I. SUCCESSION IN GENERAL

A. SUCCESSION

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO,Petitioner,vs.FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL,Respondents.CARPIO MORALES,J.:FACTS:Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration," filed by respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, respondents alleged, that a parcel of land located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of petitioner.Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation. The Court of Appeals sustained the probate courts ruling that the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation bearing in mind thatin intestate succession, what governs is the rule on equality of division. Thus, the property subject of donation inter vivos in favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor of the decedent.The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate court, herein petitioner "was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks owned by the decedent which have not been included in the inventory submitted by the administrator."ISSUES:Whether or not the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation. Whether the property of the estate should have been ordered equally distributed among the parties.HELD:NO.The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid,is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.YES.The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, viz:Art. 1003.If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)Art. 1004.Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shallinherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is set aside.Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch 135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the parties.

G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO,Petitioner,vs.ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA,Respondents.ABAD,J.:FACTS:On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled "DonationMortis Causa"in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses lot and the house in Pandacan, Manila, in equal shares. Although denominated as a donationmortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document. Guadalupe died. A few months later, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972. In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donationmortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldos assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.After trial, the RTC ruled that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors intention being to transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors lifetime, given its irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights and interest in the property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed the registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares. On Asuncions appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter rendered a decision reversing that of the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate of the deed of donationmortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldos deed of assignment in Asuncions favor. The CA further held that, since no proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that the donation, being one givenmortis causa, did not comply with the requirements of a notarial will,rendering the same void. Following the CAs denial of Jarabinis motion for reconsideration,she filed the present petition with this Court.ISSUE:Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupes donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.HELD:DONATION INTER VIVOS.That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms isinter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. InAustria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyancesmortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;2. That before his death,the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will,ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.12(Underscoring supplied)The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donationinter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.As Justice J. B. L. Reyes said inPuig v. Peaflorida,16in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donationinter vivosrather thanmortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.Since the donation in this case was one madeinter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donees acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.17Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had.Nemo dat quod non habet. WHEREFORE, the CourtGRANTSthe petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.

G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN,petitioners,vs.THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C. NAVADA,respondents.AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:FACTS:On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot." On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died. Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation. Respondents allege that petitioners through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donationsmortis causa.Petitioners deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments.The courta quoruled that the donations are donationsmortis causaand therefore the four (4) deeds in question are null and void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills and testaments. Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the courta quo's decision to Supreme Court.ISSUE:Whether or not the donations are mortis causa or inter vivos.HELD:DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.In a donationmortis causa,"the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."In determining whether a donation is one ofmortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will,ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;and(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.13In the present case, the nature of the donations asmortis causais confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death.The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations asmortis causain the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR."x x x"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this Deed of Donationmortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."15WHEREFORE, the petition is herebyDENIEDfor lack of merit.

G.R. No. 106755 February 1, 2002APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT,petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FLORENTINO LUMUBOS, DOMINGO COMIA, TEODORA CARAMPOT, ERNESTO APOLO, SEGUNDA SUMPELO, MAMERTO SUMPELO and RICARDO SUMPELO,respondents.DE LEON, JR.,J.:FACTS:Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of five (5) children, namely, Rosario Austria, Consolacion Austria, herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo, and one of herein respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II. On December 17, 1975, Basilisa executed a document designated as "Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala (Donation)". On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). As the result of the registration of that sale, Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-10434 was issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat. Herein respondents, representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria, all surnamed Sumpelo, representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria, and Florentino Lumubos filed before the Regional Trial Court Civil Case against the petitioner for annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and for reconveyance and damages. The trial court dismissed Civil Case because the donation is a donationmortis causapursuant to Article 728 of the New Civil Code inasmuch as the same expressly provides that it would take effect upon the death of the donor; that the provision stating that the donor reserved the right to revoke the donation is a feature of a donationmortis causawhich must comply with the formalities of a will; and that inasmuch as the donation did not follow the formalities pertaining to wills, the same is void and produced no effect whatsoever. Hence, the sale by the donor of the said property was valid since she remained to be the absolute owner thereof during the time of the said transaction. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed by the Court of Appeals.ISSUE:Whether or not the Donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.HELD: DONATION INTER VIVOS.The Supreme Court affirm the appellate courts decision.It has been held that whether the donation isinter vivosormortis causadepends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.InBonsato v. Court of Appeals,11this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donationmortis causa, to wit:(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will,ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of the donation in the case at bar. InCuevas v. Cuevas,we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donationinter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donationinter vivosdespite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive. Construing together the provisions of the deed of donation,the Court finds and so hold that in the case at bar the donation isinter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same ("hindi na mababawi") is the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donationinter vivos. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the donationmortis causado not go against the irrevocable character of the subject donation. According to the petitioner, the provisions which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same, are proofs that the donation ismortis causa. We disagree. The said provisions should be harmonized with its express irrevocability. Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation isinter vivosis the acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation isinter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donationsinter vivos. On the other hand, donationsmortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors lifetime.18WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated June 30, 1989 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL.,respondents.REYES, J.B.L.,J.:FACTS:The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on June 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint charged that Domingo Bonsato then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations weremortis causaand void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donationinter vivoswithout any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein. On appeal, Court of Appeals, rendered judgment holding the aforesaid donations to be null and void, because they were donationsmortis causaand were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. ISSUE:Whether or not the donations are Mortis Causa or Inter Vivos.HELD:DONATION INTER VIVOS.Despite the widespread use of the term "donationsmortis causa," it is well-established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art. 620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain ("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile donationsmortis causawith the testamentary dispositions, thus suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary successions.The Court insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to emphasize that the term "donationsmortis causa" as commonly employed is merely a convenient name to designate those dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of donations.Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or dispositionspost mortemin favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidalvs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzmanvs.Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will,ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautistavs. Sabiniano, G. R.L-4326, November 18, 1952);(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo"), a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyancesmortis causawhere revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against respondents.

G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special Administrator,petitioners,vs.HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D. PASCUAL,respondents.GUTIERREZ,JR., J.:FACTS:The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar issues. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2, 1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Pascual and therefore should be excluded from the inventory. On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties donated to Ursula. In the meantime, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes. Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 115164. The two cases were consolidated. The then Court of First Instance, Branch 8 rendered a joint decision declaring that TCT in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void. Parungao appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was, however, affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The Intermediate Appellate Court issued a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit. ISSUE:Whether or not the donation in the present is to be considered Donation Inter vivos or Donation Mortis causa.HELD:DONATION INTER VIVOS.It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case ofLaureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. In the later case ofBonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481 [1954]) this Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise:Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (fun or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal v. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista v. Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18, 1952);(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on January 5, 1977 is hereby LIFTED; and2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This DENIAL is FINAL.

B.TRANSMISSION/ACQUISITION THROUGH DEATH

G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,petitioner,vs.SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31,respondents.PUNO,C.J.:FACTS:On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner in this case. The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera. The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna. A Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null and void. In a Resolutiondated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that: on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor of the protestee. Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals in a Decision reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction."The case was then remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is correct in arguing that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the NHA. That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same before it."HELD: NO. The Supreme Court is not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of whichthe property, rights and obligationsto the extent of the value of the inheritance,of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolutionon February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sellwith NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law. The Court did not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET,petitioners,vs.Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET,respondents.PANGANIBAN,J.:FACTS:Petitioners Ismael and TeresitaMacasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife. On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the MTCC of Lipa City an ejectment suit against the children.Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); that by way of a verbal lease agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental ofP500 per week. Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the problems of the family.They added that it was the policy of respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered had been allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the renovation of respondents house.ISSUE:Whether or not the lots were allotted to petitioners as part of their inheritance and given in consideration for past debts.HELD:NO.The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon the latters demise. Indisputably, rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent. Assuming that there was an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained with respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons in the future is not inconsistent with the owners taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits, petitioners offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish claim of inheritance "allocation." Petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through a dation in payment, Lot T-78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for respondents debts.The evidence presented by petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the parents arising from the latters purported purchases and advances. There was no sufficient proof that respondents had entered into a contract of dation to settle the alleged debt. Petitioners even stated that there was a disagreement in the accounting of the purported debt,a fact that disproves a meeting of the minds with the parents.WHEREFORE,the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATIONS.

G.R. No. L-24098 November 18, 1967BUENAVENTURA BELAMALA,petitioner-appellee,vs.MARCELINO POLINAR, administrator,oppositor-appellant.REYES, J.B.L.,J.:FACTS:Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in Criminal Case No. 1922 filed before the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL, against the same Mauricio Polinar above mentioned and against other accused, for Frustrated Murder. The administrator Marcelino Polinar is one of the legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio Polinar now deceased. On May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed in the Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol against said Mauricio Polinar, et al, and when said case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision thereof, convicting the said Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages. The accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. While the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals in said Criminal Case No. 1922, has affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol,in toto, and said decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958; but said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956. The Courta quo, overruling the contention of the Administrator-appellant that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, admitted the claim against the estate in the amount of P2,025.80 with legal interest from the date claim was filed (30 July 1959) until paid. Not satisfied with the ruling, the Administrator has appealed, insisting on his theory in the Court below.ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability has been extinguished.HELD:NO.We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirelyseparate and distinct from the criminal action.Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter acquired their decedents obligationsonly to the extent of the value of the inheritance(Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of the offender's estate. Furthermore, it does not appear that the award of the trial Court was based on evidence submitted to it; apparently it relied merely on the findings in the criminal case, as embodied in decisions that never became final because the accused died during the pendency of said case.WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby reversed and set aside, but without prejudice to the action of appellee Belamala against the Administrator of the Estate of Mauricio Polinar.

C.OBJECT OF SUCCESSION

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948ANGEL T. LIMJOCO,petitioner,vs.INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased,respondent.HILADO,J.:FACTS:The Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibaez, rendered its decision in case of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail.Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law. If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.ISSUE:Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.HELD:YES.The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.WHEREFORE, decision affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. L-28067 March 10, 1928BASILIA ARAYATA,plaintiff-appellant,vs.FLORENTINO JOYA, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.VILLA-REAL,J.:FACTS:Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of lease to six lots of the friar lands at Santa Crus de Malabon, municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite. Cecilio Joya married the herein plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and Act No. 1120 of the Philippine Commission. While married to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing, on installments, from the Government. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said lots to Cecilio Joya by donation. These transfers were approved by the Director of Lands and noted in the proper registry book. Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot to Florentino Joya consideration of the sum of P2,000 said conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper registry book. On May 11, 1919, Cecilio Joya conveyed his right to lot to Marcelina Joya and Francisco Joya in consideration of the sum of P450, conveyance having been approved by the Director of Lands and registered in the proper registry book. On April 27, 1919, Cecilio Joya executed a will devising lot to Florentino Joya, Pablo Joya, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor, brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya, Feliciano and Asuncion Bobadilla, and Marcelina and Francisca Joya. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed the payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the lots in question except one, are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy their products. On May 10, 1920 some lots were transferred to Florentino Joya as administrator of the estate of the deceased Cecilio Joya. On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, his executor, the herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate to the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which was probated after the proper proceedings. In the course of the testamentary proceedings, the executor Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by the legatees, which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the herein plaintiff's opposition, who alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud.ISSUE:Whether or not the herein plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the possession and the products of the friar lands acquired by the Insular Government, which, by virtue of the law, pass exclusively to the surviving spouse upon compliance of the legal requirements,HELD:YES.While a deceased heirs or legatees acquire the ownership of the property given them in the will and may taken possession of their respective portions upon the death of their predecessor, yet upon the appointment of an administrator, the latter, by virtue of his appointment, acquires a right to the possession of the property of estate, subject to the orders of the court, unless he consents to the heirs continuing in possession thereof. But such consent does not, however, relieve the administrator of all responsibility for the management of the same and its fruits; because until the judicial partition is made, said property continues to belong to the testamentary estate. (Pimentelvs.Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Fernandezvs.Tria, 22 Phil., 603.)Being a matter of law, the defendants-appellants cannot plead ignorance of the fact that until a judicial partition of the property left by Cecilio Joya is made, said property belongs to the lather's estate and it together with its products, is subject to the payment of the testator's debts, if any. Only after judicial partition has been made do they acquire the title to their respective legacies, if the latter are valid. (Santosvs.Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil., 895.) We have seen that the legacies given by Cecilio Joya to the defendants were void. If the lands, which are the subject matter of said legacies and which are in the possession of the defendants, still belong to Cecilio Joya's estate, because no judicial partition has as yet been made of the property he left, which is subject, together with its fruits, to the payment of his debts, said defendants cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to possession in good faith insofar as the fruits are concerned; because even when the legacies are valid they acquired only when the latter judicially assigned to them in the final partition, and because, while said lands are under administration, the administrator is obliged to render an account of his management of the same and the products thereof.WHEREFORE, for the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is modified, and it is ordered that Feliciano and Pablo Joya, Asuncion Bobadilla, Delfin and Felicisima Blancaflor return lots Nos. 1031, 1086, 1153, and 2352 to the plaintiff-appellant, Basilia Arayata, together with their products, or the latter's equivalent in cash from the year 1920 until their restitution, deducting the necessary expenses of cultivation, preservation, and production. Without any special pronouncement as to costs, it is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES,respondents.FERNAN,C.J.:FACTS:Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib.It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party in this case. Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title covering Lot 773-A. TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804. The bigger portion of Lot 773 was also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago. Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804. Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name.After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B.By virtue of a court order granting said motion,on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez.Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. During the pendency in court of said case, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. Meanwhile, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case."ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are correct in their contention that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.HELD:NO.Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000RUFINA LUY LIM,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC.respondents.BUENA,J.:FACTS:Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings. Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting oflis pendensand motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the private respondents' twin motions. Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. Petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant case.ISSUE:Whether or not a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?HELD:NO.It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it. Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.33WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 145736 March 4, 2009ESTATE OF ORLANDO LLENADO and WENIFREDA T. LLENADO, in her capacity as (a) Administratrix of the Estate of Orlando A. Llenado and (b) Judicial Guardian of the Minor children of Orlando A. Llenado, and (c) in her Own behalf as the Surviving Spouse and Legal Heir of Orlando A. Llenado,Petitioners,vs.EDUARDO LLENADO, JORGE LLENADO, FELIZA GALLARDO VDA. DE LLENADO and REGISTER OF DEEDS of Valenzuela City, Metro Manila,Respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:FACTS:The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land denominated as Lot 249-D-1 (subject lot) consisting of 1,554 square meters located in Barrio Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and registered in the names of Eduardo Llenado (Eduardo) and Jorge Llenado (Jorge) under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-1689.4The subject lot once formed part of Lot 249-D owned by and registered in the name of their father, Cornelio Llenado (Cornelio), under TCT No. T-16810.On December 2, 1975, Cornelio leased Lot 249-D-1 to his nephew, Romeo Llenado (Romeo), for a period of five years, renewable for another five years at the option of Cornelio. On March 31, 1978, Cornelio, Romeo and the latters cousin Orlando Llenado (Orlando) executed an Agreement whereby Romeo assigned all his rights to Orlando over the unexpired portion of the aforesaid lease contract. The parties further agreed that Orlando shall have the option to renew the lease contract for another three years commencing from December 3, 1980, up to December 2, 1983, renewable for another four years or up to December 2, 1987, and that "during the period that [this agreement] is enforced, the x x x property cannot be sold, transferred, alienated or conveyed in whatever manner to any third party." Shortly thereafter or on June 24, 1978, Cornelio and Orlando entered into a Supplementary Agreementamending the March 31, 1978 Agreement. Under the Supplementary Agreement, Orlando was given an additional option to renew the lease contract for an aggregate period of 10 years at five-year intervals, that is, from December 3, 1987 to December 2, 1992 and from December 3, 1992 to December 2, 1997. The said provision was inserted in order to comply with the requirements of Mobil Philippines, Inc. for the operation of a gasoline station which was subsequently built on the subject lot. Upon the death of Orlando on November 7, 1983, his wife, Wenifreda Llenado (Wenifreda), took over the operation of the gasoline station. Meanwhile, on January 29, 1987, Cornelio sold Lot 249-D to his children, namely, Eduardo, Jorge, Virginia and Cornelio, Jr., through a deed of sale, denominated as "Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan,"7for the sum of P160,000.00. As stated earlier, the subject lot, which forms part of Lot 249-D, was sold to Eduardo and Jorge, and titled in their names under TCT No. V-1689. Several months thereafter or on September 7, 1987, Cornelio passed away. Sometime in 1993, Eduardo informed Wenifreda of his desire to take over the subject lot. However, the latter refused to vacate the premises despite repeated demands. Thus, on September 24, 1993, Eduardo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against Wenifreda.ISSUE:Whether the sale of the subject lot by Cornelio to his sons, respondents Eduardo and Jorge, is invalid for (1) violating the prohibitory clause in the lease agreement between Cornelio, as lessor-owner, and Orlando, as lessee; and (2) contravening the right of first refusal of Orlando over the subject lot.

HELD:NO.It is not disputed that the lease agreement contained an option to renew and a prohibition on the sale of the subject lot in favor of third persons while the lease is in force. Petitioner claims that when Cornelio sold the subject lot to respondents Eduardo and Jorge the lease was in full force and effect, thus, the sale violated the prohibitory clause rendering it invalid. In resolving this issue, it is necessary to determine whether the lease agreement was in force at the time of the subject sale and, if it was in force, whether the violation of the prohibitory clause invalidated the sale.Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, the heirs are bound by the contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations therein are not transmissible by their nature, by stipulation or by provision of law. A contract of lease is, therefore, generally transmissible to the heirs of the lessor or lessee. It involves a property right and, as such, the death of a party does not excuse non-performance of the contract. The rights and obligations pass to the heirs of the deceased and the heir of the deceased lessor is bound to respect the period of the lease.The same principle applies to the option to renew the lease. As a general rule, covenants to renew a lease are not personal but will run with the land.Consequently, the successors-in-interest of the lessee are entitled to the benefits, while that of the lessor are burdened with the duties and obligations, which said covenants conferred and imposed on the original parties.The foregoing principles apply with greater force in this case because the parties expressly stipulated in the March 31, 1978 Agreement that Romeo, as lessee, shall transfer all his rights and interests under the lease contract with option to renew "in favor of the party of the Third Part (Orlando), the latters heirs, successors and assigns" indicating the clear intent to allow the transmissibility of all the rights and interests of Orlando under the lease contract unto his heirs, successors or assigns. Accordingly, the rights and obligations under the lease contract with option to renew were transmitted from Orlando to his heirs upon his death on November 7, 1983.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 118248 April 5, 2000DKC HOLDINGS CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, VICTOR U. BARTOLOME and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III,respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:FACTS:On March 16, 1988, petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted from the signing of the Contract. In turn, petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration for the reservation of its option. Within the two-year period, petitioner shall serve formal written notice upon the lessor Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option. The contract also provided that in case petitioner chose to lease the property, it may take actual possession of the premises. In such an event, the lease shall be for a period of six years, renewable for another six years, and the monthly rental fee shall be P15,000.00 for the first six years and P18,000.00 for the next six years, in case of renewal. Petitioner regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by the Contract to Encarnacion until her death in January 1990. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments. Meanwhile, on January 10, 1990, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent Register of Deeds cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 in the name of Victor Bartolome. Petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was exercising its option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the month of March. Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the property to petitioner. Petitioner thus opened Savings Account No. 1-04-02558-I-1 with the China Banking Corporation, Cubao Branch, in the name of Victor Bartolome and deposited therein the P15,000.00 rental fee for March as well as P6,000.00 reservation fees for the months of February and March. Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds. Petitioner prayed for the surrender and delivery of possession of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of title for registration and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the payment of P500,000.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P300,000.00 as attorney's fees.ISSUE:Whether or not the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise.HELD:NO.The general rule is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible.It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the promissor's personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the contract or excuse nonperformance.11In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be performed by her heir Victor.As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself and his heirs." In 1952, it was ruled that if the predecessor was duty-bound to reconvey land to another, and at his death the reconveyance had not been made, the heirs can be compelled to execute the proper deed for reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear provision of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest between him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him.In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease, which is a property right. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 121940December 4, 2001JESUS SAN AGUSTIN,petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO MENEZ, JR.,respondents.QUISUMBING,J.:FACTS:On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an area of 168 square meters located in Rosario, Pasig City and denominated as Lot 13, Block 7, Pcs-5816 of the Government Service and Insurance System Low Cost Housing Project (GSIS-LCHP). The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. 2 On February 19, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep. Sometime in 1979, for being suspected as a subversive, an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) was issued against private respondent. Military men ransacked his house in Cainta, Rizal. Upon learning that he was wanted by the military, he voluntarily surrendered and was detained for two (2) years. When released, another order for his re-arrest was issued so he hid in Mindanao for another four (4) years or until March 1984. In December of 1990, he discovered that the subject TCT was missing. He consulted a lawyer but the latter did not act immediately on the matter. Upon consulting a new counsel, an Affidavit of Loss5was filed with the Register of Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy6of TCT No. 436465 was issued. Private respondent also declared the property for tax purposes and obtained a certification thereof from the Assessor's Officer. Private respondent sent notices to the registered owner at her address appearing in the title and in the Deed of Sale. And, with his counsel, he searched for the ,registered owner in Metro Manila and Rizal and as far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog City, Tacloban City, and in Eastern and Northern Samar. However, their search proved futile. On July 8, 1992 private respondent filed a petition docketed as LRC Case No. R-4659 with the RTC, Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 436465 to replace the lost one. To show he was the owner of the contested lot, he showed the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "D". The petition was set for hearing and the court's order dated July 10, 1992 was published once inMalaya, a nationally circulated newspaper in the Philippines. On September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented his evidenceex-parte. The trial court granted his petition. On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of the abovecited decision. He-claimed this was the first time he became aware of the case of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died sometime in 1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant of the property and the heir of Macaria, he filed his "Motion to Reopen Reconstitution Proceedings''11on October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an order denying said motion. Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which, as earlier stated, was denied in its decision of May 19, 1995. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but it was denied in a resolution dated September 11, 1995.ISSUE:Whether or not private respondent's allegation that failure to send notice to petitioner who is the actual possessor of the disputed lot is fatal to the present case.HELD:NO.Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree" is decisive. It provides:Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for :the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person it interest and registered.Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.Here, petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property based on the memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the back of the title. His claim, that he is an heir (nephew) of the original owner of the lot covered by the disputed lot and the present occupant thereof is not annotated in the said memorandum of encumbrances. Neither was his claim entered on the Certificate of Titles in the name of their original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the time of the filing or pendency of LRC Case No. R-4659. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to notice.Noteworthy is the fact that there was compliance by private respondent of the RTC's order of publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. This is sufficient notice of the petition to the public at large.WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of Philippines International Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE GROUP,petitionersvs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their behalf,respondents.

CORONA,J.:FACTS:Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and FLAG, assail not only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the August 11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez, in their personal capacities and without court approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without securing court approval have appropriated as their own personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the Estate Court. As admitted by petitioners counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification for this action by the heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that public respondent [the intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortaez in favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance Group.Parties to the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 are not the only heirs claiming an interest in the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez. The records of this caseshow that as early as March 3, 1981 an Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P.Ortaez with LigayaNovicio. This claim by the acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez is admittedly known to the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement before they executed the same. This much was admitted by petitioners counsel during the oral argument.ISSUE:1. Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction in nullifying the sale of stocks by the petitioner [Jose Ortaez] and his mother [Juliana Ortaez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez.2. Whether or not an heir has the right to dispose of the decedents property pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court.HELD:1. NO. Public respondent can never be faulted for not approving the subsequent sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortaez] and his mother [Juliana Ortaez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez.It is clear that Juliana Ortaez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.2. NO. Whileitistruethatan heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent.However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares.This means that an heir may only sell hisideal or undivided sharein the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedents estate. In the early case ofGodoy vs. Orellano,we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.

G.R. No. 129008.January 13, 2004TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS,petitionersvs.COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,respondents.TINGA,J.:

FACTS:On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City,Dagupan City and KalookanCity.He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children. They are petitioner TeodoraRiofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.Respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner TeodoraRioferio andherchildrenexecutedanExtrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaiminvolving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupanissued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners TeodoraRioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan ofP700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing aReal Estate Mortgageover the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.Respondents filed aComplaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related Documentswith Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.Petitioners filed theirAnswerto the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of TeodoraRoofers and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name.Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in vie