction because small size means that
undesirable passions can very easily spread to a majority of the people, which can then enact its will through the
democratic government without difficulty.
Madison states, "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man",[21] so the cure is to control their effects.
He makes an argument on how this is not possible in a pure democracy but possible in a republic. With pure democracy,
he means a system in which every citizen votes directly for laws, and, with republic, he intends a society in which citizens
vote for an elite of representatives who then vote for laws. He indicates that the voice of the people pronounced by a body
of representatives is more conformable to the interest of the community, since, again, common people’s decisions are
affected by their self-interest.
He then makes an argument in favor of a large republic against a small republic for the choice of "fit characters" [22] to
represent the public's voice. In a large republic, where the number of voters and candidates is greater, the probability to
elect competent representatives is broader. The voters have a wider option. In a small republic, it would also be easier for
the candidates to fool the voters but more difficult in a large one. The last argument Madison makes in favor of a large
republic is that as, in a small republic, there will be a lower variety of interests and parties, a majority will more frequently
be found. The number of participants of that majority will be lower, and, since they live in a more limited territory, it would
be easier for them to agree and work together for the accomplishment of their ideas. While in a large republic the variety
of interests will be greater so to make it harder to find a majority. Even if there is a majority, it would be harder for them to
work together because of the large number of people and the fact they are spread out in a wider territory.
A republic, Madison writes, is different from a democracy because its government is placed in the hands of delegates,
and, as a result of this, it can be extended over a larger area. The idea is that, in a large republic, there will be more "fit
characters" to choose from for each delegate. Also, the fact that each representative is chosen from a larger constituency
should make the "vicious arts",[23] a reference to rhetoric, of electioneering less effective. For instance, in a large republic,
a corrupt delegate would need to bribe many more people in order to win an election than in a small republic. Also, in a
republic, the delegates both filter and refine the many demands of the people so as to prevent the type of frivolous claims
that impede purely democratic governments.
Though Madison argued for a large and diverse republic, the writers of the Federalist Papers recognized the need for a
balance. They wanted a republic diverse enough to prevent faction but with enough commonality to maintain cohesion
among the states. In Federalist No. 2, John Jaycounted as a blessing that America possessed "one united people—a
people descended from the same ancestors, the same language, professing the same religion".[24] Madison himself
addresses a limitation of his conclusion that large constituencies will provide better representatives. He notes that if
constituencies are too large, the representatives will be "too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser
interests".[25]He says that this problem is partly solved by federalism. No matter how large the constituencies of federal
representatives, local matters will be looked after by state and local officials with naturally smaller constituencies.
Contemporaneous counterarguments[edit source | edit beta ]
The Anti-Federalists vigorously contested the notion that a republic of diverse interests could survive. The author Cato
(another pseudonym, most likely that of George Clinton)[26] summarized the Anti-Federalist position in the article Cato no.
3:
Whoever seriously considers the immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits of the United States, with the
variety of its climates, productions, and commerce, the difference of extent, and number of inhabitants in all; the
dissimilitude of interest, morals, and policies, in almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a consolidated
republican form of government therein, can never form a perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your posterity, for to these objects it must be
directed: this unkindred legislature therefore, composed of interests opposite and dissimilar in their nature, will in its
exercise, emphatically be, like a house divided against itself.[27]
Generally, it was their position that republics about the size of the individual states could survive, but that a republic on the
size of the Union would fail. A particular point in support of this was that most of the states were focused on one industry
—to generalize, commerce and shipping in the northern states and plantation farming in the southern. The Anti-Federalist
belief that the wide disparity in the economic interests of the various states would lead to controversy was perhaps
realized in the American Civil War, which some scholars attribute to this disparity.[28] Madison himself, in a letter
to Thomas Jefferson, noted that differing economic interests had created dispute, even when the Constitution was being
written.[29] At the convention, he particularly identified the distinction between the northern and southern states as a "line of
discrimination" that formed "the real difference of interests".[30]
The discussion of the ideal size for the republic was not limited to the options of individual states or encompassing union.
In a letter to Richard Price, Benjamin Rush noted that "Some of our enlightened men who begin to despair of a more
complete union of the States in Congress have secretly proposed an Eastern, Middle, and Southern Confederacy, to be
united by an alliance offensive and defensive".[31]
In making their arguments, the Anti-Federalists appealed to both historical and theoretic evidence. On the theoretical side,
they leaned heavily on the work of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. The Anti-Federalists Brutus and Cato
both quoted Montesquieu on the issue of the ideal size of a republic, citing his statement in The Spirit of the Laws that:
It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are men of
large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too great to be placed in any single subject; he has
interest of his own; he soon begins to think that he may be happy, great and glorious, by oppressing his fellow citizens;
and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country. In a large republic, the public good is sacrificed to a
thousand views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interest of the public is
easier perceived, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses are of less extent, and of course
are less protected.[32]
Greece and Rome were looked to as model republics throughout this debate,[33] and authors on both sides took Roman
pseudonyms. Brutus points out that the Greek and Roman states were small, whereas the U.S. is vast. He also points out
that the expansion of these republics resulted in a transition from free government to tyranny.[34]
Modern analysis and reaction[edit source | edit beta ]
In the first century of the American republic, No. 10 was not regarded as among the more important numbers of The
Federalist. For instance, inDemocracy in America Alexis de Tocqueville refers specifically to more than fifty of the essays,
but No. 10 is not among them.[35] Today, however, No. 10 is regarded as a seminal work of American democracy. In "The
People's Vote", a popular survey conducted by the National Archives and Records Administration, National History Day,
and U.S. News and World Report, No. 10 (along with Federalist No. 51, also by Madison) was chosen as the 20th most
influential document in United States history.[36] David Epstein, writing in 1984, described it as among the most highly
regarded of all American political writing.[37]
Douglass Adair attributes the increased interest in the tenth number to Charles A. Beard's book An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution, published in 1913. Adair also contends that Beard's selective focus on the issue of class
struggle, and his political progressivism, has colored modern scholarship on the essay. According to Adair, Beard reads
No. 10 as evidence for his belief in "the Constitution as an instrument of class exploitation".[38] Adair's own view is that
Federalist No. 10 should be read as "eighteenth-century political theory directed to an eighteenth-century problem; and ...
one of the great creative achievements of that intellectual movement that later ages have christened 'Jeffersonian
democracy'".[39]
Garry Wills is a noted critic of Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10. In his book Explaining America, he adopts the
position of Robert Dahl in arguing that Madison's framework does not necessarily enhance the protections of minorities or
ensure the common good. Instead, Wills claims: "Minorities can make use of dispersed and staggered governmental
machinery to clog, delay, slow down, hamper, and obstruct the majority. But these weapons for delay are given to the
minority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious character; and they can be used against the majority irrespective of its
factious or nonfactious character. What Madison prevents is not faction, but action. What he protects is not the common
good but delay as such".[40]
Application[edit source | edit beta ]
Federalist No. 10 is the classic citation for the belief that the Founding Fathers and the constitutional framers did not
intend American politics to bepartisan. For instance, United States Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens cites the
paper for the statement, "Parties ranked high on the list of evils that the Constitution was designed to check".
[41] Discussing a California provision that forbids candidates from running as independents within one year of holding a
partisan affiliation, Justice Byron White made apparent the Court's belief that Madison spoke for the framers of the
Constitution: "California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained
factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. See The Federalist, No. 10 (Madison)".[42]
Madison's argument that restraining liberty to limit faction is an unacceptable solution which has been used by opponents
of campaign finance limits. Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, invoked Federalist No. 10 in a dissent against a ruling
supporting limits on campaign contributions, writing: "The Framers preferred a political system that harnessed such
faction for good, preserving liberty while also ensuring good government. Rather than adopting the repressive 'cure' for
faction that the majority today endorses, the Framers armed individual citizens with a remedy".
Federalist No. 11
Federalist No. 11 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the eleventh of the Federalist Papers.[1] It was published on
November 23, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published.[2] It is
titled, "The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy."[3]
Summary[edit source | edit beta ]
The essay begins with Publius admitting that the "adventurous spirit" of America has already made the European
countries uneasy about engaging in trade.[3] Publius explains that continued uneasiness will deprive the States of "active
commerce."[4] Publius then posits that a Union would counteract that problem by making prohibitory regulations that are
uniform throughout the states, thus requiring foreign countries to negotiate with the Union as a whole and bid against each
other for trading rights.[5]
Publius then moves to discuss the importance of establishing a federal navy.[6] This would increase the Union's ability to
gain access and control the trade opportunities of the West Indies, thus allowing the Union to set prices and control all
European trade in the Americas, putting the Union in a commanding position over foreign trade.[7] This "active commerce"
in controlling trade, as opposed to "passive commerce," reflects the American spirit.[8]
Publius further emphasizes not just the importance of controlling foreign trade, but also that a Union would allow "an
unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves."[9] The naval presence will allow the States to protect trade
among themselves and help promote mutual gains.[9] Without a Union between the States, trade would be less successful;
"would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of causes."
Federalist No. 12From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Federalist No. 12 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the twelfth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November
27, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It is titled, "The
Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue."
In Federalist 12, Hamilton argues that the formation of the union will lead to greater wealth for the states. The
government, by establishing currency, would encourage industry and all Americans would enjoy the benefits. Hamilton
continues by arguing that there is no rivalry between commerce and agriculture - rather each benefits when the other
prospers. Taxes should be levied on commerce and the union will be much more efficient than the states at collecting
revenue. In fact, the article predicts that revenue will triple with the new federal government administering tax collection.
The states have been unable to establish an adequate way to collect taxes. Hamilton claims that direct taxation is not a
reality for the new government. Instead, taxes should be levied on imposts and excises, mainly on imports. Hamilton also
points out that if the federal government administers tax collection instead of leaving the task to states, it will reduce the
amount of resources needed to ensure that the tax is not being evaded. It will be much easier for the federal government
to protect one border - the Atlantic coast - than it would be for each state to protect its borders. A few ships stationed
outside of Americas ports would ensure the collection of duties. Hamilton concludes that funding the government is
essential and if Americans fail to do so then the Revolution itself will have been in vain.
Federalist No. 13
Federalist No. 13 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the thirteenth of the Federalist Papers.[1] It was published on
November 28, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published.[2] It is
titled, "Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government."[2]
Summary[edit source | edit beta ]
This essay focuses on the view that a Union would be more economically sound than separate States.[3]Publius explains
that rather than having many separate governments to support, a Union would have only one national government to
support.[4] He describes this as being both simpler and more economical.[5] The essay further explains that in order to
defend themselves, separate States would have to work together, but their support of one another would be disjointed.
[6] Only a fully united government would provide the best defense for all the States and be able to support military
establishments and necessary civil servants.[7]
Federalist No. 14
Federalist No. 14 is an essay by James Madison, the fourteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on November
30, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It addresses a
major objection of the Anti-Federalists to the proposed United States Constitution: that the sheer size of the United States
would make it impossible to govern justly as a single country. Madison touched on this issue in Federalist No. 10 and
returns to it in this essay. No. 14 is titled "Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered."
Federalist No. 15
Federalist No. 15 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the fifteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on
December 1, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 15
addresses the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the first of six essays
on this topic. It is titled, "The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union."
Federalist No. 15 warns citizens that the states are on the brink of national humiliation. There is impending anarchy
between the states and borrowing and lending policies are causing turmoil. Publius says that the states must make a firm
stand for their tranquility, dignity and reputation by creating a new government with a more energetic executive. Publius
points out that under the Articles of Confederation, the national government does not have the power or authority to issue
sanctions over individuals. The national government cannot enforce its laws because the states cannot be thrown in jail
and without an army, the national government cannot enforce taxes on states
"government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to the idea of a law that it be attended with a sanction; or, in
other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience"
Publius argues that government must have force behind its laws. He reminds the reader that punishment for disobedience
is necessary because the "passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice without this constraint."
Punishment of individuals, not states, is necessary because "regard for reputation has a less active influence when the
infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one."
Federalist No. 16From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Federalist No. 16 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on
December 4, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 16
addresses the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the second of six
essays on this topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve
the Union."
Federalist No. 17From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Federalist No. 17 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventeenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on
December 5, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 17
addresses the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the third of six essays
on this topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
Union."
Summary[edit source | edit beta ]
Federalist No. 17 specifically regards the possible encroachment of the federal government on the powers of the state
governments. Hamilton argues that because states are given the most direct power over their citizens, namely the ability
to administer criminal and civil justice, they remain "the most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment."
According to Hamilton this power contributes more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the
people affection, esteem and reverence towards the government [of the state]." Furthermore Hamilton says human nature
makes it so they are more closely attached to things they are geographically near, hence a person is more attached to
their neighborhood than the community at large. Therefore "The people of each state would be apt to feel a stronger bias
towards their local governments than towards the government of the union." Because of the reasons listed, Hamilton
believes that state governments will have the popular strength to resist encroachment on their state's rights.
Federalist No. 18
Federalist No. 18 is an essay by James Madison, the eighteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on December
7, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 18 addresses
the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the fourth of six essays on this
topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union."
Federalist No. 19
Federalist No. 19 is an essay by James Madison, the nineteenth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on December
8, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 19 addresses
the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the fifth of six essays on this
topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union."
Federalist No. 20
Federalist No. 20 is an essay by James Madison, the twentieth of the Federalist Papers. It was published on December
11, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. No. 20
addresses the failures of the Articles of Confederation to satisfactorily govern the United States; it is the last of six essays
on this topic. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
Union."
Federalist No. 21
Federalist No. 21 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the twenty-first of the Federalist Papers. It was published on
December 12, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. It is
titled, "Other Defects of the Present Confederation."
In Federalist No. 21 Alexander Hamilton focuses on the three main imperfections of government under theArticles of
Confederation, and how the Constitution will rectify these problems. First, Hamilton observes that the current government
has no power to enforce laws and also lacks a mutual guarantee of state rights. Under the Articles, a faction could easily
take control of a state and the government would not be able to do anything about it. Then, Hamilton comments on the
inefficiency of the confederation's current method of collecting taxes by quotas, and denounces it as a method by which
the states may be broken apart. According to Hamilton, however, these problems are easily rectifiable, and the
Constitution will fix all of them if it is approved.
Federalist No. 22
Federalist No. 22 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the twenty-second of the Federalist Papers. It was published on
December 14, 1787 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. This
essay continues with a theme started in Federalist No. 21. It is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: Other Defects of the
Present Confederation."
The power to regulate commerce is one of the strongest reasons to switch from the Articles of Confederation to a stronger
"federal superintendence." The lack of a centralized federal government to regulate commerce has acted as a bar against
the "formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers" and has also led to dissatisfaction between the states. Several
states have attempted to create concert "prohibitions, restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that
kingdom in this particular" area. However, "arising from the lack of a general authority, and from clashing and dissimilar
views in the states" has frustrated every experiment of the kind, and will continue to hinder the true growth that could be
realized under a federal system.
Aside from the regulation of commerce, the power to raise and keep an army, under the powers of the Articles of
Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the states for quotas of men. "This practice in the course of
the late war, was found replete with obstructions to a vigorous, and to an economical system of defense." Publius went on
to state that this led to a competition between the states, which turned into an auction for men. Having states bid on men
for defense, "is not merely unfriendly to economy and vigor, than it is to an equal distribution of the 'burden'.
Also, Publius states, that the right of equal suffrage among the states is another exceptionable part of the confederation.
"The sense of the majority should prevail. However this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain
suggestions of justice and common sense." He continues by stating, "for we can enumerate nine states, which contain
less than a majority of the people and it is constitutionally possible, that these nine may give the vote."
The overall gist of Federalist No. 22, is that the current structure under the confederation is weak and unable to support
the demands that are required of a global nation.