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TRANSCRIPT
IMPLEMENTATION OF SYBIL ATTACK IN MANET
Submitted by: Avnish Mishra Anand kumar singh Amit Bhardwaj Jyoti
PROBLEM INTRODUCTION
MOTIVATION As MANET is prone to different kind of
security attacks such as: • DoS attacks• Impersonation• Node Hijacking• Attacks on Information in Transit• Eavesdropping
Therefore performance measurement by simulating Sybil attack which is a impersonation attack is major concern and so is the motivation of our project.
PROJECT OBJECTIVE
The objective of this project is to implement Sybil attack in MANET while using AODV as a routing protocol and to analyze and compare network performance under Sybil attack in different attacking scenarios.
SCOPE Study of the wireless networks and their
types. Study of the AODV protocol. Study of Sybil Attack. Installation of NS 2. Study of the network simulator NS 2 to
perform simulation work. Study of the Object Oriented Tool Command
Language (OTcl), AWK and GNUPlot. Performing Sybil Attack in MANET Performance analysis and comparisons in
presence of Sybil attack using performance metric like throughput, packet lost, end-to-end delay .
LITERATURE SURVEY
WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORKS Consist of a collection of wireless nodes, all
of which may be mobile Dynamic creation of a wireless network
among nodes No administrative support Rapidly changing topology
CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION OF AN AD HOC NETWORK
TYPES OF AD HOC NETWORKS•Nodes are free to move without constraints•Highly dynamic membership and mobility•Topology may change rapidlyMANET•Nodes are typically static and resource constrained•Topology changes when nodes go in sleep mode
Sensor networks
•Combine mobile wireless nodes with energy-unconstrained static wireless nodes
Mesh networks
THE MANET Networking technology that allows for fast,
easy and inexpensive network deployment Collection of wireless nodes, all of which may
be mobile Multi-hop network, where each node is
able to forward data to other nodes Each node has to make routing decisions
itself, i.e. no centralized authority No fixed size and network topology
VULNERABILITIES OF AD HOC NETWORKS
Lack of Secure Boundaries
Threats from Compromised Nodes
Lack of Centralized Management Facility
Restricted Resources
ScalabilityLack of Physical
Security
ATTACKS
Based on position
External attacks
Internal attacks
THE SYBIL ATTACK An impersonation attack A malicious device illegitimately fabricates
multiple identities, behaving as if it were a larger number of nodes
Additional identities are referred to as Sybil identities
Not easy to detect because Sybil node may behave like legitimate node for sometime
A SIMPLE SYBIL ATTACK
A,e1
E,e5
G,e5
B,e2
C,e3
D,e4
F,e5
Orthogonal representation of Sybil
Attack
SYSTEM DESIGN & METHODOLOGY
NS-2 (NETWORK SIMULATOR) Discrete Event Simulator Modeling Network protocols Collection of Various protocols at multiple
layersMAC( 802.11, 802.3, TDMA)Ad-hoc Routing ( DSDV, DSR, AODV)Multicast protocols, Satellite protocols, and many
others
NS INPUT AND OUTPUTOTCL Script
OTCLNS simulator
library
Simulation results
Analysis Network Animator(NAM)
AWK
Refined analysis
Traffic source file
Scenario source
file(Cbrsimple.text)
(scen-10.text)
(simple.tcl)
(out.tr) (out.nam)
(out.awk)
(out.plot) Gnuplot
(simple.tr)
A SIMPLE NETWORK TOPOLOGY AND SIMULATION SCENARIO
AODV PROTOCOL MESSAGING
IMPLEMENTATION
ALGORITHM Create scenario (11)
On any node N,
create Sybil_nodes(s1,s2,s3,s4)
N creates 4 stolen/fake identities(s1,s2,s3,s4). add s1,s2,s3,s4 to the scenario. Create traffic to the destination using Sybil
identities. Start the traafic
For every packet p coming to node N Drop/ listen/ modify/ forward it using Sybil
identity depending on type of attack.
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
COMPARISON OF THROUGHPUT IN STATIC SCENARIO
COMPARISON OF THROUGHPUT IN MOBILE SCENARIO
COMPARISON OF PDR IN STATIC SCENARIO
COMPARISON OF PDR IN STATIC SCENARIO
COMPARISON OF PDR IN MOBILE SCENARIO
COMPARISON IN STATIC SCENARIO
Sybil node Throughput PDR End-to-End delay
No sybil node 30,600 0.037485 0.015713
Near source 36,200 0.123810 0.001292
Near destination 39,600 0.041183 0.003849
Ouside route 82,900 0-935955 4.316442
Multiple 53,800 0.057985 0.001675
Black hole attack 4,400 0.004055 7.996747
COMPARISON IN MOBILE SCENARIO
Sybil node Throughput PDR End-to-End delay
No sybil node 23,000 0.042463 0.006144
Near source 22,800 0.043208 0.009381
Near destination 65,000 0.154374 0.001446
Ouside route 37,100 0.083408 0.026492
Multiple 46,100 0.105734 0.012403
Black hole attack 6,400 0.011645 0.006104
CONCLUSION The work done indicates the performance of
MANET in presence of Sybil node. The performance of network degrades in
presence of Sybil node. There is variation in throughput, PDR and
end-to-end delay depending on type of scenario .
There is increase in load due extra packets transferred by Sybil identities.
FUTURE WORK Sybil attack for other routing protocols like
DSDV , DSR etc can be performed. Like CBR traffic, Sybil attack can also be
performed on other traffics like FTP traffic. Sybil attack on multicast, Satellite network
can be done where one node can attack on multiple nodes.
Sybil identities can also be used for eavesdropping, masquerading, traffic analysis etc.
The work done so far can also be performed in Sensor and Mesh networks.
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