fifa: for the good of the game

Presented By: John Bollinger Ka.e Bradley Kirsten Grohs Madelyn Robinson

What’s Wrong With FIFA and How A True Transparent Model Should Look

Table of Contents

“For The Good Of The Game”

Execu&ve Summary

Overview: •  History of FIFA •  Values of FIA

Corrup&on in FIFA: •  Past Allega&ons •  Diagnosing the Culture of Corrup&on FIFA’s Road to Transparency: •  Government Structure •  Independent Government CommiHee •  Progress of FIFA •  Analysis of IGC Recommenda&ons

Analysis of Best Prac&ces: •  Overview of Canadian Soccer Associa&on •  Government Structure of Interna&onal CommiHee of Red Cross •  Financial Accountability of Interna&onal CommiHee of Red Cross •  Access to Archives of Interna&onal CommiHee of Red Cross •  Implica&ons of Best Prac&ces

How To Manual: Restructuring Your Organiza&on Through Transparency 1.  Transparent Leadership 2.  Building a Culture of Accountability 3.  Strategies of Financial Transparency

What’s Wrong With FIFA and How A True Transparent Model Should Look

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Executive Summary


The following report was created to provide an overview of the Fédéra&on Interna&onal de Football Associa&on (FIFA) and their aHempts to abide by a transparent opera&ng structure. Throughout the course of the research it was determined that although aHempts have been made to end corrupt prac&ces such as bribery and fraud the weight and persuasion of the poli&cal process is too heavy to start fresh. Without cleaning house and re-‐building FIFA from the ground up it is next to impossible to ensure that truly equal and transparent prac&ce is being held accountable because of the history and &es of the organiza&on itself.

A best prac&ces analysis showcases other organiza&ons of non-‐profit and otherwise that have managed to balance the areas of which FIFA has had difficulty. The accessibility of this informa&on from names such as The Canadian Soccer Associa&on and The Red Cross demonstrate that ethical business prac&ce should not be a luxury but a right to all stakeholders and shareholders of an organiza&on.

With this in mind, a “How To Manual” has been placed in the laHer half of the research to provide other organiza&ons with the right tools to operate in transparent prac&ce. The manual provides steps for managing proper leadership, accountability, culture and finances that abide by honest policy and procedures. It is our hope that this transparency model and recommenda&ons reach a party that is willing to put them to use for the beHerment of their opera&ons.

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History of FIFA


The Beginnings

The Federa&on Interna&onale of Football Associa&ons (FIFA) began on May 21, 1904 by the world’s elite football na&ons. Their vision was to unite these dominate countries under one common umbrella to promote interna&onal play.

During it’s beginnings, FIFA baHled to gain legi&macy as an organiza&on, dealt with 2 World Wars, fought through financial restraints, and dealt with major adversity with unprecedented decisions in global growth and interna&onal sport governance. However FIFA’s leadership and their relentless drive to accomplish the vision persevered, established their reputa&on, and grew the organiza&on worldwide.

What started as a “gentlemen’s club” among the major na&ons had transformed into a mul&-‐billion dollar business who’s prominent jewel – the World Cup – draws billions of viewers worldwide to watch the best football players compete on the highest stage.

The New Era

In 1970, The FIFA pendulum swung from an “administra&on-‐oriented ins&tu&on into a dynamic enterprise” with the elec&on of Dr. Joan Havelange as President.

Havalange’s first order of business was to grow FIFA’s staff from 12 to over 100 employees as the interna&onal office took a bullish approach to growing revenue streams and expanding membership exponen&ally.

Under his leadership, FIFA grew the qualifying teams for the World Cup from 13 in 1974 to 32 finalists in 1998. This increase in teams grew membership in Africa and Asia and gave every con&nent (not just South America and Europeans) more teams in the tournament.

In 1998, current President Seth BlaHer took over the reigns and has con&nued growing the federa&on in both membership and revenue, while also focusing heavily on youth soccer development ini&a&ves.

Dr. Joan Havelange

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FIFA Mission Statement/Values Develop the game, touch the world, build a be5er future


Mission of FIFA “Played by millions around the world, football is the heart and soul of FIFA and as the guardian of this most cherished game, we have a great responsibility. This responsibility does not end with organizing the FIFA World Cup™ and the various other world cup compe&&ons; it extends to safeguarding the Laws of the Game, developing the game around the world and to bringing hope to those less privileged. This is what we believe is the very essence of fair play and solidarity.

We see it as our mission to contribute towards building a beHer future for the world by using the power and popularity of football. This mission gives meaning and direc&on to each and every ac&vity that FIFA is involved in -‐ football being an integrated part of our society.”

What FIFA Stands For “Our core values of authen&city, unity, performance and integrity are at the very heart of who we are.

Authen9city. We believe that football must remain a simple, beau&ful game played by, enjoyed by and touching the lives of all people far and wide.

Unity. We believe it is FIFA´s responsibility to foster unity within the football world and to use football to promote solidarity, regardless of gender, ethnic background, faith or culture.

Performance. We believe that FIFA must strive to deliver football of the highest quality and as the best possible experience, be it as a player, as a spectacle, or as a major cultural and social enabler throughout the world.

Integrity. We believe that, just as the game itself, FIFA must be a model of fair play, tolerance, sportsmanship and transparency.”

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Corruption In FIFA


FIFA’s Current Leadership

Joseph “Sepp” BlaEer, the current President of FIFA, was elected June 8, 1998. Despite being re-‐elected President in 2002, 2007 and 2011, BlaEer’s terms have been plagued with controversy and allegaTons of corrupTons. These allegaTons include: financial mismanagement, acceptance of bribes in Qatar’s successful 2022 World Cup bid, statements on female players, and stance on racism in FIFA.

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Corruption In FIFA


ISL MarkeTng Case

In July 2012, it was finally confirmed that honorary President Joao Havelange and ex-‐Execu&ve CommiHee Member Ricardo Teixeira received over $13 million in personal kickbacks from their marke&ng partner ISL between 1992-‐2000.

The inves&ga&on that started back in 2001 finally came to a head in early 2010, which at the &me Joao Havelange, Ricardo Teixeria, and FIFA paid 5.5 million to end the prosecu&on probe and keep the allega&ons hidden from the public.

However, the Swiss court that handled the case ruled out the appeal to keep the records private, thus resul&ng in their release from FIFA who changed their tone and were quoted saying, “FIFA is pleased that the ISL non-‐prosecu&on order can now be made public.”

Looking deeper into the report uncovers allega&ons that FIFA’s CFO and an uniden&fied party (P1 – who most believe is Seth BlaHer) knew about the payments. BlaHer served as Joao Havelange’s General Secretariat for 17 years, including the years of illegal payments.

Much of BlaHer’s 14 years as President have been spent seeking closure and to improve FIFA's image and governance.

From other interviews and research, it has also been discovered that FIFA execu&ve commiHee member Nicolas Leoz, a Paraguayan who s&ll heads the South American football confedera&on, had received two ISL payments totaling $130,000 in 2000. Also, inside informa&on suggests that all of FIFA’s third party affilia&ons are usually brought on through their willingness to produce favors, bribes, and financial contribu&ons.

Former FIFA president Joao Havelange, on the right, and Ricardo Teixeira allegedly received bribes by FIFA’s former marke.ng partner ISL.. FIFA have published the report on their website, but it leaves big ques.on marks about why no ac.on was ever taken against Havelange or Teixeira, and why the organiza.on went to such lengths to protect the two senior figures.

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Corruption In FIFA


PresidenTal ElecTon

In 2011, FIFA was rocked with more corrup&on allega&ons when it was discovered that Execu&ve CommiHee member and presiden&al candidate Bin Hammam conspired to pay Caribbean officials $40,000 for their vote.

Caribbean officials, led by former CONCACAF leader Jack Warner, hold 25 of the 208 poten&al votes, and were considered major influencers who won the elec&on.

In an aHempt to clean-‐up the scandal, FIFA banned Bin Hammam for life and he lost his seat as the President of Asian Football Confedera&on (AFC). He is the most senior official convicted of corrup&on in the governing body's 107-‐year history.

His life&me ban has recently been overturned by the Court of Arbitra&on in Sport for insufficient evidence, and is now in the hands of the FIFA Ethics CommiHee.

World Cup Ticket Scandal

In 2010, BBC alleged that CONCACAF President Jack Warner sold $84,000 worth of World Cup 2010 &ckets on the black market, taking 60 percent for his own gain. These allega&ons were brought forward from a black market &cket dealer who bought from Warner.

Warner and his family were also fined around $1 million arer the 2006 World Cup for allegedly selling &ckets on the black market. He kept his place on the FIFA Execu&ve CommiHee; however, has so far paid back only a quarter of the amount. Warner eventually resigned from his EC posi&on with FIFA in 2012 upon allega&ons regarding his involvement with the Bin Hamman presiden&al scandal.

Warner , on the leO, was reprimanded by FIFA over a 2006 World Cup .cke.ng scandal involving his family but kept his place on the execu.ve commiTee. The revela.ons in 2010 added pressure on both BlaTer and FIFA to make changes.

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Corruption In FIFA


World Cup Bids

The most glaring corrup&on scandal for FIFA has been the selec&on of their World Cup ci&es for 2018 and 2022.

Arer the announcement that Russia and Qatar had won the rights to the next World Cups, England's bid representa&ve Lord Triesman announced allega&ons that he had been approached by four men on FIFA’s Execu&ve Council (EC) for improper requests and girs in exchange for their votes. Requests ranged from a $2.5 million dona&on to help build a soccer school in the Execu&ve Council member’s home land to an honorary knighthood.

On top of these allega&ons were reports that Qatar gave $1.5 million to two EC members, Issa Hayatou of Cameroon and Jacques Anouma of Ivory Coast in exchange for their votes and influence in the decision. alleged to received $1.5 million each in bribes from the Qatar 2022 bid in exchange for their votes. With these two, plus the four others iden&fied in Lord Triesman’s report, that made up one quarter of FIFA’s EC with alleged bribery scandals.

These allega&ons were never fully inves&gated but brought a great deal of media aHen&on and inves&ga&ve journalism pieces by writes such as Andrew Jennings. When FIFA brought on Mark Pieth in 2011 as part of their reform charge, it was stated all past behaviors would not be inves&gated; however, news in July 2012 states that Ethics CommiHee head Michael Garcia could open up the case in the future.

It was stated in our research that the bidding process has tradi&onally been more about “who did what for who” instead of bid technicality and presenta&on. FIFA EC members have been observed falling asleep and having a complete lack of aHen&on during the process.

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Culture Corruption In FIFA Diagnosing The Problem


In order to effec&vely analyze FIFA’s current state, it is necessary to diagnose what is causing the corrup&on. By understanding the root of the problems, FIFA will be able to beHer tackle the issues at hand. Below highlights the main causes of FIFA’s current allega&ons:

•  Lack of standard for Conflict of Interest disclosure

•  Lack of due diligence •  Lack of financial compliance

statues •  Lack of an&-‐corrup&on

controls •  Lack of universal mandates

and procedures •  Investment of current

members in power (see circle of power on the leO)

FIFA’s current allegaTons

•  Interna&onal contract scandals •  Vote-‐rigging •  Bribery •  Ticket malprac&ces •  Illegal tax exemp&ons for FIFA and sponsors •  Limita&on of workers’ rights in World Cup bids

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FIFA’s Road Map to Transparency


June, 2013: Completion of Good Governance Process New election of members of the Ethics Committee &

Approval of further changes to FIFA Statutes

June, 2012: Approval of Reforms & Implementation Approval and implementation of changes to FIFA structure, Ethic Committee starts new

2-chamber structure, & Bidding process for future FIFA World Cups

March, 2012: Definition of Further Reforms Proposals by Independent Governance Committee &

Approval of reform proposals by Task Forces

December, 2011: Details on First Reform Proposals Establishment of Independent Governance Committee &

Update on reform proposals of Four Task Forces

October, 2011: Structural Set-Up & Transparency

Establishment of Four Task Forces: 1. Revision of Statutes, 2. Ethics Committee, 3. Transparency & Compliance, and 4. Football 2014

Despite current allega.ons, FIFA has implemented a strategic roadmap to a more transparent organiza.on. This sec.on highlights their progress.

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FIFA’s Reformed Government Structure


Below shows FIFA’s new government structure, created to ensure good governance, transparency and zero tolerance towards wrong-‐doing.

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FIFA’s Independent Governance Committee Charter


1. Purpose of the IGC •  Independent group of governance experts and stakeholder representatives •  Oversees the creation and implementation of a framework of good governance •  Ensure FIFA's integrity

2. Powers of the IGC •  The right to assess FIFA's response to allegations of past and current misconduct and

the right to recommend further investigation •  The ability to monitor FIFA's governance reform process, assess the work by the FIFA

Task Forces, submit corresponding proposals to the competent FIFA institutions, and ensure their implementation

•  The power to obtain any information it may require from FIFA officials

3. Composition and Selection •  Comprised of 13 – 15 members - appointed and removed by decision of the IGC •  The IGC Chair - the official spokesperson of the IGC and primary contact with FIFA

4. Committee Structure and Meetings •  The governance/compliance experts on the IGC shall form the Steering Committee of

the IGC The IGC Chair and Steering Committee - knowledgeable about corporate governance and compliance and prepares the IGC meetings and co-ordinates the work between meetings

•  The IGC works on a consensus basis - if consensus cannot be reached or in case of formal decisions , the IGC shall act on the affirmative vote of a 2/3 majority of the members present at a meeting

A key component to transparency is having an Independent Governance CommiTee, with zero obliga.ons to the organiza.on, in place with the power to make tangible changes. FIFA has taken the ini.a.ve to add an Independent Governance CommiTee to their organiza.on, making a step in the right direc.on.

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FIFA’s Independent Governance Committee Charter


5. Transparency •  Committed to making FIFA’s process and work product transparent, while respecting

FIFA's proprietary information •  Responsibility to protect the integrity of the reform process and not to infringe any of

FIFA's proprietary rights

6. Finances •  FIFA provides the funds necessary to operate the IGC •  Must produce bi-annual budgets in Swiss Francs relating to the operation of the IGC •  FIFA transfers the budgeted amounts to a separate bank account - Basel Institute on

Governance •  The responsibilities of BloG are documented in a Trust Deed between FIFA and BloG,

approved by the IGC - obligated to fully disclose at any time all relevant transactions to the Auditor, FIFA and the IGC

•  An independent external audit firm mutually agreed between FIFA and the IGC shall perform annual audits & publically disclose reports

•  FIFA shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless the IGC members from all liability, loss, cost or expense

7. Amendments •  Amendments to this charter shall be implemented by formal decision of the IGC

Sepp BlaTer and Mark Pieth, Chairman of FIFA’s Independent Governance CommiTee Charter, shaking hands aOer the IGC partnership.

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Independent Governance Committee Official Texts


Below is just one of the actual leTers sent from FIFA’s Independent Governance CommiTee to all FIFA stakeholders, in order to establish the power to inves.gate and punish wrong-‐doings.

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Independent Governance Committee Official Texts


Below is just one of the actual leTers sent from FIFA’s Independent Governance CommiTee to all FIFA stakeholders, explaining that the road to transparency takes .me and there is s.ll work to be done at FIFA to meet these reforms.

“I’m glad that the first part of the reform has received such overwhelming support from the Congress. This also shows the unity of our Congress. But our work does not end here. The reform process will continue, as planned, until the 2013 Congress. Thus, the road map will be respected. FIFA, and me personally, are firmly committed to this process. ” - Blatter, FIFA’s President, May 2012

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Progress of FIFA Transparency June 2012


•  96% FIFA congress approval of the amendments to the FIFA Statutes submiHed by IGC & the Task Forces

•  Reformed the restructuring of the Ethics CommiHee with a new system of two chambers with independent chairman, adop&on of the Code of Ethics

•  Approval of the crea&on of an Audit and Compliance CommiHee proposed by IGC & approval of The FIFA Code of Conduct

•  Amendment of the procedure for admission to FIFA – allowing South Sudan Football to become FIFA’s 209th member without two-‐year wai&ng period

•  The appointment to Execu&ve CommiHee of Ms Lydia Nsekera (Burundi) & the ability for women to wear headscarves while playing

•  Diversity within FIFA’s Execu&ve CommiHee – Cayman Islands ‘Jeffrey Webb installed as FIFA Vice-‐President

•  Approval of the FIFA Club Protec&on Programme -‐ protec&on of injured players of all interna&onal “A” members

•  Italian player Simone Farina – who opposed a match-‐fixing aHempt – has been appointed FIFA Ambassador to fight match-‐fixing

•  Ini&a&ves to improve the professionaliza&on of the environment in which FIFA referees develop /work & approval of introduc&on of new technologies to help referees

•  Returning to its members the power to decide the host of the World Cup

•  Elec&on of chairmen, deputy chairmen and the members of four of its commiHees by the associa&ons in the congress

•  Inves&ga&on launched by the Chairman of its inves&ga&on branch, Michael Garcia

FIFA has made progress with becoming more transparent. Below showcases the major accomplishments FIFA has made on its road to reform.

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Analysis of IGC’s Recommendations


•  Upgrade its exis&ng financial governance: develop a catalogue of poten&ally cri&cal payments, decide whether direct controls are warranted, intensify its specific an&-‐corrup&on control – FIFA has NOT taken these steps

•  Upgrade its compliance system to meet the requirements of a state of the art corporate an&-‐corrup&on compliance programme – FIFA has recognized the need, but has NOT taken acTon

•  FIFA should consider elec&ng independent members into the Execu&ve CommiHee – There is liEle evidence that FIFA has even taken this into consideraTon

•  Ethics CommiHee and the Disciplinary CommiHee should obtain dis&nct tasks. Ethics CommiHee should be transformed into independent body with power to inves&gate – FIFA has put effort into reforming; however, the degree of independence is minimal

•  A Compensa&on and Benefits CommiHee should decide over benefits of officials of FIFA bodies and senior staff – Appears to be rejected outright by FIFA

•  Announcement of Presiden&al Elec&on Candidates sufficiently ahead of the elec&on – Unclear if FIFA has even considered this recommendaTon

•  Create a system of campaign financing with sufficient backing and ruling out further private campaign – Unclear if FIFA has even considered this recommendaTon

•  FIFA should limit the terms of office of its Execu&ve CommiHee officials – FIFA has considered and REJECTED this recommendaTon

•  Introduc&on of regular due diligence checks by the Ethics CommiHee on elected members of its bodies – IMPLAUSIBLE for FIFA to implement in any manner given current circumstances

•  Decisions on hos&ng and commercializa&on should include overall abstract strategy, defined by relevant CommiHees and ra&fied by Congress – There is liEle evidence that FIFA has even taken this into consideraTon

•  Introduc&on of a conflict interest regula&on for causes of conflict with specific procedures– FIFA understands the need and has made some strides in implementaTon, but falls well SHORT of the standards

•  Adop&on of an overall governance strategy for its funds, with expenditures audited on the standard of the Goal Programme to ensure accountability – FAIL: Chuck Blazer was found guilty of financial mismanagement on a grand scale, but FIFA has kept him on ExecuTve CommiEee

Despite some of FIFA’s reforms, several of the key recommenda.ons made by the Independent Governance CommiTee have NOT been implemented.

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Analysis of Best Practices


Elec&on of board of directors every 3 years

No director may serve on the CSA board for more than 8 years

The CSA Board of Directors must include 1 current/former athlete and 1 individual currently involved in professional soccer

CSA Board of Directors must include of a minimum of 3 qualified Directors of each gender

Ac&ons of Board of Directors are audited by Governance CommiHee and Risk Management CommiHee

All Financials are available online for general public viewing

AOer a thorough inves.ga.on of FIFA’s history, current government structure, policies implemented to create change and progress made by FIFA, it has become evident that FIFA s.ll has a long road ahead to become transparent. In order to put together a “How to Manual,” this sec.on will look to analyze best prac.ces of transparent interna.onal organiza.ons.

Canadian Soccer Associa9on

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Best Practices: Government Structure Interna9onal Commi5ee of Red Cross


Assembly Supreme Governing Body: formulates policy, defines strategy, & approves the budget;

nominates directors & head of Internal Audit; composed of between 15 - 25 members of Swiss nationality; the Assembly is collegial in character

Vice President Olivier Vodoz

Vice President Christine Beerli

President

Peter Maurer

Assembly Council

Subsidiary body of the Assembly: prepares the Assembly's policies on funding, personnel & communication, links Directorate & the Assembly; composed of five

members elected by the Assembly; it is chaired by the president

Directorate

Execu&ve body of the ICRC: responsible for applying ins&tu&onal strategy defined by the Assembly; a five members commiHee appointed by the Assembly for four-‐year terms

Director-General

Yves Daccord

The Interna.onal CommiTee of Red Cross’s government structure is set to promote open communica.on and transparency.

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Best Practices: Financial Accountability Interna9onal Commi5ee of Red Cross


OBJECTIVE: Ensure the ICRC is fully accountable to its donors and other stakeholders

INTERNAL AUDIT: Ar&cle 14 of the Statutes of the ICRC: “Internal Audit shall have an internal monitoring func&on independent of the Directorate. It shall report directly to the Assembly. It shall proceed through internal opera&onal and financial audits”.

EXTERNAL AUDIT: Ar&cle 15 of the Statutes of the ICRC: “the u&liza&on of this revenue and of ICRC reserves shall be subject to independent financial verifica&on, both internally (by Internal Audit) and externally (by one or more firms of auditors).”

In accordance with the InternaTonal Standards on AudiTng, statements include:

•  Consolidated statement of financial posi&on

•  Consolidated statement of comprehensive income & expenditure

•  Consolidated cash-‐flow statement •  Consolidated statement of changes in

reserves •  Notes to the consolidated financial

statements

The Interna.onal CommiTee of Red Cross’s financials are rou.nely open to internal and external audits, in order to hold full accountability of its stakeholders.

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Best Practices: Transparent Finances Interna9onal Commi5ee of Red Cross


The Interna.onal CommiTee of Red Cross’s financials are open to the public. While FIFA does disclose some of its financials to the public, it is not to the degree that the ICRC does.

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Best Practices: Access to Archives Interna.onal CommiTee of Red Cross


“In reducing the embargo period, the ICRC is seeking to comply with current trends regarding public access to

archives and is at the same time confirming its policy of openness and transparency as defined in 1996. It is also

reasserting its wish to make the history of the ICRC known” – ICRC, 1996

The Interna.onal CommiTee of Red Cross’s past archives are open to the public to comply with transparency.

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•  Financial informa&on should be disclosed gradually and in appropriate form to members, stakeholders and the public.

•  Disclosure of financial informa&on should be done on an annual basis.

•  The financial statements of sports organiza&ons should be presented in a consistent way in order to be easily understood.

•  Accounts should be established in accordance with the applicable laws and “True and fair view” principle.

•  The applica&on of interna&onally recognized standards should be strongly encouraged in all sports organiza&ons, where possible, and required for an interna&onal body.

•  For all organiza&ons, annual financial statements are to be audited by independent and qualified auditors.

•  Accountability and financial reports should be produced on a regular basis. •  Informa&on about remunera&on and financial arrangements of the governing bodies’

members should be part of the annual accounts. •  Clear rules regarding remunera&on of the members of governing bodies and managers

should be enforced. •  Remunera&on procedures should be transparent and predictable.

Best Practices: International Olympic Committee

Financial MaTers

Distribu.on of Resources •  As a principle, financial resources which are proceeds of sport should be allocated to sport

and in par&cular to its development arer covering all necessary sports-‐related costs.

•  Financial revenues should be distributed in a fair and efficient manner . •  A fair distribu&on of the financial revenues contributes to having balanced and aHrac&ve

compe&&ons.

•  A clear and transparent policy for the alloca&on of the financial revenues is essen&al.

Transparency in Communica.on

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Implications of Best Practices


“I think the thing people really need to know about this is that transparency is sort of a long-‐term cause. It is not flip the switch tomorrow morning and everybody gets what the reality needs to be.” -‐ Shel Holtz & John Havens, authors of Tac.cal Transparency: How Leaders Can Leverage Social Media to Maximize Value and Build their Brand, 2008.

•  Internal corrup&on inves&ga&on – Execu&ve CommiHee members have a lot to lose

•  Process takes &me to see full changes •  FIFA not a cohesive organiza&on – internal figh&ng

within FIFA Asia •  Issue of democra&za&on of FIFA – elec&on through

different en&&es – has not been broached

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How To Manual:


Restructuring Your Organiza9on Through Transparency

Presented By: John Bollinger Ka.e Bradley Kirsten Grohs Madelyn Robinson

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Step 1: Transparent Leadership CharacterisTcs of a Transparent Leader

•  Transparency is directly correlated to the personality of the leader •  A transparent leader will share informa&on and expert advice to build trust by

employees •  Leadership beliefs will be followed by integrity to carry those beliefs through for

the good of the organiza&on. •  Essen&ally, a transparent leader will live the mission, core and values of the

organiza&on. •  If a mistake is made, a transparent leader will own up to mistake to move

forward. •  One par&cular Harvard Business Review study of 125 leaders suggested that

there is no definite mold for a transparent leader, but that their focus should be on constant, con&nuous self-‐development (Buel, 2008).

DemocraTc ElecTon Process

•  Anyone who has a stake in the organiza&on shall receive a ballot in vo&ng for the president

•  Should one stakeholder be unable to vote, a subs&tute shall be nominated by the party they represent

•  Objec&ve third party audi&ng commiHee shall oversee the campaigning of candidates to prevent bribery and other illegal acts

•  Leadership reign should last no longer than 4 years without re-‐elec&on

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How Transparent Leadership Creates Culture

•  A leader that fosters a transparent culture by encouraging innova&on and openness creates a climate that allows employees to feel comfortable doing this day by day (Cangemi & Miller, 2012). This is otherwise known as a values-‐based culture, which can ul&mately increase the boHom line of a company (Baum, 2005).

•  A community that believes in their leader will support their decision making •  Making organiza&onal informa&on available to the public will allow the public to

understand the reason why some execu&ve decisions are being made •  Studies show that this style of authorita&ve leadership versus authoritarian is also

correlated to posi&ve employee self-‐esteem (cangemi-‐miller). •  Leader of organiza&on should create list of ethical “promises” or a contract between

leader and the public that entails characteris&cs they can expect from said leader. Should leader not fulfill contract, re-‐elec&on shall occur (Cangemi & Miller, 2012).

Step 1: Transparent Leadership

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Leadership and a strong governance structure are only as good as the culture of accountability they can cul&vate within the organiza&on.

Accountability is defined as the processes through which an organiza&on makes a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision-‐making processes and ac&vi&es, and delivers against this commitment (One World Trust).

One Trust World, an independent charity that researches, provides recommenda&ons and advocates for accountability reform in global

Step 2: Building a Culture of Accountability

The four main elements to build a culture of accountability are transparency, par.cipa.on, evalua.on, and complaint/response.

organiza&ons states that to be accountable, an organiza&on must incorporate four main principals: transparency, par&cipa&on among stakeholders, evalua&on, and an effec&ve complaint and response system. To be accountable, an organiza&on needs to integrate all dimensions into its policies, procedures and prac&ce, at all levels and stages of decision-‐making and implementa&on. Also, meaningful accountability only results when all four principals are effec&ve and being executed simultaneously.

The key challenge is in crea&ng a more balanced rela&onship, in which the voices of those most affected by an organiza&on's ac&vi&es are not overshadowed by the interests of the most powerful. Accountability thus becomes a process that manages power imbalances between the organiza&on and its stakeholders, as well as between an organiza&on's various stakeholder groups (One Trust World).

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Transparency

ParTcipaTon

Transparency is defined as the provision of accessible and &mely informa&on to stakeholders and the opening up of organiza&onal procedures, structures and processes to their assessment (One Trust World). To build a culture of transparency, as discussed in previous sec&ons, it starts with leadership.

To generate transparency, leaders should follow four key steps: 1) value open, honest, and &mely communica&on with the public, 2) adopt prac&ces which promote open informa&on sharing, 3) work with management to create an organiza&onal culture which supports transparency, and 4) provide &me, staff and funds towards its implementa&on (Pina, Torres, and Rono). Par&cular areas to focus transparency efforts are in a comprehensive transparency policy, narrowly defined condi&ons for not disclosing informa&on, a commitment to respond to all informa&on requests, a clear informa&on appeals process, and the involvement of stakeholders in policy development (Lloyd & Harrison).

Ul&mately, the public values transparency. It helps assess organiza&onal performance and creates greater public trust that gives legi&macy to the organiza&on’s ac&ons. Transparency is not a one-‐way flow of informa&on, but an ongoing dialogue between organiza&on and stakeholders over informa&on provision.

Par&cipa&on is defined as the process through which an organiza&on enables key stakeholders to play an ac&ve role in the decision-‐making processes and ac&vi&es which affect them (One Trust World).

By making the organiza&on’s informa&on available for review and allowing stakeholders to give feedback into the decisions that affect them, organiza&ons begin to garner trust and hold themselves to an even higher level of accountability.

Also, par&cipa&on should not only be reserved for opera&onal issues, but at the policy and strategic levels as well. This deeper involvement isn’t taking the decision-‐making abili&es away from leadership, but opening up their lens to different perspec&ves from those who also have stakes in the organiza&on.

Building a Culture of Accountability

30


Complaint & Response

EvaluaTon Any organiza&on can have a great transparency and stakeholder par&cipa&on policy, but if the process isn’t being implemented effec&vely or improved con&nuously then full accountability won’t be reached.

Evalua&on is defined as the process through which an organiza&on, with involvement from key stakeholders, monitors and reviews its progress and results against goals and objec&ves; feeds learning from this back into the organiza&on on an ongoing basis; and reports on the results of the process (One Trust World).

The rela&onship between evalua&on and accountability is con&nuous learning (One Trust World). Building a culture of con&nuous improvement and introspec&on not only finds flaws and uncovers new ways to keep the organiza&on accountable, but reinforces a culture of accountability among management, employees, and stakeholders.

Finally, if/when stakeholders have a complaint about an organiza&on’s decisions or ac&ons, there needs to be a complaint and effec&ve response system for stakeholders to seek and receive a response.

Whether it’s a difference in opinion or large-‐scale dysfunc&on, an effec&ve complaint an response system is the last shield in protec&ng an organiza&on’s high standard of accountability. It also gives the stakeholder a voice and final way to be heard.

Transparency, par&cipa&on and evalua&on processes should be used to minimize the need for complaint mechanisms. However, complaint and response mechanisms are a means of last resort for stakeholders to hold the organiza&on to account and for organiza&ons to become aware of an issue that requires a response.


31

A plan is only as effec&ve as it’s implementa&on. For leadership to implement organiza&onal accountability through transparency, par&cipa&on, evalua&on, and a complaint/response system, they must cul&vate a level of commitment from the en&re organiza&on.

An organiza&on’s degree of accountability commitment is derived from two sources: embeddedeness and responsiveness (One Trust World).

Embeddedness centers around the idea that accountability needs to be integrated in all levels of the organiza&on. Leadership, management, and employees need to have a clear understanding of the benefits to being accountable and the organiza&on’s policies and procedures need to reward or deter behaviors that support/go against this belief.

Responsiveness deals with the level, quality, and &me commitment given to stakeholder engagement. A truly accountable organiza&on will train its staff and provide resources to adequately respond to accountability issues from all stakeholders.

Ul&mately, being accountable is about being open with stakeholders and engaging with them in an ongoing dialogue. Accountability generates ownership of decisions and projects and in turn enhances sustainability of results (One Trust World). Accountability isn’t difficult to implement. It just takes a commitment from leadership, an effec&ve plan that incorporates the four main principals, and a culture that is incen&vized and commiHed to it’s implementa&on.


Sustaining Accountability


For a full evalua.on form to grade your organiza.on’s accountability standards please review Appendix A.

32


Public MeeTngs: The process of making informa&on available to the general public is the true tes&mony of a transparent organiza&on. The main objec&ve of public mee&ngs is to: ensure beHer informa&on flow from organiza&on to ci&zens, facilitate par&cipa&on of its stakeholders, enable public scru&ny of ac&ons of organiza&on, and foster beHer rela&onship of the public. A clear outline of the structure and proposed agenda of the mee&ng must be provided. Dates of the public mee&ngs must be set well in advanced and publicly no&fied. Stakeholders must also be provided the opportunity to provide wriHen comments, if they cannot aHend the mee&ng.

Record Management: Relevant informa&on – complete, concise, and easy to understand – must be made available to the public. Keeping a well-‐organized record system allows the public to readily access this informa&on. A proper records management system not only enhances the public accessibility to government informa&on, but also improves the accountability, responsiveness and professionalism of the organiza&on. There needs to be a proper procedure in place for documen&ng key informa&on, policies, and ac&vi&es. Both the framework for keeping records and the guidelines for public accessibility must be simple and clear.

Online Content: Informa&on put on the Internet is accessible to every person with the ability to read and connec&on to the Internet, opening the door for organiza&ons to interact with the public. Puyng informa&on about the organiza&on on the Internet increases the informa&on available to the general public and catalyzes the interac&on between the general public and the organiza&on. Providing informa&on online strengthens the trust between stakeholders and the general pubic and builds a more transparent organiza&on. Informa&on that should be provided on the organiza&on’s website include: open board mee&ng dates/&me/loca&on, names of Board of Directors and key staff members with contact informa&on, annual reports, and core values.

Transparency is defined as “the availability and accessibility of relevant informa.on” the organiza&on provides to the general public. (Gerring & Thacker, 2004).

Open Communica9on


33


A transparent organiza&on will always provide reasons behind their decisions, remaining open as possible regarding all ac&ons and decisions that they make. Transparent decisions should be “clear, integrated into a broader context, logical and ra.onal, accessible, truthful and accurate, open (involve stakeholders), and accountable” (Drew & Nyerges, 2004).

ObjecTve Goals Criteria for EvaluaTon

Clarity •  Readily comprehensible •  No hidden meanings •  Minimal jargon •  Precise and simple

•  Can we understand it readily? •  Did we interpret meanings not explicitly

stated? •  How many acronyms are used? •  Do we need technical knowledge to

interpret?

IntegraTon •  Process fully laid out & fully disclosed

•  Consolidated into a single document

•  Provides references to external sources

•  Detailed table of contents and indices

•  Is the decision fully laid out and disclosed? •  Is a context for the decision provided? •  Are references provided? •  Are abbrevia&ons listed for reader? •  Is there a table of contents? •  Is there an index?

Accessibility •  Ability for ci&zens to request and receive government documents

•  Promotes two-‐way access to informa&on

•  Is the decision informa&on physically available?

•  Is the decision informa&on available on the Internet?

•  Do related Internet sites reference the decision?

Logic & RaTonale •  Consistent, standardized, and formalized processes

•  Provides ra&onale for decisions

•  Iden&fies clear decision points

•  Is a consistent process used? •  Are clear decision points defined? •  Is the ra&onale for a decision described? •  Is enough informa&on about values

expressed to create a value tree?

Transparent Decisions


34


The Execu&ve Board is responsible for managing the major business affairs of an organiza&on, including: big picture strategic planning, financial resource policies, staff guidance, financial/legal/ethical oversight, monitoring the organiza&on’s performance, and community rela&ons. The board authority to create commiHees and provide a budget alloca&on.

Interna&onal organiza&ons are considered quasi-‐public en&&es; consequently, they are subjected to fundamental concepts like separa&on of power and democracy. A democra&c process for elec&ng board members needs to be established.

One way to do this is through a nomina&ng commiHee. A Anyone serving on the nomina&ng commiHee cannot be nominated for the board. When elec&ng the board, the nomina&ng commiHee needs to consider the following:

•  Diversity – geographically, industry exper&se, gender, & race •  Reflec&on of the stakeholders of the organiza&on •  Outside perspec&ves •  Involvement with the general public and the community •  Cannot be staff

If the organiza&on decided against a nomina&ng commiHee, guidelines for nomina&on, campaign financing, and elec&on need to be clearly established. In addi&on, the powers, the responsibili&es, the checks-‐and-‐balances, and the term of office need to be in place, which will allow for separa&on of power.

The Execu&ve Board should quarterly meet with an established Advisory Board. Serving as a sounding board for the Execu&ve Board, The Advisory Board provides strategic advice.

Elec9on of Board Members


35


The Ombudsman is a single person, elected to represent the ins&tu&on, but acts independently to inves&gates allega&ons of maladministra&on. The two primary func&on of the Ombudsman are to examine:

1.  A decision or process which is contrary to law/regula&on or departure from established procedure

2.  The neglect, inefficiency, and inep&tude of the administra&on.

The Ombudsman officer is important to transparency efforts, because his effort to resolve maladministra&on can restore the integrity of ins&tu&ons. In order for transparency to take place, the Ombudsman officer must:

•  Be independent from the organiza&on •  Have the power to inves&gate •  Be effec&ve and fair •  Be protected from premature dismissal to guard against poli&cal influence via fixed office

term

Indicators for Assessing the Success of the Ombudsman 1.  In there an Ombudsman officer in place? 2.  Is the public generally aware of the existence of Ombudsman? 3.  Does the Ombudsman have an adequate budget/staff? 4.  Is the appointment of the Ombudsman non-‐par&san? 5.  Is the Ombudsman protected from arbitrary removal from office? 6.  Do the execu&ve commiHee respect and act on the reports made from the

Ombudsman? 7.  In there ease of access for complaints? 8.  Can complaints be made anonymously?

The Public Office facilitates beHer informa&on to the general public. It serves as a tool to increase public accessibility to informa&on and decision makers. By increasing the understanding behind the decisions, the Public Office enhances transparency in their opera&ons. The key to effec&ve transparency lies in the organiza&on’s ability to link the Public Office with the execu&ve board and the informa&on flow between the two.

CommiEees EssenTal to Support a Transparent Culture

Ombudsman Officer

Public Office

36


While the Ombudsman is tasked with promo&ng fairness, the An&-‐corrup&on Agency is charged with inves&ga&on and prosecu&on of the organiza&on. The An&-‐corrup&on Agency serves as the watchdog of the organiza&on and holds members accountable. To ensure a high level of impar&ality, commissioners must remain non-‐par&san and influences of poli&cal affilia&ons must be kept to an absolute minimum. In addi&on, members of The An&-‐corrup&on Agency must reflect the diversity of the organiza&on, in order to deflect accusa&ons of selec&ve prosecu&on. A legal advisory unit within the agency can offer guidance on conflic&ng interest of laws.

It is crucial that not only the An&-‐corrup&on Agency be provided with an appropriate level of financial resources, but that they also have enforcement capabili&es, including: subpoena and audit power, jurisdic&on over financial disclosure and lobbying registra&on reports, the authority to self-‐ini&ate complaints based upon anonymous &ps and the authority to make recommenda&ons and issue leHers of instruc&ons.

The An&-‐corrup&on Agency should provide all members of the organiza&on with regular ethical training in order to: •  Provide informa&on on new/changing laws •  Address ethical issues •  Remind members of the standards to uphold.

Oversight commiHees are external commiHees that oversee the opera&ons and ac&vi&es of specific development commiHees. These commiHees gather informa&on on the func&oning of departments and ensure that corrupt prac&ces do not take place. It is crucial that the oversight commiHee be able to work independently from the organiza&on.

Oversight commiHees should be composed of relevant experts and must be able to provide advice on simplifying procedures. Complexity provides the opportunity for corrup&on to exist, and through the exper&se of the

oversight commiHee streamlining processes, corrup&on will be reduced.

CommiEees EssenTal to Support a Transparent Culture An9-‐corrup9on Agency

Oversight Commi5ee

37


Formal whistleblowing policies are a way to create condi&ons necessary for the effec&ve management of whistleblowing. These policies should provide standard guidelines within which organiza&ons respond to the ethical or moral concerns of their employees.

Condi&ons necessary within an organiza&on for whistleblowing to be effec&ve: 1. Effec&ve communica&on to employees regarding appropriate steps in voicing ethical concerns. 2. Ins&ll confidence by appropriately responding and inves&ga&ng employee claims. 3. Reassure employees that retalia&on for expressing concerns will not be sought.

The benefits of implemen&ng a whistleblowing policy: •  Enables an organiza&on to deal with a concern internally and in an appropriate manner, rather than

publicly. Publicity about a malprac&ce can severely harm an organiza&on’s reputa&on and funding poten&al and have a similar impact on other organiza&ons in the same sector.

•  Encourages a climate of open communica&on which enables staff to voice concerns at the earliest opportunity and thus avert a larger issue in future. Also, if the employee’s concerns are misplaced, then this misunderstanding can be addressed sooner rather than later.

•  Knowing that an organiza&on has a clear policy on whistleblowing and is serious about dealing with malprac&ce should act as a deterrent to those who may be considering an illegal, improper or unethical prac&ce.

Whistleblowing policies should have the following components as a minimum:

•  A clear statement that employees who are aware of possible wrongdoing within the organiza&on have a responsibility to disclose that informa&on to appropriate par&es inside the organiza&on;

•  The designa&on of specific individuals or groups outside the chain of command as complaint recipients;

•  A guarantee that employees who in good faith disclose perceived wrongdoing to the designated par&es inside the organiza&on will be protected from adverse employment consequences; and

•  The establishment of a fair and impar&al inves&ga&ve process.

To succeed, policies must have the commitment of top management and must be adequately communicated to employees.

See Appendix D for Sample Whistleblowing Policy

Policies to Support a Transparent Culture Whistleblowing

38


Causes of Financial Corrup&on

Strategies to Avoid Financial Corrup&on

Organiza&onal consequences

Financial compliance

Internal and external an&-‐corrup&on compliance

Conflict of Interest

Lack of due diligence

Disorganiza&on and lack of consistent standards

Financial Transparency Strategies to Avoid Financial Corrup9on

Tac.cs to avoiding financial corrup.on: •  Independent audi&ng ins&tu&on •  Local & interna&onal external judicial departments •  Internal judicial commiHees •  Publicize finances •  Standardize processes

39


Direct Control: Payment is controlled un&l it reaches the ul&mate payee (i.e. contracts, contract management, accoun&ng systems, internal control mechanisms, etc.)

Indirect Control: Access to audited financial statements of payees to see proper alloca&on of funds, restrict cash payments, allow only payments to bank addresses or bank accounts defined in formal agreements, open bidding procedures when choosing contractors

Goal #1: Increase financial compliance with a more risk based approach

-‐ ObjecTve #1: Publicize bookkeeping and quarterly financial reporTng.

•  TacTc #1: Include all financial transacTons in an audited bookkeeping and financial reporTng system.

•  TacTc #2: Apply strict bookkeeping and audiTng standards (i.e. internal financial controls-‐COSO System)

•  TacTc #3: Post audited financial statements and annual reports to website

-‐ ObjecTve #2: Analyze payments systemaTcally

•  TacTc #1: IdenTfy, analyze, control (directly/indirectly) and monitor potenTally criTcal payments.

•  TacTc #2: Red flag processes to help monitor transacTons efficiently (i.e. budgetary reviews, annual audits, etc.).

•  TacTc #3: Compare revenue and expenditure to budget figures

Tip #1: When crea&ng new systems or modifying current ones, simplicity is key. Easy to understand guidelines, universal standards/procedures, reducing the number of rules and restric&ng exemp&ons are just a few ways to reduce and prevent financial corrup&on.

Financial Transparency Direct & Indirect Control of Poten9ally Cri9cal Payments

Financial Goals

40


Goal #2: Ensure proper financial monitoring with checks and balances

-‐ ObjecTve #1: Establish internal and external controls of financial processes and opera&ons within a sports organiza&on

•  TacTc #1: Retain professional external auditors and empower these independent authori&es with full fiscal jurisdic&on.

•  TacTc #2: Separate internal job func&ons involving the responsibili&es for payment (i.e. repor&ng, alloca&on and distribu&on).

•  TacTc #3: Establish internal Disciplinary, Appeal, Ethics CommiHees

-‐ ObjecTve #2: Develop performance indicators

•  TacTc #1: Assess and compare financial compliance with other member ins&tu&ons (i.e. local, regional, na&onal, interna&onal levels). Share and publicize informa&on

Goal #3: Influence the fostering of good financial governance and democracy in member associaTons (or in situaTons where organizaTons are structured boEom-‐up)

-‐ ObjecTve #1: Introduce organiza&onal consequences for conflict of interest regula&on

•  TacTc #1: Make financial contribu&ons dependent upon the applica&on of compliance

Tip #2: Public discussions on overall performance of an organiza&on and discussion of it’s ac&vi&es is important to build addi&onal confidence, improve responsiveness and enhance accountability.

Financial Transparency Financial Goals

41

References


BarneH, T. (1992). Why Your Company Should Have A Whistleblowing Policy. Sam Advanced Management Journal. pp.37-‐42. Retrieved from hHp://ethics.csc.ncsu.edu old/12_00/basics/whistle/rst/wstlblo_policy.html

Blagescu, Monica, Las Casas, Lucy de, Lloyd, Robert. Pathways to Accountability A short guide to the GAP Framework. (2005). One Trust World. Retreived on January 12, 2013 from hHp://oneworldtrust.org/publica&ons

Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement: Seminar on Autonomy of Olympic and Sport Movement. 11-‐12 February 2008. Retrieved from hHp://www.olympic.o/DocumentsConferences_Forums_and_Events/ 2008_seminar_autonomyBasic_Universal_Principles_of_Good_Governance.pdf

Champagne, Jerome. (2012). Reform Process and Democra.sa.on Should Con.nue at FIFA. Retried October 1st from hTp://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ ar.cleID=2000067275&story_.tle=Reform-‐process-‐and-‐democra.sa.on-‐should con.nue-‐at-‐Fifa

Darby, P. (2003). Africa, the FIFA Presidency, and the Governance of World Football 1974, 1998, and 2002. Africa Today, Vol. 50(1), 3-‐24.

ESPN Staff. (2012). World Cup Bids could be probed. Retrieved October 5th, 2012 from hHp://soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story/_/id/1127762/world-‐cup-‐bids-‐could-‐be inves&gated?cc=5901

FIFA Bans Bin Hamman for life for role in bribery scandal. (2012). Retrieved October 2nd, 2012 from hHp://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/soccer/2011-‐07-‐23-‐fifa Mohamed-‐bin-‐Hammam_n.htm

FIFA Congress fully backs reform process, appoints first women to execu.ve; welcomes South Sudan as 209th FIFA member. (2012). Retrieved October 1st, 2012 from hHp://www.fifa.com/abou~ifa/organisa&on/bodies/congress/news/ newsid=1639773/index.html

Gibson, Owen. (2010). Panorama: Three FIFA World Cup voters accused of taking bribes. Retrieved September 22nd, 2012 from hHp://www.guardian.co.uk/football 2010/nov/29/panorama-‐fifa-‐world-‐cup-‐bribes

Hill, D. (2008). The Fix: Soccer and Organized Crime. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

42

References


Homewood, Brian. (2012). Bin Hamman banned again. Retrieved October 2nd, 2012 from hHp://www.iol.co.za/sport/soccer/bin-‐hammam-‐banned-‐again-‐ 1.1350277#.UKv5rYUyUfo

Jennings, A. (2006) Foul! The Secret World of FIFA: Bribes, Vote Rigging and Ticket Scandals. London: HarperSports

Lloyd, Robert & Hammer, Michael. Pathways to Accountability II. (2011). One Trust World. Retrieved on January 12, 2013 from hHp://oneworldtrust.org/publica&ons

Kelso, Paul. (2011). Lord Triesman alleges FIFA corrup.on in World Cup bidding process at Commons commiTee hearing. Retrieved September 21st, 2012 from hTp://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/interna.onal/8504841/Lord-‐Triesman alleges-‐Fifa-‐corrup.on-‐in-‐World-‐Cup-‐bidding-‐process-‐at-‐Commons-‐commiTee hearing.html

Pieth, M. Dr. (2011, September 19). Governing FIFA. Retrieved from hHp: fr.fifa.commm/document/affedera&on/footballgovernance/01/54/99/69 fifagutachten-‐en.pdf.

People In Aid Policy Guide & Template, Whistleblowing. (2008). Retrieved from hHp:/ www.hapinterna&onal.org/pool/files/whistleblowing-‐policy-‐guide-‐and-‐template.pdf

Rules, Regula&ons and Administra&ve Guide. (2011). Canada Soccer: Reference Documents. Retrieved from www.canadasoccer.com/reference-‐documents-‐s14657

Schenk, Sylia. (2011). Safe Hands: Building Integrity and Transparency At FIFA. Retrieved September 22nd 2012 from www.transparency.org

Telegraph staff. (2011). Qatar could lose 2022 World Cup if corrup.on allega.ons proved, hints FIFA president Sepp BlaTer. Retrieved September 22nd, 2012 from hHp://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/8525363/Qatar-‐could-‐lose-‐2022-‐World Cup-‐if-‐corrup&on-‐allega&ons-‐proved-‐hints-‐Fifa-‐president-‐Sepp-‐BlaHer.html

The History of FIFA. (2012) Retrieved October 2nd, 2012 from hHp://www.fifa.com/ classicfootball/history/fifa/historyfifa1.html

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References


Warshaw, Andrew. (2011). Jack Warner in new World Cup .cket scandal. Retrieved October 2nd, 2012 from hHp://www.insideworldfootball.biz/component/content ar&cle/72-‐football-‐news/9008-‐jack-‐warner-‐in-‐new-‐world-‐cup-‐&cket-‐scandal

Yuan G., Houzhong, J., Li, H., & Liu S. (2011) Strategies to Avoid Corrup&ons in FIFA. Interna.onal Journal of Business and Management. Vol. 6(6), 215-‐217.

Ziegler Martyn. (2011). New FIFA bribe allega.ons over Qatar World Cup bid. Retrieved October 2nd , 2012 from hHp://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/news-‐and comment/new-‐fifa-‐bribe-‐allega&ons-‐over-‐qatar-‐world-‐cup-‐bid-‐2281847.html

Interviews

•  Oliver Fowler – Voice of @changeFIFA

•  K.M. – former PR Coordinator, U.S. Soccer (Appendix A)

•  M.B. – Former Coke COO of FIFA Tournaments (Appendix B)

•  Andrew Jennings – Author of FOUL! The Secret World of FIFA: Bribes, Vote-‐Rigging and Ticket Scandals

•  James Dorsey – Author of the widely acclaimed and quoted blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer

44

Appendix A


ObjecTve •  To gain a basic understanding of FIFA’s governance structure and it’s par&cipa&ng federa&ons. •  To understand (Confedera&on of North, Central America and Caribbean Associa&on Football)

CONCACAF and U.S. Soccer’s role in rela&on to the global football community. •  To discuss the variety of corrup&on issues within FIFA.

ParTcipant K.M., former Communica&ons Coordinator/Press Officer at U.S. Soccer Federa&on.

Overall ObservaTons •  Pricing fixing is just one area of corrup&on within FIFA. •  Jack Warner, former CONCACAF President and FIFA President Sepp BlaHer are seen as very

powerful and corrupted officials within the football community. •  U.S Soccer is one of the least corrupt interna&onal federa&ons. •  Corrup&on is mostly &ed to smaller countries that are poorer. •  Michel Pla&ni, UEFA President is perhaps the most powerful and outspoken on an&-‐corrup&on

within the football community.

Key InformaTon Current governance structure of FIFA •  FIFA is the interna&onal governing body of associa&on football and is made up of 209 na&onal

associa&ons represen&ng six confedera&ons. o  Union of European Football Associa&ons (UEFA) and CONCACAF are the most powerful

confedera&ons due to popula&on, football popularity and money.

•  Sepp BlaHer, current FIFA President, is universally seen as a corrupt leader. o  Ac&on: Remove BlaHer from leadership.

•  FIFA's supreme body is the FIFA Congress, an assembly made up of representa&ves from each affiliated member associa&on. Each na&onal football associa&on has one vote, regardless of its size or football strength.

o  Ac&on: Create a shared revenue system to allocate profit. •  FIFA is headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland.

o  Ac&on: Move headquarters to country with firmer bank/legisla&on regula&ons.

45

Appendix B


Key Insights (conTnued)

Current governance structure of U.S. Soccer and CONCACAF •  The U.S. Soccer Federa&on is not-‐for-‐profit company with public access to its financials. In

addi&on, the President of the U.S. Soccer Federa&on is an unpaid posi&on. President Sunil Gula& is also a member of the Economics faculty at Columbia University.

o  Helps aid public transparency

•  CONCACAF is just as corrupt as FIFA, although less powerful. There are many small countries of the Caribbean that are poor and are influenced by corrup&on (i.e. former CONCACAF leader, Jack Warner from Trinidad & Tobago, was thrown out of office due to shady prac&ces).

o  Ac&on: Devise an electoral college like system to create added accountability

Factors of corrup9on within FIFA •  Corrupt leadership/players/referees

o  Ac&on: Create a checks and balances within the governance structure/legisla&on (i.e. integrity unit in each football associa&on).

o  Ac&on: BeHer pensions and educa&on benefits for players. o  Ac&on: Create an interna&onal referee associa&on under the FIFA umbrella to

promote training and increase professionalism.

•  No revenue transparency o  Ac&on: Declare FIFA not-‐for-‐profit public en&ty. Disclose financial informa&on from top

down (FIFA >> Confedera&ons >> Na&onal Associa&ons).

•  Improve World Cup bid standards for host countries o  Ac&on: Place basic standards for preexis&ng infrastructures, disclosing finances and

sustainability efforts.

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Appendix B


ObjecTve •  To gain a deeper understanding of the inner-‐workings of FIFA •  To gain a deeper understanding of the rela&onship between FIFA and Coke and the power to

influence change •  To get insights on biggest issues, change recommenda&ons, etc.

ParTcipant M.B., former Chief Opera&ng Officer for FIFA Tournaments Also worked for Coke on FIFA sponsorship

Overall ObservaTons The overall observa&ons from the interview are as follows: FIFA is a HIGHLY poli&cal organiza&on that has a history of corrup&on Seth BlaHer IS corrupt, but an EXCELLENT poli&cian (trying to clean up image/legacy) Change will be most influenced by reform to the vo&ng system and how points are awarded for winning bids Andrew Jennings is too radical

Key Insights FIFA Background •  Highly poli&cal (much beHer now) •  Culture – more professional – used to be old gentlemen’s club •  EVERY decision is poli&cal

o  Pays-‐offs, bribes, etc. •  Ex. FIFA insurance company? Small local business

o  Why? Execu&ve CommiHee members get piece of business (how it’s all run) •  BlaHer is CORRUPT

o  Worked as General Secretariat for past President   Loaded with knowledge and informa&on (more than President)

o  Saw all money was making o  When took over, wanted his fair share (took millions) o  Now trying to clean up image (reform) feels he is going to get caught

 Wants legacy of cleaning up the game, not ruining it   Sincerely trying to improve for that reason

47

Appendix B


Key Insights (conTnued)

Coke’s Power in Corrup9on •  Knew was going on •  ScoH McCune and President of Coke meet with Seth BlaHer

o  He tells them everything is fine •  What supposed to do?

o  Biggest world sport and event – Need as partner

Whistle blowing •  Says what English did was stupid •  94 percent of world soccer leaders hate England

o  Arrogant, think they have right to everything o  Will never get World Cup

•  Have to play the game if want to win (Need to get into hearts and wallets of English) o  Terrible poli&cians

RecommendaTons

1. Change Vo.ng Structure a. Currently only 24 members of execu&ve council vote b. Easy to bribe – corrup&on – one vote is so much power c. Past elec&ons have had NOTHING to do with bids

i. Execu&ve members sleeping during it ii. All about bribes and favors

d. The Fix i. Have all of Congress vote (200 votes) ii. Will always be corrup&on – but will be tougher iii. Also need punishments for corrupt behavior

2. Time table on Execu.ve CommiTee Members Tenure a. Execu&ve CommiHee Members have life&me membership b. Some have been on for 20+ years

i. Leads to more corrup&on ii. Not healthy for any organiza&on

3. Weight on Technical Aspects of Bids a. This would help countries that spend great deal of &me on bids b. Need weight on technical aspects of bid and on strategic impact of World Cup

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Appendix C Accountability Evalua9on Form


The One World Trust Accountability Evalua&on Form breaks down each of the four major components of an accountable organiza&on into specific areas for implementa&on, review, and improvement. The Evalua&on form also gives a grading scale from 0-‐3 and specific criteria for each ranking.

The document is included as a supplemental document to this report and begins on pg. 32.

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Appendix D Sample Whistleblowing Policy


RELIEF AID* – Whistleblowing Policy Date of Policy Issue: Issue Number: Date of Policy Review:

IntroducTon Relief Aid believes that good communica&on between staff and volunteers at all levels throughout the organiza&on promotes beHer work prac&ce. Relief Aid seeks to conduct itself honestly and with integrity at all &mes. However, we acknowledge that all organiza&ons face the risk of their ac&vi&es going wrong from &me to &me, or of unknowingly harboring malprac&ce. We believe we have a duty to take appropriate measures to iden&fy such situa&ons and aHempt to remedy them. On this basis, staff and volunteers are encouraged to raise genuine concerns about malprac&ce in the workplace without fear of reprisals and Relief Aid will protect them from vic&miza&on and dismissal. Relief Aid undertakes to act in accordance with UK legisla&on on disclosure of malprac&ce in the workplace and to take steps to protect to its workers from detrimental treatment or dismissal if they raise concerns in good faith.

Authority for Whistleblowing Policy Overall authority for this policy sits with the Director of Human Resources. Managers have a specific responsibility to facilitate the opera&on of this policy and to ensure that staff and volunteers feel able to raise concerns, without fear of reprisals, in accordance with the procedure set down below. To facilitate this process, managers will be given training on the relevant legal and opera&onal framework and best prac&ce. All staff and volunteers are responsible for the success of this policy and should ensure that they take steps to disclose any wrongdoing or malprac&ce of which they become aware.

Scope This policy applies to all Relief Aid employees and volunteers. The legal scope of the Public Interest Disclosure Act, on which this policy is based, covers UK staff. Relief Aid has introduced these procedures to enable employees and volunteers to raise or disclose concerns about malprac&ce in the workplace at an early stage and in the right way, and they apply in all cases where there are genuine concerns, regardless of where this may be and whether the informa&on involved is confiden&al or not.

* Fic&&ous agency

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The term 'malprac&ce' includes but is not exhaus&ve of: •  Criminal offences; •  Breaches of legal obliga&ons (including negligence, breach of contract, breach of administra&ve

law); •  Miscarriages of jus&ce; •  Health and safety; •  Damage to the environment; •  The concealment of any of the above.

If an individual raises a genuine concern and is ac&ng in good faith, even if it is later discovered that they are mistaken, under this policy they will not be at risk of losing their job or suffering any form of retribu&on as a result. This assurance will not be extended to an individual who maliciously raises a maHer they know to be untrue or who is involved in any way in the malprac&ce.

Procedure for Raising a Concern If you believe that the ac&ons of anyone (or a group of people) working or volunteering for Relief Aid do or could cons&tute malprac&ce you should raise the maHer with your line manager. Where this is not appropriate because the line manager is involved in the alleged malprac&ce in some way, the maHer should be raised with the line manager’s manager and brought to the aHen&on of your local HR Manager. You may raise your concern verbally or in wri&ng and should include full details and, if possible, suppor&ng evidence. You must state that you are using the Whistleblowing Policy and specify whether you wish your iden&ty to be kept confiden&al. In excep&onal circumstances where it would be inappropriate to approach either your line manager, their manager, or your HR Manager, you may raise the maHer directly with the Head of Internal Audit.

ConfidenTality Every effort will be made to keep your iden&ty confiden&al, at least un&l any formal inves&ga&on is under way. In order not to jeopardize the inves&ga&on into the alleged malprac&ce, you will also be expected to keep the fact that you have raised a concern, the nature of the concern and the iden&ty of those involved confiden&al. There may be circumstances in which, because of the nature of the inves&ga&on or disclosure, it will be necessary to disclose your iden&ty. This may occur in connec&on with associated disciplinary or legal inves&ga&ons or proceedings. If in our view such circumstances exist, we will make efforts to inform you that your iden&ty is likely to be disclosed. If it is necessary for you to par&cipate in an inves&ga&on, the fact that you made the original disclosure will, so far as is reasonably prac&cable, be kept confiden&al and all reasonable steps will be taken to protect you from any vic&miza&on or detriment as a result of having made a disclosure. It is possible, however, that your role as the whistleblower could s&ll become apparent to third par&es during the course of an inves&ga&on.

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Equally, should an inves&ga&on lead to a criminal prosecu&on, it may become necessary for you to provide evidence or be interviewed by the Police. In these circumstances, again, the implica&ons for confiden&ality will be discussed with you.

Anonymous ReporTng Anonymous disclosures are very difficult to act upon as there may be liHle or no corroborated evidence to substan&ate the allega&ons. Proper inves&ga&on may prove impossible if the inves&gator cannot obtain further informa&on from you, give you feed back or ascertain whether your disclosure was made in good faith. Relief Aid does not encourage anonymous repor&ng as it feels it is more appropriate for individuals to come forward with their concerns.

Support for Whistleblowers Once a disclosure is made a member of the HR team will be allocated as your key contact to keep you up to date with the maHer and provide any specific support that you may need. No member of staff who raises genuinely held concerns in good faith under this procedure will be dismissed or subjected to any detriment as a result of such ac&on, even if the concerns turn out to be unfounded. Detriment includes unwarranted disciplinary ac&on and vic&miza&on. If you believe that you are being subjected to a detriment within the workplace as a result of raising concerns under this procedure, you should inform your allocated member of the HR team immediately. Workers who vic&mize or retaliate against those who have raised concerns under this policy will be subject to disciplinary ac&on.

How a disclosure will be handled All disclosures will be taken seriously and the following procedure will be used.

1. If you have any personal interest in the maHer you have raised you must disclose this at the outset. This procedure is not intended to replace the Grievance Procedure, which con&nues to be the appropriate way to raise personal issues rela&ng to your specific job or employment. 2. Your disclosure under this policy will be acknowledged in wri&ng confirming that the maHer will be inves&gated and that Relief Aid will get back to you in due course. 3. A suitable person will be iden&fied to manage the disclosure. This will be someone who is in a posi&on to take any necessary ac&on as an outcome. 4. A suitable individual will be instructed to conduct an inves&ga&on into the allega&on (they will have had no previous involvement in the maHer). We aim to start the inves&ga&on within two weeks of the disclosure. The length and scope of the inves&ga&on will depend on the subject maHer of the disclosure. In most instances, there will be an ini&al assessment of the disclosure to determine whether there are grounds for a more detailed inves&ga&on to take place or whether the disclosure is, for example, based on erroneous informa&on.

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5. You may be asked to provide more informa&on during the course of the inves&ga&on. 6. The inves&ga&on report will be reviewed by the person managing the disclosure. 7. Appropriate ac&on will be taken – this could involve ini&a&ng a disciplinary process, or informing external authori&es if a criminal ac&on has been commiHed e.g. fraud or ther. We will endeavour to inform you if a referral to an external authority is about to or has taken place, although we may need to make such a referral without your knowledge or consent if we consider it appropriate. 8. If it is found that there is not sufficient evidence of malprac&ce, or the ac&ons of the individual(s) are not serious enough to warrant disciplinary ac&on, it may be more appropriate for the manager to take a more informal approach to dealing with the maHer. 9. You will receive wriHen no&fica&on of the outcome of the inves&ga&on, though not all the details or a copy of the report. 10. Possible outcomes of the inves&ga&on could be that:

•  the allega&on could not be substan&ated; or •  ac&on has been taken to ensure that the problem does not arise again. You will not, however, be given details about the ac&on taken as this could breach the human rights of the person(s) involved.

11. If you are not sa&sfied with the response you have received you should raise the maHer with the Head of Internal Audit or the Company Secretary outlining your reasons. 12. If you have asked to remain anonymous, care will be taken to respect this request (see sec&on on confiden&ality above).

CorrecTve AcTon and Compliance As part of the inves&ga&on into disclosures made under this policy, recommenda&ons for change will be invited from the inves&gator to enable Relief Aid to minimize the risk of the recurrence of any malprac&ce or impropriety which has been uncovered. The Director of Human Resources will be responsible for reviewing and implemen&ng these recommenda&ons in the future and for repor&ng on any changes required to the main board.

False Disclosures Relief Aid will treat all disclosures of malprac&ce seriously and protect staff who raise concerns in good faith. However, appropriate disciplinary ac&on will be taken in accordance with the Disciplinary Procedure against any employee or volunteer who is found to have made a disclosure maliciously that they know to be untrue, or without reasonable grounds for believing that the informa&on supplied was accurate. This may result in dismissal. NB. In cases of sexual misconduct, there are specialist resources available within Relief Aid. Please contact your HR Manager.

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I have received RELIEF AID's Whistleblowing Policy, which I have read and understood.

NAME: -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ SIGNED: -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ DATE: -‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐-‐ Please return this page to Human Resources

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