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Julie George ISA International Conference 2017 Hong Kong June 17, 2017

International Institutions: A Place for Middle Powers in the Global System

ABSTRACT For more than half a century, political science scholars have studied whether international institutions promote peace and the extent to which they are responsible for the protection of global stability. This central question on international stability draws on hegemonic stability theory that argues that stability is a public good that can be produced only when a single dominant state is able and willing to provide it. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory - Charles P. Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner - argue the belief that stability of the international system requires a single hegemon to enforce the rules of interaction among the members. Yet, the literature on hegemonic stability theory and institutions neglects the role of middle powers, especially from the Pacific region, within the global system. Middle powers have become a part of the equation of stability through the proliferation of multilateral and interregional coalitions and convenings such as the Bandung Conference, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Group of 20 (G20). This paper seeks to answer what role international institutions and middle powers possess in the overall stability of the world system a la hegemonic stability theory.

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INTRODUCTION

For more than half a century, political science scholars have studied whether international

institutions promote peace and the extent to which they are responsible for the protection of

global stability. This central question on international stability draws on hegemonic stability

theory that argues that stability is a public good that can be produced only when a single

dominant state is able and willing to provide it. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory -

Charles P. Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner - argue the belief

that stability of the international system requires a single hegemon to enforce the rules of

interaction among the members. Yet, the literature on hegemonic stability theory and institutions

neglects the role of middle powers within the global system. This paper seeks to answer what

role international institutions and middle powers possess in the overall stability of the world

system a la hegemonic stability theory.

As early as the 15th century, middle powers were defined as states with sufficient strength

and authority to stand on their own without the need of help from others (Wight 1978:298).

Recently, there has been a shift in the literature on global stability. Scholars now identify middle

powers as carving out a niche for themselves, pursuing a narrow range of foreign policy interest,

and redistributing power in the international system. With stability not always guaranteed as a

result of the constraints that restrain the leadership of the hegemon, the middle powers come

forward and act together, particularly through international institutions. Political science scholars

such as Daniel Flemes, Eduard Jordaan, Andrew Hurrell, and Detlef Nolte find that the

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explanation of changing power relationships in the international arena provides a holistic

understanding for stability. Middle powers display foreign policy behavior that not only

stabilizes, but also legitimizes the global order particularly within and towards international

institutions. DEFININGING MIDDLE POWERS & INSTITUTIONS

Although hegemonic stability theory does not take middle powers into full consideration

of the global order, it is important to define the model of these types of states and institutions.

Across the theoretical paradigms of realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, academics agree

that middle powers rank somewhat below the great powers in terms of their influence on world

affairs. However, the concept and dynamic of middle powers’ role in stability has changed as

evidenced in the literature over time. In 1946, Martin Wight classifies middle powers in Power

Politics on the basis of their power in comparison with dominant states, evidenced by military

capabilities (65). Since then, other scholars have built upon this definition by including middle

powers’ population and economic power are preconditions for their status. In 1996, Robert Cox’s

Middlepowermanship: Japan and the Future of the World Order emphasized that the term,

middle power, is not a fixed universal, but rather a set of practices that continually evolve in

search of different forms of actorness (246). Now, in the 21st century, there have been further

revisions in the literature that assert middle powers are credited with a special interest in

international institutions or in forming coalitions in such institutions, both of which serve the

objective of constraining the power of stronger states (Nolte 2010: 891). Middle powers best

exemplify their means of influence through international institutions. In John Ikenberry’s After

Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, he

reasons that middle powers prefer that international stability is a result of a rule of law in

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institutions that place strict limits on the returns to power (2001:6). Many of these political

science scholars assert that great powers are not the sole factors in the equation of stability.

Essentially, middle powers is not a static model – rather, middle powers take on an activist style

in that they participate in global issues that are beyond their regional periphery to maintain

global stability.

Middle powers, are first and foremost, identified by their role in international institutions

whereas regional powers bear a special responsibility for regional security and for the

maintenance of order in the region. It is important to note the differentiation between regional

powers and middle powers in regards to the dynamics of stability. One way to suitably contrast

middle powers and regional powers is through Detlef Nolte’s How to Compare Regional

Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics; for middle powers, they seek to increase

leadership through political influence in diplomatic forums whereas regional powers combine

leadership and power over resources (2010:890). Therefore, middle powers are a key component

of the global order because they seek to sustain stability as fortification of their posture in the

international community. While middle powers lack the resources to partake in every area of

international politics, they tend to opt for reformist change and attempt to construct identities that

are distinct from those of weak states. For middle powers, multilateralism in international

institutions consists of not being directly involved in conflicts, possessing a degree of autonomy

in relation to the hegemon, facilitating progress in the global order, and an obligation to stability

in interstate relations. Overall, middle powers are the catalysts for sustained stability because

they take on the initiative to participate in conflicts that are beyond their immediate concern or

self-interest.

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Furthermore, hegemonic stability theorists assert that institutions were created to help

states cooperate with each other in the achievement of mutual gains and maintain international

financial stability. As defined by Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer in Multipolar Power

Systems and International Stability, stability is the probability that most members of the system

continue to survive, large scale war does not break out, and the continuance of political

independence and territorial integrity (1964:390). On one hand, in the realist camp, John

Mearsheimer’s False Promises of International Institutions reasons institutions are just a

reflection of the distribution of power in the world and that they hold little promise for promoting

stability. They argue that institutions are based off self-interests of the dominant power and do

not have an independent effect on state behavior (Mearsheimer 1995:7). On the other hand, for

proponents of constructivism such as John Ruggie, argue against this claim by asserting that

there remains a consensus that multilateral norms and institutions have stabilized global

consequences among states. International regimes, coined by John Ruggie in International

Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, is

the “language of station action” and social institutions around which actor expectations converge

in a given area of international relations (1982:380). Institutions are not just utilized for the

leveraging of power by the hegemon. Stefan A. Schirm’s Leaders in Need of Followers:

Emerging Powers in Global Governance advocates middle powers’ wish to assume leadership

roles in international institutions and promote solidarity in the world system. As a force of

stability, international institutions serve as a two-way street for the hegemon, middle powers, and

smaller states to facilitate security. In its foundation, middle powers strive to carry out their

interests through multilateral cooperatives in international institutions for the preservation of the

mutual goal, stability, rather than counter-balance for relative power.

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CONVERSATION WITH HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY

Hegemonic stability theory aptly supports that the maintenance of international

institutions by the hegemon contributes to stable interstate relations when there are

disproportionately powerful states among the potential co-operators. However, the theory misses

a fundamental aspect that incorporates the collaboration of middle powers in maintaining these

institutions. In Robert O. Keohane’s Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International

Politics, a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but

may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution

(1969:269). Similar to Mearsheimer’s claim, Andrew Hurrell argues that international

institutions are also “sites of power and reflect and entrench power hierarchies and the interests

of powerful states” (2000:4). Though the hegemon may have sufficient interest in supplying the

public good of stability and bearing the full costs of provision, the presence of a stable

international regime necessitates a persistent following from subordinate states. Middle powers

attempt to wield means of influence through international institutions. These institutions are not

just concerned with liberal purposes of alleviating common problems or promoting shared

values. On this global stage, middle powers can promote attitudes favorable to their interests and

influence rule making for the overall stability of international order. Hegemonic stability theory

appropriately credits the hegemon for taking on the responsibility of restoring stability in the

international system when there is a lack of leadership. However, while not every actor in

international institutions plays an equal role, they all contribute to the overall stability of these

bodies. Authors such as Daniel Flemes, Detlef Nolte, and Randall Schweller challenge us to

view middle powers as catalyzers or facilitators of stability in international institutions as they

display a specific political approach of coalition building. Middle powers, just as the dominant

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power, have the ability to participate effectively in international institutions and stabilize the

world system.

The “free rider problem” is implicitly underscored in hegemonic stability theory in that

the smaller states bear none of the costs of provision and share fully in the benefits. Yet, middle

powers also bear costs for the price of maintaining stability. Middle powers constantly face costs

when they take into consideration domestic groups from their countries that fear undesired great

power influence in international institutions. In contrast to Charles Kindleberger’s work, Duncan

Snidal’s The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory maintains that the collective action problem is

impossible; it is in the best interests of states to reciprocate stability and cooperation, particularly

under the conditions of growing interdependence after the postwar years (1985: 594). Middle

powers attempt to strive in an environment where their fates are at the risk of being conditioned

by the policies of the dominant power. Charles Kindleberger’s The World in Great Depression,

1929-1939 and Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action declare that the most powerful

state, the hegemon, is forced to supply essential public goods and has the tendency of being

exploited by smaller states. Hegemonic stability theory emphasizes how the hegemon is the

“author” in providing stability. However, proponents of the theory neglect the weight that middle

powers carry in international institutions. Randall Schweller highlights a weakness of

Kindleberger and Olson’s point by asserting in The Concept of Middle Power, “middle powers

are neither mere pawns of great-power politics nor outright dependents of a great power” (2014:

2). They possess enough resources so that in a coalition with a number of other states, they can

have an aggregated affect on the international system through international institutions. Although

middle powers may lack overall leadership, they elicit stability in the global order by involving

other like-minded states in an attempt to arrive at a workable compromise, usually through

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institutions (Jordaan 2003:167). Therefore, taking into consideration of middle powers, the

hegemon is not the only state that faces costs from the “free rider problem” as purported by

hegemonic stability theory.

The hegemonic stability theory lacks a holistic view of states within the global order by

placing them in binary encampments. It asserts that that nations tend to align on the basis of

interests, – those that are satisfied, known as status quo states as opposed to those that are

dissatisfied, revisionist states. Yet, middle powers are neither status quo states nor revisionist

states. Middle powers differ from revisionist states in that they understand the constraints

enforced by the hegemon and carefully negotiate their own positions and behaviors within the

tolerable range. Additionally, revisionist states are likely to be more aggressive as they seek to

change the global order in terms of power. They also tend to be primarily concerned with their

own status and prestige above all other considerations, hoping to remodel the global order. As a

result, revisionist states are faced with their own survival, power, and security, which can often

lead to competition and conflict. Middle powers are fundamentally cautious agents, protecting

their domestic growth and sovereignty and displaying foreign policy measures that secure their

objectives. In this manner, middle powers frequently manage risk and uncertainty within

international institutions to secure the stability of global governance and maintain sufficient

bases of followership. Therefore, as the dynamic between states changes, so do the possible roles

and behaviors of middle powers (Krasner 1976: 318). Middle powers are not seeking to enhance

their relative power in the international system, but rather enforcing an atmosphere of security

for states in international institutions. More importantly, middle powers demonstrate a propensity

to promote stability in the world system in a way that does not challenge or threaten the global

status quo or seek to be the hegemon.

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By placing states in either camp, as hegemonic stability theory reasons, political scientists

are overlooking what middle powers can offer to the global order. The assumption that underlies

the theory is that a hegemon can enforce rules and norms unilaterally, avoiding the collective

goods problem. In The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Charles Kindleberger argues a

hegemonic power is not only needed to keep stability in the global system, but it also forms

global norms. In fact, he argues that there is no universally accepted standard of behavior for

small countries and that they lack power to affect the outcome of great events. Essentially,

Kindleberger asserts that the role of states, with the exception of the hegemon, are privileged to

look after their own private national interest rather than concern themselves with the public good

of stability in the world economy as a whole (1973: 300). Robert Gilpin’s War and Change in

World Politics reasons that subordinate states will accept their exploitation from the hegemon as

long as the costs of being exploited are less than the costs of overthrowing the hegemonic power

(1981:11). Gilpin also points out that all hegemons will decline in power because it is arduous to

maintain power. He further writes of how lesser states obey the commands of the dominant state

or states’ as a result of power and prestige. This may hold true for weak states, but middle

powers are not passive followers of the hegemon. Middle powers assert their own interests

through international institutions, thus resisting a passive nature in the world system. It is

through these bodies that middle powers institutionalize their preferred norms of global

governance, as they cannot maximize their bargaining power unilaterally. By taking on this

central form of international diplomacy, middle powers influence negotiations, advertise their

commitment to stability, and strengthen their image of global citizenship.

Many political science scholars have focused on the role of great powers in the

international institutions, but middle powers are playing a more prominent role in the global

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arena. Stephen Krasner’s State Power and the Structure of International Trade emphasizes the

dominant power and its tendency to use its superior status to structure the trading system to its

own advantage. Krasner also states that institutions alone cannot define stability of the global

order, through the hegemon, because “institutions created during periods of rising ascendancy

remained in operation when they were no longer appropriate” (1976:342-343). However, Eduard

Jordaan’s The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between

Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers retorts this claim by emphasizing that middle powers

are stabilisers and legitimisers of the world order, whether in times of hegemony or not. Middle

powers are assuming greater responsibility in the international system due to their ability to bring

about deep global change; they tend to mitigate endemic instability of military-political conflict

with stronger economic origins in international institutions (Jordaan 2003:169). James Scott,

Matthias vom Hau, and David Hulme build on this claim by stating that middle powers have the

ability to consolidate their economic position and assert their influence in the international

system through a regionally focused geo-economic and geopolitical strategy (2012:8). The

inclusion of middle powers in the understanding of global stability and international institutions

does not mean that the hegemon becomes irrelevant. Instead, recognizing the changing nature of

power among states points to the rising importance of how stability incorporates all “players of

the game”. GLOBAL ORDER & INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Hegemonic stability theory is limited to conditions that favor the position of the hegemon

in relation to the subordinate states. The theory is widely useful when two distinctive

propositions are simultaneously supported: the presence of a dominant state leads to greater

stability in the international system and this greater stability benefits all states in the system.

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However, the hegemon may show more than one perception that reveals their motives for

increased power, which drastically affects the stability of the global order. At times, a hegemon

can showcase coercive leadership or benevolent leadership (Snidal 1985: 588). In this manner,

hegemons have two different conceptions of how they are perceived in the world system.

Therefore, scholars such as Duncan Snidal challenge political observers to think of the

shortcomings of hegemonic stability theory, as it might be of use to analyze the posture of

middle powers in the world system with a hegemon. In Snidal’s The Limits of Hegemonic

Stability, he raises the possibility that the hegemonic actor has the ability to distribute costs

among states, which can alter the distribution of benefits to favor itself (1985:588). The hegemon

also needs institutions to legitimate their power over the hierarchical structure. Middle powers

help ensure system stability through the persistence of rules that characterize international

institutions, so that the hegemon can be observed in its distribution of power and capability over

the relevant issues.

Institutions are complemented by the explanatory variable of followership, which is

needed by both the hegemon and middle powers for the outcome of stability. For the stability

and effectiveness of international institutions, hegemonic states need institutions to sustain their

position in the global order, as well as distribute the responsibilities of leadership. Likewise,

middle powers define themselves staunchly by their participation in international institutions,

their capacity to mediate, and dissemination of interests. In Robert Keohane’s International

Institutions: Two Approaches, he asserts that at any point in time, transaction costs within the

global order are to a substantial degree the result of the institutional context (1988:386). In this

context, international stability is driven by communication, economic and political interaction,

and diplomacy among states within international institutions. Hegemonic stability theorist,

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Charles Kindleberger reasons, “an essential ingredient of followership is to convince the leader

that he is the author of the ideas that require the use of his resources” (1973:301). Therefore, the

hegemon, middle powers, and weak states need to work together to maintain global stability.

The diplomacy that middle powers utilize in international institutions propels stability is

drastically different from hegemonic diplomacy. As supported by hegemonic stability theory, the

hegemon will take the lead and overpower other states in the international system to enforce

international order. However, middle powers rely on each other for multilateral action to

promote their interests and security of the global order. Middle powers take responsibility of

stabilizing global consequences, despite their inferior status to the hegemon, by determining

strategies for consensus building. Robert Cox substantiates this claim by writing that middle

powers could be influential because they are “ not suspected of harboring intentions of

domination and…have resources sufficient to enable them to be functionally effective”

(1989:10). Middle powers need adequate networks with other states to can help foster stability

through international institutions. These networks will assist them to mediate, broker, and bridge

roles, and consequently, enhance their diplomatic influence in bringing stability to the

international system. EXPECTATIONS OF MIDDLE POWERS

Hegemonic stability theory holds that a hegemon can help resolve or at least keep in

check conflicts among middle powers or small states. As previously mentioned, the theory

misses a fundamental aspect – the significant role that middle powers can play in preserving

stability in the world system. Middle powers help stabilize and legitimize the global order

because they serve as mediators among states in conflict. They do not serve as a grouping of

idiosyncratic actors within international institutions. Middle powers are dedicated to “orderliness

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and security…as they often attempt to pre-empt, contain and resolve conflict between warring

parties” (Jordaan 2003: 169). Additionally, Randall Schweller’s The Concept of Middle Power

claims that middle powers have a unique place within international institutions where they can be

expected to display a specific pattern of statecraft that promotes international stability by serving

as bridge builders, international conflict managers, and facilitators of resolution activities

(2014:6). It is not just the hegemon that serves as the gatekeeper of stability. Schweller goes on

to say that middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to sustain global

order from those who could possibly threaten it, such as the hegemon or small powers. Because

middle powers are between the dominant power and subjected weak states in terms of influence,

they have the ability to serve as the diplomatic mediators of international institutions.

International institutions, through the efforts of middle powers, help constrain the

autonomy of the hegemon. Moreover, it is a result of institutions that there is a check and

balance of power and stability among all states, including the hegemon. Andrew Hurrell’s Paths

to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States supports this claim with “institutional

means, built on a global basis, remain the chosen route for engendering stability within the

international economic system” (2000:4). Institutions empower middle powers as well as provide

them the political space to create new coalitions that counter-balance contrasting preferences of

the dominant state. Additionally, middle powers take an initiative in international institutions

because it protects them with a predictable rules-based environment, where they have sufficient

capacity and credibility to partake in those tasks. As argued by Andrew Cooper and Daniel

Flemes in Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: An

Introductory Review, middle powers share similar characteristics on the need for rules and order

in multilateral institutions (2013:957). Middle powers have become a part of the equation of

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stability through the proliferation of multilateral and interregional coalitions such as BRICS,

IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), and the G20. Gary Goertz’s International Norms and

Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model claims that middle powers that engage in

coalitions are often successful in accomplishing their goals even when faced with great power

opposition (2003:185). This is due to a major initiative that comes from the middle powers to

assert their posture in international institutions, which gains backing from smaller states.

Moreover, when middle powers take a greater stance in international institutions, they hope to

gain international recognition and traction with other states.

The hegemon, United States, took leadership of sustaining global financial stability,

particularly after World War II. However, between World War I and World War II, there was an

absence of a world leader, resulting in economic chaos and the Great Depression. Hegemonic

stability theory, as supported by Charles Kindleberger, convincingly shows how the hegemon

develops and enforces the rules of the system. While the lack of a hegemon may have led to the

breakdown of global order in the 20th century, there is a newfound collaboration of states, led by

middle powers that attempt to prevent economic disorder in the 21st century. Empirically,

political science scholars observe the strength of middle powers in international institutions such

as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and International Monetary Fund. It is also

predicted among economists that middle powers in the G-20 will be able to stabilize the

international system due to their purchasing power and modernization. There is, evidently, a

more pluralistic nature of international order that includes the increasing economic and

demographic potential of the middle powers.

Middle powers have the ability to command the hegemon or dominant states to follow

institutional rules and provide them with the opportunities that prevent the overpowering of

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smaller states. Jeanne A.K. Hey raises the point in Small States in World Politics that “states are

deemed small not by an objective definition, but by their perceived role in the international

hierarchy” (2003:3). This enforces the stability of international institutions because middle

powers look out for smaller powers as to preserve their security according to the decision-

making procedures of the bodies. Middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey, and Canada have

understood that to project themselves as relevant actors to international institutions and stability,

they must build coalitions with one another. As a result, middle powers have greater bargaining

capacity and help to prevent unilateralism of major powers. Hegemonic stability theory falls

short in that it significantly focuses on the hegemon of the leader-follower relationship among

states. In engaging a wider theoretical debate over the nature of the hegemony, middle powers

challenge the notion of the theory to demonstrate the inadequacy of a leader-centered approach

to contemporary international politics.

INDIA AND THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE - 1955 Many of the international institutions established at the end of World War II have sought

to alleviate issues such as colonization, the end of the Cold War, environmental threats and

global poverty. However, very little has been altered in the basic structure of these global

institutions. The Bandung Conference, held from April 18–24, 1955, was important to India's

mentality on its position in the international arena, and subsequently, its United Nations policy

and aspirations. This was the first large scale conference organized by newly independent Asian

and African countries such as India, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Burma to advocate cultural

cooperation, international peace, and opposition to colonialism. The fight against colonialism

that India had to endure to gain independence pushed forth the Non-Alignment Movement. India

desired to be the master of its fate. Many of the non-aligned countries promoted the principles of

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self-determination, national independence, sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of States. In

Nehru’s speech to the Bandung Conference Political Committee on the status of global politics,

he boldly stated to the delegations, “So far as I am concerned, it does not matter what takes

place; we will not take part in it [blocs] unless we have to defend ourselves. If I join any of these

big groups I lose my identity.i” Moreover, Pakistan, Philippines, Iraq, and especially India,

struggled against imperialism, and opposed multilateral military alliances, apartheid, and the use

of force to solve international issues.

ii

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The Bandung Conference was pioneering in the fact that these smaller, although

population dense, countries advocated peaceful coexistence among all nations and

democratization of international relations. In his speech to the Bandung Conference participants,

Nehru urged countries to be aware of the unaligned area and how joining different camps or

alliances could lead to war. Unlike many Western countries, the countries that attended

the Banding Conference pushed for international cooperation on an equal footingiii. The Bandung

Conference was monumental in international politics because it was a milestone for Third World

countries to collaborate, discuss their political views, and insist that their recommendations play

a role in the world order.

By working alongside African countries, India emphasized the need for a positive

approach to all issues, particularly because the Afro-Asian group assumed new character and

power in the international system. Ms. Pandit attended the 18th Session of the General Assembly,

where she ascertained that there were opportunities available in which India could take a

prominent role in African and UN affairs with a clearly defined policy. India desired to be of

assistance to African countries because many nations were divided among themselves and

without common policies. Ms. Pandit writes, “We had abandoned no principles. We continued

pledged to the things we believe in. We wanted the closest co-operation with the African nations

but statesmanship demanded different methods of approach to world issues at different times”iv.

She also convinced African leaders at this session that India did not have an ulterior motive of

leadership, but rather had the desire to collaborate in the United Nations and outside with African

and Asian countries in establishing a new world order that valued freedom and equality of

opportunity for all without discrimination. However, Ms. Pandit not only calls for cooperation

between Asian and African countries, but also the initiative to voice their opinions. She writes, “I

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stressed the point that, we, the new nations, now had the responsibility of living up to the

statements we had made in the past. Soon our group would have the majority voice in the United

Nations and we must use our power to good purpose”v. Through Ms. Pandit’s words and

encouragement for African and Asian countries, many leaders began to look to India for

leadership in international cooperation at the United Nations.

The principles and spirit of the Non-Alignment Movement continued after the Bandung

Conference. The major leaders of the Non-Alignment Movement were Gamal Abdel Nasser of

Egypt, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia and

Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia; they later became the founding fathers of the movement.vi

Similar to the core of the Bandung Conference, the Non-Alignment Movement insisted that

countries should not be passive in the world system. Rather, the movement urged Third World

countries to have a voice in international politics and take concerted action. Based on India's

Ministry of External Affairs, "In 1960, in the light of the results achieved in Bandung, the

creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was given a decisive boost during the

Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the United Nations General Assembly, during which 17 new

African and Asian countries were admitted.vii” As the Non-Alignment Movement began to grow,

so did the number of Member States in the United Nations. These non-aligned countries began to

take more of a firm stance in international politics, specifically India. Similarly, these countries

made efforts to raise their voices so that the Great Powers’ voices were not the only ones being

listened to in the United Nations.

However, in 1971, India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with

the Soviet Union, which shocked various countries and bruised India’s reputation. It seemed to

other countries that India was taking a stance of alignment in international affairs, especially

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when it interfered in the affairs of neighboring countries from the 1970s to 1980s. A great

amount of debate that followed the Bandung Conference was categorizing Soviet policies in

Central Asia and Eastern Europe as the same as Western imperialism. Although there was

criticism of the signing of this treaty, Indo-Soviet relations began to gain momentum after Soviet

leaders visited India in 1955. In his speech to the Bandung Conference participants on major

blocs, Nehru asserted that he “belong[s] to neither and [I] propose to belong to neither whatever

happens in the world. If we have to stand alone, we will stand by ourselves, whatever happens

(and India has stood alone without any aid against a mighty Empire, the British Empire) and we

propose to face all consequences…”viii. Additionally, he argued that a relationship between

countries can survive without any trace of bloc politics or alliances. In fact, Nehru stated that

India does not agree with communist teaching or with anti-communist teachings. However, he

stated, “We have had their (Soviet leadership) goodwill and their good wishes all along…and

this is the consolation to use and we certainly hope to have that in the future”ix. At the core of the

Non-Alignment Movement, countries like India were not passive or neutral to global issues, but

rather took a stance for their values of cooperation and stability, and were willing to cooperate

with countries in good faith.

ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a relatively new multilateral financial

institution, was established to assist countries with their infrastructure challenges and needs

across Asia. The AIIB aims to stimulate growth and improve access to basic services by

emphasizing interconnectivity and economic development. Created in January 2016, the Beijing-

based bank provides infrastructural financing in the Asia-Pacific region, but is also seen as a

competitor to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, which are heavily Western

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dominated. With a total approved membership of 77 members, the president of AIIB, Jin Liqun,

has stated that he expects 85 members to be associated with the bank by the end of 2017 (Yao).

Some of the AIIB founding members to be highlighted are China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia,

Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Myanmar, the Philippines, Pakistan, Britain, Australia, Brazil

France, Germany, and Spain (Huang).

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Independent of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the China-led AIIB

and its founding members have the opportunity to set the rules for the bank. Of significant

importance, the United States has not decided to apply to be a member of AIIB, and instead,

continues its leadership with the IMF and World Bank. David Dollar asserts, “China’s initiatives

in Asia are seen in many quarters as a setback for the United States. The U.S. government

contributed to this narrative through its efforts to discourage allies from joining the new AIIB. In

the end, major American allies, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and South Korea, did

join the Chinese initiative, and Japan is seriously considering becoming a member. However, this

is likely to be a temporary diplomatic setback for the United States” (“The AIIB and the ‘One

Belt, One Road’”).

Though Christine Lagarde, chief of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stated that

the IMF would be happy to cooperate with the AIIB, there has been much frustration from the

United States over the creation of the bank. The Obama administration has raised potential issues

of the bank’s transparency, governance, and clashes with existing institutions such as the Asian

Development Bank. In Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South

Korea, it is argued that the Obama administration actively “dissuaded others from joining the

AIIB because it represents a direct challenge to existing norms of international governance on

the one hand, while Asian neighbors see a clear need for enhance infrastructure investment in the

region and a potentially useful niche role and justification for the establishment of the AIIB”

(Snyder 56). In response to the alternative narratives of AIIB, its key founder has emphasized

that AIIB would complement existing international institutions.

22

Middle powers, particularly in Asia, are emerging as vital fulcrums of stability. While

there are several middle powers that have benefited from the US-led international order, the

AIIB project has given them an opportunity to help “change the rules of the game” while

simultaneously supporting good governance. The AIIB project invites countries, particularly the

founding members, many of which are middle powers, to collaborate in writing the rules of the

bank and discuss new financial resources for development infrastructure projects.

GROUP OF TWENTY

Founded in 1999, the Group of Twenty or otherwise known as G-20 is comprised of

twenty members who seek to review and promote high-level talks of policy issues regarding

international financial stability. These countries include: Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, United

States, India, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, France, Germany, Italy,

23

United Kingdom, China, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. The G-20 has worked to enforce

financial regulations to prevent financial crises, promote cooperation on tax issues and financial

transparency, and collaborate on vital challenges such as climate change and global health

security.

There has been a growing consensus that middle powers have been excluded from global

gatherings for an extended period until the elevation of the G20 in 2008. Though the G20 is large

in terms of size, middle powers have the opportunity to become significant beneficiaries to the

group. In “The G20 and Contested Global Governance: BRICS, Middle Powers, and Small

States,” it is argued that “middle powers and smaller states, with a greater sense of the stakes

involved concerning ‘hub institutionalization, have a much greater incentive to actively engage

with the G20” (Cooper 1). Cooper goes on to assert that middle powers in the group utilize and

leverage their agency through efforts such as coalitions, ad hoc groupings, and expert/working

group tracks. With a group as large as twenty, deadlocks and contested global governance are

often visible. However, the dynamics of middle powers in the G20 allows for them to have a

“political opportunity structure…to gain traction in terms of setting strategic priorities within the

G20 on niche issues as well as to provide a mediatory role in diffusing conflict arising from

geopolitical system structural shifts” (Cooper 11). Through diplomacy, middle powers can take

on an increasing role by taking initiative with other like-minded countries to yield and

recommend new issues for the G20 agenda as well as raise solutions. The current international

landscape necessitates the role of middle powers to take a bigger role in this interconnected

world.

24

One of the main issues that the G-20 takes up is tackling the effects of climate change.

Aside from working together to help bring the Paris Agreement into action in 2016, G-20

members have sustained momentum on climate action by promoting energy efficiency and

working with the private sector to address climate change. A leader in tackling the climate

change issue under the Obama administration, the United States’ efforts in this arena are now in

jeopardy as evidenced by the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris

climate accord. This major break from international partners from the landmark agreement will

isolate the United States in the collaborative effort to curb global warming. In fact, the United

States’ reversal from the Paris climate accord puts itself at odds with the other 194 member states

25

that signed onto the agreement. Despite the United States’ pledge to remove itself from the

accord, other countries, particularly middle powers, have stepped up to prove their commitment

to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Many leaders, such as Prime Minister Narendra Modi of

India, have spoken out to assert and reaffirm the highest level of commitment to the accord, as

well as to pledge that they would go above and beyond to combat climate change. Middle

powers have the opportunity to exercise cooperative leadership while constructively addressing

the new political, financial paths posed by the Trump administration and creating a more

inclusive and progressive international system. CONCLUSION

One of the great debates in the field of international relations centers on the purpose of

international institutions and its role in global stability. Middle powers do not have the military

power or economic might to assume a hegemon position in the world system. Yet, as argued by

Eduard Jordaan, middle powers self-interests derive from a deeper level, one that emphasizes

stability, controllability, and progress in their economic status. Essentially, middle powers

legitimize the global order by utilizing and asserting themselves through international

organizations, relying on the authority afforded by these institutions in order to manage and

maintain the prevailing world order (Jordaan 2003:169). Suspended between the hegemon and

small states in the global order, middle powers encourage stability by facilitating conversations

of collaboration in international institutions.

To an extent, hegemonic stability theory does accurately describe the hegemon’s

behavior in the international system as evidenced in Charles Kindleberger and Stephen Krasner’s

works. Yet, some scholars such as Eduard Jordaan, Randall Schweller, and Detlef Nolte argue

that the validity of hegemonic stability theory has diminished due to the rise of multiple actors in

26

international institutions. At the same time, middle powers is an ever-changing concept and it is

difficult to extrapolate how they will interact with the hegemon and in international institutions.

Nonetheless, with a rise of middle powers taking initiative in international institutions, the

hegemon must account for other states in sharing the costs of leadership.

Hegemonic stability theorists neglect the consideration the role of middle powers within

the global order as an agent for stability. In the context of current political events, middle powers

are gaining more ground within international institutions as they emphasize coalition building

and multilateral frameworks. Randall Schweller highlights that at the international systemic

level, middle power have made significant strides in their pursuit of promoting global stability by

putting “themselves forward as champion of anti-colonial, racial, and economic justice”

(2014:3). Political observers now notice the rise of middle powers as evidenced by the emphasis

of cooperation through the efforts of the Bandung Conference, Asian Infrastructure Investment

Bank, and G20. Now more than ever before, middle powers should neither be underestimated

when it comes to the value of reinforcing stability in the international system or a force for good

in leading collaborative efforts. Essentially, middle powers possess a unique vantage point in the

international system and international relations today as proactive multilateralists for stability.

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