final stats paper proofed

8/3/2019 Final Stats Paper Proofed

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ASSESSING THE BASIS FOR TEA PARTY SUPPORT:

SOCIAL IDENTITY,POLITICAL PREFERENCES OR SPECIFIC ATTITUDES

Clint SwiftUniversity of Missouri


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INTRODUCTION:

There are two prominent schools of thought on what makes for the basis of partisan

attachment. The first views partisan attachment as a rational choice based on policy

preferences (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006). The other, in

line with Campbell et al (1960), eschews a deliberative process rooted in preferences in

favor of an explanation that takes partisanship as deeply rooted in social identity (Green,

Palmquist and Schickler 2002). The rise of the Tea Party since the 2008 presidential

election provides us with an interesting opportunity to expand our understanding of what

leads individuals to support relevant political organizations with explicit electoral

aspirations.

The question that this paper seeks to address expands upon the literature

mentioned above by attempting to identify the antecedents to political support for the Tea

Party. The social identity hypothesis of partisanship advanced by Green, Palmquist and

Schickler (2002) suggests that individuals decide which party to support based on the

kinds of social groups that they perceive to be associated with the parties. They then select

a party that has an associated social identity most closely aligned with their own. Although

the Tea Party may have certain features in common with political parties

they run

candidates in elections and are not explicitly bound to any single issue or group of issues

they cannot easily be forced to fit into the social identity hypothesis for a few reasons.


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supporters and established social identities.1 Second, if we attempt to discern the kinds of

social groups represented by the Tea Party we necessarily resort to associating with it

those groups who we perceive as being closest to its political outlook. It essence we resort

to political preferences as a shortcut to allotting the Tea Party with a base social identity.

Finally, because of the Tea Partys functional inclusion within the Republican Party it would

be difficult to distinguish those social identities associated with the latter from the former.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES:

These considerations point us towards an approach to understanding support for

the Tea Party not in terms of social identity but in terms of political preferences. This

constitutes the initial hypothesis of this paper:

H1A: General indicators of political preferences better explain support for the

Tea Party among Democrats, Republicans and Independents than indicators of

social identity.

In other words, when general political preferences are taken into account, social identity

does not play a role in determining Tea Party support. This expectation not only follows

from specific considerations about the Tea Party but also from previous research on

partisanship more generally. Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) have found, using ANES

data from 2004, that ideology is more strongly associated with party identification than is

social identity. H1A articulates the expectation that this relationship is extended to Tea

Party support as well.


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The second hypothesis of this paper posits thatspecific attitudes on salient political

issues provide more explanatory power than measures of general preferences in regards to

Tea Party support:

H1B: Specific Political Attitudes better explain support for the Tea Party amongDemocrats, Republicans and Independents than indicators of general

preference or social identity.

This hypothesis is derived from the presumption that general political preferences are

summations of specific attitudes. Considering this, as determinants of Tea Party support

specific political attitudes should provide a more comprehensive explanation. The

expectation is that when these measures of specific attitudes are introduces, the effects of

general preferences will no longer be significant.

Our confidence in these first two hypothesesis bolstered by the fact that Tea Party

support is not distributed evenly among partisans. Table 1 shows a strong linear

relationship between partisanship and affective evaluations of the Tea Party. Since party is

so strongly associated with ideological self-placement (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006), it

is reasonable to propose that Tea Party support will follow a similar pattern.

The apparent association in Table 1 might lead us to believe that any relationship

between attitudes and Tea Party support is simply a spurious to partisanship. However,

there are two reasons to doubt this interpretation. First, as previously noted, research has


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organizations have not been shy in criticizing the Republican Party. In fact, the numerous

high-profile Tea Party challenges to incumbent Republicans in the 2010 congressional

primaries would indicate a degree of opposition between the two. This would cast doubt on

the claim that strong Republicans are more than likely strong Tea Party supporters. When

these two groups are in conflict, what determines support for one over the other? This

paper asserts that party is in fact spurious to attitudes, as indicated by the causal map in

Figure 1.

That party may be spurious to attitudes, however, does not mitigate the fact that

nearly three-quarters of Tea Party supporters identify as Republicans. That supporters are

so highly concentrated within the Republican Party and that the parties display significant

differences in preferences and attitudes necessitate an additional set of hypotheses. These

hypotheses mirror the initial set, except that the unit of analysis shifts from all respondents

to only Republican respondents:

H2A: General indicators of political preferences better explain support for the

Tea Party among Republicans than indicators of social identity.

H2B: Specific Political Attitudes better explain support for the Tea Party among

Republicans than indicators of general preference or social identity.

In these hypotheses the expectation is that the patterns observed among the

population as a whole are similarly reflected among only Republicans. In other words, Tea

P t t R bli i f t f liti l f t i l id tit d


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This analysis will utilize the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study along with the ANES

2010 Panel Recontact Survey. These studies were internet based surveys conducted by the

American National Election Studies (ANES) between January of 2008 and July of 2010. The

initial panel study contained a total of 21 monthly waves from January 2008 to September

2009. The 2010 recontact contained a single wave occurring in June and July of 2010;

these data were matched and merged to the 2008-2009 data using the unique case

identifier corresponding to individual respondents across the whole period of the study.

Of the first 21 waves, 10 were constructed by ANES and primarily contained

politically relevant questions. The remainder of the waves were constructed by third party

researchers and covered a variety of non-political subject matter. This analysis will only

draw from data obtained in the 10 initial ANES waves and the one additional recontact

wave.

The 2008-2009 study contains two cohorts, the first of which (cohort 1) was

recruited by telephone in late 2007. Cohort 2 was recruited using the same methodology in

the summer of 2008. The initial telephone samples were obtained using a stratified

random-digit-dialing methodology meant to provide a representative sample of U.S.

citizens with landline phone numbers, age 18 and older as of the 2008 presidential election

(DeBell, Krosnick and Lupia 2010, 18).

Potential respondents were offered $10 per month to complete each wave of the

Th d t i l d d i th t d h did t t h


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January of 2008. Cohort 2 was added to the study in the ninth wave in September of 2008.

Table 1 shows the per-wave number of respondents for ANES waves.

Dependent Variable:

The dependent variable in this analysis is the degree of affective support for the tea

party, derived from a single question in the 2010 recontact wave. This variable is measured

as a seven-point ordinal scale ranging from dislike a great deal (1) to like a great deal

(7). Table two shows the distribution of responses for the dependent variable.

Although it may be more logically consistent to infer that attitudes shape the degree

of tea party support, previous research has indicated that partisan affiliation can also shape

attitudes (see for example: Bartels, 2002 and Gerber, Huber and Washington, 2010). This

analysis does not treat tea party support as a kind of party identification, however the

potential effects of participation in Tea Party activities and even a loose affiliation with Tea

Party groups or representatives may be expected to parallel those accompanying party

identification. Measuring the dependent variable in the final wave of the ANES study

allows us to lag the independent variables and control for any potential reverse causality.

Independent Variables:

The social identity variables include the demographics age, gender, religion, region

d h bl f d d l l d d


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The primary explanatory variables used in this analysis measure general

political preferences and specific politically relevant attitudes. General political preferences

are measured using the standard 7-point ideology self-placements scale as well as a 7-point

scale examining support for candidate Obama (measured at wave 10).

Political attitude variables are grouped into four categories: social, racial, economic,

and security attitudes. Each category contains a series of variables based on relevant

questions in the ANES survey about general political attitudes or opinions based on specific

salient policy issues.

Social attitudes are measured based on opinions on three salient social issues: gay

marriage, firearms laws (specifically, conceal and carry permits) and abortion. The first

two of these variables are measured using responses to a single question coded along the

seven-point favor/oppose scale. Attitudes on abortion are measured using an eight-point

additive index of pro-life attitudes based on responses to questions that asked whether

abortion should be legal under several different circumstances. Respondents receive a

value of zero (0) if they answer that abortion should be legal under all seven circumstances

and a value of seven (7) if it should be illegal under all circumstances.

Racial attitudes are measured using four variables that assess the respondents

support for affirmative action programs, views on the current degree of racial

discrimination, amnesty for illegal immigrants and an attribution of inequality scale. The

fi t th i bl d ith di l l b d t i l


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The attribution of inequality scale is an additive index based on responses to eight

questions that ask respondents how important certain considerations are for explaining

the income gaps between blacks and whites.4 Four of the eight questions identify

considerations that speak to inherent differences between the races (e.g. blacks have less

ability or god made blacks and whites differently), whereas the other four identify

systemic or institutional considerations (e.g. persistent employment discrimination or

government policy). The variables are measured along a five-point ordinal scale with

possible responses ranging from very important to not at all important. The first set of

variables were coded so that the not at all responses equal zero (0) and the very

important ones equal four (4). The second set was coded in the inverse order. The values

of these variables were summed into a 32-point additive scale where higher perceived

inherent racial differences for inequality received higher scores.

The economic attitudes category contains three variables meant to measure

different dimensions of politically relevant economic views. The first variable measures

support for increased taxation on individuals in the upper income bracket (making

$200,000 a year or more). This variable is measured on a seven-point ordinal scale ranging

from favor a great deal (1) to oppose a great deal (7). The second variable in this group

ascertains views on the provision of government services, where respondents are asked

whether the federal government should provide more or less services than they currently

d Thi i bl i d i t di l l i f l t (1)


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Attitudes on national security are measured using three variables that examine

support for the suspension of habeas corpus protections for suspected terrorists, court

order requirements for obtaining wire-taps on suspected terrorists and a deadline for

withdrawing troops from Iraq. These three variables are all measured using the seven-

point favor/oppose scale.

FINDINGS:

Not surprisingly, Tea Party supporters do appear to be distinct from the rest of the

population in terms of both political preferences and attitudes as well as in terms of some

measures of social identity. Figures 2a and 2b compare Tea Party supporters to the rest of

the population along these two dimensions.

As figure 2a indicates, the Tea Party supporter contingent contains statistically

significant fewer women, Blacks and Catholics from the rest of the population. The only

groups identified by these findings as being more strongly represented within the Tea

Party supporter contingent are Southerners. These findings largely hold true even when

Tea Party supporters are only compared to Republicans, the one exception being for

Blacks5. However, a number of social identities fail to yield statistically significant

differences, including Latinos, Jews, those with college degrees and the wealthy. Thus,

figure 2a presents us with some indications that Tea Party support may in fact be a

f ti f i l id tit t t h th i (H )


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have been standardized so that positive numbers indicate more conservative mean

responses. All of the differences shown in attitudes and political preferences are

statistically significant.6 Unlike with the social identity distinctions, figure 2b shows across

the board differences in both comparison groups. Although these findings provide support

for this papers hypotheses, a more thorough tests that that examines these variables

combined effect is necessary.

Table 4a7 reports the results of OLS models where social identity, political

preference and attitude variables are regressed on Tea Party support for all respondents.

Model 1 in table 4a shows the results when only social identity variables are included. This

models reports that all of the social identity variables save age and income are

significant and together explain a little less than 12 percent of the variation in Tea Party

support (R2 = .117). However, when we introduce political ideology into the model, the

variables for Southerners and Catholics are no longer significant and the R2 more than

triples (.371).8 When we introduce the level of support for candidate Obama into the model

(model 3), virtually all of the social identity variables become insignificant except for

Protestantism and level of education. Models 1 through 3 in table 4a clearly demonstrate

that indicators of political preference perform better in predicting Tea Party support than

the social identity variables, confirming H1A.


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To testH1B, model 4 introduces the variables measuring specific political attitudes.

In model 4, Protestantism remains (marginally) significant while income replaces

education in significance. All other measures of social identity do not reach traditional

levels of significance. All of the coefficients for the attitude variables are in the expected

direction and eight of the thirteen are statistically significant. If we examine them by

groups we find that three of the four racial attitude variables, two of the three economic

variables and two of the three national security variables are significant. Only one of the

social attitude variables is statistically significant. Although the introduction of the attitude

variables reduces the magnitude of the preference variables to a great extent, both

preference variables remain significant. In terms of H1B, these findings are not entirely

conclusive and thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis that preferences matter at least as

much as attitudes when we consider the entire population.

The results that we find when we consider only the Republicans within the sample

are significantly different from those in table 4a. Table 4b shows the OLS results on the

Republican sample. The social identity model (model 5) indicates that Tea Party supporters

are more likely to be male and protestant than other Republicans, but show no statistically

significant differences on any of the other social identity variables. When we introduce

ideology, Protestantism is no longer significant while the variable for Black respondents is.

Th i t d ti thi i l i bl ith d l 2 i th R 2 i ifi tl i


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findings of models 5 through 7 strongly indicate that Tea Party support among Republicans

is a better explained by political preferences than social identity, confirming H2A.

The introduction of the attitude variables in model 8 do not alter this general finding

however, it does change the significance of the social identity variables. When controlling

for attitudes we find that gender is no longer significant but religion is (both Protestantism

and Catholicism). The pattern of significant groups of attitudes largely reflects that in

model 4 except that none of the national security attitudes are significant. This would seem

to indicate that attitudes on national security do not constitute a significant consideration

for Tea Party support among Republicans. More interestingly, model 8 shows that when

attitudes are controlled for, political ideology is no longer significant. This finding strongly

supports H2B and indicates Republicans and Tea Party supporters are differentiated by

their attitudes on specific issues more than they are by their self-reported political

ideologies.

CONCLUSIONS:

The analysis undertaken in this paper indicates that Tea Party support, like

partisanship (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006), is more a function of political preferences

than social identity. Furthermore, there are indications that among Republicans the

group within which most Tea Party supporters are found a specific set of political

attitudes accounts for Tea Party support. Although not related to a central hypothesis of


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Table 5 presents standardized coefficients for the significant preference and

attitude variable in models 4 and 8 so that we can more precisely compare the magnitudes

of each variables effects to one another. These standardized coefficients indicate that in

both models the economic attitude variables are some of the most potent indicators of Tea

Party support. When looking at the entire sample, they are the strongest coefficients among

the attitude variables. For the Republican sample they are joined by attitudes regarding

conceal and carry permits and granting amnesty to undocumented immigrants. The most

interesting finding in table 5 however is that support for candidate Obama out performs

every other variable in both models. That this holds true even when ideology and specific

attitudes are accounted for is somewhat puzzling. This indicates that support for Obama

encompasses some aspect of Tea Party support that is not controlled for in the model.

Because this variable is measured prior to the 2008 election, it cannot be related to any

specific policies that President Obama has instituted since his inauguration. It is possible

that candidate Obama espoused some specific policy proposals in the campaign that Tea

Party supporters were particularly opposed to and were not accounted for in the attitude

variables in the model. Another possibility is that some dimension of race attitudes is being

measured via support for candidate Obama that is not being accurately measured in the

variables already included. The specific orientation towards candidate Obama among Tea

Party supporters that is apparent in this analysis certainly deserves additional scholarly

f


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WORKS CITED:

Abramowitz, Alan and Kyle Saunders. 2006. Exploring the Bases of Partisanship in theAmerican Electorate: Social Identity vs, Ideology. Political Research Quarterly 2(June 2006): 175-187.

Bartels, Larry. 2002. Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions.Political Behavior 24: 11750.

Campbell, Angue, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1960. The American

Voter. New York: Wiley.

DeBell, Matthew, Jon A. Krosnick, and Arthur Lupia. 2010. Methodology Report and UsersGuide for the 20082009 ANES Panel Study. Palo Alto, CA, and Ann Arbor, MI:Stanford University and the University of Michigan.

DeBell, Matthew, Vincent Hutchings, Simon Jackman, and Gary Segura. 2010. Methodology

Report and Users Guide for the ANES 2010 Panel Recontact Survey. Palo Alto, CA, andAnn Arbor, MI:Stanford University and the University of Michigan.

Downs, Anthony. 1957.An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven,CT: Yale University Press.

Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, Ebonya Washington. 2010. "Party Affiliation,Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment."American Political ScienceReview104 (4 November): 720-744.


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Figure 1: Hypothesized Causal Relationship between

Partisanship, Political Attitudes and Tea Party Support.

N = 1545

*Parties included leaners.

Note: Correlation for 7-point scales: r = .578, p < .001

Table 1: Affective Evaluation of the Tea Party By Partisanship*

Democrats Independents Republicans

Vie

wofTheTea

Party

Favorable 6.5% 2.6% 52.0%

(47) (34) (344)

Neutral 37.3% 56.4% 38.2%

(268) (93) (253)

Unfavorable 56.1% 23.0% 9.8%(403) (38) (65)

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

(718) (165) (662)


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Table 2: Per-Wave Respondents (ANES Waves only)

Wave N

January 2008 (Wave 1) 1,623

February 2008 (Wave 2) 1,457

June 2008 (Wave 6) 1,420

September 2008 (Wave 9) 2,586

October 2008 (Wave 10) 2,628

November 2008 (Wave 11) 2,665

January 2009 (Wave 13) 2,543

May 2009 (Wave 17) 2,389

July 2009 (Wave 19) 2,313

August 2009 (Wave 20) 2,273

June-July 2010 (Recontact Wave)a

1,561

Source: Table reproduced from DeBell, Krosnick and Lupia (2010, p. 7)a

N for the 2010 recontact is from DeBell, Hutchings, Jackman and

Segura (2010)

Table 3: Support for the Tea Party

Frequency Percent

-3. Dislike A Great Deal 338 21.5

-2. Dislike A Moderate Amount 131 8.3

-1. Dislike A Little 45 2.9

0. Neither Like Nor Dislike 626 39.8

1. Like A Little 63 4

2. Like A Moderate Amount 183 11.6

3. Like A Great Deal 188 11.9

Total 1574 100.0


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Figure 2a: Comparing the Social Identity of Tea Party Supporters.Note: Positive numbers indicate larger portion among Tea Party supporters.

*Difference is statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed). Chi-squared tests.g

Expected cell count for at least one cell was less than 5 for Chi-squared test.

Figure 2b: Comparing The Percent Difference in Mean Responses of Tea Party Supporters.*

Note: Positive numbers indicate more conservative mean Tea Party response.

-17.1*

-8.4*

-2.2

-5.1*

-0.8

9.1*

-2.6

3.7

-15.3*

-0.3g

-1.5

-7.9*

-0.3

8.9*

2.51.4

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

Female Black Latino Catholic Jewish Southerners College

Degree

Income

$100K+

PercentDiferenceinMeanResponse

Tea Party Supporters vs. All OthersTea Party Supporters vs Other Republicans

21.3

13.1

26.9

24

33.2

26.8

13

6.3

18.6

11.8

17.6

9

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

rcentDiferencein

MeanResponse

Tea Party Supporters vs. All Others

Tea Party Supporters vs Other Republicans


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Table 4A: OLS results for predictors of Tea Party Support. Social Identity, General Political

Preferences and Specific Political Attitudes for All Respondents.

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4B SE B SE B SE B SE

Age -.007 (.004) -.008** (.003) -.006 (.003) -.003 (.003)

Male .527*** (.103) .204* (.089) .159 (.083) -.064 (.093)

Black -1.253*** (.208) -.790*** (.178) -.315 (.170) .037 (.203)

Latino -.536* (.250) -.436* (.211) -.171 (.198) -.007 (.218)

Protestant .962*** (.120) .316** (.106) .236* (.099) .283* (.110)

Catholic .523*** (.140) .050 (.120) .049 (.113) .210 (.126)

South .321** (.112) .122 (.096) .104 (.090) -.004 (.099)

Income .011 (.014) -.012 (.012) -.008 (.011) -.035** (.013)

Education -.214*** (.033) -.096** (.029) -.066* (.027) -.022 (.031)

Ideology -- -- .553*** (.024) .338*** (.027) .116** (.036)

Obama -- -- -- -- .340*** (.025) .182*** (.031)

Gay Marriage -- -- -- -- -- -- .019 (.025)

Conceal and Carry Permit -- -- -- -- -- -- -.080*** (.020)

Abortion -- -- -- -- -- -- .006 (.024)

Amnesty -- -- -- -- -- -- .041 (.021)

Affirmative Action -- -- -- -- -- -- .064* (.026)

Amount of Discrimination -- -- -- -- -- -- .127* (.056)

Attribution of Inequality -- -- -- -- -- -- .048*** (.012)

Tax the Rich -- -- -- -- -- -- .106*** (.025)

Government Services -- -- -- -- -- -- .023 (.031)

Business Regulation -- -- -- -- -- -- .112*** (.026)

Habeas Protection -- -- -- -- -- -- -.052* (.023)

Wire Tapping -- -- -- -- -- -- .005 (.022)

Iraq Deadline -- -- -- -- -- -- .070** (.024)

(Constant) 1.573*** (.409) 1.080** (.350) -.189 (.340) -1.029* (.449)

N 1383 1357 1357 931

R2

.117 .371 .449 .570

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p< .05.


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Table 4B: OLS results for predictors of Tea Party Support. Social Identity, General Political

Preferences and Specific Political Attitudes for Republicans Only.

Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8

B SE B SE B SE B SEAge .007 (.005) .004 (.005) .004 (.004) -.001 (.005)

Male .446** (.135) .349** (.13) .350** (.124) .109 (.144)

Black -1.655 (.916) -1.875* (.883) -.938 (.846) -1.144 (.989)

Latino -.150 (.392) -.199 (.378) .114 (.360) .519 (.478)

Protestant .463* (.182) .312 (.177) .319 (.168) .619** (.193)

Catholic .03 (.206) -.008 (.199) .088 (.189) .454* (.221)

South .234 (.143) .198 (.138) .167 (.131) .080 (.144)

Income .006 (.020) .000 (.019) .004 (.018) -.027 (.020)

Education -.030 (.044) -.045 (.043) -.019 (.041) -.011 (.049)

Ideology -- -- .339*** (.050) .191*** (.051) .032 (.064)

Obama -- -- -- -- .287*** (.036) .147** (.044)

Gay Marriage -- -- -- -- -- -- .073 (.043)

Conceal and Carry Permit -- -- -- -- -- -- -.089** (.032)

Abortion -- -- -- -- -- -- -.010 (.035)

Amnesty -- -- -- -- -- -- .082* (.032)

Affirmative Action -- -- -- -- -- -- .099* (.048)

Amount of Discrimination -- -- -- -- -- -- .165 (.087)

Attribution of Inequality -- -- -- -- -- -- .040* (.020)

Tax the Rich -- -- -- -- -- -- .090* (.035)

Government Services -- -- -- -- -- -- .101* (.049)

Business Regulation -- -- -- -- -- -- .095* (.041)

Habeas Protection -- -- -- -- -- -- -.048 (.032)

Wire Tapping -- -- -- -- -- -- -.001 (.031)

Iraq Deadline -- -- -- -- -- -- -.023 (.039)

(Constant) .325 (.552) .311 (.531) -.949 (.528) -1.826* (.708)

N 578 578 578 391

R

2

.058 .129 .217 .396*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p< .05.


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22

Variable Name Question Measurement Wave(s)

BizReg Do you think the U.S. federal government should do more to

influence how businesses operate in this country, should the

federal government do less to influence businesses, or should the

government do about what it's doing now to influence

businesses?

7-point scale (-3 = A lot more, 3 = A lot less)

11

Habeasa

Imagine that the U.S. government suspects a person in the United

States of being a terrorist. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor

nor oppose the government being able to put this person in prison

for months without ever bringing the person to court and charging

him or her with a crime?

7-point scale (-3 =Favor a great deal, 3 = Oppose a great deal)

1 and 10

WireTapa

Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S.government being required to get a court order before it can listen

in on phone calls made by American citizens who are suspected of

being terrorists?


1 and 10

IraqDeadline Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose setting a

deadline for withdrawing all U.S. troops from Iraq?


10

Male Dummy ( 1 = Male, 0 = Female) 1 and 9

Age Age on Nov 2, 2008. 1 and 9

Black Dummy ( 1 = Black, 0 = Non-Black) 1 and 9Latino Dummy ( 1 = Latino, 0 = Non-Latino) 1 and 9

Protestant Dummy ( 1 = Protestant 0 = Non-Protestant) 1 and 9

Catholic Dummy ( 1 = Catholic 0 = Non-Catholic) 1 and 9

South State of residence recoded into regions according to Census

regions (top code)

Dummy ( 1 = South 0 = Non-South)

1 and 9

Income 19-point scale:

1 - less than $5,000

2 - $5,000 to $7,4993 - $7,500 to $9,999

4 - $10,000 to $12,499

5 - $12,500 to $14,999

6 - $15,000 to $19,999

7 - $20,000 to $24,999

8 - $25,000 to $29,999

9 - $30,000 to $34,999

10 - $35,000 to $39,999

11 - $40,000 to $49,999

12 - $50,000 to $59,99913 - $60,000 to $74,999

14 - $75,000 to $84,999

15 - $85,000 to $99,999

16 - $100,000 to $124,999

17 - $125,000 to $149,999

18 - $150,000 to $174,999

19 - $175,000 or more 1 and 9


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23

Variable Name Question Measurement Wave(s)

Educ 14-point scale:

1 - No schooling completed

2 - Nursery School to 4th grade

3 - 5th or 6th grade

4 - 7th or 8th grade

5 - 9th grade

6 - 10th grade

7 - 11th grade

8 - 12th grade No Diploma

9 - High School Graduate

10 - Some college, no degree

11 - Associate degree

12 - Bachelor's degree

13 - Master's degree

14 - Professional or Doctorate

degree 1 and 9

final stats paper proofed

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