Prog ram me Ti t l e : Cre at in g o p port u ni t i e s fo r you th e mp loym e nt in So ut h S u da n

FINAL EVALUATION

Youth, Employment and Migration South Sudan

Aut h or : R ic ha rd C h iwa ra , c ons u lta nt

December 2012

Thematic window

Pro log ue

This final evaluation report has been coordinated by the MDG Achievement Fund joint programme in an effort to assess results at the completion point of the programme. As stipulated in the monitoring and evaluation strategy of the Fund, all 130 programmes, in 8 thematic windows, are required to commission and finance an independent final evaluation, in addition to the programme’s mid-term evaluation. Each final evaluation has been commissioned by the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO) in the respective programme country. The MDG-F Secretariat has provided guidance and quality assurance to the country team in the evaluation process, including through the review of the TORs and the evaluation reports. All final evaluations are expected to be conducted in line with the OECD Development Assistant Committee (DAC) Evaluation Network “Quality Standards for Development Evaluation”, and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) “Standards for Evaluation in the UN System”. Final evaluations are summative in nature and seek to measure to what extent the joint programme has fully implemented its activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes. They also generate substantive evidence-based knowledge on each of the MDG-F thematic windows by identifying best practices and lessons learned to be carried forward to other development interventions and policy-making at local, national, and global levels. We thank the UN Resident Coordinator and their respective coordination office, as well as the joint programme team for their efforts in undertaking this final evaluation. MDG-F Secretariat The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation are those of the evaluator and do not necessarily

reflect the views of the Joint Programme or MDG-F Secretariat.

FINAL EVALUATION

South Sudan

Thematic Window Youth, Employment and Migration

Programme Title:

“Creating opportunities for youth employment in South Sudan”

Richard M Chiwara December 2012

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Joint Programme Number Joint Programme Title Thematic Window Participating UN Agencies Joint Programme Budget Joint Programme Timeline National Implementing Partners

MDGF 1888 Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in South Sudan (Formerly part of the YEM Sudan Programme) Youth Employment and Migration ILO (Lead Agency) IOM, FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO and UNOPS. Total Budget: $4,534,228 Funded by MDGF: $4,534,228 Funded by GRSS: Start date: September 2009 End date: 30 August 2011 Revised End Date: 31 December 2012 Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports Ministry of Labour, Public Service and HR Development Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives Ministry of Commerce and Industry Ministry of Education Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious

Affairs Ministry of Health Bank of South Sudan Microfinance Unit South Sudan AIDS Commission South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilsation and

Reintegration Commission

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A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Final Evaluation of the Joint Programme “Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in South Sudan was undertaken over the period 15 October to 23 November 2012 by an independent evaluator. The final evaluation focused on measuring development results and potential impacts generated by the joint programme. It was based on the scope and criteria provided in the evaluation terms of reference (TOR) See Annex 4 for details.

Based on the review of background documents, the evaluation noted that the Joint Programme (JP) was implemented in a unique period for South Sudan and in a very complex and difficult environment. The magnitude of the challenges in the new nation of South Sudan are quite phenomenal, particularly the lack of infrastructure, high levels of poverty, weak government structures at the State and County levels, and the limited capacity within the civil service and public administration.

The JP was first designed in 2007 when Sudan was still one country and following the separation of South Sudan in July 2011, the programme was divided into two separate programmes. At the start of programme implementation in March 2010, the Government of South Sudan did not agree with the JP design, noting that it had not been approved by the Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee (IMAC) and that some of the activities were inconsistent with its priorities. The UN duly responded by setting in motion the process of obtaining IMAC approval, followed by an inclusive UN and government Inception Mission which revised some of the JP activities and approach. The major revision of the approach was (i) shifting the focus from specific States to labour markets, (ii) shifting the focus from target groups such as Internally Displaced Persons, (IDPs), returnees, ex-combatants and children associated with armed forces to an inclusive approach focusing on all youth, and (iii) shifting from Accelerated Learning Programmes (ALP) to vocational and life skills training.

Following the revision of the JP strategy and approach, the JP’s logic model and theory of change, was quite logically articulated and was based on (a) addressing challenges in the enabling environment – mainstream youth in national and State-level development policies and Action Plans, and (b) developing and implementing specific interventions to demonstrate what is possible and what could be done to empower the youth at the local levels (and in the context of their specific labour markets).

However, the evaluation observed some fundamental weaknesses in the JP implementation approach. Firstly, there were too many UN agencies involved especially at the downstream level. Some of the UN agencies did not have the capacity nor comparative advantage to operate at that level, and in some cases this resulted in some of the critical activities that had a major bearing on the JP theory of change not being implemented. In particular, the JP logic for creating youth opportunities was premised on the assumption that after they obtained appropriate skills training, that most youth would establish income generation and

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microenterprises; but the JP did not implement the activities for establishing the microfinance and microcredit outputs. The roles of UN agencies did not reflect their comparative advantages. For example, ILO would have been better placed to handle Labour Market Surveys instead of UNDP; and UNICEF was allocated funds for livelihood training instead of ILO and UNIDO. In addition, given that ILO and UNIDO had similar areas of work in the South and North respectively, it would have been more efficient for them to swap activities when the programme was divided into two.

Secondly, the JP used the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). Since a key result of the JP was to strengthen the enabling environment and mainstreaming youth issues into national development plans, institutional capacity building would have been a critical component of the programme process. However, DIM does not promote national capacity building and also it does not create an institutional venue for programme sustainability. The evaluation was however cognizant of the considerable capacity gaps, particularly at the time of the JP design which would have made the National Implementation Modality (NIM) almost impossible, and in particular for the donor. In addition, the evaluation also noted that UNICEF operated through a grant contract with PLAN International who then subcontracted to the Indian CAP Work Force Development Institute. PLAN provided a sub- contract to SMECOSS a local NGO to do enterprise and savings training. UNFPA operated through a grant contract to Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA), an American NGO. However, ILO and UNDP provided funds and capacity building support for Labour Market Survey capacity direct to the National Bureau of Statistics.

Thirdly, the programme was not designed as a joint programme, strictly speaking. By definition, a joint programme should enable joint attribution of results by two or more UN agencies. This means that UN agencies must work together through a common work plan to achieve attributable results – outputs. Where UN agencies are only contributing to a common result – outcomes – this cannot be defined as a joint programme. This provides the basis and mechanisms for UN agency collaboration in the context of their different programming and operational regulations, reporting models and timeframes. Due to the lack of joint planning and implementation, the JP missed some opportunities for building synergy between different UN agency outputs. For example, youth to whom skills training had been given through the JP activities were not necessarily engaged by the other UN agencies that were undertaken construction and renovation of youth facilities and infrastructure.

At the process level, the JP introduced some innovative approaches that the GRSS could upscale and replicate to accelerate its youth empowerment agenda. Some of the noteworthy innovative approaches include; (i) Linking vocational and enterprise training to targeted Skills and Market Opportunities assessments, (ii) The Youth Peer Education Network, (iii) Mobile training, (iii) Farmer Field Schools, and (iv) functional literacy. Moreover, as part of building more transformational and scalable approaches, the JP established two clustered joint UN/GRSS strategic initiatives; (i) the development of a youth volunteer service (Payam Youth

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Service) linked to the national development plan, and (ii) the Cattle Camp Initiative to provide mobile training in excluded areas and to reach the pastoralist youth.

The challenge remains with capacity of the duty bearers at the local levels to continue with these innovations and also the motivation of the participating youth and communities to continue in the absence of dedicated support in resources and leadership. Evidence was obtained of large numbers of drop-outs from the Y-Peer network and Farmer Field Schools due to lack of incentive for the volunteering participants.

The JP’s most significant result was in raising awareness and focusing attention on the strategic importance of addressing youth empowerment in terms of (a) long term stability, and (b) economic development. The JP contributed notably to results at the policy level. Specific results achieved include, Development of the draft Youth Policy, Support for conducting an Urban Labour Market Survey, Developing the TVETE Policy, and National Cooperative Strategy. Youth issues were embedded into all the 4 pillars of the country’s first national development plan - South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2011-13, the UNDAF 2012 – 2013, and the UN Peace Building Support Plan. Based on analysis of the foregoing findings, the evaluation identified four key lessons that were emerging from the JP experience which should be taken into account in future programming in order to enhance inter-agency collaboration and to strengthen effectiveness of programme results. Lesson 1: The extensive number of partnering UN agencies does not necessarily imply better inter-agency collaboration nor effective implementation. Joint planning and implementing of activities such that there is joint attribution to results at output level enhances inter-agency collaboration. Lesson 2: The multi-dimensional attributes of sustainability imply that to enhance project sustainability, a rigorous sustainability analysis is needed at the time of formulation of a project or a programme. Such an analysis which is to be followed up by development of a sustainability strategy will assist in incorporating the elements of sustainability, right at the design stage of a project. Lesson 3: Development processes and results that are not demand driven and lack national ownership, including through budget and institutional support, cannot continue beyond the life of the project.

Lesson 4: When development partner efforts and activities in support of national development priorities are not centrally coordinated; they produce negative unintended consequences such as promotion of a culture of dependence and inefficient utilization of resources through duplication and mismanagement.

Going forward, there was a need for the UN to position itself strategically in order to have a greater impact on youth empowerment in future programming. Clearly, given the high levels of rural violence, poverty, food insecurity and illiteracy in the population in general and the youth in particular, providing livelihood opportunities at the downstream level would be an important

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contribution for the UN. On the other hand, given the country’s high dependence on a depleting oil resource and limited domestic production and high reliance on imports for almost everything; the UN should provide support for economic growth and diversification.1 While these are not necessarily mutually exclusive concepts, they provide a useful basis for structuring the problems and targeting UN agency technical expertise to address the problems based on their individual comparative advantages. For example, based on its comparative advantages in a country where 78% of households depend on subsistence farming – cropping and animal husbandry, the UN could achieve more impact by focusing more on growth through supporting the government in policies and strategies to do with Agriculture Modernization, Value-chain Creation and the development of Trade and Markets.

On the whole, the UN focuses on addressing these issues, mainly by providing support for policy development, including inter-sectoral policies; limiting the scope of interventions, including by engaging national institutions in implementing activities and developing national capacities. This of course also requires development of a very solid and effective M&E system to ensure that there is value for money. This evaluation recommends the following:

1) Overall, the JP addressed a critical development challenge (youth empowerment) in South Sudan; and therefore the momentum that was created should be maintained.

2) The UN should undertake a comprehensive gap analysis; and only then identify and match relevant UN agency technical expertise based on their comparative advantages to address the gaps.

3) The UN should limit the scope of interventions by focusing on strategic areas that promote (1) economic growth and development, and (2) human resources development as a long-term strategy for sustainable employment creation.

4) The UN should build a platform for sustaining programme results by integrating institutional capacity development, including through national implementation (government, NGOs and CBOs).

5) The UN should provide more support to policy development including sectoral policy coherence to strengthen the enabling environment for sustainable youth empowerment (e.g. regulatory frameworks and by-laws that support various legislation).

6) The GRSS should provide requisite resources to support its priorities and strategies for youth empowerment, including establishment of Youth Empowerment Fund; and budget support to vocational and youth training centres.

1 While economic growth may be essential for poverty reduction, the relationship between the two also depends on the capabilities of the poor to take advantage of expanding economic opportunities. ‘Livelihoods’ integrates the measures that enable the poor to cope with and recover from stress and shocks; and comprises creating small capabilities, assets and activities required for the poor to make a living.

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7) The GRSS should streamline the mandates and develop clear linkages between vocational and technical education, including on regulation, inspection, accreditation and M&E frameworks, as well as introducing entrepreneurial education into the system.

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B. Contents

A Executive Summary iii B Contents viii C Acronyms ix D Map of South Sudan x

I. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Evaluation Context 1 1.2 Objectives and Scope 1

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE JP 2 2.1 Background and Context 2 2.2 JP Results Framework 4 2.3 Strategy and Theory of Change 6

III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 7 3.1 Overall Approach 7 3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 8

IV. REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION 9 4.1 Budget Delivery 10 4.2 Employment Creation for Youth Mainstreamed 13 4.3 Policies and measures to help Youth Enter Labour Market 14 4.4 Innovative Interventions to Create Employment 16

V. EVALUATION FINDINGS 18 5.1 Design Level 18 5.2 Process Level 23 5.3 Results Level 28 5.4 Sustainability 36

VI. CONCLUSIONS 37

VII. GOOD PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNT 40 7.1 Good Practices Identified 40 7.2 Lessons Learnt 40

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 41

List of Tables and Figures:

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T.1 JP Results Framework 5 T.2 Data Collection Tools and Sources of Information 9 T.3 Budget Delivery 13 T.4 Programme Budget Structure by Component 24 T.5 JP Management Committee 26 T.6 JP National Steering Committee 27 T.7 Extract from Quarterly Reports 27 T.8 Youth Empowerment in South Sudan Development Plan 29 T.9 Objectives of Youth Employment Fund 30 T.10 Youth Issues in State Action Plans 31 T.11 Interventions at state Level 33 F.1 Entry Points and Pathways for Youth Employment 6 F.2 Evaluation Design 7 F.3 Activity Realignment and Budget Reallocations 11 F.4 Thematic Areas for Creating Youth Employment 20 F.5 Crosscutting Nature of Youth Empowerment 21 F.6 MDGs Addressed by JP 32 ANNEXES: A.1 Documents Reviewed 43 A.2 Individuals Interviewed 45 A.3 Status of Activity Implementation 48 A.4 Evaluation Terms of Reference 53

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C. Acronyms

ALP Accelerated Learning Programme AWP Annual Work Plan BEST Basic Employability Skills Training BOSS Bank of South Sudan CAAFG Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups CBOs Community Based Organisations CBOS Central Bank of Sudan CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CSOs Civil Society Organisations DIM Direct Implementation Modality DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration EES Eastern Equatoria State EET Entrepreneurship Education Training EIA Employment Intensive Approaches FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FFS Farmer Field School FMOGE Federal Ministry of General Education GONU Government of National Unity GRSS Government of the Republic of South Sudan ICT Information & Communication Technology IDPs Internally Displaced Persons ILO International Labour Organization IMAC Inter-Ministerial Approval Committee IOM International Organization for Migration JAM Joint Assessment Mission JP Joint Programme M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDGs Millennium Development Goals MDG-F Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund MEMI Ministry of Energy, Mining and Industry MFI Microfinance Institution MoAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry MoARF Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries MoRDC Ministry of Rural Development & Cooperatives MoCTS Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Supply

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MoCYS Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports MoEST Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology MoFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning MOI Ministry of Industry MoLPSHRD Ministry of Labour and Public Service and Human Resource Development MPI Ministry of Physical Infrastructures MTE Mid-Term Evaluation NIM National Implementation Modality NSC National Steering Committee OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children PMC Programme Management Committee RCO Resident Coordinator's Office SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army SSDP South Sudan Development Plan TOR Terms of Reference TOT Training of Trainers TREE Training for Rural and Economic Empowerment TVETE Technical Vocational Education and Training for Employment UNAIDS United Nations Joint Programme on HIV and AIDS UNCT United Nations Country Team UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organisation UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services VTC Vocational Training Centre YEM Youth Employment and Migration Programme in Sudan YEP Youth Employment Programme Y-Peer Youth Peer Education Network YTC Youth Training Centre

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D. Map of South Sudan

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Evaluation Context

1. In December 2006, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Government of Spain signed a major partnership agreement for the amount of €528 million with the aim of contributing to progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other development goals through the United Nations System. The Fund used a joint programme mode of intervention and operated through the UN teams in each country, promoting increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions through collaboration among UN agencies. 2. Under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F) M&E Strategy and Programme Implementation Guidelines, each programme team was responsible for designing an M&E system, establishing baselines for (quantitative and qualitative) indicators and conducting a final evaluation with a summative focus. In accordance with this guideline, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in South Sudan commissioned the final evaluation of the Joint Programme – Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in South Sudan – to be undertaken during the period 15 October to 23 November 2012. The final evaluation was undertaken by an independent evaluator contracted for the purpose. 3. This report is the final evaluation report of the joint programme “Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in South Sudan. The unit of analysis throughout the report was the joint programme, in this context understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation. 1.2. Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation 4. The final evaluation focused on measuring development results and potential impacts generated by the joint programme, and based on the scope and criteria included provided in the evaluation terms of reference (TOR). See Annex 4 for details. 5. The scope of the evaluation was first, to measure the extent to which the joint programme had fully implemented planned activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes and development results; and second, to generate substantive evidence based knowledge, on the MDG-F thematic windows on Youth Employment and Migration by identifying best practices and lessons learned that could be useful to other development interventions at national (scale up) and international level (replicability). 6. The specific objectives of the evaluation were:

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a) To measure to what extent the joint programme had contributed to solve the needs and problems identified in the design phase.

b) To assess the joint programme’s degree of implementation, efficiency and quality delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised.

c) To determine the extent to which the joint programme had attained development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries, participants, including individuals, communities and institutions.

d) To measure the joint programme contribution to the objectives set in thematic window on Youth Employment and Migration, as well as the overall MDG-F objectives at local and national level.

e) To identify and document substantive lessons learned and good practices associated with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Paris Declaration, Accra Principles and UN reform with the aim to support the sustainability of the joint programme or some of its components.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE JP

2.1. Background and Context

7. The multiple civil wars between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and other South Sudanese militias officially ended in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). However, as a consequence of the protracted civil war and recurrent natural disasters, the political, physical and socio-economic infrastructure, including educational and health care systems had been severely weakened or destroyed. In South Sudan in particular, institutions and systems had to be largely built from scratch. 8. During the war, the country experienced forced migration on a massive scale, resulting in Sudan having the world’s highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs).2 Close to one million people also fled to neighboring countries as refugees. This migration created a vacuum in rural areas and destroyed the established economic structures, leaving the youth separated from their families and communities, thereby depriving them of basic education, social and vocational skills needed for acquiring sustainable livelihoods. 9. Following the signing of the CPA, large numbers of the population began to return to their areas of origin. However, with more than 70 percent of the returnee population below the age of thirty years, their economic integration was made difficult due to lack of infrastructure and basic services. In its report, the Joint Assessment Mission noted, “…it is likely that a significant portion of the displaced will choose to settle in urban rather than rural areas. This will be 2 At the time of the CPA, Sudan’s IDPs were estimated at 4 million, not including those displaced by the conflict in Darfur.

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particularly true of youth, who (i) have grown up in urban or peri-urban areas, (ii) were displaced in the Southern garrison towns, and (iii) are ex-combatants”.3 10. The following extract from the Joint Programme document underscores the national policies of Sudan that the JP intended to support. “Within the context of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), the promotion of productive sectors was identified as a key priority for sustainable development. The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (2005) prescribed that the GRSS and the States should ‘adopt policies and provide facilities for the welfare of children and youth, and ensure that they develop morally and physically; and are protected from abuse; and empower the youth to develop their potential’. Also, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) five-year strategic plan (2007-11) included: ‘…for both north and southern Sudan, recognize that the alignment of vocational training and education outputs to labour market needs will increase employment opportunities’. In addition the GRSS stated that they ‘aim to forge a southern society in which the youth are conscious, empowered, confident, patriotic and committed to the development and progress of their motherland and so to contribute to the recovery and development of the nation (GRSS Policy Statement 2006). Source: JP document, page 8 11. In November 2008, the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) together with 11 UN agencies4 signed the Joint Programme “Creating Opportunities for Youth Employment in Sudan (YEM)”. The joint programme aimed to provide skills development and livelihood opportunities for youth aged between 15 to 30 years in both Northern and Southern Sudan; and address the post-conflict circumstances of migrant youth, returnees and demobilized soldiers, including women and children associated with armed forces and armed groups. The lead technical agencies for the joint programme were the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in Northern Sudan and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Southern Sudan. The programme had a timeframe of two years from September 2009 to August 2011, and a budget of US$8,123,400 divided equally between the North and the South.5 12. Due to the late start of the South Sudan component, the programme commenced in March 2010. During the period April – May 2010, the UN and Government of Southern Sudan (GRSS) undertook a joint Inception Mission to confirm the suitability of the Southern Sudan component of the YEP and to take into account any changes in circumstances. The Inception Mission focused on four objectives:

3 Joint Assessment Mission Report, 2005. 4 FAO, ILO (Lead Agency), IOM, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNFPA, UNOPS AND UNV. 5 Northern Sudan had budget of $3,662,500 and Southern Sudan had $4,534,228.

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a) To assess the programme’s strategic approach, coherence and budget allocations to determine if changes were required to ensure that programme activities were coordinated and have impact;

b) To introduce the programme objectives and outcomes to GRSS and State counterparts, and civil society in the pilot locations;

c) To review and agree the pilot locations for programme implementation; and d) To assess the linkages between the pilot locations and the programme’s thematic

interventions to ensure cohesion and compatibility: Employability and Job Creation; Technical and Vocational Education and Training for Employment; and Life skills.

13. The Inception Mission found that:

i. Circumstances in Southern Sudan had changed since the project document was drafted in 2008 where the dominant concern was a focus on the high level of youth returnees returning to the South from Northern Sudan and East Africa. By mid-2009 the vast majority of returnees had relocated to the South. Many of these returnees had decided to relocate to urban areas and not to return to the countryside.

ii. Since 2008 armed violence among agro-pastoralist youth had become of increasing concern to both the Government and UN. Although the issue was briefly mentioned in the project document not sufficient attention was given to this category of youth and their particular needs.

iii. There was a growing recognition in Southern Sudan that youth employment and youth issues had not been sufficiently addressed during the post-CPA recovery and reconstruction period. This needed to be addressed through the preparation and financing of a more substantive GRSS and States Youth Employment Programme.

iv. Adjustments to a number of Youth Employment Programme activities were required so as to ensure that there was: (a) stronger alignment to GRSS and State priorities; (b) a clearer focus on quick employment and literacy activities; (c) a reduction in the number of overlapping activities; and (d) a greater emphasis on achieving impact through clustering and joined-up actions at GRSS, State and in demonstration localities.

2.2. JP Results Framework

14. The original JP document had three outcomes and 22 outputs. Following the Inception Mission, the UNCT revised the joint programme strategy and approach. However, realising that any change of the JP outcomes and outputs would further delay the start of the programme by necessitating that the project document should be resubmitted for approval by the MDGF Secretariat, the UNCT decided to maintain the original outcomes and outputs and only changed the JP activities. Some of the JP outputs that were specifically related to the Northern Sudan

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component of the results framework were omitted, leaving the JP with a total of 16 outputs as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Joint Programme Results framework

JP Outcome 1: Employment creation for youth is mainstreamed into national development framework. Output 1.2: Joint Action Plan for Youth Employment Activities in place for GRSS Ministries by end of programme. Output 1.4: Micro finance policies conducive to youth employment developed with the Bank of Southern Sudan. Output 1.5: Integrate youth and adolescence priorities into national and state plans including guidelines on vocational training developed conducive to youth employment. JP Outcome 2: Policies and measures are implemented to help youth enter and remain in the labour market. Output 2.1: State level action plans for employment if youth developed in three States and in line with national strategies. Output 2.3: Analysis undertaken on strategic economic sectors, labor force supply and demand and opportunities for youth self-employment in three States. Output 2.4: Enhanced capabilities of at least three meso-level delivery institutions per state to implement youth development policies and services. Output 2.5: Short-term livelihood skills training packages and enterprise development training programme prepared and public training institutions have enhanced management capacity in Wau and Warrap. Output 2.7: Reduced youth vulnerability towards HIV through increased accessibility and acquisition of information, knowledge and life skills on HIV and AIDS. JP Outcome 3: Innovative interventions to create concrete employment and training opportunities for youth are developed and implemented in three states. Output 3.1: Functional literacy accelerated learning programme (ALP) and vocational training opportunities available for adolescents with special focus on girls and ex-child soldiers. Output 3.2: Employability of youth improved through the adoption of short and medium term literacy skills with special focus on females. Output 3.3: Young women and men empowerment to increase employment opportunities through improved knowledge on reproductive health.

Output 3.5: Livelihood training packages and entrepreneurship development training offered to youth in Wau. Output 3.6: Local capacity for running training on micro and small enterprises and developing cooperatives. Output 3.7: Microfinance capacity building and micro-business startup mechanisms established. Output 3.8: Youth benefit from on-the-job skills training at youth centres including cash income through temporary employment during building renovation and construction activities. Output 3.9: Youth have improved access to training facilities and the ability to engage in sustainable productive employment in areas of return in Warrap State.

Output 3.10: Rural youth have acquired life skills for improved (i) agricultural production, (ii) livestock husbandry, and (iii) food marketing and sustainable income generating activities in two localities in Eastern Equatoria States.

Source: Joint Programme document

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2.3. JP Strategy and Theory of Change 15. The project was implemented in eight localities in four States of Southern Sudan, with an objective of demonstrating youth employment approaches in three broad labour markets: urban markets, rural markets and agro-pastoralist livelihoods.6

16. The programme strategy for achieving these objectives was based on demonstrating quick impact activities that are not constrained by educational barriers using three thematic areas and two primary entry points as the specific pathways to guide implementation activities. Figure 1 below illustrates the entry points and pathways to creating youth employment.

Figure 1: Entry Points and Pathways to Creating Youth Employment

Source: MDGF-YEP/ILO/29 June 2011

17. The programme strategy was designed with a view to implement a set of clustered and linked actions to develop employment and life skills from which the following three results and lessons could be achieved:

Firstly, scaling-up of good practices in MDG-based employment and life skills to all ten States through contributing to the development of a larger youth employment and life skills strategy and programme;

6 Juba and Wau as localities for urban markets approach; Magwi and Bor counties as localities for rural markets approach, and Jonglei and Warrap States as localities for agro-pastoralists approaches.

MAIN ENTRY POINTS

Quick workplace learning and employment support

Work-based functional literacy, life skills and business dev. services

Private sector employment, including self and group-based jobs

Short skills training and employment support

Functional literacy and short pre-vocational skills training

Functional literacy, life skills and business services

Private sector employment, self and group-based jobs

Accelerated learning and employment support

Vocational training and employment support

Basic Education Accelerated Learning combined with Pre-vocational Skills

Technical Education combined with Life Skills & Business Dev. services

Private sector employment; self and group-based employment

Certified Vocational Training with Life Skills &Business Dev. Services

Private Sector Employment; self and group-based employment

Temporary Job Creation Schemes that include work-based functional literacy (e.g. Payam Youth Service)

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Secondly, to contribute to the development of youth policies and the production of Youth Employment Action Plan/s at both National and State levels; and

Third, the implementation of practical employment and life skills training opportunities for young men and women tailored to their individual choices and needs.

III. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

3.1. Overall Approach

18. This section presents the evaluation plan and methodology that was based on the foregoing outline of the joint programme context, rationale and strategy; as well as analysis of the evaluation terms of reference (TOR) as provided by the evaluation commissioners. 19. Figure 2 below is a diagrammatic representation of the evaluation design showing the research issues associated with each programme element. Figure 2: Evaluation design

20. The following four-step approach was adopted to carry out the evaluation:

PROGRAMME COMPONENTS RESEARCH ISSUES KEY QUESTIONS

Programme Activities

Overall Programme Objectives

Programme Outputs

Programme Outcomes

Activity implementation: - What was done; how - Where and when

Assess changes in: - Attitudes/behaviour - Knowledge /practice - Plans and results

Determine likelihood of: - Up-scaling/replicability - Sustainability/impact

Did programme activities enhance or limit programme success; how and why?

To what extent do the results address the key issues and challenges?

Are programme objectives being achieved; and are they likely to be sustained?

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① Passive data acquisition. Documentary analysis, including analysis of the Joint Programme document, periodic planning, progress and M&E reports, annual programme reports and Government policy and strategy papers. The list of documents reviewed is at Annex 1 to this report.

② Active data acquisition. Interviews of stakeholders through individual/group interviews of final beneficiaries, institutional beneficiaries, implementation partners and other relevant stakeholders such as youth and women’s associations, vocational training institutions and relevant civil society organisations (CSOs). The interviews (number, target, duration) were determined through consultation with the Joint Programme partners. A sample of projects sites, institutions and beneficiaries were visited for in-situ observations. The list of individuals interviewed is at Annex 2 to this report.

③ Data analysis. The data that was collected from the documents and interviews was analysed qualitatively to extract relevant information linked to the evaluation questions provided in the TOR. The preliminary findings of the evaluation were presented to the evaluation reference group (ERG) as part of the process to validate and triangulate the information.

④ Draft report and final report. A draft report of the evaluation findings, lessons learned and recommendations was submitted to the evaluation commissioners and joint programme partners for comments. This report incorporates their comments.

3.2. Data Collection and Analysis 21. The Results Framework did not specify verifiable indicators and baselines and therefore it was difficult to collect targeted data. However, the assessment of the outcome levels was based on qualitative analysis of the programme achievements in order to identify what the JP had accomplished by way of bringing about positive development change to support the national priorities. The evaluation analysis therefore focused on the core results at the outcome level, focusing more specifically on the sustainability of JP results and processes. 22. Primary data was collected using qualitative data collection methods based on semi-structured interviews and group discussions. Meetings and interviews were held with over 90 individuals and stakeholders, including central and State Government officials, UN agency staff, youth and other beneficiaries. Visits were undertaken to five States (Western Bahr-el Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Warrap States). This approach allowed for triangulation of information from multiple sources. 23. Table 2 below provides the framework guide for the data collection tools and sources of information used in the evaluation. The list of key information providers and stakeholders was provided by the JP focal persons of the participating UN agencies who were also responsible for scheduling appointments and facilitating visits to relevant offices and project sites.

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Table 2: Data collection tools and sources of information Evaluation criteria Data collection tools Sources of information DESIGN LEVEL: The extent to which the objectives of the programme consistent with the needs of the people, the needs of the country and MDGs.

- Document review/analysis - Individual interviews - Group interviews

- National policy planning and strategy documents

- Partner UN agency panning documents

- Youth beneficiaries - Local and national

government officials - Civil society organisations

PROCESS LEVEL: - Extent to which

resources/inputs were turned into results

- Effective exercise of leadership by the country’s national/local partners

- Document review/analysis - Interviews

- National policy planning and strategy documents

- Partner UN agency panning documents

- Youth beneficiaries - Local and national

government officials - Civil society stakeholders

RESULTS LEVEL: Extent to which the objectives of the programme were achieved

- Observations/site visits - Interviews

- JP partner official reports - Youth beneficiaries - Institutional beneficiaries - Civil society stakeholders

SUSTAINABILITY: Probability of the programme benefits continuing in the long term

- Interviews - Document review/analysis

- Local and national government officials and duty bearers

- External stakeholders and donor organisations

IV. REVIEW OF ACTIVITY IMPLEMENTATION

24. This section presents a summation of the status of the JP financial delivery at the end of project implementation and a review of the progress made on the implementation of activities. The main activities implemented by the Joint Programme are summarized under three headings, reflecting the Joint Programme’s Outcomes:

① Mainstreaming of employment creation for youth into national development framework;

② Implementation of policies and measures to help youth enter and remain in the labour market; and

③ Development and implementation of innovative interventions to create concrete employment and training opportunities for youth in three states.

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Some of the outputs in the original design were specific to North Sudan and therefore were not included in the revised results framework for South Sudan.7

4.1. Budget delivery

25. The allocated JP budget for the South Sudan component was USD 4,233,981 all of which was funded by the MDG-F. The budget was allocated to 9 participating UN agencies. The JP was implemented through the Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) rather than National Implementation Modality (NIM). While the NIM modality is usually the favoured implementation modality on the grounds that it promotes institutional capacity development, the evaluation noted the peculiarity of the situation in South Sudan and agreed that under the circumstances of limited civil service and financial management capacity, the DIM modality was more realistic. The Government of South Sudan was an entirely new administration and the public service barely 5 years old, which was emerging from 21 years of civil war. The country was therefore still establishing its systems of government while also the civil service and public administration systems were being developed. In many instances, the government was operating on legal framework adapted from the North or borrowed from neighboring countries while it moved to establish its own national policies. 26. When the JP was launched in South Sudan in March 2010, the Inception Mission noted that the situation in South Sudan had changed since the JP design in 2007 and the project needed to reflect these changes. Among the key issues and changes that had to be addressed, were (i) Lack of political support on the selection of locations by the GRSS, (ii) Lack of alignment between some of the proposed JP activities with GRSS and State priorities, and (iii) Increasing trends in cattle youth violence. In order to address these issues, the initial budget allocations to participating UN agencies were reviewed during the JP Inception Mission in order (a) to more effectively align the JP to GRSS and State level priorities, (b) to improve Delivery-as-One, and (c) to remove overlap and duplication. More specifically, the GRSS and the UN agreed that the JP needed to focus much more on providing youth with employability skills rather than focusing on long-term schooling and vocational training approaches. Figure 3 below shows the activities that were realigned and the attendant budget reallocations. 7 The JP did not report on the outputs in the original project design that were specific to the North: Outputs 1.1., 1.3., 2.2., 2.6., and 3.4.

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Figure 3: JP Activity realignment and budget reallocations Original activity Realigned activity UN Agency Budget reallocation

Construction of feeder roads in target States

Renovation and construction of Youth Training and Enterprise buildings

UNOPS

$454,000

Construction of new training centres

Renovation of Youth Training buildings

IOM $186,000

4-Year Accelerated Learning Programmes

Develop functional literacy materials and TOT

UNICEF $55,000 UNDP $55,000 UNIDO $25,000

ILO $25,000 FAO $15,000

Separate Skills and Entrepreneurship Policy and Curricular activities by 3 UN agencies

Single cross-Ministry TVETE Policy, Curricula and Standards for Short Courses

UNICEF $70,000 UNIDO $70,000

ILO $70,000

Source: Gb/MDGF-YEP/23 July 2010

27. The JP funds were transferred in June 2009 and the programme started in September 2009 with a planned implementation period of two years, thus projecting its end date to August 2011. The evaluation noted that the general environment in Sudan was not very conducive for implementation of the JP. There were various complications, not least among them the fact that Southern Sudan (then) was only a sub-office of the UNCT based in Khartoum which resulted in complex coordination challenges. Although the CPA had been signed in 2005, the peace was very fragile and access to some of the target JP States was very difficult. 28. Furthermore, the first JP Coordinator that had been recruited by ILO as the Lead UN agency for South Sudan resigned after one month, thereby causing further delays as another recruitment process had to be started. Eventually ILO recruited a Chief Technical Adviser who arrived in Juba in March 2010. Consequently the JP implementation was delayed by a period of almost 9 months. However, the MDG-F Secretariat had approved a default 6-month extension on an exceptional basis for any of its JPs that had under-estimated the startup time, which automatically extended the JP end date to December 2011. The JP further requested another no-cost extension for an additional four months, which was approved by the MDG-F Secretariat in December 2012, moving the JP end date to 30 April 2012. In addition, due to a design oversight, part of the funds had been allocated to each UN agency. Participating UN agencies in South Sudan had agreed to pool funding for the final evaluation in October 2010 and sought guidance from the MDTF on how this could be put into effect. However this process took longer than anticipated, and at its discretion, the MDG-F secretariat extended the end date to 31 December 2012 in order to enable the final evaluation of the JP to be undertaken within the period of the project cycle in accordance with the MDG-F Guidelines on M&E. The following exhibit highlights some of the major events that affected timely programme implementation.

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Selected highlights of events that affected the JP implementation Nov 2008 Project document signed by UN (Khartoum) and GNU. Jun 2009 MPTF (NY) disburses first tranche of funds. Oct 2009 UNIDO and ILO begin Inception Mission. ILO staff resigns after one month

(South Sudan component stalled). Mar 2010 New ILO CTA arrives in South Sudan.

IMAC approval; Ministry of Youth appointed as thee lead institution. Apr 2010 National elections (UN agencies reduce activities and travel to States). Apr-May 2010 South Sudan Inception Mission. Jul 2010 PMC approves Inception Mission report and revised budget. Oct 2010 NSC (Khartoum) approves Inception Mission report and revised budget.

PMC approves 18-month work plan. Jan 2011 Referendum. UN reduces activities and travel to States.

98% of South Sudanese vote for separation and establishment of a new state. Feb 2011 Sudan Armed Forces invade the Abyei Transitional Area.

UN requested to reduce staffing levels. Apr 2011 Mid-term evaluation due to start. MDGF Secretariat cancels the evaluation due

to withdrawal of evaluator. May 2011 Sudan closes the border with South Sudan and stops all cross border trade.

Some JP activities (UNIDO and IOM) affected. 9 Jul 2011 South Sudan independence. UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan

established and all UN agencies have to sign new Standard basic Agreements with GRSS. Separation of the JP into YEM Sudan and YEP South Sudan.

14 Jul 2011 South Sudan admitted to United Nations. Sep 2011 Original end of project. Oct 2011 Mid-term evaluation.

NSC (Juba) endorses MTE and approves no-cost extension to 30 April 2012. Dec 2011 Mid-term evaluation provided to UNCT in South Sudan.

End of first no-cost extension. Feb 2012 Oil shut down. Government counterparts prepare austerity measures and are

inaccessible, focusing on core functions and priority services. Apr 2012 SPLA and SAF armed forces clash along the border.

End of second no-cost extension. Sep 2012 Sudan and South Sudan agree to restart oil production and de-militarise the

border. Oct-Nov 2012 Final evaluation. Dec 2012 End of project.

29. The events highlighted above had profound effect on the progress and JP implementation. However, many of the planned activities were completed, albeit with minimal impact in terms of the intended results. Budget delivery by UN agencies was also quite satisfactory given the disruptions highlighted above and thanks to the extensions. Some UN agencies (UNAIDS, UNFPA and UNICEF) also provided additional funding to implement their interventions. In

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addition, PLAN International contributed $154,314 towards activities associated with the JP. Table 3 below shows the status of the JP budget as of 30 November 2012.8 Table 3: Budget delivery as at 30 November 2012

UN Agency Allocated Budget (US$)

Committed (US$)

Disbursed (US$)

Balance (US$)

Delivery (%)

FAO 305,000 305,000 0 100% ILO 801,540 797,842 3,698 99.5% IOM 399,859 393,123 6,736 98.3% UNAIDS 97,263 101,437 (3,608) 104.3% UNDP9 591,247 544,247 544,432 47,004 92.1% UNFPA 96,590 97,825 97,825 (1,235) 101% UNICEF 368,456 412,080 412,080 43,624 111.8% UNIDO UNOPS 917,514 888,002 29,512 96.8% TOTAL

Source: JP participating UN agencies

4.2. Employment creation for youth is mainstreamed into national development framework.

30. The main thrust and implementation strategy for this outcome was to intervene at policy level to enable and facilitate the development of an enabling environment and institutional capacity for creating opportunities for youth at the level of the duty bearers. Three participating UN agencies contributed to this outcome – ILO, UNDP and UNICEF. The evaluation noted that approximately 8% of the total JP budget was spent on this outcome. Based on the information obtained from the interviews, the JP’s most significant and strategic achievements were made under this outcome. 31. The JP supported the development of a rapid survey approach to neighbourhood skills and market opportunities in five locations. The assessment used the Training for Rural Economic Empowerment (TREE) model that was developed by ILO in 2009. TREE market assessment tools include survey tools for assessing consumer demand for goods and services, market opportunities, and observations of local markets. This methodology significantly improved on the systems used by training providers in South Sudan. One of the innovative approaches used was the use of the smart phone technology to undertake the surveys. In the last 18 months, 3 UN agencies and 4 international NGOs have adopted the methodology and a total of 24 market surveys were undertaken. The JP also commissioned a comparative analysis of 22 market assessments and supported development and publishing of a Manual for conducting Market Assessments. These documents will be housed on the website of the 8 The expenditure figures for UNIDO were not made available to the evaluator. 9 The balance on the UNDP budget includes pending disbursements for support to establishment of the Payam Youth Service and for the final evaluation.

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National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Although initially designed to be administered to an equal number of male and female respondents, this was not accomplished in the Youth or Market Opportunity Surveys. In the Youth Survey, 37 % of respondents were female, while in the Market Opportunity Survey, 36 % of respondents were female.10 32. The JP also supported the NBS to conduct an Urban Labour Force Survey. ILO and UNDP jointly provided $400,000 towards the survey, which was yet to be started by the NBS at the time of writing this report. The NBS planned to undertake a pilot in December 2012 and the actual survey in January to March 2013. The NBS noted however that it still had a shortfall of about $300,000 in required funding in order to undertake the comprehensive urban labour force survey, after obtaining additional funding from the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and German Aid Agency (GIZ). The World Bank was also reported to be considering providing this shortfall. UNICEF LEAD programme and the YEP provided support to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MOCYS) to develop a Youth Policy. A draft of the policy had already been produced and at the time of writing, a validation workshop was being planned for stakeholders to provide comments on the draft policy. 33. In addition, the JP had also supported the GRSS to develop and produce a National Strategy for Cooperatives and Economic Associations. With the JP support, the GRSS was working towards creating a legal framework to establish a conducive environment for cooperatives. The framework will seek pro-poor, inclusive development, be consistent with strategic plans including the South Sudan Development Plan, and be formulated with as much participation as possible from cooperative members. 34. The JP did not implement the activities designed for output 1.4 to develop microfinance policies for youth employment.11 Providing microfinance and microcredit to youth who have completed entrepreneurship training from other components of the JP would significantly strengthen the JP’s effectiveness and increase its impact. This output was therefore a critical component of the JP theory of change and the failure of the JP to establish and provide microcredit facilities was a strategic weakness. The status of activity implementation is shown at Annex 3a to this report.

4.3. Policies and measures are implemented to help youth enter and remain in the labour market.

35. The initial logic behind this outcome was to enable the JP to test the validity and coherence of the policies through practical implementation at the State level. While this was a logical sequel to policy development, in practice it proved to be very difficult to do within a 2- 10 Youth Employment & Livelihood Baseline Assessment on Skills & Market Opportunities; page 11. 11 ILO had planned study tours to Tanzania and Uganda (Development of Microfinance Cooperatives in South Sudan for Inclusive Economic Growth, Dec 2011), but the funding to undertake the activities was not available. The Microfinance Policy was however being developed under the Private Sector Development Project supported by the World Bank.

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year project cycle period. Moreover, some of the JP assumptions were much more applicable to North Sudan but did not hold true for South Sudan. For example, some of the States existed nominally with no infrastructure to support public administration, and in some cases, with the Governors still located in Juba. In addition, the UN system was operating on a one country – two governments framework for Sudan and did not become a fully-fledged country office until after the separation in July 2011. 36. Four UN agencies contributed towards this outcome – ILO, UNDP, UNICEF and UNIDO. One of the implementation challenges was that UNIDO did not have an office presence in South Sudan and was operating from Khartoum. This affected some of the planned activities, as for example when the border was closed in May 2011, UNIDO faced difficulties in transferring funds from Khartoum as the currency was changed to South Sudan Pounds. In addition UN flights between Khartoum and South Sudan ceased to operate after July and UN operational staff had to travel via either Addis Ababa or Nairobi to access South Sudan. IOM was also partially affected, because construction materials such as cement and metal roofing sheets were sourced from Khartoum, and that flow was affected by the closure of the border. Despite these challenges, the JP was able to implement and complete some of the planned activities, although the major weakness was that the activities did not fully achieve the combined effect necessary to realize the impact anticipated in the JP theory of change. At the field level, the implementation of activities also had inherent weaknesses with unintended consequences. In Wau, UNIDO partnered with Don Bosco Vocational Training Center (VTC) to run short 2-week skills training. The JP provided a stipend of 15 SSP to participants, gave them breakfast and a startup tool kit at the end of the training. However, the regular students of the VTC who were registered for 2-year courses were not getting any of these benefits, which created some bad feeling among the students. In addition, there was a general feeling expressed by the State Ministry officials and staff of the VTC that the 2-week certificate had very limited market value.

There were some positive success stories from the short 2-week course. a) Two young males were using the skills to construct their own houses. b) One youth was employed in a welding firm after completing the training.

These stories were obtained only as anecdotal evidence. There was no follow up to monitor how the trainees were using the skills or the startup kit that was given to them. Nonetheless, the stories indicate that the approach could achieve some impact, albeit on a very low scale.

37. The JP did introduce some innovative interventions, which are capable of further replication and scaling up by the government. Through the introduction of market assessments, the needs of individual communities can be assessed and vocational and skills training programmes can be better tailored to improving livelihoods and creating micro-enterprises in the local economy thereby contributing to local markets, rather than channelling youth to

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seeking employment opportunities in the larger urban centres. The JP also introduced the concept of mobile training, which can be quite effective particularly in rural and agro-pastoralist areas, where vocational training centres are few in number, often inaccessible to remote communities and not sufficiently functional or flexible to provide community-based, demand-driven training. Three main approaches to mobile training delivery were introduced: (i) locating semi-permanent training facilities in a solid structure, such as an old building which is converted into a workshop or classroom, (ii) fully equipped training units travel in trailers or tents to selected locations, where training may be conducted over a period of days or weeks, and (iii) trainers travel to more isolated communities with a light equipment to conduct training over a number of hours or days using locally available learning materials. Annex 3b to this report shows the status of activity implementation under Outcome 2 as at end of programme.

4.4. Innovative interventions to create concrete employment and training opportunities for youth are developed and implemented in three states.

38. Nine UN agencies contributed towards this outcome – FAO, ILO, IOM, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO and UNOPS – with 64% of the total budget allocated to activities under this outcome. A number of innovative approaches were introduced, most of them for the first time in South Sudan. The underlying logic was to ensure that interventions fit the profiles of youth in an inclusive manner. The JP undertook Youth Employment and Baseline Surveys on Skills and Market Opportunities in Juba, Bor, Magwi and Abara, (UNDP), and two separate markets in Wau (IOM) and Kwajok (UNHCR) using both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies with the help of locally hired data collectors and translators. Interviews were conducted with consumers, community leaders, business owners and employees, and youth in each location and found that (a) youth lacked basic numeracy, literacy skills and language skills, (b) lacked business knowledge and know-how, and (c) existing vocational training centres did not fulfill demand and were often underfunded and not operational. 39. Based on this evidence, the JP seconded a TVETE advisor to the government TVET adviser to Government to support key TVETE line ministries - MOLPS, MOE and MOYSR. The TOR for the TVETE Advisor was to:

Develop six-month and shorter courses, including standardised curricula and accreditation in six basic trades as well as piloting in selected JP demonstration centres;

Develop a framework and guidance for mobile skills training (e.g. ago-pastoralist and fisheries youth, etc.) including piloting in selected JP locations;

Strengthen TVETE routine data reporting through the Ministry of Education’s Management Information System (EMIS);

Develop curriculum in a minimum of three selected vocational trades, including standardised HIV and AIDS, career guidance, entrepreneurial skills modules (e.g. Know

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about Business, etc.) and occupational safety and health including piloting in selected JP areas;

Develop standardised Entrepreneurship Education and Training (EET) activities that were currently being or had been carried out at existing Vocational Training Centres (VTCs);

Develop a strategy on how to synchronise the TVETE curricula with the needs of labour markets including self-employment in coordination with the main training providers such as Don Bosco, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Save the Children, NPA, and World Vision.

40. Within the scope of their mandates and comparative advantages, UN agencies then introduced specific initiatives to implement the TVETE approach. IOM and UNOPS introduced Employment Intensive Approaches (EIA) to improving youth-related infrastructure while ILO undertook a national workshop for GRSS ministries and representatives from all 10 States to link broader employment, economic and social policies to targeted interventions aimed at overcoming the country’s major challenges of reducing underemployment and unemployment. The strategy involved combining up-streaming actions (policy and planning) with down-stream actions (interventions that directly create employment); and linking both labour demand and supply with creating employment opportunities for target groups, including youth, women, ex combatants, small famers, fishers and herders. UNFPA introduced the Youth Peer Education Network (Y-Peer), which is a non-formal social learning approach to Reproductive Health, HIV and AIDS, gender equality and family planning that targets youth who are not in school to train them to teach their peers by assembling them into self-managed networks at local and national and international levels. The Y-Peer model has no educational barriers, is community-based, uses peer relationships and encourages organized group formation; it is scalable, inexpensive and simple; and it takes advantage of the fact that peers are traditional providers of information to each other, particularly about sensitive issues among youth such as reproductive health. UNESCO was also in the process of developing approaches to use Y-Peer networks for literacy and numeracy training. 41. The JP also planned to introduce the Payam Youth Service both as a job creation scheme and a national civic service. Community-based youth volunteer services are much more affordable and cost effective than those provided through international development agencies and national NGOs. However, the envisaged establishment of a Payam Small Grants Fund to support the self-help actions of youth associations did not materialise. In addition, the JP was planning to support Amadi Rural Development Institute to become a national centre for sustainable livelihood skills training including ToT in farmer field schools. 42. The evaluation found however that the JP had not been able to effectively link these initiatives in a synergistic manner to achieve impact. In the first instance, the initiatives are individually undertaken in different locations, and secondly there was no specific follow up to

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evaluate the practical aspects of their application post-fact in order to determine their effectiveness and to further support the youth to utilise the acquired skills. The status of activity implementation under Outcome 3 as at end of programme is shown at Annex 3c. V. EVALUATION FINDINGS

5.1. Design Level

43. This section contains the evaluation findings on the relevance of the JP and its design. It addresses the issues pertaining to the extent to which the objectives of JP were consistent with the needs and interest of the people, the needs of the country and the Millennium Development Goals.

5.1.1. Relevance of the JP design to the needs of the country and its people

44. The JP was initially designed in 2007 and signed in November 2008, just under three and half years after the signing of the CPA which officially ended one of Africa’s longest civil wars. At the time, the major concerns evolved around two issues; first the large numbers of the population who had been displaced from their homes by the war and was desirous to return to their areas of origin; and second, the reintegration of combatants, including women and children associated with armed forces and armed groups. This was further reflected in the selection of the target States where the interventions were to be undertaken. The following excerpts from the original project document underscore the thinking around the JP design at the time.

“Six States were selected as priority areas for the JP - Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan (in North Sudan); Eastern Equatoria, Warrap and Western Equatoria (in South Sudan) – based on the criteria of having a significant number of returnees…” p9

“Some (sic) areas of intervention will differ between north and south in response to the different contexts; 1) In the south states, the high number of youth who are former child soldiers is one

of the key impediments to development…hence UNICEF will focus on vocational training specifically targeting this group.

2) UNFPA interventions will focus on empowering women, increase their self-worth and self-awareness and create a basis for employability.

3) Southern Sudan suffers from having very limited infrastructure. It is therefore proposed that labour-intensive infrastructure projects will be undertaken only in Southern Sudan. p13

Source: JP document (original version)

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45. After the initial delays in starting the JP Coordinator arrived at the beginning of March 2010 and negotiations to launch the JP were held with the GOSS, who expressed reservations on two issues. First, the GOSS did not fully agree with the locations selected and some of the proposed activities; and secondly, the government observed that the project had not received the official approval of the GRSS Inter-ministerial Appraisal Committee (IMAC). The UNCT then moved to resolve the issues by (a) unpacking the project’s main activities into separate components for the South and North, (b) preparation of a project briefing note, and (c) convening of a GOSS ministers meeting to prepare for the IMAC. Following these initiatives, the project was approved by IMAC on 22 March 2010 and immediately moved to the Inception Mission. 46. Field visits and consultations were held with over 340 participants, two-thirds of whom were male. The Inception teams met a total of 144 State and County officials as well as a cross section of civil society, including 25 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 6 women’s associations, 10 youth associations, and also held focus group meetings with 107 youth (71 male and 36 female) and undertook visits to 19 adolescent and youth facilities (vocational and technical training centres, schools and accelerated learning centres. Based on these broad consultations, the project design was substantially adjusted to represent the views and needs of the people. The major adjustments made fell within the following three categories:

Shift the project strategy from geographic targeting of States to labour markets, of which three key markets were identified – urban markets, rural markets and agro-pastoral markets;

Shift the project focus from special interest groups (IDPs, returnees, ex-combatants) to inclusiveness; and

Shift the focus from academic skills and vocational training to providing technical and vocational education and training for employment (TVETE) with no entry barriers, including life skills training.

47. The new design reflecting these changes was illustrated in the Inception Mission report by the following diagram.

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Figure 4: Thematic areas for creating opportunities for youth employment

48. In the context of the socio-economic challenges facing South Sudan, there could be more strategic approaches to employment creation and opportunities for the youth. South Sudan’s economy is characterised by high dependence on a depleting oil resource, limited domestic production, virtually no manufacturing and industrial activity and a high reliance on imports. Although the oil revenues are significant, production from existing fields had peaked and the revenues are expected to gradually decline in the years ahead unless new discoveries take place. Volatility in the prices and production of oil also make macro-economic and budgetary planning difficult. The non-oil economy is based predominantly on subsistence farming and livestock-rearing.12 49. In this connection therefore, it would appear that a more focused attention and support for economic growth and diversifying the economic base would have a more strategic impact on employment creation in the medium to long term. The JP approach for providing livelihood opportunities is a ‘quick-fix’ solution at best, and can only pacify an energetic youth in the short term.13 The concept of ‘youth’ should not be taken as a static phenomenon. As today’s youth ages into adulthood and seniors, a ‘new youth’ will always replace it. Solutions geared towards addressing the problems of the youth should therefore not only be addressed in the context of the current generation of youth. The high influence of contemporary information and communication technologies (ICT) on lifestyle preferences should also be taken into account when designing programmes for the youth. 5.1.2. Efficacy of the JP design M&E plan in measuring development results

50. The JP lacked an effective M&E plan with appropriate indicators for measuring and reporting on results. Consequently, most (if not all) of the intermediate reports generated by

12 South Sudan Development Plan 2011-13, p 24-25. 13 The JP partners acknowledged the point but noted that the JP was focused on the short term.

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT

EMPLOYABILITY &

JOB CREATION

TVETE SKILLS

TRAINING

INCLUSIVENESS

LIFESKILLS

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the JP provided information on the status of activity implementation as opposed to reporting on the effect of the interventions on the situation of target groups. For example, after completion of ‘training of trainers’ (TOT) training, no specific follow up was undertaken or reported on to indicate whether or not the trainers were providing training to secondary groups, or whether the trainers were providing effective training according to the methods that they had been taught. 51. The JP mid-term evaluation (MTE) made a similar observation. However, most of the recommendations made by the MTE were not addressed in an improvement plan, in part because the MTE itself was only completed 4 months prior to the JP end date of April 2012, before the current extension to 31 December 2012. 5.1.3. Appropriateness of the JP approach in responding to development challenges 52. Given the crosscutting nature of the challenges around creating opportunities for the youth, and the diversity of the population that make up the group that is referred to as ‘youth’, there is a lot of logic in combining different perspectives and expertise represented by various UN agencies. By the same token, the needs of the youth also fall within the mandates of different sector ministries of government. In that regard, the JP approach was indeed an appropriate tool for addressing the development challenge. Three line Ministries (Labour, Education and Youth) were leading the mainstreaming of youth employment through the TVETE approach. Figure 5 below provides data that illustrates the crosscutting nature of the youth problem in South Sudan.

Figure 5: Demonstrating the crosscutting nature of youth employment

Source: JP Briefing Note, June 2012.

53. The evaluation found however, that in the context of the YEP JP in South Sudan, the number of participating UN agencies was excessive, resulting not only in coordination

94% of young people enter labour force with no

qualification. Only 27% of 15 years + are literate (40% male, 16% female; 53% urban, and 22% rural.

Youth Labour Market in South Sudan

22

difficulties, but also in overlap and duplication of functions, which reduces the efficiency of implementing and increases transaction costs. The roles of UN agencies did not reflect their comparative advantages. For example, ILO would have been better placed to handle Labour Market Surveys instead of UNDP; and UNICEF was allocated funds for livelihood training instead of ILO and UNIDO. In addition, given that ILO and UNIDO had similar areas of work in the South and North respectively, it would have been more efficient for them to swap activities when the programme was divided into two. 54. The evaluation found that the “jointness” of the JP was defined at the outcome level. However, by definition, an outcome is a broad development result to which no individual UN agency can claim attribution. It stands to reason therefore, that several UN agencies may contribute to a common outcome as a matter of course without the need of a joint programme. On the other hand, an output is a specific short-term result to which full attribution can be claimed on the basis of specific interventions. In that regard, a joint programme is a situation where two or more UN agencies are contributing to the same output and can all claim partial attribution. Good practice examples of this JP include (i) the support given to GRSS by ILO, UNICEF and UNIDO towards the development of a TVETE policy, curricula and standardisation, and (ii) the support to Labour Force Surveys in which ILO provided technical support (survey concept, questionnaire design, etc.) and UNDP supported pre-testing, training and data cleaning. The evaluation identified a number of missed opportunities where different UN agencies could have contributed to a common output. For example, in the city of Wau in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, UNIDO undertook short two-week courses to train unemployed youth in such skills as masonry, carpentry, welding and painting. Prior to that IOM had sub-contracted work for the construction and renovation of the Youth Training Centre. This was an opportunity for the two UN agencies to work with the same youth to complement each other’s efforts and results.14 A similar situation applied to the renovation of the Youth Training Centre in Juba which did not engage the youth that had undergone UNICEF/PLAN supported skills training. 55.

14 IOM noted that “The construction work of the training center was ongoing while UNIDO was conducting their training courses. IOM could not wait for UNIDO trainees to complete the courses which would have delayed the project implementation”. This actually explains the whole point, if there had been joint planning the activities could have been structured such that the trained youth were given the opportunity to do the renovation of the Youth Training Center. Besides, the training period was only two weeks and could hardly constitute substantial delay in project implementation.

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5.2. Process Level

55. This section presents the evaluation findings of the JP’s efficiency of processes, including assessment of the extent to which the JP resources were converted into outputs and the efficacy of the management and coordination model.

5.2.1. Efficiency

56. Development projects are not that easily amenable to such assessments of efficiency from an input/output relationship because some of the inputs are not that directly correlated to the output. For example, time inputs are not a controllable variable, particularly in a post conflict environment such as South Sudan where access to some areas can be limited due to external influences such as security, access, weather or other unforeseen circumstances. Cost efficiencies are also difficult to measure in the context of South Sudan where almost everything is imported, and combined with lack of infrastructure, the cost of commodities is very high. This leads to very high staff costs relative to project outputs, including any outputs derived from activities that are sub-contracted to local partners. Security considerations also had an impact on lead and implementation time in instances where project activities were stalled while the overhead costs had to be maintained. 57. These issues contributed to a difficult implementation environment for the JP. However, there were also other factors that were within the control of the UN system. For example, the engagement of the UNRCO was very minimal. Given that the JP brought together almost all UN agencies in South Sudan, this was clearly one of the joint programmes which could have been specifically implemented directly through the UNRCO coordination. 58. However, there are aspects associated with the JP’s work processes that relate to its efficiency and can serve as a proxy indicator for the JP’s efficiency. It is indicative to look at the programme budget allocation by component to get an insight of how the JP prioritised its interventions relative to the programme logic model. About 8% of the budget was allocated to outcomes 1 and 2, which combined addressed the policy dimensions for creating opportunities for youth at the national and State levels. The remainder of the budget (92%) went to down-stream activities aimed at developing youth skills (64%) and developing youth-related infrastructure (28%). Table 4 shows the programme budget structure by component.

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Table 4: Programme budget structure by component Component Budget % Expected results TVETE policy

$287,500

7.9%

Development, dissemination and implementation of GRSS TVETE policy, standards, curriculum, accreditation and certification in 3 States

Life skills with an emphasis on Functional Literacy, reproductive Health and Gender Equality

$575,000

15.9%

- Design and implement a life skills and ALP for teachers including rehab of ALP centres - Literacy materials for pre-vocational skills and enterprise training - Training of Trainers

Employability and job creation in the private sector including self-employment

$1,760,000

48.6%

- Vocational and entrepreneurial training -State level business and capacity development, including coops and associations - Microfinance capacity building

Renovation and equipping of youth facility infrastructure

$1,000,000

27.6%

- New building construction - Renovation of existing buildings - Lease and opérate agreements

TOTALS $3,622,500 100% $911,728 from total budget could not be explained.

Source: Embedding a Programme Strategy and Prioritising Resources to Create Enhanced Coherence; YEP/ILO/31 July 2010

59. It would be very difficult to make a prescriptive judgement about the appropriateness or otherwise of the budget allocations to components. However, reference to the government’s own priorities and situation analysis may provide an indication of how the JP could have provided more value-added.

“The Government lacks absorptive capacity due to limited human capital, institutional and organisational structures and domestic production capacity” SDDP, p 31. “At independence the Government took on large number of new responsibilities for which it has only limited experience. It is (sic) important to ensure coherent, medium-term technical assistance strategy to provide advice and training to the agencies responsible for policy management” SDDP, p 32. “In the short run, the Government does not have the capacity to formulate and implement the policies that would be desirable in the medium and long term” SDDP, p 33

60. The above statements suggest an overwhelming need for more attention towards policy formulation and institutional capacity development. While acknowledging that the JP introduced significant innovative approaches (TVETE, Y-Peer, etc.), it should also be recognized that these were “demonstration” projects whose sustainability (replication and up-scaling)

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depended to a greater extent on availability of enabling policy environment and institutional capacity of the duty-bearers.

A recently published book, Pastoralism and Development in Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins, observes that pastoralism in the horn of Africa generates $1 billion annually. It argues that “more effective policies towards pastoralism and the livestock economy could bring more widespread development and stability to the region. Rather than seeing these marginal areas as troublesome sites of potential uprising and secession, policy makers should take notice and tap into what is going on by fostering inclusive growth and income diversification for those who are unable to make it in the core livestock economy”. Huffington Post, Pastoralism: Good News From a Troubled Region of Africa.

61. The second aspect relates to the elimination of overlap and duplication of activities between UN agencies and harmonization of strategies between line ministries. The evaluation found that the JP consistently tried to eliminate duplication, sometimes successful and sometimes not so successfully. In the case of the development of cross-ministry TVETE curricula for example, the JP pooled resources and attached a technical Adviser with the government to support the three Ministries involved, thereby eliminating duplication. However, the implementing mechanism for the pooling of resources proved to be not so easy. In the first instance, the UN agencies had agreed to divide the Technical Adviser’s contract into separate segments in which a different agency would be responsible for the payment. As it turned out, this would have necessitated that each time the contract passes to a different agency, there is a competitive bidding process before the Technical Adviser could be paid. Finally, the agencies agreed to transfer funds to one administrative agency.

5.2.2. JP Governance, management and coordination 62. Creating opportunities for youth is a crosscutting issue which requires a multi-sectoral approach. The JP approach whereby different UN agencies came together to contribute towards the issue from their different vantage points; as well as the approach to engage various sector ministries of government to develop a common strategy and approach for youth opportunities was therefore very appropriate. However, the evaluation did not find clear evidence of UN agencies working together towards a common result, except for the one instance where 3 UN agencies jointly supported the development of TVETE policy in 3 line Ministries through a common TVETE Technical Adviser collocated with government. 63. The results framework for the JP has individual UN agencies responsible for each output separately. By definition a joint programme is a set of activities contained in a common work plan and related budget, involving two or more UN organizations and (sub-) national partners. It happens where UN agencies, with national partners and donors, see clear gains in

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effectiveness and efficiency from combining their efforts and resources in a common work plan and budget.15 It stands to reason therefore that a joint programme cannot be defined at the outcome level, because outcomes are long-term results to which no individual UN agency can claim attribution. Individual UN agencies can still contribute to the same outcome through their respective country programmes without the need of a joint programme. However, at the output level, if two or more UN agencies contribute to the same output and the results can be clearly attributed to all of them, then that is defined as a joint programme. Other than the fact that the participating UN agencies were funded from the same source, there was nothing in the design or the implementation process that suggested that they were working through a joint programme. 64. By the same token, the coordination between line Ministries was not clearly defined. In discussions with officials of the key TVETE line Ministries, the evaluation found that there was no joint planning or monitoring taking place. The only joint activity that had taken place was the study tour to Tanzania that was organized and facilitated by the JP. A Joint Programme Management Committee (PMC) was established and had clear TORs.16 The PMC met quarterly and was represented at appropriate levels, both within the UN and government setup. At its first meeting in July 2010, the PMC endorsed the Inception Mission report. The composition of the PMC is shown in the following table. Table 5: Joint Programme Management Committee for South Sudan

National partners UN agencies Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (Co-chair) UNRCO (Co-chair)

Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development FAO Ministry of General Education and Instruction ILO Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development

IOM

Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment UNAIDS Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare UNDP Ministry of Health UNESCO Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries UNFPA South Sudan DDR Commission UNICEF Bank of South Sudan, Microfinance Unit UNIDO South Sudan AIDS Commission UNOPS

Source: Briefing Note; YEP/ILO 10 October 2011

15 United Nations Development Group (2010); How to Prepare an UNDAF: Part II, Technical Guidance for UNCTs.

16Terms of Reference for the Southern Sudan Programme Management Committee

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65. The JP also found that a National Steering Committee (NSC), was established in Khartoum to provide overall strategic guidance and oversight of the JP. However, given the tensions between the two governments in resolving outstanding CPA issues, there was not much interaction between them. A YEP NSC was established in October 2011. The evaluation noted that it was very difficult to convene the NSC, which only met once in October 2011 to approve the MTE report and the JP request for a no-cost extension to April 2012. The UNRCO was also not very engaged in the JP processes. With a JP of nearly all UN agencies in South Sudan, the UNRCO shoul;d have played a more active role in its implementation. The composition of the NSC is shown in Table 6 below.

Table 6: Joint Programme National Steering Committee for South Sudan Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (Co-chair) UN Resident Coordinator who is also Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) and UN Humanitarian Coordinator is Co-chair. Minister of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Spanish Embassy representative

Source: Briefing Note; YEP/ILO 10 October 2011 66. At operational level, ILO was the lead agency, but the CTA had only a coordinating role. Each UN agency was responsible for its own operational management and decisions, with a designated focal person. In practice what this meant was that there was no joint planning taking place. The ILO CTA was also responsible for compiling the reports submitted by the focal points, but with no clear management responsibility, could not provide direct quality assurance. As a result, some of the information provided through the colour-coded quarterly reports were not clear and did not appear to be plausible. The following extracts from the quarterly reports illustrate the point. Table 7: Extract from JP quarterly report Output Activity UN

agency Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10

1.5 Build institutional capacity for planning, quality data collection and management access to reliable functional literacy and vocational training data on young adolescents

UNICEF

3.7 Provide business skills training and startup kits/capital for youth; collaborating with FAO, ILO, IOM and UNIDO

UNDP

3.8 Rehabilitation and expansion of Juba Youth Training Centre, technical assistance, design and support and construction supervision

UNOPS

Source: JP Consolidated Quarterly Colour-coded work plan report (Apr-Aug 2012)

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67. The above examples are selected for their illustrative significance without suggesting that they are the only ones that are not clear or that the respective UN agencies were the worst reporting. Clearly, in the case of output 1.5 the activity itself is vague (probably more of an output than an activity). Secondly the red reports in quarter 5 and 7 do not make sense given that the activity is already in progress; and finally it is not clear what was actually completed in quarter 10 – the institutional capacity for planning and data collection (which would require an assessment of capacity) or the access to literacy and training data. With respect to output 3.7, the evaluation found that startup capital was never provided to the youth, and so it is also not clear what the green is supposed to mean. On output 3.8, the activity is reported completed several times through its implementation cycle only to re-emerge as being still in progress. 68 The mid-term evaluation (MTE) was originally scheduled to take place in April/May 2011 but had to be postponed because the evaluator became unavailable. The UN in South Sudan then requested to delay the MTE until October 2011 to allow the country to focus on the separation of South Sudan and establishment of a country office. At that time, the JP had requested a no-cost extension effectively moving its end date to April 2012; thus in effect the MTE was done only 6 months prior to the project closure. Since the MTE was commissioned by the MDG-F Secretariat, the report was only provided to the UNCT in December 2011, only 4 months before the official end date of the JP. Consequently, the JP did not make an improvement plan to address the recommendations of the MTE. Some of the significant recommendations of the MTE included (1) The JP to engage a national evaluator to conduct continuous evaluation of the JP outputs and results in order to reshape some of the JP activities, (2) The MDG-F Secretariat to give the ILO CTA management authority for the JP, and (3) UN agencies to improve joint implementation and enhance coordination through proper application of available tools and guidelines.

5.3. Results Level

69. This section contains the evaluation findings on the extent to which the objectives of the JP were achieved. The assessment includes analysis of (i) the JP contribution to MDGs and the goals of the MDG-F goals of the thematic window on Youth Employment and Migration, (ii) the JP impact on target groups, and (iii) the JP contribution to increase civic participation in development issues. In order to provide a fair and objective assessment, the evaluation recognized that the original JP document and programme strategy was revised by the Inception Mission which modified the programme activities so that they could be more consistent with the priorities of the GRSS by disaggregating the development situation of South Sudan from the original combined North/South analysis. 70. The revised overall programme results of the South Sudan component were defined as set out below.

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① Development of youth policies and Youth Employment Action Plans at national and

State levels. ② Scaling up MGD-based good practices on employment creation and life skills and

contributing to the development of a youth employment and life skills programme. ③ Development and implementation of practical employment and life skills training

opportunities for young men and women tailored to their choices and needs.

71. The evaluation noted that the revised programme objectives and intended results did not represent a significant and fundamental departure from the original outcomes in the JP document designed in 2007. In essence, the revised formulation grouped the original outcomes 1 and 2 under the first result area; and unpacked the original outcome 3 into two separate result areas. For purposes of fair and objective evaluation, the ensuing assessment of results is grouped under the revised programme results.

5.3.1. Developing youth policies and Youth Employment Action Plans at national and State levels

72. The JP made quite significant contributions to mainstream youth issues into the national policy and strategy frameworks. Particularly notable was the inclusion of specific youth issues under all the pillars of the SSDP as shown in the following table.

Table 8: SSDP addressing of youth empowerment Development Pillar

SSDP strategy for youth

Economic Improve producers’ agri-business skills (youth and women self-help groups and cooperatives)

Governance Continue the Youth parliament. Train political parties, civil society and media forums in multi-party democracy, good governance, and gender and youth empowerment.

Social Begin a Payam Youth Service which will involve young people in national health and literacy campaigns and organize cultural and sporting events at the Payam level.

Security Continue DDR programmes. Prioritise schools for mine clearance to ensure safety for learning.

Source: JP Briefing Note of May 2011.

73. Also particularly notable is the JP’s contribution to the development of the South Sudan Youth Policy The JP facilitated the establishment of a Task force, which had representation of the GRSS, UN agencies and CSOs including youth associations. . At the time of writing this

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report, a draft of the Youth Policy was already completed, and it was due to be reviewed through a workshop of stakeholders. 74. Notwithstanding the high degree of JP’s achievement towards this outcome, the evaluation also found that some aspects of the JP strategy were not accepted by the GRSS. The JP had proposed three areas that needed to be addressed through the youth policy; (a) a medium-term youth employment strategy; (b) an associated fast track delivery mechanism in the form of Youth Fund; and (c) the establishment of a country-wide Payam Youth Service. The idea of the Youth Fund was not yet endorsed by GRSS, pending Cabinet approval. The objectives of the Fund were very strategic to promoting the empowerment of youth, and included the following four windows: Table 9: Objectives of the Youth Empowerment Fund

Window Scope and purpose Promotion of Entrepreneurship in Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET)

- Capital & Equipment fund for the renovation and construction of TVET centres

- Capacity building for TVET policy makers, instructors and managers; and

- TVET to work transition – counselling, advocacy, employment matching, informal apprenticeships, labour market surveys and tracer studies, etc.

Promoting Youth Business Development Opportunities

- Business start-up finance, working capital for cooperatives, and self-employment;

- Youth employment services, business counselling and advocacy actions, funding for youth business development services, etc.

Job Creation Schemes and Youth Micro-projects

- Labour intensive public works top-up grants to encourage and execute labour intensive public works and hiring of apprentices

- Establishing and running a country-wide Payam Youth Volunteer Service

- Support the activities of registered youth associations at payam and boma levels.

Capacity Building and Lesson Sharing for Scaling-up Actions

- Develop capacity for Youth Action Plans; - Monitoring and evaluation of these measures; - Share lessons and good practice; and - Undertake regional technical cooperation exchanges - Scale-up the most successful and innovative actions

Source: MDG-F JP (2011); The BIG South Sudan Youth Plan

75. At the State level, the JP supported the development Sate-level Action Plans. The JP undertook consultations with stakeholders in the JP locations and developed a framework for the Action Plans. Studies and consultations were undertaken in Jonglei and Warrap State for the Agro-pastoralist Livelihoods Approach; Eastern Equatoria State for the Rural Markets

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Approach; and Western Bahr El-Ghazal State and Central Equatoria State (Wau and Juba) for the Urban Markets Approach. 76. The studies provided insights into the main areas that needed to be addressed in the State Action Plans. Table 10: Youth issues to be addressed in State Action Plans

Focus area Activities Farming Developing local markets by prioritising modern agriculture and

horticulture, livestock, and fisheries Business Training on (i) raising awareness about business; (ii) starting a

business; (iii) running a business; (iv) growing a business and (v) linking viable businesses to micro-finance providers.

Gender equality Assistance to young women to enable them to increase their decision making within both the household and local community and their participation in local markets.

Literacy, vocational and technical skills

Expand the range and quality of vocational and technical skills with on short pre-vocational skills (under 6 months) that integrate functional literacy into the training activities.

Youth leadership, peace building, counseling and the development of youth associations:

Expansion of youth training and counseling in activities such as functional literacy, life skills, peer adolescent health education and the development of youth associations, sports clubs and youth leadership.

State and County Youth Committees

Developing leadership and coordination mechanism that brings together at both the State and County levels the various agencies and interests working on youth issues and activities.

Source: MDG-F JP; Development of State-level Action Plans - Main Components

77. The evaluation found that some aspects of these Action Plans were already being implemented as part of the JP activities. For example in Wau, TOT training had been provided to 22 youth of which 8 were female. They in turn had provided training to 85 additional youths (24 of them female). However, the TOT trainers noted that the training was designed and developed by UN agencies without consultation with them, and did not include some of the issues that they considered to be priorities such as language training and computer skills. In Jonglei State, an International United Nations Volunteer (UNV) was supporting the State Youth Steering Committee.

5.3.2. Scaling up MGD-based good practices on employment creation and life skills; and developing youth employment and life skills programme

78. Based on analysis of the JP activities and implementation approaches, the evaluation noted that the JP was potentially designed to contribute to the following 5 MDGs.

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Figure 6: MDGs addressed by the JP MDG goal Target Description

1 1B Achieve decent employment for women, men and youth. 2 2A Achieve universal primary education

(Indicator 8: Literacy rate of 15-24 year old) 3 3A Share of women in wage employment (in the non-agricultural

sector) 6 6A Have halted (by 2015) and begun to reverse the spread of HIV

and AIDS. 8 16 Develop and implement strategies for decent and productive

work for youth.

79. The interventions that were implemented in the target States did not have the critical mass or magnitude to make a significant impact in terms of scaling up of MDG-based practices. The evaluation was aware that the interventions were intended to ‘demonstrate’ innovative approaches. However, based on information obtained from stakeholders, including State government officials and participants, there was no intention on their part to sustain these alternative approaches. The general feeling was that the approaches (particularly the 2-week vocational skills training) were short to effectively address the youth unemployment challenges in the States. In addition, the State governments were faced with budget constraints, which rendered them incapable of continuing with the interventions.

When asked if he would be willing to contract any of the trainees to construct a house for him, one of the masonry instructors responded: “…not unless the trainees were working under supervision of qualified tradesmen. The training that they got was only to raise their awareness on the range of possibilities that are open to them, but it was not enough to make them skilled tradesmen.”

80. Interventions were implemented in all the target JP locations. The interventions that were implemented in collaboration with NGOs (PLAN, ADRA) or directly with Youth Associations (Warrap State Youth Union) showed better results than those that had a higher dependence on government support. The following table describes the interventions that were undertaken in the States, and highlights their limitations from the perspective of stakeholders.

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Table 11: Interventions undertaken at the State level JP location Labour market Interventions Stakeholders’ comments Wau (Western Bahr al Ghazal State)

Urban market approach

2-week skills training provided to 600 youths (welding, masonry, carpentry and painting).

Stakeholders questioned the market value of the training. VTCs prefer 4-month modules. The trainees (carpentry and masonry) were given starter kits but no follow up to monitor usage.

2-week TOT training to 22 youths (8 female) on entrepreneurship.

Trainers only able to do 1-week training for 85 youths (24 female) due to lack of budget. Not effective skills transfer.

Construction and renovation of Youth Training Centre.

The YTC was under-utilised. The centre was mostly hired out for workshops.

Support to VTC on operation and maintenance of the Hydraform block machine.

The machine was not in use due to lack of budget for purchase of materials.

Kuajok (Warrap State)

Agro-pastoralist market approach

Completion of office building and construction of pit latrines for Warrap State Youth Union

The Youth Union centre was used effectively for various training and income generation activities for the youth. Other partners had also donated equipment including desktop computers and V-Sat for internet.

2-week skills training for 120 youths: masonry (93 males) and electricity (27 male)

Youths felt that 2 weeks was insufficient; and preferred 4-6 month modules. Also wanted training to include microfinance and peace-building. State Ministry of Youth also observed that (1) agro-pastoralist issues not addressed, and (2) no institutional capacity building for State government.

Bor (Jonglei State)

Agro-pastoralist market approach

JP support to formation of Jonglei State Youth Union.

The Union has no facilities; also noted that members are mostly elite urban youth.

3 youths (1 female) attend one-week entrepreneurship training in Juba

Participants noted that this was only awareness creation; and no specific skills gained.

2-week computer skills training in Bor.

Introductory and familiarization of computers.

Training on cooperatives; and training for restaurant owners

Most participants drawn from the Ministry of cooperatives. No new coops registered.

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JP location Labour market Interventions Stakeholders’ comments Magwi County (Eastern Equatoria State)

Rural market approach

About 30 youths trained as Y-Peer Education Network

Group members noted that no funds for them to conduct training for other youths; and many members had dropped out due to lack of incentives.

6 Farmer Field Schools were established.

Members reported increase in yields. 3 Facilitators resigned due to lack of incentive. Not many youth were involved because the returns are too little and slow.17

Microenterprise established: 1) Lulu processing 2) Catering 3) Bee-keeping

The enterprises were not self-sustaining financially. Members also noted that the skills training was very short.

Torit County (Eastern Equatoria State)

Rural market approach

- 15 pastoral youth trained as Community Animal Health workers and provided with kits for practice

- 65 pastoral youth trained in dairy handling, processing and marketing

Beneficiaries provided with Community Animal Health Workers kits, milk handling and processing equipment and reagents. Equipment included milk cans, solar freezers, testing equipment and reagents.

Juba (Central Equatoria State)

Urban market approach

- JP constructed and renovated Juba Youth Training Centre. Also provided tools and equipment.

- 3-month BEST training courses supported at Juba technical Secondary School in collaboration with PLAN International

- Youth Peer Educator Network established

- Juba Youth Training facility was not functional due to lack of budget.

- Juba technical Secondary School had run 3 batches of courses. Trainees were getting industrial placements and majority got employment. There was a high dropout rate and very few female participants.

- The Y-Peer Network faced with high dropout rate due to lack of incentive. Minimal government support for events.

17 FAO noted that the low number of youth was mainly due to the local definition of youth (understood to include up to 45 years). The evaluator did not find any valid reason why JP partners should have deviated from the definition of youth as defined at the design phase.

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5.3.3. Developing and implementing practical employment and life skills training tailored to the choices and needs of the youth

81. The employment and life skills training that were developed and implemented by the JP were very practical. However, as noted above and throughout this report, stakeholders did not find some of the training packages to be very effective. The major limitation, according to the stakeholders’ opinions was in the duration of the skills training, which most of them considered to be of limited market value, as well as not sufficient to transfer skills, given the low literacy levels of some of the participants. In Warrap State for example, State Ministry officials had told the youth that they would support them to get government contracts if they completed the four-month skills training offered by VTCs. 82. It seemed that the JP interventions that relied on the government’s support for impact and sustainability faced greater challenges than interventions in which the JP worked directly with civil society organisations. In Warrap state, the JP had supported the State Youth Union to complete the construction of the Youth Centre. The Union was able to independently received additional support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and acquired 6 desktop computers, including a V-Sat system for internet access. At the time of writing the report, the Union was running 4-month skills training programmes in masonry, carpentry and Electricity; and had plans to reach across state lines to engage with Youth associations in Jonglei State to dialogue on peace building and address the challenge of cattle rustling between the two States. 83. The JP’s failure to provide start up support in the form of microfinance and micro credit to the trainees also limited the impact of the interventions. Very little evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, was obtained to indicate that the trained youth were putting the acquired skills to any meaningful use in terms of establishing micro enterprises that can create employment for the youth. 84. Through the Youth Peer Education Network (Y-Peer) the JP was supporting youth training and awareness in Reproductive Health, HIV and AIDS. The Y-Peer network used radio programmes to reach out to youth, including personal contact in schools and within the community. There was however a high dropout rate among the trained peer educators due to lack of incentives and support to cover costs for transport and related activities. The peer educators also stated that government support was minimal and they did not have sufficient materials such as HIV and AIDS testing kits as well as condoms. Also in Juba, the network members said the government and teachers did not allow them to demonstrate condom usage in schools.

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5.3.4. Functional literacy training

85. Many of the youths that were consulted as part of this evaluation appreciated the training that they had received, but most of them noted that the period of training was too short for them to acquire the skills. The evaluation also found that the youths had somewhat different priority areas that they would have wanted to be trained in. Language training and computer skills ranked high among the youth priorities. 86. The JP developed training modules for functional literacy in collaboration with the MOEGI. However, there was no coordination with the MOLPS or the MOCYS under whose mandates the VTCs and YTCs fall. This lack of coordination could affect the effective implementation of functional literacy. The line ministries with responsibility for vocational training were of the opinion that the skills training offered through the Technical Secondary Schools that were run by the MOEGI ended to place more emphasis on the theoretical aspects of skills training rather than the practical aspects, which were emphasized by the VTCs and YTCs. 5.4. Sustainability

87. There are several dimensions that have direct influence on the JP sustainability in one way or another, and more importantly, they have a collective effect such that weakening of any one of them has the potential to jeopardize the sustainability of the entire project, in the long run.

5.4.1. Continued operation and maintenance of project facilities

88. Many of the interventions, and particularly those that had high dependence on government support were not getting adequate budgetary and institutional support. The Vocational Training centre in Wau and the Juba Youth Training Centre are specific examples where the facilities constructed and renovated by the JP were not being utilised. This affects sustainability, at least in the short term. In Juba, the JP had also provided some tool kits for skills training to the Youth Training Centre, but the equipment was not maintained under appropriate storage conditions to ensure that it can be used when training and operational budgets would be made available.

5.4.2. Continued flow of net benefits 89. The question whether or not the project guarantees an acceptable level of financial and economic return to participants is critical to sustainability. The interventions undertaken by the JP at the community levels were rather highly subsidized with virtually no input from participants. One of the very impressive JP outputs observed during the evaluation were the entrepreneurship training in Magwi County, which led to establishment of group-based micro-

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enterprises including (a) Lulu processing, farmers groups, bee-keeping, catering and retailing. The total project costs were 935,796 SSP of which 53% (496,000 SSP) was from the JP and 47% (439,796 SSP) from other partners – PLAN Canada and PLAN South Sudan. 90. The groups were producing and marketing their products. However, all the groups reported a high rate of dropouts because of the low returns. In the Lulu Processing group, the evaluation noted that the JP had purchased vast quantities of packaging materials, including 5 and 10 litre containers for oil and small bottles for body lotion. The catering group uses cooking oil as one of their inputs but were not buying from the Lulu group citing issues of quality and price. Notably, dropouts were also happening in the Peer Education Network groups.

5.4.3. Continued community participation

91. As stated above, there has been a high rate of participant dropouts. In addition, the evaluation observed that there were no independent community-based initiatives to emulate the successful practices demonstrated by the JP supported groups. For example, in Magwi County, the farmers group noted that they had experienced increased yields as a result of practicing the farming methods introduced to them. However, there were no other farmers groups that had formed in the community to learn from the established groups.

5.4.4. Institutional stability

92. One of the key weaknesses in most of the JP outputs is the lack of adequate institutional support for the outputs. The Y-Peer groups in Juba and Magwi noted that they were not getting any support from the State Ministry of Youth. The VTC and YTC also were failing to conduct any training or youth activities because of lack of sufficient institutional support from the government. However, the Youth Union in Kwajok (Warrap State) had demonstrated a high level of initiative by sourcing additional support from other development partners; and because of their successes, they had also managed to garner support from various State Ministries who were planning to award them government contracts for services.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

93. The JP contributed notably to results at the policy level. Specific results achieved include, Youth Policy, Labour Market Survey, TVETE Policy, State Action Plans and National Cooperative

There was a noticeable tendency towards ‘dependency’ exhibited by most of the groups. For example, the Farmer Field School group in Magwi County had a request for the JP to assist them with funds and equipment for ‘uprooting trees’.

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Strategy. The mainstreaming of youth empowerment into all the 4 pillars of the SSDP is probably one of the JP’s most significant results. This means that Youth Empowerment is effectively recognized as a crosscutting issue. This raises the question of how the UN can further assist the GRSS to sustain the momentum going forward, and ensure that youth issues are integrated in sector policies and strategies. The question that the UN should be asking is:

What is the risk that the objectives for youth empowerment contained in the SSDP could fail to be implemented or be implemented ineffectively?

94. The answer to this question will provide the UN with the framework for developing future programmes and interventions to help the GRSS to maintain the momentum. The UNDAF already provides a very solid analysis for answering this question, as well as a foundation for developing future interventions. This gap analysis should lead to the conclusion that there is a fine difference between “the needs of the people, and the needs of the country”. Clearly, given the high levels of poverty, food insecurity and illiteracy in the population in general and the youth in particular, the people need livelihood opportunities. On the other hand, given the country’s high dependence on a depleting oil resource and limited domestic production and high reliance on imports for almost everything; the country needs economic growth and diversification.18 95. While these are not necessarily mutually exclusive concepts, they provide a useful basis for structuring the problems and targeting UN agency technical expertise to address the problems based on their individual comparative advantages. Take for example the case for FAO. Based on its comparative advantages in a country where 83% of population are in subsistence farming; where can FAO provide more value-added to address both the needs of the people and the needs of the country? It would seem that the focus should be more inclined towards growth through supporting the government in policies and strategies to do with Agriculture Modernization and Value-chain Creation. In the case of UNDP, where can strategic value-addition be realised to support the GRSS to create sustainable opportunities for youth? Again it would seem that greater impact could be achieved by developing national capacities for pro-poor policy planning and implementation; developing a conducive environment for private sector development and strengthen public administration and management. 96. Based on the foregoing, the areas where this evaluation identified some of the gaps are listed below, and provide a basis for developing the way forward.

18 While economic growth may be essential for poverty reduction, the relationship between the two also depends on the capabilities of the poor to take advantage of expanding economic opportunities. ‘Livelihoods’ integrates the measures that enable the poor to cope with and recover from stress and shocks; and comprises creating small capabilities, assets and activities required for the poor to make a living.

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A. Government structures. The government lacks uniformity in its structures. Some States do not have a State Ministry of Youth while others still do not have a State Ministry for Cooperatives. A harmonized structure across all States would make it easier for planning and budgeting resources for the youth. The UN can support the GRSS to harmonise its structures as well as policies.

B. Legislation. South Sudan still uses some laws, regulations and policies adopted from the North. For example, South Sudan did not have a Labour Law, although ILO had supported a draft Labour Bill which was still with the Ministry of Justice. ILO was also supporting the Trade Unions to develop a Trades Union Bill. In addition, both the Labour Law as well as the Cooperatives Law (2011) had no regulations and bylaws to guide the implementation of the laws; and there was no Policy for Cooperatives. The JP had only supported the development of the National Strategy for Cooperatives.

C. TVETE Policy. There is lack of clarity on the mandates and responsibilities between the key line Ministries of Education (Technical Education) and Labour (Vocational Training). There are also no clearly defined linkages between vocational training and technical education, including such issues as (a) accreditation for prior education, (b) qualification framework, and (c) employment standards.

D. Skills training. Lack of national capacities to undertake skills and market opportunities assessments. A draft guide was developed by the JP but there was no training for national institutions to develop their capacities. Also, Tracer Studies that are a critical component for evaluating skills training were not undertaken, although a 5-day training on Tracer Studies was provided to key institutions under the TVETE component.

E. Youth Associations/Unions. There was insufficient outreach to remote areas (partly due to security problems). The marginalized youth in remote areas that form the majority of youth and who actually are the main problem cause for insecurity, cattle rustling, etc are not being reached. Many of the Youth Union members are actually employees of various Government departments. Disadvantaged youth are faced with the problem of lack of economic assets; and the GRSS has not developed clear land ownership policies, etc. The UN can support Youth Associations in the broader context of civil society empowerment.

F. Coordination of development partners. There are many partners working around the issues of livelihoods and youth empowerment, but the GRSS is not fully aware of who is doing what, and where. The UN can assist with coordinating efforts of development partners.

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VII. GOOD PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

7.1. Good Practices Identified

97. Some good practices were developed and established, which, if effectively implemented have potential to achieve significant impact in terms of strengthening the youth empowerment agenda. On the part of the GRSS, the critical issues as discussed in preceding sections is to strengthen the policy environment and enhance coordination so that youth empowerment is indeed addressed as a crosscutting issue. In this regard, the establishment of Cluster systems within the government both at central and State levels enhances coordination. 98. At the JP level, there were also several good practices that were introduced, which could be upscaled and replicated by the GRSS at all levels. The Y-Peer approach can be very effective in providing information and awareness to the youth, especially around subjects such as reproductive health, which are culturally considered as taboo and therefore not ordinarily discussed between youth and elders. The concept of mobile training was also a very innovative good practice, particularly in the context of the scarcity of infrastructure and high costs associated with construction of infrastructure in South Sudan. The Farmer Field Schools can also be quite effective in community awareness raising and improving productivity through the “learn-by-doing” approach. 99. Two good practices that are quite strategic were the development of (i) Skills and Market Opportunity Surveys and (ii) Functional Literacy. The first one links skills and vocational training to existing market opportunities thereby providing an evidence-based approach to curriculum development. However, since the market is dynamic and always shifting, there is a need to ensure that these surveys are undertaken continuously. In addition, the resultant training curriculum should also be continuously evaluated through Tracer Studies. The second – functional literacy – is also a strategic innovation, particularly in a context where only 40% of the population between the ages 15-24 years is literate. Functional literacy therefore links literacy training to life skills, thereby providing incentives for attending classes.

7.2. Lessons Learned

100. The implementation of the JP in South Sudan generated some important lessons which should be taken into account in future programming in order to enhance inter-agency collaboration and to strengthen effectiveness of programme results. The key lessons are listed below.

❶ Extensive number of partnering UN agencies does not necessarily imply better inter-agency collaboration nor effectiveness. Joint planning and implementing of activities

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such that there is joint attribution to results at output level enhances inter-agency collaboration.

❷ The multi-dimensional attributes of sustainability imply that to enhance project sustainability, a rigorous sustainability analysis is needed at the time of formulation of a project or a programme. Such an analysis which is to be followed up by development of a sustainability strategy will assist in incorporating the elements of sustainability, right at the design stage of a project.

❸ Development processes and results that are not demand driven and lack national ownership, including through budget and institutional support, cannot continue beyond the life of the project.

❹ When development partner efforts and activities in support of national development priorities are not centrally coordinated; they produce negative unintended consequences such as promotion of a culture of dependence and inefficient utilization of resources through duplication and mismanagement.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

101. Overall, the JP helped to highlight the importance of youth empowerment as an area of programming focus in South Sudan. The JP also provided a clearer understanding of the key limitations and challenges around programming for youth, including the inadequate and insufficiently coordinated policies, lack of institutional capacities at the central and State levels and inadequate coordination among the main players and line Ministries. Going forward, the UN should focus on addressing these issues, mainly by providing support for policy development, including inter-sectoral policies; limiting the scope of interventions, including by engaging national institutions in implementing activities and developing national capacities. This entails the development of a solid and effective M&E system to ensure that there is value for money.

102. This evaluation therefore recommends the following:

Recommendation 1:

The UN should undertake a comprehensive gap analysis in order to identify and match relevant UN agency technical expertise based on their comparative advantages to address the gaps. The number of participating UN agencies should be limited to include only those UN agencies with relevant expertise and capacity to contribute towards the overall objectives within the scope of their mandates.

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Recommendation 2:

The UN should limit the scope of interventions by focusing on strategic areas that promote (1) economic growth and development, and (2) human resources development as a long-term strategy for sustainable employment creation.

Recommendation 3:

The UN should build an institutional venue for sustaining programme results by integrating institutional capacity development, including through national implementation (government, NGOs and CBOs).

Recommendation 4:

The UN should provide more support to policy development including sectoral policy coherence to strengthen the enabling environment for sustainable youth empowerment (e.g. regulatory frameworks and by-laws that support various legislation).

Recommendation 5:

The GRSS should provide requisite resources to support its priorities and strategies for youth empowerment, including establishment of Youth Empowerment Fund; and budget support to VTCs and YTC.

Recommendation 6:

The GRSS should streamline and develop clear linkages between vocational training and technical education and entrepreneurial education, including a systematic accreditation mechanism and qualification framework.

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ANNEX 1: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

UN (2012); South Sudan UNDAF 2012-2013 UN (2012); South Sudan Peace Building Support Plan MDG-F (2012); Mid-Term Evaluation of the JP Creating Opportunities for Youth

Employment in South Sudan GRSS (2012); Strategy for Cooperative Development, Final Draft ILO/Forcier Consulting (2012); Manual for Conducting Market Assessments ILO/Forcier Consulting (2012); Comparison of Twenty-Two market Assessments Jonglei State (2012); Ministry of Sports, Youth, Culture and Heritage Strategic Plan MDG-F (2012); No-cost extension Request: Amendment – MDGF 1888 JP (2012); Minutes of PMC Meeting of 17 Jan 2012 JP (2012); Briefing Paper – Development of State-Level Action Plans JP (2012); Briefing Note – Youth Peer Education Network JP (2012); Briefing Note – Developing Skills Training through a Mobile Approach JP (2012); Briefing Note - Business Training for Youth and Women JP (2012); Briefing Paper – Youth Employment and Livelihood Baseline Assessment on Skills

and Market Opportunities JP (2012); The Development of Technical and Vocational Education and Training for

Employability: Towards a shared perspective for the UN JP on Youth Employment JP (2012); UNESCO Literacy and Numeracy Materials to Support Livelihood and Technical

Skills Training approaches in South Sudan JP (2012); UNICEF/PLAN CAF Basic Employability Skills Training Demonstration in Juba and

Abara JP (2012); UNESCO 10th Quarter Narrative Progress Report JP (2012); Youth Consultations – Education Sector Strategic Plan JP (2012); UNICEF Funded YEP Final Report JP (2012); JP Concept Note: Cattle Camp Initiative JP (2012); Draft TOR: Pastoralism Working Group JP (2012); Work Plan Reports (Colour-coded) 3rd Quarter – 11th Quarter JP (2012); Summary Progress Reports 3rd Quarter – 11th Quarter GRSS (2011); South Sudan development Plan 2011 – 2013 IOM (2011); Wau Market Assessment of Youth Vocational Training Opportunities JP (2011); Payam Youth Service: Foundational Institutional and Capacity Building

Development to Establish National Volunteer Service in South Sudan JP (2011); Minutes of PMC Meeting of 2 Aug 2011 JP (2011); Minutes of PMC Meeting of 11 May 2011

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JP (2011); Briefing Note – Creation of a Payam Youth Service JP (2011); Briefing Note – Youth-related Initiatives in the South Sudan Development Plan

(SSDP) 2011-2013 JP (2011); Briefing Note – The BIG Southern Sudan Youth Plan ILO (2011), Labour Market in South Sudan MDG-F (2011); No-cost extension Request – MDGF 1888 JP (2011); Briefing Note – Amadi Rural development Institute Southern Sudan centre for Census Statistics (2010); 5th Sudan Population and Housing Census MDG-F JP (2010); Inception Mission Report for the Southern Sudan Programme Component JP (2012); Minutes of PMC Meeting of 19 Oct 2010 JP (2012); Minutes of PMC Meeting of 26 Jul 2010 JP (2010); Briefing Note for Programme Management Committee Meeting of 26 July 2010 UNCT Sudan (2008); YEP Joint Programme Document GRSS (2007); Background Analytical Report for the South Sudan Vocational Training Policy GRSS (2007); South Sudan Vocational Training Policy

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ANNEX 2: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

# UN AGENCIES 1. Angwech, S. Project Field Officer FAO 2. Ayuen, D. LEAD Project Officer UNICEF - Jonglei 3. Boyd, G. Chief Technical Adviser ILO 4. Buckingham, J. Project Manager UNOPS 5. Carew, I. Youth Specialist UNDP - Jonglei 6. Hjarrand, J. Education Specialist UNESCO 7. Horvath, B. Country Director UNDP 8. Kahando, S. Literacy Specialist UNESCO 9. Kenyi, P. Vocational Training Specialist UNIDO

10. Kir, D. Programme Analyst UNDP 11. Kyalo, S. Programme Engineer IOM 12. Mashologu, M. Growth and MDG Unit UNDP 13. Nahesi, J.K. Reintegration & Community Stabilisation Officer IOM 14. Olusanmi, A. Support to States Coordinator UNDP - Kwajok 15. Taban, R. Project Officer UNICEF 16. Takunya, S. Local Economic Development Specialist ILO - Kwajok 17. Turie, M. Youth Policy Development Consultant UNICEF 18. Vadamanis, V. Coordination Officer UNRCO 19. Waterman, N. YEP TVETE Advisor ILO # National Government Officials

20. Abucha, B. A/Director General Cooperatives MAFC&RD 21. Ape, T.K. S/Inspector Technical Education MOGEI 22. Atero, M. Deputy Director, Field Management MAFC&RD 23. Baptist, P. Under-Secretary for Youth MOCY&S 24. Dimido, A. Director, Cooperatives Administration MAFC&RD 25. Gunda, M. V. Director of Youth Training MCY&S 26. Kuol, A. Director General, Cooperatives Development MAFC&RD 27. Ochoki, A. MAFC&RD 28. Rondyang, J. Director AIDS Commission 29. Silvers, K.O. Head, Cooperative Development MAFC&RD 30. Thiang, D. C. Director of Economic Statistics NBS 31. Watha, U. Director TVET MOGEI 32. William, L. S/Inspector MCY&S # Local Authority Officials (State/ County)

33. Abud, H. Head of Industry Section State Min. of Industry and Mines, Wau

34. Aruna, J. A/Director Magwi County 35. Benard, A. Boma Chief (plus 51 community members) Abara Boma 36. Chidgkom, D. A/Director of Culture Jonglei State Ministry

of Youth 37. Cornelio, E. Director Administration and Finance State Min. of Industry

and Mines, Wau

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38. Deng, A. Secretary General, Council of Ministers Jonglei State 39. Dhurl, A. A/Director of Administration Jonglei State Ministry

of Youth 40. Elis, J. Director General State Min. of Youth,

Wau 41. Ferdinand, K. Staff Officer State Min. of Industry

and Mines, Wau 42. Joseph, C. Staff Officer State Min. of Industry

and Mines, Wau 43. Juuk, P.M. Governor Jonglei State 44. Kuch, R. A/Director of Youth Jonglei State Ministry

of Youth 45. Kuol, S.P. State Minister of Education and Instruction Jonglei State 46. Majok, W. Director General Jonglei State Ministry

of Youth 47. Medan, B. Minister Jonglei State Ministry

of Youth 48. Mobior, A. A/Director of Sports Jonglei State Ministry

of Youth 49. Obakev, H. Head of Mining Section State Min. of Industry

and Mines, Wau 50. Paul, L. A/Director Cooperatives Warrap State

Ministry of Coops. 51. Yok, E. Director, Youth and Sports Warrap State

Ministry of Youth # NGOs, CSOs and other partners

52. Callis, E. Project Manager Forcier Consulting 53. Chot, K. Instructor - Electronics Juba Technical

Secondary School 54. Elhaj, Y. State Director for Youth Central Equatoria 55. Eresto, C. Director Juba Youth Training

Centre 56. Khemis, I. Peer Educator Adolescent Social

Reproductive Health 57. Martin, P. Director, Wau Vocational Training Centre Wau 58. Mbasa, J. VTC Volunteer Adolescent Social

Reproductive Health 59. Milla, P. Instructor – Motor Mechanics Juba Technical

Secondary School 60. Mustafa, M. Project Officer PLAN International 61. Otsudi, P. (Prof) Director (Local NGO) SMECOSS 62. Poni, J. Leader, Community Mobilisation Adolescent Social

Reproductive Health 63. Sunil, F. Principal Don Bosco VTC 64. Voya, J. Project Manager ADRA South Sudan 65. Whitaker, C. Researcher Forcier Consulting

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# Youth 66. Achiek, J. Member (Training beneficiary) Jonglei Youth Union 67. Akot, J. Secretary for Finance Warrap State Youth

Union 68. Alonga, S. Member, Y-Peer Group Magwi County 69. Aluong, S. Secretary General Warrap State Youth

Union 70. Anert, J. Secretary for Social Affairs Warrap State Youth

Union 71. Boma, A. Chairperson, Youth Association Abara Boma 72. Chan, M. Youth trained in 2-week carpentry module Wau 73. Deug, A.A. Information Secretary Warrap State Youth

Union 74. Dumo, J. Youth (Training beneficiary) Jonglei State 75. Gala, O. Trainee – motor mechanics Juba YTC 76. Kuir, S. Council Member Jonglei Youth Union 77. Lamoaka, M. Member, Y-Peer Group Magwi County 78. Longa, R. Trainee – motor mechanics Juba YTC 79. Louis, Y. Youth trained in 2-week welding module Wau 80. Malish, C. Youth trained in Motor Mechanics Juba Technical

Secondary School 81. Natali, R. Youth trained in 2-week entrepreneur module Wau 82. Okwera, C.J. Member, Y-Peer Group Magwi County 83. Omeke, J. Member, Y-Peer Group Magwi County 84. Oringa, S. Group leader, Catering Group Magwi County 85. Panther, D. A/Director for Cooperatives Jonglei State Ministry

of Coops & Rural Dev. 86. Poba, J. Trainee – motor mechanics Juba YTC 87. Ring, G.M. Secretary for External Affairs Warrap State Youth

Union 88. Sereno, E. Trainee – English language Juba YTC 89. Stephen, K. Trainee – motor mechanics Juba YTC 90. Sunday, A. Group Leader, Lulu Processing Group Magwi County 91. Taban, R. Member, Y-Peer Group Magwi County 92. Vitlale, P. Trainee – motor mechanics Juba YTC

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ANNEX 3: STATUS OF ACTIVITY IMPLEMENTATION

Annex 3a

JP Outcome 1: Employment creation for youth is mainstreamed into national development framework

Output Activities Status of implementation Output 1.2: Joint Action Plan for Youth Employment Activities in place for GRSS Ministries by end of programme

1. Support and assist a GRSS-led Technical Working Group to prepare and coordinate the development of a National Action Plan (NAP) for Youth Employment with policy priorities and actions in line with Southern Sudan's national development strategy. 2. Support the execution of a Labour Force Survey in South Sudan. 3. Support and assist the development of a GRSS-led TVETE through the provision of a technical assistance expert to work on policy, curriculum and accreditation of six basic trades for courses up to 6 months duration.

Activity 1 was completed. - Contribution to the National Youth Development Policy - Youth issues included in SSDP under the economic, governance, social, and security pillars. Activity 2 in progress. - Funds provided to NBS for Urban Labour

Market Survey Activity 3 completed. - TVETE advisor jointly supported by pooling of ILO, UNICEF & UNIDO funds co-located in government. - Six basic trade courses shortened to 3 and 6 months duration. - Five additional short 3 to 6 month courses developed primarily for women - food production and processing, entrepreneurship, hairdressing and beauty therapy.

Output 1.4: Micro finance policies conducive to youth employment developed with the Bank of Southern Sudan

1. Develop policy and technical guidelines to mainstream financial support to youth with the Bank of Southern Sudan.

This activity was not implemented.

Output 1.5: Integrate youth and adolescence priorities into national and state plans including guidelines on vocational training developed conducive to youth employment

1. Build institutional capacity for planning, quality data collection and management access to reliable functional literacy and vocational training data on young adolescents. 2. Support the development and introduction of functional literacy to youth training centres and pastoralist field and life skills schools. 3. Support the development of cross-ministry vocational training guidelines and policies and their introduction to youth training centres in the demonstration localities.

Activities were partially implemented. - No post-facto evaluation was

undertaken to determine whether capacity was effectively developed

- South Sudan vocational training policy and draft standardisation and harmonized curriculum provided to central and State government ministries

- Functional literacy manuals developed but not yet implemented in training centres

- Tracer studies introduced to vocational training institutions

- Cross ministry guidelines not completed

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Annex 3b JP Outcome 2: Policies and measures are implemented to help youth enter and remain in the labour market Output 2.1: State level action plans for employment if youth developed in three States and in line with national strategies

1. Support and assist the development of State-led Youth Action Plans and ensure alignment with State development plans and the GRSS National Action Plan for Youth Development.

Activity was implemented. - Youth Action Plans were

developed in target States

Output 2.3: Analysis undertaken on strategic economic sectors, labor force supply and demand and opportunities for youth self-employment in three States

1. Conduct supply-demand analysis of rural livelihoods and urban labour market and identify major livelihood constraints, priorities and options/potentials.

Activity was implemented. - Comparative labour market

opportunity was done and has been adopted by other development partners.

Output 2.4: Enhanced capabilities of at least three meso-level delivery institutions per state to implement youth development policies and services

1. Support and assist State Ministries, vocational and technical training centres, and youth training centres to deliver an integrated skills package comprised of technical skills, business skills and life skills. 2. Design and conduct training of trainers to enhance the capacities of institutions to implement TVETE and business development policies and services linked to Output 3.6.

Activity 1 was implemented.

Activity 2 was implemented. - TOT training was done, and

in some States, the trainers also conducted training.

Output 2.5: Short-term livelihood skills training packages and enterprise development training programme prepared and public training institutions have enhanced management capacity in Wau and Warrap

1. Assess the capacities of the State Industry Development units in assisting micro and small enterprise and State Ministry of Youth, private and public training institutions in providing short term livelihood skills training packages. 2. Develop an entrepreneurial training programme with State Industry Development Units and short term livelihood training packages with the State Ministry of Youth and identified private and public training institutions. 3. Strengthen the capacities of State Industry Development Units to assist micro and small enterprises and State Ministry of Youth and identified public and private training providers to provide livelihood skills training packages through trainings. 4. Monitor progress and institutional improvements.

There were no State Industry Development Units in the States visited by the valuation

Output 2.7: Reduced youth vulnerability towards HIV through increased accessibility and acquisition of information, knowledge and life skills on

1. Hire local expert and assess the training and information needs of TVETE instructors and youth on knowledge and life skills on HIV and AIDS. 2. Based on the assessment, develop a HIV/AIDS curriculum for vocational and technical training centres for South Sudan. 3. Adapt, test and produce HIV and AIDS training

Activity 1 was implemented. The TVETE expert was hired and located in government. HIV/AIDS curriculum was not developed.

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HIV

materials relevant to the Southern Sudanese context. Develop core capacities of master trainers at and conduct Training of Trainers for TVETE instructors in three states through a local facilitator. 4. Provide audio visual equipment and related materials relevant to the TVET centres to be used for awareness raising on HIV/AIDS among the target population. 5. Follow through and monitor progress for increased dissemination of information, knowledge and life skills on HIV at TVET centres.

Annex 3c

JP Outcome 3: Innovative interventions to create concrete employment and training opportunities for youth are developed and implemented in three states. Output 3.1: Functional literacy, accelerated learning programme (ALP) and vocational training opportunities available for adolescents with special focus on girls and ex-child soldiers

1. Contribute to the design and implementation of functional literacy, ALP and vocational training curriculum and materials for planners, teachers and instructors in the demonstration localities including the use of the media for advocacy and information purposes 2. Provide rehabilitation support to youth training facilities and mobile services for young people in the demonstration localities

Activity was completed.

Output 3.2: Employability of youth improved through the adoption of short and medium term literacy skills with special focus on females

1. Conduct a rapid assessment of literacy materials, trainers and learners to develop a contextual appreciation of the teaching and learning environment 2. Design training modules and conduct training of trainers (ToT) and literacy training for youth with a special focus on females. 3. Adapt, test and produce functional literacy material relevant to the Southern Sudanese context. 4. Conduct training of trainers. 5. Monitor teaching of functional literacy and modify the training and material accordingly.

Functional literacy manuals were completed but the roll-out for their implementation was not yet done.

Output 3.3: Young women and men empowered to increase employment opportunities through improved knowledge on reproductive health

1. Design and conduct peer reproductive health education training for youth groups in three demonstration localities - Magwi, Budi and Juba.

Y-peer groups were established and functioning in target areas.

Output 3.5: Livelihood training packages and

1. Develop and adopt short term livelihood training packages with potentials for employment and self-employment.

Livelihood training was undertaken in target areas.

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entrepreneurship development training offered to youth in Wau and Warrap

2. Conduct livelihood training packages for target beneficiaries. 3. Establish linkages with local industries for apprenticeships, internships, on-the-job training and job placements. 4. Provide business coaching to existing enterprises, including graduates of training programmes conducted for growth and creation of additional employment. 5. Monitor progress and institute improvements for sustained delivery of training programmes and advisory services.

The Technical Secondary School in Juba also undertook placement of trainees in local companies.

Output 3.6: Local capacity for running training for micro and small enterprisess and developing cooperatives and associations enhanced at state level

1. In the demonstration localities: (i) assess the business development support needs (Output 2.3); and (ii) devise business training packages for Training of Trainers and conduct business training. 2. Assist ten groups in the demonstration localities to: (i) form cooperatives; (ii) develop their organisational and management capacities through training and advisory assistance; and (iii) link the cooperatives to savings and credit training (Output 3.7)

TOT training was undertaken but the effectiveness of such training could not be verified, in part due to lack of follow up and budgets.

Output 3.7: Micro-finance capacity building and micro-business start-up supporting mechanisms established for boosting youth self employment

1. Form and train autonomous savings and credit associations focusing on youth associations, enterprise development centres, and associations of farmers and livestock keepers. 2. Provide business skills training and start-up kits and capital for youth in collaboration with ILO, FAO, IOM and UNIDO.

Activities under this output were not undertaken.

Output 3.8: Youth benefit from on-the-job skills training at youth centres including cash income through temporary employment during building renovation and construction activities

1. Rehabilitation and expansion of the Juba Youth Training Centre - technical assistance, design and support and construction supervision. 2. Expansion of the Dichwinyi Women's Centre/Panyikwara Youth Association enterprise development centre - technical assistance, design and support and construction supervision. 3. Phase 1 construction of the Akobo Youth Enterprise Development centre - technical assistance, design and support and construction supervision.

Juba YTC was rehabilitated but it was not operational because of a lack of budget support from the GRSS.

Output 3.9: Youth have improved access to training facilities and the ability to engage unsustainable productive employment in areas of return in Warrap State and Wau

1. Rehabilitation and expansion of the Wau Youth Training Centre - technical assistance, design and support and construction supervision. 2. Completion of the Youth Union Centre buildings in Kwajok - technical assistance, design and support and construction supervision. 3. Livelihood and technical skills training in Wau and Warrap State.

Wau YTC was rehabilitated but not operational due to lack of budget support from the government.

Output 3.10: Rural youth have acquired

1. Review Farmer Field School training materials and produce appropriate training resource

FFS were established in the target areas. However, the

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life skills for improved: (i) agricultural production; (ii) livestock husbandry; and (iii) food marketing and sustainable rural income generating activities in two localities in Eastern Equatoria State.

materials for South Sudan. 2. Conduct Training of Trainers (ToT) in Farmer Field School methodology for team leaders and facilitators. 3. Run Farmer Field School training over a period of 9 to 12 months. 4. Upon graduation from Farmer Field Schools provide graduates with basic productive assets. Undertake follow-up visits with graduates.

Trainers/Facilitators were not being given any incentive and dropping out..

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ANNEX 4: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A FINAL EVALUATION OF THE UN/GRSS JOINT PROGRAMME ON CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN

General Context: the MDG-F

In December 2006, the UNDP and the Government of Spain signed a major partnership agreement for the amount of €528 million with the aim of contributing to progress on the MDGs and other development goals through the United Nations System. In addition, on 24 September 2008 Spain pledged €90 million towards the launch of a thematic window on Childhood and Nutrition. The MDG-F supports joint programmes that seek replication of successful pilot experiences and impact in shaping public policies and improving peoples’ life in 49 countries by accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and other key development goals.

The MDG-F operates through the UN teams in each country, promoting increased coherence and effectiveness in development interventions through collaboration among UN agencies. The Fund uses a joint programme mode of intervention and has currently approved 128 joint programmes in 49 countries. These reflect eight thematic windows that contribute in various ways towards progress on the MDGs, National Ownership and UN reform. The MDG-F M&E Strategy

A result oriented monitoring and evaluation strategy is under implementation in order to track and measure the overall impact of this historic contribution to the MDGs and to multilateralism. The MDG-F M&E strategy is based on the principles and standards of UNEG and OEDC/DAC regarding evaluation quality and independence. The strategy builds on the information needs and interests of the different stakeholders while pursuing a balance between their accountability and learning purposes.

The strategy’s main objectives are: 1. To support joint programmes to attain development results; 2. To determine the worth and merit of joint programmes and measure their contribution

to the 3 MDG-F objectives, MDGS, Paris Declaration and Delivering as one; and 3. To obtain and compile evidence based knowledge and lessons learned to scale up and

replicate successful development interventions. Under the MDG-F M&E strategy and Programme Implementation Guidelines, each

programme team is responsible for designing an M&E system, establishing baselines for (quantitative and qualitative) indicators and conducting a final evaluation with a summative focus.

The MDG-F Secretariat also commissioned mid-term evaluations for all joint programmes with a formative focus. Additionally, a total of nine-focus country evaluations (Ethiopia, Mauritania, Morocco, Timor-Leste, Philippines, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Honduras and Ecuador) are planned to study more in depth the effects of joint programmes in a country context.

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Brief Description of the South Sudan Youth Employment Programme (YEP)

The Sudan MDGF Joint Programme on Youth Employment and Migration (YEM) project document was developed during late 2007 and approved in November 2008. The Joint Programme operates using a pass though funding modality. In June 2009 the MDGF Secretariat transferred funds to all the participating UN organisations.

The YEM was orginally designed as a single country programme comprised of two implementation components –a Northern and a Southern component. These reflected the federal nature of Sudan at that point in time - one country two system namely Government of National Unity and Government of Southern Sudan. The Northern component is led by UNIDO while the Southern component is led by the ILO. The Northern component commenced operations in October 2009 while the Southern component started in March 2010. However with the independent of South Sudan on 9 July 2011 the YEM Project was divided into two separate country programmes.

In the South Sudan programme there are ten participating UN organisations: FAO, ILO, IOM, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, and UNOPS. ILO is the lead technical agency and UNDP is the administrative agent. On behalf of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) the Ministries of Youth and Labour undertake the lead functions on behalf of the 10 GRSS Ministries and Commissions.

The Youth Employment Programme (YEP) aims to provide skills development and livelihood and employment opportunities to 2,500 young men and women aged between 15 to 30 years. It is a UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) project that seeks to demonstrate in eight localities19 in four States across South Sudan youth employment approaches in three broad labour markets: urban markets, rural markets and agro-pastoralist livelihoods.

The programme has a time-span of thirty months and scheduled to finish at the end of August 2012. Implementation of activities started at the end of July 2010. However due to a late start the activities are six months behind those of the Sudan. The budget for programme operations is divided almost equally between the Sudan and South Sudan with US$3,622,500 to South Sudan and US$3,567,500 to the Sudan.

In South Sudan there are three broad employment and livelihood sectors in which youth seek skills and economic opportunities. These are: urban markets, rural markets and agro-pastoralist livelihoods. To address these three sectors the Programme seeks to demonstrate quick impact activities with no educational barriers for each of the sectors using three thematic areas and two primary entry points to guide its implementation activities.

The three youth employment demonstration approaches are:

• An urban markets approach using Juba and Wau as the localities • A rural markets approach using Magwi and Bor counties as the localities • An agro-pastoralist approach using Jonglei and Warap States as the localities

19 Kwajok town and Tonj North county in Warrap State; Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal State; Juba in Central Equatoria State; Magwi and Budi counties in Eastern Equatoria State; and in Bor town and Akobo county in Jonglei State

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The three thematic areas for creating opportunities for youth employment are: • Promotion of entrepreneurship in Technical and Vocational Education and Training for

Employment (TVETE) with a focus on short courses up to 6 months duration • Lifeskills with an emphasis on Function literacy, Reproductive health including HIV/AIDs

awareness and prevention, Peace building and Gender equality • Employability and Job creation in the Private sector namely Self and group-based

employment including cooperatives, family and own account businesses and private businesses

The primary objective of the Youth Employment Programme is to implement a set of clustered and joined-up employment and life skills actions designed to demonstrate good Millennium Development Goal (MDG) practice from which the following three results and lessons can be drawn:

Firstly, scaling-up MDG-based employment and life skills good practices to reach all ten States through contributing to the developing a larger youth employment and life skills strategy and programme. Secondly, to contribute to the development of youth policies and the production of a Youth Employment Action Plan/s at both GOSS and State levels. And thirdly, the implementation of practical employment and life skill training opportunities for young men and women that are tailored to their choices and needs.

The commissioner of the evaluation is seeking high-qualified consultant to conduct the final evaluation, of this joint programme. 1. OVERALL GOAL OF THE EVALUATION

One of the roles of the Secretariat is to monitor and evaluate the MDG-F. This role is fulfilled in line with the instructions contained in the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy and the Implementation Guide for Joint Programmes under the Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund. These documents stipulate that all joint programmes will commission and finance a final independent evaluation. Final evaluations are summative in nature and seek to:

1. Measure to what extent the joint programme has fully implemented their activities, delivered outputs and attained outcomes and specifically measuring development results.

2. Generate substantive evidence based knowledge, on one or more of the MDG-F thematic windows by identifying best practices and lessons learned that could be useful to other development interventions at national (scale up) and international level (replicability).

As a result, the findings, conclusions and recommendations generated by these evaluations will be part of the thematic window Meta evaluation, the Secretariat is undertaking to synthesize the overall impact of the fund at national and international level.

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2. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES The final evaluation will focus on measuring development results and potential impacts generated by the joint programme, based on the scope and criteria included in these terms of reference. This will enable conclusions and recommendations for the joint programme to be formed within a period between four and six months.

The unit of analysis or object of study for this evaluation is the joint programme, understood to be the set of components, outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs that were detailed in the joint programme document and in associated modifications made during implementation.

This final evaluation has the following specific objectives: 1. Measure to what extent the joint programme has contributed to solve the needs and

problems identified in the design phase. 2. To measure joint programme’s degree of implementation, efficiency and quality

delivered on outputs and outcomes, against what was originally planned or subsequently officially revised.

3. Measure to what extent the joint programme has attained development results to the targeted population, beneficiaries, participants whether individuals, communities, institutions, etc.

4. To measure the joint programme contribution to the objectives set in their respective specific thematic windows as well as the overall MDG fund objectives at local and national level. (MDGs, Paris Declaration and Accra Principles and UN reform).

5. To identify and document substantive lessons learned and good practices on the specific topics of the thematic window, MDGs, Paris Declaration, Accra Principles and UN reform with the aim to support the sustainability of the joint programme or some of its components.

Annex 1 contains a set of evaluation questions that define the information that must be generated as a result of the evaluation process. The questions are grouped according to the criteria to be used in assessing and answering them. These criteria are, in turn is grouped into three levels of the programme: design; process; and results.

3. EVALUATION DELIVERABLES The consultant is responsible for submitting the following deliverables to the commissioner and the manager of the evaluation:

Inception Report (to be submitted within 10 days of the submission of all programme documentation to the evaluation team)

This report will be 8 to 10 pages in length and will propose the methods, sources and procedures to be used for data collection. It will also include a proposed timeline of activities and submission of deliverables. The desk study report will propose initial lines of inquiry about the joint programme. This report will be used as an initial point of agreement and understanding between the consultant and the evaluation managers. The report will follow the outline stated in Annex 3.

Draft Final Report (to be submitted within 15 days after the completion of the field visit, please send also to MDG-F Secretariat).

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The draft final report will contain the same sections as the final report (described in the next paragraph) and will be 20 to 30 pages in length. This report will be shared among the evaluation reference group. It will also contain an executive report of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its main findings, conclusions and recommendations. The draft final report will be shared with the evaluation reference group to seek their comments and suggestions. This report will contain the same sections as the final report, described below.

Final Evaluation Report (to be submitted within 10 days after reception of the draft final report with comments, please send also to MDG-F Secretariat)

The final report will be 20 to 30 pages in length. It will also contain an executive summary of no more than 5 pages that includes a brief description of the joint programme, its context and current situation, the purpose of the evaluation, its methodology and its major findings, conclusions and recommendations. The final report will be sent to the evaluation reference group. This report will contain the sections establish in Annex 3. 4. KEY ROLES AND RESPONSABILITIES IN THE EVALUATION PROCESS There will be 3 main parties involved in the implementation of MDG-F final evaluations. These are:

• The Resident Coordinator Office as commissioner of the final evaluation • The programme coordinator as evaluation manager • The Programme Management Committee that will function as the evaluation

reference group In addition the MDG-F Secretariat that will function as a quality assurance member of

the evaluation in cooperation with the commissioner of the evaluation. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation study. See Annex 2 for details of the roles and responsibilities of each of the above-mentioned parties. 5. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND PREMISES OF THE EVALUATION The final evaluation of the joint programme is to be carried out according to ethical principles and standards established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).

• Anonymity and confidentiality. The evaluation must respect the rights of individuals who provide information, ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality.

• Responsibility. The report must mention any dispute or difference of opinion that may have arisen among the consultants or between the consultant and the heads of the Joint Programme in connection with the findings and/or recommendations. The team must corroborate all assertions, or disagreement with them noted.

• Integrity. The evaluator will be responsible for highlighting issues not specifically mentioned in the TOR, if this is needed to obtain a more complete analysis of the intervention.

• Independence. The consultant should ensure his or her independence from the intervention under review, and he or she must not be associated with its management or any element thereof.

• Incidents. If problems arise during the fieldwork, or at any other stage of the evaluation, they must be reported immediately to the Secretariat of the MDGF. If this is not

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done, the existence of such problems may in no case be used to justify the failure to obtain the results stipulated by the Secretariat of the MDGF in these terms of reference.

• Validation of information. The consultant will be responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information collected while preparing the reports and will be ultimately responsible for the information presented in the evaluation report.

• Intellectual property. In handling information sources, the consultant shall respect the intellectual property rights of the institutions and communities that are under review.

• Delivery of reports. If delivery of the reports is delayed, or in the event that the quality of the reports delivered is clearly lower than what was agreed, the penalties stipulated in these terms of reference will be applicable. 6. QUALIFICATIONS OF THE CONSULTANT The consultant should meet the following criteria: Education:

• Hold a Masters degree in Development Studies political Science or any relevant Social Science

Experience: • Have at least 7 years working experience as a development practitioner /evaluator in

developing countries; • Specific working experience in programme and project implementation and evaluation

in Government instutitions or a international development agency • Demonstrated ability to prepare evaluation or other project documents, policy briefs,

analytical reports, and undertake participatory research; • Excellent computer skills include application of MS Windows, MS Office, etc.

Language Requirements: • Excellent communication skills and fluent in English (comprehension, written, and

spoken) • An understanding of Arabic would be an advantage