ExplainingGermany’srefugeepolicychangein2015usingKingdon’sMultipleStreamFramework;incomparisonwiththeNetherlands

APRIL26,2017

KathinkaLuisaGaessStudentnumbers1723820Supervisor:Prof.Dr.J.VoorhoeveSecondreader: Dr. A. AfonsoMasterThesisinPublicAdministrationSpecialization:InternationalandEuropeanGovernanceFacultyofGovernanceandGlobalAffairsUniversityofLeiden

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Executivesummary

ThisresearchexplorestheextenttowhichKingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework(MSF)explains

thedifferenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsduring2015.Both

countrieshadbeenconductingrestrictiveasylumpoliciesduringthepast20years.However, in

2015,atthepeakoftheEuropeanrefugeecrisis,Germanyabruptlytransformeditsapproachto

refugeesintoanopen-doorpolicywhiletheNetherlandscontinuedwithitsrestrictiveapproach.

This ledtoaremarkabledifference in thenumberofasylumseekersbothcountriesreceived in

2015;adivergencewhichservedasapointofdepartureforthisresearch.Thispapermainlyfocuses

on the case study ofGermany’s asylumpolicy. However,my findings are being compared to a

synchronicanalysisoftheDutchrefugeepolicybymycolleagueLuciaOverpelt.

Inordertoexplainthedifferentdevelopmentswithregardtopolicychange,Kingdon’sMultiple

StreamsFrameworkwasappliedtobothcases.However,throughoutthestudyitbecameapparent

thattheMSFshowsflawsinexplainingpolicychangeundercertaincircumstances.Hence,rather

thansimplyapplying themodel, thispaperalso tests themodel.TheMSFwasapplied to three

decisivepolicydecisionsoftheGermangovernmentin2015whichreflectapolicychange.Thedata

wascollectedwiththeapplicationoftheprocess-tracingmethod.

InmyGermancasestudy,thefindingsrevealedthattheMSFcanexplainthechangeinGermany’s

asylumpolicyonlytoa limitedextent.Althoughitcorrectlydescribesagendasetting,themodel

fails to consider important contextual circumstances and interrelationships. TheMSF does not

include decisionmaking in a crisis situation, nor does it consider policy-making in amulti-level

structure like the EU. Additionally, it fails to recognize that different actors, e.g. the German

Chancellor,influencethepolicy-makingprocessthroughtheirinteractionandverbalpower.After

comparingthosefindingstotheNetherlands,itbecameclearthatthemodelfailstoexplainsimilar

elementsfortheDutchcase,eventhoughtheNetherlandsexperiencedalowerlevelofcrisisand

nopolicychange.ThisledtotheconclusionthattheMSFdoesnotadequatelyexplainthedifference

intheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015,becauseitlackscrucial

factorsof contextand interactionwhicharenecessary tobe includedwhen researchingpolicy-

makingandpolicychangeinbothcasestudies.Therefore,itisrecommendedtoadjustthecurrent

MSFaccordinglyortodevelopanewmodelforpolicychangewhichtakesthemissingelements

intoaccount.

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DeclarationofAuthorship IherebydeclarethatthisMasterthesistitled‘ExplainingGermany’srefugeepolicychangein2015

using Kingdon’s Multiple Stream Framework; in comparison with the Netherlands’ has beendevelopedasafinalpaperforobtainingaMasterdegreeinPublicAdministrationattheUniversity

ofLeiden,theNetherlands.TheresearchprocesshasbeensupervisedbyProf.Dr.JorisVoorhoeve.

Iherebyconfirmthat IhaveauthoredthisMasterthesis independently;withoutexternalhelp. I

declare that the researchmaterialhasbeendulyaccredited in the reportand thatallpassages

whicharegenerallyorliterallyretrievedfrompublicationsandotherresourcesaremarkedassuch.

DenHaagApril26,2017

Dedicationandwordsofacknowledgement

Thisthesisisdedicatedtomyparents,StephanieandHanno.Forsupportingmeallmylifeandfor

havingsparkedandnurturedmypoliticalinterest.

IwouldliketothankKenvanMastrigtforsupportingme,bearingwithmeandbeingthereatany

moment; Lucia Overpelt for being a great partner in crime and for going through this process

togetherfromthebeginninguntiltheveryend;Prof.Dr.JorisVoorhoeveforinspiring,guidingand

supervisingmeinthisthesisprocess;VasileiosKarakasisforallthosehoursoftechnical,scientific

andmental support; StephanieGaess and JanetAnderson for borrowing their timeandbrains;

MartinaBelevaforallthosesharedlibraryandcoffeehours.LastbutnotleastIwouldliketothank

myfriendsandmysisterwhohavealwaysbeenpatientandsupportive.Thankyou.

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TableofContents.................................................................................................................................... 1

.................................................................................................................................... 1

.................................................................................................................................... 1 Executive summary .......................................................................................................................... 2 Declaration of Authorship ................................................................................................................. 3 Dedication and words of acknowledgement ...................................................................................... 3 List of Figures ................................................................................................................................... 6 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................... 6

1. | Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................... 7 1.1. Thematic overview ............................................................................................................... 7 1.2. Methodological aspects ....................................................................................................... 9 1.3. Academic and societal relevance ......................................................................................... 9 1.4. A reader’s guide .................................................................................................................. 10

2. | Chapter 2: Situation Analysis ............................................................................... 12 2.1 How the crisis unfolded ....................................................................................................... 12

2.1.1 Causes and conflicts ....................................................................................................... 12 2.1.2 Reasons and motives to flee to Europe .............................................................................. 13

2.2 How the situation was managed at EU level ........................................................................ 14 2.3 Germany’s change of course in its refugee policy ................................................................ 15

2.3.1 History of migration flows and refugee policy in Germany ................................................ 16 2.3.2 Political actions and crisis management in summer 2015 ................................................... 17 2.3.3 Portrayal of the issue and the course of asylum policy ...................................................... 19 2.3.4 Different responses of civil society and politics to the government’s refugee policy ............. 20

2.4 Conclusions of the situation analysis ................................................................................... 21

3. | Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ........................................................................ 23 3.1. Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework ............................................................................. 23

3.1.1. The framework in perspective ...................................................................................... 23 3.1.2. The three streams ....................................................................................................... 25 3.1.3. Policy windows and the role of coupling ....................................................................... 28

3.2. Literature Review .............................................................................................................. 29 3.2.1. The nature of policy change ........................................................................................ 30 3.2.2. Contextual factors: Decision making during times of crisis and in multi-level structures . 30 3.2.3. Participant interaction and verbal power in the political stream .................................... 34

3.3. Conclusion of the theory section ......................................................................................... 37

4. | Chapter 4: Data Collection and Methods ............................................................... 39 4.1. Key concepts, measurement and data sources .................................................................... 39 4.2. Research approach and design ........................................................................................... 40

5. | Chapter 5: Findings .............................................................................................. 43 5.1. Decision No. 1: The suspension of the Dublin System in Germany, August 21 – 25, 2015 ..... 45

5.1.1. Problem Stream ......................................................................................................... 45 5.1.2. Policy stream .............................................................................................................. 47 5.1.3. Political stream .......................................................................................................... 49 5.1.4. Conclusion political decision No. 1 ............................................................................... 50

5.2. Decision No. 2: The reallocation of refugees from Hungary to Austria and Germany – September 4, 2015 .......................................................................................................................... 52

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5.2.1. The time between decision No. 1 and No. 2 .................................................................. 52 5.2.2. Problem Stream ......................................................................................................... 53 5.2.3. Policy stream ............................................................................................................. 56 5.2.4. Political Stream .......................................................................................................... 58 5.2.5. Conclusion of political decision No. 2 ........................................................................... 60

5.3. Decision No. 3: The implementation of border controls; no sealing of the border – September 13 ................................................................................................................................. 62

5.3.1. The Problem stream .................................................................................................... 62 5.3.2. The Policy Stream ....................................................................................................... 65 5.3.3. The Political Stream .................................................................................................... 67 5.3.4. Concluding political decision No. 3 ............................................................................... 68

5.4. Conclusion of the Findings Chapter ..................................................................................... 70

6. | Chapter 6: Comparison of the German to the Dutch case ........................................ 74

7. | Chapter 7: Overall Conclusions ............................................................................. 79 7.1. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 79 7.2. Research limitations and recommendation for further research .......................................... 81

Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 83 I. Scientific Sources .................................................................................................................... 83 II. Empirical Sources for Data of Analysis .................................................................................... 85

Appendices ................................................................................................................. 97 A. Additional literature ................................................................................................................ 97

a. Policy windows .................................................................................................................... 97 b. Framing ............................................................................................................................... 97

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ListofFiguresFigure1:Differentdevelopmentsofasylumpoliciesin2015............................................................8

Figure2:Structuraldesignofthethesis.............................................................................................9

Figure3:First-timeapplicationsin2015(EurostatinBBC,2016)....................................................12

Figure4:FundsforSyrianrefugeesinneighboringcountries(UNHighCommissionerforRefugees

inSly,2015)...............................................................................................................................13

Figure5:ImportantpoliticaldecisionsonGermany’srefugeepolicyinsummer2015..................19

Figure6:AMultipleStreamsModelofPolicymaking(Gagnon&Labonte,2013)..........................29

Figure7:Triangularrelationshipbetweenthemedia,politicalactorsandthepublic....................34

Figure8:ImportantpoliticaldecisionsonGerman’srefugeepolicyinsummer2015....................43

Figure9:AsylanträgeundEASY-Registrierungen:bluecolumnsindicateEASYregistrationsandred

columnsindicatethenumberofasylumapplications(BAMFinEngler,2016).......................44

Figure10:Whatoccupiedthepublicagenda?.................................................................................45

Figure11:PoliticaldecisionNo.1.....................................................................................................51

Figure12:AsylanträgeundEASY-Registrierungen:bluecolumnsindicateEASYregistrationsand

redcolumnsindicatethenumberofasylumapplications(BAMFinEngler,2016)................57

Figure13:PoliticaldecisionNo.2.....................................................................................................61

Figure14:WindowofopportunityindecisionNo.3........................................................................65

Figure15:PoliticaldecisionNo.3.....................................................................................................69

Figure16:Differentdevelopmentsofasylumpoliciesin2015........................................................75

Abbreviations AfD:AllgemeinefürDeutschland(AlternativeforGermany)

BAMF:BundesministeriumfürMigrationundFlüchtlinge(GermanMinistryofMigrationand

Refugees)

CDU:ChristlichDemokratischeUnionDeutschlands(ChristianDemocraticUnionofGermany)

CSU:ChristlichSozialeUnion(ChristianSocialUnion=BavarianChristianDemocrats)

EU:EuropeanUnion

MSF:MultipleStreamsFramework

PVV:PartijvoordeVrijheid(FreedomPartyoftheNetherlands)

SPD:SozialDemokratischeParteiDeutschland(SocialDemocraticPartyofGermany)

UN:UnitedNations

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1. |Chapter1:Introduction“Do not underestimate the urgency. Do not underestimate our imperative to act. Winter isapproaching–thinkofthefamiliessleepinginparksandrailwaystationsinBudapest,intentsinTraiskirchen,oronshoresinKos.Whatwillbecomeofthemoncoldwinternights?”–Jean-ClaudeJunker(Junker,J.-C.inStateoftheUnionspeech,2015)

1.1. Thematicoverview

TherefugeecrisiswasthemostdebatedtopicinGermanyin2015(Statistica,2016).Whilelivingin

theNetherlands,IbecameawarethatrefugeesarealmostinvisibleonthestreetsofDutchcities.

Oneofthereasonsisthat,in2015,theNetherlandsonlyreceived59.100refugeeswhichaccounts

for0,35%oftheirpopulation,whileGermanytookon890.000refugeesthataccountfor1,113%of

its population (Seiffert&Wormann, 2016).Despite their differences in size, both countries are

economicallywelloff,geographicallycloseandculturallysimilar(DNHK-A,2017;DNHK-B,2017).

Thisledtothelogicalassumptionthatbothcountrieswouldhandleanidenticalnumberofrefugees

percapita.Thefactthatthisisnotthecasesparkedmyinterestinthereasonsforthatremarkable

differenceinnumber.Additionally,myfellowstudent,LuciaOverpelt,developedaninterestinthe

waytheNetherlandsmanagedtherefugeecrisis.Thismotivatedustocomparethetwocountries.

Afterconductingsituationanalysesforbothcountrieswefoundrelevantpointsofcomparison:In

2015, the German government executed a welcoming refugee policy1 while the Netherlands

pursuedapolicyofdiscouragement.Aninterestingside-noteisthattheDutchpopulistpartywas

presentinparliamentduringtheyear2015asthethird-strongestparty.TheGermanpopulistparty,

incontrast,hadnotyetpassedits5%hurdletoenterparliament.Bothcountrieshadpursueda

similarasylumpolicy forthepast20yearsthatreducedthenumberofrefugeestoaminimum.

However,insummer2015,theGermangovernmentwentthrougharadicalshiftandtransformed

itsrefugeepolicyfromapolicyofdiscouragementintoapolicyofwelcome.TheNetherlands,on

theotherhand,stayedoncoursewiththeirrefugeepolicy.Thisremarkabledifferenceinasylum

policyofthetwocountriessparkedourinteresttowriteathesisonthequestionwhyonecountry

1 Pleasenote:Throughoutthepaper,IwillfocusonGermany’srefugee/asylumpolicy.Itconcernsthosepeoplewhoappliedforasylum,eveniftheyaredeniedsuch.Hence,Iwillnotfocusonthegeneralmigrationpolicy.Therefore,IdonotincludepeoplewhoenteredGermanyduetoreasonsotherthanasylum.

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changedandtheotheronepursueditspolicyapproachleadingtoasubstantialdifferenceinthe

numberofreceivedrefugees.

Figure 1: Different developments of asylum policies in 2015

The goal of this research is to explain the driving forces of policy change. In this regard, J.W.

Kingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework(Abbrev.MSF),whichwehadelaboratelydiscussedthrough

ourMasters,appearedtobethemostsuitablemodel.Itdescribeshowandwhatkindofideasreach

thepoliticalagendaandcausepolicychange. Italsoexplores institutionsandagencythatplaya

roleinthepolicyprocess.Hence,ittriestoincludeavarietyofdimensions.Forthisreason,Iaimed

atapplying theMSF in regard to this case studybyusing themodelasaguideline formydata

collection. Throughout the research, it became clear that I had to shiftmy focus from ‘simply

applying’ the model to testing and potentially complementing the model. This is because

inconsistenciesweredetectedintheliteraturereviewandwhenapplyingthemodeltothecase.

BoththeoryandthefindingssuggestedaddingsupplementaryelementstotheKingdonmodelin

order to accurately describe policy change. In sum, the Kingdon model is adequate for data

collection,butneedsfurthertestingandcomplementaryelementstobefullyeffective.

The fundamental challenge was the design of a research which includes the following three

elements:Twosinglecasestudies,acomparisonbetweenthetwocasestudiesandaframework

that needs to be tested and potentially complemented. I decided to work with the following

researchquestions:TowhatextentdoesKingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework(MSF)explainthe

differenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015?However,in

ordertoanswerthisquestion,thefollowingsub-questionhadtobeaddressedfirst:Towhatextent

doestheMSFexplainthepolicychangeinGermany?Usingtheseresearchquestionsasapointof

departure,IfirstmadeacasestudyforGermanywhichwasbasedonthesituationanalysisandthe

literature. ItestedthemodelonthreedecisivepolicydecisionstheGermangovernmenttookin

Asylumpolicyofdiscouragement

TheNetherlands:59.100refugees

Germany:890.000refugees

?Before2015 Endof2015

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2015.TheyreflectedachangeinGermany’sasylumpolicy.Meanwhile,Ialsohadtoaddinliterature

based on the findings. From the findings, I was able to answer the sub-question referring to

Germany.Subsequently,IcomparedmyfindingstoLuciaOverpeltwhodidasynchroniccasestudy

fortheNetherlands2.BasedonthecomparisonIwasabletoanswerthegeneralresearchquestion

anddrawconclusions.

1.2. Methodologicalaspects

Fromascientificpointofview,thestudyisofdescriptivenatureincludingexploratoryelements.

This isbecause the researchdocumentsacausalprocesswhilegeneratingnewquestions tobe

further researched. It reflects anunusual researchprocesswhich is partly deductive andpartly

inductive.ThisisduetothefactthatIapplytheorytestingaswellastheorygenerationwhileatthe

sametimegoingbackandforthbetweentheoryandfindings.Moreover,theresearchillustratesa

qualitativecasestudywhichincludesthecollectionofdatainformofprocesstracing.Thefindings

ofthesinglecasestudyarecontrastedwithLuciaOverpelt’s findings.Therefore,thispaperalso

includesacomparativeelementwhichenhancesthe lowexternalvalidityof theprocess-tracing

method.Finally, it is importanttohighlightthattheresearchisappliedtoarealistictimeframe.

ThedatacollectionincludesthetimefromAugust1untilSeptember17,2015.Inthisperiod,the

refugeecrisisemergedinGermanyandthethreeeventsofanalysisoccurred.

1.3. Academicandsocietalrelevance

Thisresearchwillacademicallycontributetoandbuilduponpublicadministrationandpublicpolicy

research inmultipleways. First, it attempts to explore and explain the driving forces of policy

changebyapplyingtheKingdonmodeltotheGermanrefugeepolicyinthetimeframementioned

2L.Overpelt’sresearchcanbefoundinthearchiveoftheUniversityofLeidenunderOverpelt,L.(2017).ExplainingchangeandstabilitywithMultipleStreamsFramework(MSF)intheNetherlandsandGermanyduringthe2015refugeecrisis.UniversityofLeiden.

Figure 2: Structural design of the thesis

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above.ThisisthefirsttimetheKingdonmodelhasbeenappliedtothiscasewhichmakesitaunique

contributiontotheacademicfieldofpublicadministrationandpublicpolicy.Secondly,withthis

researchtheMSFisappliedtoacasewhichisembeddedintoacontextofcrisisandmulti-level

structures.Thisconnectsthemodeltoawideracademicspectrumthanjustlocalpolicy-makingas

donebyKingdon.Inregardstomulti-levelstructures,N.Zahariadishasdonerelevantpre-workby

applyingtheMSFtopolicy-makingwithintheEuropeanUnion(ZahariadisN.,2008).Myworktries

tobuildonhisinsightsbyreflectingacasestudyfromtheviewpointofamemberstate.Byapplying

amodelofpublicpolicytoacasethatisaffectedbycrisisandmulti-leveldiplomacy,Ialsoconnect

several academic fieldswith each other. Hence, the results of this researchmight not only be

relevant for public administration/policy scholars, but also to researchers focusing on crisis

management and multi-level diplomacy. Thirdly, the MSF, although discussed widely among

scholars,hasnotbeenfullyappliedtomanycasesyet(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Therefore,

thisresearchoffersanopportunitytorevealthetotalvalueofthemodel.Inaddition,thisstudy

includes a comparative element by being contrasted to a similar case study. This provides the

readerwithaninsightintoadifferentcase-studythatmadeuseofthesameresearchapproach.

OnehastoacknowledgetheactualityofthematterandthefactthatresearchontheEuropean

refugeecrisisisstillrelativelyyoungprovidesthetopicwithahighsocietalrelevance.Firstly,when

Istartedwiththispaper,notmuchresearchhasbeenpublishedontheEuropeanrefugeecrisis.In

fact,itwasarelativelyunexploredfield.Hence,thisstudycontributestothisexplorationprocess

andaddstoexistingresearchontheEuropeanrefugeecrisis.Secondly,althoughtherefugeeissue

isnotconsideredtobeacrisisanymore,itwillhavelong-termconsequencesformemberstates

thatreceivedahighnumberofrefugees.Also,untiltoday,theEUisstrugglingwithsettingupan

effectiverefugeepolicy.Ithasnotyetmanagedtoagreeonapermanentdistributionscheme.For

European policymakers, this researchmight be interesting to understandwhy some countries

pursueopen-borderandothercountriesrestrictiveapproachesinregardstotheirrefugeepolicies.

For German policy makers, this research might be valuable to understand why the German

governmentrespondedtotherefugeecrisisthewayitdid.Hence,Ibelievethetopichassocietal

impactonvariouspoliticallevels.

1.4. Areader’sguide

Thispaperisstructuredinthefollowingway:Chapter2servesassituationanalysiswhichprovides

backgroundtothewaythecrisisemergedandthewayitwasmanagedondifferentlevels.Italso

distils the three key policy decisions of the German government that reflect the change in

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Germany’srefugeepolicy.Chapter3referstothetheoreticalframeworkwhichisdividedintotwo

parts.ThefirstpartdescribestheMultipleStreamsFramework.Thesecondpartreflectsonthe

discussionof theMSF. Thereby, aspects thatwere apparent in the situation analysis aswell as

elementswhichdifferentscholarsdeemedasimportantinregardtotheMSFareincluded.Chapter

4describesthedatacollectionandthemethodology.Itexplainshowthekeyconcepts,thethree

streams, are measured and which data sources will be used. Additionally, I elaborate on the

researchapproachanddesign.Chapter5reflectsonthedatacollectioninwhichIapplytheMSFto

thethreekeydecisionsoftheGermangovernmentwiththehelpofprocesstracing.Inthisway,the

sub-researchquestionreferringtoGermanycanbeanswered.InChapter6,Icomparemyfindings

to Lucia Overpelt’s case-study findings. Here, I eventually answer themain research question.

Lastly,Chapter7concludesthepaperandprovidesresearchlimitationsandpotentialforfurther

research.

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2. |Chapter2:SituationAnalysisThischapterprovidesabriefoverviewofthe2015refugeecrisis,itscausesanditsmanagement.

This includesan insightonhowthecrisishasbeenhandledatEuropeanUnion levelandat the

Germangovernmentlevel. Inthisrespect, IwillanalysetheGermanchangeofcourseinasylum

policyonthebasisofthecountry’smigrationhistoryandthreedecisivegovernmentdecisionsin

2015.Iwillputthefocusonthegovernment’sportrayalofthecrisisandthecourseofitsasylum

policy.Subsequently,Iwillanalysedifferentresponsesofcivilsocietyandthepoliticalspheretothe

government’srefugeepolicy.Thus,thischapterservesasanoverviewbutalsoasabasisforthe

literaturereviewinthesubsequentchapter.

2.1 Howthecrisisunfolded

2015canbedescribedasayearinaveryviolenteracountingninewarsandcivilwarsintheMiddle

EastandtheNorthofAfrica(Cockburn,2015).Asaconsequenceofitsgeographicproximity,Europe

faceditsworstdisplacementcrisissinceWWIIwith1,000,573refugeesreachingitsshoresbysea

in2015(Clayton&Holland,2015).ThosepeoplefledtheircountriesduetoongoingwarsinSyria

and Iraq, aswell as conflicts and instabilities in countries likeAfghanistan, Eritreaor elsewhere

(UNHCR-B,2016).

2.1.1 Causesandconflicts

The three dominant population

groupswhowere fleeingare Syrians

ofwhomhalfamillionpeoplecrossed

the Mediterranean in 2015 and

accountfor50percentofallrefugees

coming to Europe; Afghans who

accountedfor20percentand Iraqis

forsevenpercent(Clayton&Holland,

2015).

By2015,Syriafounditselfinastateof

war formore than fouryearswithout

showinganysignoftermination(Kingsley,2015).People’slossofhopeintheirwar-torncountries

andthefailureofdiplomacytoendthewarscontributedto250.000casesofdeathand12million

displacedpeopleservingasthekeyreasonsforthewaveofrefugeestoEurope(Sly,2015;United

Figure 3: First-time applications in 2015 (Eurostat in BBC, 2016)

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Nations,2015).Thedestructionofallmeanstomakealiving,thecontinuationoftheconflictand

the IslamicState forcedhalfofSyria’s23millioncitizensto leavetheirhomes,with fourmillion

refugeesresidinginothercountriessuchasTurkey,Lebanon,Jordanandthememberstatesofthe

EuropeanUnion(Cockburn,2015;UNHCR-C,2016).

AfghansandIraqisalsofledtheircountriesduetoconflictandwar.TheUNHighCommissionerfor

HumanRightscharacterizedAfghanistanascaughtina“venomouscycle”ofviolence,becauseof

theintensificationofthewarafterthewithdrawalofmostinternationalforces(AlHussein,Z.R.in

Grossmann,2015,para.5).In2015,theAfghangovernmentclaimedthat80%ofthecountrywould

beunsafeduetoextremistgroupssuchastheTalibanandIS(Kingsley,2015).Thesamecanbe

observedinIraqwheretheIslamicStatehasprovokedthedisplacementof3,3millionpeopleasof

December31,2015duetoitscontrolofsubstantialterritoryandthespreadofitssectarianposition

(Cockburn,2015;InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre,2016).

2.1.2 ReasonsandmotivestofleetoEurope

ThereasonsandmotiveswhyrefugeesfromtheMiddleEaststartedcomingallthewaytoEurope

aremultiple.First,refugeesinSyria’sborderingcountriessuchasTurkey,JordanandLebanonhave

beenexperiencingasituationwithoutanyprospects.Theyareusuallynotrecognizedasrefugees.

Hence,theyaredeniedtherighttoworkandtheirchildrenoftenarerefusededucation(Kingsley,

2015). In 2015, 400.000 refugee children in Turkey were not attending school (Human Rights

Watch, 2015). In addition, the UN experienced a huge shortfall in funding which significantly

reducedthehandoutstorefugeefamilies(seeFigure4).TheUNhasreceivedlessthan50%ofwhat

it needed to care for the refugeeswhich

presents itself, for instance, in the lackof

foodandhealthcareinLebanonandJordan

(Grant, 2015; Sly, 2015). This makes the

Middle East an unpleasant place to stay.

Therefore,manyrefugeesdecidedtomove

to Europe, and particularly Germany, to

securetheirentitledrightsunderthe1951

refugeeconventioninthehopeforabetter

lifeandfuture(Kingsley,2015).

Thishopehadbeenfurthertriggeredbytwofactors:Firstly,anopen-borderpolicycomingfrom

the German government signalled the suspension of the Dublin Regulations in August 2015. It

Figure 4: Funds for Syrian refugees in neighboring countries (UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Sly, 2015)

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impliedtheacceptanceofanyasylumapplicationcomingfromSyrians,eveniftheyhadappliedfor

asyluminotherEuropeancountriesbefore.Thissparkedabiggerwaveofrefugeearrivals,since

peoplenolongerfearedbeingarrestedinneighbouringHungary(Kingsley,2015).Additionally,the

morepeoplearrivedinGermany,themorepeoplewantedtofollowinordertoreunitewithfamily

membersorfellowcountrymen(Salloum,2015).Secondly,moreconvenienttravelrouteshadbeen

discovered (Kingsley, 2015). Initially, refugees started travelling to Europe via the Central

MediterraneanroutesailingfromLibyatoItaly.However,towardssummer2015,visarestrictions

in North Africa and the Libyan civil war complicated reaching the Libyan coast. Hence, people

realisedthatcrossingtheEasternMediterraneanintoGreeceandwalkingtheBalkanrouteseemed

acheaperandsaferoption.This increasedthenumberofpeople landing inGreecesignificantly

from43,000in2014tomorethan750,000in2015(Kingsley,2015;UNHCR,2016).Meanwhile,the

Balkanstatesfacilitatedeasiertravelthroughtheirterritory(Kingsley,2015).

ThelastreasonwhyrefugeesmadetheirwaytoEuropeneedstobeascribedtotheEuropeanUnion

itself.TheEUunderestimatedpeople’sdesperationandassumedthatrefugeeswouldneverdare

risktheirlivesandtotakethedangerousjourneytoEurope(Kingsley,2015;EuropeanUnion,2016).

OncerefugeesrealisedthatgainingasyluminEuropeiseasierthanexpectedtheysimplyforced

Europe’shandbyactuallymakingthejourneythemselves.Thiscausedadisorderlyprocessinwhich

anyonewasable toreachEuropeby joiningtheSyriantravellers. In themeantime,by failing to

relocateasignificantnumberofrefugeesfromTurkey,EuropeprovidedTurkeywithlittleincentive

tobetterprotectitsownborders(Kingsley,2015).Insum,theresultdemonstrated“aperfectstorm

inwhichrefugeeshavenoreasontostayput;MiddleEasterncountrieshavenoincentivetoprevent

themfromleaving;andEuropehasnomeansofblockingtheirpath”(Kingsley,2015,para.14).

2.2 HowthesituationwasmanagedatEUlevel

Inspring2015,theEUmemberstategovernmentsstartedtofeelasenseofurgencyafterbeing

surprisedbytheunprecedentednumberofmigrantsthatstartedtoshiftfromtheCentraltothe

EasternMediterraneanroute(EuropeanUnion,2016).InMay2015,theEUdecidedonaEuropean

agenda on migration underlying the need for better migration management and shared

responsibilities.Itidentifiedactionsandmeasuresintheareasof(I)incentivereductionforirregular

migration,(II)thesecuringofexternalbordersandsavingoflives,(III)astrongasylumpolicyand

(IV)anewpolicythatdefineslegalmigration(EuropeanCouncil,2016).Hence,theEUgovernments

experiencedaclearshiftintheirfocusfromsavinglivestowardshowtotreatpeoplethatactually

setfootonEuropeanterritory(EuropeanUnion,2016).

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However,rapidly,flawsofthepre-existingDublinRegulationsbecameobvious.Itputatremendous

burdenon first-entry countries such as Italy andGreecewhowere in chargeof processing the

majority of asylum applications. Soon the EU started to discuss burden sharing via reallocation

schemes(EuropeanUnion,2016).However,thisdividedtheunionintotwocamps.Ononeside,

onecouldfindamajorityoftheEasternmemberstateswhodonothaveatraditionoflarge-scale

immigrationandfearedalossofidentity.Ontheothersidewerethosewhofavouredamandatory

reallocationscheme.Thiswaslargelypreferredbythenorth-westerncountriessuchasGermany

whowerearguinginfavourofthefulfilmentofaninternationalhumandutyincludingthedefence

ofhumanrights(MerkelandLofveninMartinez,2015;Zafrini,2016).

Soon,theEUrealizedthatitneededtotakesomeurgentshort-termmeasurestocopewiththe

situation.Insummer2015,theunionfacedamassiverefugeeinfluxviatheGreekislands.Atthat

time,GermanyexperiencedthestrongestinfluxduetoitssuspensionoftheDublinRegulationfor

Syrians. It became clear that the voluntary reallocation scheme was not showing any effect.

Consequently, the Council decided upon themandatory reallocation of 40.000 (September 14,

2015) and laterof anadditional120.000migrants (September22,2015) from Italy andGreece

(EuropeanUnion,2016).However,thedecisiontoreallocate120.000migrantswasonlymadeafter

extensivediscussionsspreadovermonths,persuasionattemptsbytheEuropeanCommissionand

theeventualuseof themajorityvotingmechanism3 (Junker, J.-C. inStateof theUnionspeech,

2015;CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,2015).Theuseofmajorityvotesisconsideredtobehighly

unusualforsuchasensitiveissue(CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,2015).Thus,inthetimeframe

of this paper4 the EU coerced itsmember states into agreeing on the reallocation of 160.000

refugees;however,itfailedtomakememberstatesagreeonapermanentdistributionmechanism.

2.3 Germany’schangeofcourseinitsrefugeepolicy

Thissectionanalysesthechangeofcourse in theGermanasylumpolicybasedonthecountry’s

history in migration and refugee policy5 and three decisive government decisions in 2015.

Additionally, Iwill focuson the government’smotives and framingof the crisis and its refugee

3CzechRepublic,Romania,SlovakiaandHungaryvotedagainstmandatoryquotasandFinlandabstained.4Exceedingthetimeframeofthispaper:InSeptember,theurgencytoregaincontrolofexternalbordersandtheregistrationprocessofrefugeesbecameapparent.Therefore,theinstalmentofregistrationhotspotsandthedevelopmentofajointactionprogrammewithTurkeywereagreedupon(EuropeanUnion,2016).ThedealwithTurkeyenteredintoforceinMarch2016andincluded3billionofsupportfundingtoTurkey,aone-to-oneexchangemechanismwhichcomprisedthatrefugeesthatreachtheGreekislandsillegallyshouldbebroughtbacktoTurkeyinexchangeforregisteredrefugeesbeingsentbyTurkeytotheEU,andthedropofvisarequirementsforTurkishcitizenswithintheEU(ReimannA.etal.,2016).5 Pleasenote:Throughoutthepaper,IwillbefocusingonGermany’srefugee/asylumpolicy.Itconcernsthosepeoplewhoappliedforasylum,eveniftheyaredeniedsuch.Hence,Iwillnotfocusonthegeneralmigrationpolicy.Therefore,IdonotincludepeoplewhoenteredGermanyduetoreasonsotherthanasylum.

16

policy.Eventually,Iwillanalysethemostimportantresponsestothegovernment’srefugeepolicy

bythecivilsocietyandthepoliticalsphere.

2.3.1 HistoryofmigrationflowsandrefugeepolicyinGermany

InordertounderstandhowtheGermangovernmentmadeaU-turn in its refugeepolicy,some

brieffactsaboutGermany’smigrationhistoryandthedevelopmentofitsasylumpolicyneedtobe

highlighted. Although I do not focus onGermany’s generalmigration policy, I consider it to be

important to reflect on Germany’s overallmigration history as it is often linked to a country’s

refugee policy. The country experienced four crucial migration influxes since the WWII. First,

between1944and1948,12millionGermancitizensandethnicGermanshadtoleavetheirhomes

intheformerEasternpartsofGermanythatwereannexedbytheSovietUnionorPoland.They

wereforcedtofindahomeinGermanyorAustria.Germanystruggledwithreceivingandcaringfor

suchahighnumberof refugeesdue toachaoticpost-warsituationmarkedbydestructionand

poverty(Herm&Kubitza,2015).Thesecondwave,occurringbetween1955and1973,featured

economicmotives.Approximately2.6million‘guestworkers’fromGreece,Turkey,ItalyandSpain

wereinvitedtoparticipateintheeconomicriseofGermany(Katz,Noring,&Garrelts,2016).Third,

themostrecentimmigrationwaveGermanyexperiencedoccurredinthe90sduetotheendofthe

cold war and the German reunification (Oezcan, 2004). Between 1988 and 2003 threemillion

‘resettlers’6 returned to Germany. Its number peaked in the early 90s with 390.000 resettlers

arriving in 1992 alone (Katz, Noring, & Garrelts, 2016). In the same year, 438,190 asylum

applicationswerefiledmainlyfromcitizensoftheformerYugoslaviaandRomania(Bade&Oltmer,

2005).Thisnumbercomesclosetothe2015number.However,itisimportanttoconsiderthatonly

4,2%of the refugees in1992weregrantedasylumwhile around60%of the refugees in2015

receivedtheasylumstatus7(ProAsyl,2017;BundeszentralefürpolitischeBildung,n.a.).

From this time on, the German government frequently reformed its asylum lawwhich usually

concludedinitsintensificationandanever-decreasingnumberofrefugeesenteringthecountry.In

1992,thegovernmentdecidedupon‘theasylumcompromiseinordertodealwiththeimmigration

pressure and the social andeconomic challengesof the reunification,’. Itwas ground-breaking,

sinceitimplieddenyingasylumapplicationsfrom“safethirdcountries”(Katz,Noring,&Garrelts,

2016, p. 6). Additionally, a policy of discouragement was pursued which included the

6ResettlersareethnicGermanswhohadleftthecountryinordertomigratetotheformerSovietstatessincethe18thcentury(Katz,Noring,&Garrelts,2016)7Pleasenote:RefugeesfromSyria,IraqandEritreahadanalmost100%chancetobegrantedasylumin2015(ProAsyl,2017)

17

‘Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz’ in 1993. It resulted in asylum applicants receiving only a small

amountofmoneytomakealiving.Attimes,theamountwaslessthanthestandardunemployment

benefit (Heißler, 2015). Therefore, asylum numbers decreased substantially (Katz, Noring, &

Garrelts,2016).AnotherreasonforthedecreaseistheDublinRegulationwhichenteredintoforce

in 1997. Sincemost of the countries bordering with Germany were participants of the Dublin

Regulation,refugeesattemptingtoapplyforasyluminGermanycouldonlydosobyenteringthe

countrybyairplane.Consequently,since2004,only50.000peopleappliedforasyluminGermany

(Heißler,2015).

Inthepasttenyears,theGermangovernmentswayedbackandforthinitsrefugeepolicy.Once

the number of asylum seekers was perceived too low due to demographic deficits and labour

shortage the parliament agreed on the ‘Zuwanderungsgesetz’ in 2004. Together with better

conditionsforEUworkers,thelawalsorelaxedtherestrictionsofasylumrecognitionandimproved

thestatusofrefugeefamilies(Oezcan,2004;Heißler,2015).Forthisreason,thenumberofasylum

seekersstartedto increasesince2010.Especially refugees fromstates incrisissuchasSomalia,

Iraq,SyriaandAfghanistanmadetheirwaytoGermany.Oncethenumberwasperceivedastoo

high,thegovernmentdeclaredtheBalkanstates-Serbia,MacedoniaandBosniaHerzegovina-as

safecountriesinordertoterminatethestayofasylumseekersfromthesecountriesmorequickly

(Heißler, 2015). Hence, in the past 20 years, Germany represented a rather restrictive refugee

policy.Everyslightincreaseofasylumseekerswasfollowedbycontainmentmeasures.

During the2015 refugeecrisis, the fourthevent, theGermangovernment respondedunusually

late.Althoughlocalcommunitieshadalreadybeenwarninginwinter2015whiletransitcountries

startedpreparinginspring2015,theofficialsinBerlinrefusedtoundertakeaction.Forinstance,a

requestfromtheMinistryofMigrationtohireadditionalstaffinordertoquicklyprocessoldcases

wasdeclined(AmannM.etal.,2015).Thelow-migrationprofileGermanypursuedforthelast20

yearsaswellastheDublinRegulationmadeGermanyanalmostunreachablecountryforasylum

seekers.Thesefactorscontributedtothenon-preparednessoftheGermangovernmentinregard

tothisrefugeecrisis.

2.3.2 Politicalactionsandcrisismanagementinsummer2015

Insummer2015,Germanywasdriftingintoastateofcrisis.Ithadthehighestnumberofasylum

applicants ithadhadinmanyyearsaswellasthehighestnumber inEurope.Severalconditions

aggravated the situation. The Dublin Regulationwas starting to show flaws, because reception

countries let refugees pass without registration. Germany counted more than 1,000 refugees

18

enteringthecountrywithoutpermissiononasingledayinJuly.However,Germanauthoritieswere

nolongerallowedtosendasylumseekersbacktoGreeceasthecountrywasinsuchbadfinancial

condition. Moreover, via the Balkan route, affluent Germany and global suffering was linked

eventually(Alkousaaet.al,2016).ThoseconditionscausedahighamountofpressureonGerman

authorities. It led to the need to pursue actions that would change Germany’s refugee policy

eventually.

TheGermangovernmentreactedtotherefugeeinfluxwiththreedecisivemeasuresthatrepresent

awelcomingrefugeepolicyapproach(seeFigure5).Thesemeasuresareofgreatimportanceand

willbefurtheranalysedthroughoutthepaper.First,onAugust25,2015Germanysuspendedthe

DublinRegulationforSyrianrefugees.ItimpliedthatoncetheyreachedGermanground,refugees

wouldnotbesentbackimmediately.Thisdecisionwasmadepublicbyanaccidentaldocumentleak

ofanoverstretchedMinistryofMigration8(Abéetal.,2015).Theannouncementofthisdecision

triggeredawaveofenthusiasmamongstSyrianstotraveltoGermanyandamongnon-Syriansto

findwaysofhidingtheiridentities(WeltN24,2016;Alkousaaet.al,2016).Astheinfluxincreased

administrationsstartedtostruggleandneededtobeassistedbycivilsociety(Bochow,2015).This

iswhentheGermanChancellorreleasedherfamous“Wirschaffendas.”9statementonAugust31.

ItwasdebatedinthemediaaseitheranattempttotransformGermanyintoamoralsuperpower,

orasacompassionatestatementfreefromanytacticandcalculation(Abéetal.,2015).

Asaseconddecision,onSeptember4,GermanyandAustriajointlyagreedonabsorbingthousands

ofrefugeesthatwerestrandedinHungary(WeltN24,2016).Budapesthadturnedintoafavoured

travel stop for refugees fromwhich theywere unable to depart due to theDublin Regulation.

However,onAugust31,theHungariangovernmentallowedthefirsttrainstoleaveBudapestwith

thedestinationofMunich.TheAustrianandGermangovernmentcondemnedthisactionandurged

HungarytoadheretotheDublinrules(Kasparek&Speer,2015).Thus,communicationbetweenEU

member states seemed to be disturbed intentionally or unintentionally (ARD, 31.08.2015). On

September4,agroupofthousandrefugeeswhoweretiredofwaitinginBudapeststartedwalking

towardsAustriaalongthehighway.Itbecameknownasthe#marchofhope.Themediawereclosely

followingtheirwalkandreportedonthecircumstancesunderwhichthosepeoplehadtosleepon

thehighwayintherain(Domokos,2015).ThisputsufficientpressureonMerkelandtheAustrian

Chancellor Faymann toopen theborders.Hence,during theweekendof September4-6, trains

8Please note, throughout the paper, I will make use of the German abbreviation BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration undFlüchtlinge)whenreferringtotheMinistryofMigrationandRefugees9Translatedthestatementsignifies:„Wecandoit!“

19

beganofficiallydepartingfromBudapesttoGermany.Thatweekend,refugeesenteringGermany

amountedto20,000(Alkousaaet.al,2016).ThisdecisionwasframedasajointexceptiontoEUlaw

(StreiterandSteinmeierinPresse-undInformationsamtderBundesregierung,2015).However,it

turnedouttobeirreversibleleadingtoGermany’spermanentopen-borderpolicy.

The third political decisionwas a direct consequence of the second decision. Due to the open

borders,thenumberofrefugeesenteringGermanyincreasedsignificantly(Alkousaaet.al,2016).

ThecityofMunichhadtocarrythemainburdenandwasdependentonthehelpofthousandsof

volunteers.Atonepoint,thecity’smayorannouncedtheMunich’snearcollapse,becausethecity

was unable to accommodate any more refugees (Reiter, D. in ARD, 12.09.2015). German

government officials were forced to find a solution which should limit the influx. One of the

discussedoptionswas the sealing of the borders.However,Merkel decidednot to limit but to

deceleratetheinfluxby‘only’implementingbordercontrols.Thismeasurewouldnotturnrefugees

awaybutsendaclearsignalofGermanyremainingopentothem,instead(Alkousaaet.al,2016).

Concluding,thesethreepoliticalmeasuresinresponsetothe2015crisisclearlyreflectapolitical

change in Germany’s asylum policy. This open-door policy significantly contributed to the high

numberof890.000refugeesthatenteredthecountryin2015(deMaizèreinderSpiegel,2016).

2.3.3 Portrayaloftheissueandthecourseofasylumpolicy

ThecrucialpolicyactionstowardsawelcomingrefugeepolicystronglycentredaroundMerkel’s

opinion,assertivenessandcrisisperception.Merkelportrayedheractionswithargumentsbased

onvaluesandpracticalities.Sheregarded itas theGermans’moraldutytorepresentarefugee

welcomingcountry(MerkelinAnneWill,2015).Whenshewasaskedhowitfeelstobethefaceof

Figure 5: Important political decisions on Germany’s refugee policy in summer 2015

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afriendlyGermany,sherespondedthatshewashappythatGermany,too,isnowacountrythatis

abletoprovidehopetopeopleabroad.Sheaddedthatwhenlookingatthecountry’shistory,that

thisissomethingofgreatvalue(Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).Here,thefeeling

ofguilt inrelationtotheGermanpastmighthaveplayedacrucialrole(Freedland,2015).Other

argumentationsforarefugeefriendlyattitudewereofpracticalnatureandderivedfromtheskills

shortage and the ageing of German society. Refugees were often framed as a boost for the

economy (Bundesregierung, 2016). In this regard, humanitarian and moral values as well as

practicalreasonsservedasjustificationfortheopen-borderpolicy.

The Chancellor, the media and the public opinion created what became known as the

‘Willkommenskultur’10.MerkelchosetoleadthesituationbysayingthatGermanyisabletocope

withthechallenge.Sheembodiedapositiveframingofthecrisisandhercrisismanagement.Inthis

regard, the famous ‘Wir schaffendas.’ statement,encouragingwords to theGermancitizens in

Sundayeveningprimetimeinterviews,aswellasvisitstorefugeecentresandselfiestakenwith

refugees reflected her personal and political attitude (Merkel, A. in summer press conference,

2015;Merkel inAnneWill,2015).Thepositiveportrayalof thechallengewasbackedupbythe

‘Willkommenskultur’Germanswereprovidingat train stations in the firstweeksof themassive

arrivals(Alkousaaet.al,2016).Also,themediaonlyreportedpositivelyontheatmosphereinthe

country (see findings).TheGermangovernmentexperiencedastrongboostofconfidence,as it

seemed,throughthefactthatagreatpartofthecountrywasreadyandwillingtojointlymanage

thesituation(Amannetal.,2015).Withthelegitimationofthepublicandthemedia,thecultureof

welcometurnedintoapolicyofwelcome.

2.3.4 Different responses of civil society and politics to the government’s refugeepolicy

Asthecrisis intensifiedtheGermangovernmentreceivedavarietyofresponsestotheirasylum

policycoursefromEuropeanandnationalpoliticalleaders,Germanpartiesandcitizens.

At theEuropean level,opinionsweredividedaboutGermany’spolicycourse.Ontheonehand,

particularlyEasternEuropeanmemberstatesopposedGermany’sattemptatanopen-doorpolicy.

Forinstance,theHungariangovernmentcondemnedGermany’ssuspensionoftheDublinsystem

anddeclaredthattherefugeecrisisneedstoberegardeda‘Germanproblem’(Orbán,V.,Schulz,

10 Translation: Culture of Welcome; The term describes the intercultural competence and openness of a society thatappreciates immigration and inclusiveness (Heckmann, 2012). Throughout this paper, I use the German term‘Willkommenskultur’,becauseeventheinternationalmediamadeuseoftheGermantermwhenreferringtotheGermancivilsocietywhichengagedintotherefugeematter.

21

M.inpressconference,2015).Also,GreatBritainwhichrefusedtocontributetoaEuropeanasylum

solutionandDenmarkwhichtemporarilysuspendeditstrainconnectionstoGermanybecamepart

oftheopposition(Amannetal.,2015;Abéetal.,2015).Ontheotherhand,neighbouringcountries

suchasFranceandAustriasupportedGermany’sopen-doorpolicyandcontinuedpromotingafair

European distribution system. In addition, the EU institutions supported Germany’s course.

However,theywereunabletodomorethanpersuadingastheirhandsweretiedduetothedivided

memberstates(Merkel,A.,Fayman,W.,Vučić,A.,Mogherini,F.inpressconference,2015).

Alsoonthenationallevel,acleardivisionofopinionsbecameapparent.Merkelreceivedcriticism

forhercoursefromcertainpoliticalactors.OnethatwentasfarasopposingherinpublicwasHorst

Seehofer,theBavariangovernorandleaderoftheCSU,theBavarianCDUsisterparty.Hepublicly

statedthatitwasamistaketocircumventtheEUasylumrulesanddemandedacaponrefugees

andthesealingoftheborders(WeltN24,2016).Furthermore,heaffrontedMerkelbyinvitingthe

HungarianPrimeMinister,ViktorOrbán,toBavariatodiscussthecrisis(Amannetal.,2015).Onthe

otherhand,MerkelreceivedsupportfromtherestofthegoverningcoalitionincludingtheChristian

andtheSocialDemocrats(Zeitonline,2015).Even,theLeftPartysawthenecessityofthepolitical

decisionsleadingtoanopen-doorpolicy(Gysi,G.inDeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015,2015).

Another actor thatmade its voice heard was themedia. In the period during which themost

defining decisions were taken, the media solely reported positively on refugees and the

government’s decisions (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15, 2015). Even the conservative and

sensationalistBILDnewspaperdidnotfindfaultwiththedecisiontosuspendtheDublinRegulation

forSyrians(Bild,2015).Thisattitudealsoseemedtoreflectintheoverallpublicopinionwhichwas

characterized by a compassionate and refugee welcoming civil society. The German

‘Willkommenskultur’wascelebratedinternationallyasTVpicturesofGermansgreetingrefugees

ontrainstationscirculated(AlJazeera,2016).Inthefollowingweeks,tenpercentoftheGermans

engaged in volunteering activities for refugee matters (Kamann, 2015). However, pictures of

burning asylum accommodations and right-wing protestors also circulated. These pictures

remindedpoliticiansofthefactthatasmallpartofGermanydoesnotagreewiththeasylumcourse

ofthegovernment(ARD,18.08.2015).Themediaandpoliticianssharplycondemnedthesepeople

andtheirmotives(Hollande,F.andMerkel,A. inpressconference,2015);(GauckinZeitOnline,

2015,para.1;Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).

2.4 Conclusionsofthesituationanalysis

In 2015, the refugee crisis surprised the European Union which had underestimated people’s

22

desperationandthecouragetorisktheirlivesbytakingthedangerousjourneytoEurope.Reasons

whypeoplefledfromcrisiscountriesintheMiddleEastandAfricatoEuropewerevarious.They

included an inhumane situation without prospects in the neighbouring countries, the German

suspension of the Dublin Regulation for Syrians, the discovery of the Balkan route and the

recognitionthatapplyingforasylumintheEUisrelativelyeasy.Thisputpressureontheunionto

implementnecessarymeasures. TheEU respondedwith the creationof a Europeanagendaon

migrationandshifted its focus fromsaving livestothetreatmentofpeoplethatset footonEU

territory.Due to the flaws in theDublinRegulations,member states engaged indiscussionson

burdensharingandpermanentreallocationschemes.Easternmemberstatesopposedpermanent

distribution schemes while Western member states favoured them. Due to those diverging

memberstateinterests,onlyareallocationof160.000refugeesfromItalyandGreecewasagreed

upon.Hence,noagreementonapermanentdistributionmechanismwasreached.

Germany, too, found itself surprised and unprepared due to the previous adoption of a low

migration profile. The high refugee influx transformed the country into a state of crisis. As a

reaction,theGermangovernmentengagedinmeasuresthatreflectedanopen-doorpolicywhich

were justifiedwith argumentsbasedon values andpracticalities. In this context, threedecisive

policydecisionsreflectthegovernment’schangeofcourse:thesuspensionoftheDublinRegulation

for Syrian refugees, the absorption of the refugees inHungary, and the decision to implement

bordercontrolswithoutsealingtheborderforrefugees.Hence,Germanyrespondedtothecrisis

withapolicychange.

ChancellorMerkel significantly contributed to thepositiveportrayal of the crisis andher policy

approach and enjoyed support from a big part of German society and themedia. This helped

legitimizingasignificantpolicychangeawayfromthediscouragingasylumpolicyitpursuedforthe

past20years.However,theopen-doorpolicyalsoreceivedpubliccriticismfromwithinherparty.

Additionally, right wing protests and violence posed a strong contrast to the German

‘Willkommenskultur’thatwascelebratedinternationallyasGermanswelcomedandtookcareof

arrivingrefugeesontrainstations.Nevertheless,intheend,Mrs.Merkel’spolicyapproachallowed

for890,000registeredrefugeestoarriveinGermanyin2015.

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3. |Chapter3:TheoreticalFramework

The theory section is composedof twoparts. First, Iwill explain indetail theMultiple Streams

FrameworkwhichservesasguidelineforthedatacollectionthatwillbeelaboratedoninChapter

5.Secondly,Iwillreviewtheliteraturethatadds,criticizesoremphasizesontheMSF.Theliterature

isbasedonthefindingsofthesituationanalysisandongeneraldebatescirculatingaroundtheMSF.

3.1. Kingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework

TheMultipleStreamFramework(abbrev.MSF)whichispartofJohnW.Kingdon’sagenda-setting

theory was originally published in 1984. It is regarded one of the most relevant and debated

theories of public policy (Baumgartner in Zahariadis N., 2016). For this paper, it serves as a

theoreticalguidelineforthedatacollectionwhichissummarizedinthefindingschapter.Generally,

themodelhasreceivedmuchappraisalaswellascritiqueandwastestedinavarietyofpolicyfields.

However,itisimportanttonotethatthenumberoftimesthefullmodelhasbeenappliedtoreality

issparse.AlthoughasignificantnumberofresearchershavereferredtoKingdon’sMSFtheyhave

usuallydonesoby identifying individualelementsof themodel (suchaspolicyentrepreneuror

window of opportunity) in order to provide background to their papers. However, researchers

rarely have applied those concepts directly. A significantly smaller number of researchers have

madeactualuseoftheelementsintheiranalysiswhileanevensmallernumberhasappliedthefull

MSFtopolicyanalysis(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Hence,Ialsohopetocontributetothebody

ofresearchbyapplyingthefullmodeltorealityascoherentlyaspossible.

For the case of the German refugee policy approach in 2015, theMSF has been chosen as a

frameworkfordatacollectionbutalsoasamodeltobechallengedandtested.Kingdonarguesthat

theMFSexplainshowandwhatkindofideasreachthepoliticalagendaandeventuallycausepolicy

change(Kingdon,2011).Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis(2013)addthatthemodelexploreswhichactors

participate during a window of opportunity, how issues are framed and how skilled policy

entrepreneurs politicallymanipulate the process. Thus, I expect themodel to help explain the

drivingforcesbehindthechangesinGermanasylumpolicy.Additionally,LuciaOverpeltandIwould

liketoexplorehowandwhytheGermanpolicyapproachdifferedtotheoneoftheNetherlands.

3.1.1. Theframeworkinperspective

WiththeMultipleStreamsFramework,Kingdonaimedatexpressingthechaoticandunpredictable

nature of the American public policy-making process while still carving out clear patterns. By

providingatooltounderstandtheagenda-settingprocess,theMSFexplainshowideasmoveupon

24

theagenda.ItspointofdepartureisCohen,MarchandOlsen’sGarbageCanModel(Kingdon,2011).

Itdescribeshowfourstreamsthathavealifeoftheirownrunthroughanorganization:Problems,

solutions, participants and choice opportunities. The moment a choice opportunity runs by

availableparticipants,problemsandsolutionsevokechange.Achoiceopportunitycanbeviewed

asagarbagecanintowhichavarietyofproblemsandsolutionsarecastoffbyparticipantsasthey

are generated (Cohen,March,&Olsen, 1972). TheMSF shows Kingdon’s attempt to apply the

GarbageCanModeltothepoliticalsetting.

According to Kingdon, there are two important factors that need to be considered when

investigatingwhichissuesarriveontheagendainthepublicpolicy-makingprocess:Processesand

participants.First,theMFSincludesthreeprocesses:Problems,policyproposalsandpolitics(see

Figure6).Theseareindependentstreamswhichdevelopinaccordancewiththeirownrulesand

dynamics. Despite their independence, there is a critical juncture at which the three streams

intersect.Thismeans that “aproblem is recognized,a solution isavailable, thepolitical climate

makesthetimerightforchange,andtheconstraintsdonotprohibitaction.”(Kingdon,2011,p.88).

Atthispoint,policyentrepreneurs,whohavedevelopedpolicyproposalsandwaitedforproblems

orchangesinthepoliticalstreamtocomealong,attachtheirsolutions.Consequently,thismight

evoke policy change. The opportunity for an entrepreneur to push a proposal is called ‘policy

window’. It isusuallyonlyopenforashorttimebeforeitclosesagain,sincepolicymakerssoon

focustheirattentiononsomethingelse(Kingdon,2011).Asasecondfactor,theroleofparticipants

inside11andoutside12thegovernmentneedstobehighlighted.Participantscanbeinvolvedinany

orinseveralstreamsoftheMSF.Kingdonemphasizesthatisimportanttomakeadifferentiation

betweenparticipantsandprocesses(Kingdon,2011).Ingeneral,itneedstobeacknowledgedthat

in other countries, different participantsmight be involved in thepolicy process than theones

KingdondefinedfortheAmericancontext.

TheMSFisbasedonthreeapproacheswhichincludethetracingoforiginsofinitiatives,rational

andcomprehensivedecisionmaking,andincrementalism.WiththetracingoforiginsKingdonwants

toillustratethattheproximateoriginofpolicychangevariesfromcasetocase.Duetoaninfinite

regress,anultimateoriginofanideaorproposalcannotbespecified.Additionally,topicsdonot

movefromparticipanttoparticipantwitharegularpattern.Hence,ifapersonwouldtraceback

thepathofaproposal’shistory,therewouldbenologicalplacetostoptheprocess(Kingdon,2011).

11Participants inside thegovernmentcomprise theadministration including thePresidentandstaff, civil servantsand theCongress(Kingdon,2011).12Participantsoutsidethegovernment includeinterestgroups;researchers,academics,consultants,foundationsandthinktanks;themedia;election-relatedparticipantsandthepublicopinion(Kingdon,2011).

25

Secondly,theapproachofcomprehensiveandrationaldecisionmakingshouldemphasizethefact

thatpolicymakersactuallydonotmakedecisionsrationally.Kingdonjustifiesthisbypointingout

theirfailuretodefinegoalsclearlyandtocomparealternativessystematically.Thisgoeshandin

handwithhisdenialofthefactthatpolicyproceedsinorderlystages.Heratherclaimsthatstreams

develop independentlyandare logicallycoequal (Kingdon,2011).Thirdly,Kingdonexpresseshis

disagreementwithCharlesLindblomwhoarguesthatpolicychangeoccursincrementally(Kingdon,

2011; Lindbloem, 1959). His study proves that agendas change in a discontinuous and non-

incrementalmanner(Kingdon,2011).Thesethreeelementsserveasbaselineforhismodel.

3.1.2. Thethreestreams

ThethreestreamsformthefundamentalsoftheMSF.Theyaremarkedbydifferentcharacteristics

andcomposedofdifferentfactors(seeFigure6).

3.1.2.1. Theproblemstream

Theproblemstreamdescribeshowconditionsreceiveattentionandsubsequentlytransforminto

politicalproblems.Problemsattract attentionofpeople in andaroundgovernmentby focusing

events,suchascrisesordisasters;byfeedbackofcurrentprogramsandbysystematicindicators

and indicator changes. Firstly, indicators refer to activities and events such as disease rates,

consumerprices, or highwaydeaths. Indicators aremostly assessed tounderstand aproblem’s

magnitude or to raise awareness of changes in a problem. Additionally, people around and in

governmentlookforchangesinindicators,becausetheymightrepresentachangeinasystem’s

state.Secondly,focusingeventsmightturnpeople’sattentiontoindicatorsorproblemsiftheyare

notself-evident.Forinstance,disastersorcrisesrepresentfocusingevents.Thirdly,feedbackserves

asamoreprogrammaticfactorthanindicators.Feedbackabouttheoperationofexistingprograms

that reach government officials often bring problems to their attention. Contents of feedback

messages can include the realisation that a programmes implementation does not squarewith

higherorlegislativeadministrativeintent;thefailuretomeetstatedgoals;thecostofaprogramme

orunanticipatedconsequencesofapublicpolicythatcomestotheattentionofdecisionmakers

(Kingdon,2011).

Some attention needs to be devoted to the way problems are defined. A condition does not

necessarilyhavetobeaproblem.Itmighttransformintoaproblemwhenpeoplestartbelieving

thattheyneedtodosomethingaboutit.Hence,conditionstranslateintoproblemswiththehelp

ofvalues,comparisonsandcategories.Peopledefineproblemsbycomparingtheircurrentsituation

26

withthevaluestheyhaveregardingmoreidealsituations.Amismatchbetweenone’sconception

of an ideal state and the observed conditions becomes a problem. Additionally, problems are

defined by the comparison people make about their own situation with other countries. For

instance, relative disadvantages and inequality might pose a problem. Lastly, the way people

categorize subjects defines problems. In that sense, struggle over a problem definition might

dependonthedefiningcategoriesandthewaytheywillbeused.Thisimpliesthatpeoplemightbe

unabletojudgeaproblembyitscategory,butacategorycanstructuretheperceptionpeoplehave

aboutaproblem(Kingdon,2011).

3.1.2.2. Thepolicystream

Thepolicystreamdescribespolicycommunitieswhichconcentrateongeneratingpolicyproposals.

Kingdonreferstothe‘primevalsoup’whenhedescribesideasfloatingaroundandfadinginthese

policy communities (Kingdon, 2011, p. 116). Existing and new ideas confront each other and

combineinvariousways.Ideasthatmeetcertaincriteriasurviveandturnintoimportantpolicies

asinanaturalselectionprocess(Kingdon,2011).

Someattentionneedstobepaidtotheroleofpolicycommunitiesandpolicyentrepreneurs.Firstly,

policycommunitiesconsistofintimatecyclesofspecialistsinacertainpolicyareawhoarescattered

bothwithin and outside government. They share a common concernwith one policy area and

interactwitheachother.Inpolicycommunities,intellectualpuzzlesanddilemmasarebeingsolved

andalternativesdevelopedbymuddling throughproposalsandproblems. Secondly, the roleof

policyentrepreneursistoadvocateforproposalsandideas(Kingdon,2011).Theydosobycrafting

meaningwhichtheydisseminatetopolicymakerstogainattentionandtomobilizesupport(Ackrill,

Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Whiletheydonotnecessarilyneedtobepartofapolicycommunity,they

arewillingtoinvesttheirresourcesinthehopeforafuturereturn.Theirgenerationofsolutions

canoccur intwoways:Theyeithersenseaproblemandadvocateasolutiontosolve it;orthey

become advocates for solutions and look for current problems to which they attach their pet

solutions.Hence,policycommunitiesandentrepreneursareessentialforthesuccessofapolicy

proposal(Kingdon,2011).

Policyentrepreneursmakeuseofavarietyof tactics toensure thesuccessfuladoptionof their

proposals.Themostimportantoneisthe‘softeninguptechnique’.Itinvolvesadvocatingfortheir

ideasinmanydifferentforumswhichsoftensupchangeresistantpolicycommunitiesandpublics

thatgetusedtonewideasandbuildacceptance.Whenanopportunityemergesthatallowsfor

pushing a proposal, theway has been paved.Without this procedure, a proposalmight fail to

27

succeed,evenwhenbeingpushedattherighttime(Kingdon,2011).Secondly,theirproposalswill

have an increased chance to survive whenmatching three criteria - technical feasibility, value

acceptability and anticipation of future constraints. Hence, a successful proposal is usually

softened-upandfulfilsthethreecriteria(Kingdon,2011).

3.1.2.3. Thepoliticalstream

Thepoliticalstreamconstitutesthebroaderenvironmentinwhichpolicyismade(Ackrill,Kay,&

Zahariadis,2013). It isassembledfrompartisan,electoralorpressuregroupfactors. Itsets itself

apartfromhappeningsinthepolicycommunitiesandfromtheproblemstream.Developmentsin

thepolitical streamaffect agendas,because theypossess thepower topushnew itemson the

agendawhileensuringthatotheritemsgetpostponed(Kingdon,2011).

Thefirstelementofthepoliticalstreamisthenationalmood13.Itispredicatedontheassumption

thatalargenumberofcitizensthinkalongthesamelines.Themoodcanchangefromtimetotime

and these changes can significantly impact on policy agendas and outcomes. Government

participants sense the nationalmood in order to promote items on their policy agenda and to

preventothersfrombecomingprominentbypushingthemintoobscurity.Therefore,changesin

thenationalmoodaffecttheadministration’ssuccessincreatingnewproposals.Themooddoes

not necessarily evolve from the masses, but can come from anywhere. For instance, social

movements can change the mood when being effectively organized and leaded. Successful

movements can spill into the general public and eventually have electoral impact. As a result,

politiciansoftenjumponthebandwagonwhichcanadduptothekindofshiftinthenationalmood.

Consequently,amoodshift canmakecertainproposalsviable thatwerenotviablebefore,and

outweighalternativeproposals(Kingdon,2011).

The second element of the political stream refers to organized political forces. Kingdonmainly

focusesoninterestgroups.However,intheGermansystem,partiesandtheirspokespersonswho

areoftenrepresentedaspoliticalelitesneedtobeincludedaswell.Theymightbemoreoutspoken

and influential inGermanythan intheUSbecausethemulti-partysystemallowsfortheirwider

involvementinthepolicy-makingprocess.Inthisconnection,HillcriticizesKingdonforunderplaying

thedimensionofpoliticsintheagenda-settingprocess(Hill,2013).Furthermore,isimportantto

understandthatthoseforcescreatetheenvironment inwhichpoliticaldecisionmakershaveto

balancebetweenthepro-andcontraargumentsonagivenproposalortheriseofanagendaitem.

13Pleasenote:Nationalmoodandpublicopinioncanbeusedinterchangeablythroughoutthispaper.

28

People around and in the government, sense the interplay of support and opposition through

communicationflows(Kingdon,2011).Whileinthepolicystreamconsensusismainlybuiltthrough

persuasion,thepoliticalstreamisdominatedbybargaining(Kingdon,2011).

Thethirdelementiscomposedofeventswithinthegovernmentsuchasturnoversofkeypersonnel

and questions of jurisdictions. The turnover of personnelmight lead to the generation of new

prioritiesonto theagenda.Thequestionof jurisdiction,on theotherhand, concerns itselfwith

constitutions,statueschartersandregulations.Inthisrespect,agendasettingisaffectedbytheturf

battlesofadministrativeagenciesandcommittees(Kingdon,2011).Concluding,thenationalmood,

politicalforcesandeventswithingovernmentcomposethepoliticalstream.

3.1.3. Policywindowsandtheroleofcoupling

Next, the role and functioning of policywindows and coupling needs to be explained. A policy

window is “the result of an iterative process between problems, solutions, actors and events.”

(Natali,2004,p.1080).Whenpolicywindowsopen,thecouplingofthethreestreamsismostlikely

tohappen.Hence,aproblemisdefined,asolutioniscreatedandpushedbyanentrepreneurand

a political change provides the right time for policy change. It describes the moment when

proposals are linked to political exigencies, and alternatives are introduced once the agenda

changes.Inthisrespect,itisimportanttorecognizethatthewindowisonlyopenforashorttime

periodduringwhich thedifferent streams joinandarecoupled.Thenentrepreneurspush their

problem conceptions, political forces andproposals into the choiceopportunity. Theoutcomes

dependonhowtheelementsaremixedandcoupled.Theagendaismorelikelytobeaffectedby

thepoliticalandtheproblemsstreamwhilethealternativesareinfluencedbythepolicystream.

Therefore,awindowopensbecauseofanewproblemwhichcapturesattentionorbecauseofa

shiftinthepoliticalstreamsuchasachangeofadministration,apoliticalturnoverorachangein

thenationalmood(Kingdon,2011).Itisimportanttobeawarethatwindowscanbeofpredictable

of unpredictable nature. In the unpredictable case the joining is accidental and forces the

governmenttomoveonedirectionortheother(Kingdon,2011).Hence,theappearanceofapolicy

windowcancausesignificantconsequences.

29

3.2. LiteratureReview

The intellectual impact of Kingdon’s agenda-setting theory has been discussed widely. Many

researchers(partly)appliedhismodelanddeemeditasausefultoolcompatiblewithavarietyof

policyarenas(Baumgartner,2015;Sabatier,2007).Nevertheless,itisarguedthatthemodellacks

clarityandinternalconsistency(Sabatier,2007).OnepossiblereasonisthatKingdononlyfocuses

ontheagenda-settingprocess intheUS.However,scholarsarguethatoneshouldnotholdthis

againsthim,becauseheprovidesageneral,usefultoolkittoexplaincontextualchange(Ackrill,Kay,

&Zahariadis,2013;Hill,ThePublicPolicyProcess,2013).CarineyandZahariadisperceivetheMSF

as a lens that explains US policy under the conditions of ambiguity. In their opinion its major

strength lies in providing an insight in interactions between institutions and agency (Cairney&

Zhariadis,2016).Inthisregard,themodelexplainsthewaythepolicyprocessworksin“’organized

anarchies’,where there isashifting rosterofparticipants,opaquetechnologies,and individuals

withunclearpreferences”(Cairney&Zhariadis,2016,para.1).

The literature review provides a discussion of elements of the MSF that seem to be relevant

accordingtothesituationanalysisandaccordingtoimportantscholarsinthefield.

Figure 6: A Multiple Streams Model of Policymaking (Gagnon & Labonte, 2013)

30

3.2.1. Thenatureofpolicychange

Atfirst,itiscrucialtoaddressageneraldebatesurroundingtheMSFthatisofimportancetothis

casestudy–thequestionswhetherpolicychangesoccurinanincrementaloranabruptmanner.

On the one hand, Lindblom claims that policy change occurs in small incremental steps. They

proceedfromsmall,marginaladjustmentsmadebypolicymakerswhosebehaviourhedescribes

as‘muddlingthrough’(Lindbloem,1959).Kingdonagreeswiththenon-rationaldecisionmaking,

butdisagreeswithLindblomonthefactthatpolicyproceedsinorderlystages.Hearguesthatthe

generationofalternativescanberegardedasanincrementalprocess,butthatthisdoesnotapply

toagendachangeswhichhappen inanon-incrementalanddiscontinuousway (Kingdon,2011).

ThisviewissupportedbyBaumgartnerandJoneswhoclaimthatpublicattentiontosocialissues

cannot be described as being incremental. Here, they refer to the public agenda which often

experiences dramatic sudden agenda changes evoked by negative feedback in agenda-setting

processesandpolitics.Withtheirtheoryof‘punctuatedequilibria’,theyclaimthatlargeshiftsoccur

inwhich the agenda is resetmore radically after it experiencedaperiodof stability andminor

adaptations(Jones&Baumgartner,2005).ThistheoryisdevelopedfurtherbyCapoccia&Kelemen

whorefertocriticaljunctures.Inthecontextofpath-dependentprocesses,criticaljuncturesare

short moments during which agent choices encounter an increased probability to affect the

outcome of interest. Hence, agents havemore freedom in decision-making. It is important to

recognizethatthedecisionsmadewithinacriticaljuncturemayevokeapath-dependentprocess

(Capoccia&Kelemen,2007).Thesituationanalysissuggeststhelikelihoodofacriticaljuncturein

combinationwithapath-dependentsequence;however,thedetailsneedtobeinvestigatedinthe

datacollectionprocess.

3.2.2. Contextual factors: Decision making during times of crisis and in multi-levelstructures

Whentherefugee influx increased inGermany, thegovernmentneededtomakedecisionsthat

wereaffectedbyacrisisandbymulti-leveldiplomacy.Thosecontextualfactorswhichinfluencethe

problemandthepolicystreamaredisregardedbytheMSF.

3.2.2.1. Decisionmakinginacrisismode

Acrisismightchangethenatureandoperationalproceduresofthepolicystream.Asthesituation

analysissuggestsGermanyfounditselfinacrisismode.Inhisbook,Kingdonreferstotheopening

ofpolicywindowsthroughcrises,buthedoesnotrefertothecircumstancesofpolicy-makingin

crisissituations.Rather,heassumesthatpolicyentrepreneursandpolicy-makershavesufficient

31

time to flesh out one ofmany solutions to a problem. However, according to literaturemore

complex policy windows such as those caused by a crisis might change the decision-making

proceduresandthereforethenatureofthepolicystreamasaprimevalsoupaswellasthenature

ofpolicyentrepreneurs.

Firstofall,itisimportanttodefinecrisisandthecircumstancesthataccompanythepeopledealing

withit.Acrisisis“aseriousthreattothebasicstructuresorthefundamentalvaluesandnormsof

asystem,whichundertimepressureandhighlyuncertaincircumstancesnecessitatesmakingvital

decisions.”(Rosenthal,Charles,&t'Hart,1989,p.10).Itiscomposedofthreeelements–threat,

uncertaintyandurgency.Threatalonedoesnotnecessarily leadtoaction(e.g.climatechange);

however, it is timecompression thaturges leaders toact.Timeconstraintsalsosignify that the

usual policy-making methods of debating and selecting the most suitable proposal cannot be

applied.Moreover,thefactthatdecisionsareoftenhighlyconsequentialwhileinvolvingdilemmas

anduncertaintiesaboutfuturedevelopmentsrequiresleaderstobediscrete.Furthermore,during

crises,citizenslookattheirleaders,becausetheyexpectthemtominimizethedamageofthecrisis

andeliminatethethreat(Boinetal.,2005).Thus,leadersfacetheresponsibility“tohelpsafeguard

societyfromtheadverseconsequencesofthecrisis”andguidethenationoutofthecrisis(Boinet

al.,2005,p.10).Thesecircumstancesforceleaderstoactquicklyandoftenonlyunderconsultation

ofaveryclosegroupofdecisionmakers(Boinetal.,2005).

This unusual manner of decision making contradicts the MSF model in three ways. Firstly, it

providespolitical leaderswithmorepowerthanindicatedbyKingdon.Inhisbook,Kingdononly

devotesasmallsectionto‘thepresident’.Inthisconnection,heindicatesthatthepresidentcan

settheagendasinglehandedlyandthathisbillstakethefirstspotinthequeue.However,healso

statesthatthepresidentisunabletodominatetheseriousalternativesandthereforetodetermine

thepolicyoutcome(Kingdon,2011).Though,literaturesuggeststhatleaderstakeonkeydecision

makingrolesduringcrises.Also,thesituationanalysismakesusbelievethatChancellorMerkel,as

aleader,hadacrucialroleinthepolicydebate.However,becauseKingdondoesnotrefertopolicy-

makingincrisissituations,heunderestimatesthepotentialpowerofpoliticalleaders.

Secondly,thereisreasontobelievethatpolicycommunitieshavealessimportantroleindecision

makingduringcrises.Thefactthatleadersneedtomakequickanddiscretedecisionsimpliesthat

alternativesarenotbeingchosenafterbeingdiscussed inofficial forumsorpolicycommunities

attendedbypolicyentrepreneurs.Ifthiswastrue,thenthepolicystreamasdescribedbyKingdon

mightnotapplytoacrisissituationliketheoneweareanalysing.

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Thirdly,connectedtobothpreviouspointsistheassumptionthatpoliticalleadersmightactaskey

decisionmakersandaspolicyentrepreneursatthesametime.Originally,policyentrepreneursare

thecrucialmeansofproducingactionwhilecraftingcontestablemeaningwhichtheydisseminate

topolicymakers(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).They influencepolicychangebychoosingthe

alternativesdecisionmakerscanpickfrom(Kingdon,2011).Whendecisionmakersbecomepolicy

entrepreneurs they potentially develop and choose their own policy solutions. In contrast to

Kingdon’sunderstanding,thismeansthattheypossessthepowertosteerthedirectionofpolicy

outcomes (Zahariadis N. , 2008). This option is widely discussed even in relation to non-crisis

scenarios.Accordingtoscholars,therearedifferentreasonswhythoserolescanblur.Ackrill,Kay,

&Zahariadis(2013)whoclaimthatEUdecision-makingtakesplaceinanenvironmentdominated

byambiguitysuggestthatpolicyentrepreneursmustbeseenintheircontextinordertoapprehend

theirinfluenceinpolicychange.Politicalactorsarerationalandself-determiningwhileoperatingin

particular contexts. For this reason, they might engage in “creative policy-making strategies”

(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013,p.14).Anotherreasonwhythelinebetweendecisionmakersand

policyentrepreneursmightblurisconnectedtothecrisisscenario.Certainpolicyissueswhichare

salientinpolicywindowsmightbesocomplexthattheydemandauniquesolutionanddonotleave

muchroomtomanoeuvreforentrepreneurialagency.Thesameappliestowindowsthatcreate

short-term,time-pressuredpoliticalagendas(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Inthisrespect,the

generalassumptionisthat‘somethingneedstobedone’(Ackrill&Kay,2011).Here,itisthenature

of thepolicywindow that forcesdecisionmakers to create and choose apolicy solutionwhich

makesthembecomepolicyentrepreneurs(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Hence,Ackrill&Kay

claim that the separation between policy entrepreneurs and decisionmakers as suggested by

Kingdon is too stark. They recommend to draw an analytical distinction between the policy

entrepreneurs as individuals and the process describing policy entrepreneurship (Ackrill & Kay,

2011).Whenconsideringpolicyentrepreneurshipasasetofbehaviours,ratherthanapermanent

characteristic,itallowsforbetterapprehensionofactionsmadeincertainpolicy-makingsituations

(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).Concluding,thequestionwhetherthepolicystreamchangesits

natureundertheinfluenceofacrisisneedstobeaddressedintheresearch.

3.2.2.2. Multi-leveldiplomacy

Thesituationanalysis shows that thepolitical struggle related to the refugeecrisisdidnotonly

include the national decision-making level, but also the European level. However, Kingdon’s

frameworklackstheinclusionofmulti-levelstructuresandtwo-levelgames,sincepolicysolutions

are largely produced domestically in his framework (Cairney & Zhariadis, 2016). Hence, the

33

questionwhether outside factors and decisionmaking in the context of amulti-level structure

affectsthethreestreamsinthenationalsettingneedstobeaddressed.

Atthispoint,onemustacknowledgethatissuesaswellasresponsesinformofdecision-making

processeshavebecomemoreglobalsincethefirsttimetheMSFwaspublished.Inrespecttothe

refugeecrisis,Rosenauwouldarguethatitisatypicalexampleforanissuethatinterlinksdomestic

and international affairs and therefore requires global response. When dynamics such as the

occurrenceofwarsshift,thentheconsequencesofthosedevelopmentswillaffecteverylevelof

community–fromtheprovincialtotheinternationallevel(Rosenau,1995).Inthisrespect,modern

criseshavebecomeincreasinglycomplexbydisregardingcommonboundariesbutincludingdeep

additionalproblemsandprolongedimpacts(Rosenthal1998;‘tHartandBoin2001inBoin&t'Hart,

2003).Forthisreason,theyrequireresponsesinformofcontrolmechanismsthatreachbeyond

nationalboundaries.Thistranslatesintointernationalsystems,suchastheEuropeanUnion,which

diminishnationalentitiesandtheextensionoflocalmechanisms.Insum,whengovernmentscreate

nationalpolicies,theywillincreasinglyclashwithinternationalframeworkswhocreatepoliciesthat

lieoutsidethelegalstateframeworks(Rosenau,1995).Therefore,aglobalissuemightaffectthe

threestreamsofnationalpolicy-making.

AnothertheorythatsupportsRosenauisStephenson’sMulti-LevelGovernancetheory.Itregards

theEUasamultilevelstructureandreferstothenotionthatmemberstatesengageindispersed

policymaking activity which involves multiple actors (institutions and individuals) at different

political levels. Although there are geographical separation and spatial distinctions, there is an

intimateentanglementbetweentheinternationalandthedomesticlevelsofauthority.Atitsheart

liesthecommunityandself-governancewhicharerepresentedinpoliticalpartiesandthepublic

opinion(Stephenson,2013).Theseframeworksillustratetheinfluencesondecisionmakinginthe

EuropeanUnionon anational and an international level.However, theMSF remains limited in

specifyingthiscontextandthedescribedlinks(Ackrill,Kay,&Zahariadis,2013).

Therefore, it also disregards policy practices, such as two-level games. They involve the

engagementofstaterepresentativesinnegotiationsattheinternationallevelinordertoreacha

tentativeagreement.Meanwhile,theyengageinseparatediscussionsatthenationallevelinorder

to decide whether to ratify the agreements. In addition, states can degrade or improve their

bargaining positions by offering small or large win-sets (Putnam, 1988). Thus, international

positionsareinfluencedbydomesticpoliticsandtheotherwayaround.Thismightbeanimportant

factorofconsiderationwhenapplyingtheMSF.

34

Inconclusion, ifdecisionmaking isembedded inaspecialcontextsuchasacrisissituationora

multi-levelstructure,itistobeexpectedthatthepolicystreamchangesitsoriginalnature.Towhat

extentandinwhatwaythisisthecaseneedstobeinvestigatedwithinthiscasestudy.Also,the

questions if and how those contexts affect the problem and the political stream should be

addressedbythisresearch.

3.2.3. Participantinteractionandverbalpowerinthepoliticalstream

Literature challenges Kingdon’s description of the political stream in several ways. To clarify,

Kingdon says that the political stream consists of shifts in the nationalmood, the influence of

political forces and political turnovers. In general, he refers to the institutional power of those

forces.However,scholarsbelievethatparticipantsinthepoliticalstreammightberatherpowerful

throughtheirverbalpowerandinteractionprocesseswitheachother.Boinetal.suggestthatin

crisissituationspoliticalactors14,massmediaandthecitizenryformatriangularrelationship(see

Figure7).Here,communicationbetweencitizensandgovernmentsismediatedandtransmittedby

massmedia in a contextwhere all other political actors try to persuademedia to convey their

opinionsandinformationtothepublic.Allconstituentsofthisrelationshipsend,receiveandabsorb

information on the crisis. This enhances their influence on theway the crisis is perceived and

managed.Thewaytheydosodependsontheirroleandpositionintheinstitutionalcontext(Boin

etal.,2005).Also,thesituationanalysissuggeststhatMerkel,themediaandthepubliccreatedthe

‘Willkommenskultur’by interactingwithandinfluencingeachother.Theirmutualagreementon

thesituationmostlikelylegitimizedMerkel’srefugeepolicyapproach.

Therearevarioustheoriesthatbuildonthistriangularrelationshipbydescribinghowthedifferent

participants interact with each other. They include discursive institutionalism, themobilization

modelandpolicyevaluation.Accordingtodiscursiveinstitutionalism,Kingdonfailstodescribehow

14includinggovernment,politicalpartiesaswellasnon-governmentalactorsandwhatKingdonreferstoasinterestgroups

Politicalactors Thepublic

Themedia

Issue

Figure 7: Triangular relationship between the media, political actors and the public

35

politiciansseektoinfluencethepublicopinionwhileatthesametimelookingforitsapproval.Itis

whatSchmidtcalls‘thecommunicativediscourse’(SchmidtV.A.,2008,p.310).Here,politicians

engagewiththegeneralpublicwiththepurposeofpresentation,legitimationanddeliberationof

political ideas. It is considered a mass process of public persuasion of political actors who

communicateandframetheprogramsandideasgeneratedamongpolicy-makers.Italsoinvolves

otheractors,suchasoppositionparties,activists,expertsandthemediawhocommunicatetheir

reactionstogovernmentpolicies.Meanwhile,thegeneralpublicrespondstothesuggestedpolicies

viagrass-rootsorganizationsandmobilizations,aswellasopinionpollsandsurveysetc.(Schmidt

V.A.,2008).ThemobilizationmodelofCobbetal.makessimilarassumptionsaddingthatpolicy

implementationisoftencontingentonbehaviourchangesandpublicacceptance(Cobb,Ross,&

Ross,1967).Inrespecttocrisissituations,Boinetal.saythatitisimportantthatpoliticalleaders

provide‘meaning’tothecrisisinawaythatthecrisismanagementeffortsareenhanced(Boinet

al.,2005,p.13).Inordertodoso,theymustbeperceivedasatrustworthyandcrediblesourceof

information.Onlywhentheyaretrusted,theirwordsandactionsareperceivedascompetentand

sincere(Boinetal.,2005).Again,thesituationanalysissuggeststhatespeciallyMerkelprovided

meaningtothecrisisinawaythatlegitimizedthechangeintheGermanrefugeepolicy.

Anotherformofinteractionnexttocommunicativediscourseispolicyevaluation.Itisdifferentto

what Kingdon calls policy feedback, because it can be highly subjective. Political actors embed

policyevaluation in the regularpolitical debateand include themedia and thewiderpublic. In

Germany policy evaluation can be observed in almost every 8 o’clock news show in form of

interviews or statements of politicians (ARD Archiv, 01.08.15 - 17.09.15). It usually focuses on

intendedresultsofpoliciesandtheirunintendedconsequenceandoften includespublicblame-

games (Fischer, Miller, & Sidney, 2007). This goes hand in hand with Stone’s conception that

politiciansusedifferentcausalexplanationstoassignresponsibilitytoproblems(Stone,2012).It

hasbeenobservedinthesituationanalysisonthenationallevelbetweenpoliticalpartiesandthe

government;andontheEuropeanlevelbetweenmemberstatesandtheEuropeaninstitutions.In

general,policyevaluationreferstotheattemptofpoliticalactorstopubliclyinfluencethepolicy-

makingprocess.

ThosemodelsrequiredeviationfromtheKingdonmodelinseveralways.First,withinthepolitical

stream,Kingdonreferstotheinstitutionalpowerthepublicopinionandpoliticalforcesexerton

theagendaandthepolicy-makingprocess.However,hedoesnotrefertotheverbalpowerandthe

interactionprocessesoftheseactors.Theaforementionedtheoriessuggestthattheverbalpower

36

andtheinteractionprocessesbetweenmedia,politicalactorsandthepublicmightplayacrucial

roleandshouldbetakenintoconsideration.

Thisrequiresthemediatoberegardedpartofthepoliticalstream.Accordingtotheory,themedia

mightserveasacrucialactorandmediatorinthepoliticalstreamwhileattemptingtoinfluence

occurrencesinthepolicystream.Also,thesituationanalysissuggeststhatthemediawereactively

participatinginthepoliticalprocess.AccordingtoKingdon,themediahavethepowertoaffectthe

publicagendaandshapeissues;however,healsostatesthatthemediaareunabletoaffectthe

policyagenda.Thisisduetothefactthatthatthemediaserveasmessengerandnotasshaperor

creator of messages by simply reporting on the processes in government. He denies their

independent effect on governmental agendas (Kingdon, 2011). In contrast, other researchers

attributemore importancetothemediaandrefertotheirverbalpower(Walgrave&vanAelst,

2006).For instance,Downs(1972)claimsthatthemedia influencetheextenttowhichan issue

wouldtracktheissue-attentioncycle.Moreover,Hillstatesthatthemethodsandtimingofproblem

reporting affect the political attention these problems receive. Additionally, he claims that the

mediashapeideasonthepolicyagendabypromotingsomeperspectivesandexcludingothersand

byhighlightingsimplerideasratherthanthemorecomplexones(Hill,2013).Baumgartnerbuilds

onthistheorybyarguingthateachtimemediainterestinatopicishigh,onecanexperiencesome

degreeofpolicychange(Baumgartner&Jones,2009).Thus,otherresearchersassignmorethan

just amessenger role to themediaby assuming their tactical reporting and framingof events.

Hence,duringtheresearch,ithastobeinvestigatedwhetherthemediaisanactiveparticipantin

thepoliticalstreamwhileexertinginfluenceonthepolicyagenda.

Thirdly,thepublicopinionmightbemorepowerfulthanindicatedbyKingdon.Heclarifiesthatthe

publicopinioncanindirectlythrustissuesontheagendabyencouragingvote-seekingpoliticiansto

engageintoatopic.Inaddition,hesaysthatpublicopinioncandirectgovernmentorconstrainthe

governmentfromcertainactions.Yet,hedoesnotdescribehowitisabletodoso.Kingdonalso

explainsthattherearelimitationstotheinfluenceofthepublicopinion,becauseimportantpolitical

spheresareinvisibletothepublic;andthepublicopinionisrarelyinformedenoughtoinfluencea

debate among policy specialists (Kingdon, 2011). However, the situation analysis raises the

assumption thatMerkelwas able tomake certain decisions, because her attitude towards the

refugeequestionreceivedsupportfromabigpartofthepublic(oftenreflectedinthemedia).Thus,

thepublicapprovalmighthavelegitimizedheractionsassuggestedbythemobilizationmodeland

communicativediscourse.

37

Thisisconnectedtothefourthpoint–thefactthatpoliticalactorsseektoinfluencepublicopinion

forvariousreasons.Kingdonsaysthatpoliticalactorstrytosensepublicopinion(Kingdon,2011).

Also,hestatesthatpublicopinion“may,insomeimportantrespects,beanechoofeventsatthe

governmental level” (Kingdon,2011,p.149);however,hedoesnot indicatethatpoliticalactors

activelyseektoinfluencepublicopinionfortheirpurposes.Yet,contemporaryliteraturebelieves

thatthisisthecase.Asstatedabove,crisismanagementliteraturebelievesthatifgovernmental

actors successfully frame the nature of a crisis, they hold the key to define the appropriate

resolutionstrategies.Forthisreason,theyneedtoinfluenceordirecttheopinionsandbehaviorof

the citizenry (Boin et al., 2005). Interestingly, the situation analysis suggests that this was

elaborately done by Chancellor Merkel. Communicative discourse and the mobilization model

describethesamephenomenonfornon-crisissituations.Evenregardinggenericpolicydecisions

political actors seek for agreement and approval of the public. This shows that Kingdonmight

underestimatethefactthatthepublicopinionispotentiallyshapedbypoliticalactorsinawaythat

theycanachievetheirgoals.Concluding,theinfluenceofverbalinteractionofdifferentparticipants

inthepoliticalstreamoneachotherandonthepolicydecisionsneedstobeinvestigatedduring

theprocess-tracingprocedure.

3.3. Conclusionofthetheorysection

The thorough explanation of the MSF shows that the model is elaborate, detailed and highly

abstract inmanyways reflecting on the chaotic and unpredictable nature of the public policy-

makingprocess.ThediscussionofthetheoryillustratedthepossibilitythattheMSFmighthaveto

beadjustedwhenbeingappliedtothecaseofthispaper.Severalelementsthatwerediscussed

needtobetakenintoconsiderationduringthedatacollectionprocess.

1. Thedebatewhetherpolicychangeoccursinincrementalwaysorinanabruptfashionthrough

punctuatedequilibriaorcriticaljuncturesincombinationwithapath-dependentdevelopment

needstobeaddressed.

2. Iwill need topayattention towhetherpolicy-making in the contextof a crisis changes the

natureofthepolicystream.Inthisregard,itisimportanttoconsiderthespecialcircumstances

ofurgencyanddiscretionunderwhichleadersneedtomaketheirdecisions.Therefore,italso

needstoberesearchedwhetherpolicycommunitiesreallyhavethechancetoinfluencethe

policy-makingprocess.Thisisconnectedtothequestionwhetherdecisionmakerscanactas

policyentrepreneursandwhetherpolicyentrepreneurshipshouldratherberegardedasaset

ofbehavioursthanasapermanentcharacteristic.

38

3. Decision making that is affected by global issues and multi-level structures also needs

examination.Next to crisis circumstances, this is an areawhichhas not been addressedby

Kingdon’sMSF.Theeffectofthosecontextualfactorsonthethreestreamsinanationalsetting

needstobeexplored.

4. Finally, the research needs to address the verbal power and the influence of interaction

betweendifferentparticipantsinthepoliticalstream.Thetheorythatthemedia,politicalactors

and the public form a triangular relationship which includes flows of communication,

interactionandinfluenceasdescribedbycommunicativediscourse,themobilizationmodeland

policyevaluationneedstobeexploredandspecified.Thisisalsoconnectedtothedebatewhich

rolethemediaplayinthepolicy-makingprocess.Additionally,Iwillhavetopayattentionto

thequestionswhetherthepublicopinionlegitimizesgovernmentalactionandwhetherpolitical

actorsactivelyinfluencepublicopinion.

InthefollowingchapterIwillexplainhowIwillcollectdatawiththeprocess-tracingmethodand

theKingdonmodelasabackbone.Forthedatacollectionitself,Iwillneedtopayattentiontowhat

other researchers have added to or criticized in regard to theMSFmodel. The results will be

recorded in the Findings Chapter which will conclude with a diagnosis on how well the MSF

describesthepolicychangeintheGermanrefugeepolicy.Subsequently,Iwillcomparemyresults

totheDutchcaseandseewhethertheyapplytoanothercasestudy.

39

4. |Chapter4:DataCollectionandMethods

Themodel I amgoing touse inorder to testwhetherand inwhatwaychangeoccurred in the

Germanrefugeepolicyin2015istheMultipleStreamsFramework.Thischapterdefineshowthe

threestreamsandtheincludingconceptsthatconstitutetheMSFwillbemeasuredandinwhich

dimension. I will base these indications on the definitions in the theory and in the literature

sections.Moreover,IwillindicatethedatasourcesthatIamgoingtouse.Eventually,Iwillelaborate

ontheresearchapproachanddesign.

Thethreestreamsarecomposedofdifferentelementswhichillustrateconceptsthatneedtobe

researched.Theirdefinitioncanbefoundinthetheorysection.

4.1. Keyconcepts,measurementanddatasources

The problem stream consists of indicators, focusing events and policy feedback. Also, theway

problemsaredefinedandframedbypolitical,governmentalandnon-governmentalactorsplaysan

importantrole.Atthisjuncture,Iwillpayattentiontowhethervalues,comparisonsorcategories

influencetheproblemdefinitionasKingdonsuggests. Iwill focusondefinite15anddesignative16

statementsofthoseactorsaccordingtoToulmin’s“classificationofthesortsofclaimsthatcanbe

madeinarguments”(Toulmin,1958,inDryzekandBerejikian,1993,p.51).Onesourceforthose

statementswillbetheARDeveningnews,Tagesschau,duetothefactthattelevisionisthemost

popularnewsmediumforGermans.TheTagesschauhasthehighestviewingratewith10million

viewersdaily(Tagesschau,2016;SchmidtH.,2015).Additionally,interviewsandpublicstatements,

pressreleasesandconferencesandpoliticaldebateswillserveasdatasources.

Furthermore,Iwillpayattentiontofocusingeventswhichgenerateattentionandpossiblycausea

window tobeopened.Also, indicatorswhichoftencomplement thoseeventswill be regarded,

becausetheyprovideanunderstandingofaproblem’smagnitude(Kingdon,2011).Iwilllookfor

thoseevents and indicators in theTagesschaunews17. TheTagesschau isusually veryaccurate,

timelyandpositionitselfasbeingindependentformpoliticalandeconomicinterest(ARD,2016).I

willanalyseeverynewsshowinthetimeframestatedbelow.Lastly,Iwillpayattentiontopolicy

feedbackwhichincludesthetechnicalproofthatapolicyprogrammedoesnotworkthewayitwas

intendedto.

15definitive=concerningthemeaningofterms16designative=concerningquestionsoffact17TheTagesschauisthenewsshowofGermany’sfirstpublicTVchannel,ARD.

40

Concerning thepolicy stream, Iwill considerpolicy communities andpolicy entrepreneurswho

develop ideas and push them at a window opening. They will be defined as political and

governmentalactors,suchastheChancellor’staffandministries,bureaucrats,politicalpartiesand

theirspokespeople,aswellasNGO’sandthinktanks ifavailable. Iwill focusontheir ideasand

suggestions that can illustrate policy solutions and alternatives. According to Toulmin, those

statementsshouldbeadvocative18andevaluative19(Toulmin,1958,inDryzekandBerejikian,1993).

Furthermore,as literaturesuggests Iwillalsopayattentiontothemulti-levelstructure.For this

reason,IwillincludetheEuropeanagendaandstatementsofEuropeanactorsincludingmember

state leaders inregardstoGermanyandtherefugeecrisis.Furthermore, Ineedtoconsiderthe

circumstancesofdecisionmakinginacrisismodeifapplicable.Toretrievethisdata,Iwillmakeuse

of theTagesschaunews, interviewsandpublic statements, press releases and conferences and

politicaldebates.

Withrespecttothepoliticalstream,Iwillconsiderthepublicopinion,statementsofpoliticalactors

andinterestgroups,mediainvolvement,turnoverofkeypersonnelandquestionsofjurisdiction.In

ordertosensethepublicopinion,Iwillpayattentiontoofficialpollsandmediareferencesto,for

instance,protests.Inordertoseewhetherliteratureisrightaboutthepresence,interactionand

influenceofthetriangularrelationship,Ineedtopayattentiontoacoupleoffactors.First,Iwill

analyseevaluativestatementsofpoliticalactorsandinterestgroupsinreferencetothesuggested

policysolutionorformerpolicieswhichshouldreflectpolicyevaluation(Toulmin,1958,inDryzek

andBerejikian,1993).Here,Ialsowatchoutforblamegamesamongpoliticians.Iwilllookforthem

inthemedia,debatesandpressstatements.Secondly,Iwillanalysethepresenceandtheroleof

themedia inthepoliticalstream.Here, Iwillpayattentiontowhetherandhowcommunicative

discourse20 occurs between themedia, the public andpolitical actors. Again, themedia, public

debatesandpress-statementswillserveassources.Inthisconnection,Iwillneedtofocusonthe

questionwhetherpoliticalactorsactivelyinfluencethepublicopinionandwhetherpublicopinion

legitimizesgovernmentalactioninreturn.

4.2. Researchapproachanddesign

ThisstudywillbeconductedasaqualitativecasestudywiththeGermanrefugeepolicyillustrating

thecaseofresearch.Withinthecase,theMSFwillbeappliedtothreemainpoliticaldecisionsthat

shouldreflecttheoverallchangethatGermanyexperiencedinitsrefugeepolicyin2015.Thus,the

18advocative=somethingthatshouldorshouldnotexist19evaluative=concernstheworthofsomethingwhichdoesorcouldexist 20asdefinedinliterature

41

three decisions occurring in a path-dependent fashion are the main reasons why Germany

absorbed890.000refugeesin2015.Generally,theMSFservesasskeletonstructureforgathering

researchdata.

Thestudyisdescriptiveincludingexploratoryelementsandaimsattestingandgeneratingtheory.

Firstly, thedescriptivenaturepredominates,because itdocumentsacausalprocess(clarifyinga

sequenceofstagesorsteps)andreportsonthecontextandbackgroundofasituation(Neuman,

2014). However, while exploring patterns of empirical facts, there is a great overlap between

descriptionandexploration(Toshkov,2016).SincetheMSFhasneverbeenappliedtotheGerman

refugeecrisis, thisresearchformulatesquestionsfor futureresearchandexploresnewterritory

(Neuman,2014).Ithasthereforeexploratoryelements.Secondly,itreflectsanunusualresearch

processwhichaimsattheorytestingandtheorygeneration.AtthebeginningoftheresearchIhad

plannedtosimplyapplytheMSFtothisparticularcase;however,throughouttheresearchprocess

the goal of applying themodel soon shifted to testing themodel. This is due to the fact that

inconsistenciesweredetectedintheliteraturereviewandwhenapplyingthemodeltothecase.

Thetheorytestingpart requiredadeductiveresearchapproach.However,since Ialsoaimedat

generatingtheorybypotentiallycomplementingMSF,theresearchispartiallyinductive.Thismixed

approachwillshowinconstantlygoingbackandforthbetweenempiricalfindingsandtheory.

Tolimittheresearch,Ihaveappliedarealistictimeframe.Thethreepoliticaldecisionsofanalysis

occurredbetweenAugust25andSeptember13,2015.Sourceswillbeanalysedindepthinthat

time-frame. However, in order to retrieve a coherent picture, the three decisions cannot be

detachedfromthebiggertimeline.TherefugeeissuestartedtooccupytheGermanpublicagenda

atthebeginningofAugust,2015.InAugust,therewasnosingledaywithoutnewsreportingonthe

refugeetopic(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-17.09.15).Forthisreason,IwillcollectfindingsfromAugust

1untilSeptember17,2015.Thetimeframeofanalysisexceedsthelastdecision,becausepolitical

decisionsareoftenanalysedretrospectively.Inthisway,Imakesurenottomissoutonvaluable

information.

The applicable research method that is used for this purpose is process tracing. It builds on

mechanisticexplanationsthatidentifycausesandeffectsaswellasthecausalpathsthatlinkthem.

Ittriestoexplainhowthecauseinfluencestheeffect(policychange)“bytracingthelinksofthe

causalchainortheinteractionsoftheelementsofamechanisticmodel”(Toshkov,2016,p.150).

Causal paths usually specify a sequence of events because mechanisms often unfold in time

(Toshkov,2016).Bydisentanglingthedifferentmechanismsthatmightproduceachange inthe

42

dependentvariableprocesstracinghelpsformulatingexpectationsaboutintermediatestepsthat

takeplace in thecausalchainofevents (Bennett&George,2006).Additionally,process tracing

facilitates the definition of observable and fine-grained implications of causal processes and

outcome.Thisenables researchers to testmultiplehypothesesandestablishcausality (Panke in

Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012). Therefore, the process-tracing method often avoids using

explanatoryhypothesesthatonlyinvestigateonecause-effectrelationship.

Theprocess-tracingmethod fits theapplicationof theMSFon the refugeecrisisdue tovarious

features itpossesses.Firstly,process tracingattempts to investigateanactor’s informationand

motivationandkeepsacloseproximitytothesubjects.Itaimsatinvestigatingwhatactorswant,

whatkindofideastheyhaveandwhattheircapabilitiesaretoachievetheirgoals.TheMSF,onthe

otherhand, is amodelwhich receives its input fromvarious actors and their actions (Toshkov,

2016).Inthisrespect,themodelandthemethodsuiteachother.Secondly,processtracingisalso

usedtorecovertheinstitutionalcontextwhileitreconstructsthechronologyofeventsthatleadto

anoutcomeofinterest.ThisisrelevantfortheMSFbecauseitmovesinstreamswhoareboundto

orinfluencecertaininstitutionalcontexts(Toshkov,2016).Additionally,timeplaysacrucialfactor

inregardtowhenpolicywindowsopenandstreamsarecoupledtoprovokepolicychange.Thirdly,

likethestructureoftheMSF,processtracingasksforflexibilitywhileincludingeventsandgeneral

facts.Furthermore,itmediatesbetweenstructureandagencyandshiftsbackandforthbetween

theabstractandtheconcretewhilebuildingexplanatoryaccounts (Toshkov,2016). In thisway,

process tracingnotonlyanswers ‘why’,butalso ‘how-come’questions (Panke inExadaktylos&

Radaelli,2012).Concluding,theapplicationofprocesstracingontheMultipleStreamsModel is

reasonable as it provides the model with enough space for research and interpretation while

accepting thatapolicychange roots inacombinationof factors thatneed tocometogether in

ordertoproduceaneffect.

However,whenapplyingprocesstracingtoasinglecasestudytheinternalvalidityishighwhilethe

external validity in regards to generalizations is limited. Thus, Panke recommends to conduct

additionalcasestudiesinordertomakegeneralizationspossibleandenhancethepositiveeffect

producedbythehighinternalvalidity(PankeinExadaktylos&Radaelli,2012).Thisincreasesthe

valueofcomparingmyresearchfindingstotheresearchfindingsintheDutchcasestudyconducted

byLuciaOverpelt.

43

5. |Chapter5:FindingsThefindingssectionreflectsthemainoutcomesoftheprocess-tracingprocedureofthethreekey

politicaldecisionsthatillustrateapolicychangeintheGermanrefugeepolicy(seeFigure8).The

goalistoanalysethedecisionsthroughthelensofachronologicalreconstructionincombination

withtheMultipleStreamsFramework.Inthisway,Ihopetoanswerthesub-researchquestionby

explaininghowandwhytheGermanrefugeepolicychangedin2015.

Beforestartingwiththeanalysisofthefirsteventitiscrucialtoprovidesomecontext.Although

thefirsteventhappenedtowardstheendofAugust,itisimportanttoacknowledgethattherefugee

debateslowlyconqueredtheGermanpoliticalagendaattheendofJuly.Afteranalysingmultiple

Tagesschaueditions itbecameclear that theGreekdebtcrisisextensivelyoccupied theagenda

beforethatpointoftime.Duetoitscomplexity,itdidnotleavespaceforanotherpoliticaltopicto

bedebated(Faigle,Polke_Majewski,&Angeloudis,2015).Ultimately,theinevitableagendashift

coincidedwiththeincreasingnumberofrefugeesenteringGermanyinthesummerof2015(see

Figure9).

Figure 8: Important political decisions on German’s refugee policy in summer 2015

44

Figure 9: Asylanträge und EASY-Registrierungen: blue columns indicate EASY registrations and red columns indicate the number of asylum applications (BAMF in Engler, 2016)

ItisalsoimportanttorealizethatseveralissueswererunningonGermany'spublicagendaatthe

sametimeasthethreeeventsofanalysis(seeFigure10).Theydirectlyandindirectlyinfluenced

theseevents.OneofthemainhappeningsisthatfromJulyonrefugeeswereenteringtheEUin

highernumbersthanbefore(UNHCR-E,2017).Fromthatmoment,themediacoveredrefugees

andtheproblemsthey facedontheir route. Itprovidedthe impressionthat theGermanmedia

‘werewalkingwiththerefugees'.Coveragestartedwiththeproblemsthemaincrowdswerefacing

in Turkey andGreece (especially the island Kos). They continuedwith reports from the Balkan

route21untilthefirstmasseseventuallyarrivedinGermany(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-17.09.15).Also,

thewaydifferentcountriesrespondedtothedifferentrefugeewaves,suchassuchastheborder

closinginMacedoniaandtheconstructionofawallinHungary,werecovered(ARD,21.08.2015;

Zeit, 2015). Once the media started focusing on Germany, the struggles faced by refugees,

municipalities, the state and its administrations and civil society were reported (ARD Archiv,

01.08.15-17.09.15).

Furthermore, the debate on whether and how the European Union could install a common

EuropeanasylumpolicyandreplacethedysfunctionalDublinRegulationwasadominanttopicon

the German public and political agenda during that time (Hollande, F. andMerkel, A. in press

conference, 2015). German politicians blamed the non-acting of the EU for the increasing and

uncontrolledinfluxofrefugeestoGermany(Gabriel,2015).Hence,theGermanandtheEuropean

21Macedonia,Serbia,andHungary

45

politicalagendawereinterlinkedinregardstotherefugeecrisis.Thisreflectsamulti-levelstructure

assuggestedbyliterature.

Eventually,aphenomenonthatincreasedwiththehighnumberofrefugeesenteringGermanywas

right-wing violence towards

refugees and refugee

accommodations. From January

until July 2015, 202 attacks have

beenrecorded.Thoseoccurrences

wereextensivelycovered,debated

and condemned in public (ARD,

19.08.2015;ARDArchiv,01.08.15-

17.09.15,2015). In general, those

issuesoccupyingthepublicagenda

influencedandoftenmergedwith

the political agenda. Therefore,

they affected the three decisions

ofanalysis(seeFigure8).

5.1. DecisionNo.1:ThesuspensionoftheDublinSysteminGermany,August21–25,2015

5.1.1. ProblemStream

Beforefocusingontheelementsoftheproblemstream,oneshouldpayattentiontothewaythe

problem was defined by various actors. The problem leading to the suspension of the Dublin

RegulationinGermanywasthattheGermanauthoritieswereoverwhelmedwiththeregistration

andadministeringofrefugees(Alkousaaet.al,2016).Thiscausedlongwaitingperiodsforrefugees

in respect to their registration and for those who waited for granted asylum (Merkel, ZDF-

Sommerinterview 2015; Amann et al., 2015; ARD, 11.08.2015, 2015). In return, this led to

overcrowdedasylumcentresandashortageofaccommodation.Additionally,asylumseekersthat

were denied asylum stayed in reception centres for longer than necessary (Herrmann in ARD,

23.07.2015;ARD, 27.07.2015;Der Spiegel, 2015). Theway theproblemwasportrayeddiffered

amongpoliticians.Forinstance,theHomeSecretaryindicatedthatGermanyischallengedbutnot

Figure 10: What occupied the public agenda?

46

overwhelmedwhileMerkelstatedthateverythingcanbemanagedtogether(deMaizèreinARD,

11.08.2015;Merkel,ZDF-Sommerinterview2015).However,ViceChancellorGabrielpursuedaless

positivestancebymakingclearthatGermanywasindangertounderestimateitsbiggestchallenge

since the reunification (Gabriel, 2015). Hereby, he made use of an element of comparison to

accentuatehisproblemdefinition.Thus,theproblemwasportrayedinmultipleways.

Whenanalysing theproblemstream,oneneeds topayattention to threedifferentelements–

policyfeedback,indicatorsandfocusingevents.Intheweeksthatprecededthepolicydecisionof

analysis,policyfeedbackincombinationwithpolicyevaluationaswellasindicatorsandfocusing

eventswerestimulatingthedebateonrefugeesuntilthepointthatrefugeesreplacedtheGreek

FinancialCrisisonthepoliticalagenda(Vornbäumen,2015).

Policyfeedbackandpolicyevaluationoccurredondifferentlevelsshowinghowtherefugeecrisis

wasacrossing-borderissueembeddedintoamulti-levelstructure.Inregardstotheinternational

sphere, themedia highlighted the clear failure of the Dublin regulation. It did so by extensive

reportingon indicators and small focusing events referring todrowning refugees, overcrowded

GreekislandsandoverwhelmedGreekadministrations(AmnestyInternational,2015).Lateron,this

turnedintothecoverageofchaoticsituationsinMacedonia,Serbia,andHungary.Inaddition,the

UN,NGO'sandGermanpoliticianscriticizedtheDublinRegulationandtheperceivedsilenceofthe

EuropeanUnion(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-17.09.15,2015).Forinstance,Merkeldidnotonlymention

thatDublinisnotbeingreinforcedatthemoment,shealsomentionedthatDublinbecameinvalid

(Hollande,F.andMerkel,A.inpressconference,2015;Merkel,ZDF-Sommerinterview2015,2015).

OtherpoliticianssuchastheViceChancellorusedharshwordstodescribetheEU’sinactivityinthe

refugeecrisissuchthefactthattheEUseemstobein“wintersleep”(Gabriel,2015,min.00:13:00

–00:13:30).Ingeneral,Germanpoliticianstriedtoshiftresponsibilityintherefugeequestionaway

fromtheGermangovernmentandtotheEU.Hence,thisreflectedstoriesofblameinthecontext

of policy evaluation. This is a surprising finding as literature suggested policy evaluation to be

occurringinthepoliticalstream.

On the national level, policy evaluation in regards to the overwhelmed administrations also

occurredinformofpublicstatements.RefugeesfromtheBalkanstateswhoamountedto40%of

allasylumapplicationsuntilJulyoftenreceivedtheblameforthechaoticsituationinGermany,as

theirchanceforasylumwasfairlylow(ARD,23.07.2015;BundesamtfürMigrationundFlüchtlinge,

2015). For instance, the Home Secretary of Bavaria stated that the return of the Balkan state

refugeesistakingtoolongandthattheyareoccupyingtoomuchspaceinasylumaccommodations

47

(HerrmanninARD,23.07.2015).Otherpeopleinchargeofmunicipalitiesandcitiescomplainedthat

thesituationwashome-made;thatmunicipalitiesdidnothavesufficienttimetoprepare;andthat

thestategovernmentneededtoincreaseitssupporttremendously(KochinARD,12.08.2015;Jäger

inARD,26.07.2015).Thus,policyevaluationwasasignificantpartoftheproblemstream.

Indicatorsillustratedtheseriousnessofthesituation.Onecommonindicatorreferredtothewaves

of refugees of various origins that entered Germany at different times (ARD, 23.07.2015). For

instance,thefactthatGermanyhadregistered218.221refugeesfromJanuarytoJuly2015ofwhich

44.417 applications were Syrian received attention (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge,

2015).Anotheralarmingindicatorwasthat2.700refugeeswereregisteredonadailybasisinJuly

whichwasexpectedtoincreaseinAugust(ARD,19.08.2015).Additionally,NGOs,politiciansand

themediapaidattention to the indicatorsbypointingout that theconditionsandstandards in

Germanasylumaccommodationsweredecreasingandthatregistrationprocessesweretooslow

(ARD,07.08.2015).

Furthermore,ahighamountof focusingeventshappened in themonthsbefore the firstevent,

suchasthesinkingrefugeeboatsinfrontoftheGreekandtheItaliancoast(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-

17.09.15, 2015). However, only one focusing event opened thewindow of opportunity. This is

because it concretized that a big number of refugees would eventually cross the border into

Germany. It was August 19when the Home Secretary announced that Germanywould expect

800.000refugeeswithin2015.Additionally,heannouncedavarietyofmeasuresthatneedtobe

takeninordertoadministrateandaccommodatethishighnumberofrefugees(Maizière,2015).

Concluding,theHomeSecretaryandthisannouncementofurgencyopenedthewindowforthe

suspensionoftheDublinSystemthatonlyoccurredtwodaysafter.

5.1.2. Policystream

InregardstothesuspensionofDublin,thepolicystreamdevelopedinaratheruntypicaland‘non-

Kingdonlikefashion’.Thepolicyentrepreneurwhodraftedandinternallydistributedthedefining

memoonAugust21wasanemployeeoftheGermanMinistryforMigrationandRefugees(Wenzl,

2015).Thememosaid that theDublinRegulationwouldbesuspendedforSyrianrefugees.This

indicatedthattheplacewhereSyrianrefugeesenteredtheEUwillno longerbe investigatedby

Germanauthorities.Asaconsequence,Syrianscouldnotbesentbacktothosefirst-entrycountries.

Thememohadthepurposeofacceleratingregistrationprocessesinordertoprovidebureaucratic

relief(Abéetal.,2015).However,thedocumentwasdeterminedonlyforinternalpurposesand

notsupposedtoleaktothepublicasitdidfourdayslater.OnAugust25,thememoendedupin

48

theinboxoftheNGOProAsylwhoaskedBAMF22forthevalidationofthedocument.Asareaction,

theministry tweeted “Weareatpresent largelyno longerenforcing theDublinprocedures for

Syriancitizens(BAMFinAbéetal.,2015,para.25).Asajustification,theministrystatedthatthis

yeartheyhadnotbeenoperatingaccordingtoDublin forquitesometime (Ata inTagesspiegel,

2015).Anothertruthwasthattheministrywascompletelyoverstretchedandno longerableto

tracebackrefugees’countriesoforigin.Inthisregard,theannouncementoftheexpected800.000

refugeestriggeredBAMF’sshort-termreaction(Alkousaaet.al,2016).Thus,inthiscasetherewas

nopolicycommunitydiscussingdifferentalternatives.Rather,thesolutionhasbeenpulledoutof

thehatinastateofadministrativestruggle.Inthiscase,thepolicyentrepreneuractedasadecision

makerassuggestedbyliterature.

Politicalleadersletthedecisionpass.TheHomeSecretarytriedtocontroldamagebyjustifyingthat

theactionwas‘just’aguidelinefortheadministration(deMaizèreinAbéetal.,2015).However,

neitherhenorMerkelwhosaidthepreviousdaythatDublinshouldbeputbackintoforcetriedto

reversethisadministrativedecision.ApossibleexplanationwhyMerkeldidnotreversethepolicy

decisionmightbeherangertowardsright-wingattacksonrefugeesandrefugeecentresthathad

happenedinHeidenauacoupleofdaysinadvance.TheFrenchPresidentHollandeindicatedthat

thishappeningwasawake-upcallforbothMerkelandhimtoclarifywhatasylumlawmeansin

democraticcountries(Hollande,F.andMerkel,A.inpressconference,2015).

TheKingdonmodelstatesthatinordertochooseasolutiontoaproblemalternativesneedtobe

considered.Sincethisdecisionhasnotbeendiscussedwidelyinthepublicandpoliticalsphereitis

embeddedinaratheruntypicalpolicystream.Nevertheless,ithasbeenacceptedasaquickand

temporalsolutiontorelieveadministrations.Otheralternativesthatwerebeingdebatedshould

haveunburdenedGermanadministrationsinthelongrun.Oneofthemwasthesuggestiontotreat

Balkan refugees differently which should accelerate the returns to their home countries. For

instance,itwassuggestedtonotdistributethemtothemunicipalitiesatallbutletthemstayinthe

firstreceptioncentres.Thisshouldacceleratetheprocessofreturn(HerrmanninARD,23.07.2015;

deMaizèreinARD,14.08.2015).Anothersolutionwhichwasappliedincludeddeterrencevideosof

theGermangovernmentincooperationwiththeBalkanstategovernments.Theconcretegoalof

this campaign was to reduce the number of the unpromising asylum applications from those

countries(BundesministeriumdesInnern,2015).Otheralternativesincludedthemobilizationofall

employee resources for the Migration Ministry, more capacity for first reception and more

22 BAMF=AbbreviationBundesamtfürMigrationundFlüchtlinge(MinistryforMigrationandRefugees).

49

accommodationpossibilities (Merkel,2015).Eventually, leadingGermanpoliticians,butalsothe

FrenchpresidentdemandedacommonEuropeanasylumpolicywhichshouldincludethecommon

definitionofsafecountries;moreandeffectiveregistrationcentresinItalyandGreeceandafair

distributionschemewithinEurope (Hollande,F.andMerkel,A. inpressconference,2015).This

shows how policy-making was embedded in a multi-level structure. However, one needs to

acknowledgethatthesemeasureswouldhavenotbeenabletomeettherequiredurgencyinthe

waytheDublinsuspensiondid.

5.1.3. Politicalstream

In the political stream, the public opinion and the media took a refugee-friendly stance and

positivelyinfluencedthesuspensionoftheDublinRegulationforSyrians.InAugust,60%ofGerman

citizens(morepeoplethaninJuly)believedthatGermanyisabletomanagethelargenumberof

incoming refugees (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., 2015). This coincided with the majority

agreeingwithGermanybeinganimmigrationcountry.44%evensaidthattheywouldnotmindif

thenumberwouldrisefurtherwhileonly11%believedthattherewerealreadytoomanyrefugees

inthecountry.Furthermore,40%ofthequestionedcitizensindicatedthattheywouldbewillingto

voluntarily engage for refugees (Stern, 2015). These numbers clearly indicate a high level of

toleranceandsolidarityoftheGermanpopulationtowardsrefugees.Also,thepoliticalcourseof

MerkelandtheCDUreceivedsupportwith42%ofthecitizensspecifyingthattheywouldre-elect

the CDU at this moment of time while voting for Merkel as the most popular politician

(ForschungsgruppeWahlene.V.,2015).

Thisattitudewasreflectedandstimulatedfurtherbythemedia.Notonlydidthemediareporton

allindicatorsandfocusingeventsinrelationtorefugeesandtheirsufferingwithinandoutsideof

thecountry,butalsodidtheydosowithextendedcoveragetimesandoverallpositiveframingof

therefugeeissue.TheTagesschaustartedtoreportextensivelyonrefugeesinJulyandcontinued

reportingonrefugeesonadailybasisinAugust(Tagesschau,2016;ARDArchiv,2015).

Themedia’spositiveframingoftherefugeeissuecanbeobservedinmediacontentwhichreflected

solidaritywithrefugeesorcondemnedtheEUfornon-action.Additionally,theyclearlydenunciated

right-wingattacksonrefugees(ARD,22.08.2015).Whenalarmingnewshadtobereported,such

astheHomeSecretary'sannouncementofexpected800.000refugees,themediawouldcontrast

themwithpositivenewsandindicators.Forinstance,themediahighlightedhowGermanymakes

6,5MrdEuroprofitannuallythroughtaxespaidbymigrants(ARD,19.08.2015).Inrespecttothe

suspensionofDublin,eventheconservativeBILDnewspaperremainedpositive.Theintroductory

50

linesofthearticlethatreferredtoBAMF’sTwitterannouncementregardingtheDublinsuspension

stated:“140characterstowardsthefuture”(Bild,2015,para.1).Hence,themediaapprovedon

thisparticularpoliticaldecision.

Othermeasures themedia took in order to transmit a positive imageof refugees included the

reporting of personal refugee stories. Also, they provided a platform for people who speak in

defence of refugees (and against right-wing violence), such as UNHCR, NGO’S, politicians,

volunteersandprominentpeople(ARDArchiv,01.08.15-17.09.15,2015).They,therefore,steered

thepolicydebateandnurturedcommunicativediscourse.Concluding, themediaandthepublic

opinionformedaunityintheirpositiveattitudetowardsrefugees.Theyinfluencedandpositively

evaluatedrefugee-friendlypoliticaldecisionssuchasthesuspensionoftheDublinSchemewhich

illustratesthepowerfultriangleBoinetal.referto.

5.1.4. ConclusionpoliticaldecisionNo.1

ThewaythispoliticaldecisiondevelopedcanonlypartlybeexplainedbytheMSF.Therearetwo

factorsthatcorrespondedwiththemodel:First,Kingdonsaysthatpolicychangeispossiblewhen

thethreestreamsarecoupledduringtheopeningofawindowofopportunity.TheGermanHome

Secretaryopenedthiswindowwiththeannouncementof800.000expectedrefugees.Second,the

agenda-setting process was influenced by occurrences in the problem stream. However, the

problemstreamwasnotonlyshapedbyindicators,focusingeventsandpolicyfeedback,butalso

bytheextensivereportingandpublicdiscussionsofthoseeventsinformofproblemdefinitionand

policy evaluation. This included several actors on multiple levels proving that the issue was

embeddedintoamulti-levelstructureasindicatedbyliterature.Additionally,alargeportionofthe

Germanpublicwasopenforsuchapolicychangeastheyshowedsolidarityandtolerancetowards

refugees. This was again supported by refugee-friendly media reporting who also provided a

platform for political actors to trigger communicative discourse. The country’s general positive

attitude towards refugeesmight havemotivatedMerkel to giveher blessing to thedecision to

suspendDublinforSyrians.Thus,thetriangularrelationshipbetweenpoliticians,themediaandthe

public described by theory does exist and surprisingly occurs in the political, as well as in the

problemstream.Anotherunexpected factorwasthe inducementof theDublinsuspensionbya

spontaneousadministrativedecisionfromaministryandnotthroughanelaboratedebateinpolicy

communities.ThisisparadoxicaltotheMSF,sinceitunderminestheoriginalcharacterofthepolicy

stream.However,itfitsthechaoticsituationGermanyanditsadministrationsfoundthemselvesin.

51

Figure 11: Political decision No. 1

52

5.2. DecisionNo.2:ThereallocationofrefugeesfromHungarytoAustriaandGermany–September4,2015

5.2.1. ThetimebetweendecisionNo.1andNo.2

Thepoliticaldecisionsofanalysiscannotstandalone,sincetheyareconnectedthroughaseriesof

path-dependentevents.Therearetwotime-spansthatareimportanttoconsider.First,thereisthe

timebetweenAugust25(thedateofthesuspensionofDublin)andAugust31,thedatewhenthe

Hungarianprimeminister allowed the first trainswith refugees to depart towards theAustrian

border.Inthistime,manyfocusingeventsoccurred:

• August26:MerkelvisitsarefugeeaccommodationinHeidenau,theplacewheretheright-wing

riotshappenedacoupleofdaysearlier.Hergoalistoshowsolidaritywithrefugeesandtoset

aclear signagainst right-wingattacks.Whenshestepsoutofhercar, right-wingprotestors

heavilyinsulther.Avideoofthoseinsultscirculatesinthemedia.Lateron,itbecameknown

thatthoseinsultsconcernedMerkeldeeplyandthatthiswasthemomentinwhichshestarted

treatingtherefugeeissuewithfirstpriority(Austetal.,2015;Alkousaaet.al,2016;Salloum,

2015).

• August27:Onthisday,atruckofasmuggler isfoundontheAustrianhighway. Itcarries71

deadrefugeesthatsuffocatedinthetruck.Thiseventdeeplyshockspoliticiansandthepublic

inGermany(Presse-undInformationsamtderBundesregierung-C(27.8.2015)).

• August29:ThemediastartexcessivelyreportingonthesituationattheBudapestKeletitrain

stationwheremoreandmorerefugeesarrive.Theyrefusetoregisterastheyareplanningto

continuetheirtraveltothewest.TheHungarianpolice,however,preventsthemfromtraveling

further.Thisleadstothetrainstationsturningintoinhumanemassdormitories.Protestsand

clasheswiththepoliceincreasefromdaytoday(ARD,29.08.2015,ARDArchiv,201523).

• August30:TheHungariangovernmentannouncesthattheterminationoftheprovisionalfence

to the Serbian border. However, refugees still find ways to overcome the hindrance (ARD,

30.08.2015).

Secondly, there is the time-spanbetweenAugust 31 and September 4, thedateof the second

event.Thehappeningsinthistimewillbedescribedintheproblemstream.

23Time-spantolookupinarchive:August29–September4

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5.2.2. ProblemStream

TheproblemstreamadvancingdecisionNo.2ismainlydefinedbyproblemdefinitionandpolicy

evaluationaswell as focusingevents.Problemdefinitionandpolicyevaluationoccurredon the

nationalandtheinternationallevelreflectingmulti-leveldiplomacy.Governmentswhosecountries

wereaffectedbytherefugeecrisisdefinedthesituationinrespecttotheirowncountryaswellas

inrelationtoEuropewhichoften includedtwo-levelgames.TheEUandvariousmemberstates

wereconfrontedwithnegativepolicyevaluation includingstoriesofblame. In theseweeks, the

disputebetweenthedifferentgovernmentsandtheEUwasfrequentlymadepublic.Inthecontext

ofpressconferences,communicativediscoursewashighlyvisible.Atthispoint,itisimportantto

clarifythatthesituationinHungarywasasymbolforthenon-functioninganddisagreementabout

EUasylumpolicy.

ThereweretwodifferentperspectivesreflectingthesituationonaEUlevel.Theperspectivewhich

wasstronglysupportedbyGermany,AustriaandFranceandtheEUinstitutionsincludedtheview

thatDublinIIIisnotworkingandthattheEU,asa“communityoffate,responsibilityandlaw”needs

toinstallanewasylumpolicythatincludesfairdistributionquotas(Merkel,A.inspeechinAustria,

2015, para. 7; Merkel, A. in summer press conference, 2015). At this juncture, the Austrian

ChancellorprovidedHungarywithindirectpolicyevaluationbyclaimingthattheconstructionof

wallsandwatchtowerscannotbecommonground(Merkel,A.,Fayman,W.,Vučić,A.,Mogherini,

F.inpressconference,2015).Atthebeginningofthearguments,Merkelandheralliesstatedthat

theothercountriesneedtobe‘convinced’(Merkel,A.,Fayman,W.,Vučić,A.,Mogherini,F.inpress

conference,2015).Themoretimewentby,themorethreatsinformoftwo-levelgamescouldbe

identifiedintheirargumentation.Forexample,MerkelindicatedthatiftheEUfailsintherefugee

question,Europe’sconnectionwiththeUniversalHumanRightswillbedestroyed.Also,shesaid

thatSchengenwillbequestionedifnoagreementonafairquotacanbereached(Merkel,A. in

summerpressconference,2015).Additionally,theViceChancellorwarnedEasternEuropeanstates

that if they continue rejecting burden sharing, Europe’s financial planning needs to be altered

(Gabriel,S.&Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).Ingeneral,thissideusedstoriesofblameby

accusing the Eastern European countries for obstructing the way to a fair solution based on

solidarity.

Theother side’s argumentationwas ledby theHungarianprimeminister, ViktorOrbán,whose

countryfacedaprecarioussituationwithabignumberofrefugeesbeingstuckinBudapest.Heand

hisgovernmentalsoinvolvedstoriesofblame.Forinstance,HungarymadeGreeceandBrussels

54

responsiblefornotdoingenoughtoprotecttheEuropeanborderswhichiswhyHungaryhadto

takeoverthetask(Szijjártó,2016).OrbánalsoclaimedthattheEUwasnotdealingwithaEuropean

butaGermanproblem,sincealltherefugeeswanttogotoGermany.Generally,hearguedthathe

was just fulfillinghisEuropeandutieswhileprotectingSchengen (Orbán,V., Schulz,M. inpress

conference, 2015). His views received support from other Eastern European states (ARD,

04.09.2015).

OntheGermanlevel,Merkelengagedintocommunicativediscoursewhenaddressingtherefugee

crisisinpublic.However,shenevermadeuseoftheterm‘crisis’whenaddressingtheissue(Merkel,

A. in summer press conference, 2015). Rather, she framed the refugee crisis to be a “huge

challenge”whichcanonlybemasteredwhenGermanyactsinaccordancetoacommonwilland

when breaking new ground (Merkel in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung-B

(27.08.2015),para.6).SheindicatedthatflexibilityshouldnowdominateGermanthoroughness.

This also served as justification of the suspension of the Dublin system Germany was heavily

attacked for. In this time,Merkelalso releasedher famous ‘Wirschaffendas.’ statementwhich

became her personal slogan for her crisismanagement approach (Merkel, A. in summer press

conference,2015).Here,Merkelclearlyprovidedmeaningtothecrisisinordertoeventhepath

forhercrisismanagementsolutionsassuggestedbyBoinetal.

TheChancellormadeuseofallelementsofproblemdefinitionaccordingtoKingdon.Thoseinclude

values, categories and comparisons. Firstly, Merkel justified here humanitarian thinking and

(future)actionswith thehelpof theBasicConstitutionalLawwhichsheportrayedasaGerman

value system. It includes the right for political asylum and the respect of dignity of all persons

(Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).Also,shereferredtoChristianvalueswhenmaking

thatargument(Merkel,A.,Sommaruga,S.inpressconference,2015).Secondly,Merkelmadeuse

ofcomparisonsinordertodefinetheproblem.Forinstance,shecomparedthe‘darkpast’ofthe

countrywiththecurrentstateofbeing“acountryofhopeandchance”(Merkel,A.insummerpress

conference, 2015,para. 11). Further, sheequated the current situationwith formerprecarious

situations such as the Greek debt crisis or the reunification which Germany had successfully

managed.ShedidsoinordertoindicatethatGermanyisa‘strongcountry’whichisabletodeal

withchallenges(Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).Eventually,sheandothermembers

ofthegovernmentmadeuseofcategoriesbydrawingaclearlinebetweenthosewhobelievein

thehumanitariansolutionsuchasthevolunteersandNGO’S;and“thedarkersideofGermany”

referringtotheright-wingprotestors (Gauck inZeitOnline,2015,para.1).Thoseshouldnotbe

followed,becausetheydonotsupportandworkagainsttheappropriatevaluesystem(Merkel,A.

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insummerpressconference,2015).Concluding,Merkelbecamethemouthpieceofahumanitarian

treatmentofrefugees(Hassel,T.inTagesschau,2015).Withherencouragingspeeches,sheasked

theGermancitizenstofollowherexampleandlead.Also,sheindirectlyaskedforpublicapproval

ofherpolicydecisionsassuggestedbycommunicativediscourse,themobilizationmodelandcrisis

managementliterature.Inthatrespect,sheuseduntypicalwordsforherstylesuchas‘beingproud’

ofhercountry(Merkel,SommerpressekonferenzvonBundeskanzlerinMerkel,2015).Inaddition,

the media supported Merkel by commenting that she developed a political vision and finally

showedsomeleadership(Lautenbeck,R.inTagesschau,2015).This,demonstratestheinteraction

ofthetriangularrelationshipbetweenpoliticalactors,themediaandthepublic.

As mentioned above, this problem stream is quite elaborate including many path-dependent

focusingeventscloselysucceedingeachother.TheseeventsincreasedthepressureontheEU(and

Germany),becausetheyhappenedinsuchasorttime-spanandwithinEUborders.Amongstthose

eventswere two that opened the policywindowwhich enabled the decision forGermany and

AustriatoabsorbtherefugeesfromHungary.Thefirstfocusingeventwas,accordingtoOrbán,a

direct consequence of Germany suspending the Dublin Regulation. On August 29, Hungary

suddenlydecidedtoallowhundredsofrefugeestotravelbytraintoAustria(Glass,S.inTagesschau,

2015).TheHungariangovernmentjustifiedthisactionwithtwostatements:Firstly,itclaimedto

have misunderstood the German decision to suspend Dublin and assumed that Germany was

planning on offering asylum to all refugees (Rüger, T. in Tagesschau, 2015). This shows that

communicationbetweenEUmemberstateswasintentionallyorunintentionallydisturbed(ARD,

31.08.2015).Secondly, itblamedGermanyforthechaoticsituation,sincetheDublinsuspension

causedhopeandpressureamongrefugeestofindawaytoGermany(Rinke,2015).Thefactthat

Hungarywasoverwhelmedwiththenumberofrefugeesenteringtheircountryandthefactthat

they were harshly criticized for their border policy was left unmentioned (Verseck, 2015).

Concluding,thiswasthefirstattempttoopenapolicywindowandatthesametimethereason

whythefollowingeventhappened.

The second focusing event which eventually led to political decision No. 2 was caused by the

refugeesthemselves.AfterGermanyandAustriaurgedOrbántorefrainfromlettingrefugeespass

andadheretotheDublinrules,heorderedtocloseoffthetrainstationsforrefugeesagain.Atthis

moment, therewere still ca.3.000 refugeesnearby the station inBudapest (Kasparek&Speer,

2015).OnSeptember3,refugeeswerebeingtoldthattheycouldtaketheregionaltrainstowards

theborder;however,thefirsttrainwasstoppedinBicske,23kmawayfromBudapest.There,the

policetriedtoforcetherefugeesoffthetrainand intoregistrationcentres.Whenthismessage

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spread,nomorerefugeestriedtoentertrainsinBudapest(Kasparek&Speer,2015).However,in

BisckeandinBudapestrefugeesstartedtoprotest.OnSeptember4,around1.000refugeeswho

felt frustrated about the Hungarian authorities decided to takematters into their own hands.

Togethertheystartedwhatbecameknownasthe#marchofhope.Underpoliceescort,acrowdof

refugeesleftBudapestandstartedwalkingonthehighwaytowardsthe180kmdistantAustrian

border(ARD,04.09.2015).Theywereaccompaniedbythemediawhoensuredthatthepicturesof

refugeeswalkingnexttospeedingcarsspreadrapidly(Domokos,2015).Concluding,thiswasthe

daywhenthousandsofrefugeesforcedtheirwayintotheheartofEuropeandopenedtheirown

policywindow.

5.2.3. Policystream

InthenightofSeptember4,themediareportedonrefugeessleepingonthehighwaywithoutany

shelter.Thatnight,MerkelandFaymann,whoactedaspolicyentrepreneurs,agreedtoopentheir

countrybordertothoserefugees.BeforeMerkelmadeherfinaldecision,sheliaisedwiththeVice

Chancellor,theForeignMinisterandherHomeSecretary.ShealsocalledtheheadoftheCSUparty

andBavarianPrimeMinisterSeehoferwho,sheknew,mighthaveopposedherdecision.However,

accordingtomediasources,sheonlytriedtoreachhimonceanddecidedtogoaheadwiththe

decisionwhenhedidnotanswerhisphone(Abéetal.,2015;Austetal.,2015).Thiscanberegarded

as the ideal moment within the open policy window, since those whose agreement Merkel

appreciatedagreedand thosewhomighthaveopposedherplanwerenotconsulted.After the

decisionwascommunicatedtoOrbán,hecooperatedbysendinghundredsofbusseswhobrought

therefugeestotheAustrianborder(Austetal.,2015).Inthefollowingdays,thousandsofrefugees

arrivedatthetrainstationsofViennaandMunich(Kálnoky,2015).

Twothingsshouldbehighlighted inregardstothisdecision.First,thedecisionwasmadeunder

immensetimepressurebetweenleaderswhodidnotconsultwithanypolicycommunities.Again,

thisunderminesKingdon’snotionofthepolicystream.Secondly,thisdecisionwasframedasaone-

timedecision;however,thiswasnotthecase.Thenextmorning,themediausedheadlinessuchas

“the night inwhich the gate to Europewas burst open” (Kálnoky, 2015, para. 1). TheGerman

governmentendeavouredtoensurethathiswasauniqueeventbydescribingthesituationasa

resolutionofanemergencyandbyemphasizingthatDublinisstillvalid(StreiterandSteinmeierin

Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2015). Nevertheless, this decision was

irreversibleandshowedthateventshadtakenapath-dependentcourse. ItopenedtheGerman

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bordertomanymorerefugees(seeFigure12)anddeterminedthenewcourseofGerman’srefugee

policyforthenextmonths(Kálnoky,2015).

Furthermore,thedecisiontoopenthegateswasasymbolforthefailureofinternationalpartiesto

discuss alternatives. In the days before the incident, politiciansmade increasingly use of press

conferencesinordertorepresenttheirpositionsandtoargueopposingpartiesinpublic.Hence,

communicativediscourseaswellaspolicyevaluationembeddedinamulti-levelstructureplayeda

crucial role. I first reflect on the discussions in the European and subsequently in the German

politicalsphere.

Ontheonehand,Germanyanditsalliesagreedthataquicksolutionwhichwouldenablerefugees

tomakeuseoftheirrighttoreceiveprotectionwasneeded(MerkelinPresse-undInformationsamt

derBundesregierung,2015).Theirpreferredsolutionwasa fair,EU-widequotasystem.Besides

that, they agreed that Greece and Italy can no longer be left alone and that the European

registrationsystemneedstobeexpanded(Merkel,A.insummerpressconference,2015).Onthe

otherhand,Hungaryanditsalliesopposedrefugee-friendlymeasures.Notonlydidtheywantto

indicatetorefugeesthattheyshouldstayinTurkey,becauseitisasafecountry;butalso,didthey

wanttomakeborderprotectionapriority.Inthisregard,theyportrayedtheconstructionofawall

astheprotectionofSchengenandDublin.Furthermore,theyopposedaquotasystem,becauseit

wouldattractmorerefugees(Orbán,V.,Schulz,M.inpressconference,2015).

Figure 12: Asylanträge und EASY-Registrierungen: blue columns indicate EASY registrations and red columns indicate the number of asylum applications (BAMF in Engler, 2016)

58

The EU,who started engaging in the discussions late sidedwithGermany and its allies. Schulz

engagedintopolicyevaluationbyarguingthatHungaryisnotpursuingaconstructiveapproachto

problemsolving.Healsoclaimedthatitcanhardlybeaproblemtodistribute400.000–500.000

refugeesunder507billionpeoplewho live in28member states (Orbán,V., Schulz,M. inpress

conference,2015).JunkerandTusksuggestedmorecarefulmeasuresbyproposingthereallocation

of 100.000 – 120.000 refugees (Schulz and Junker in ARD; 03.09.2015). It is interesting, that

European leaders found themselves arguing against Hungarywho claimed to uphold European

regulations.Inthisregard,thefundamentalquestionwaswhetherhumanitarianvaluesshouldbe

prioritizedoverthecommonlyagreedrulesoftheEU.

5.2.4. PoliticalStream

Aswiththepreviousevent,mediaandthepublicopiniondominatedthepoliticalstream.However,

thistimealsoreactionstothepolicydecisionofpartiesandinterestgroupsneedtobeconsidered.

Again,policyevaluationcanbeobservedinthisstream.

The media were positive-minded in their reporting on refugees before and after the political

decision.Ontheonehand,theyfollowedtheoccurrencesintheproblemstreamclosely.Onthe

otherhand,theybecameadvocatesforrefugeesbyfocusingonthefollowingpoints:Firstly,they

attemptedtoconnecttopeople’senseofsolidaritybyrepresentingthehumanfaceofrefugees

andreflectingonthedestiniesoftheirfamilies.Forinstance,themediaextensivelyreflectedon

the story of the small, Syrian boy, Aylan, who was found drowned on a Turkish beach (ARD;

03.09.2015).Secondly,themediaengagedincharitymeasures.Forinstance,theTagesschauasked

fordonations for refugees ineveryeveningnews shows fromAugust27on (ARD,27.08.2015).

Thirdly,themediaalsoprovidedaplatformtointroducevolunteersandtheirworkandreflecton

the ‘Willkommenskultur’ in the country (ARD, 05.09.2015; Querner, 2015). Especially after the

decisiontoabsorbtherefugeesfromHungary,themediareportedonthemanyvolunteerswho

providedrefugeeswithfirstaidandcareonGermany’strainstations(ARD,05.09.2015).Chancellor

Merkel encouraged themedia to continue their style of reporting, since the portraying of role

modelswouldencouragemorecitizens tohelp (Merkel,A. in summerpressconference,2015).

Also,via themediasheandherministers repetitivelyaddressedthegreatdeedsofcivil society

(Gabriel,S.&Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).Thisclearlyprovesthepresenceofthepowerful

trianglebetweenthemedia,politicalactorsandthepublicasindicatedbyliterature.Fourthly,the

mediaexpressedtheiroutrageattheEU’snon-actingandattheinhumanetreatmentofrefugees

bycertaincountries(ARD,30.08.2015;Hassel,T.inTagesschau,2015).Hence,themediadidnot

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only reportpositivelyon refugeesbut alsoencouraged the ‘Willkommenskultur’ and supported

Merkel’shumanitariansolutionapproach.

Themedia’spositivitytowardsrefugeesandpoliticaldecisionsreflectinghumanityandsolidarity

alsoshowedinthepublicopinion.22%ofGermancitizensclaimedthatGermanyshouldtakeon

more refugeesand37% indicated tobepleasedwith thecurrentnumber.88%expressed their

willingnesstoengagepersonallyforrefugees.Moreover,92%ofthecitizensagreedwithMerkelby

preferringaEuropeanquotasystem.Also,85%favouredlegalimmigrationpossibilitiestoprevent

thedangerousseatravels(ARD,03.09.2015).Insum,theGermanpublichadanoverallpositive

attitudetowardsrefugeesatthetimeofthedefinedpoliticaldecisiononSeptember4.Thismight

haveencouragedMerkelintakingthisdecisivedecision.

WhenanalysinginterestgroupopinionsbeforeSeptember4,onebecomesawarethattherewere

twosidespresentinthepublicsphere.Ontheonehand,therewerethosewhowereinlinewith

themediaandthepublicopinionbyholdingapositiveattitudetowardsrefugees.Forinstance,the

socialdemocraticpartyinvitedhundredsofvolunteerstotheirheadofficeinBerlinasasymbolfor

the“friendlyGermany”(Gabriel inARD,29.08.2015,min:00:04:54).Also,representativesofthe

CatholicChurchmadetheirvoicesheard inthemedia.TheyaddressedEuropeanpoliticswhich,

accordingtothem,needtochangeitsgoalorientationandensurethatnoonediesattheEuropean

borders(Marx,2015).Ontheotherhand,therewereafewright-wingprotestorsandextremists

who achieved media coverage due to violent attacks on refugee accommodations (ARD,

18.08.2015).Eveniftheycannotbeseenasanofficiallyorganizedinterestgroup,theystillreceived

a largeamountofpublicattentiondue to theirbehaviourand the fact that theyposedasharp

contrasttothe‘Willkommenskultur’.

Eventually,sincetherewasnotimeforpoliticalactorstodebatethedecisiontoabsorbrefugees

fromHungaryinadvance,oneneedstopayattentiontothewayitwasdiscussedretrospectively.

Thereweretwopositionswhoexpressedtheirviewinformofpolicyevaluation.Ontheonehand,

therewerethosewhosupportedthedecisionoftheChancellor,suchasthecoalitionpartnerSPD

(Zeitonline,2015).Ontheotherhand,therewerethosewhocriticizedthedecision,suchasthe

CSU leader, Seehofer,whowasnot consultedbefore thedecision to absorb the refugees from

Hungary. He declared the next day that the Chancellor had “decided in favour of a vision of a

differentGermany”(Abéetal.,2015,para.52).Further,theCSU,asajointentity,declaredthatthe

decisionwaswrong andwould send an incorrect signal to Europe. In their view,Germanywas

unabletoabsorbmorerefugees(dieWelt,2015).ThefactthattheownsisterpartyopposedMerkel

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inpublicandthereforetryingtodividethepartyacquiredanewdimensionfortheChancellor(Abé

etal.,2015).However,thenon-inclusionoftheCSUinthispoliticaldecisionmighthaveenabled

thedecisiontobetakeninthisparticularway.

Insum,thepoliticalstreamreflectsamultitudeofopinionsonMerkel’shumanitarianrefugeepolicy

approach.Also,inthisstreampolicyevaluationisconsciouslyusedbyvariousactorstoinfluence

eachother.Nevertheless,thefactthatMerkelhadthebackofthemedia,abigpartofthepublic

opinion,andthecoalitionpartnermighthavemadetakingthispoliticaldecisioneasier.

5.2.5. ConclusionofpoliticaldecisionNo.2

Thedecisiontoabsorbthestrandedandbadlytreatedrefugees inHungarywasahumanitarian

decisionbasedonwhatMerkeldefinedtobeGermanandEuropeanvalues.Connectedthrough

manypath-dependentfocusingevents,thisdecisioncanberegardedasalogicalconsequenceof

thefirstadministrativedecisiontosuspendtheDublinRegulation.Inadomino-likefashionthings

tookitscourseandreceiveditsfinalpushthroughViktorOrbánwhosenttrainstoGermanyand

playedacat-andmousegamewiththerefugeesinhiscountry(ARD,04.09.2015,2015).Once,they

couldnotbearitanymore,theydecidedtomarchtowardstheborderandforcedtheopeningofa

policywindow.Merkelwhofoundherselfinthepositionthatheralliesandclosestministersagreed

while her opponentswere absent only had to ‘push through’ at the rightmoment in time. By

absorbing the refugees from Hungary, she opened the German border. Again, we observe a

decisionthatwasnotbasedonthereflectionofapolicycommunitybutbasedontimepressure

andtheconsultationofafewindividuals.Additionally,thedisputebetweenEasternandWestern

member states shows that the issuewas embedded into amulti-level structure and therefore

sensitivetoexternalforces.Two-level-games,policyevaluationandcommunicativediscoursewere

usedtoinfluenceopposingactorsortheownpublic.Inregardtotheownpublic,itisimportantto

highlight that Merkel showed determined leadership. She portrayed the crisis and her crisis

managementapproachinawaythatexpressedconfidencethatthiscrisis ismanageable.Atthe

sametime,shemotivatedcitizenstoparticipateincrisismanagementmeasures.Additionally,she

benefittedfromandpraisedasupportingmediacoverage.Inreturn,theoverallpositiveattitudein

thecountrymighthavemadeMerkelfeellegitimizedtopursuewiththebolddecisiontoabsorb

therefugeesfromHungary.

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Figure 13: Political decision No. 2

62

5.3. DecisionNo.3:Theimplementationofbordercontrols;nosealingoftheborder–September13

Afterthesecondevent,refugeesarrivedinGermanyinlargenumbers.Professionalaidstructures

wereunabletokeepupandthereforeneededassistanceofthecivilsociety.Thepicturesinthe

(inter-)national media showed thousands of citizens applauding the arrivals of refugees and

deliveringfirstaidatGermantrainstations.Thetime-spanbetweenthesecondandthethirdevent

wasninedays.

5.3.1. TheProblemstream

Theproblemstreaminthiseventwasdominatedbyproblemdefinitionsandoccasionsofpolicy

evaluationaswellasindicatorsthatoftenoccurredintheformoffocusingevents.

Atthisphase,problemdefinitionandpolicyevaluationinGermanywashighlyinfluencedbythe

debateonwhetherthedecisiontoabsorbtherefugeesfromHungarywasthe‘right’decision.The

personwhowasportrayinghimselfasabigopponentofMerkel’sdecisionwasHorstSeehofer.He

wassupportedbyhisfellowCSUpartymembers.Inpublicstatements,heexpressedthatMerkel’s

decisionwasabigmistake,thatthe“plugcannotbeputbackonthebottle”andthathewould

inviteViktorOrbántofindacommonsolutiontotheproblem(SpiegelOnline,2015,para.1).Clearly,

thiswasanattempttopubliclyaffrontMerkelwhocriticisedOrbánforhistreatmentofrefugees.

Nevertheless,Merkel also received support for the decision from her own party, the coalition

partnerSPD,theGreenaswellastheLeftParty(Gysi,G.andOpermann,T.inDeutscherBundestag,

09.09.2015).

Ingeneral,politicianspraisedthe‘Willkommenskultur’andpromotedGermany’sabilitytomanage

thesituationsuccessfully.Inthisregard,valueswereoftenusedtodefinethesituation.TheGreen

PartydescribedtheGermans’willingnesstohelpasa“SeptemberFairytale”(Göring-Eckardt,K.in

DeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015,p.11614).Politiciansdidnothesitatetoverbalizethattheyare

‘proud’oftheircounty–astatementthatishighlyunusualforGermanpoliticians(Göring-Eckardt,

K.inDeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015;Gabriel,S.&Merkel,A.inpressconference,2016).Also,

consideringthecountry’shistory,MerkelappreciatedthefactthatpeopleconnectedGermanyto

hope(Gabriel,S.&Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).Furthermore,sheboldlyaddressedher

criticsbysayingthatGermanywouldnolongerbehercountryifshehadtoapologiseforshowing

afriendlyfaceinanemergencysituation(Faymann,W.,Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).In

ordertosupportherpointofview,shevisitedaregistrationcentre inBerlinwhileminglingand

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takingselfieswithrefugees(Austetal.,2015;ARD,10.09.2015,2015).Thoseselfieswerepicked

up by the national and international Twitter community. In this regard,Merkel embodied the

‘Willkommenskultur’.ShedidnotstoprepeatingthatGermanywillbeabletomanagethissituation

(Gabriel, S. &Merkel, A. in press conference, 2015). During the budget week, theMinister of

Financesupportedhereffortby indicatingthatGermany isabletomasterthesituationwithout

accumulatingdebts(ARD,08.09.2015).

However,thepartiesweredividedonthequestionwhetherthegovernmentfollowedagoodpath

in regards to itsasylumpolicyandcrisismanagement. Increasingcriticismcame fromthe state

ministers and communities. They felt blindsided by the government who decided to open the

borderswithoutanywarningorpreparationtime(Lewntz,R. inAustetal.,2015).Similarly, the

leaderoftheGreenPartycriticizedthecountry’sunpreparedness.Sheaccusedthegovernmentof

havingoversleptthelastmonths,althoughtherefugeeinfluxwasforeseeable(Göring-Eckardt,K,

in ARD, 08.09.2015). She also pointed out that the government should be ashamedbecause it

wouldneverbeabletomanagethesituationwithoutthetremendoushelpofthecivilsociety.In

her view, the government found itself in a ‘policy crisis’ which was caused by the failure and

sluggishnessoftheadministrations(Göring-Eckardt,K.inDeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015).Thus,

problemdefinitionwasoftenconnectedtonegativepolicyevaluation.

OntheEuropean level,Merkel,Gabrieland Junker, thePresidentof theEuropeanCommission,

providedpolicyevaluationtothosememberstateswhoshowedthemselvesunwillingtoagreeon

aquotasystem.Withthehelpoftwo-levelgamesGabrielindicatedthatopenborderswerethebig

economicadvantageforEasternEuropeanstates;however,Germanywouldreconsiderpromoting

openbordersiftheburdencontinuesconcentratingononlythreecountries(Gabriel,S.&Merkel,

A. inpressconference,2015). Inthisrespect,MerkelposedthecrucialquestionofhowEurope

shouldoperatewhenfacingissuesthatconcernhumanvalues.Sheexpressedtheneedtodefine

the‘Europeanspirit’(Faymann,W.,Merkel,A.inpressconference,2015).Inherargumentation,

she received support from Junker in his State of the Union speech on September 9. Without

pointingfingers,heclaimedthattheUnionisnotingoodshape.Healsoclarifiedthatfeardoesnot

help,butthattheEUshouldrathertakedetermined,boldandconcertedaction.This,accordingto

him,wouldbedonebestbyaquick instalmentof a fairquotamechanism.At this juncture,he

providedseveralargumentsbasedonvaluesandcomparison:

1) TheEUshouldactaccordingtohistoricalfairness,asalmosteverymemberstatehadbeenexperiencingrefugeesinthepastduetowar,religiousorpoliticalpersecution,dictatorshiporoppression.

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2) Europeisthemoststableandwealthycontinent.3) Thenumberof refugees is low in comparison towhatother countries suchas Lebanon

receive.4) Thecrisiswillnotberesolvedinnearfutureanddesperatepeoplewillalwaysovercome

wallsandfences(Junker,J.-C.inStateoftheUnionspeech,2015).

Whenlookingatwhatcausedthepolicywindowtoopeninthispoliticaldecision,focusingevents

andindicatorsneedtobeconsidered.Fromthedayonoftheborderopening,Germanyfaceda

tremendousincreaseinrefugees.MostofthemleftHungaryafterMerkelhaddecidedtoopenthe

borders (Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Meanwhile, the BAMF was said to be “drowning in asylum

applications”24 (ARD; 10.09.2015, min: 00:04:45). At that point of time, 250.000 unprocessed

applicationswerepiledupwhichalsomeantthatthepeoplewhofiledapplicationswereoccupying

spaces in the first-reception centres (ARD; 10.09.2015).Meanwhile, trains were bringingmore

refugeesintothecountry.TheHomeSecretaryexpressedthatthespeedoftheinfluxwastoohigh

andthatdecelerationisurgentlyneeded(deMaizèreinARD,11.09.2015).TheCityofMunichwas

concernedthemostduetoitsgeographicproximitytoAustria.Fordays,thecitywassuccessfully

copingwithtenthousandrefugeesarrivingonadailybasis,becauseofthemanyvolunteersand

improvisationalmeasures.ItsrepresentativesaddressedadirectappealtotheChancellorandthe

otherfederalstatestonotleaveMunichtoitself(Blume-BeyerleinARD,06.09.2015).Themayor

complainedthatittooktoomuchtimeandefforttoconvincetheotherfederalstatestotakeon

refugees(ReiterinARD,13.09.2015).FortheweekendofSeptember12,thecityexpected50.000

newarrivals(ARD,11.09.2015).OnthisSaturday,Munich’smayorsentanSOSindicatingthatthe

city’s capacities are reached and thatMunichwas about to face a collapse (Reiter, D. in ARD,

12.09.2015).Thiswasthemomentthatopenedthepolicywindow(seefigure14).

24InformalsourcesindicatedthattheBAMFchefwashopelesslyoverwhelmed(ARD;10.09.2015).AnindicationthatthismightbetruecouldbehisdismissalthatfollowedonSeptember17th(BundesministeriumdesInnern,2015).

65

WindowofopportunityfordecisionNo.3

Figure 14: Window of opportunity in decision No. 3

5.3.2. ThePolicyStream

Oncethepolicywindowhadopened, itonly tooktheGermangovernment24hours todiscuss,

decideuponandimplementdecisionNo.3,theinstalmentofbordercontrols.AfterMunich’sSOS

call, the leadingpoliticianswere forced to act quickly. TheBavarian InteriorMinistermade the

suggestion of temporary border controls (Alkousaa et. al, 2016; Seehofer, H. in SpiegelOnline,

2015).SeehofersupportedhissuggestionandurgedtheChancellorandherclosestministers25to

execute(Hermann,J.andSeehofer,Hinpressconference,13.09.2015).Inthiscase,theBavarian

politiciansservedaspolicyentrepreneurs.ThesolutionwassupportedbytheheadoftheGerman

federalpolicewhohadpreparedimplementationplansbasedonaformerG7summitthatrequired

border controls.Healso favouredplans to seal theborderby sending refugeesback toAustria

(Romann, D. in Alkousaa et. al, 2016). Merkel and her closest ministers agreed on the

implementationofborder controls, but theChancellor insistedon the fact that asylumseekers

couldcontinueentering thecountry (Alkousaaet.al,2016).Ata laterpointof time, shewould

arguethat itwas impossible toclosetheborders.Otherwise,sheexplained,onewouldhaveto

builda3000-kmfencearoundthecounty(Merkel,2015).Ingeneral,thisdecisionwhichwasmade

inafewhoursandonlyamongasmallcircleoftoppoliticiansclearlyreflectsdecisionmakingina

crisismode.

25ThecallwasattendedbyMerkel,Seehofer,theViceChancellor, theHomeSecretaryandtheMinisterofForeignAffairs(SpiegelOnline,2015).

66

On September 13, theHome Secretary announced thatGermany introduces temporary border

controls26 with a focus on the German-Austrian border and immediate effect (de Maizère in

Salloum,2015).HealsocalledonallEuropeanmemberstatestoadheretotheDublinRules.He

justifiedthedecisionwithseveralarguments.First,therewasaclearneedtolimittheinfluxand

allowadministrationsandthecivilsocietytocatchtheirbreath.Secondly,Germanyhadtoreturn

toorderlyproceduresduetosecurityreasons.Thirdly,thedecisionservedassignaltoEuropethat

burden sharing is extremely necessary (deMaizère, T. in press conference, 13.09.2015, 2015).

Clearly, deMaizère engaged in communicative discourse by publicly justifying this decision to

multipleparties.

It is importanttoconsiderthatthedecisionwasmadeonedaybeforetheEUHomeSecretaries

metinBrusselstodiscussandvoteonJunker’splantoredistribute160.000refugeesfromItalyand

Greece(ARD,13.09.2015).TheBavarianMinisterofInteriorconfirmedthatthedecisionshouldalso

serve as political leverage formember states to accept Junker’s plan (Herrmann, J. in Salloum,

2015).Additionally,theEUandGermanyconfirmedthatMerkelhadconsultedwithJunkeronthe

borderclosing.Junker’sapprovalshowedthatheregardedtheGermanpolicydecisionasastrategic

leverageforhisownplan(ARD,13.09.2015).Hence,two-levelgamescanclearlybedetectedatthis

pointintime.

OnaGermanlevel,theBundestag(whichreunitedafteritssummerbreak)attemptedactingasa

policycommunitybydebatingmeasurestosolvethecurrentsituation.Besidesthemanylong-term

measuressuchas theneed for integration lawsandan increasedbudget for themunicipalities,

short-term solutions were being discussed. For instance, the government was asked to solve

structuralproblemsfirst,becausevolunteersmightbecometiredandthenationalmoodmightshift

(Gysi,G.inDeutscherBundestag,09.09.2015).TheGreenPartysuggestedemployingmoredecision

makers who could process asylum applications (Göring-Eckardt in Deutscher Bundestag,

09.09.2015).Inthisrespect,theCDUproposedtodelegatepeoplefromthecustomsorthenational

employmentagency to theBAMF (ARD;10.09.2015).Meanwhile,Bavariademanded thatother

federal states takeonmore refugeesand thata seconddistributionpost shouldbe installed in

LowerSaxony(ARD,12.09.2015).However, thosedebatedshort-termmeasureswereunableto

prevent the city ofMunich fromcollapsing. In theend, thedefiningdecision leading toborder

controlswasnotbeingdebatedandagreeduponbyapolicycommunity.Instead,asmallgroupof

top-levelpoliticianstookthedecisionunderenormouspressureaspredictedbycrisisliterature.

26 Note that the Schengen agreement allows for temporary border controls in situations when public order is severelythreatened(Abéetal.,2015;Alkousaaet.al,2016)

67

5.3.3. ThePoliticalStream

Inthelightoftheevents,thepoliticalstreamwasheavilydominatedbytheinfluenceofpolitical

parties,interestgroupsandthemediawhoexertedpolicyevaluationandcommunicativediscourse.

Partiesandinterestgroupsexpressedamultitudeofopinionsonthedecisiontoimplementborder

controls.Ontheonehand,theGreenandtheLeftPartycriticizedthedecision.TheGreenParty

claimed that the government used the decision to distract from its own failure to support the

municipalitiesproperlyintermsoffinances,accommodationsandacceleratedprocedures(Göring-

Eckardt,K.inGathmann,2015).Theyclaimedthatbordercontrolsdonotsolvetheissuesathand,

becauserefugeesstillneedtobecaredfor.Rather,therootcausesofflightneedtobecombated

(Gysi,G.inGathmann,2015).Thedebatesshowedaclearformofnegativepolicyevaluation.

On the other hand, the decision to implement border controls was supported by various

participants.Thegoverningparties,CDU/CSUandSPD,indicatedthatitsendsanimportantsignal

totheEU(Seehofer,H. inSpiegelOnline,2015).Furthermore,itwasreasonedthatthedecision

allowedGermanytoreturntoarule-basedsystemandthatmunicipalitiesreceivedamomentof

urgentbreak(Bouffier,V.andGabriel,S.inARD,14.09.2015).Also,thetradeunionofthepolice

expressedtheirreliefregardingthedecelerationoftheinfluxandtheenhancedstateofsecurity

(GdPinSpiegelOnline,2015).Eventually,theEUinterpretedthedecisionassupportfortheJunker

plan. According to them,when even the strongest country reaches its limits, it shows that the

burdencannotbedistributedonjustafewshoulders(ArminStauthinTagesschau,2015).Insum,

manystatementsandopinionswereexpressedintheframeofcommunicativediscourse.

In contrast, the media opposed border controls and advocated a humanitarian and solidary

solution. Not only did they portray the implementation of border controls as a sign of

powerlessnessandgovernmentfailure;butalso,didtheyblamethegovernmentforanineffective

BAMFandforhavingleftalonethemunicipalitiesfortoolong.Accordingtothemedia,Schengen

wasaniconoftheEuropeanideaandopenbordershadbeenpraisedasoneofthemostimportant

accomplishmentsofthememberstates(ARD,13.09.2015).Acommentatorstatedthatthecurrent

picturesshowingbordercontrolsandbarbedwiresare“explosivedevicesforthefreedomandthe

trustintheEU.”(Preiß,M.inARD,14.09.2015,min:00:17:55).Themediasentoutaclearwarning

byindicatingthatthedecisionendangerstheuncomplicatedcoexistenceamongneighbours(ARD,

14.09.2015).Inthisregard,themediaclearlyprovidedpolicyevaluationtotheGermangovernment

whileenteringthepoliticaldialoguewithanownvoice.

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Moreover, themedia took an equally negative stance onHungary and the EuropeanUnion. In

respect toHungary, they indicated that thecountrywould treat refugeesas criminalsopposing

Humanvalues(ARD,08.09.2015;ARD,14.09.2015,2015).ReferringtotheEU,themediastated

that the union had not been seen that estranged for a long time (ARD, 09.09.2015). Also, the

Commission was blamed, because it had not done a thorough job as guard of the contracts.

Accordingtothemedia,EuropeanpoliticsshouldbecreatedinBrusselsfirstandforemost(Krause,

R.D.inARD,09.09.2015).Thus,themediaclearlyengagedinpolicyevaluationonmultiplelevels.

However,themediareportedpositivelyonthecultureofwelcome.Fordays,theyshowedpictures

ofthemanyvolunteersatMunichtrainstationandatdifferentplacesofthecountry(Austetal.,

2015;ARD,05.09.2015;ARD,06.09.2015).Theyalsoprovidedinteractivemapswithlocalinitiatives

inGermanyandencouragedtoparticipateincivilsocietyactivities(ARD,07.09.2016).Eventually,

theyreportedonpro-refugeedemonstrationsinGermanyandalloverEurope(ARD,12.09.2015).

Through their reporting, theynurtured the ‘Willkommenskultur’ and gave the impressionof an

overallrefugee-friendlyGermanpublic.

5.3.4. ConcludingpoliticaldecisionNo.3

Thedecisionwhichincludedtheintroductionoftemporarybordercontrolsandtheretentionof

openbordersforasylumseekerswasofhumanitarianandadministrativenature.Itreinforcedthe

twodecisionsmadebeforeand illustrated theconsequenceofapath-dependentdevelopment.

RefugeesthatfeltmistreatedinHungarymadeuseoftheopportunitytotraveltoGermanywithout

hindrances (policy decision No. 2). This led to the increase of refugees forcing the German

government into decision No. 3. The main factors leading to the opening of a policy window

includedanincreasingrefugeeinfluxtoBavaria,aslowdistributiontootherfederalstatesandan

ineffectiveBAMFwhich led to theeventual collapseof thecityMunich.At thispoint,Germany

officiallyfounditselfinastateofcrisis.Oncetheseverityofthesituationwasrecognized,Bavarian

politiciansonlyhadto‘push’theirsolution,thebordercontrols,whichwaseventuallyagreedupon

byMerkelandasmallcircleoftopministers.However,Merkel,forherpart,madesurethatthe

borders stayed open. In the days before this decision she had positioned herself towards a

humanitariansolutionbypromotingandsupportingtheWillkommenskultur.Consideringthepolicy

stream,itisimportanttoacknowledgethatthepolicycommunitieshadnoeffectonthisdecision.

Rather,thedecisionwasmadeundertimepressureamongasmallgroupoftop-levelpoliticians.It

was justified to thepublic in formofcommunicativediscourse.Also, it servedas leverage fora

distributionquotaonEU levelandthereforeclearlysymbolizedtwo-levelgamesandmulti-level

69

diplomacy.Participantsinthepoliticalstreamshoweddividedopinionsonthedecision.Especially

themedia expressed its criticism by engaging in policy evaluation. However, the decision was

supportedbythemostimportantministers,bothcoalitionpartiesandtheEuropeanCommission

whichmadeitsdeploymenteasier.Concluding,thisdecisionwasadministrative,becauseithelped

regulatingtherefugeeinflux;andhumanitarian,becausethebordersofGermanystayedopenfor

asylumseekers.

Figure 15: Political decision No. 3

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5.4. ConclusionoftheFindingsChapter

Thefindingschapterillustratedtheresultsofthedatacollectionwhichincludedtheapplicationof

theKingdonmodeltothreeimportantpoliticaldecisionsreflectingGermany’sturninitsrefugee

policy.Now,severalconclusionscanbedrawninrespecttowhethertheMSFexplainsthepolicy

changeinGermany.Whenaddressingtheresearchsub-question‘TowhatextenddoesKingdon’s

MSFexplainthechangeinGermany’sasylumpolicy?’,theanswerneedstobe‘toalimitedextent’.

First, Iwill illustratethestrengthswhicharefollowedbythe inconsistenciesofthemodelwhen

appliedtotherealityofthiscasestudy.

Clearly, the three political decisions that were taken in a three-week time span reflect critical

junctureswithpath-dependentconsequencesassuggestedbyCapoccia&Kelemen.Aselaborated

above,criticaljuncturesaremomentsduringwhichthechoicesmadebyagentsfaceaheightened

probability to influencetheoutcomeof interest.Thesechoicesusuallyevokeapath-dependent

development.ThefirstcriticaljuncturereflectedtheaccidentalsuspensionoftheDublinsystem.

Here,BAMFmadeanadministrativedecisionthatinitiatedthecourseofGermany’srefugeepolicy

leadingto890.000registeredrefugeesin2015.Thisdecisioncausedanincreaseofrefugeesmaking

theirwaytoEuropeandeventuallyGermany.Othercountries,suchasHungarychoseadifferent

course in the refugee crisis by trying to make refugees feel as uncomfortable as possible. In

accordancewiththeoverallvaluesetofitscitizensandthemedia,theGermanChancellorhadno

otheroptionthantakingdecisionNo.2–theabsorptionoftherefugeesofHungary.Thisdecision,

beingofhumanitariannature,was irreversibleandopenedGermany’sborder tomanymore to

come. Even at the point of Munich’s collapse and many critics complaining, the Chancellor

acknowledgedthatclosingtheborderisnotanoption.Toeasehercritics,shetookdecisionNo.3

andimplementedbordercontrols;however,shedecidedtonotsealtheborderandtograntentry

to those inneed.These threeeventsheraldedasubstantial change inGermany’sasylumpolicy

fromapolicyofdiscouragementtoanopen-doorpolicy.Consequentially,itledto890.000asylum

applicantsthroughout2015.Thus, itcanbesaidthat incrisissituations,policychangedoesnot

happen incrementally;but ratherabruptasdescribedbyKingdon. In thiscase,wewereable to

observehowabruptchangemanifests itself inadomino-like, irreversibledevelopmentincluding

morecriticaljuncturesalongtheway.

TheMSFsucceedsinservingasatoolwhichfacilitatesdatacollectioninthefieldofagenda-setting

andpolicy-making.Inthisregard,theproblemstreamisaccuratelydescribedincludingitselements

of focusingevents,policy feedbackand indicators. Itprovidesaclearpictureonhow issuesare

71

defined, turn intoproblemsand reach importanceon the agenda. Furthermore, policywindow

openingswhichfacilitatepoliticalactorstoenactchangecanbeobservedaswell.Additionally,the

model helps capturing an unsteady environment in which factors and actors within the three

streamsattempt to influenceeachotherand thedirectionofpolicy change.However, theway

Kingdondescribesthemtodosoandthewayhedescribespolicychangetooccurdoesnotapply

totherealityofthiscasestudy. Infact,thenatureofthepolicystreamandthepoliticalstream

differs to theoriginalMSF. This is becauseKingdondisregards certain circumstanceswhich are

presentinthiscasestudy.

ThefirstcircumstancethatisnotaddressedbyKingdon’sMSFisdecisionmakinginacrisismode.

The three policy decisions of analysis confirm crisis management literature by indicating that

decisionsoftenneedtobemadeundertimeconstraintsandunderdiscretion.Allthreepolitical

decisionsweremadeby(individual)actorsundertimeconstraintsanddiscretion.This illustrates

thatthreeelementsinthepolicystreamchangetheirnatureincomparisontothedescriptionof

Kingdon’sMSF. Firstly, the basic element of the policy stream, the policy communities, which

developanddebateproposalsthatarepickedandpushedbypolicyentrepreneurs,doesnotapply.

Eveniftheyareavailable,theymightnotbeconsulted.Thisisbecauseincrisissituations,timeand

discretionforcedecisionmakerstoadopttheroleofpolicyentrepreneursthemselves.Thisrelates

to the second aspect which shows the need to regard policy entrepreneurship as a behaviour

pattern,ratherthanadistinctcharacteristic.Thus,thenatureofpolicyentrepreneurshipchanges.

Thirdly,oneneedstorecognizethatincrisissituations,decisionmakersaremorepowerfulthan

originallystatedbyKingdon.Infact,theyareabletoinfluencethedirectionofpolicychangethe

wayMrs.MerkeldidindecisionNo.2.ThisisacrucialdifferencetoKingdonwhoattributesthis

kindofpowertothepolicyentrepreneursbehindthedecisionmakers.Hence,theseelementsshow

thatKingdondisregardsthespecialcircumstancesofdecisionmakinginacrisismodeinhismodel.

Secondly,anothercircumstancethatKingdonfailstoincludeisthefactthatdecisionmakingmight

beembeddedintomulti-levelstructures.InhisMSF,policysolutionsareproduceddomestically.

Thismightbeduetothefactthatwhenhefirstpublishedhismodel,globalizationwasnotadvanced

yetandintergovernmentalresponsestoglobalissueswerelesscommon.However,anissuethat

crossesborders suchas the refugee crisis requires the responseof several countries and/oran

organ like the European Union. The research shows that the German, the European and the

memberstates’agendaswerecloselyintertwined.Additionally,politicalleadersframedproblems

andevaluatedpoliciesreferringtoandblamingeachother.Therefore, institutionalcomplexities

thatcomewithmulti-levelstructures,aswellasdiplomaticcomplexitiessuchastwo-levelgames

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need to be added to theMSFwhen applying it to a crossing-border issue. This influences the

occurrencesintheproblemstreamandchangesthecharacterofthepolicystream.

Thirdly,Kingdondisregardstheverbalpowerandinteractionprocessesbetweenpoliticalactors,

the media and the public and the influence they might have on policy decisions. Crisis

communicationliteratureandthecasestudyshowthatthosethreeparticipantsformatriangular

relationship.Viathisrelationship,theysharecommunicativediscourseorpolicyevaluationcontent

andinfluenceeachother.Inthisrespect,itisimportanttohighlightthatthemediaarenotjusta

shaperofmessagesasdefinedbyKingdon.Forinstance,themediatookanopenstanceagainstthe

German government by criticizing the border controls. They also provided negative policy

evaluationtotheEUfortheirnon-action.Additionally,thepro-refugeeatmospherethemediaand

thepubliccreatedwasespeciallystrongandevenpraisedbytheChancellor.Merkel,forherpart,

wasanextraordinarydominantpoliticalactorinthetriangle.Shedidherbesttoadoptaleadership

stylewhichprovidedmeaningtothecrisisandrepresentedthe‘Willkommenskultur’.Assuggested

bycrisiscommunicationliterature,sheclearlytriedtoconvincepublicopinionofherhumanitarian

crisismanagementapproach. In return,shereceivedsupport fromthepublicwhichmighthave

madeherfeellegitimizedtopursueheractionsassuggestedbycommunicativediscourseandthe

mobilizationmodel.Thisclearlychangestheoriginalcharacterofthepoliticalstream.

Yet,a ratherunexpected findingwas that thepublic formof informationandopinionexchange

betweenthethreepartieswaspresent inallstreams-sonotonly inthepoliticalstream.Policy

evaluation and communicative discoursewas found in the problem stream in formof problem

definitions;inthepolicystreaminformofdiscussionofalternativesandinthepoliticalstreamin

form of evaluative statements of policies. Unfortunately, this research is limited and therefore

unable to indicate a degree of influence these actors and processes have on policy decisions.

However, this triangular relationship proved to be difficult to be applied to theMSF as it was

constantlycrossingthebordersofthestreamsthereforeconnectingthem.Hence,thereisreason

to assume that the streams do not run independently, but are being connected through the

interactionofparticipants.

Concluding, although this case study reflects abrupt change, Kingdon’s MSF is very limited in

explainingthepolicychangeinGermany.Itisrecommendedtoadjustthemodelwhenapplyingit

tothecontextsofcrisesandmulti-levelstructures.Additionally,theverbalpowerandtheeffect

participantsof the triangular relationshiphaveoneachotherandon thepolicy-makingprocess

73

needs to be investigated further27. Here, especially the role of charismatic leaders should be

analysedin-depth.

27Formoreresearchlimitations,pleasehavealookatChapter7.

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6. |Chapter6:ComparisonoftheGermantotheDutchcase

Sofar,IhaveansweredthequestiontowhatextenttheMSFexplainstheGermanchangeinasylum

policy.However,inordertoanswertowhatextenttheMSFexplainsthedifferenceintheasylum

policyapproachesofGermanyand theNetherlands in2015, theGerman situationneeds tobe

comparedtotheDutchcasewhichwasresearchedbyLuciaOverpelt.

Atthisjuncture,itisimportanttorememberthecommonpointofdeparture-thecircumstance

thattworelativelysimilarcountriespursuedadifferentasylumpolicycoursein2015.Despitethe

size,bothcountries seemed relativelyequal in termsofeconomy, cultureandgeographywhile

pursuing a similar discouragingmigration policy during the past 20 years. However, when the

refugeesknockedonEurope’sdoorsin2015turningpartsofthecontinentintoacrisisarea,the

commonpathoftheDutchandtheGermanasylumpolicystartedtodivide.TheDutchcontinued

their policy of discouragement leading to the reception of 59.100 refugees in 2015; while the

Germansstartedpursuinganopen-borderpolicyleadingtothereceptionof890.000refugeesin

2015.InthehopetounderstandthedrivingforcesofthisdevelopmentKingdon’sMSFwasapplied

tobothcases.Thisfinalsectionofthethesiswillcomparetheresultsofbothcasesandeventually

answertheresearchquestion:‘TowhatextentdoesKingdon’sMultipleStreamsFramework(MSF)

explainthedifferenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015?’

Tostartwith,itisimportanttomentionthatintheresearchedtimeframe,bothcountriesfaced

differentpolicy-makingconditions.Firstly,bothcountriesfoundthemselvesatdifferentlevelsof

crisis. From July on, the refugee influx into Germany increased significantly which forced the

Germangovernmentaswellascivilsocietytooperateinacrisismode.Theamountandthepace

offocusingeventsthatcausedahighamountofdecisionswhichneededtobetakenevokedan

abrupt policy change. Itmanifested itself in the three decisive policy decisions analyzed in this

paper.ThosedecisionsopenedtheGermanborderto890.000refugeesin2015.TheNetherlands,

ontheotherhand,perceivedtheircountrytobeinastateofcrisis;however,thecrisiswasona

muchlowerlevelthaninGermany(Overpelt,2017).Thiswasduetothefactthatthenumberof

incoming refugees was comparatively low and decision makers still had the time to work out

strategicpatternsofaction.

Anotherdifferenceinpolicy-makingconditionsbothcountriesfacedisrelatedtothedegreeofthe

citizens’ government support. TheGerman government’s refugee-friendly actions found crucial

supportbythemediaandthepublic.IntheNetherlands,however,thecultureofwelcomewasnot

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aspronouncedasinGermany.Infact,societywasmuchmoredividedabouttherefugeequestion.

Thismighthavedifferentreasons.First,theDutchgovernmentavoidedtoundertakeboldactions

as the right-wing party, PVV28, which was part of the opposition mobilized and gained voters

(Overpelt,2017).However,inGermany,theright-wingparty,AfD29,hadnotmadeitintoparliament

yetandwasnofactorofhindrance.ThecriticsMerkelfacedfromwithinherownpartyhadless

effectsincetheydidnotdeprivevotesfromheratthispointoftime.Second,Merkeladopteda

moreproactiveleadershipstyleintherefugeecrisisthanherDutchcounterpart,MarkRutte.Not

onlydidhewaitamonthbeforespeakingoutonthecrisisbutalsodidhedeclineparliamentarian

debatesandassignedproblemsolvingresponsibilitytotheEU.ThisledtothefactthattheDutch

public perceived their PrimeMinister as invisible (Overpelt, 2017).Merkel, on the other hand,

embodiedahumanitarianrefugeepolicyapproach.BasedonconstitutionalandChristianvalues

she‘instructed’hercountryonhowtomanagethecrisis.OtherthanMarkRutte,shedidnotlet

herself being intimidated by opponents, but rather represented the ‘Willkommenskultur’. Her

authenticity and charisma contributed to the country’s unity in this debate. Concluding, the

different policy-making conditions both countries faced as well as the fact that one country

experiencedabruptchangeandtheotheronestabilityquestiontherelevanceofthecomparison.

Figure 16: Different developments of asylum policies in 2015

Nevertheless,eveninthosetwodivergingcasestudies,similaritieswerefoundwhenapplyingthe

Kingdonmodel.ConcerningthestrengthsoftheMSF,bothstudiesconcludedthatthemodelisa

valuablestartingpointforresearchingthepolicy-makingprocessandagoodtooltounderstand

agendasetting.Consideringthepolicy-makingprocess,bothstudiesfoundthatthemodelcaptures

anunsteadyenvironmentincludingamultitudeofinfluencingfactorsandtheconnectedambiguity

28PartijvoordeVrijheid29 Abbrev:AllgemeinefürDeutschland

Asylumpolicyofdiscouragement

TheNetherlands:59.100refugees

Germany:890.000refugees

Stability

Before2015 Endof2015

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(Overpelt,2017).Inregardtoagendasetting,Iclaimedthatthemodelfacilitatesunderstandingon

how issues reach importance on the agenda. L. Overpelt (2017) indicated that it explains how

attentionincreasesinreferencetoanissue.Sinceagendasettingusuallyevolvesfromtheproblem

stream, both studies experienced the problem stream to be accurately described by Kingdon.

Hence, he correctly describes the circumstances which cause a problem to reach the political

agendaandpotentiallychangeapolicy.

However,wealsofoundcommoninconsistencieswhenapplyingtheMSFtothetwocasestudies.

LikeintheGermancase,theMSFcannotfullyexplainthesituationintheNetherlands.Oneofthe

mainreasonsisthefactthattheMSFdoesnotapplytopolicy-makinginacrisissituation.Although

thecrisisintheNetherlandswasmuchlessadvanced,itstillposedsimilarpolicy-makingpatterns.

Inbothcountries,decisionmakersdidnotconsultpolicycommunitiesforpossiblesolutions.For

Germany, thiswas the case because decisionmakers had towork under time pressure and in

discretion; for theNetherlands, thiswas thecasebecause thegovernmentgenerallyholds“the

power of initiative” (Overpelt, 2017, p. 41). For this reason, both cases undermine the original

natureofthepolicystream.SimilarlytoGermany,decisionmakersintheNetherlandsturnedinto

policyentrepreneurswhopushedtheirfavouritepolicysolutions(Overpelt,2017).Hence,inboth

countries decision makers were able to influence the direction of policy change. This finding

contradicts Kingdon by illustrating that decision makers possess more power than originally

assumedandbyshowingthatwecannotmakeaclearseparationbetweenpolicyentrepreneurs

anddecisionmakers.AtthispointitisinterestingtomentionthattheGermanleadersmadeuseof

that power to radically transform the refugee policy while the Dutch leaders pursued the

maintenanceofstability.ThiscouldbeduetothefactthattheDutchwerestilltryingtocontrolthe

crisiswhiletheGermans,beingunabletocontrol,werereactingtothecrisis.Insum,theneedto

adjusttheMSFtodecisionmakinginacrisismodebecomesevenmoreapparentafterfindingthe

samepatternsinpolicy-makingintheGermanrefugeecrisiscomparedtoanevenlowerlevelof

crisisintheNetherlands.

Anothercommon inconsistencythatwas foundwhenapplyingtheMSF is the fact thatKingdon

ignoresmulti-levelstructures.TherefugeecrisisbeganinthecountrieswithEUoutsideborders.

From there, it quickly advanced tobecominga crisis of thewhole EuropeanUnionas refugees

forced their way towards the Western member states. Germany and the Netherlands, who

experienced a significant increase of refugees in the summer of 2015, had to deal with the

treatmentofthecrisisonanationalandonaEuropeanlevel.Whiletryingtofindnationalsolutions

totherefugeeinflux,bothcountriesengagedwith,blamedandassignedresponsibilitytotheEU

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withdifferentpurposes.TheGermanpoliticalactorsmadeuseofpolicyevaluationandtwo-level

games inorderto increasethepressureonthememberstatesandtheEUinstitutionstofinda

commonsolution;theNetherlandsreferredtotheEUtojustifyitsownreluctancetotakeaction.

In this respect, the national problem aswell as the policy streamswere being influenced by a

crossing-bordercrisisandtheinstitutionalcomplexitiesthatcomewiththetreatmentofit.Hence,

multi-levelstructuresneedtobeincludedintotheMSFwhenpolicy-makingconcernsacrossing-

borderissueandrequiresanintergovernmentalresponse.

Lastly,bothcasestudiesconfirmedthatthetriangularrelationshipbetweenthemedia,thepublic

andpoliticalactorsinfluencesthepolicy-makingprocess.Inbothcasestudies,themediaweremore

influentialthansuggestedbyKingdon.Also,thepublicopinionprovedtobemorepowerful.Itis

assumedto legitimize (inGermany)orprevent (in theNetherlands)decisionsofpoliticalactors.

Therefore,politicalactorsmadeuseofpolicyevaluationandcommunicativediscoursetoinfluence

andtoenterintopublicdialoguewithotherpoliticalactors,themediaandthepublic.Especially

theGermanChancellormadeuseofthispublicformofinteractioninordertoprovidemeaningto

the crisis and to promote her crisis management approach. Merkel proved to be a dominant

political actor and therefore strong participant in the triangular relationship. The Netherlands

illustrate a good example for what happens when the political leader does not engage in this

relationship.Notonlydid theotherparticipants in the triangle criticizeRutte for keepinga low

profile,butalsodidhisabsenceofferGeertWilderstoadoptamoredominantstanceandtohinder

policychange(Overpelt,2017).Inmystudy,Iclaimthatthistriangularrelationshipoperatesinand

connectsall threestreams.Unfortunately,bothstudieswereunable to indicatehowstrongthe

influenceofthattriangularrelationshipis.Thisofferspotentialforanadditionalstudy.

Concluding,thelackofvitalelementsofcontextandinteractionintheMSFmakesitimpossibleto

explainthedifferenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofthetwocountries.Thetwocasestudies

turned out to be very different in nature, due to different levels of crisis and policy-making

conditionsaswellasdivergingdegreesofpolicychange.However,thecasestudycomparisonwas

very relevant inorder toclarify thatevenunderdifferentcircumstances theMSFmissescrucial

elementsthatmightinfluencepolicy-makingandpolicychange.Inthisrespect,themodellacksthe

inclusion for decisionmaking in a crisismode; policy-making in amulti-level structure and the

inclusionoftheinfluencetheverbalinteractionofthemedia,thepublicandpoliticalactorshave

on thepolicyprocess. This changes theoriginal characterof thepolicyand thepolitical stream

significantly. Therefore, the researchquestion ‘Towhat extentdoesKingdon’sMultiple Streams

Framework (MSF) explain the difference in the asylum policy approaches of Germany and the

78

Netherlandsin2015?’hastobeansweredasfollows:TheMSFdoesnotexplainthedifferencein

asylum policy approaches because it lacks crucial factors of context and interaction both case

studiesareaffectedby.

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7. |Chapter7:OverallConclusions7.1. Conclusions

This paper aimed at investigating the extent to which Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework

explainsthedifferenceinasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015.The

point of departure was a remarkable difference in the way the Netherlands and Germany

approachedandhandledtherefugeecrisisin2015.Bothcountriespursuedasimilardiscouraging

migration policy during the past 20 years. However, when the refugee crisis reachedWestern

Europe in late summer 2015, Germany decided to pursue an open-border policy under the

leadershipofMerkelwhiletheNetherlandscontinuedhandlingasylumwithrestriction.Thisledto

the fact that Germany had accommodated 890.000 refugees and theNetherlands only 59.100

throughout2015.Inordertoresearchthedrivingforcesofthisdivergentdevelopment,Kingdon’s

MSFwasusedasatheoreticalguidelineandabackboneforthedatacollection.Sincethisresearch

only includedacasestudyonGermany, thedata for thecomparisonwith theNetherlandswas

retrievedfromLuciaOverpeltwhodidasynchroniccasestudyfortheNetherlands30.

After reviewing the literature and collecting data with the process-tracing method and in

accordance to Kingdon’sMSF, the sub research question ‘Towhat extend does Kingdon’sMSF

explain the change in Germany’s asylum policy?’ had to be answered as follows: Although the

Germancase illustratesabruptpolicychangeasfavouredbyKingdon,theMSFwasonlyableto

explainthechangeofGermany’srefugeepolicytoaverylimitedextent.

Variousreasonsexplainthisconclusion:TheMSFaccuratelyportraystheagenda-settingprocessin

the problem stream. So, the circumstanceswhich cause a problem to reach andmove up the

politicalagendaandpotentiallychangeapolicyiscorrectlydescribed.Themodelalsoadequately

predictsthatpolicychangeoccursabruptly.Furthermore,itsucceedsincapturinganunpredictable,

ambiguouspolicy-makingenvironment.Therefore,itprovidesscholarsinthisunsteadyfieldwith

anopportunitytostructuretheirdata.However,theGermancasestudyshowsthatthepolicyand

thepoliticalstreamcanbeofdifferentcharacterthanoriginallydescribedbyKingdon.Thisisdue

tothefactthatthemodeldisregardsimportantfactorsofcontextandinteraction.

30 L.Overpelt’sresearchcanbefoundinthearchiveoftheUniversityofLeidenunderOverpelt,L.(2017).Explainingchangeand stability with Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) in the Netherlands and Germany during the 2015 refugee crisis.UniversityofLeiden.

80

ThiscasestudyshowsthattheMSFdisregardstwocrucialcontextualfactors.Firstofall,theMSF

doesnotincludedecisionmakinginacrisissituation.Thecasestudyshowsthatinacrisismode

decisionmakersoftendevelopandchoosetheirownpolicysolutions,becausetheyactundertime

constraintsanddiscretion.ThiscontradictstheMSFintwoways.Ontheonehand,decisionmakers

do not consult with policy communities to find the right solution but rather draft a solution

themselves.Thus,whatKingdondescribesas thebasicelementof thepolicystream, thepolicy

community,doesnotapply.Ontheotherhand,decisionmakersoperateaspolicyentrepreneurs.

Therefore,theterm‘policyentrepreneurship’shouldratherrefertoabehaviourpatternthantoa

characteristicassuggestedbyKingdon.Additionally,decisionmakersactingaspolicyentrepreneurs

have more power than expected by Kingdon. This is because they create and pick their own

solutionsandarethereforeabletosteerthedirectionofpolicychange.Anothercontextualfactor

Kingdonmisses ispolicy-making inmulti-level structures.The refugeecrisis is a crossing-border

issue demanding an intergovernmental response. Therefore, institutional and diplomatic

complexitiesthatcomewithexternalfactorsandplayers,suchastheEU,needtobeincludedinto

theproblemandthepolicystream.

Second,theMSFmissesacrucialelementofinteraction.Itdisregardstheinfluenceofverbalpower

andinteractionprocessesbetweenpoliticalactors,themediaandthepubliconthepolicy-making

process. Those three actors form a triangular relationship in which they share communicative

discourseandpolicyevaluation.IntheGermancase,thethreeactorsusedthisformofinteraction

inordertocreateandnurturethe‘Willkommenskultur’.EspeciallytheChancellorwasadominant

participantofthetriangle.Sheadoptedaproactiveleadershipstylewhichprovidedmeaningtothe

crisisandjustifiedherhumanitarianrefugeepolicyapproach.Theopenformofinteractionofthose

participantsdoesnotonlyinfluencethepolicy-makingprocessbutalsochangestheoriginalnature

of thepolitical streamandconnectsall threestreams.Therefore, it isassumable that thethree

streamsdonotrunasindependentlyasindicatedbyKingdon.Insum,thiscasestudydetectedthat

the MSF misses crucial elements that influence or change the three streams. This makes an

adequateapplicationoftheKingdonmodeltothecasesubstantiallydifficult.Hence,theMSFcan

explainthepolicychangeinGermanytoaverylimitedextendonly.

AftercomparingthosefindingstotheDutchcase,itbecameclearthatthetwocasestudiesdiffer

greatly due to unlike levels of crisis, policy-making conditions and degrees of policy change.

Germanyfounditselfinacrisismode.UnderthecharismaticleadershipofAngelaMerkelandthe

influenceofthe‘Willkommenskultur’thecountryabruptlychangeditsrefugeepolicyfromapolicy

ofdiscouragementtoanopen-borderpolicy.TheNetherlands,whoexperiencedacrisisonalower

81

scale,decidedforstabilityandthereforepursued itspolicyofdiscouragement.Despiteofthese

majordifferences,thecomparisonstilldisclosedmajorsimilaritiesintheapplicationoftheMSF.

Bothstudiesdeemedthemodeltobeausefultooltoresearchagendasettingandpolicy-making.

However,bothstudiesarrivedatthefindingsthatKingdonmissescrucialelementsofcontextand

interactionwhichchangetheoriginalnatureofthepolicyandthepoliticalstream.Context-wise,

theMSFfailstoincludedecisionmakinginacrisismodeandpolicy-makinginamulti-levelstructure.

In respect to interaction, it disregards the influenceof the verbal power and interactionof the

media,thepublicandpoliticalactorshavethroughoutthedifferentstreamsandthereforeonthe

policyprocess.Thus,theoverallresearchquestion‘TowhatextentdoesKingdon’sMultipleStreams

FrameworkexplainthedifferenceintheasylumpolicyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlands

in2015?’needstobeansweredasfollows:TheMSFfailstoexplainthedifferenceintheasylum

policyapproachesofGermanyandtheNetherlandsin2015.ThisisduetothefactthattheMSF

lacks elementswhich are necessary to be includedwhen researching policy-making and policy

changeinbothcasestudies.Therefore,itisrecommendedtoadjustthecurrentMSFaccordingly

ortodevelopanewmodelforpolicychangethatincludesthemissingelements.

7.2. Researchlimitationsandrecommendationforfurtherresearch

Beforeclarifyingtheresearch limitations indetail, it is importanttopointoutthatthisresearch

discoveredandhighlightedsomemissingelementsoftheKingdonmodel.Basedontheseelements,

itrecommendstoadjusttheKingdonmodelordevelopanentirelynewmodelthatincludesthese

factors.However,asalimitationthisresearchdoesnotexplainhowanadjustedoranewmodel

hastolooklike.Furthermore,itneedstobeemphasizedthattheMSFoffersabroadspectrumof

dimensionsthatcanbeexplored.Therefore,thisresearchneedstobelimitedatvariouspoints.I

would like tohighlight themainareasof limitationandprovide recommendation forexpansion

possibilitiesofthisresearch.

Firstly,consideringthecasestudythisresearchislimitedintime.Thisresearchfocusesonthethree

weeksinlatesummer2015.Idecidedforthistimeframebecausethoseweretheweeksinwhich

thecrucialpolicydecisionsweremadethatledtothe890.000refugeesin2015.Iamfullyaware

thattheatmosphereinthecountryshiftedlaterintheyearandthatthetimeperiodafterwardsis

influencedbydifferent factors, suchase.g. the riseof the right-wingpartyAfD.Toexpand the

research in time and to investigate if policy-making within the refugee policy field changes

throughouttimeandunderdifferentcircumstances(e.g.anon-crisismode)seemstobeavaluable

extensionofthisresearch.

82

Secondly,Istronglyrecommendapplyingmorecasestudiesinregardstocrisissituationsand/or

multi-levels structures building on this research. In that way, an adjustment of theMSF or an

entirelynewmodelforpolicy-makingunderthosecircumstancescanbedeveloped.

Thirdly,theroleoftheactorsthatareassignedimportancetowithinthiscasestudyneedstobe

further explored. For instance, the role of ChancellorMerkel in the refugee crisis needs to be

furtherresearched.Here,itisrecommendedtoconsultleadershiptheoriesincludingMaxWeber’s

typeofcharismaticauthority(Weber,1958).Furthermore,theexactinfluenceofthemediaonthis

particular policy change needs to be further investigated. An elaborate media study is

recommended. Additionally, the effect participants of the triangular relationship have on each

other and on the policy-making process needs to be researched. This study explored that the

triangularrelationshipexertspoweronthepolicy-makersandthedecisionstobetaken;however,

itdoesnotprovetowhatextentitdoesso.Hence,furtherresearchisneededinconnectiontothis

particular case study. Findings of such additional research could then be included into similar

studieswithdifferentcases.

Fourthly,anotherfieldthatshouldbelookedintoistheroleofframinginthepolicy-makingprocess.

Thisresearcharrivesattheassumptionthatframing(donebyvariousactors)couldinfluencethe

policy-makingprocess.However,thisneedstobeembeddedinanown,mostlikelyquantitative,

research.

Withthisthesis,IhopethatIcontributedtoanexcitingfieldofresearchwhileraisingnewquestions

forthefuture.

- WORDCOUNT:28.717includingin-textreferences-

83

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Appendices

A. Additionalliterature

a. Policywindows

Another important debate aroundMSFmodel addresses the question howpolicywindows are

being opened. According to Kingdon, policy windows open due to a new problem capturing

attentionorbecauseofachangeinthepoliticalstream,suchasachangeinthenationalmode,a

politicalturnoverorachangeinadministration(Kingdon,2011).However,thepoliticaldecisions

mentioned in the situation analysis indicate that certain actorsmight be able to influence the

opening of a window. This theory has first been expressed by Natali who argued that policy

entrepreneursareabletohelpopenwindows(Natali,2004).Further,theideahasbeendeveloped

byCram(1997)andCorbett(2005).Cramarguesthatonekeyskillofpolicyentrepreneurs isto

facilitate the emergence of a window. At this juncture, she especially refers to the European

Commission which does not just passively wait but actively engage in encouraging a window

emergence inorder topush itspreferredproposal (Cram,1997).Corbettclaimsthatwithin the

Commissionpolicyentrepreneursareabletoopenpolicywindows.He,therefore, locatespolicy

entrepreneursinhigherlevelsofgovernmentthanKingdondoes(Corbett,2005).Inthisregard,the

distinctionbetweenpolicymakersandpolicyentrepreneursbecomesblurred(Ackrill&Kay,2011).

Iwillelaboratemoreonthisinthediscussionofthepolicystream.

b. Framing

Whatexactlycomposesverbalpower?Onepossiblewayistoevaluatesymbolicdevicesinpolitics.

A symbol is anything that represents something else. Itsmeaning depends on theway people

interpret,respondtoanduseit.Symbolsarefundamentalfeaturesofpoliticaldiscourse.Inproblem

definition, they function as strategicweapons in away that politicians can attract support and

persuadedoubtersbyshapingtheirperceptionsandsuspendingcriticism.Hence,theyaremeans

ofcontrolandinfluence.Theyarecollectivelygenerated,maintainedandchanged(Stone,2012).

Moreover,symbolshaveemotiveandcognitivefunctionswhiletransmittingaclearbutsimplified

message(ElderandCobb,1983,inSabatier,2007).Symbolsthatderivefromanation’scoreidentity

aremorelikelytotriggeranemotivepoliticaldiscourseratherthanarationalone.Ingeneral,the

construction of identity summarized in symbols serves as an important political action guide.

(ZahariadisinSabatier2007).

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Political symbolic devices are stories, synecdoche’s and metaphors. Narrative stories serve as

principalmeansforthedefinitionandcontestationofpolicyproblems.Themostcommonstory

themesarechangeandpower.Storiesofchangeincludestoriesofdeclineandrise.Storiesofpower

includestoriesofhelplessnessandcontrol(Stone,2012).Especiallyintimesofcrises,policymakers

wanttotellstoriesofcontrol(Boinetal.,2005).Storiesofdeclinewhichfosteranxietyandstories

ofcontrolwhichcommunicatehopeareoftenwoventogetherasinthestoryofdeclinesettingthe

impetusforthestoryofcontrol.Synecdoche’sarefiguresofspeechthatrepresenttypicalcasesof

largerproblems.Metaphorswhichcomparetwothingsonthesurfaceoftenimplyaprescription

for action and a larger narrative story (Stone, 2012). Concluding, those symbolic elements are

commonfeaturesofframing.

Anotherfeatureofframingisambiguity.ZahariadisclaimsthattheMSFimpliespolicy-makingunder

ambiguity(Sabatier,2007).Ambiguityisafeatureofthehumanconditionwhichdescribesthestate

of thinking in many ways about the same phenomena or circumstances (Feldmann, 1989, in

Sabatier, 2007; Stone, 2012). It enables decision makers to clothe their actions in different

meanings. It is often better suited than precision, because being ambiguous about intentions

facilitatesapolicymakerwithroomtowiggleinthefuture.Furthermore,“theambiguityofsymbols

helpstransformindividualstrivingsintocollectivedecision.”(Stone,2012,p.182).Zahariadisadds

that manipulation, by providing meaning, identity and clarification, is the effort of controlling

ambiguity.Politicalmanipulationisregardedtobemorethanidentityconstructionandpersuasion.

Itincludesthegenerationoffactstochangeminds(ZahariadisinSabatier,2007).Inthisrespect,

Stonesclaimsthatfactsaresociallyconstructedandinterpretative.Theyareusedbypoliticalactors

tostrategicallyachievetheirinterests(Stone,2012).Zahariadisconcludesthattheapplicationofa

framingstrategycombinedwithinstitutionsandpolicywindowschangethemeaning,contextand

policiesovertime(ZahariadisinSabatier,p.70).He,therefore,clearlystatesthatframingcanput

weightonthestreamswhicheventuallymightleadtopolicychange.