Return or Remain: Analyzing UNHCR Behavior in the Afghan and Rohingya Refugee Crises

An Honors Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of theRequirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at

Syracuse University

Lara Hicks

Candidate for Bachelor of Arts Degreeand Renée Crown University Honors

Spring 2020

Honors Thesis in International Relations

Capstone Project Advisor: _______________________ Dr. Lamis Abdelaaty

Assistant Professor, Political Science

Capstone Project Reader: _______________________ Jared Van Ramshorst Instructor, Geography

Honors Director: _______________________ Chris Johnson, Interim Director

© (Lara Hicks, 2020)

Abstract

This thesis is a qualitative and quantitative study of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and its crisis response strategies. The project examines the UNHCR through semi-structured interviews and case studies on the Rohingya and Afghan refugee crises. Using thematic analysis of interviewee responses, along with the case studies, I introduce and investigate the plausibility of the Persecution-Source Theory. This theory posits that the UNHCR will respond differently to a refugee crisis depending on the type of persecution refugees experience—internal or external. It argues that when refugees fled their countries of origin due to state-induced persecution (internal), the UNHCR will opt to provide humanitarian assistance as a primary response strategy. Conversely, if refugees fled due to persecution not originating from the state (external), the UNHCR will choose to repatriate as a main strategy. Although similar in many aspects, exploration of the Rohingya and Afghan cases highlights both the easily discernable and ambiguous differences in responses to the crises by the UNHCR. The thesis seeks to identify the “why(s)” behind the UNHCR choosing to pursue a repatriation-centered response over a primary humanitarian assistance-based response in some crises and vice versa. Each case study highlights the UNHCR’s apparent priorities within these internal and external contexts, demonstrating that the constraints placed upon the agency, and humanitarian work in general, highly impact how durable solutions are pursued and implemented. The interviews shed further light on humanitarian and political constraints. The combined results of the interview data and case studies show that, despite some anomalies, the Persecution-Source Theory holds; this is especially true in situations of internal persecution. I conclude that further research on the root causes of refugee crises and their impact on the UNHCR is needed, and that causal factors should be given more weight in how we conceptualize the work of UN agencies as they endeavor to provide refugees with solutions.

Executive Summary

i

This thesis is an examination of the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and its

responses to refugee crises in southern Asia. My research is guided primarily by two questions:

1) What impacts the UNHCR’s ability to find solutions for refugees; and 2) why does the

UNHCR sometimes select repatriation as a main crisis response strategy and at other times

choose humanitarian assistance as the primary crisis response tactic? The aim of this research is

to investigate the various crisis response tactics of the UNHCR through two case studies—the

Afghan and Rohingya refugee crises, which incorporate responses from semi-structured

interviews with refugee officials in the field. Throughout the paper, the refugee crises being

studied are those of mass displacement—one million or more externally displaced people.

To explain the variation in the UNHCR’s responses to refugee crises, I use an original

theory based on the source of the persecution causing refugee crises—a Persecution-Source

Theory. Acknowledging that the UNHCR relies on voluntary funding, the UNHCR will be more

likely to use humanitarian aid as its primary refugee crisis response tactic if a state is persecuting

its people, or internal persecution. Conversely, the UNHCR will be more likely to use

repatriation as a primary strategy if the source of the persecution is derived externally as a result

of inter-state conflicts, invasion, or other means; I call this external persecution. I use both

qualitative and quantitative methods to evaluate the Persecution-Source Theory and how it holds

within similar refugee crises. The size of the impact is reflected qualitatively by an analysis of

interview responses and thematic content analyses, and quantitatively by funding trends to the

UNHCR from 2014-2019.

My research is built upon fifteen semi-structured interviews with UNHCR officials and

International Organization for Migration (IOM) workers in Geneva, Switzerland along with

scholars from different think tanks, and a U.S. State Department staff member. I perform

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thematic content analyses of the interview responses and assign each interviewee a numerical

value on two, three-point scales. One scale looks at humanitarian aid, relief, and assistance given

to arrival countries, and the other is based on repatriation. A value of “0” on either scale signals

that the response is not used by the UNHCR, whereas a value of “3” represents a 100% response,

meaning that the UNHCR uses that response and that response only as its way of addressing a

refugee crisis. A value greater than 1.5 out of 3 is needed to be considered a primary majority

response to a refugee crisis. Also factored into the scales are an analysis of the Afghan and the

Rohingya refugee crises’ background, UNHCR responses, coordination, UNHCR media

coverage, and funding information.

The results of this research show that the Persecution-Source Theory, when applied to

UNHCR responses, does hold. However, the extent to which it illustrates consistency in refugee

crises is also limited by the politics of the host country and country of origin, and by how the

humanitarian space for the UNHCR to work in is constrained. Furthermore, timing also plays an

important role. Large crises that are protracted, after an initial “Emergency Phase” period in

which humanitarian aid and assistance are readily administered, have the UNHCR develop a

long-term solutions strategy to assist the refugees. In both the Afghan and Rohingya cases, the

UNHCR is most impacted by the persecution that generated the crises when seeking to find

durable solutions for the refugees.

This work is significant in that it contributes to the growing body of research on the

UNHCR and its abilities to provide solutions for refugees. While the results have their

limitations, the thesis highlights the need for researchers to investigate the root causes of conflict

and violence as they relate to UN agencies providing humanitarian aid. Furthermore, it highlights

the confines of the humanitarian space that the UNHCR, the IOM, and other international

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organizations occupy. Additional research on these constraints can help to paint a clearer picture

and better inform those advocating on behalf of and working with the world’s millions of

refugees. My hope is to shed more light on the global issue of protracted, mass displacements

through this thesis.

Table of Contents

iv

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………...i Executive Summary……………………………………………………………………………...iiAcknowledgments………………………………………………………………………………..vAdvice to Future Honors Students……………………………………………………………..vi

List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………………..viiList of Tables…………………………………………………………………………………...viiiAbbreviations……………………………………………………………………………………ix

Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………………1Review of the Literature…………………………………………………………………..3

Chapter 2: Research Design and Theory……………………………………………………...11Theory……………………………………………………………………………………11Research Design and Data……………………………………………………………….24

Chapter 3: Case Study: Internal Persecution of the Rohingya……………………………...33Background………………………………………………………………………………34UNHCR Responses………………………………………………………………………41Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………..48

Chapter 4: Case Study: Afghan Refugees and External Persecution……………………….55Background………………………………………………………………………………56UNHCR Responses………………………………………………………………………63Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………..68

Chapter 5: Conclusion………………………………………………………………….............73

References……………………………………………………………………………………….80Appendix………………………………………………………………………………………...87

Acknowledgments

v

This thesis could not have been possible without the strong support system I have had at Syracuse University. To Dr. Lamis Abdelaaty, thank you for your advising throughout the past two years. Your guidance, patience, and unwavering support has pushed me to grow as a student of international relations and as a researcher within refugee studies. A huge thank you to Jared Van Ramshorst for serving as my reader, your comments and suggestions were especially helpful to me as I sought to make this project more accessible within the forced migration literature. I am especially grateful for the generosity of the Renée Crown University Honors Program—thank you for investing in me financially and personally. A special thanks to Naomi Shanguhyia for your honors and scholarship advising, and to Laura McCall for her assistance in my travel to Geneva, Switzerland. To those I interviewed: thank you for letting me pick apart your brains and for your hospitality in Geneva. Your insights are invaluable, and your service: admirable.

I am forever indebted to the International Relations Department; thank you for providing me with rigorous coursework, wonderful advising, and for recognizing the scholar in me. I am particularly grateful to the strong women of IR that have taught, advised, and encouraged me: Dr. Francine D’Amico, Dr. Terrell Northrup, Amy Kennedy, and Angela Allen. Additionally, thank you to the Maxwell-in-Washington program for a life-changing semester in Washington DC and for help with connecting me to the interviewees of this thesis (shoutout to Dr. Ryan Williams and Dr. James Keagle!). Furthermore, thank you to the Syracuse Model United Nations Team and to delegates past and present; your commitment to upholding the ethos of the UN system was what motivated me to pursue this project in the first place.

To the friends that motivated me as I persevered in my writing amidst procrastination along with literal blood, sweat, and tears: thank you. I truly could not have done this without you all (especially Erin, Julia, and Patrick). And, to my family, your love and support has kept me going through the ups and downs of undergraduate life. Thank you for believing in me and for shaping me into the person I am today.

***

This thesis was born out of an intense appreciation for the strength and resilience of the world’s many refugees. Thank you for sharing your stories, it is those stories that have enabled me to research and to advocate.

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Advice to Future Honors Students

First, be kind to yourself. There will be times where you are unsatisfied with your work

and have trouble remaining motivated. If you are anything like me, you will probably fret over

little details and strive to be a perfect writer while conducting research amid an inherently

imperfect process. Hold yourself to high standards, but recognize that there will always be more

to do (and isn’t that the point of conducting original research? This is not the end but only the

beginning for many of us!). I encourage you to reach out to others working on their projects or to

friends and family for support.

Do keep a notebook and folder with your thesis notes and drafts to refer to. It is so easy to

lose track of your project if you lack a system to organize your thoughts, ideas, sources, and

comments. Establish timelines as you go, one large general one with important dates, and smaller

detailed ones for each semester. Communicate diligently with your advisor, and do not be afraid

to ask “stupid” questions. Stick to your deadlines, try not to procrastinate, and do not get super

frustrated with yourself for inevitably doing so.

Finally, your advisors are more than just faculty member supervising your progress. Use

this thesis as an opportunity to immerse yourself in something that matters to you and share these

personal and research experiences with your advisor. It is scary to be vulnerable with those you

look up to, but I believe that expressing vulnerability and understanding that there is so much we

do not know is an organic part of writing an Honors Thesis. Now, get out there and write!

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List of Figures

Figure 1. UNHCR Response to Refugee Crisis Scales 13

Figure 2. UNHCR Phases in Responding to the Indochinese Refugee Crisis 23

Figure 3. Resilience and Solutions Measures for Inside Afghanistan—Budget 26

Figure 4. UNHCR's Supplementary Appeal - Myanmar Refugee Emergency—Budget 27

Figure 5. UNHCR Planning Framework 28

Figure 6. Phases of Thematic Analysis 32

Figure 7. Myanmar and Bangladesh Map 34

Figure 8. Rohingya Refugee Arrival Trends Since Aug. 2017 39

Figure 9. UNHCR 2018 Rohingya JRP Protection Framework’s Four Pillars 44

Figure 10. UNHCR Response to Rohingya Refugee Crisis Scale 51

Figure 11. Map of Afghanistan and Refugee Movements 56

Figure 12. Afghan Repatriation Trends Since 2009 61

Figure 13. UNHCR Response to Afghan Refugee Crisis Scale 70

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List of Tables

Table 1. UNHCR—Myanmar Financials 46

Table 2. UNHCR—Bangladesh Financials 47

Table 3. Thematic Analysis of Interviews; Rohingya Case 49

Table 4. UNHCR—Afghanistan Financials 67

Table 5. UNHCR—Pakistan Financials 68

Table 6. Thematic Analysis of Interviews; Afghan Case 69

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Abbreviations

HRP Humanitarian Response Plan

ICC International Criminal Court

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IGO Intergovernmental Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IOM International Organization for Migration

JRP Joint-Response Plan

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NGO Non-governmental Organization

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

PoR Proof of Registration

RBA Rights-Based Assessment

RSD Refugee Status Determination

SSAR Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees

UN United Nations

UNHCR UN Refugee Agency

x

Chapter 1

Introduction

no one leaves home unlesshome is the mouth of a sharkyou only run for the borderwhen you see the whole city running as well…

no one leaves home unless home chases youfire under feethot blood in your bellyit’s not something you ever thought of doinguntil the blade burnt threats intoyour neckand even then you carried the anthem underyour breathonly tearing up your passport in an airport toiletsobbing as each mouthful of papermade it clear that you wouldn’t be going back…1

Syria, Venezuela, Central African Republic, Bosnia, Palestine—refugee crises are born

out of violence, uprooting individuals and families from all over the world against their will. The

United Nations (UN) estimates 70.8 million people around the world have been forced from their

homes by conflict and persecution at the end of 2018. Of those, nearly 30 million are refugees—

people that crossed international borders when fleeing—and that number continues to increase

(UNHCR 2019). These figures demonstrate the need for a stronger and more proactive global

response. Unfortunately, countries’ efforts to mitigate and alleviate these crises have been

limited. The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is mandated to assist and protect

refugees via refugee camps, aid distribution, documentation assistance, and through other means.

The UNHCR is also tasked with alleviating crises, with the goal to repatriate or return refugees

1 “Warsan Shire – Home.” n.d. Genius. Accessed April 6, 2020. https://genius.com/Warsan-shire-home-annotated.

safely back to their countries of origin.2 However, the agency faces numerous challenges and

criticisms.

The UNHCR’s efforts to aid refugees are especially hampered by ongoing protracted

conflicts. This contrasts with the crises that characterized the initial post-World War II period,

which ended when the conflict or root causes of the forced displacements were addressed

(Adelman 2001). There has been a shift in the rhetoric and conception of large-scale refugee

crises since it is recognized that these displacements are likely to continue for many years to

come (Harrell-Bond 1989, 50-51). Some scholars and researchers of forced migration direct

attention to the existing knowledge rifts in understanding the implications of refugee-generating

conditions, and the solutions to these conditions. For example, Weiner (2007) expresses “the

confusion among policy makers in how to think about, much less respond to, the internal crises

in Rwanda, Burundi, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Russia’s Chechnya demonstrates how great is

the intellectual vacuum” (6). His statement predates the Syrian refugee crisis, a crisis which

conveyed the extent to which mass exoduses of people impact international relations,

humanitarian response, and global security.

This calls into question the UNHCR’s effectiveness and capacity due to the growing

numbers of displaced persons. The UN Refugee Agency seeks to find solutions for refugees and

promotes different strategies for different crises, but just how effective are those responses? How

does the UNHCR determine a crisis response strategy for each refugee situation? What impacts

the UNHCR’s ability to assist refugees in finding solutions? Does the violence or persecution

that generated the refugee crisis have any influence on how the UNHCR determines a response

strategy to address it? Why does the UNHCR sometimes select repatriation (voluntary return)

2 See Wani 1999, 212 for a more thorough and exhaustive account of the UNHCR’s mandate.

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and other times choose humanitarian assistance as a primary refugee crisis alleviation method?

These are the questions that this thesis explores and hopes to answer.

In an attempt to make sense of the puzzling elements in UNHCR policy and practice, I

introduce an original theory based on the source of the persecution causing refugee crises in

relation to funding—a Persecution-Source Theory. Acknowledging that the UNHCR relies on

voluntary funding, the UNHCR will be more likely to use humanitarian aid as its primary

refugee crisis response tactic if a state is persecuting its people, or internal persecution.

Conversely, the UNHCR will be more likely to use repatriation as a primary strategy if the

source of the persecution is derived externally as a result of inter-state conflict, invasion, or other

means; I call this external persecution. Later in the thesis, I use qualitative and quantitative

methods to evaluate the Persecution-Source Theory and how it holds within similar refugee

crises. I maintain my focus on the types of root causes in crises, or rather, refugee-generating

conflicts since there is a greater need for more proactive policies and humanitarian responses—

reform that centers refugee crisis prevention at the forefront.

Review of the Literature

Despite the demonstrated urgency and the global scale of the multiple ongoing refugee

crises, forced migration literature often focuses on the UNHCR and its functions from a security

perspective but does not examine the differing types of persecution and how they may affect the

UNHCR’s work with refugees. In this chapter, I review the literature through three critical

themes: 1) root causes in forced migration; 2) factors influencing UNHCR operations; and 3)

categorizing persecution. This thesis researches refugee crises in southern Asia using combined

aspects of these themes.

3

Root Causes in Forced Migration

A body of literature concentrates on the root causes of refugee crises. Stein (1986b)

iterates in his piece The Experience of Being a Refugee: Insights from the Research Literature

that scholars should analyze refugee crises using historical and comparative perspectives, which

“views them as recurring phenomena with identifiable and often identical patterns of behavior

and sets of causalities” (5). Researchers did just that, examining different sets of causal factors or

root causes of refugee crises within different contexts. Zolberg, Astri, and Sergio (1989) write

that international war may generate refugee flows. Moore and Shellman (2006) look at the

effects of genocide, politicide, and state-sponsored violence on refugee movements. Hovil and

Lomo (2015) stress that displacement is engendered by different interconnected causal factors,

particularly those that are historical, political, legal, social, economic, and religious. White

(2017) adds to the discussion, referring to root causes as “political, demographic and climactic

forces that impel people to move from their homes to safe places,” specifying that these causal

factors are related to violence, climate change, and population changes (76-77).

In addition to explaining how refugee law responded to changes in refugee “flights,”

Jenkins and Schmeidl (1995) group the world’s refugees into five major groups: 1) political

dissidents; 2) target minorities; 3) victims of generalized violence; 4) victims of state-inflicted

terrorism; and 5) victims of international wars (65). Their analysis includes mapping ethnic

competition, political exclusion, and other components that lead to civil wars, state repression,

and international wars using the world system theory3 (76). They also contend that any durable

solution requires addressing the “underlying root causes” of the refugee crisis (79).

3 The world system theory focuses on the world-system as a primary unit of analysis, see Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1992. “The West, Capitalism, and the Modern World-System” 15 (4): 561-619.

4

It is also worth acknowledging the use of case studies and detailed investigations of

refugee crises that endeavor to reveal more complete causal stories. Such work has varied in

scale, geography, and length; Crisp (1984), Whitaker (2008), Ogata (1999), Nair (1997), and

Betts (2013b) provide compelling case studies on the refugees in Djibouti, Tanzania, Kosovo,

South Asia, Yemen, and Somalia to name a few.

I now turn to the factors that influence UNHCR operations, which are often tied to the

root causes of the crises the agency aims to alleviate.

Factors Influencing UNHCR Operations

Many scholars discuss factors that influence UNHCR operations but vary in their

focuses. A significant strand of literature points to funding as a major factor influencing UNHCR

operations and does so employing myriad research methods. Zeager and Bascom (1996) use

game theory within international relations to research the impacts of funding on UNHCR

decision-making regarding repatriation (483). They also look at how donor fatigue—a decrease

in funding from donors who grow “fatigued” from contributing monetarily to a crisis that is yet

to end—limits the UNHCR in enacting effective repatriation initiatives (483). Crisp (2001),

Harrell-Bond (1989), Vayrynen (2001), and Whitaker (2008) review funding gaps within the

refugee regime. They too find that a lack of donor support affects the UNHCR’s operations; less

funding prevents the UNHCR from assisting refugees how the agency sees fit and prolongs a

refugee crisis.

However, the voluntary funding narrative may be more complicated than this

generalization implies. Roper and Barria (2010) suggest that the use of earmarked donations

signaling foreign policy priorities of industrialized states providing larger contributions “may not

be linked to larger humanitarian issues” (631). Thus, the type of funding allocated to certain

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crises or projects can further influence the UNHCR’s work on the ground. One can assert that

funding and state influence are associated with the UNHCR’s policies and practices.

Loescher (2001) investigated this assertion in his work. He finds that the UNHCR is

essentially a pawn for states vying for different interests, many of which are political.

Furthermore, he claims that Western donors’ views carry a lot of weight in how the UNHCR

implements durable solutions like repatriation. Barry Stein (1986a) had reached a similar

conclusion earlier, he posits that international politics play an especially important role in

constraining the UNHCR (269). Barnett (2001) describes how the UNHCR felt pressure from

states to pursue certain refugee policies (256). Lischer and Milner (2003) also look at state

influence but offer a more nuanced explanation: the lack of political will among states leads to

inaction and depletion of voluntary funds to the UNHCR (613). Taking this point even further,

the overall lack of political will hinders the UNHCR from helping refugees find and experience

durable solutions (613).

The discussion on the effectiveness of the UNHCR’s three durable solutions—

repatriation (voluntary return), reintegration (integrating refugees into their country of origin or a

host country), and resettlement (moving refugees to a third country to resettle)—has received

more attention within refugee scholarship. Goodwin-Gill (2001) refers to these aspects of the

literature as the “challenge of solutions,” identifying more scenarios that seem unlikely

candidates for any kind of long-term solution, let alone a durable one (140). Crisp’s analyses are

in consonance with Goodwin-Gill’s, he finds that durable solutions are “unrealistic,” as are the

UNHCR’s expectations and responsibilities when approaching a refugee crisis (186-187). This is

especially pertinent with regard to repatriation, it is possible that a continued focus on

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repatriation as the durable solution of choice is unrealistic and unachievable given many

disruptions to traditional statecraft and UN work, of which are forthcoming (Harrell-Bond 1989).

The scholarly research largely examines external factors or conditions influencing the

UNHCR’s ability to assist refugees, and Adelman (2001) believes that these external conditions

frame UNHCR responses (11). However, it is also important to consider the evolution of the

agency itself under changing external conditions. Scholars have taken note; Pitterman (1984)

was vocal about the UNHCR’s identity constraints as early as the 1980s (26). She states that the

agency was amid an identity crisis, one that would prevent it from effectively fulfilling its

mandate to protect the world’s refugees (26). Similarly, Barnett (2001) attributes changes in how

sovereignty was conceived and acted on within the state system to greater UNHCR intervention

in refugee crises (245). Now, the UN Refugee Agency could engage with countries of origin

preemptively—perhaps expanding work into international development and capacity building.

This topic within UNHCR and refugee regime literature essentially opened Pandora’s

box. What, then, was the UNHCR’s mandate given the changing international landscape? Betts

(2013a) puts forth an explanation pertaining to “regime complexity.” He indicates that the

network of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs),

governments, and other actors within the refugee regime possess competing, overlapping

interests. This, in turn, makes it difficult for the UNHCR to realize and fulfill its mandate, as

well as prompts the agency to take on responsibilities that are probably better suited for other

organizations (i.e. the United Nations Development Programme) (71-74). In sum, the

partnerships the UNHCR has with others involved in refugee protection and assistance

complicate the agency’s work, causing criticism and questioning of its leadership.

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Another factor that could impact the UNHCR’s operations is related to security. Loescher

(1994) observed trends in conflicts that generated refugee crises and noticed that the number of

internal conflicts was steadily increasing (365). The nature of warfare and violence was shifting

inward, meaning that mass displacements could be attributed to civil war, ethnic-related

violence, and state-sponsored persecution (365). Loescher’s work at most alludes to the potential

relationship between the types of refugee-generating conflicts and the UNHCR’s capacity to

provide refugees of those conflicts with solutions and assistance—the subject of this thesis. And

at the very least, his work highlights that the changing nature of conflicts has political

implications for a supposedly non-political organization, along with a need for reform to the

UNHCR’s mandate to adapt to the new security realities we are witnessing (internally-displaced

persons, a growing responsibility for the agency, are a concrete example of this complexity).

Much of the refugee scholarship has covered the many confounding variables in the

context of the UNHCR’s operations, but this theme within the literature misses an opportunity to

connect the persecution or the conditions that created a refugee crisis, to the network of factors

that influence the UNHCR’s work. The final section addresses this gap by returning the literature

review to persecution. I choose to examine different groupings and categorizations of

persecution within refugee studies, with some serving as a framework for the research methods

of this thesis.

Categorizing Persecution

Weiner (1996) is one of few calling for classification of persecution types in the hopes

that this categorization will inform national governments and institutions as they devise policies.

I find Weiner’s methodology significant; it serves as a framework for my development of the

Persecution-Source Theory. Weiner describes persecution actors in refugee crises as

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“internalists” and “externalists,” but also notes that complexity within these labels should be

taken into account (1996, 35).

Werkner (2010) examines internality and externality regarding security and the causes of

refugee crises, or “the origin of the threat [emphasis in the original]” (68). She links the many

constraints and power relations that come with humanitarian missions and the use of armed

forces to the theoretical works of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (68). Werkner details the

contention experienced among states and IGOs in terms of protection and intervention

(especially relevant in the contexts under which the UNHCR operates) (68). This does not

consider how this same contention can cause harm or conflict which forcibly displaces people. In

her piece What’s So Special About Persecution? Kuosmanen (2014) looks at different

conceptions of persecution, identifying the core components of systematic threats. She mentions

the role of “state-like organizations involved in [prima facie]4 persecution points,” an

acknowledgment of extremist groups causing mass displacements (133).

Still, Weiner uses the most systematic approach to categorizing persecution. His

groupings of refugee-generating conflicts are designated as four types: 1) inter-state wars

(including anti-colonial wars), 2) ethnic conflicts, 3) non-ethnic civil conflicts, and 4) flights

from repressive authoritarian and revolutionary regimes (Weiner 1996, 9). He focuses on “mass

refugee flows,” (as do I throughout this thesis) in which more than 10,000 individuals crossed an

international border due to consequences of their country of origin and were classified by the

UNHCR and/or governments as refugees (9-10). However, there are caveats to persecution

categorizing. Weiner acknowledges that it is difficult to classify a conflict or persecution source

as ethnic or non-ethnic (18). Using the Afghan conflict as an example, Weiner explains the

4 The UNHCR uses prima facie status for those defined by fleeing in mass movements, usually as a result of conflict or violence, when it is not always possible or necessary to conduct individual interviews with every asylum seeker who crosses a border; see Zieck, Marjoleine 2015, 1115-129.

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transitions between civil war and inter-state war in Afghanistan but ultimately categorizes the

refugee crisis as a “war-related case,” deeming the principal factor or original persecution source

that led to the mass exodus as the framework for categorizing conflict in refugee crises (18).

This chapter reviewed the existing literature on persecution and UNHCR operations, as

well as identified notable research gaps. Although the refugee literature has expanded to consider

the various causes of refugee crises, it seldom considers categorizing the causal factors to

analyze and discern any trends to inform policymakers, humanitarian workers, governments, and

NGOs. Investigating the relationship between different types of persecution in refugee crises and

what effects they can have on UNHCR responses to refugee crises can lead to proactive reforms

to the agency. Chapter two draws from the three themes discussed to describe my research

design, theory, and data collection methods. Chapters three and four then apply the research

methods to case studies on the Rohingya and Afghan refugee crises. I conclude in chapter five,

summarizing my findings and how the Persecution-Source Theory fared in the analyses.

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Chapter 2

Theory

The UNHCR continues to use different strategies to respond to different crises, but it is

difficult to discern why the agency does this in refugee crises where solutions seem scarce. It is

important to investigate the greater processes that the UNHCR dictates or is dictated by in order

to best assist refugees and better inform all actors within the refugee regime. To that end, this

thesis examines large protracted refugee crises in Asia, analyzing its causes, effects, and

implications for the UNHCR.

In the first part of this chapter, my research question is introduced, and the chosen

theoretical framework is justified. Specifically, I define the dependent and independent variables,

present my hypothesis based on an original Persecution-Source Theory, and provide alternative

explanations. The second part of Chapter 2 explains my research design by identifying the

research methods utilized to test the hypothesis. This thesis uses a mixed-methods approach,

combining qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitatively, an analysis of funding earmarks to

the UNHCR is conducted to determine trends. Qualitatively, research focuses on the Afghan and

Rohingya refugee crises as two case studies. Interviews of UNHCR staff, IOM staff, and

individuals associated with UNHCR operations within the context of the case studies are

evaluated using thematic analysis techniques.

Research Question

Why does the UNHCR differ in their response strategies to similar refugee crises? More

specifically, why does the UNHCR sometimes select repatriation as its main crisis response

strategy and at other times choose humanitarian assistance for refugee host countries as a

primary crisis response tactic instead? The aim of these research questions is to examine the

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various UNHCR crisis responses and plans through two case studies (the Afghan refugee crisis

and the Rohingya refugee crisis), if/why one method was preferred over the other in these

particular cases, and what implications that has for preventing future refugee crises. Throughout

this thesis, the refugee crises being studied are those of mass displacement—one million or more

externally displaced people.5

Nomenclature and Application

A refugee, as defined by the UNHCR, is a person forced to flee his or her country due to

persecution, conflict, or violence (1951 Refugee Convention). A refugee is only identified as

such if there is reasonable evidence that the individual is experiencing a “well-founded fear” of

persecution pertaining to race, religion, nationality, politics, or membership in a specific social

group. In accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention, the refugee must be outside the country

of origin and be unable to return to or fear returning to the country of origin given a “well-

founded fear” of persecution. A refugee differs from a voluntary migrant, who willingly leaves a

country of origin for economic advancement, and an internally displaced person (IDP), who too

flees but does not cross an international border.

I use the terms humanitarian aid and assistance interchangeably to mean food, water,

shelter, and health-related and other services typically provided to refugees by the UNHCR.

Country of origin and home country all refer to the state that a refugee was originally from or the

country of a refugee’s nationality. Likewise, the host country and receiving country describe the

state (being examined) that is accepting refugees.

Dependent Variable

5 This was a purposeful decision, but it would be wise to investigate smaller refugee crises for future study.

12

The dependent variable of this thesis is the UNHCR’s primary response to a refugee

crisis. Responses are examined on two, three-point scales, one regarding humanitarian aid, relief,

and assistance given to arrival countries and the other on repatriation. A value of “0” on either

scale signals that the response is not used by the UNHCR, whereas a value of “3” represents a

100% response, meaning that the UNHCR uses that response and that response only as its way of

addressing a refugee crisis. Any values in-between equate to a mix of responses by the UNHCR,

a value greater than 1.5 out of 3 is needed to be considered a primary majority response to a

refugee crisis. Any value besides the sum of both the UNHCR’s use of humanitarian aid as a

response and repatriation as a response represents other refugee crisis alleviating tactics such as

resettlement or economic integration. Figure 1 illustrates these scales.

Figure 1. UNHCR Response to Refugee Crisis Scales

Repatriation in its simplest terms is defined by the UNHCR as the act of returning to the

country of origin (1951 Convention). Repatriation can be voluntary and involuntary. In the

context of refugee crises, voluntary repatriation is the return of refugees to their countries of

13

origin, given that these states are safe to return to. Furthermore, voluntary repatriation occurs

only when refugees repatriate willingly. The UNHCR facilitates voluntary repatriation through

various means, including in-person interaction with refugees, monitoring the conditions of

countries of origin, and assisting refugees’ return administratively and legally, among others.

Conversely, involuntary repatriation implies that refugees return to their countries of origin

against their will. Involuntary repatriation is often associated with non-refoulement, which

means, as stated in Article 33 (1) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees:

“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refoule’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the

frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,

religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (1951 Refugee

Convention).

Humanitarianism is characterized by three guiding principles of humanitarian action: a

‘humanitarian’ element, impartiality, and neutrality. As a result, humanitarian aid signals the

actions relief agencies use to uphold international humanitarian law to prevent and end human

suffering via these principles (International Committee of the Red Cross 2020). Relief,

assistance, and aid can take on many forms. The most basic and common forms include food,

shelter materials, health services, protection, and education (International Committee of the Red

Cross 2020). Some less obvious forms are site planning initiatives and the use of cash-based

interventions (Use of Unearmarked Funding). Numerous UN organizations and funds such as the

UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization, and the World Food

Programme collaborate with NGOs and the UNHCR to administer humanitarian aid to specific

populations. According to Heather Rysaback-Smith, humanitarian aid was “once almost

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exclusively related to military conflict” (2016). After WWII ended, aid took on a global focus

and shifted from strictly Europe to parts of Asia and Africa (Rysaback-Smith 2016).

Persecution-Source Theory

To explain the variation in the UNHCR’s responses to refugee crises, I use an original

theory based on the source of the persecution causing refugee crises in relation to funding—a

Persecution-Source Theory. Acknowledging that the UNHCR relies on voluntary funding, the

UNHCR will be more likely to use humanitarian aid as its primary refugee crisis response tactic

if the origin country of the crisis’s government is directly persecuting its people internally.

Conversely, the UNHCR will be more likely to use repatriation as its primary strategy if the

source of the persecution is not derived from the state internally, but rather externally vis-à-vis

other states or actors as explained below. Funding would be delegated to repatriation efforts as a

result. If the persecution has elements that are internal and external, the UNHCR will follow a

standard process beginning with humanitarian aid steps and then will gradually repatriate

refugees. Thus, funding will vary based on the progression of a crisis but will be primarily

focused on humanitarian aid efforts.

All things equal, if one examines the source of the persecution one can assert that the

UNHCR would respond differently with respect to sovereignty and international norms. If a state

is persecuting its own people (resulting in mass forced displacement), the UNHCR would take a

pseudo-state approach to provide these refugees with basic needs without disparaging the origin

state’s sovereignty. Refugees fleeing this type of persecution would be less likely to voluntarily

return because they would not want to repatriate to a state that targets them and denies them their

basic human rights.

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However, if the government of a state is not outright persecuting its people, the refugees

fleeing their country of origin would be more inclined to return. Typically, these refugees still

have citizenship in their country of origin and are recognized as legitimate citizens of that state.

Thus, the UNHCR, the host countries, and the refugees themselves would favor repatriation if it

is possible.

For the purposes of this theory, large-scale examples of conflict and violence leading to

large refugee crises/mass displacements are examined.

Internal Persecution

The first part of the theory concerns itself with persecution toward refugees of a

particular country perpetrated by that country’s central government. This internal category of

persecution can take on multiple forms, but large-scale events including those of civil war, ethnic

cleansing, and genocide are the forms of internal persecution I focus on as they are associated

with larger refugee crises.

An example of forced displacement as a result of civil war is the Yemeni Refugee Crisis.

The Yemeni Civil War caused 3 million Yemenis to seek refuge in neighboring countries and 22

million in need of humanitarian assistance. The source of the persecution against many Yemeni

refugees effectively originated from the central government itself due to this civil war (Yemen

Refugee Crisis).

Many definitions of ethnic cleansing exist throughout global security studies literature,

but the UN officially defines it as: “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or

intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group” (Office

on Genocide Prevention). There is no international treaty that details ethnic cleansing as a

specific crime. However, ethnic cleansing is defined as “a crime against humanity under the

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statutes of both the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Criminal Tribunal

for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)” (Office on Genocide Prevention). It is frequently hard to

distinguish between acts of genocide and those of ethnic cleansing, as ethnic cleansing crimes

can violate specific parts of the UN Genocide Convention. However, the refugee crises resulting

from the Yugoslav Wars are frequently used as examples of ethnic cleansing and ethnic conflict.

Genocide, as defined by the UN Genocide Convention (1948), consists of “acts

committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious

group”. The legal definition is in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the Crime of Genocide and further expands upon the acts of genocide:

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Office on Genocide Prevention).

The Great Lakes refugee crisis is an example of genocide present in refugee crises. It began with

two million Rwandans fleeing to the surrounding Great Lakes region of Africa after the

Rwandan genocide. Hutus were escaping persecution from the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front,

which had taken over Rwanda at that point (BBC News Rwanda Genocide 2019).

Yet another example of internal persecution present in refugee crises is the repressive

regime. Although repression of governments can vary, by in large security forces either

supporting or not supporting the current head of state commit violence against civilians. The

crisis in Venezuela highlights such a dynamic. An estimated 1.4 million refugees have fled to

neighboring Colombia, escaping violence from the Maduro administration (Wilkinson 2019).

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External Persecution

External sources of persecution would by default be any forms of persecution not directly

coming from the refugee crisis origin state’s central government. Instead, refugees are persecuted

by other state and/or non-state actors. Violence as a result of terrorist activity and war between

one or more states is the best example of external persecution.

One case of external persecution is Boko Haram and its exodus of Nigerian refugees.

Although the Nigerian military executed the terrorist group’s leader in 2009, a resurgence of

Boko Haram attacks led to 250,000 Nigerian refugees fleeing to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger

along with attacks on the UN and government buildings (Nichols 2015). Afghanistan, as we will

later see, is another state that has dealt with (and still deals with) terrorism and refugee crises.

A war between two or more states can also lead to refugee crises. During the Vietnam

War in 1975, roughly three million people attempted to escape to other countries via boat. These

Indochinese “boat people” were escaping Communist-rule and the ongoing conflict between the

United States and Vietnam (Thompson 2010). The Iraq War between the U.S. and Iraq is another

instance where a war between states creates refugee movements.

Mixed Persecution

It is important to note that the above examples are fluid and not always entirely boxed

into either external persecution or internal persecution. Often, civil war leaves power vacuums

for terrorist organizations to fill, suggesting a transfer in persecution from an internal source to

an external source. Furthermore, other categories of persecution exist. Some examples include

smaller-scale events and more “mixed” sources of persecution (slavery). Whether more internal,

external, or maybe a combination of both, persecution varies in practice and intent.

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An example of terrorist groups contributing to the forced displacement of people is the

crisis in Syria. Al-Nusra, ISIS, and other groups are involved in the power shifts of the Syrian

Civil War, causing 5.6 million people to flee Syria from 2011 onward according to most recent

UNHCR figures (Syrian Refugee Crisis). However, the Assad regime has also greatly persecuted

Syrians. Both internal and external sources of persecution are present in the Syrian Civil War and

crisis, they highlight the differing interests of major stakeholders.

As I have mentioned in the last chapter, Weiner (1996) throughout his categorization of

the root causes of refugee crises found it difficult to assign one label to a multi-faceted refugee

crisis. However, he chooses to attribute a refugee crisis classification to the initial origin of the

crisis. His example of Afghanistan as a war-related case demonstrates the complexity between

civil war and inter-state war in distinguishing a crisis from others. To address any ambiguity that

comes with the Persecution-Source Theory, I too label Afghanistan as a war-related case and

focus on contrasting internal persecution with external persecution, rather than choosing to look

at the joint impact of mixed persecution cases.

Hypotheses and Observable Implications

My hypothesis derives from the Persecution-Source Theory. When comparing states

experiencing refugee crises, I expect the UNHCR to administer humanitarian aid/relief efforts as

its primary strategy of aiding refugees fleeing from internal, state-sponsored persecution. I also

expect the UNHCR to use repatriation as its primary strategy in alleviating refugee crises where

the main source of persecution originates from different state or non-state actors.

If correct, multiple observations exist when employing this theory. When the source of

persecution causing a refugee crisis is internal, deriving from the country of origin’s government,

the UNHCR will have a majority percentage of its funds directed toward alleviating the crisis

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through humanitarian aid tactics. Furthermore, within quotes, interviews, and media analyses, the

UNHCR will press for humanitarian aid-related donations to the crisis and/or explain its

priorities for assisting the refugees affected by state-led persecution. Conversely, if the source of

persecution causing a refugee crisis is external, from other state or non-state actors, the UNHCR

will focus a majority percentage of its funds toward alleviating the crisis through repatriation

efforts. Quotes, interviews, and media analyses should point to increased movements of

voluntary repatriation. In cases where persecution is both internal and external, the UNHCR will

focus its funds mostly toward humanitarian aid relief efforts.

Alternative Explanations

Although there is a compelling case that can be made for the source of refugee

persecution and the preference of either repatriation or assistance/aid directed toward the host

country by the UNHCR, there are factors other than the source of the persecution that could

influence the relationship between UNHCR crisis response tactics and refugee crises. The

allocating of funds toward certain refugee crisis alleviating strategies, media coverage of crises,

and a standard process based on timing are three alternative explanations for UNHCR

preferences toward certain strategies over others.

Funding Allocation

The UNHCR receives its funding through voluntary donations. There exist two avenues

for allocating funds: 1) Earmarked Funds (General Programs) and 2) Special Projects. Donors

can decide what kind of donation they would like to make. In other words, donors are in control

of whether their donations go toward General Programs and/or Special Projects. However, more

emphasis has been placed on Special Projects funding since states and donors can use this

category as a means of supporting specific refugee crises and responses to them in certain ways.

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Donors do this for a variety of reasons, but often for political motivations (Harrell-Bond 1989).

General Programs funding has taken a hit as a result, and general humanitarian aid/relief,

although still in great demand, is less likely to be funded compared to specific initiatives (Forced

Displacement in 2017).

Controlling for all other variables and given this information, in a comparison of refugee

crises, the UNHCR may choose to administer humanitarian aid/relief efforts as its primary

strategy of aiding refugees when top donors’ (namely state governments) voluntary funds are

delegated specifically to humanitarian-based projects. Furthermore, the UNHCR could choose to

use repatriation as its primary strategy in alleviating refugee crises if voluntary funds are

delegated specifically to repatriation efforts. It is dependent on the donors’ intent for the money.

This explanation, as we have seen previously, is frequently mentioned throughout the literature,

but it may not be sufficient enough to stand on its own. Although top donors are state

governments, other top non-state donors may not have a specific political objective in mind

when donating. The UNHCR would still allocate voluntary funds as expressed by the non-state

government donors, but that would not directly influence the agency to favor repatriation over

humanitarian aid or vice versa when using the funds to alleviate refugee crises.

Alternately, the UNHCR could choose to administer humanitarian aid/relief efforts as its

primary strategy of aiding refugees when a refugee crisis experiences more press coverage and

media attention compared to other crises. Conversely, the UNHCR could prioritize repatriation

as its primary strategy in alleviating refugee crises when a refugee crisis receives a lower amount

of news coverage relative to other crises.

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Media Coverage

Some refugee crises receive more media coverage than others. Given that voluntary

donations can be allocated to General Programs or Special Projects, donors may choose to have

their funds be used for a particular crisis (via Special Projects) if they are more aware of the

crisis and are more informed on the state of the refugees in that particular emergency. Increasing

media attention of a refugee crisis may compel donors to contribute to humanitarian aid efforts to

help alleviate that crisis through a donation to Special Projects. Consequently, the UNHCR

would delegate those funds to that crisis. An opposite situation may also occur. The less often the

media covers a crisis, the more likely it is to be overlooked by donors and thus the UNHCR may

feel the need to put a swift end to the crisis via repatriation as its primary tactic so as to prioritize

other more “popular” refugee crises to appeal to donors. If this explanation is true, the UNHCR

should collaborate with other NGOs to ensure that refugee crises that are more “forgotten” than

others still receive sufficient media coverage to ensure that refugees receive the care that they

need.

Standard Crisis Timeline

Another explanation could be attributed to a standard timeline or process of the

UNHCR’s crisis response. The key driver behind the UNHCR’s decision-making, in this case, is

timing. The evolution of refugee crises can be separated into three loosely defined phases: 1) The

Emergency Response Phase; 2) The Response Plan Phase; and 3) The Exit or “Hand Over”

Phase. 6 The logic then, is as follows: the newer the refugee crisis, the more likely the UNHCR is

to administer humanitarian aid as its primary crisis response method. The longer a refugee crisis

lasts or the more protracted it is, the more likely the UNHCR will employ repatriation efforts as

6 For this thesis, I have named the phases explicitly. They vary in how they are referenced throughout the literature.

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its primary crisis response method. Figure 2 briefly illustrates this process with the Indochinese

Refugee Crisis.

Figure 2. UNHCR Phases in Responding to the Indochinese Refugee Crisis

When a crisis hits, the UNHCR will respond immediately by providing humanitarian aid

to the refugees fleeing. This Emergency Response Phase will not involve any repatriation efforts

and will focus solely on addressing the immediate needs present through Quick Impact Projects

or other strategies. After some time has passed and the initial shock of the refugee crisis has

subsided, the UNHCR will then determine its next steps in the form of an action plan, such as the

“Joint Response Plan (JRP) for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis.” The Response Plan Phase

identifies long term needs, logistics, sector objectives, indicators and targets, and organization

and funding requirements. Aid will be administered more systematically with intentions to meet

goals aligned with UNHCR durable solutions. Lastly, when a significant amount of time has

passed and it has been deemed safe for refugees to return to their country of origin, the UNHCR

will begin repatriation procedures and “hand over” the refugees back to their home country. This

last phase often contains many unknowns and researchers like Sarah Deardorff Miller criticize

the UNHCR for being unclear in their exit strategies (2019).

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The Emergency Response Phase

1975: Vietnamese refugees fled when South Vietnam fell to communist forces.UNHCR camps and humanitarian aid

The Response Plan Phase

1979 Geneva Conference1989 Geneva Conference, Comprehensive Plan of Action

The Exit or “Hand Over”

Phase1995: 1,311,183 asylum seekers resettled, the rest were repatriated.

This explanation, although likely to hold true to some degree, does not account for all

other factors such as donor influence, media coverage, persecution type, and many others. The

timing itself cannot be the sole variable determining UNHCR responses.

Research Design and Data

Part one of the chapter focused on theoretical groundwork. This next part of the chapter

explains my research design and data collection methods.

The research design used a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative and

quantitative data. Qualitatively, investigating two case studies on the Afghan and Rohingya

refugee crises can give detailed insights into the UNHCR’s differing responses to seemingly very

similar cases. By the same logic, performing thematic analyses on interviews of UNHCR staff,

think tank experts, and other refugee officials within the context of the case studies is an

effective way of categorizing responses and identifying patterns. By analyzing sets of funding

earmarks to the UNHCR for the Afghan and Rohingya refugee crises one can identify any larger,

noteworthy trends in the allocation of voluntary donor funds over time and to what arena

(General Programming or Special Projects or both).

Using a triangulation approach through qualitative and quantitative research together

helps to more accurately test the hypothesis and ensure validity. It can more accurately highlight

both a causal relationship between the sources of the persecution in refugee crises and UNHCR’s

decision-making processes, as well as UNHCR donation patterns that are more generalizable. In

terms of deriving patterns and themes, thematic analysis is a commonly used qualitative

approach to analyzing interview data. To that end, thematic analyses are helpful in further

determining what the UNHCR aims to do with its funding and what it has done, for numbers

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alone cannot demonstrate the level of help that has been provided to the refugees as a result of

donations.

In the next section, my case study selection is specified. Then, the operationalization of

the dependent and independent variables is quantitatively expressed alongside the

operationalization of variables for the qualitative portion of the research.

Case Selection

The first section of the qualitative analysis investigates two case studies of refugee crises

in Afghanistan and Myanmar over a six-year period (2014-2019) consistent with UNHCR Global

Reports funding data. The second section consists of thematic analyses of interviews with public

officials from the UNHCR, think tank experts, and other officials on topics related to the Afghan

and Rohingya refugee crises and the UNHCR’s decision-making processes. When examining

each refugee crisis, Afghan refugees’ country of origin is Afghanistan, and Rohingya refugees’

country of origin is Myanmar. Pakistan hosts the largest number of Afghan refugees and

Bangladesh hosts the largest number of Rohingya refugees (Forced Displacement in 2017).

Through detailed case studies on UNHCR behavior toward Afghan and Rohingya refugees in

Pakistan and Bangladesh, numerous implications reveal themselves later in the thesis.

Cases were chosen based on specific criteria: length of refugee crises, geographic

location, number of refugees for both cases, and UNHCR attempts to alleviate the crises. Both

the Afghan and Rohingya crises have taken place for roughly the same amount of time, from the

late 1970s onward. The UNHCR defines protracted crises as “one[s] in which 25,000 or more

refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five or more years in a given asylum

country” (Forced Displacement in 2017). Both cases fit this description. According to the

UNHCR 2017 Global Report, both crises have been identified as “major situations” in the Asia-

25

Pacific region. Conflict displaced more than 470,000 people in Afghanistan in 2017, affecting 31

out of 34 provinces. In 2017, Bangladesh hosted 655,000 Rohingya refugees and Bangladesh

hosted 1.4 million Afghan refugees (Forced Displacement in 2017). In Afghanistan, 470,000

were displaced due to conflict (Forced Displacement in 2017).

Although similar in relative geographic location, scale and length of the emergencies, and

prioritization by the UNHCR, initial quantitative trends suggest UNHCR-led solutions toward

these crises differ. Afghanistan and Myanmar also differ in respect to majority religion and

demographics, but both have similar GDP per capita calculations and religiosity plays an

important role in societal and governmental relations (IMF Report for Countries).

The UNHCR’s Regional Plan: Building Resilience and Solutions for Afghan Refugees in

South-West Asia (2017) highlights funding choices in regard to assisting Afghan refugees amidst

Afghanistan’s declining security situation from 2015 onward (see Figure 3).

26

Figure 3. Resilience and Solutions Measures for Inside Afghanistan—Budget

Source: United Nations. “UNHCR's Regional Plan – Building Resilience and Solutions for Afghan Refugees in South-West Asia – 1 July 2016 – 31 December 2017 (June 2016).” UNHCR. Accessed April 16, 2020.

This contrasts with the UNHCR’s Myanmar Refugee Emergency Response in

Bangladesh (2018) which shows funding needs for the Rohingya crisis are centered more on

basic needs and essential services (see Figure 4).

It can be asserted based on these initial figures that repatriation strategies are more readily

applied to Afghan refugees than Rohingya refugees, whereas humanitarian aid/relief efforts are

the more primary tactic in helping Rohingya refugees rather than Afghan refugees. Chapters 3

and 4 delve into more quantitative detail on funding changes for the crises.

Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis concentrates on UNHCR funding from the period of 2014-2019

since that is the data that the UNHCR has made available via annual Global Reports. Through

quantitative methods, I look at funding changes for the Rohingya and Afghan refugee crises from

2014-2019 to determine if the UNHCR prioritizes repatriation-related efforts over humanitarian

27

Source: UNHCR. “UNHCR's Supplementary Appeal - Myanmar Refugee Emergency Response in Bangladesh.” Operational Portal. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/62739.

Figure 4. UNHCR's Supplementary Appeal - Myanmar Refugee Emergency—Budget

aid as a primary solution or vice versa. This is accomplished by locating what parts of the budget

and donations are allocated to whom and where. Furthermore, refugee population numbers and

flows are analyzed over the same period to indicate signs of repatriation or aid-based policy

implementation.

Allocation of Funds

The allocation of funds is determined by numerous divisions. The UNHCR describes the

process of determining a budget via its Emergency Handbook. Furthermore, the annual UNHCR

Global Reports provide budget and expenditure breakdowns in terms of earmarked and

unearmarked funds. Geographically, categories separate budget and expenditure data on regional

and individual country bases. Also, four pillars distinguish which types of forcibly displaced

people will receive funding. For the purposes of this thesis, Pillar 1: “Global refugee

programme” is the only pillar used in quantitative funding analysis since all other pillars pertain

to statelessness, reintegration, or IDP operations rather than the UNHCR’s typical refugee

mandate. Figure 5 shows the UNHCR Planning Framework in this regard.

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Figure 5. UNHCR Planning Framework

Source: UNHCR. “Emergency Handbook.” Accessed March 27, 2019. https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/257108/unhcr-operations-plan-in-emergencies.

When observing changes in UNHCR funding to determine the UNHCR’s strategies in

alleviating refugee crises, it is important to note whether the funding is earmarked or not, where

the donated funds originated from if unearmarked, and if there is a positive or negative

correlation between the amount of time a crisis has persisted and categorized funding. Funding is

reallocated on a quarterly basis along lines of earmarked, softly earmarked, or unearmarked

designations (Use of Unearmarked Funding 2017).

With specific regard to funding, several outcomes could result. Beginning with General

Programs, if there is a steady increase in this type of funding from 2014-2019, more services and

aid are being administered based on need as determined by the UNHCR and vice versa. Of these

funds, a breakdown of which countries are receiving more funds from General Programs, what

the funding will go towards, and changes in these funds over time can highlight the UNHCR’s

crisis alleviating priorities. The next step is to look to the persecution source of the refugee crisis

being investigated—either internal, external, or a combination of both.

This same process is repeated for Special Projects funds, except the funding is decided

upon by the donor. Of the funds donated to specific countries, a breakdown of what the funding

is going toward (repatriation efforts or more aid-based efforts) will signal the priorities of the

donors which, therefore, are the UNHCR’s crisis alleviating priorities since they have no

decision in the matter. The next step is to once again examine the persecution source.

Refugee Movements

The numbers of refugees moving to and from Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to and from

Bangladesh and Myanmar make up the second part of the quantitative analysis. The UNHCR’s

Global Reports for each refugee crisis break down the refugees into groupings based on those in

camps, those who voluntarily return to their host countries, and other categories. For

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consistency’s sake, I analyze the movements of Afghan and Rohingya refugees during the same

donor period: 2014-2019, as available.

Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative analysis covers different components and contexts of the Rohingya and

Afghan refugee crises through primary and secondary research. I use interview responses on the

UNHCR as an institution and its decision-making in the Rohingya and Afghan refugee crises to

determine under what circumstances repatriation-related efforts are prioritized over humanitarian

aid as a primary crisis solution or vice versa. The role of persecution type and the source is

questioned within the crises and in general to test the Persecution-Source Theory.

Data Collection and Measurement

To measure the role of persecution sources in the Rohingya and Afghan case studies, I

conducted fifteen interviews. I spoke with individuals working at UNHCR and IOM

Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland in person. Questions were asked on a semi-structured basis

to identify the primary causes behind the UNHCR’s decisions to focus on either repatriation-

centered or humanitarian aid-centered efforts in refugee crises. They were also asked about the

Rohingya and Afghan Refugee Crises and the reasoning behind the UNHCR’s differing

responses to both.

I also interviewed think tank scholars in person from the Center for Strategic and

International Studies, the Woodrow Wilson Center, and the Atlantic Council in Washington DC.

In terms of staff positions, I conducted interviews with the highest-ranking available scholars

who were willing to participate. Questions were asked on a semi-structured basis with the

purpose of obtaining alternate perspectives on the UNHCR’s decision-making processes toward

Rohingya and Afghan refugees.

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Furthermore, I interviewed a U.S. State Department staffer, a former IOM official, and

numerous refugee consultants. In addition to the traditional semi-structured questions asked,

interviewees were asked to identify the reasons behind donation allocation and the motivations

that compel state governments to donate to some crises over others. Responses were then

evaluated based on key themes pertaining to repatriation, humanitarian aid, the UNHCR, and the

refugee crises discussed.

If interviewees used language expressing that the UNHCR’s primary response to a

refugee crisis is repatriation, its value on the first scale (Figure 1) will be greater than 1.5.

Similarly, if interviewees used language indicating that the UNHCR’s primary crisis response is

humanitarian aid, the value on the second scale will be greater than 1.5. Usage of secondary

sources directly from the UNHCR, UN System, NGOs, and media coverage supplement the

interview responses for a value on the scales.

Thematic Analysis

To measure and interpret interview responses, I used thematic analysis. Specifically, I

manually pulled elements or “chunks” from interview notes and identified, analyzed, and

reported themes, drawing from Braun and Clarke’s methodology from Using Thematic Analysis

in Psychology to test the persecution-source theory and hypothesis (2006). To determine what

counted as a theme, I read and reread the interview notes and transcripts, labeling the ideas

behind the data relevant to my research question by coding. Next, these codes were

systematically sorted into patterns or subcategories, and eventually main themes. Lastly, the

themes were interpreted. Figure 6 provides a visual of this process in more detail. With each

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interview, based on the themes and codes, responses were assigned a numeric value on the scales

in Figure 1.7

Employing thematic analysis techniques allowed me to have flexibility in my project

while engaging in thorough and consistent methods to evaluate the interviews. I have

incorporated both inductive and deductive coding measures, as used by Dr. John Schulz in

evaluating interview data (Schulz 2012).

This chapter detailed the various aspects of the project’s research design. In the Theory

portion, my research question and chosen theoretical framework are specified. The Research

Design and Data part of this chapter illustrated the research methods, both qualitative and

quantitative, utilized to test my hypothesis. Chapters 3 and 4 applies the Persecution-Source

Theory and my research methods through two case studies—the Rohingya and Afghan refugee

crises.

Chapter 37 See Tables 3 and 6 for themes, definitions, and examples.

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Figure 6. Phases of Thematic Analysis

Case Study: Internal Persecution of the Rohingya

“We used to live in a big house beside a lake where my husband would go fishing. I was

very happy there. I have two children and another one on the way. Two weeks before the crisis, a

bomb exploded near our village. We knew the military would come to the village to find the

culprits, so the men went to the lake to hide. I have not seen my husband since.”8

Stories like this are not uncommon among the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. A history of

ethnic violence and persecution by the Myanmar government has stripped hundreds of thousands

of people of their homes, leaving them injured, traumatized, and separated from family members.

Now, into 2020, the Rohingya refugees face an uncertain future as the UNHCR continues to

work with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and others to bring an end to the crisis. This uncertainty

reminds us of the critical need to engage in research and analysis so families and individuals can

cease putting their lives on hold.

In the previous chapter, my research methods and theory were explained. This chapter

applies these methods and the Persecution-Source Theory to a case study analyzing the Rohingya

refugee crisis, with Myanmar as the country of origin and Bangladesh as the major host country

examined. The first section details the historical background of the crisis, Myanmar politics, and

the Rohingya refugee population in Bangladesh. Then, an overview of UNHCR actions taken to

address the crisis describes changes in funding, response strategies, and goals for providing

solutions to Rohingya refugees. The chapter concludes with an analysis portion, evaluating

UNHCR responses to the Rohingya refugee crisis and their consistency with the Persecution-

Source Theory.

Background

8 “Tales of Horror from Myanmar: ‘They Burned My Daughter Alive.’” CNN. Cable News Network. Accessed April 17, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/09/world/myanmar-rohingya-refugee-stories/.

33

The Rohingya refugee crisis is the result of systematic persecution by the Myanmar

government and its security forces against the Rohingya people, a Muslim minority group in a

predominantly Buddhist country. The Myanmar government refuses to recognize the Rohingya

and denies their citizenship, viewing them as illegal immigrants originally from Bangladesh.

Although anti-Muslim sentiment, civic unrest, and citizenship questions have characterized

modern Myanmar politics from the 1970s onward in multiple forced migration flows, the most

recent wave of Rohingya persecution can be broken up into two parts, displacing hundreds of

thousands of refugees within days. The first part started in October 2016 and ended in January

2017, and the second part began in August 2017 and is still ongoing.9

The crisis has displaced over 700,000 Rohingya, according to UNHCR data (Refugee

Emergency Response Bangladesh). Upwards of 600,000 Rohingya have been fleeing primarily

to Bangladesh, with many more still going to India, Thailand, Malaysia, and other parts of South

and Southeast Asia. The majority of the Rohingya have fled Myanmar’s Rakhine State to seek

refuge in Cox’s Bazar, home to the Kutupalong refugee camp, which currently hosts over

9 Shahid, Rudabeh (Atlantic Council—Nonresident Senior Fellow), in discussion with the author. December 7, 2019.

34

Figure 7. Myanmar and Bangladesh Map

Source: Al Jazeera. 2017.“Rohingya Crisis Explained in Maps.” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/09/rohingya-crisis-explained-maps-170910140906580.html.

600,000 refugees (the world’s largest refugee camp) (Refugee Emergency Response

Bangladesh).

Before the International Court of Justice in early December 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi,

Myanmar’s State Counsellor (and Nobel Peace Prize laureate) claimed that war crimes “may

have been committed against Rohingya Muslims,” but she continues to deny any acts of

genocide by security forces (Mcpherson 2020). Furthermore, she believes that refugees are

exaggerating the abuses they faced; she suggested that UN investigators and human rights groups

continue to victimize Myanmar with “unsubstantiated narratives” (Mcpherson 2020).

Historical Context

Ethnic groups besides the Buddhist majority, the Bamar, have faced extensive sectarian

divisions and ethnic conflict within Myanmar. The Myanmar government recognizes 135 ethnic

groups, however, the Rohingya remain unrecognized which has resulted in statelessness and

legality issues. The Rohingya believe they are indigenous to western Myanmar and have an

ethnic affinity with Arabs, Mughals, and Portuguese.10 They attribute their descent to Arakan

people before and during British colonialism. The Arakan region (now known as the Rakhine

State) was classified as an “independent kingdom” between India and the Burmese Kingdoms of

Myanmar (Ghosh 2016).

Known as Burma at the time, Burmese were the rulers in power in Myanmar during the

1700s. It was at this time that the British East India Company took interest in land neighboring or

near India. The British fought against the Burmese in three Anglo-Burmese Wars. Ultimately,

Britain took over Burma in 1886 and reformed virtually all aspects of Burmese society,

economics, and politics (Majalla 2011). On January 4th, 1948 Burma declared independence from

Britain consistent with the Independence Act of 1947. The 1940s were an especially turbulent 10 Ibid.

35

time and a coup d’état led to General Ne Win’s takeover. Since this coup, the Burmese military

has played a “direct or indirect” role in controlling state functions.11

The Rohingya suffered from persecution as early as the 1940s. Known as the Tatmadaw,

Myanmar’s military began explicitly targeting the Rohingya in 1978. The Tatmadaw carried out

Operation Dragon King in the Rakhine State, in which they claimed to be targeting illegal

immigrants (Majalla 2011). Moe describes the nature of the Tatmadaw’s campaign against the

Rohingya: “[The Tatmadaw] carried out with impunity a ‘Four Cuts’ campaign against other

ethnic populations, cutting off food, funds, and information. The goal is to prevent recruits from

joining ethnic armed groups and quell aspirations of greater self-determination” (2017). A shift

in policy contributed to the persecution of the Rohingya, creating a legal space for more

discrimination and denial of Rohingya legitimacy (Ghosh 2016). The 1982 Citizenship Law

enacted by the Tatmadaw excluded the Rohingya as one of Myanmar’s 135 “national races.”

Through the law, citizenship is granted to those belonging to one of the national races

(Associated Press 2018). Associate and naturalized citizenship are the remaining standings a

person can have in Myanmar. Naturalized citizenship can only be given to those with one or

more parents with a type of Burmese citizenship and/or can provide “conclusive evidence” that

their parents moved to and lived in Burma prior to its colonial independence in 1948 (Ghosh

2016). Despite the Rohingya residing in the Rakhine State for multiple generations, the

Myanmar government refused and continues to refuse Rohingya citizenship, regarding them as

Bengali Muslims who are in the country illegally due to British partitioning. Although

originating from the 1982 law, this remains the government’s position to date.

More military violence took place in the 1990s, causing the Rohingya to flee on multiple

occasions en masse to Bangladesh and other South or Southeast Asian countries. After Aung San

11 Ibid.

36

Suu Kyi’s 1990 electoral victory, the military began persecuting the political opposition and

especially targeted Muslims in the Arakan region for their religion and support of the pro-

democracy movements. An estimated 250,000 refugees fled to Bangladesh, and their eventual

return was facilitated by the UNHCR in the early 2000s. This repatriation did not seem to last,

and the Rohingya were consistently uprooted by the Myanmar army (Majalla 2011). In 2006,

150,000 refugees from Myanmar were documented in camps in Thailand (Moe 2017).

A new constitution was drawn up by military forces in 2008. Now, Myanmar is governed

as a parliamentary system; 25% of the legislators are appointed by the military and the other 75%

are elected in general elections. The establishment of the National Human Rights Commission,

new labor laws, less press censorship, and movement toward a mixed economy convey the

beginning of Myanmar’s transition to democracy (Associated Press 2018). Occurring from 2011-

2015, the reforms also allowed for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from arrest. Many are

skeptical of the reforms, and Myanmar’s intent to democratize, especially given the ill-treatment

of the Rohingya and other ethnic minority groups like the Karen. The assertion is that the

Burmese military can strengthen institutions more conducive to democracy as well as the

conditions that keep the Tatmadaw in control. Suu Kyi remains unable to control Myanmar

military forces, serving as a de facto leader.12

In light of the governmental restructuring, violence toward the Rohingya remained

commonplace. 2012 was also no stranger to systematic violence perpetrated by the state against

the Rohingya. The 2012 Rakhine riots between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims led to

the displacement of nearly 100,000 Rohingya and caused the government to declare a state of

emergency. Additionally, the government continued to not recognize the Rohingya as one of the

country’s 130 national ethnic groups in 2012. Known as a civil war, the conflict between the

12 Ibid.

37

Rohingya and governmental/non-governmental groups worsened. Government crackdowns

targeting the Rohingya carried on into 2015. However, 2017 witnessed the largest influx of

Rohingya into Bangladesh, with 625,000 people fleeing by December 2017.

Described by members of the international community, the UN, and NGOs as ethnic

cleansing, the Tatmadaw used (and in previous insurrections have used) gang rape, forced labor,

indiscriminate killings, violence against civilians, and the burning/bulldozing of Rohingya

villages in the Rakhine State as methods of “replacing” the Rohingya and wiping any trace of

them from Myanmar. Despite witness accounts and Human Rights Watch mapping of the burned

and bulldozed Rohingya villages, the government denies any wrongdoing.13 In 2017, Myanmar

and Bangladesh signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to spur voluntary repatriation

of the Rohingya and cooperation on the situation, but critics pose that until there is a legal path to

citizenship created for the Rohingya people, they will remain in camps like Kutupalong in Cox’s

Bazar, Bangladesh (Darusman 2018).

Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh

Approximately 671,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are documented to have fled

targeted violence in Myanmar since August 2017. These refugees joined some 213,000 Rohingya

who were already in Bangladesh due to previous waves of displacement. Figure 8 shows how the

Rohingya refugee arrival rate in Bangladesh changed from 2017-2018.

Figure 8. Rohingya Refugee Arrival Trends Since Aug. 2017

13 Former IOM worker (Head of IOM Community Stabilization Unit) in discussion with the author. December 14, 2019.

38

In late August into early September alone, more than 80,000 Rohingya fled crossing the border

into Bangladesh. Numbers hovered near the 20-35,000 mark until later into September, when

entry into Bangladesh began to subside (besides some flare-ups). By the end of 2018, the total

Rohingya population in Cox’s Bazar District was close to 906,600 (UNHCR 2019). Refugees

have spontaneously settled in and around existing refugee communities in two main settlements,

Kutupalong and Nayapara, overstretching already-limited services and scarce resources.

According to the UNHCR, 75% of the Rohingya refugees who fled during the latest crisis

arrived in September 2017. Although the arrival rate significantly decreased into 2018, the

refugee influx created “the world’s most densely populated refugee settlement” (Rohingya

Refugee Crisis Explained).

Type of Persecution

The persecution Rohingya refugees have experienced and continue to experience for the

purposes of this thesis, using categories from the Persecution-Source Theory, is taken to be

internal persecution. Evidence from the 2019 UN Independent Factfinding Missions, NGO

reports, and personal accounts indicate that the Tatmadaw systematically drove out the

39

Rohingya. Although there is contestation as to whether the Tatmadaw’s raping, pillaging,

murdering, and burning of villages in the Rakhine state constitute genocide or ethnic cleansing, it

is clear that they instituted campaigns to kill thousands of Rohingya people and cover up the

deaths. In other words, the Rohingya are facing state-sponsored or induced persecution that

targets them for their ethnicity and hinders them from being legally recognized within

Myanmar’s borders.

Given the Tatmadaw’s mass human rights violations and the Myanmar government’s

exclusion of the Rohingya within its Citizenship Law, we can expect the UNHCR to use

humanitarian assistance as a primary crisis response for the Rohingya case. The UNHCR will

also devote a majority percentage of its General Projects and eligible Special Projects funds to

alleviating the crisis through humanitarian aid tactics from 2014-2019. Furthermore, an analysis

of quotes, interviews, and media coverage should point to the UNHCR focusing on humanitarian

aid-related donations to and aspects of the crisis. News stories would illustrate the urgency of the

situation through increased frequency and coverage on humanitarian aid. If the Persecution-

Source Theory holds, interviewees would indicate the UNHCR’s primary response to the

Rohingya crisis as humanitarian assistance, meaning a value on the first scale (Figure 1) will be

less than 1.5 and the value on the second scale will be greater than 1.5.

UNHCR Responses

For the purposes of this section, I focus on UNHCR responses beginning in 2017 onward

since the largest and most recent Rohingya exodus that took place heightened at that time. In the

initial weeks of the Rohingya refugee crisis’s 2017 emergency phase, the UNHCR airlifted more

than 1,500 metric tons of humanitarian aid to Bangladesh (Rohingya Refugee Crisis Timeline).

This aid consisted of blankets, plastic sheets, sleeping materials and tents, kitchen items, jerry

40

cans, and more (100 Days of Horror). Over 50,000 bamboo, rope, and tarpaulin shelters were

constructed to house the new refugees in Bangladesh. Humanitarian aid six months into the crisis

was expanded to include and call for natural disaster supplies to combat cyclones and monsoons,

such as poles, ropes, shelter-grade tarpaulins, sandbags, and tools (100 Days of Horror).

Interviews with former and current IOM officials highlighted “the Sphere Standards,”

which are baseline standards of humanitarian responses and a mechanism to hold humanitarian

actors accountable.14 The UNHCR uses these to standardize their responses by ensuring that

“human dignity and human rights at the basis of refugee protection are duly reflected in the

standards of care. Rather than focusing on available resources, the indicators will contribute to

move towards a Rights-Based Approach (RBA).”15 RBA provides the loose framework that takes

international human rights norms, standards, and principles and uses these to standardize

processes of humanitarian and development agencies. The UNHCR integrates human rights into

its operations through gender mainstreaming, capacity building, etc. in its protection planning

objectives and implementation of program activities to assist refugees.

In terms of the UNHCR Media Centre’s coverage of the crisis, there are numerous

observable trends. Firstly, leading up to the crisis, UNHCR articles about the Rohingya were

published at a frequency of about once per year from 2005 to 2016. In 2017, the number of news

stories increased exponentially; from January to August there was one story per month released.

September 2017 proved to be a turning point and peak: for that month alone, the UNHCR Media

Centre released ten Rohingya news stories with some published back-to-back (UNHCR Stories).

Now, about one story per month or two months focuses on the Rohingya, and the content has

14 Aplon, Jason, (IOM Transition and Recovery Division, Department of Operations and Emergencies Post Conflict/DDR Advisor) in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020; Grundy, Sam, (IOM Program Advisor, Transition and Recovery Division) in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020; Former IOM worker in discussion with the author. December 14, 2019. 15 Ibid.

41

generally deviated from needs and the situation in Bangladesh to include refugee stories,

progress on legal proceedings, and other topics (UNHCR Stories). Rohingya repatriation stories

have not been covered by UNHCR, many are humanitarian aid related or share refugees’ stories

and resilience.

Toward the end of 2017 and beginning of 2018, amid the UNHCR providing Rohingya

refugees with aid and services—consistent with the agency’s protection mandate—two fact-

finding missions sought to investigate the nature of the human rights abuses the Rohingya were

fleeing from in Myanmar. A coalition of 69 human rights NGOs appointed an Independent Fact-

Finding Mission team, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, urging for the

UN Security Council to respond to the humanitarian crisis and consider legal repercussions. The

second Independent Fact-Finding Mission 2018 Report from the Office of the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) suggested the UN Security Council establish an ad

hoc international criminal tribunal or have proceedings go through the International Criminal

Court. Further recommendations reiterated support for repatriation without violating non-

refoulement, increased monitoring and reporting, and other measures (OHCHR, n.d.). The

OHCHR’s Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar submitted its report to the United

Nations Human Rights Council on September 12, 2018 and concluded that the Tatmadaw did

violate international law and principles of international humanitarian law (OHCHR, n.d.). This

report also described the nature of the Tatmadaw’s actions toward the Rohingya as “crimes

against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing” (OHCHR, n.d.).

In March 2018, the UNHCR launched a Joint Response Plan (JRP) for the Rohingya

Humanitarian Crisis. The three sections of the plan include the nature of the crisis and its needs;

the agency’s response strategy along with its partners; and, within their response strategy,

42

each sector’s needs in addition to their own set strategies. The Response Strategy section

explains the UNHCR’s goals and initiatives (in order of priority/precedence) they plan to

undertake to address the crisis with respect to those most in need. Here, the UNHCR introduces

its Protection Framework (see Figure 9), guided by four strategic objectives: 1) Provide timely

life-saving assistance and protection, as well as improve the living conditions of Rohingya

refugees and affected host communities; 2) Ensure well-being and dignity of Rohingya refugees

and affected host communities; 3) Support environmentally sustainable solutions; and 4)

Confidence building and resilience of Rohingya refugees and affected host communities (2018

JRP for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis). Since the first JRP in 2018, a 2019 iteration has been

published. Currently, a draft of the 2020 JRP is also available in the works (Dhaka Tribune

2019).

43

Figure 9. UNHCR 2018 Rohingya JRP Protection Framework’s Four Pillars

When comparing and contrasting the 2018 and 2019 JRPs, we can observe some notable

differences. In 2019, the UNHCR expresses shifting its focus toward increasing service quality

and the diversity of services (i.e. mental health services); scaling up protection-monitoring

programs; and increasing direct participation of refugee men, women, and youth through

committees. Additionally, there were three strategic objectives listed for 2019: 1) Collectively

deliver protection to refugee women, men, girls and boys; 2) Provide life-saving assistance to

affected populations; and 3) Foster social cohesion (2019 JRP for Rohingya Humanitarian

Crisis). According to the Dhaka Tribune, within the draft of the 2020 JRP readers will notice that

as the emergency period has slowed, aid sectors like the shelter component will require less

funding, signaling a potential reprioritization toward solutions, protection, and legal processes

(HumanitarianResponse 2017).

44

Source: ReliefWeb. 2018. “JRP for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis: March - December 2018 - Bangladesh.” ReliefWeb. reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/jrp-rohingya-humanitarian-crisis-march-december-2018-0.

Coordination

Jacob Kurtzer explains that the UNHCR is often constrained politically by the refugee-

sending and refugee-receiving governments they work with.16 Furthermore, in an interview with

UNHCR Deputy Director of Resilience and Solutions, Mamadou Dian-Balde, reminds critics of

the UNHCR’s work that the agency was created by states.17 Thus, an important aspect of the

UNHCR’s response strategy and its ability to respond lies within coordination efforts between

major stakeholders, especially national governments.18 Beginning in 2017, the Government of

Bangladesh and other humanitarian organizations coordinated to provide aid to the Rohingya

refugees. Initially, Bangladesh showed solidarity with the Rohingya, but as the crisis evolved

views toward hosting more refugees shifted.19

UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi and Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary

Md. Shahidul Haque signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Geneva known as the

Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State. Regarding Myanmar, a similar

agreement was set up in early 2018. The tripartite MoU between the UNHCR, the United

Nations Development Programme and the Government of Myanmar that sought to create

appropriate conditions for safe, voluntary, and orderly repatriation of Rohingya refugees from

Bangladesh was extended for one year. However, numerous sources from the UN, NGOs, and

other governments agree that Myanmar has not done what is necessary to foster conditions

conducive for the return of the refugees (UN News 2018).20 Refugee returns at this time remain

16 Kurtzer, Jacob (CSIS Deputy Director and Senior Fellow—Humanitarian Agenda), in discussion with the author. December 4, 2020.17 Dian-Balde, Mamadou (UNHCR Deputy Director for Resilience and Solutions), in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020.18 Dian-Balde, Mamadou (UNHCR Deputy Director for Resilience and Solutions), in discussion with the author. January 2020. (Interviews of UNHCR Consultants by author, 2020)19 Shahid, Rudabeh, in discussion with the author. December 7, 2019; Former IOM worker, in discussion with the author. December 14, 2019.20 See also works by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International (more located in the References section).

45

stagnant and low, the UNHCR reports 95 refugees have voluntarily returned to Myanmar (UN

News 2018).

Besides coordination at the state level, the UNHCR has undergone restructuring in an

attempt to better service refugees. A most recent example is the agency’s decentralization of

regional offices and bureaus. For Asia and the Pacific, the new regional bureau and its offices are

located in Bangkok. Additionally, the UNHCR convened the first Global Refugee Forum in late

December 2019 to share overall best practices, encourage governments and other stakeholders to

make pledges, and provide a platform for refugees to share their stories among academics,

policymakers, and NGO workers.

UNHCR Funding for the Rohingya Refugee Crisis

Below are two tables, documenting changes in UNHCR funding toward initiatives in

Myanmar and Bangladesh respectfully. Table 1 illustrates Myanmar’s financials from 2014-2019

and Table 2 displays Bangladesh’s financials for the same period.

Table 1. UNHCR—Myanmar Financials

UNHCR Budget (in USD) UNHCR Expenditure (in USD)Year Basic

Needs Durable Solutions (repatriation)

Budget Total

Basic Needs

Durable Solutions(repatriation)

Expenditure Total

2014 39,865,482

3,708,203 68,108,703 6,056,284 630,446 21,525,219

2015 28,710,421

4,745,305 72,772,720 5,848,961 1,071,038 17,615,690

2016 17,796,118

12,039,879 56,212,579 5,562,733 697,807 17,128,649

2017 19,058,006

7,833,245 49,162,200 5,817,050 913,138 17,537,167

2018 14,875,491

2,399,530 46,116,560 4,869,882 465,547 16,688,276

46

201921 13,497,385

3,120,049 38,724,000

The data for Myanmar is representative of overall funding totals from the Pillar 1 (refugees)

category. Upon examining UNHCR funding for Myanmar for the period, there exist some trends.

The total budget determined overall has decreased essentially each year, and total expenditure

has seemingly plateaued around $17 million. Although the UNHCR has allocated various

amounts ranging from about $3 million to upwards of $12 million toward repatriation, the reality

is small fractions of total expenditure actually end up funding it. The basic needs portion of the

budget has also been mostly decreasing since 2014, but in expenditure, it is only slightly

decreasing in small increments. Efforts to use repatriation as a primary solution do not seem to

illustrate the funding story, most of the money (planned in a budget and the reality of

expenditure) tends to be used for humanitarian aid or other needs/capacity-building not included

under basic needs.

Table 2. UNHCR—Bangladesh Financials22

UNHCR Budget (in USD) UNHCR Expenditure (in USD)Year Basic

Needs Durable Solutions (repatriation)

Budget Total

Basic Needs

Durable Solutions(repatriation)

Expenditure Total

2014 12,306,018 4,240,243 7,534,7302015 5,859,101 15,184,305 7,576,7832016 13,667,947 7,284,0222017 67,596,216 49,606,7752018 220,442,812 159,895,165201923 223,467,75

7845,567 307,553,397

21 Note: UNHCR Expenditure funding data not available for 2019.22 Note: Bangladesh Financial information was not made readily available by the UNHCR and did not designate how much expenditure (if any) went to voluntary returns for the period observed. Other data besides budget totals and expenditure totals were not reported except in 2014 and 2015.23 Note: UNHCR Expenditure funding data not available for 2019.

47

Now turning to UNHCR funding for Bangladesh, patterns are more difficult to discern. The data

for Bangladesh is representative of overall funding totals from the Pillar 1 (refugees) category.

Firstly, the total budget determined overall has greatly increased from $12,306,018 in 2014 to

$307,553,397 in 2019. This is reflected in expenditure too, with $7,534,730 in 2014 to an

expenditure of $159,895,165 in 2018 (2019 expenditure data is not yet available). Unfortunately,

the UNHCR has not made all of its data publicly accessible, so funding toward repatriation and

basic needs for Bangladesh cannot be determined. However, given the large increase in overall

budget and expenditure, one could assert that these areas would also increase in funding.

Analysis

My analysis revealed that all interview participants shared aspects of six themes. Table 3

highlights these themes, providing definitions and examples. The data suggests that the UNHCR

will respond similarly to refugee crises during its “Emergency Phase,” regardless of whether

what generated the refugee crisis was internal persecution, external persecution, or mixed (see

Figure 2). However, once crises are more protracted, the root causes of the refugee flow or the

types of persecution matter and greatly impact the agency’s abilities to find solutions for those

refugees. Regarding the Rohingya, the UNHCR is unable to select repatriation as a primary long-

term crisis response tactic or feasible durable solution. This is the case for a multitude of reasons.

Taking the theme Constraints, the UNHCR faces obstacles assisting the Rohingya

through humanitarian aid measures. Although the Bangladesh government has taken in hundreds

of thousands of refugees fleeing from Myanmar, they are also a refugee-sending country and

they have their own domestic challenges that make the government more difficult to work with.

Another constraint that hinders the UNHCR’s ability to provide the Rohingya refugees with

48

solutions is that of the country’s economics and a need for aid for its people alongside the

Rohingya. Arguably the most impactful constraints deliberately cited by respondents were the

Myanmar government’s lack of political will to address the Tatmadaw’s crimes against

humanity. Without finding a way to reform relations toward the Rohingya legally (such as

through citizenship) and socially with the end of these grave human rights violations/the

destroying of Rohingya villages in Rakhine, repatriation as a solution is seemingly impossible.

Table 3. Thematic Analysis of Interviews Themes, Descriptions, and Examples; Rohingya Case.

Theme Description ExampleReturn Likelihood; conditions needed;

and popularity of safe, dignified, orderly, and voluntary returns among refugees and actors

According to an IOM Official, internal conflict or inter-ethnic conflict makes it “incredibly more difficult to return refugees” (2020).24

Constraints Obstacles in refugee assistance and partnerships between stakeholders

“It is complicated to forsee any durable solutions for the Rohingya. Bangladesh has limited resources and a huge population, making it hard to integrate; international support not to the scale that is needed for integration to occur… None of the solutions are there.”25

Politics How national policies affect the UN Refugee Agency

“UNCHR hates being involved in political stuff. Humanitarians don’t want to admit they’re involved in political work… but then they have to make political calculations all the time.”26

Root Causes What generated a refugee flow Ethnic conflict makes things complicated; causes are more linked to solution responses rather than immediate responses.27

Budget Monetary contributions and their impact on UNHCR operations

“The donors listen to the UN… it’s very different in the humanitarian world, in the political world, in the development world. It’s really where the UN system works best.”28

24 Aplon, Jason, in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020. 25 Elie, Jerome, (ICVA Senior Policy Officer for Forced Displacement), in discussion with the author. January 9, 2020.26 Interview with former IOM worker, December 14, 2019.27 Dian-Balde, Mamadou, in discussion with the author. January 7, 202028 Interview with former IOM worker, December 14, 2019.

49

Solutions Durable solutions (repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement) and their likelihood

“Response determinations are impacted by other factors, but for durable solutions the nature of the displacement matters more.”29

The Politics theme can thus be thought of as a subset for this case study—either as a type

of constraint, on finding solutions budgetarily and otherwise, an innate part of the return process,

or the dynamics of the UNHCR’s work with Myanmar and Bangladesh no matter how neutral

they try to appear. Essentially, the UNHCR is: a) unable to assist Bangladesh in returning

Rohingya refugees to Myanmar because of the nature of the displacement and its politics; b)

unable to resettle the Rohingya in other countries due to their ethnicity and a lack of willingness

by the international community; and c) cannot reintegrate the Rohingya in Bangladesh since they

are viewed as “temporary refugees.” This leaves little to no room for durable solutions, making

humanitarian aid continuation the agency’s only option, at least for the time being. Additionally,

the U.S. “typically doesn’t earmark funds for the [UNHCR] budget,” which highlights that the

hypothesis in which the UNHCR is a “pawn” of large state donors is not true for each crisis, if

any.30 If state influence from top donors readily impacted the UNHCR’s work for this crisis,

perhaps the U.S. would be earmarking its funds to exert influence.

The novel combination of responses by all interviewees, UNHCR funding data of the

Rohingya crisis, and steps taken by the UNHCR suggest that the UNHCR uses humanitarian aid

as a majority response rather than repatriation or other solutions. In this case, the Persecution-

Source Theory held against alternative explanations in the Rohingya case: to a significant extent,

the internal persecution faced by the Rohingya is now an obstacle in coming up with a solution

to alleviate the crisis. As interviewees have described, when the root causes of a crisis are

29 Kurtzer, Jacob (CSIS Deputy Director and Senior Fellow—Humanitarian Agenda), in discussion with the author. December 4, 2020.30 Sultan-Khan, Athar, (UNHCR Special Advisor to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees), in discussion with the author. January 8, 2020.

50

inherently political and require major policy reform by the country of origin, ways of alleviating

or working on solutions to a crisis are minimized.31 Figure 10 displays where the Rohingya crisis

falls on the UNHCR Response scales. When averaging the values assigned to each interviewee

along with budget/expenditure considerations and UNHCR actions to date, the UNHCR’s use of

humanitarian aid as a response has a value of 2.3.32 For use of repatriation as a response toward

the Rohingya crisis, the value is 0.7, indicating that the UNHCR has not been able to begin

successful, orderly return operations of Rohingya refugees nor does it plan to in the immediate

term.33

Figure 10. UNHCR Response to Rohingya Refugee Crisis Scale

The Rohingya case study illustrates some consistency with the Persecution-Source

Theory. Since constraints are placed on the UNHCR’s work as a result of the root causes of the

Rohingya crisis—which is classified as internal persecution—the UNHCR is unable to repatriate

31 Dian-Balde, Mamadou, in discussion with the author. January 6, 2020. Kurtzer, Jacob, in discussion with the author. December 4, 2019. Sultan-Khan, Athar, in discussion with the author. January 8, 2020.32 Average of interview responses’ numerical values, taking into account other information from the Rohingya case study. See Appendix for assigned numerical values per interview.33 Average of interview responses’ numerical values, taking into account other information from the Rohingya case study. See Appendix for assigned numerical values per interview.

51

Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar. We can conclude that the ethnic cleansing and internal,

state-led persecution which generated the Rohingya refugee crisis now influences the UNHCR’s

responses and abilities to assist the Rohingya in Bangladesh. However, many interviewees

stressed the importance of timing as another important factor. Had this analysis focused solely on

the agency’s responses in 2017 alone, the results may be different since the most recent influx of

Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh required extensive UNHCR emergency response and

humanitarian aid to assist the hundreds of thousands of new refugees in Cox’s Bazaar.

Many interviewees discussed the UNHCR’s operations under constraints by voluntary

donations. In varying levels of enthusiasm, responses conveyed that strong donors and

earmarked funding alone cannot make up the majority of pressures exerted onto the agency.

Some found the UNHCR to be less constrained by its budget and expenditure as opposed to other

UN agencies or organizations, like the IOM.34 Others described the agency’s expertise and

mission to be respected by donors, claiming that they listen to the UNHCR rather than command

it.35 UNHCR officials also expressed that the funding model does not impede their ability to

assist refugees, although some “may be biased.”36 Dian-Balde explains that he does not think he

is “at the mercy of the governments,” when conducting his work. “It isn’t just money that is

influential, smaller governments that host larger percentages of refugees per capita are important

too.”37

News coverage and attention directed toward crises are important, but those interviewed

whom themselves do not work for the UNHCR merely hypothesize how influential this is.

34 Aplon, Jason, in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020; Grundy, Sam, in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020; Raiman, Daniela (UNHCR Senior Policy Officer and Global CCCM Cluster Coordinator), in discussion with the author. January 9, 2020; Sultan-Khan, Athar, in discussion with the author. January 8, 2020.35 Ibid; Dian-Balde, Mamadou, in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020; Kugelman, Michael, in discussion with the author. December 11, 2019.36 Dian-Balde, Mamadou, in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020.37 Ibid.

52

According to Kugelman and Aplon, the UNHCR does an effective job of addressing refugee

needs, even in places like Chad which remains virtually absent within media coverage.38 Aplon

and Grundy also point out that, when looking at the duration of a protracted crisis and the

potential for media fatigue it really depends on the political situation. “If there are gross human

rights violations… the crisis often becomes weighted. This is a different media character, [the

crisis] will get a lot of attention. However, with protracted crises, there is a precipitous drop-

off.”39

In terms of timing, the longer a refugee crisis lasts or the more protracted it is, there is

uncertainty if the UNHCR will employ repatriation efforts as its primary crisis response

method.40 UNHCR officials strongly contended that this was not the case and that it is dependent

on the will of the refugees. In the case of the Rohingya, there is almost no desire to return to

Myanmar.41 Sultan-Khan explains that the parameters for the UN Refugee Agency were clear

against the backdrop of the Cold War, “later on, of course, it got more complicated. That was

when we started to get involved with internally displaced people.”42 His response signals back to

the idea that the nature of conflicts led to more complex displacements and political situations

for the UNHCR to respond to, durable solutions will look different in these cases if they are an

option at all. Jerome Elie responded similarly, first detailing the difference between normal

refugee status determination (RSD) processes versus large group RSD (which happens in the

Rohingya case, they are considered prima facie) and then reviews each of the durable solutions 38 Aplon, Jason, in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020; Kugelman, Michael, in discussion with the author. December 11, 2019.39 Aplon, Jason, in discussion with the author. January 7, 2020; Grundy, Sam, in discussion with the author. January 7, 202040 Independent Refugee Consultant, in discussion with the author. January 8, 2020; Elie, Jerome, in discussion with the author. January 9, 2020; OCHA Consultant, in discussion with the author. January 5, 2020; UNHCR Associate Legal Officer, in discussion with the author. January 6, 2020; U.S. State Dept. official, in discussion with the author. December 28, 2019. 41 Raiman, Daniela, in discussion with the author. January 8, 2020; Shahid, Rudabeh, in discussion with the author. December 7, 2019.42 Sultan-Khan, Athar, in discussion with the author. January 8, 2020.

53

for the Rohingya in Bangladesh. He finds that “none of the solutions are there,” and in regard to

repatriation this cannot take place since “there is no accountability for what has been done.”43

Sultan-Khan provides a beacon of hope. He says that despite the constraints placed on the

agency to work toward durable solutions, the High Commissioner for Refugees has many strong

partnerships: “…for example, Gabon or Cape Verde took the lead on the Organization of Islamic

Countries’ response toward Rohingya refugees. This response is critical when the UNHCR can’t

speak or advocate for refugees. It makes the work difficult, but UNHCR can still practice

advocacy and be a voice for the ‘voiceless.’”44

This chapter examined the Rohingya refugee crisis as a case study of internal persecution,

charting the forced displacement’s background and UNHCR responses to it. Chapter 4

investigates the Afghan refugee crisis and external persecution using a similar framework.

43 Elie, Jerome, in discussion with the author. January 9, 2020.44 Sultan-Khan, Athar, in discussion with the author. January 8, 2020.

54

Chapter 4

Case Study: Afghan Refugees and External Persecution

“I am sick, in eyes and body, so I want to go home to Afghanistan.”45

The Afghan refugee crisis just experienced its 40th anniversary of the Soviet invasion.

The protracted nature of the crisis, along with the numerous actors involved in conflicts within

and against Afghanistan has made it a complex case. The UNHCR faces many obstacles in

assisting the Afghan refugees in finding long-term solutions, and the Pakistan government is

pushing for more repatriation initiatives despite a deteriorating and unstable security situation

within Afghan borders. Politics aside, it is vital that all actors in the refugee regime do not forget

the suffering and hardship the Afghan refugees have endured for multiple generations.

The last chapter used a case study to investigate the Rohingya refugee crisis and its

implications under the Persecution-Source Theory. Similarly, this chapter examines the Afghan

refugee crisis, with Afghanistan as the country of origin and Pakistan as the host country of

focus. The first section delves into the historical background of the crisis, Afghan politics and

contributing factors to the crisis, and the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan. The next section

establishes a brief snapshot of UNHCR actions taken to address the crisis, particularly those

regarding funding, response strategies, and potential solutions for Afghan refugees. Lastly, this

chapter concludes by analyzing the UNHCR’s responses to the Afghan refugee crisis and their

significance under the Persecution-Source Theory.

Background

45 United Nations. n.d. “Afghan Refugees Share Hopes and Fears with UN Refugee and Relief Chiefs.” UNHCR. Accessed April 16, 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2018/9/5b940bf24/afghan-refugees-share-hopes-fears-un-refugee-relief-chiefs.html.

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The Afghan refugee crisis began due to the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979-1989. Four

main “waves” of forced displacement or exoduses of Afghan refugees have contributed to the

crisis as we know it today. The first wave occurred during the war when the Soviets initially

invaded (1979–1989), the second was due to the Afghan Civil War (1992–96), immediately

following was displacement as a result of Taliban Rule (1996–2001), and lastly the ongoing War

in Afghanistan (2001–present) has continued to cause Afghan refugees to flee. According to the

UNHCR’s 2018 Global Report, there are 2.5 million registered refugees from Afghanistan, with

most having fled to Pakistan and Iran (UNHCR 2019).

The UNHCR’s most recent data indicates there are currently 1.4 million Afghan refugees

in Pakistan (UNHCR 2019). Afghan refugees make up the largest protracted refugee population

in Asia and the second-largest refugee population following the Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2019).

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Figure 11. Map of Afghanistan and Refugee Movements

Source: ReliefWeb. Afghanistan Multi-Year Protection and Solutions Strategy (2019-2021) – Afghanistan. ReliefWeb. reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-multi-year-protection-and-solutions-strategy-2019-2021).

Afghanistan remains unstable, with some Afghan states being more dangerous than others. This,

combined with tensioned relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, has made finding

solutions to the Afghan crisis especially difficult. Figure 11 highlights this complexity through a

map of Afghanistan and the movements of refugees from across the Durand line (the

Afghanistan and Pakistan border).

Historical Context

Afghan migration to Pakistan dates back to the 10th century (Ghufran 2008). After the

Second Anglo-Afghan War, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (the Durand Line) was lineated

under British India’s Mortimer Durand influence. In 1947, political interference from British

India in Afghanistan ended. With Pakistan now in the picture, the Pashtun and Baloch tribes

found themselves divided (Ghufran 2008). However, outside influence and interference by

European countries did not end with Britain. Soon, the Soviet Union became more closely

involved with Afghan affairs.

The Soviet Union supported the Afghan Communist government against anti-Communist

Muslim guerillas throughout the Soviet-Afghan War. Afghanistan’s government in 1978 with

Mohammad Daud Khan as president was overthrown, leading to Nur Mohammad Taraki’s rule.

Relations with the USSR at this time grew stronger, despite a lack of popularity by the greater

Afghan public. The USSR initiated land and social reforms, to the dismay of opposition groups.

Any dissent against these reforms resulted in intense persecution from the Soviets (Sultana

2011). The Mujahideen (a collective of Islamic groups) retaliated and led insurgencies against

the Soviets, leading to an invasion by Soviet forces on December 24, 1979. The invasion

removed then President of the People’s faction, Hafizullah Amin. The U.S. supported

Mujahideen, which helped to spread civic unrest across Afghanistan (Tober 2007).

57

The Soviets’ influence, although still present, gradually declined in the 1980s. Much of

the persecution was left for the Afghan army to commit against dissenting civilians. The Soviets

sought to target the Mujahideen by “depopulating” rural areas and killing larger numbers of

civilians.46 These initiatives forcibly displaced millions of Afghans. In 1981, there were 1.5

million Afghan refugees, by 1982 roughly 2.8 million Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan

(Ghufran 2008). 1986 noticed a peak, the number of Afghan refugees had risen to nearly five

million, with the majority of the refugees based in Pakistan (Khan 2017, 11). Most of the Afghan

refugees that came to Pakistan were ethnic Pashtuns, but Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras were

ethnic groups also represented. It is estimated that during the invasion, there were more than six

million Afghan refugees (Khan, 8).

The conflict further evolved into three periods of Afghan civil war, followed by the

ongoing war in Afghanistan. The first of which was a continuation of the Soviet-Afghan War,

excluding the Soviets from 1989-1992. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union supported opposing

sides of the civil war as before, but the Afghan army was able to fight off the Mujahideen during

this time (Safri 2011). This was short-lived though; the Afghan government fell in 1992 when

President Mohammad Najibullah stepped down and Mujahideen groups took over Kabul. The

second civil war (1992-1996) took place between opposing Mujahideen rebel groups. Human

Rights Watch claims that there were five different Mujahideen armies or groups contributing to

the extensive damage of Kabul from 1992-1995 (Human Rights Watch 2001). The city’s

population subsequently decreased from 2 million to roughly 500,000 (Human Rights Watch

2001).

46 Kugelman, Michael (Asia Program Deputy Director and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center), in discussion with the author. December 2019.

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During this period in the 1990s, international funding for Afghan humanitarian aid began

decreasing. Consequently, the UNCHR launched an “encashment” program to encourage

voluntary repatriation from Pakistan to Afghanistan in tandem with Pakistani calls for increased

voluntary return (Khan 2017, 11). However, in 1994 the Taliban (an extremist Islamic group

originating from and believed to be backed by Pakistan) began taking over Afghan cities and

provinces. By 1995, the Taliban controlled twelve Afghan provinces.47 Despite the merging of

groups and the formation of new alliances from various Mujahideen groups, the Taliban secured

control over southern, eastern, and western Afghanistan. They sealed their official takeover of

the country by toppling over Kabul in September 1996, establishing the Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan, marking the third period of Afghan civil war creating mass displacement. Tens of

thousands died from the wartime atrocities and bombings (Human Rights Watch 2001). As a

result, Afghanistan accepted refugee returns and witnessed more displacement. After the Taliban

came to power, humanitarian aid declined again, forcing more Afghans to cross into Pakistan

(Khan 2017, 3). A Human Rights Watch report describes the series of Taliban massacres against

civilians from 1996-2001. According to the report, the Taliban especially targeted Shia or Hazara

Muslims (2001).

After the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, repatriation initiatives began again.

From 2002 to 2015, over 3.8 million Afghans returned to Afghanistan with assistance from the

UNHCR (Ahmadi and Lakhani 2016, 1). It is worth mentioning that estimates of Afghan

refugees as they have moved between Afghanistan and Pakistan may be largely inaccurate due to

numbers of unregistered Afghan refugees resulting from an “unregulated and unmonitored

system” in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Ahmadi and Lakhani, 1). This system has subjected

Pakistan to large-scale movements, trafficking of drugs and arms, and militant entry originating

47 Interview with former IOM worker, December 2019.

59

from Afghanistan—which made the Afghan refugee situation a protracted political, security, and

economic issue.48

There was a spike in returns from Pakistan in early 2015 following the attack on a

military school in Peshawar in December 2014. Actions by Pakistani security forces and local

authorities continue to push refugees to return. During the first ten months of 2015, Pakistan

deported 20,000 undocumented Afghan refugees and reported nearly 96,000 spontaneous returns

of undocumented refugees (Ahmadi and Lakhani 2016, 3).

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

Historically, the Afghan refugees in Pakistan were not restricted to the refugee camps and

could experience more mobility compared to refugees in other host countries (Khan 2017, 15).

They moved around freely throughout the country where they were allowed to work, acquire

education, rent houses, and travel freely within Pakistan like other Pakistani citizens.49 As the

crisis grew more protracted, some Afghan refugees moved from camps to residential

neighborhoods, integrating into urban life in Pakistan. However, despite successful cases of

integration, Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, meaning Afghan

refugees cannot access formal education opportunities, to open a bank account, formally work, or

buy property. Moreover, the longevity of the instability in Afghanistan has exacerbated worsened

relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan; family units have formed in Pakistan over multiple

generations making it difficult to repatriate Afghan refugees.50 In sum, “the longer it takes, the

more difficult it [assisting Afghan refugees] becomes.”51

48 Aplon, Jason (Transition and Recovery Division Post Conflict/DDR Advisor, IOM), in discussion with the author. December 2019.49 Ibid.50 Interview with former IOM worker, December 14, 2019.51 Sultan-Khan, Athar (Special Advisor to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Office of the UNHCR), in discussion with the author. January 8, 2020.

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Approximately 1,420,673 million Afghan refugees have fled to Pakistan as of 2019 data.

In total, the different displacements of Afghan refugees have resulted in 2,371,815 registered

according to 2019 statistics (UNHCR Global Focus: Populations 2019). Despite Pakistan being

adamant about repatriation, the number of refugees fleeing to Pakistan is increasing. UNHCR

data indicates that in Pakistan, 1,352,560 refugees were registered in 2016. In 2017, refugee

numbers increased to 1,393,143, and in 2018 those registered reached 1,404,019 (UNHCR

Global Focus: Populations 2019). On the other end, rates of repatriation have been markedly

high prior to 2016. Figure 12 shows how the Afghan refugee repatriation rate changed from

2009-2016.

The graph indicates minimal changes from 2009-2015. However, 2016 witnessed high fatalities

as a result of security operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban. 383,951 registered refugees

voluntarily repatriated to Afghanistan in 2016. In 2017, this decreased to 60,545, and in 2018

smaller still: 16,220 (UNHCR Global Focus: Populations 2019).

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Figure 12. Afghan Repatriation Trends Since 2009

Source: Chaudhry, Hufsa. 2017. “HRW Report Accuses UNHCR of Inaction over 'Forced Repatriation' of Afghans.” Dawn.com, Feb. 13, 2017, www.dawn.com/news/1314348.

These numbers can be attributed to a response to security deterioration in Afghanistan. In

2018, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan recorded the highest amount of

civilian deaths, which also includes the highest ever recorded statistic of children killed in the

conflict (Amnesty International 2019). 11,000 casualties were reported, including 3,804 deaths

and 7,189 injured (Amnesty International 2019). The “Analysing Peace and Quantifying Its

Economic Value” report by the Institute for Peace and Economics claimed Afghanistan is the

world’s “least peaceful” country, replacing Syria (2019). Unsurprisingly, the numbers of those

successfully repatriated has decreased.

Type of Persecution

Using classifications from the Persecution-Source Theory, the persecution Afghan

refugees have experienced and continue to experience for the purposes of this thesis is taken to

be external persecution. In other words, the Afghan refugees have fallen victim to violence as a

result of an inter-state conflict (the Afghan-Soviet War) and/or persecution from non-state actors

(the Taliban).

Given increasing negotiations with the Taliban, greater calls for repatriation by Pakistan

and Iran, the inconsistency of the violence stemming from military operations, we can expect the

UNHCR to use repatriation as a primary crisis response for the Afghan case. The UNHCR will

also devote large percentages of its General Projects and eligible Special Projects funds to

alleviating the crisis through voluntary return funding from 2014-2019. Furthermore, an analysis

of quotes, interviews, and media coverage should point to the UNHCR focusing on return-related

donations to and aspects of the crisis. News stories would illustrate coverage on repatriation

initiatives, and there would be fewer articles published (since media coverage tends to focus on

the beginning of a crisis). If the Persecution-Source Theory holds, interviewees would indicate

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the UNHCR’s primary response to the Afghan crisis as repatriation, meaning a value on the first

scale (Figure 1) will be greater than 1.5 and the value on the second scale will be less than 1.5.

UNHCR Responses

Consistent with the methodology used in the Rohingya case, I focus primarily on

UNHCR responses beginning in 2016 onward since that is when the agency released its most

recent regional plan: Building Resilience and Solutions for Afghan Refugees in South-West Asia.

Additionally, the 2016 Repatriation of Afghan Refugees from Pakistan Supplementary Appeal

asking for increased funds to meet financial requirements for the Regional Plan to adjust for

projected returns of Afghan refugees of up to 221,000. The Appeal details a continued focus on

voluntary and dignified returns of Afghan refugees, their monitoring and advocacy, and payment

of repatriation grants as financial support of integration/reintegration. Additionally, I examine

coordination between the UNHCR, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other relevant actors from 2014

onward (consistent with funding data provided for the 2014-2019 period).

In terms of the UNHCR Media Centre’s coverage of Afghan refugees and their safety,

there are numerous observable trends. UNHCR articles about the Afghan refugees were

published quite frequently in 2002 and 2003, with a dip around 2013 (stories were published

once per year or less). They maintained this plateau until 2015. Here, the number of news stories

began to steadily increase; five stories were released in 2015 with some focus on repatriation of

51,000+ Afghan refugees from Pakistan and the “future of Afghan refugees” (UNHCR Stories).

This trend did not carry on into 2016, however. The only story of that year focused on the

UNHCR and its funding set aside for 60,000 returnees (UNHCR Stories). 2017 and 2018 saw

three and four stories respectively, whereas 2019 only had one story published. Although articles

and news stories have varied across years, consistent topics discussed include the status of the

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UNHCR assisting with voluntary returns of Afghan refugees, Afghan refugees expressing their

desire to return to Afghanistan, the future of Afghan refugees, and other solutions-based stories.

Humanitarian aid has not been discussed at length, rather conditions of camps and the Afghan

refugees’ experiences are more touched upon (UNHCR Stories).

Although the attention placed on the voluntary return of Afghan refugees has ebbed and

flowed depending on the year and UNHCR initiatives, NGOs and governments point out the lack

of safety and stability among government forces and the Taliban within Afghanistan. In

December 2018, a UNICEF report found that from January to September of 2018, five thousand

children were killed or injured in Afghanistan (Radio Liberty 2018). Human Rights Watch

claims more than 10,000 civilians were killed or wounded during 2018, with one third being

children. Most recently, on March 5th, 2020, ICC judges authorized an investigation into war

crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by the Afghan government, the

Taliban, American troops, and U.S. foreign intelligence operatives. This builds upon reports of

attacks in urban areas by insurgents, airstrikes and night raids by the U.S. and Afghan forces

causing many civilian casualties, and the consideration of the Afghanistan Independent Human

Rights Commission calling the Taliban’s “terrorism against the Afghan civilian population” a

war crime (Afghanistan Analysts Network 2020). These war crimes by the Taliban include

killing teachers, abducting aid workers, and burning school buildings (Afghanistan Analysts

Network 2020).

There was a spike in returns from Pakistan in early 2015 following the attack on a

military school in Peshawar in December 2014, and actions by Pakistani security forces and local

authorities continue to push refugees to return. During the first ten months of 2015, Pakistan

deported 20,000 undocumented Afghan refugees and reported nearly 96,000 spontaneous returns

64

of undocumented refugees. As a result, under the 20-point National Action Plan, the government

devised a policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees. The goal was to register Afghan

nationals by the end of 2015 (Khan 2017, 55-56). Border clashes took place in June 2016 which

further influenced Pakistan’s refugee policy. Pakistan then enforced new border rules, requiring

and checking for valid and legal travel documents for all Afghans entering Pakistan, even for

those who commute to Pakistan daily for work or schooling.

Coordination

Coordination between the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the UNHCR

(namely in the form of a Tripartite Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation) has led to a variety of

agreements, strategies, and frameworks that have shaped responses to the protracted crisis.

Beginning with Pakistan, the government adopted the Afghan Management and Repatriation

Strategy to identify and implement durable solutions for Afghan refugees. Since the situation in

Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, extensions on the dates Pakistan agreed to host Afghan

refugees until were repeated as interim measures. A new policy toward the Afghan refugees

(approved in 2013) extended Proof of Registration (PoR) cards initiatives and the Tripartite

Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation until the end of 2015. Additionally, new priorities

manifested in the “National Policy on Afghan Refugees,” which formed in relation to the

Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR). Now in its 8th year, the SSAR aims to facilitate

dialogue, coordinate responses, and increase consensus-building and partnerships for the Afghan

refugee situation. It tasks the Government of Afghanistan incorporating SSAR’s objectives into

national policy (UNHCR International Conference 2020). It also aims to provide guidance on

safe and dignified voluntary repatriation, “sustainable reintegration” inside Afghanistan, and host

community aid.

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In collaboration with NGOs and other UN actors, the UNHCR is working to provide

refugees with solutions and humanitarian aid as described in Afghanistan: 2017 Humanitarian

Response Plan (HRP) and its 2018 iteration (ReliefWeb, n.d.). The HRP houses an overall

Country Strategy (involving work between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and other actors) and

Operational Response Plans, which are broken down into different humanitarian clusters (ex.

emergency shelter & non-food items, health, and food security & agriculture). One specific

Operational Response Plan—the “Refugee & returnee response plan”—is led by the UNHCR

(Humanitarian Response Annual Review 2017). The SSAR continues to serve as the key

framework for the Afghan refugee crisis.

According to Pakistan Radio, the UNHCR anticipates returning 60,000 refugees to

Afghanistan. Repatriation efforts are to resume, despite the security challenges Afghanistan still

faces.52 It is too early to tell how peace talks with the Taliban and will affect the UNHCR as they

continue to assist the Afghan refugees.

UNHCR Funding for the Afghan Refugee Crisis

Below are two tables, documenting changes in UNHCR funding toward initiatives in

Afghanistan and Pakistan respectfully. Table 4 illustrates Afghanistan’s financials from 2014-

2019 and Table 5 displays Pakistan’s financials for the same period. The data for Afghanistan is

representative of overall funding totals from the Pillar 1 (refugees) category.

The UNHCR funding for Afghanistan, despite a large fluctuation in 2016 for all

categories, has some mild trends. The total budget determined overall has decreased each year

(except 2016), and total expenditure has varied slightly above or below $70,000,000. Money in

52 Interview with UNHCR consultant, January 2020.

66

the budget allocated toward basic needs has varied year by year, but not as much in expenditure,

which has remained around $20,000,000.

Table 4. UNHCR—Afghanistan Financials

UNHCR Budget (in USD) UNHCR Expenditure (in USD)Year Basic

Needs Durable Solutions (repatriation)

Budget Total

Basic Needs

Durable Solutions(repatriation)

Expenditure Total

2014 58,102,488 42,171,904 151,970,856 20,954,576 10,300,458 64,259,4622015 40,487,989 46,714,886 150,643,886 18,419,254 29,772,827 70,354,7712016 54,586,824 30,402,789 259,233,865 N/A N/A 198,000,000*2017 21,465,461 59,832,802 137,626,889 19,120,417 28,729,550 70,006,6982018 24,514,625 22,971,511 125,834,134 23,497,918 8,690,156 62,059,853201953 29,350,170 20,539,709 121,705,680

Regarding voluntary returns in the budget and in expenditure, funding has also varied year to

year. However, quite a large portion goes toward repatriation within the budget and through

expenditure. Curiously, some years in the budget and expenditure, more funding goes toward

repatriation than to total basic needs. In 2015 this is the case, as with 2017. 2019 data displays

the smallest budget determined for Afghanistan over the period, but with an increase in funding

for basic needs.

The UNHCR’s funding for Pakistan, like Afghanistan’s, does not have many clear

generalized trends. The data for Pakistan is representative of overall funding totals from the

Pillar 2 (refugees) category. The total budget has decreased and plateaued gradually from 2014-

2019, from $162,483,588 to $99,201,69. Decreases in expenditure also seem to mimic that of the

decreasing budget.

53 Note: UNHCR expenditure funding data unavailable for 2019.

67

Interestingly, expenditure for voluntary repatriation has remained in the 3-4 million USD

range but within the budget, funding set aside for repatriation has largely varied. This means that

despite values as high as $16,130,356 in 2014 for repatriation, only around $3 million of that

money will be used for that purpose.

Table 5. UNHCR—Pakistan Financials

UNHCR Budget (in USD) UNHCR Expenditure (in USD)Year Basic

Needs Durable Solutions (repatriation)

Budget Total

Basic Needs

Durable Solutions(repatriation)

Expenditure Total

2014 67,776,163 16,130,356 162,483,588 26,473,185 3,308,685 64,498,1862015 71,931,069 14,820,441 136,702,630 32,912,429 4,415,533 64,264,3812016 72,592,838 3,160,080 137,352,356 28,476,415 4,144,154 54,725,7602017 70,253,010 3,993,861 127,073,202 26,805,711 3,153,610 53,215,9912018 52,948,797 6,581,538 99,201,669 17,658,461 3,113,537 36,682,893201954 35,418,893 10,735,024 99,201,669

Basic needs expenditure has continuously decreased along with the basic needs budget. After a

sharp drop in funds budgeted for repatriation in 2016, the part of the budget for voluntary

returns/repatriation has increased, with 2019 almost reaching levels dating back to 2014 and

2015 despite a decreasing overall budget.

Analysis

My analysis revealed that all interview participants shared aspects of six themes. Table 6

looks at these themes with definitions and examples. The data suggests that the UNHCR will

respond similarly to refugee crises during its “Emergency Phase,” regardless of whether what

generated the refugee crisis was internal persecution, external persecution, or mixed (see Figure

2). However, once crises are more protracted, the root causes of the refugee flow or the types of

54 Note: UNHCR expenditure funding data unavailable for 2019.

68

persecution matter and greatly impact the agency’s abilities to find solutions for those refugees.

Regarding the Afghan refugees, the UNHCR is continuing to select repatriation as a primary

long-term crisis response tactic or durable solution, despite growing insecurity in Afghanistan.

Table 6. Thematic Analysis of Interviews Themes, Descriptions, and Examples; Afghan Case.

Theme Description ExampleComplexity Inconsistency, lack of clarity,

uncertainty; challenges make it difficult for assisting refugees

“The humanitarian space is shrinking, there is confusion due to political complexities. No one knows who is fighting who.”55

Security Objective and perceived safety within the host country and country of origin

Pakistanis often misattribute Afghans as Taliban members and the Pakistani government—sick of being a host country—threatens to repatriate Afghan refugees.56

Protracted How the long duration of a crisis impacts UNHCR coordination and assistance

“Sometimes it [finding solutions] takes too long, as is the case for the Afghan crisis. The longer it takes, the more difficult it becomes.”57

Political Will Willingness of different actors to work together and/or to bring an end to a refugee crisis

“Depending on the situation sometimes we have different capabilities… is the government ready to support [the refugees]?”58

Repatriation Returns, voluntary or involuntary, to a defined country of origin

“It’s never clear when it’s the right time is to repatriate… there’s always an imperfect environment for return.”59

Funding Monetary contributions or constraints and their effect on returning refugees

The UN was not neglecting the Afghan refugee crisis, but donor fatigue placed pressure on Pakistan and the UNHCR.60

Considering responses by all interviewees, UNHCR funding data of the Afghan crisis,

and measures taken by the UNHCR suggest that the UNHCR varies in their response strategy

year to year, but ultimately directs efforts toward repatriation as a primary long-term solution. In 55 Sultan-Khan, Athar, in discussion with the author. January 2020.56 Kugelman, Michael, in discussion with the author. December 2019.57 Sultan-Khan, Athar, in discussion with the author. January 2020.58 Dian-Balde, Mamadou (UNHCR Deputy Director for Resilience and Solutions), in discussion with the author. January 2020.59 Aplon, Jason, in discussion with the author. January 2020.60 Kugelman, Michael, in discussion with the author. December 2019.

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this case, the Persecution-Source Theory had a correlation in the Afghan case: to an extent, the

external persecution faced by the Afghans is now hindering the UNHCR from coming up with a

solution to alleviate the crisis. As Kurtzer, Dian-Balde, and others have described, 61 when the

root causes of a crisis are inherently political and require major policy reform by the country of

origin, ways of alleviating or working on solutions to a crisis are minimized.

When averaging the values assigned to each interviewee along with budget/expenditure

considerations and UNHCR actions to date, the UNHCR’s use of humanitarian aid as a response

has a value of 1.34.

Figure 13. UNHCR Response to Afghan Refugee Crisis Scale

For use of repatriation as a response toward the Afghan crisis, the value is 1.59, indicating that

the UNHCR has facilitated some instances of successful, orderly return operations of Afghan

refugees, and plans to continue repatriation efforts in the immediate term despite the lack of

61 Dian-Balde, Mamadou, in discussion with the author. January 2020; Kurtzer, Jacob, in discussion with the author. December 2019; interview with UNHCR Consultant. January 2020.

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safety and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Figure 13 applies these values to the two UNHCR

Response Scales.

The Afghan case study illustrates some consistency with the Persecution-Source Theory.

Since we can assert that the constraints placed on the UNHCR’s work are a result of the root

causes of the Afghan crisis—which is external persecution—the UNHCR seeks to (but is

sometimes unable to depending on the conflict) repatriate Afghan refugees back to Pakistan. We

can conclude that the inter-state war and Soviet-led (and ongoing American-led) operations

which generated the Afghan refugee crisis in waves now influence the UNHCR’s responses and

abilities to assist the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. However, many interviewees stressed the

importance of coordination between Afghanistan and Pakistan as another important factor.

Interviewees primarily discussed the UNHCR’s operations under constraints by politics

and the ongoing conflict. Responses show that pressure from Pakistani policy and officials along

with inconsistency in Afghan security make up the majority of pressures exerted onto the

agency. When it comes to the Afghan crisis, respondents described the agency’s expertise and

mission to be respected by major stakeholders.62 UNHCR officials expressed that the willingness

of refugees to repatriate or make related decisions often “depends upon the information they

receive from the UNHCR…as a reliable information source.”63 According to Kugelman and

Aplon, the UNHCR does an effective job of addressing refugee needs, but is in a tricky situation

of “risking non-refoulement.”64 In terms of timing, the longer a refugee crisis lasts or the more

protracted it is, it remains to be seen if the UNHCR will employ repatriation efforts as its

primary crisis response method.65 In the case of the Afghan refugees, there is a limited desire to 62 Aplon, Jason and Sam Grundy (IOM), in discussion with the author. January 2020. 63 Dian-Balde, Mamadou, in discussion with the author. January 2020.64 Aplon, Jason, in discussion with the author. January 2020; Kugelman, Michael, in discussion with the author. December 2019. 65 Sultan-Khan, Athar, in discussion with the author. January 2020. Abraham, Abraham (former refugee official), in discussion with the author. January 2020.

71

return to Afghanistan due to the high levels of integration Afghan refugees have experienced in

Pakistan.66 An IOM official stressed how the forty-year anniversary of the initial displacement

has led to “generations of Afghan refugee families living in Pakistan, with some refugee children

never having been to Afghanistan.”67 This reality, combined with the government of Pakistan

exerting more pressure onto Afghan refugees to leave, regardless of whether the UNHCR is

conducting repatriation operations places the agency in an especially difficult set of

circumstances.

This chapter examined the Afghan refugee crisis as a case study of external persecution,

charting the background of the crisis, and UNHCR responses to it. Chapter 5 concludes with a

summary of my findings and opportunities for future research.

66 Interview with former IOM worker, December 2019.67 Ibid.

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Chapter 5

Conclusion

This project investigates the research questions: Why does the UNHCR sometimes select

repatriation (voluntary return) and other times choose humanitarian assistance as a primary

refugee crisis alleviation method? How does the UNHCR determine a crisis response strategy for

each refugee situation? What impacts the UNHCR’s ability to assist refugees in finding

solutions? It is evident that the root causes of the crisis play an important role in constraining or

impacting the UN Refugee Agency’s ability to help refugees.

I argue that the UNHCR would be more likely to repatriate if the refugee generating

source in the crisis is external. On the other end, the UNHCR would be more likely to select

humanitarian aid and assistance as a crisis response strategy if the persecution source is internal.

These two main groupings of persecution comprise the Persecution-Source Theory.

In the last two chapters, I tested the Persecution-Source Theory through a mixed-methods

research plan, combining qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitatively, an analysis of funding

earmarks to the UNHCR is conducted to determine trends. Qualitatively, research focuses on the

Afghan and Rohingya Refugee Crises as two case studies. Interviews of UNHCR staff, think

tank experts, and individuals associated with substantial donations to the UNHCR within the

context of the case studies are evaluated using thematic analysis.

These chapters tested the Persecution-Source Theory, taking into account funding

allocation toward certain refugee crisis alleviating strategies, media coverage of crises, and a

standard process based on timing. The UNHCR’s ability to select certain crisis response

strategies may be dependent on the donors’ intent for the money. The UNHCR could also

prioritize repatriation as its primary strategy in alleviating refugee crises when a refugee crisis

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receives a lower amount of news coverage relative to other crises, and humanitarian aid with a

higher amount. In terms of timing, the longer a refugee crisis lasts or the more protracted it is,

the more likely the UNHCR will employ repatriation efforts as its primary crisis response

method.

The next section summarizes results from chapters 3 and 4, comparing them. Then, I

discuss observations of the Persecution-Source Theory within the chapter, acknowledging areas

of improvement. I end by looking at the implications of the project and opportunities for future

research.

Findings Overview

This thesis contributes to the growing body of research on the UNHCR and its abilities to

provide solutions for refugees. In Chapter 3, a case study of the Rohingya refugee crisis

including funding changes from 2014-2019 and personal interviews showed that internal

persecution is correlated with the UNHCR selecting humanitarian aid as a primary crisis

response. I looked at recent historical changes that have impacted Rohingya refugees and their

experiences in Bangladesh as the host country. I then investigated the UNHCR’s responses to the

crisis qualitatively through guiding documents and partnerships among countries and parties

involved, and quantitatively by analyzing funding trends. The results do support the Persecution-

Source theory, even against alternative explanations.

Chapter 4 involved a case study of the Afghan refugee crisis, also including funding

changes from 2014-2019. Personal interviews showed that external persecution is correlated with

the UNHCR choosing repatriation as a primary crisis response. This chapter also included a

recent history of Afghan refugees and their experiences in Pakistan as the host country. The

analysis investigated the UNHCR’s responses to the crisis qualitatively through guiding

74

documents and partnerships among countries and parties involved, and quantitatively through

funding trends. The results do lend some support to the Persecution-Source theory, but some

intervening variables illustrate a more complex causal story.

Comparing the Rohingya and Afghan Crises

It appears as if for the Rohingya, the UNHCR solutions strategy is still heavily reliant on

humanitarian assistance due to numerous constraints. The first constraint is the political situation

in Myanmar; the government lacks the legal architecture needed to provide the Rohingya with

citizenship status or a path to obtaining citizenship, therefore, repatriation is not an option.

Furthermore, many refugees do not want to return because it is not safe for them to do so. The

political will by countries to assist Bangladesh and/or to speak out against Myanmar is minimal.

For example, many countries are not helping in terms of resettlement, they are simply

contributing monetarily. Additionally, reintegration or integration is difficult in Bangladesh due

to their fair share of challenges (some of which include the generating refugee mass-movements,

a lack of money, citizens having similar needs as refugees leading to discontent, and climate

change). The result is a need to use humanitarian assistance to maintain the status quo until

different solutions can be implemented.

This contrasts with the Afghan refugees, for the UNHCR uses the SSAR which was

created out of a concern that humanitarian assistance alone, particularly as it has diminished over

the years, is entirely insufficient to address the complex needs of the refugee population and

provide a basis for successful returns and reintegration. Although there may be a desire to

repatriate Rohingya refugees to Myanmar, there is common recognition among scholars and

refugee officials that the means to promote safe, orderly, and voluntary return to Myanmar do

not exist for now. Between Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, the legal mechanisms are much

75

more developed and are stronger (as is the pressure being placed on Afghan refugees to

repatriate from the Pakistan government).

Even though this is the case, this same set of RSD policies that enables the Pakistan

government and the UNHCR to help Afghan refugees is also contributing to, through arbitrary

deadlines, their lack of documentation and safety as they are deported or are unaccounted for.

Moreover, the UNHCR often lacks the capacity to process Afghan refugees via RSD since so

many are approaching the agency as asylum-seekers. This has given more power to the Pakistan

government to only provide resources and care to those documented, leading to the deportation

of undocumented Afghan refugees and/or more instances of forced repatriation to Afghanistan

(potentially non-refoulement). Additionally, a focus on repatriation through larger concentrations

of funding and in terms of policy preferences reveal a push to continue repatriation initiatives

more so in the Afghan case than in other cases. Both the Rohingya and Afghan crises have

unstable situations within Myanmar and Afghanistan, yet the thesis shows how the preference to

repatriate Afghan refugees is much greater than that to repatriate Rohingya refugees.

Testing the Persecution-Source Theory

Therefore, the Afghan and Rohingya case studies show how “policy impedes practice.”

The type of persecution, external for the Afghan refugees and internal for the Rohingya refugees,

did impact the UNHCR’s ability to assist both refugee groups since the nature of the persecution

caused the constraints that the agency now faces. Furthermore, the Persecution-Source Theory

points to the differences in solutions strategies that the UNHCR has taken in these crises, the UN

Refugee Agency seeks to repatriate Afghan refugees whenever possible but not for the Rohingya

refugees since the opportunity to repatriate (or to pursue the other durable solutions) does not yet

exist. In other words, crises generated by internal persecution confine the UNHCR to

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humanitarian assistance-based response strategies since genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other

forms of internal persecution prevent safe conditions and policies for the return of those

displaced. It will take a dramatic shift in circumstances and ideology by the country of origin

responsible for the persecution to alter its behavior and manufacture the political will necessary

to effectively work with and assist the UNHCR.

For external persecution, one can assert that the elimination of the external threat

provides the space the UNHCR needs to facilitate voluntary returns—given that the country of

origin is safe. My investigation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan highlights this does not always

hold when the country of origin is unsafe. The instability in Afghanistan constrains the

UNHCR’s capacity to repatriate Afghan refugees despite the steps already taken and desired to

be taken within the SSAR and legal frameworks. The intent and political will among Pakistan

and Afghanistan tend to be present, the safety necessary for Afghan refugees to repatriate often is

not.

In addition to the importance of political will and safety in the UNHCR response strategy

calculus, it is wise to acknowledge the clarity to which the persecution experienced by the

refugees in the Rohingya and Afghan cases was internal and external. The Rohingya situation is

often linked to the phrase “textbook definition of ethnic cleansing” (100 Days of Horror). It is

evident from a variety of sources that the persecution the Rohingya face is internal, deriving

from the country of origin. For the Afghan case study, however, numerous external actors

became involved in the external persecution of Afghan refugees after the initial invasion by the

Soviets. More specifically, the traditional responses and coordination among the UNHCR with

relevant actors upon the elimination of the external persecution’s source was not seen in

77

Afghanistan. In fact, insecurity remained and increased as a result of continued violence despite

the removal of the preliminary threat.

The implications of this observation yield more importance to the Persecution-Source

Theory and others like it. The Rohingya case exemplifies a clear-cut, concrete scenario of

internal persecution. Inherent to the persecution’s internality are the aforementioned constraints,

namely a lack of political will and safety in the country of origin. Essentially, refugee crises

generated from internal persecution can be expected to come with these constraints. When

controlling for refugees’ desire to return, it makes sense that alleviating the internal threat

through robust policies and social cohesion would increase the likelihood of refugees returning

to their country of origin. Unfortunately, this type of situation is rarely, if ever, seen. It is

unlikely that this outcome will occur soon for the Rohingya refugees, if at all.

However, for external persecution, several different outcomes can take place. The safety

of the country of origin, when controlling for refugees’ desire to return and the implementation

of strong policies and transformative justice, is not necessarily contingent on the elimination of

the external persecution source. Just because the conflict between the USSR and Afghanistan

ended does not mean that Afghanistan is now (or ever was) safe for voluntary returns. This

caveat points to a need for expansion of the Persecution-Source Theory, particularly within the

external and mixed categories of persecution.

Opportunities for Further Research

This research demonstrates that the Persecution-Source Theory can help to make sense of

the complexities of the UNHCR’s work in refugee crises. The thesis shows how consideration of

the root causes of crises can help to better inform policymakers and refugee officials or to predict

78

the constraints the UNHCR will face throughout the duration of a refugee crisis. Moreover, it

signals a greater need for investigation of countries of origin and the causes of refugee crises.

Further research could expand this investigation into other regions to see if the

Persecution-Source Theory and others like it hold within Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and

the Middle East and North Africa. It would be worth engaging in more comparative case studies

in this regard, considering different ethnic conflicts, state-sponsored persecution, and ongoing

war. Additional research could contribute empirically to the refugee literature, testing the

significance of the associations I explored using world data sets. It is also important to continue

studies of the Rohingya and Afghan refugee crises as they evolve.

This paper examined a gap in the literature, where the UNHCR’s response strategies and

the types of persecution refugees experienced are an unacknowledged association. However, this

work also sheds light on the plight of refugees as they seek to find safety for themselves and their

families. In my belief, it is our (shared) responsibility as researchers to continue to inform

policymaking groups and local communities on the dynamics of our world. Although my work

touches upon one unknown within the refugee regime, many others need to be addressed,

whether that is through the plausibility of the Persecution-Source Theory or other means.

Regardless of how we seek to minimize the suffering of our fellow humans, we must persist, for

no one deserves to be forcibly uprooted from the places they call home.

79

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Appendix

Interviewee Interviewee’s Position Date of Interview

Location of Interview

Communication Method

Jacob Kurtzer CSIS Deputy Director and Senior Fellow—Humanitarian Agenda

Dec. 4th, 2019 Washington DC In person

Rudabeh Shahid Atlantic Council—Nonresident Senior Fellow

Dec. 7th, 2019 Washington DC Skype

Michael Kugelman

Wilson Center—Deputy Director of Asia Program, Senior Associate for South Asia

Dec. 11th, 2019 Washington DC In person

Former IOM Worker

Previous Head of IOM Community Stabilization Unit

Dec. 14th, 2019 Washington DC Phone

U.S. State Department Official

Manager and Program Analyst Dec. 28th, 2019 N/A Phone

OCHA Consultant

Humanitarian Affairs Consultant

Jan. 6th, 2020 Geneva, Switzerland

In person

UNHCR Legal Consultant

Associate Legal Officer Jan. 6th, 2020 Geneva, Switzerland

In person

Independent Refugee Consultant

Independent Senior Consultant; former UNHCR Country Director for Afghanistan

Jan. 6th, 2020 Geneva, Switzerland

In person

UNHCR Consultant

UNHCR Consultant—Emergency Services

Jan. 6th, 2020 Geneva, Switzerland

In person

Mamadou Dian-Balde

UNHCR Deputy Director, Division of Resilience and Solutions

Jan. 7th, 2020 UNHCR Headquarters; Geneva, Switzerland

In person

Jason Aplon IOM Transition and Recovery Division, Department of Operations and Emergencies Post Conflict/DDR Advisor

Jan. 7th, 2020 IOM Headquarters; Geneva, Switzerland

In person

Sam Grundy IOM Program Advisor, Transition and Recovery Division

Jan. 7th, 2020 IOM Headquarters; Geneva, Switzerland

In person

Independent Refugee Consultant

Independent Humanitarian Consultant

Jan. 8th, 2020 Geneva, Switzerland

In person

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Athar Sultan-Khan

UNHCR Special Advisor to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Jan. 8th, 2020 Geneva School of Diplomacy & International Relations;Geneva, Switzerland

In person

Daniela Raiman UNHCR Senior Policy Officer and Global CCCM Cluster Coordinator

Jan. 9th, 2020 UNHCR Headquarters; Geneva, Switzerland

In person

Jerome Elie International Council of Voluntary Agencies Senior Policy Officer for Forced Displacement

Jan. 9th, 2020 Geneva, Switzerland

In person

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Persecution-Source Theory Scale Values68

Numerical Values for Scales (Figure 1)Interviewee Rohingya Crisis Afghan Crisis

Jacob Kurtzer Humanitarian=2 Humanitarian=1.5Repatriation=1 Repatriation=1.5

Rudabeh Shahid Humanitarian=2.5 Humanitarian=2Repatriation=0.5 Repatriation=1

Michael Kugelman Humanitarian=2 Humanitarian=1.5Repatriation=1 Repatriation=1.5

Former IOM Worker Humanitarian=2.5 Humanitarian=2Repatriation=0.5 Repatriation=1

U.S. State Department Official Humanitarian=2 Humanitarian=1Repatriation=1 Repatriation=2

OCHA Consultant Humanitarian=2.5 Humanitarian=1Repatriation=0.5 Repatriation=2

UNHCR Consultant Humanitarian=2 Humanitarian=1Repatriation=1 Repatriation=2

Independent Refugee Consultant

Humanitarian=2 Humanitarian=1Repatriation=1 Repatriation=2

UNHCR Consultant Humanitarian=2 Humanitarian=1Repatriation=1 Repatriation=2

Mamadou Dian-Balde Humanitarian=2.5 Humanitarian=1.5Repatriation=0.5 Repatriation=1.5

Jason Aplon Humanitarian=2.75 Humanitarian=1.5Repatriation=0.25 Repatriation=1.5

Sam Grundy Humanitarian=2.75 Humanitarian=1.5Repatriation=0.25 Repatriation=1.5

Independent Refugee Consultant

Humanitarian=2 Humanitarian=1Repatriation=1 Repatriation=2

Athar Sultan-Khan Humanitarian=2.5 Humanitarian=1.25Repatriation=0.5 Repatriation=0.75

Daniela Raiman Humanitarian=2 Humanitarian=1.5Repatriation=1 Repatriation=1.5

Jerome Elie Humanitarian=2.75 Humanitarian=1.25Repatriation=0.25 Repatriation=1.75

Average: Humanitarian Avg.=2.3 Humanitarian Avg.=1.34Repatriation Avg.=0.7 Repatriation Avg.=1.59

68 Based on Figure 1, which shows a humanitarian and repatriation scale to test the Persecution-Source Theory.

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Sample Questions Asked

For the UNHCR:

What is your understanding of how the UNHCR determines what strategies to use to alleviate a large refugee crisis?

Are some refugee crises given more attention than others? If so, why?

When (in the duration of a refugee crisis) does the UNHCR begin to use repatriation as its main strategy if it is used at all?

Do you think the type of persecution that is experienced by refugees influences the UNHCR’s responses in helping them? For example, if a state engages in genocide against people residing in its borders would the UNHCR react differently than if refugees were fleeing persecution from a civil war?

How does the UNHCR handle crises where the state is persecuting its people via genocide or ethnic cleansing (ex. Myanmar)? Is there a pattern?

How does the UNHCR handle crises where terrorist groups or outside forces are persecuting people? Is there a pattern?

How does the UNHCR determine when it is safe for refugees to return to their countries of origin?

Describe the UNHCR’s work with Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.

How influential are the UNHCR’s largest donors in determining what happens on the ground on a 1-10 scale (with 1 being not influential at all and 10 being making key decisions for the UNHCR)?

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