final foreign policy conclusion

8/4/2019 Final Foreign Policy Conclusion

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INTRODUCTION

The simplest definition of foreign policy is that, it is the attempt by a state to maximize its

national interest in the external or international environment. However, this definition suggests

some complexities. The definition assumes a commonly agreed definition of national interest.

National interest, as a concept is derived from a realist perspective which means decisions that

states make to preserve and improve power. It is therefore not true to assume that the definition

of national interest as being commonly agreed.

Secondly, Foreign Policy is an ends and means, a problem of achieving certain national goals

with limited means available. The attempt to attain these goals is largely outside one’s control.

These attempts are made with other states that are seeking the same goals for themselves

sometimes at the expense of the competing state.

One would need to include some measure of cooperation, or at least alliance building or working

together. Of the two basic goals of the state, that is, security and prosperity, security is always

presented as a zero sum game. Prosperity requires states to cooperate with each other.

One may then summarize and state that the foreign policy of a state are the strategies employed

by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals in international arena.

Basically a Nation first considers and decides upon various policy options, methods and tactics

based on influenced wants and needs from its domestic environment

Foreign policy analysis

Foreign policy analysis involves the study of how a state makes foreign policy. It also involves

the study of both international and domestic politics. A state may implement foreign policy

through diplomacy, war, trade, intergovernmental organizations and economic sanctions.

Foreign Policy Analysis is the study of the process, effects, causes, or outputs of foreign policy

decision making. Foreign Policy Analysis explains why specific states do specific things at

specific times. Foreign policy analysis is the study of the conduct and practice of relations

between different actors, primarily states, in the international system. Diplomacy, intelligence,

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trade negotiations and cultural exchanges all form part of the substance of Foreign policy

analysis.

At the heart of the field is an investigation into decision making, the individual decision makers,

processes and conditions that affect foreign policy and the outcomes of these decisions. By virtue

of this approach, Foreign policy analysis is necessarily concerned with the boundaries between

the external environment outside of the nation state and the internal or domestic environment,

with its variety of sub-national sources of influence.

The group’s focus is to examine how the state level of analysis affects a country’s formulation

and implementation of its foreign policy. As such, it necessary to give an in-depth definition of

the terms ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nation-state’.

DEFINITION OF NATION STATE

NATION

Nation is a term that is used to describe a group of people who may or may not live in the same

state or country.

Definitions of nation rely on objective or subjective criteria or on some combination of the two.

On the objective criteria of definition of nationality rely on the commonality of a certain trait

among members of a group e.g. characteristics such as shared language, religion, ethnicity

(C9ommon Descent) and culture.

STATE

According to Daniel A Sapp- A state is a geographically bounded entity governed by a central

authority that has the ability to make laws, rules and decisions and to enforce those laws, rules

and decisions within its boundaries.

A state is also a legal entity recognised under international law as the fundamental decision

making unit of the international legal system.

States determine their own policies and establish their own forms of government.

A nation is a grouping of people who view themselves as being linked to one another in some

manner.

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Nationalism refers to the feeling of attachment to one another that members of a nation have and

to the sense of pride that a nation has in itself.

It is a geographically bounded legal entity under a single government the population of which

psychologically considers itself in some way shape or form related

The term nation-state is more recent of the other two ‘nations’ & ‘state’ and it reflect growing

convergence in recent years between the two older terms.

NATION-STATE

Nations and states may seem identical but they are not.

States govern people in a territory with boundaries. They have laws, taxes, officials, currencies,

postal services and (usually) armies.

They wage war, negotiate treaties, put people in prison and regulate life in thousands of ways.

They claim sovereignty within their territory e.g. the Karen claim to be a nation trapped within

the state of Burma/Myanmar.

The Sioux are a nation within the boundaries of the United States-each of these nations has its

own special territory rights, laws and culture but not statehood.

That Arab nation embraces more than a dozen states while the nation of the Kurds takes in large

areas of four states

Some people assume that states are fixed and permanently established across most of the globe

whereas states are in flux(change)

State boundaries are often changed-by war, negotiation, arbitration or even by the sale of

territory for money e.g. Russia sold Alaska to the USA

Nation-state provides identity where identities have been weak.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

This is one of the ways of examining state behavior. It can also be said to be a perspective on

international relations based on a similar state of actors and processes that suggests possible

explanations to why a state acts in a particular way .Scholars see several levels of analysis

through which state behavior can be examined.

System level analysis examines state behavior by looking at the international system. It is the

most comprehensive of the levels available, encompassing the totality of interactions which take

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place within the system and its environment. In this level of analysis, the international system is

the cause and state behavior is the effect. Characteristics of the international system cause states

to behave the way they do. Change in the international system will cause change in state

behavior. The key variable in the international system is the power of a state within the system.

Some states are powerful; others are weak. So for example, the cold war had two powerful

states. Therefore the central cause of all state behavior in the cold war was the fact that the US

and USSR were the two powerful states in a bipolar system. Today, there is unipolar system –

one superpower (or hyper power) -- and that defines the behavior of all other states in the system.

(See neo-realism below). So this level of analysis might explain the US intervention in Iraq as a

matter of the US, the one and only powerful state, flexing its muscles to police the world against

states that threaten it. The US wants to preserve its dominance and therefore crushes all

challengers.

Organizational level analysis examines the way in which organizations within a state function

to influence foreign policy behavior. States don’t make decisions. Organizations bargain with

each other to create a foreign policy that is a compromise between competing organizations.

This level of analysis for example, might look at the Iraq war and try to explain it by examining

the interests of the US military, the department of defense, the state department, and central

intelligence agency. How did these organizations create US foreign policy would be the key

question at this level of analysis?

Individual level analysis focuses on people. People make decisions within nation states and

therefore people make foreign policy. Scholars might look at the roles of different leaders. This

level of analysis might explain World War II by examining the role of Hitler. It might look at

the end of the cold war by studying Gorbachev. It might suggest that the economic reforms in

China are a result of the transition from Mao Zedong’s leadership to Deng Xiaoping’s rule. This

level of analysis also includes cognitive theories --theories that explain foreign policy by looking

at the way leaders perceive the world. Larson’s book is an example of this. This is a focus on

perception, misperception, and communication. Individual level analysis might ask questions

such as these: Are there aspects of George W. Bush’s character and belief systems that have

defined the US response to the 9/11 attacks? Would Al Gore or John Kerry have behaved any

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differently in a similar situation? How do Bush and his senior decision makers perceive the

world and their role in it?

Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics, is the most prominent effort to develop a

Rigorous and prudent model of "modern" or “structural" realism, has tended to define the terms

of a vigorous debate during the past two decades. It follows and builds upon another enormously

influential book in which Waltz developed the Rousseau an position that a theory of war must

include the system level (what he called the "third image") and not just first (theories of human

nature) or second (state attributes) images. Why war? Because there is nothing in the system to

prevent it.

State level analysis examines the foreign policy behavior of states in terms of state

characteristics. For example, some scholars say that all democracies behave a certain way; they

don’t fight with other democracies. Some scholars might look at the different behaviors of weak

or strong states; states that live in rough neighborhoods (Germany or France) vs. states that live

in more benign surroundings (the US). Some scholars might say that the foreign policy behavior

of every state is a cultural characteristic, defined by the historical legacy of the state, the

religious or social traditions, or the economic and geographic nature of the state itself (see

constructivism below). State level of analysis might explain the US intervention in Iraq as a

function of the missionary quality of US foreign policy. The US has always had an idealist

streak in its foreign policy (some disagree with this) and sees “bad guys” out there in the

international system. The US is compelled by the nature of its political system and its belief that

someday all states will be like the US. It has a drive to remake the world in its own image. The

job of US foreign policy is not done until all states are democratic and all nations have free

market economies.

The most important actors within the global system continue to be the central governments of

sovereign states.Each central government has relationships with other central governments and

other international actors. These relationships are summarized as that country's foreign policy.

The dominant model of the global system continues to hold the view that the world is composed

of a system of sovereign states. The sum total and the product of all foreign policies would result

in what we call the global system.

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Determinants of States’ Foreign Policies

The foreign policy of a given state depends on its power, its objectives, and its leadership.

Power is an elusive concept but widely used in political science. Power may be defined as the

ability to persuade others to do things that they would not do ordinarily unless pressured to do so.

Within domestic politics, power is usually based on numbers, wealth, and organizational skills.

A small group that is well organized may exercise considerable influence even without large

sums of money. In international politics, power depends on both geopolitical factors and

idiosyncratic factors.

Objectives of Foreign Policy: The objectives of states vary greatly but all states seek to

preserve themselves, maintain their independence and security and pursue their national

interests.

Leadership: Leaders and the elites who support them help to shape the foreign policy of

countries. In making decisions, leaders must take account of two categories of determinants that

impact on their foreign policies.

Influences of Foreign policy.

Global or External Influences

Geopolitics. The geopolitical location of a state is one of the external determinants on its

foreign policy. It matters where on the globe a country is located. It matters whether the country

has natural frontiers: that is whether it is protected by oceans, high mountains, or deserts. It

matters who one's neighbors are and whether a given country is territorially large, populous,

affluent, and well-governed.

Relative Position within the Global system.

Internal or Domestic Influences

Internal or Domestic Determinants on States' Foreign Policies focus attention "on variations

in states' attributes, such as military capabilities, level of economic development, and types of

government.

Military Capabilities. This include the size of military, Equipment, Training, Leadership and

Nuclear or non-nuclear capabilities.

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Economic Capabilities. It includes Traditional, Transitional, and Modern

Societies. Industrialization. Stages of Industrialization: Wood, Coal, Oil, Nuclear, Renewable

Resources. Gross national product, Per Capita GNP, GINI Index, Lorenz Curve of Inequality.

Type of Economy: Free Market Economics, Centrally Planned Economies, Socially Steered

Market Economies (Soziale Markwirtschaft)

Type of Government. Constitutional democracies (presidential systems and parliamentary

systems). Autocratic Systems (authoritarian and totalitarian). Military Dictatorships. Political

Party Systems. Traditional monarchies (Saudi Arabia). Modern theocracies (Iran).

State Power is the power that the government machineries have and it influences the state’s

foreign policy while National Power is the power the other actors in a State have which also

influences Foreign Policy.

Bases of National Power depend on many variables, such as: Location of the state--coastal or

landlocked, Size--large or small territory, Population--large or small, Natural Resources--oil, iron

ore, forests, etc. Technology-developed or under-developed

Type of Government--dictatorship or democracy Type of Economy--market or centrally planned,

Size and Equipment of Military--nuclear or conventional, Belief systems of Country

Idiosyncratic Factors

Leadership, Morale of Military, Degree of Popular Support, Nature of Friends and Allies and

Enemies

To try and figure out why states behave the way they do, then we need to look at theories which

are useful tools that can help us conceptualize the concepts and explain the reasons behind this behaviour.

State Level of Analysis: Theories of Foreign Policy Analysis

i) Realism and Foreign Policy Analysis:

Political realists view the state an appropriate unit of analysis and are seen as pursuing

foreign policy to advance national interest.

According to this view, a state’s capacity or power is central to shaping its foreign policy

strategies.

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The state’s capability enables it to achieve its goals even when they clash with those of

other states.

Goldstein, for instance, observes that a state’s capability to influence another is based on

its possessions.

These include a country’s size, level of income, armed forces and population.

Rothgeb observes that despite a state’s possession of power, this does not in itself always

guarantee that it will prevail in conflicts.

This is based on the fact that power, if taken out of context, only provides generalunderstanding of typical outcomes.

The relative power among states can indeed rise or decline depending on the state’s

ability to use it in order to achieve desired goals. Power is indeed not absolute and must

be analyzed in relation to others.

The realist focus on states as a unit of focus leaves no room for the role of the individuals.

Indeed, states are seen as unitary and individuals are only perceived to work towards

attaining state goals. For realists, the only element that shows prominent impact onforeign policy apart from state capability is the nature of leadership

ii) Liberal Theory:

Liberal warrants one’s attention because it speaks to issues that realism disregard like:

o The impact of domestic politics on state behavior

o The implications of economic interdependence and,

o The role of global norms and institutions in promoting international cooperation

Liberalism emphasize ethical principle over military capabilities

Politics at the global level is more a struggle for consensus and mutual gain rather than

struggle for power and prestige

Liberalism stresses:o The need to substitute attitudes that stress the unity of humankind for those that

stressed parochial national loyalties to independent sovereign states

o The importance of individuals – their essential dignity and fundamental equality

throughout the course of history and the need to place the protection and

promotion of human rights and freedom ahead of national interest and stateautonomy; and

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o The use of power of ideas through education to arouse world public opinion

against warfare

o Liberals also posit that leaders socialized within democratic cultures share a

common outlook. For instance, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that “democratic

government will make wars less likely”, while later on Franklin Roosevelt later

agreed that, asserting “the continued maintenance and improvement of democracyconstitute the most important guarantee of international peace.”

o Liberals also emphasized on free trade; that commerce can reduce conflict - ideas

of Immanuel Kant, Charles Montesquieu, Adam Smith, David Hume etc;commercial intercourse creates a material incentive to resolve disputes – that wars

reduces profit by interrupting vital economic exchanges.

o In summary:

Core Concern: institutionalized peace; how self serving actors learn to see benefits to coordinating behavior through rules and organizations in order

to achieve collective gains

Key Actors: States, International Institutions, Global Corporations

Central Concepts: Collective Security, International regimes, ComplexInterdependence, Transnational Relations

Approach to Peace: Institutional Reforms through democratization, open

markets, and international law and organization

Global Outlook: Cooperative view of human nature and belief in progress

iii) Groupthink:

Irving L. Janis, “Groupthink Among Policy Makers”, in Nevitt Sanford and

Craig Comstock (eds.), Sanctions for Evil, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,1971), pp. 71 – 89

Group think refers to “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they aredeeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when concurrence – seeking becomes so

dominant that it tends to override critical thinking”.

It also refers to a decline in mental efficiency and in the ability to test reality and

to make moral judgments.

Loyalty becomes the highest form of morality for the members. Loyalty requiresthe group members to avoid raising critical issues, to avoid calling a halt to soft-

headed thinking and to avoid questioning weak arguments, even when the

individual member begins to have doubts and to wonder whether they are indeed behaving in a soft-headed manner.

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Most of the main symptoms of group think arise because the members of

decision-making groups avoid being too harsh in their judgments of their leader’sor colleagues ideas. They adopt a soft line of criticism, even in their own thinking.

At their meetings, all important issue with no bickering or conflict to spoil thecozy atmosphere.

According to Janis, group cohesion will only lead to groupthink if one of thefollowing two antecedent conditions is present:

• Structural faults in the organization: insulation of the group, lack of tradition

of impartial leadership, lack of norms requiring methodological procedures,homogeneity of members' social background and ideology.

• Provocative situational context: high stress from external threats, recent

failures, excessive difficulties on the decision-making task, moral dilemmas.

- Social psychologist Clark McCauley's three conditions under which groupthink occurs:

• Directive leadership.

• Homogeneity of members' social background and ideology.

• Isolation of the group from outside sources of information and analysis.There are generally eight symptoms of groupthink which will be outlined below:

1) A shared illusion of invulnerability, which leads to an extraordinary

degree of over-optimism and risk taking

2) Manifestations of directly pressure on individuals who express

disagreement with or doubt about the majority view, making it clear that

their dissent is contrary to the expected behavior of loyal group members

3) Fear of disapproval for deviating from the group consensus, which leads

each member to avoid voicing his doubts when most of the others seem to

agree on a proposed course of action

4) A shared illusion of unanimity within the group concerning all the main judgments expressed by members who speak in favor of the majority view

(partly resulting from the preceding symptom, which contributes to the

false assumption that any individual who remains silent during any part of the discussion is full accord with what others are saying);

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5) Stereotyped views of the enemy leaders as evil, often accompanied by the

assumption that they are too weak or too stupid to deal effectively with

whatever risky attempts are made to outdo them;

6) An unquestioned belief in the inherent morality of the in-group, whichinclines the members to ignore the ethical and moral consequences of their

decisions;

7) The emergence of self-appointed minds guards within the group –

members who take it upon themselves to protect the leader and fellow

members from adverse information that may prevent them from being ableto continue their shared sense of complacency about effectiveness and

morality of past decisions; and

8) Shared efforts to construct rationalizations in order to be able to ignorewarnings and other forms of negative feedback, which, if taken seriously,

would lead the members to reconsider the assumptions they continue to

take for granted each time they recommit themselves to their past policy

decisions.- Groupthink, resulting from the symptoms listed above, results in defective decision

making. That is, consensus-driven decisions are the result of the following practices of

group-thinking.

1. Incomplete survey of alternatives

2. Incomplete survey of objectives

3. Failure to examine risks of preferred choice4. Failure to reevaluate previously rejected alternatives

5. Poor information search6. Selection bias in collecting information

7. Failure to work out contingency plans.

- According to Irving Janis, decision making groups are not necessarily destined to

groupthink. He devised seven ways of preventing groupthink (209-15):

1. Leaders should assign each member the role of “critical evaluator”. Thisallows each member to freely air objections and doubts.

2. Higher-ups should not express an opinion when assigning a task to agroup.

3. The organization should set up several independent groups, working onthe same problem.

4. All effective alternatives should be examined.

5. Each member should discuss the group's ideas with trusted people outsideof the group.

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6. The group should invite outside experts into meetings. Group members

should be allowed to discuss with and question the outside experts.7. At least one group member should be assigned the role of Devil'sadvocate. This should be a different person for each meeting.

Example: The Bay of Pigs Fiasco

Background:

The Bay of Pigs Invasion was an unsuccessful attempt by United States-backed Cuban exiles tooverthrow the government of the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. Increasing friction between the

U.S. government and Castro's leftist regime led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to break off

diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961. Even before that, however, the CentralIntelligence Agency had been training anti-revolutionary Cuban exiles for a possible invasion of

the island. The invasion plan was approved by Eisenhower's successor, John F. Kennedy.

On April 17, 1961 about 1300 exiles, armed with U.S. weapons, landed at the Bahía de Cochinos

(Bay of Pigs) on the southern coast of Cuba.

Hoping to find support from the local population, they intended to cross the island to Havana. Itwas evident from the first hours of fighting, however, that the exiles were likely to lose.

President Kennedy had the option of using the U.S. Air Force against the Cubans but decided

against it. Consequently, the invasion was stopped by Castro's army. By the time the fightingended on April 19, 90 exiles had been killed and the rest had been taken as prisoners.

The failure of the invasion seriously embarrassed the young Kennedy administration. Some

critics blamed Kennedy for not giving it adequate support and others for allowing it to take placeat all. The captured exiles were later ransomed by private groups in the U.S.

Additionally, the invasion made Castro wary of the U.S. He was convinced that the Americanswould try to take over the island again. From the Bay of Pigs on, Castro had an increased fear of

a U.S. incursion on Cuban soil.

Groupthink analysis:

Groupthink appeared in the run-up to the Bay of Pigs invasion in the following manners:

1) The president was so charismatic that his staff wanted to follow him and do what hewanted. Staff members did not feel free to express opinions perceived contrary to whatKennedy wanted. Of course they weren't always sure exactly what he wanted so this at

times turned into supporting guesses about what he wanted.

2) Outside experts were excluded, ostensibly to protect secrecy (which was alreadycompromised). No independent viewpoints sought or allowed. The CIA had intelligence

that contradicted the beliefs on which the decisions were based, but that information

never made it to the decision-makers.

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3) Limited purviews: Schlesinger, for example, felt that as an academic he would be

presumptuous to bring up his concerns.

4) Illusion of invulnerability. The feeling was, “We are smart and we are automaticallymoral. Therefore we will succeed."

5) Illusion of unanimity. "Let's all support the president!" Staff members regarded it as

important to be unanimous, to the point that they suppressed their thoughts to achievethat unanimity.

6) Self-appointed mind-guards. For example, Robert Kennedy told Schlesinger that

everyone should get behind the president.

All that together added up to an apparently unanimous decision to carry out an action that failed

miserably. And contrary to the working assumption, there was no way to blame it on renegade

Cuban exiles; the whole world knew that the U.S. was behind the invasion.

It is impossible to know what would have happened had the administration sought and paid

attention to other information or analysis, but it is highly probable that decision-makers would

have seen the potential problems and called off the invasion.

The Bay of Pigs provided a painful lesson, but thankfully Kennedy and his staff members

learned that lesson well. When the Cuban missile crisis arose, they took deliberate action to

avoid groupthink. Among the ways they did this were:

2. Kennedy deliberately absented himself from many meetings in order to avoid exertingundue influence over discussions.

3. Committee members themselves resisted pressure for unanimity and freely expressed

their disagreements. Rules of protocol were suspended to allow frank and free-wheeling

discussion.4. Group member roles were defined to include being skeptical "generalists," charged with

examining the problem as a whole. Purviews were not limited.

5. Subgroups examined the issues and were later cross-examined by other groups.6. No opinion was regarded as gospel, either a group or an individual opinion. Nor was any

opinion automatically dismissed.

7. Decision makers deliberately sought and considered all pertinent information, eveninformation that went contrary to their preferred course of action.

8. The entire attitude was one of vigilant appraisal rather than groupthink.

The decision was still difficult and the outcome uncertain. In fact, Kennedy said that the people

whose ideas were rejected were the lucky ones because they would be able to say, "I told youso." Thankfully that was not the case; the action taken (a blockade) solved the problem.

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iv) Rational Actor Model:

National Actor: Under the rational actor model, Allison observes that nation is treated as

the primary actor and it examines a set of goals, evaluates them according to their utilityand then picks the one that has the highest pay-off.

This model asserts that policy making is the outcome of a series of games betweenstrategic actors.

Action is chosen in response to the strategic problem which faces the nation. Threats and

opportunities arising in the “international strategic market place” move the nation to act.Static Selection: The sum of activity of representatives of the government relevant to a

strategic problem constitutes what the nation has chosen as its “solution”. Thus the action

is conceived as a steady – state choice among alternative outcomes (rather than, for example, a large number of partial choices in a dynamic stream).

Action as Rational Choice: Action results from national choice among alternatives of a

means calculated to achieve strategic objectives.

(A) National security and national interests are the principal categories inwhich strategic goals are conceived. Nations seek security and a range of

further objectives

(B) Various courses of action relevant to a strategic problem provide thespectrum of alternatives

(C) Endorsement of each alternative course of action will produce a series of

consequences. The relevant consequences constitute advantages anddisadvantages in terms of strategic goals and objectives.

(D) Rational choice is value-maximizing. The rational agent selects the

alternative whose consequences rank the highest in terms of goals andobjectives.

Example of RAM: The Cuban Missile Crisis

Kennedy tried many times to overtly get rid of Castro and/or its government, but failed. Due to

these threats from America, Castro called upon its larger ally, Khrushchev, to help him defend

his small island from Kennedy. Khrushchev responded by sending a “180 SA-2 missiles to Cuba

and a battery of Soviet coastal defense cruise missiles, along with trainers, and the deployment of

a regiment of regular Soviet troops.” This government, alliance, and now a military buildup wasin direct conflict with the goals of Kennedy. With Kennedy’s goals being challenged he had to

respond.

In response to the Soviet missiles in Cuba so close to America, Kennedy had a couple of options.

The first of which is just to do nothing.

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American, up till then, had always been under the target of Soviet missiles. In addition, America

did not want to escalate to nuclear war. America did not want to make an action that would set

off a chain reaction of events that would lead to such a catastrophe.

A second option was to put diplomatic pressures on the Soviets. This option would entail giving

Khrushchev an ultimatum or bringing up the issue to the United Nations or the Organization of

American States to see if those organizations would get involved with getting rid of the missiles.

A third option was to secretly approach Castro to defect against the Soviets. This would make

sure that Castro understood that it was either “split or fall” to the United States. A fourth option

was an invasion of Cuba. This was considered a last resort, but it would make sure that Cubacould not or would not be occupied by Soviets or their missiles.

A fifth option was to conduct an air strike on the missile sites. This option would take out all

defense sites as well as the missiles and the capabilities for the Soviets to launch those missiles.

A sixth and last option was a naval blockade of the coast of Cuba. This option would not allow

any ships to pass, especially Soviet ships, through a blockade, thereby stopping the flow of

supplies for more Soviet troops or missiles into Cuba. Kennedy had many options at his disposal

but to determine which one to choose, RAM must look at the consequences.

v)Bureaucratic Politics (Government Politics Model)

Views the state as a plurality of actorsPolicy outcomes are not based on the single, national interests of the state

Policy results from either compromise, competition or coalitions among government

officialsThese government officials have different perspectives of the same issue

Policy advisors and officials within the executive branch will bargain, log-roll and politicamong each other Many times, the president will choose the policy option that is favored by the coalition

that includes a member that is influential with the President

The proposals put forth by various groups, or coalitions, within the executive branch are based on the interests of the respective bureaucracies that individual or group represents

“Where one sits is where one stands” on a particular issue or conflict

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For example: if a given conflict might require a military campaign, then perhaps key

officials within the Pentagon or Joint Chief of Staff would support military deployment

and the use of force; meanwhile officials within a State Department would favor and callfor a diplomatic settlement

This would cause an internal battle with the government

The president usually decides what policy to go with on the strength of coalition buildingand, thus, favorable balance of power from each actor – in other words, which coalition

of bureaucratic actors will make a more persuasive argument with the President?; Or,

which group of actors is more influential with the President?Conflicts can involve a multiple number of actors; political battles can consist of cabinet

level secretaries, under secretaries, White House senior policy advisors or entire

bureaucratic offices.

Example of Bureaucratic Politics Model:

A Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962

Started with the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba in October, 1962Led to the formation of the Executive Commission (ExComm) which presented JFK with

a number of optionsa) Defense Secretary Robert McNamara advocated a “do nothing” approach

From McNamara’s point of view, “a missile is just a missile …. It makes

no difference whether you are killed by a missile from the Soviet Union or

Cuba”

McNamara looked at the situation from the view point of a military

tactician who saw no tactical or logistical difference in the ballisticmissiles’ point of origin

b) National Security Council (NSC) assistant McGeorge Bundy favored a more

diplomatic settlement to the crisis

Bundy proposed making a request to the UN and the Organization of American States for an inspection team to go to Cuba and verify the

presence of the offensive missiles

Bundy also proposed a meeting with the Soviet Leader Khrushchev to

negotiate the removal of the missiles from Cuba, making Cuba neutral,U.S. withdrawal from Guantanamo and U.S. removal of Jupiter Missiles

from Turkey; in other words, Bundy proposed a diplomatic compromise

between the US and USSR

Because Bundy was one of the main supporters and organizers of the

failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Bundy perhaps saw problems and

risks of a military force and thus, called for diplomacyc) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) called for a military solution to the conflict

The JCS had a long prepared contingency plans for an offensive strike

against Cuba – this was seen as the moment of truth by the JCS

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Thus, the JCS called for an air-strike to finally “cleanse” the WesternHemisphere of Communism

They argued that the Soviets had inserted the missiles in a daring

challenge to the US, which must be met

Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, also supported the air-strike, as a need to

respond to the US with force By now, the “do-nothing” and diplomatic proposals had been thrown out;

JFK decided that something affirmative had to be done to counter Sovietactions

d) With that, McNamara and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Roswell Gilpatric)

called for a naval blockade

A naval blockade was seen as the best combination of doing something to

respond to USSR; yet, this response could be seen as a defensive response

and, thus, not seen as aggressive or “hard-line”

Just as importantly, it would be McNamara and Gilpatric’s Pentagon that

would have primary responsibility for carrying out the blockade

It was McNamara that was seen as JFK’s closest advisor (second to RFK)in foreign/defense affairs

Also, RFK came out for the blockade

Therefore, the “blockade coalition” of McNamara, RFK and TheodoreSorensen (the President’s Special Counsel) held more influence and sway

with JFK than “air-strike coalition” of the JCF, Rusk and Dean Acheson

(NCS Head)

Because JFK did not have much personal compatibility with latter coalition, the President was more in favor of the recommendations of his

preferred coalition – whom he trusted more

As a result, JFK opted for the naval blockade!

vi)The Organization Process Model

The state is a collection of loosely allied organization ( a plurality of actors)These organizations, which the government consists of, are divided each with a primary

responsibility

The state acts in accordance with the routines that these organizations enact.Each organization attends to a special set of problems and acts on these problems

The organizations will act in somewhat independence of other organizations

Therefore, the decision making of the state comes from the independent behavior of amultiple number of organizations

Thus, policy and state behavior is determined prior to an event occurring

Examples of the Organizational Process Model:

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A Military Mobilization of Any State

A state’s decision to enter a war is really an organizational one

At the bottom, there are soldiers in platoons>These platoons are in companies>these

companies are in armies>these armies are acting in response to orders given to them bylieutenants and captains>these orders coincide with the fixed routines and standard

procedures of the military

B World War I

When Austria – Hungary marched into Serbia, Russian forces began to mobilize todefend Serbia

Czar Nicholas at first ordered partial mobilization of the military – just to show Austriathat Russia was willing to defend the Serbs

However, Russian military leadership informed the Czar that partial mobilization would

make full mobilization almost impossible; thus, the military urged the Czar to order full

mobilization (Russian mobilization capabilities were slower than any other major power involved)

Germany viewing the Russian full mobilization, responded with its full mobilization

This gave Russia the impression that Germany was initiating aggression; thus Russia

committed to defending SerbiaAustria – Hungary, seeing both the German and Russian mobilization, and fearing

Germany might back out on its alliance pact with Austria, ignored communications from

Berlin and marched into SerbiaTherefore, it was not German power ambition or interests that created WWI; rather, it

was the fixed routine of the countries’ military doctrines and capabilities that created the

“domino” effect toward war. Germany, actually did not want war. All states were drawninto the war by way of military organizational routines.

V) Perception and Misperception by Robert Jarvis

- Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that

misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models.

Hypotheses

- "Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and

images."- There are two ways to make mistakes: One is to not change your views in the face of

conflicting information, the other is to be too willing to do so. Both scholars anddecision-makers are more likely to do the first (not to change their views).

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- It's easier to integrate contradicting information into your image if it comes bit-by-bit

than if it comes all at once. So deliver it all at once, as a fully-formed competing theory

that must be reckoned with.- Misperception is easiest to correct if an actor is mis-categorized (but the category exists

in your head) (e.g. Britain was aware of the category of expansionist states, but it didn't

think Hitler belonged in it); it is hardest to correct if your mind completely lacks a certaincategory (e.g. China in the 19th century didn't know what to make of the West)- If the sender (of a message) has something different on his mind (the "evoked set") than

the receiver does, misunderstanding is likely.- The more time I spend drawing up a plan, the more clear it is to me. So I will assume it is

equally clear to you, making misperception on your part even more likely.- An action may convey an unintended message if the action itself doesn't turn out as

planned.

Hypotheses about Perception

- Decision-makers tend to see other states as more hostile than they are.- We tend to assume that the behavior of others is more centralized and coordinated than it

is (related to hypothesis. 7).- Similarly, we tend to take the foreign ministry's position as representative of the

government as a whole.- When states do something w like, we give ourselves too much credit for getting them to

do so; when states do something we don't like, we attribute it mostly to internal

(domestic) forces.- When I don't try to conceal my intentions, I assume that you accurately perceive them.

- "Suggests that if it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace, it

is often even harder for him to see that issues important to him are not important to

others.- We tend to forget that a single bit of evidence might support more than one view,

including opposing views. See also Allison on this point.

Example of Perception and Misperception – Iran and US Perception of Each Other

Since the fall of Mohammed Reza Shah in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has remained

politically isolated from the United States and the West. After eight years of brutal war with Iraq,

Iran has embarked on a major effort to rebuild its devastated military. A major element of itsmilitary reconstruction has been the acquisition of advanced weapons systems with strategic

applications, such as long-range bombers, submarines, advanced underwater mines, and ballistic

missiles. Iran is also suspected of pursuing the development and acquisition of weapons of massdestruction. Given Iran's latent hostility towards the United States and its past willingness to

engage in terrorism, these activities are a most serious concern.

One of the most significant such dilemmas is the US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Saddam

Hussein's Iraq was the gravest threat to Iran's security, followed by the Taliban government and

its brand of Sunni extremism. The United States removed both threats. Iran should, therefore,

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feel that its security position has improved significantly. This in turn should reduce Iran's

perceived interest in acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities.

However, many Iranians see the same reality from an entirely different viewpoint. Instead of

Saddam Hussein's regime, Iran now confronts on its western and eastern borders the most

powerful military in the history of the world and a radical ideological government in Washington bent on overturning governments like Iran's. The American presence surrounding Iran has not

improved security but rather has put a dagger to Iran's front and back. If ever a country needs

nuclear weapons to deter a stronger adversary, it is Iran.

But perhaps the crucial dilemma for Iranian and American officials concerns the question of

regime change. Iranian citizens essentially have voted for regime change several times and have

not obtained it. The unelected Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamene'I, as well as the judiciaryand security apparatus he controls, have prevented the elected president and parliament from

directing the state. Unfortunately, these unelected men determine whether Iran will seek nuclear

weapons, conduct terrorism, or recognize Israel's right to exist. Few inside or out of Iran believe

the US can or should remove this regime. Thus, if vital international problems need to beresolved now, there is little choice but to deal with the people who have power in Iran.

CHINESE CASE STUDY

China's Foreign Policy has changed dramatically since the establishment of the People's

Republic of China in 1949, transforming China’s position from being a Soviet ally challenging

the West, to an independent radical revolutionary state, and then reform-minded country eager to

join the international community? As communism collapsed elsewhere after the end of the Cold

War China is becoming an emerging global power practicing “socialism with Chinese

characteristics”.

China’s traditional culturalism, as envisaged by leading Chinese writers like Liang Qichao, Sun

Yatsen and Feng Youlan, and analyzed by American scholars such as Joseph Levenson and John

K. Fairbank, dominated the Chinese approach to foreign relations for over 2,000 years before the

twentieth century. This culturalism articulated a clear distinction of a Chinese ‘Us’ vis-a`-vis the

non- Chinese ‘Others’. As the twentieth century Chinese philosopher Feng Youlan observed,

‘what the Chinese were always concerned about was the continuation and integrity of the

Chinese culture and civilization from the early Qin dynasty onwards; Chinese had clearly made a

distinction between the “China”, or “Huaxia”, with the “Barbarians (Yidi)”’. Feng argued that

‘such a distinction was made according to a cultural criteria rather than racial differences’.1

1 Feng Youlan, Zhongguo zhexue jianshi, A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy,(Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1985), pp. 211–222.

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James Harrison also pointed out that ‘the traditional Chinese self-image has generally been

defined as “culturalism”, based on the historical heritage and acceptance of shared values, not as

nationalism, based on the modern concept of the nation-state’.2 From a culturalist point of view,

the primary identity of the Chinese was the general acceptance of traditional Chinese culture,

namely, the Confucianism that dominated the minds of the Chinese for almost 2,000 years. It is

the acceptance, or not, of this culture that separated the Chinese and the others, or the

‘barbarians’. Furthermore, culturalism did not regard the boundary between the Chinese and

barbarians as static or fixed. Once the ‘barbarians’ adopted Chinese culture, they became

Chinese, and vice versa.3

The "sleeping dragon" has wakened up and is becoming a major political and economic force in

regional and world affairs. Chinese diplomacy is signing investment agreements, building roads,

forming strategic partnerships and gaining membership in regional and international

organizations. Developing Countries are the favorite target for Beijing policy, seen both as

extremely important sources of energy and raw materials, and as supporters to its multilateral

approach to international affairs. China's foreign policy towards the "Third World" shifted,

beginning from the early `80s, from being political-ideological to pragmatic-economic aimed.

Developing countries represent for China many opportunities: sources of oil and raw materials,

new markets for its products and possible allies in the United Nations and in the Taiwan's issue.4

CONCLUSION

2 James Harrison, Modern Chinese Nationalism (Hunter College of the City of New York:

Research Institute onModern Asia, 1969), p. 2.3 Liang Qichao, Liang Qichao zhexue sixiang lunwen ji, Collection of Articles by LiangQichao of His Philosophical Thoughts, (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1984), p. 7.

4 Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, Derek Mitchell, China and the Developing

World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. (M.E. Sharpe, 2007)

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Foreign policy is about obtaining an overall perspective of those activities in which the state is

engaged internationally. Foreign policy behaviour of every state is defined by the historical

legacy of the state, the religious or social traditions or the economic and geographical nature of

the state itself. It is also a means through which the state’s national interest is pursued and

acquired and it therefore must take into cognizance of the objectives the state seeks to pursue and

the means it must have at its disposal to realise the goals.

The national interest encompasses the core values such as the sustenance of state sovereignty and

the guarantee of its territorial integrity at and the assurance of its economic interests. Perceptions

create the overall context in which foreign policy decisions are made.

State level of analysis sees the state as the central actor in the global order. It also acknowledges

that states are complex organizations whose internal dynamics influence their international

actions. The exact nature of that process changes according to a number of variables, including

the type of political system, the type of situation, the type of issue and the internal factors

involved. Another set of internal factors centers on the policy making impact of various foreign

policy making actors. These include political leaders, bureaucratic organizations, legislatures,

political parties and opposition, interest groups and the public. Each of these influences foreign

policy but their influence varies according to the type of government, the situation and the policy

issue.

A nation is said to be secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of sacrificing its

core values. To ensure its security, the state develops national security policy. Such a

policy presupposes dangers external and internal to the state. It is also possible for the

pursuit of security to be driven by the state’s desire and ambition to retain or create

wealth and development for its citizens. Security can be acquired by the state on its

own if it is endowed with enough resources or through alliance with others.

However, regardless of what type of policy adopted by the state, its pursuit is influenced by

several factors such as the availability of resources, the level of technological advancement,

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population size and density, and ethnic and racial cohesion are critical. Also important are

environmental elements such as the geographical location, terrain, climate and natural resources.

Equally important is the world system and the space it gives to a given state and the nature and

type of the political structures in existence.

Usually, heads of government are the most powerful foreign policy making actors with the

bureaucratic organizations coming a close second. The leadership element is also very crucial.

(Does a leader for example perceive constraints as obstacles or opportunities?) This element

must be present at all levels to think through relevant institutions at regional, state and local

level. It is the very essence of leadership is the enhancement and the assurance of the state’s

survival However, it is also important to not that foreign policy is not formulated by a single

decision-making process. The national interest is determined by the decision-makers and is

arrived at after an aggregation of divergent views through a consensus-building process.

Weaknesses

States operate in a complex and interdependent international system and as such they cannot

claim to have absolute independence in the formulation of their policy.

For one to really understand Foreign Policy, one has to look also at the related concepts of

sovereignty, autonomy, interdependence and integration.

Although states remain the dominant actors in the international system, their role is somewhat

weakened by globalization. This means that much of government’s authority has shifted to

supranational authorities.

While state responsibilities have increased, its control over internal outcomes have been

weakened as well

Finally, although our focus was on the state level of analysis, it appears that when it comes to the

formulation of foreign policy, all the three levels of analysis are interrelated.

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final foreign policy conclusion

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