Project Supervisors

Rahimah AbdulrahimExecutive Director, The Habibie CenterHadi KuntjaraDeputy Director for Operations, The Habibie Center

Managing Editor

Ray Hervandi

Thinking ASEAN Team

A. Ibrahim AlmuttaqiAskabea FadhillaFina AstrianaMuhamad ArifRahma SimamoraWirya Adiwena

A Note From the Editor

Articles

Will China’s Four-Point Consensus Lead to A More Polarized ASEAN?

Indonesia’s New ASEAN Foreign Policy

Russia’s Forthcoming Summits with ASEAN and China

Infographic: Indonesia in ASEAN

ASEAN Round-Up

Rodrigo Duterte Has a Commanding Lead in the Polls as the Philippines Goes to Vote

ASEAN Literary Festival Brings the Region’s Finest Writers to Jakarta

Weak Perception, a Challenge to AEC Labor Integration

ASEAN Needs Laos Leadership

Contents

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ISSN 2502-0722

A note from the editorDear readers:

Welcome to the May 2016 issue of Thinking ASEAN!

We turn our attention this month to the strength of ASEAN’s ties with its dialog partners and that strength relates to the internal dynamic of its member countries. ASEAN, the intergovernmental institution that unites almost all of Southeast Asia, draws its strength from how much member countries agree with one another on issues of common concern. As a consequence, ASEAN’s effectiveness is commensurate to the level of internal consensus.

Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, a PhD scholar at the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National University, focuses the first article in this issue. He sketches out the implications of China’s recent Four Point Consensus that exposes the lack of ASEAN’s internal consensus on the South China Sea. He also explores what all this means to ASEAN’s dialog partners with interest in the issue.

Meanwhile, in the second article of this issue, Muhammad Arif, researcher at the ASEAN Studies Program at the Habibie Center, explores whether the alleged weakening of Indonesian support for ASEAN is more than just rhetoric. In his search for evidence, he examines what President Joko Widodo has actually been doing vis-à-vis ASEAN.

Dr. Victor Sumsky, who directs the ASEAN Centre at MGIMO University in Moscow, Russia, devotes the third article in this issue to an overview of Russia’s upcoming summits with ASEAN and China. He underlines what exactly makes ASEAN attractive to Russia, in comparison to China, and vice versa.

Our infographic this month provides snippets of the evolution of Indonesian membership in ASEAN. Our ASEAN Round-Up articles features the result of the recent presidential election in the Philippines, this year’s ASEAN literary festival, AEC labor integration, and Laos leadership in ASEAN.

Please don’t hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have suggestions or prospective submissions.

Happy reading!

Best regards from Jakarta,

Ray Hervandi

Managing Editor

Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.

The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.

Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.

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Will China’s Four-Point Consensus Lead to A More Polarized ASEAN?

Balikatan 2009 military exercises between US and the Philippines. Photo Credit: US Navy/Wikimedia Commons.

Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto is Indonesian Presidential PhD Scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Australian National University.

On April 23, 2016, China reached a so-called four-point consensus with Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, and Laos. The consensus states that the South China Sea disputes are not an issue between China and ASEAN; “the imposition of unilateral will” to solve disputes is opposed; all disputes should be resolved through Article 4 of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties; and countries other than ASEAN and China “should play a constructive role rather than the other way around.”1

The consensus came about not long after a maritime incident between China and Indonesia in the South China Sea as well as while the case between China and the Philippines is underway at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, the Netherlands. To that extent, the consensus might allow China to better anticipate stronger resistance from some ASEAN countries against Beijing’s nine-dash, or U-shaped, line in the South China Sea.

Importance of the consensus

The four-point consensus was interesting for three reasons. First, it was agreed between China and only three ASEAN countries, including one claimant, Brunei. China’s move was surprising. By cajoling only the three countries, Beijing reinforces the impression that it is interfering in ASEAN’s affairs and polarizing ASEAN as far as the South China Sea disputes are concerned. On the other hand, Chinese analysts argue that the consensus demonstrated, “ASEAN members are not united on many issues, including the South China Sea.”2 In other words, the so-called consensus is not a consensus at all since it alienates seven other ASEAN members, whose voices also matter when deciding ASEAN policies on the South China Sea.

Second, the consensus aimed to anticipate the PCA ruling, which China might refer to as the “imposition of unilateral will” by the Philippines. Defying Beijing, Manila expects the PCA to clarify whether China’s U-shaped line claim is consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and whether the features occupied by the claimants are entitled to UNCLOS maritime jurisdictions, such as the 12-nautical mile territorial sea and/or the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A ruling unfavorable to China’s stance could give the Philippines and other ASEAN claimants commanding legal and moral heights vis-à-vis Beijing—though this does not imply ASEAN claims are UNCLOS-compliant either.3 The consensus has therefore given Beijing a reason to defy the PCA’s ruling, whatever it might turn out to be, in advance despite its legal obligation to comply as a signatory to UNCLOS.

Third, the consensus was reached shortly after Laos had taken over the chairmanship of ASEAN from Malaysia. Reflecting the four-point consensus, Laos agreed with China that the South China Sea disputes “are not an issue between China and ASEAN,” that they should be negotiated peacefully only between the claimants, and that China’s rejection of the PCA process is therefore understandable.4

For Laos, the consensus and ASEAN chairmanship could give it disproportionate clout over issues sensitive to China. Laos could preempt initiatives from other ASEAN members to raise South China Sea disputes in the upcoming ASEAN forums that it will soon chair. If true, this move could repeat the failure of the Cambodian chairmanship of ASEAN in 2012 when Phnom Penh failed to facilitate the production of a joint communiqué that prompted Indonesia’s face-saving efforts for ASEAN to issue a six-point principle.

A more polarized ASEAN?

The four-point consensus raised the concern of an openly polarized ASEAN. Using its economic clout, Beijing could highlight intra-ASEAN differences that will complicate, if not subvert, a common ASEAN position on the South China Sea. To be fair, although the consensus has exposed fissures in ASEAN more clearly, it simply reflects existing differences among ASEAN members rather than an exclusively Beijing-engineered attempt at dividing the regional organization.

In 2014, China was already the largest investor and trading partner of Cambodia and Laos, with funding including the support for the China-Laos railway project that will turn Laos from a land-locked country into a land-linked one.5 In addition, Beijing includes Brunei in the “Belt and Road Initiative,” supports Brunei’s Wawasan 2035 development plan, and advances Brunei’s economic diversification strategy amid low global oil prices.6 Individual economic stakes might consequently make the implementation of the so-called ASEAN Way, which precludes the rule of majority, more difficult. In other words, ASEAN cannot agree unless every member state agrees.

At issue will be the reaction from member countries that are concerned with what consequences the consensus might mean to the unity of ASEAN. Three paths are already discernible. First, other ASEAN states could follow the Philippines’ arbitration move or its variations. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia have said they would consider the option of international arbitration.

If they do so, they will raise China’s reputational and diplomatic costs within ASEAN, even with the possibility of opposition from other members.

Second, they could intensify efforts to balance China by promoting security cooperation with countries equally wary of Beijing’s intent in the South China Sea. The United States may soon lift the arms embargo against Vietnam, while Japan has promoted closer coastguard cooperation with Vietnam and the Philippines. In addition, the United States has initiated bilateral airborne maritime surveillance exercises with Indonesia over the South China Sea that complements US surveillance flights from Malaysia, and Australia’s long-running security commitment under Operation Gateway.

Third, ASEAN could continue improving individual maritime defense and security capabilities. Vietnam has acquired six Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, while the Philippines ordered two strategic sealift vessels from Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesia and Malaysia will bolster their military presence in the South China Sea—an unprecedented decision that both countries would not take lightly.

On the other hand, ASEAN has also learned about the divisive prospect of pushing the South China Sea issue too hard on its agenda. A delicate balance must thus be struck between maintaining cohesion among ASEAN members, while accommodating their many wishes. However, there is no reason for ASEAN to conclude that the two are necessarily irreconcilable. The 2015 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus provides a telling example of how members can agree to disagree, which in a way represents the institution’s progress towards maturity. In fact, individual members seem careful not to burn bridges with China lest they could not depend on alternative partners from outside the region. Notwithstanding their promises of support, uncertainties loom large in the roles the outsiders play in the region.

The outsiders: spoilers or stabilizers?

In general, the outsiders maintain geostrategic, geoeconomic, and legal stakes in the South China Sea. Geostrategic imperatives do not only compel them to support or defend allies, such as the United States in the Philippines, but also to check each other’s moves. Russian-US tensions over Ukraine and Eastern Europe have contributed to Moscow’s closer alignment with Beijing to oppose US interference in the South China Sea. Likewise, Japan’s decision to provide maritime security aids to some ASEAN claimants will improve their resilience in the face of Chinese maritime assertiveness that Tokyo also faces in the East China Sea.

While the United States remains neutral when it comes to the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, it has become increasingly active in challenging China’s reclamation activities in the South China Sea by conducting the so-called Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) and encourage allies, such as Japan and Australia, to follow suit, if not publicly endorse US actions. Interestingly, ASEAN remains ambivalent toward such operations. While the Philippines supported the US FONOP, Indonesia’s top security minister has criticized them, saying such operations would constitute part of the problem rather than solving it.

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Indeed, US-led FONOP remains contentious for several reasons. First, the objectives of FONOP remain unclear: Do they challenge excessive maritime claims by anyone or focus solely on China’s? Washington may insist that such operations have been continuous and consistent against all countries with excessive maritime claims, yet. ASEAN observers cannot help but conclude that FONOPs in the South China Sea are targeted against China. Second, the United States itself has not ratified UNCLOS that makes it less credible to challenge China’s maritime claims. Without ratifying UNCLOS, the United States might give off a hypocritical impression not only to China but to ASEAN claimant states that expect it to also play by the rules.

Third, FONOP would raise the risk of incidents at sea between China and the United States with potential consequences for ASEAN claimants as the littoral states. Although the United States and China have so far been circumspect in dealing with FONOP, orchestrated escalations during their conduct are not without risks. As Beijing continues to militarize its occupied features, the risk of incidents between maritime units involved, afloat or airborne, will increase that may not only result in escalating tensions but also inadvertent conflicts.

Meanwhile, geoeconomic and legal stakes also motivate Japan, India and some European Union (EU) countries to remain engaged in the South China Sea. India has energy concessions in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone that overlaps with China’s nine-dash line. Meanwhile, Japan is interested in seeing how the South China Sea disputes would implicate its own territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyou Islands. All of them are determined to maintain the safety and security of military and economic sea lines of communications (SLOC) through the South China Sea.

Despite China’s accusations of growing intervention, the involvement of outsiders is actually limited since they remain preoccupied with more proximate concerns. Amid the uncertainty over its rebalance, doubts linger over the extent of US commitment. The United States may not only want to check Chinese maritime assertiveness, but also must instil confidence in ASEAN over the price Washington is willing to pay for that commitment in the face of crises elsewhere.7

In spite of the Act East Policy, the Indian Navy still lags adequate capacity for long-distant power projection beyond the Indian Ocean, while land boundary disputes with Pakistan and China continue to divert India’s strategic attention away from the sea. Despite their diplomatic support to some of the claimants, Japan and Russia are likewise concerned with their own disputes in the East China Sea and the East Sea. All this leaves Australia the only country credible enough to focus exclusively on the South China Sea, but its capacity as a middle power is limited and contingent on how the US commitment above enables what Australia can do.

On ASEAN’s part, frustrations and desperation over its inability to challenge and deter Chinese maritime assertiveness have led them to invite or welcome the involvement of outsiders with their different interests. Whether these outsiders are seen as spoilers and stabilizers really depends on how ASEAN countries expect and allow them to play. Outsiders might increase the individual deterrence of ASEAN claimants against China, but they can also reinforce Chinese perceptions that some ASEAN

members exploit the outsiders to contain China diplomatically and militarily. Increasing the involvement of outsiders could also complicate ASEAN’s efforts to reach a consensus with China in formulating the Code of Conduct (CoC), if not also in implementing the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. However, China should partly shoulder the blame. What ASEAN countries do with the outsiders is largely a reaction to China’s behavior. A more polarized ASEAN could thus become Beijing’s self-fulfilling prophecy: the more China pushes to enforce the U-shaped line (including through militarization and fortification of its U-shaped line, and stalling on the progress to formulate the CoC), the more ASEAN claimants will increase reliance on support from the outsiders.

Endnotes

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Talks about China’s Four-Point Consen-sus on South China Sea Issue with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos,” April 23, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1358478.shtml

2. Kor Kian Beng, “Beijing trying to show split in Asean over South China Sea,” The Straits Times, April 25, 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/beijing-trying-to-show-split-in-asean-over-south-china-sea

3. James Kraska, “Forecasting the South China Sea Arbitration Award,” Maritime Awareness Project, April 27, 2016, http://maritimeawarenessproject.org/2016/04/27/forecasting-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-merits-award/

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Chi-na, “Wang Yi: China and Laos Reach Consensus on South China Sea Issue and China Appreciates Laos’ Objective and Fair Stance,” April 23, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1358479.shtml

5. Tian Shaohui, “Laos, China pledge to further boost bilateral ties,” Xinhua, April 23, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/23/c_135306185.htm

6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Chi-na, “Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzadin Waddaulah of Brunei Meets with Wang Yi,” April 21, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activi-ties_663312/t1358164.shtml

7. Michael Green et al, Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), 43-47.

Indonesia’s New ASEAN Foreign Policy

President Joko Widodo with Lao PDR President Choummaly Sayasone.Photo Credit: Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia.

Muhamad Arif is Researcher at the ASEAN Studies Program of the Habibie Center.

In contrast to earlier widespread belief, Indonesia under President Joko Widodo is not abandoning ASEAN. Indonesian foreign policy towards ASEAN, however, is now based on a more pragmatic and realistic approach that derives from an objective assessment of the country’s national interests in a changing strategic environment. What skeptics say…

When Joko Widodo was inaugurated as Indonesian president in October 2014, he was expected to be different from his predecessors in leading the third-largest democracy with an expanding international profile. After all, this is the man who rose to power from the margins. Only two years before becoming the most powerful man in Indonesia, whose complexity of problems it faces is matched only by the enormously diverse threads of its sociocultural fabric, Jokowi was a mayor of the small city of Surakarta in Central Java. He was an alien to the oligarchic politics of Jakarta, in which power is mostly defined by proximity to old, powerful elite families, the military or the business community. If there is one thing to be least expected from the furniture trader-turned-president, it should be his excellence in foreign policy.

Thus we saw a widespread nuance of skepticism on Indonesian foreign policy under Jokowi. Jokowi is identified as “… new to the practice of diplomacy” and “does not appear to come to the presidency with any strong views about Indonesia’s place in the world, or any particular passion for the subject.”1 Jokowi’s inexperience was also expected to bring about “an element of the unknown into Indonesian foreign policy.”2

Furthermore, analysts also predicted that Jokowi, who had spent most of his time as mayor and governor taking care of public services, would be preoccupied with domestic concerns and distracted from international issues.3

Perhaps, no other actors in international politics were more worried about Indonesia’s inward turn in foreign policy than its fellow members in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). An “emerging power narrative” and realist turn, one analyst argues, has moved Indonesia away from ASEAN, leaving the regional grouping leaderless, more divided and weak.4

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Domestic orientation and preference for bilateralism over multilateralism also appear to strengthen this shift in Indonesia’s ASEAN policy.4 As the primus inter pares in ASEAN, Indonesia has enough heft that signs of determined change can send other members of ASEAN and extraregional actors into nervous mode.5

The truth…

Almost two years into his presidency, Jokowi has proven, in contrast to what skeptics say, that Indonesia under his rule has not turned its back on diplomacy. He has, instead, scored a number of notable achievements in all four areas of priorities in Indonesian foreign policy: securing Indonesian sovereignty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, intensifying economic diplomacy and increasing Indonesian role in regional and international affairs.

Indonesia, for instance, has speeded up territorial borders negotiations with neighboring countries. In late 2015, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs completed the evacuation of 2,393 Indonesian citizens from the civil war in Yemen, which the Ministry claims as “the biggest, most complex and quickest” evacuation Indonesian government had ever done in history. In the area of economic diplomacy, Indonesia diplomats have also been active in promoting export, investment and tourism. Indonesia was actively involved in about 37 meetings and negotiations on economic partnership agreement during the course of 2015. Finally, Indonesian diplomatic machinery has also been active in increasing Indonesian role in regional and international affairs. Most notable achievements in this area include the Indonesian chairmanship of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indonesia’s active role in supporting the independence of Palestine—including by hosting the Fifth Extraordinary OIC Summit on Palestine and Al-Quds Al-Sharif—and the promotion of maritime cooperation in the region.

Similarly, with regard to ASEAN, Indonesia is anything but abandoning it. In 2015, Indonesia actively pushed to promote a number of initiatives in ASEAN, including to streamline the regional grouping’s meetings, to enhance the capacity of the Indonesia-led ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR), to promote the rights of migrant workers as well as to promote maritime cooperation in the ASEAN-driven East Asia Summit (EAS). A strengthened leadership of Indonesia in ASEAN also remains one of the strategic goals to achieve, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Planning 2015-2019. It is also in Indonesian interests to enhance the ASEAN-led economic cooperation such as ASEAN Economic Community and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Examining the course of Indonesian diplomacy in the last one and a half years, thus, suggests that Jokowi’s inexperience in diplomacy does not translate into inactivism in Indonesian foreign policy. This gap would only be understandable if we closely examine the new foreign policymaking structure of

the country that has enabled a more realistic and pragmatist approach of foreign policy based on an objective assessment of changing strategic environment Indonesia is facing.

It’s not only about Jokowi, it’s also about people around him…

In this piece, I have argued that the case of Indonesian foreign policy is best understood not by looking merely on what government officials’ statements for Indonesian foreign policy is more than that.6 Over the course of its history, Indonesian foreign policy has been influenced significantly by a range of domestic factors, i.e. from the domestic political structure to the nature of civil-military relations. At particular points in time, even factors as micro as the leader’s adherence to certain cultural beliefs overpower other factors in influencing Indonesian foreign policy.7 Hence, the understanding and explanation of the nature of Indonesian foreign policy under Jokowi, in this case towards ASEAN, should be informed by the grasp of within-the-country dynamics.

Jokowi himself is not the most foreign policy-proficient president Indonesia has seen. He, however, has equipped himself with a foreign policy-making structure whose expertise offsets Jokowi’s lack of experience. It is known, for instance, that Jokowi made himself humbly receptive for briefings on foreign policy issues by a team of intellectuals he had assembled during his campaign two years ago.

Most notable among these advisors is Rizal Sukma, who was the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Jakarta-based influential think tank, and Indonesian leading analyst on international politics. Sukma is indeed considered as “Jokowi’s closest foreign policy aide.”8 It is very likely that Jokowi maintains communication with Rizal Sukma even after the latter was appointed as the Indonesian ambassador to the United Kingdom.

Also influential is Andi Widjajanto, a former defense scholar at the University of Indonesia who resigned his position to lead Jokowi’s campaign team. After the presidential election, Andi served as one of the deputies on the transition team for defense and security matters and later spent a brief time as the Cabinet Secretary.

Jokowi, in other words, might not be as dominant as his predecessors in foreign-policy formulation, but that is for good rather than for bad. The group of intellectual advisors around him comprises the top analysts and scholars of international relations in the country. Jokowi plays his part by letting these intellectuals to provide an academically sound and objective assessment of the country’s national interests and the changing strategic environment in which those interests are going to be pursued. It is important to note that it is indeed Rizal Sukma who has been long advocating for Indonesia to be more assertive vis-à-vis its ASEAN foreign policy.9

Most of these intellectuals that were influential in charting the course for Jokowi to win the presidency are no longer around.

Rizal Sukma, as noted before, is now the ambassador in the United Kingdom, while Andi was forced to leave the cabinet in 2015 most probably due to political pressure. The foreign policy guideline they formulated, however, remains intact and followed by Jokowi until today.

In addition to the informal intellectual advising circle, Jokowi also makes sure that his formal cabinet can deliver. Political pressure from his own party and coalition partners notwithstanding, Jokowi manages to slip in technocratic figures in a number of strategic ministerial posts. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, is a well-experienced diplomat. Although she lacks the high profile and charisma of her predecessor, she knows how to get things done. She was at the forefront in the campaign to evacuate Indonesian citizens from Yemen last year. She also took an active role in the Indonesian mission to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran when diplomatic relations between the two countries worsened earlier this year. Minister Marsudi also deserves credit for being an active part of Indonesian “total diplomacy” to rescue Indonesians kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf terrorist group recently. In quite a similar fashion, Jokowi posted Thomas Lembong, a soft-spoken Harvard graduate with extensive experience in trade and investment, as his Minister of Trade. Despite much criticism for his pro-market stance, Minister Lembong is undoubtedly a man who knows what he is doing.

The latest promising developments in Indonesian foreign policy-making also include the greater engagement of non-governmental actors, i.e. think tanks, civil society organizations and academia. As foreign policy is no longer the exclusive domain of a few members of the policy-making elites, it has to be formulated within complex power structures where the government is no longer the dominant actor and the role of public opinion and non-government actors has become increasingly important.10

Focus group discussions on specific foreign policy issues held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs inviting experts from the NGOs and universities are now more common.

The prominence of the presidential advisory group, the technocratic approach in strategic ministerial posts and the opening up of the foreign policy-making structure to engage broader non-governmental components have enabled more objective and intellectually informed foreign policymaking. The emergence of “groupthink” is also prevented by this new foreign policymaking structure. Although sometimes parochial interests of certain individuals or groups within or outside the government still get into the process, Indonesia now has a more pragmatic and realistic foreign policy grounded in objective assessment of the country’s national interests and its changing strategic environment.

What Jokowi is actually doing with ASEAN…

So what does Indonesian foreign policy towards ASEAN under Jokowi really entail? As noted before, as part of its broader course of foreign policy, Indonesian foreign policy towards ASEAN is now based on a more pragmatic and realistic

approach driven by an objective assessment of the country’s national interests and the changing strategic environment in which those interests are going to be pursued. Gone are the days when Indonesians were willing to compromise on national interest for the sake of ASEAN cohesion. Gone as well are the days when Indonesia would punch below its weight and imprisoned itself in the “golden cage”11 of ASEAN. Indonesia is indeed now embarking on a course of foreign policy that Sukma advocated almost a decade ago when he advocated that “Indonesia should free itself from any undeserving obligation to follow the wishes of any state or a grouping of states, including ASEAN, if by doing so we sacrifice our own national interests” and that it “no longer hesitant about taking a different track from other ASEAN member countries.” Gone are the days of the naïve “thousands friends zero enemies” foreign policy.12

There is renewed realization that Indonesia is destined to play a greater role at the regional as well as international levels. Indonesia is geographically destined to be placed right at the center of the world’s geoeconomic and geopolitical gravity that is shifting to this region. Indonesia’s position as a hub and in the major transit routes of world trade makes it natural for the country to have greater strategic interests. Moreover, demographic features—a large working workforce and a Muslim-majority, democratic population—are among the potentials Indonesia is exploiting. It seems self-evident that ASEAN is too small for a country as big as Indonesia. But that is not the case.

A firm and outward-looking foreign policy approach does not mean that Indonesia is abandoning ASEAN. Indonesia cofounded the regional grouping five decades ago and it remains committed to build its foreign policy around it. In other words, ASEAN remains a cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. In fact, strengthening ASEAN serves Indonesian greater strategic interests. Regional peace and stability, for instance, is one of Indonesian primary national interests.

And the role of ASEAN is crucial in this matter at it remains the most advanced and mature regional diplomatic modality to build a new regional security architecture based on rule and laws rather than competitive balance of power. ASEAN-led regional forums should be strengthened and serve as the avenues for enhanced diplomatic interaction among regional and external powers. A successful ASEAN can also serve as a role model to be adopted in Indonesia’s other areaa of interest in the Indian Ocean in which regional cooperation remains underdeveloped. Indonesia can become a truly “global maritime fulcrum” when it can lead two functional regional organizations in its two neighboring oceans, the Pacific and the Indian.

Indonesia’s new realistic and pragmatic foreign policy towards ASEAN can appear to be a drastic departure from the previous administrations. Surely, not everyone is comfortable with it and certain countries might need some time to get used to it. In the end, they can rest assured that Indonesia is anchored in ASEAN and its new leadership approach in the regional organization is actually what everyone needs.

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Endnotes

1. Aaron L. Connelly, Indonesian Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi, Lowy Institute Analyses (Sidney, 2014), 5.

2. Adelle Neary, “Indonesia under Jokowi: A Foreign Policy Driven by a ‘Global Maritime Nexus,’” cogitASIA, 2014, http://cogitasia.com/indonesia-under-jokowi-a-foreign-policy-driven-by-a-global-maritime-nexus/.

3. Ibid.

4. Vibhanshu Shekhar, Realist Indonesia’s Drift Away from ASEAN, Asia Pacific Bulletin (Washington, D.C., 2015).

5. Avery Poole, “Is Jokowi Turning His Back on ASEAN?,” The Diplomat, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/is-jokowi-turning-his-back-on-asean/.

6. See Muhammad Arif, “Realism and Indonesian Foreign Policy: Not So Much About the International Structure than Domestic Politics” paper presented in the Biannual International Conference on Indonesian Politics and Government 2015, Universitas Indonesia, November 3rd 2015; Muhammad Arif, “Understanding Indonesian Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realism Approach” upcoming in-book chapter; Muhammad Arif, “Intervensi Militer Indonesia Di Timor Portugis 7 Desember 1975: Analisa Kebijakan Luar Negeri Pada Level Sistem Internasional, Politik Domestik Dan Individu,” GLOBAL: Jurnal Politik Internasional 15, no. 2 (2014).

7. See Ibid.

8. Aaron L. Connelly, “Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo’s Foreign Policy Challenges,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 37, no. 1 (2015): 1–28.

9. See Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy,” The Jakarta Post, June 30, 2009; Rizal Sukma, “A Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy for a Post-G8 World,” The Jakarta Post, 2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/05/a-postasean-foreign-policy-a-postg8-world.html.

10. Rizal Sukma, “Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Possibilities,” in Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2012), 77–92. A detailed and comprehensive account on the impact of democratization on Indonesian foreign policy, see Muhammad Wirajuda, “The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: Regional Cooperation, Promotion of Political Values, and Conflict Management” (The London School of Economic and Political Science (LSE), 2014).

11. Sukma, “Indonesia Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy.”

12. Sukma, “A Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy for a Post-G8 World.”

Russia’s Forthcoming Summits with ASEAN and ChinaDr. Victor Sumsky is Director of the ASEAN Centre at MGIMO University, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

Saint Petersburg, Russia. Palace Embankment, house 38 (Winter Palace).Photo Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

Two forthcoming summits are looming large on Russia’s immediate Asian agenda. The first one is to take place on May 19-20 in Sochi, where the leaders of Russia and ASEAN will commemorate the 20th anniversary of their dialog partnership. The second one, between President Xi and President Putin, is scheduled somewhat later in June in Beijing.

In anticipation of these events, several interrelated questions are popping up in the global—or shall we say pro-Western?—media. Are the Russians and the Chinese really getting that close to forming some kind of grand alliance? If yes, then what are the potential consequences for the rest of Asia, including ASEAN? Is Russia resigning itself to the role of China’s junior partner? What is so valuable, from ASEAN’s point of view, in a partnership with Russia? Can it offer ASEAN anything that the other partners would not or cannot offer?

The Issue of Russia’s Alliance with China

There is a distinctive touch of schizophrenia in mainstream Western thinking about the possibility of Russia and China forming a strategic alliance worthy of the name. Too many debates on the issue start and end with the conclusion that such an alliance will never materialize, or if it somehow does, it will not result in anything substantial. The standard arguments refer to post-Soviet Russia being depopulated and technologically backward, China being far more dynamic economically than Russia but essentially a colossus on feet of clay, and both of them harboring such historically motivated suspicions that preclude the growth of genuine trust.

10Issue 11 / May 2016

Isn’t it remarkable though that these debates have proceeded nonstop at least for a couple of decades? More than that, they are now acquiring a new momentum. Basically, it betrays a growing uneasiness about the fact that, contrary to popular beliefs, the process of Russia-China rapprochement continues and deepens.

A striking example of dualism in assessing the potential of Russia-China interactions is Barack Obama’s geopolitics—namely his synchronized attempts to cut Russia away from Europe and to create a split between China and Asia. In the first instance, his government does so by promoting the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and provoking the crisis in Ukraine. In the second instance, it presses hard for conclusion of the Transpacific Partnership Agreement, exploiting to the US advantage on the tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula.

On the one hand, the current US administration is striving to undermine further progress in China’s modernization and Russia’s recovery from the 1990s chaos precisely because considerable progress—more obvious in China’s case, of course—has been already achieved. On the other hand, while Washington’s own maneuvers are actually pushing Moscow and Beijing towards each other, Americans remain remarkably unconcerned by it. Most probably, they still persist in their conviction that Russia and China cannot make it together under any conceivable circumstances. But in the not-so-distant future, it may turn out that Obama and his team had made a fatal policy flaw.

A Truly Sovereign Player…

Once in a while, an observer posing as Russia’s well-wisher or even a friend will publicly complain that if the country continues to pursue closer cooperation with China, it is bound to be reduced to the latter’s junior partner, ending up in a position compatible neither with Russia’s own great power ambitions nor with the aspirations of other Asian actors. This line of thinking is mostly supported by general references to the asymmetry between Russia and China as far as their socioeconomic trajectories are concerned.

But isn’t this asymmetry typical of China’s present relations with almost all the other global and regional partners? If so, why specifically Russia should be denied the option of active involvement with China?

Or will Asia be happier in case of a sudden estrangement between the two mighty neighbors? To figure out the answer, one only has to remember the numerous shocks that the Moscow-Beijing feud produced on the continent in the Cold War era.

At the same time Russia’s strategic behavior during the last decade is not at all an imitation of what and how China has been doing—not because Russia is inherently more ‘aggressive’ but

due to the need to respond adequately to the way it is treated by the United States and the West as a whole.

Judging Putin’s Russia by the measurements of the Yeltsin era, Washington tried to press it into submission by drawing former Soviet republics into the US orbit. It does so by enlarging NATO, creating new military bases and anti-missile defense facilities along the Russian perimeter, but it is utterly failing to achieve its objectives. When Russia retaliated by repulsing Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia, refused to extradite Edward Snowden to America and provided support to Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, the United States and its allies went berserk. A violent coup in Ukraine, a worldwide media campaign to demonize the Russian president and the imposition of economic sanctions were in sum tantamount to an attempted regime change.

Once again, the result was the opposite of what was expected. Crimea’s bloodless and joyful reunification with Russia, and later on a successful antiterror campaign in Syria brought Vladimir Putin’s popularity ratings to unprecedentedly high levels. The newest state of the art equipment—be it Kaliber-guided missiles fired at the Daesh targets from as far as the Caspian Sea or military robots impressively tested on Syrian battlefields—demonstrated to the world the true technological resources of the Russian economy.

Deeds speak louder than words, and choruses of professional Russophobes cannot change that. By virtue of its deeds, Russia has reemerged as a great power with no reservations, one of the very few sovereign players on the global stage. Having done that, will it be ready to merely play a second fiddle to somebody else? The answer is a definite no.

…and a Multipolar World Champion

During their recent meeting, Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Wang Yi confirmed that both Russia and China are opposing moves to internationalize the South China Sea dispute. Would this be enough to claim that Russia is joining China in the attempts to split ASEAN over the South China Sea issues, and therefore the accord between the two powers is bad for ASEAN solidarity?

In this scheme of reasoning ASEAN’s best friend is the United States, which is inspiring the Association’s members to take a unified position on the South China Sea. At present, this is not likely to happen, but if it somehow happens in the future indefinite, what would it mean for the proverbial ASEAN centrality—the principle that forms the foundation of the emerging East Asian security architecture? It is brutally clear that in this scenario, ASEAN as a regional moderator is forced to commit a suicide by becoming a de facto American ally, and the hypothetical security system in which it is now promised a central role will not be constructed.

With this in view, let’s get back to what the mutual understanding between Russia and China mean for ASEAN in

a deep, fundamental sense. As long as Russia and China stand by each other like they do it now, it is impossible to ‘isolate’—or ‘contain’ or ‘encircle’— either of them. Together, they have a chance to secure a relatively safe passage from a unipolar ‘guided chaos’ to a multipolar world order.

For ASEAN, it is time to realize that the Asian Century vision is incompatible with unipolarity but harmonizes fairly well with the vision of a multipolar world. If so, then Russia, China and ASEAN have a serious reason to see each other as strategic partners in a long-term historical perspective.

A framework for their comprehensive interactions was recently suggested by President Putin. Addressing the Federal Assembly of Russia on December 3, 2015, he proposed to start consultations on possible economic cooperation between Eurasian Economic Union (comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (of which both Russia and China are founding members) and ASEAN.

Beyond doubt, this initiative will be discussed at both the Sochi and the Beijing summits. Let us wait and see how quickly the Russian proposal will be followed by concrete steps, if any. But let us also remember that the way of such grand projects is rarely, if ever, smooth.

10Issue 9 / March 2016

As the primus inter pares in Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s importance to ASEAN goes beyond its geography and demographic heft. As a founding member of ASEAN, Indonesia’s support and active participation in the regional institution is a source of ASEAN strength. A change in Indonesian policy can have consequences for ASEAN.

Indonesia in ASEAN

SUKARNO

Struggle against colonialism and injustice

SUHARTO

Economic development and political stability,

domestically and regionally, anticommunism.• 1948 Indonesia bases

its foreign policies on the “free and active” principle coined by Vice President

Mohammad Hatta.

• 1963 Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines agree to cooperate in a loose regional confederation known as Maphilindo.

• 29 August 1963, Malaysia announced to declare the feeration on 16 September 1963. The policy of Konfrontasi cause a major downfall of Southeast Asia’s trust towards Indonesia

• 1967 Indonesia and the other four founding members establish ASEAN as a cooperation institution as the region is buffeted by communist threats.

• 1971 Indonesia and other ASEAN member states initiate the Zone for Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) on November 27. The initiative reiterates members’ commitment to stability and security from external interference in any form.

• 1976 Indonesia hosts the Bali Summit, resulting in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The treaty is a code of conduct for regional relations and a guideline for the pacific settlement of disputes.

“Emil Salim reportedly described ASEAN as that club of Adam Malik” (Anwar, 1997 p.54)

BACHARUDDIN JUSUF HABIBIE

• 1997-1998 Indonesia struggles with the Asian Financial Crisis and its aftermath. Since Reformasi, Indonesia plays a more passive role in ASEAN.

• 1999 UN-sponsored popular referendum on Timor Leste independence unfolded.

ABDURRAHMAN WAHID

• 2001 Indonesia hosted workshops for ASEAN and Human rights mechanism over 2001-2004.

• President Joko Widodo commenting on foreign policy ‘Our foreign policy is free and active. We make friends with all countries; but only when doing so would be beneficial to our people. Do not just make friends if we are disadvantaged.’ (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/01/has-jokowi-put-asean-sidelines.html)

MEGAWATISOEKARNO PUTRI

Indonesia strengthened the relations with great powers - United States, China and Russia - as well as with the

ASEAN countries

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

Focused on ASEAN countries followed by increasing engagement

globally.

• 2009 Indonesia is at the forefront for the establishment of AICHR, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.

• 2009-2014 Under Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa’s leadership, Indonesia pursues a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ policy to build regional mechanisms driven by middle powers with no overly dominant powers.

• 2011 Indonesia leads the negotiations between Thailand and Cambodia to settle the Preah Vihear disputes.

JOKOWI

Is ASEAN still a cornerstone in Indonesia

foreign policy?

• Rizal Sukma, former executive of Jakarta-based think tank CSIS: “We used to say ASEAN is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Now we change it to a cornerstone of our foreign policy.”

• President Joko Widodo’s plans to turn Indonesia into a global maritime fulcrum have led neighboring countries to be more alert to its growing assertiveness. Indonesia sinks foreign vessels proved to have exploited its maritime resources illegally.

• 2003 Indonesia promoted democracy and human rights as Southeast Asian regional values.

• 2003 Indonesia pushes for the establishment of a security community. ASEAN agrees to it, along with the establishment of the AESC.

• 2004 Indonesia drafted a plan of action that sees regular and free general elections to occur in all ASEAN countries by 2017.

14Issue 11 / May 2016

ASEAN ROUND-UPRodrigo Duterte Has a Commanding Lead in the Polls as the Philippines Goes to Vote

TIME, 8 May 2016

The boorish frontrunner—who during campaigning made jokes about rape, his penis and killing his children if they took drugs—is tipped to win

It was all grins in Davao City on Monday morning, as voters lined up to cast ballots for the new President of the Philippines, confident that their pugnacious mayor, Rodrigo Duterte, would romp home after building a commanding lead in latest polls…

… Human-rights groups allege that “death squads” reporting to Duterte stalk criminals across sprawling Davao and conduct summary executions that have claimed hundreds of innocent lives. However, Duterte is unapologetic for the tactics he’s used to clean up this city of 1.5 million, once renowned as a lawless hub of communists, Islamic militants and gangsters, but which now has a reputation for thriving security.

“If I make it to the presidential palace, I will do just what I did as mayor,” Duterte told a crimson sea of 200,000 supporters in Manila’s Rizal Park on Saturday. “All of you who are into drugs, you sons of bitches, I will really kill you. I have no patience, I have no middle ground, ether you kill me or I will kill you idiots.”

Why it matters: Duterte is a polarizing figure in the Philippines. His opponents often highlighted Duterte human rights abuses allegations. Meanwhile, his supporters seem to vote him for his strong style of leadership and his promise of order—perhaps a ‘bloody’ one, as he himself said, but order nonetheless. This is another example of why democracy in Southeast Asia is an ongoing dialogue. Time and again, strong leaders would arise in democratic countries in the region and challenge democratic values, often mentioning that the leaderships that democracy has produced are often weak and riddled with corruption.

ASEAN Literary Festival Brings the Region’s Finest Writers to Jakarta

Jakarta Globe, 26 April 2016

Top writers and thinkers from across Southeast Asia will gather for the third edition of the Asean Literary Festival at Taman Ismail Marzuki in Central Jakarta on May 5-8.

This year’s festival, themed “The Story of Now,” brings into focus the way Southeast Asian authors “respond and adapt to the current global system,” the festival’s website says.

This marks the festival’s continuing dedication to themes of democracy and human rights, as was also apparent in its previous instalments. The festival was initiated in 2014 by the Muara Foundation, a Jakarta-based nonprofit organization that aims to improve education and cultural literacy in Indonesia.

Programs throughout the four-day event range from panel discussions and readings, to workshops and children’s programs.

Read more: http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/features/asean-literary-festival-brings-regions-finest-writers-jakarta/

Why it matters: The forum is important to promote greater attention towards ASEAN literatures. Indeed, the Southeast Asian region has yet to produce a Nobel Prize in Literature winner. This is not because of lack of talent. Countries in Southeast Asia have produced literary geniuses, such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer from Indonesia, or Jose Rizal from the Philippines. A forum that coalesce the diverse literatures in the region in one place is important to put greater attention from the world toward the treasure trove that is Southeast Asian literatures.

Weak Perception a Challenge to AEC Labor Integration

The Jakarta Post, 7 May 2016

Indonesia is faced with regulatory obstacles and the weak perception of potential workers in its battle to effectively integrate its labor force into ASEAN, which promises free movement of skilled labor within the region, according to an academic forum.

To date, those two problems represent the main challenges for Indonesians hoping to integrate promptly among the ASEAN labor market.

There are currently 100,000 Indonesian workers employed in alternate ASEAN member states, according to data presented by Indonesia’s permanent representative to ASEAN Rahmat Pramono during a seminar held by the Foreign Ministry and the University of Indonesia ( UI ) on Tuesday.

ASEAN ROUND-UPThis figure is far below proportion for the most populous country in ASEAN. With a population of 250 million, Indonesia makes up more than two-thirds of the 600 million people in the ASEAN Community.

Read more: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/05/07/weak-perception-a-challenge-aec-labor-integration.html

Why it matters: Indonesian workers should be able to gain benefit from the ASEAN Economic Community as it allows free movement of skilled labours. However, in order to do so, the Government of Indonesia needs to increase workers’ competitiveness through increasing education level and skills. In addition, the Government of Indonesia should also provide more information on how to work in other ASEAN Member States.

ASEAN Needs Laos leadership

East Asia Forum, 7 May 2016

Laos has announced a new leadership team amid calls for the country, as the ASEAN Chair for 2016, to unite ASEAN on territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Laos changes leadership every five years. Two top posts were in the spotlight this time around as the incumbent president and prime minister did not run again for the 11-member Politburo in the National Congress, held in January this year. Former vice president Boungnang Vorachith, a recently elected Party Secretary General, was endorsed to become the President in the first session of the National Assembly held on 20–22 April.

As part of the US’ so-called ‘pivot to Asia’, President Barack Obama hosted the US–ASEAN summit in February this year, with the aim of forging closer US engagement with ASEAN. The South China Sea territorial dispute was one of the major topics discussed. Yet a joint communiqué, the ‘Sunnylands Declaration’ released by the participating heads of states, did not specifically mention the South China Sea as a potential hotspot. Rather they called for countries to respect the sovereignty of each nation and adhere to international law, in comments seemingly directed at China.

China’s rise has profound implications for Laos specifically and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. China is now the largest investor in Laos, having overtaken Vietnam in 2013, and has also become the country’s biggest trading partner. Regionally, China’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea has upset ASEAN members such as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Ahead of a much anticipated ruling by the International Court of Justice in a case brought by the Philippines on the issue, Beijing has begun to court smaller ASEAN member countries such as Cambodia and Laos, and even Brunei, to act in China’s favour.

Read more: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/05/07/asean-needs-laos-leadership/

Why it matters: ASEAN chairman is a difficult position to hold, as was shown by Cambodia during their chairmanship in 2012. The region as a whole is still finding the right rhythm in regard to its relations with China and US. In regard to Laos, it is worth noting that while they are traditionally close to Vietnam which is currently locked in dispute over the South China Sea with China, they are seen to increasingly veer towards China in recent years. This is not surprising given the fact that China is investing heavily in the country, including through mega infrasastructure development projects such as the Laos-China high speed railway. This is a move that provides real benefit for the Laotian people. In this connection, the burden is not just on Laos to ensure that their chairmanship holds true to ASEAN spirit and centrality but also for other ASEAN member states to ensure that ASEAN still matters for Laos.

16Issue 11 / May 2016

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The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental,

non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality

and integrity of cultural and religious values.

The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes,

respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of

human resources and the spread of technology.

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The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by

2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN

that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.

The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government

circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help

spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within

our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

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