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The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is officially claiming in its Strategy 2030 that it is committed to a prosperous, inclusive, resilient and sustainable Asia Pacific, with a focus on poverty eradication. With more than a billion people living in poverty in the region and with COVID-19 pushing millions back into poverty, the bank’s vision seems timely and relevant. The ADB has also declared that it will “prioritize support for the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the region,” with a renewed focus on fragile and conflict-affected states.1

Through loans, technical assistance and policy recommendations, the ADB claims to implement projects aimed at eradicating poverty and promoting economic growth. The top three priority areas of the bank’s lending from 2018 to 2020 include transport (USD 37 billion), energy (USD 25 billion), and governance and institutional development (USD 18 billion). From 2007 to 2016, the

top three sectors for its loans, grants and guarantees are transportation and information and communications technology (ICT) (USD 40 billion), energy (USD 34 billion) and the public sector (USD 18 billion).2 These show the bank’s stress on infrastructure projects, through their prioritization of transport, energy and ICT. Likewise, the disbursement of funds towards the public sector, governance, and institutional development emphasizes the ADB’s overarching influence over the region’s political landscape. Despite their influence to forward inclusive and sustainable development as one of the leading providers of development finance in the region, the bank’s priorities exhibit how they instead serve as a driver of fragility in developing member countries (DMCs). Financing governance also extends to granting loans for autocratic governments, despite the reigning culture of impunity in the region. ADB’s emphasis on infrastructure as a catch-all solution to issues of poverty and development is a manifestation of the corporate capture of development, wherein profit is prioritized over genuine development.

Emphasis on infrastructure has only led to worsen development disparities, with the exclusion of the marginalized and vulnerable from “development” projects. Furthermore, infrastructure investments are pursued to extract and exploit natural resources of developing countries for economic activities of private corporations

Financing Autocratic RegimesIntroduction

BOX 1. DEFINITION OF FRAGILITY.Fragility is defined as a combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. These risks include weak governance and institutional capacity, economic and social insecurity, greater vulnerability to the effects of climate change and natural hazards, and political instability. Furthermore, fragility can lead to negative outcomes such as the breakdown of institutions, a deepening of already prevalent societal divisions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies and violence.3

The ADB has supported democratic backsliding and human rights violations by financially backing oppressive regimes, threatening the security of the people of the region. In the face of the ongoing military coup in Myanmar, widespread attacks, detention and killings have been carried out by the armed forces or the Tatmadaw. As of June 14, 2021, there have been 863 deaths, which include children, 4,880 detainees and hundreds forcibly disappeared.5 Despite these atrocities, there remain active ADB projects in the country worth USD 4.3 billion. While the bank has announced that it has freezed disbursements to the country as of February 2021, it was still able to transfer a total of USD 527.27 million to the government, which can be used for the continuing conduct of arrests, attacks, disappearances and deaths.6

Meanwhile with the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, the ADB lent millions of dollars to national

and donors. Years of ADB-funded infrastructure projects have also intensified conflict and instability, negatively impacting the state of peace and security in the region. Even worse, these projects are accompanied with threats and risks to local communities, such as human rights violations, militarization, corruption and environmental degradation.4 Therefore, the ADB is seen as a driver of fragility in the region by negatively impacting the peace and security of DMCs by supporting oppressive regimes, forwarding the corporatization of development, and exploiting the people and the environment.

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governments under the COVID-19 Active Response and Expenditure Support (CARES) Program. Among the first recipients of this loan are India7 and the Philippines8, which, coincidentally, are also the governments which have the worst pandemic management, coupled with increased attacks on civil society. The ADB has granted both the Modi and Duterte administration USD 1.5 million each under the CARES program. Civil society organizations have noted the lack of transparency of the two national governments and the bank for the use of these loans. Even after a year into the pandemic, both countries are still witnessing extreme outbreaks, leading to thousands of infections and deaths. Additionally, both governments have implemented repressive lockdown measures and laws that restrict civic space, leading to widespread arrests, detainment and killings of journalists, human rights activists and environmental defenders.9,10 Despite these documented cases and against peoples’ campaigns, the ADB has continued to provide financial support to India and the Philippines, essentially backing state-sponsored attacks against their constituents.

The ADB, however, does not only provide financial support, but also technical assistance, another mechanism in which the bank is able to forward policy conditionalities in order to pursue economic reforms that only serve the interests of the bank, its donors, and its private sector partners.

Economic Reforms, Conditionalities and the Corporate Capture of Development

In eradicating poverty, the ADB’s strategy is to reform the economic structure of its developing member countries. In actuality, this means attaching policy conditionalities to grants and loans where governments have to make necessary reforms to provide an inviting business environment. For instance, the ADB is actively promoting public-private partnerships (PPPs), which, according to the bank, enables the private sector to support governments in addressing development issues in the region. However, this paves the way for the private sector to seize control over natural resources and the basic social services of DMCs. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the ADB funded a program called Promoting Economic Diversification in 2019, with the rationale that economic growth of the Republic will be achieved through the pursuit of a “more dynamic and globally oriented market economy.”13 The bank approved a USD 50 million

grant to the Kyrgyz government to diversify the economy and promote PPPs. Among the high-priority reform areas included in the program was a stress on trade reforms, PPPs and skills development for the labor market. Underlying these reforms is the assignment of a larger role to the private sector for economic growth and development. Instead of promoting self-sufficiency in developing countries, labor and production are largely decided by corporations, leading to the privatization of basic social services, such as water, energy and health.

BOX 2. MISALIGNMENT OF PPPs WITH DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS PRINCIPLES.Various research have proven that PPPs are not compliant with the development effectiveness principles of country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and mutual accountability. Country ownership and inclusive partnerships required from development projects are violated in order to comply with private sector interests.

State guarantees for the private sector under PPPs can undermine the financial and economic base of developing countries, since they are often forced to buy a certain amount of goods and services, regardless of the demand. In fact, there is a violation of state sovereignty on the part of aid providers which, by promoting the interests of the private sector, redraw legislations and dictate their own standards and procedures that do not comply with national laws and social, environmental standards.11

Moreover, it has been noted that PPPs are used to conceal public borrowing, while providing long-term state guarantees for profits to private companies. Negative impacts of PPPs such as debt, violation of human rights and environmental degradation are then shouldered by the people, as they are forced to pay off loans and face the risks from these impacts. The lack of transparency and accountability of the private sector also allow for further violation of national laws, principles of development effectiveness and human rights.12

The reform of the Kyrgyz health sector was undertaken by the ADB, with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Japanese government. However, because of the bank’s stress on the privatization of social services, the reform led to the lack of access to free treatment in state and municipal health care institutions. Free healthcare only extended to treatment for first

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aid and specific diseases, and only for socially vulnerable segments of the population. With additional taxes for health insurance and the lack of guarantee for free treatments, more than half of the population is forced to self-medicate.14

Furthermore, infrastructure projects, in the form of power plants, irrigation systems and gas projects, have been pursued to encourage extractive economic activities, in the interest of multilateral development banks, donors and the private sector, but at the expense of the people of the region. Under the umbrella of poverty eradication, the bank has focused on expanding support for the private sector as the main driver of change, through infrastructure projects.

On paper, the ADB claims that these infrastructure projects will be able to grant people’s access to basic social services such as water and electricity. However, it can be seen that the cost of these infrastructure projects are shouldered by the people. While the private sector profits from these projects, the cost of infrastructure loans is relegated to the people, through additional or an increase in taxes to pay the debts. Furthermore, the poor implementation of projects by the private sector have led to the waste of funds, defective facilities and a rise in the prices of services. The people are then expected to bear the costs for the faulty projects the ADB has imposed on these countries. While civil society organizations, peoples’ organizations

and communities attempt to make ADB accountable, the bank, with the aid of the national governments, have not only kept data confidential, but also launched violent attacks to suppress their voices.

In Myanmar, the Myingyan Natural Gas Power Project was funded by the ADB, with the World Bank (WB), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and UK’s Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG). A year after the commissioning of the plant, electricity tariffs increased by 72.9%, with huge losses to the state in 2018 to 2019, amounting to USD 437 million. The Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between multilateral development banks and the government of Myanmar mandated guaranteed purchases of electricity produced from natural gas. Prices for electricity rose five times the regular price, with the government covering the price difference for domestic consumers, leading to losses. The details of this agreement between the banks and the government of Myanmar, however, are kept secret. Seeking information regarding the agreement from the government of Myanmar is fraught with harassment of local activists. Aid providers have also refused to disclose information, citing privacy policies and the need to request such information directly from the government of Myanmar.15

Meanwhile, the Taza Suu (Clear Water) Project covering over 500 villages in Kyrgyzstan, was funded by the ADB and the World Bank. In 2000,

the Asian Development Bank agreed to provide a loan of USD 37 million to the Kyrgyz government for the creation of infrastructure, like water supply networks and treatment facilities, to provide residents of the villages of Chui, Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken regions with clean water. The World Bank provided a USD 15 million loan to cover the cost of building water infrastructure in the Issyk-Kul, Naryn and Talas regions.

However, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have noted the misuse of funds due to the poor state of the infrastructure borne out from the project. Instead of the intended chlorination station, they constructed a

primitive device made of rusted barrels and hose. Poor facilities have also created additional health risks for the people, with the infestation of gordian worms in the tap water generated from the infrastructure.16 While local organizations have been closely monitoring the project, they were subjected to attacks. The evidence they were able to collect was confiscated, and the head of one of the NGOs, Taza Tabigat, was attacked by unknown persons during a monitoring trip to the Chui Oblast district.

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Furthermore, NGOs have noted the lack of transparency and the violation of national legislations by the ADB and its partners. The Accounts Chamber of the Krygyz Republic confirmed the embezzlement and misuse of funds of the Taza Suu project, due to the failure of the water supply systems.17 Without contracts and receipts, the population was charged 5% of the total cost of the Taza Suu project, most of which were stolen by local officials. Payment for the ADB’s foreign consultant, Dar Mukhendeslik Musavarlik, amounted to USD 3.1 million, a tenth of the total loan given by the bank. In the end, the people bore the brunt of the impact of these projects. Failure of these infrastructures have left 500 villages, or a third of the whole Kyrgyzstan, without access to clean water, while still paying for the loans from the ADB.

Extractive Economy, Exploitative Policies

A closer look at the bank’s activities behind the facade of its “commitment to inclusion and sustainable growth in the region” reveals primarily geopolitical, geo-economic interest, with its activities aimed at opening state borders to access developing countries’ resources and national economies for the free movement of capital. Donor countries, with the private sector, have been scrambling to gain control over land and resources from developing member countries for their own interests.

Major shareholders, through international finance institutions (IFIs), have also been promoting the militarization and securitization of aid. As major shareholders to the ADB, the United States and Japan use aid not only to promote their economic agenda, but also to counter China’s provision of foreign aid in the region through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For example, ADB also focuses on infrastructure connectivity in Myanmar,

which will complement its financing for connectivity in northeast India and Bangladesh, under the South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC).18 This project has also been used to counter the Chinese influence in the country, under the BRI. Myanmar is also part of ADB’s Greater Mekong Sub Economic Cooperation (GMS), under which the bank financed a portion of the Greater Mekong Sub Region East-West Economic Corridor Highway Development Project in the country.

The ADB has only negatively impacted the living conditions of the Indigenous Peoples, with the “plunder of ancestral lands, and blatant

disregard of their rights, culture and ways of life.”19 Indigenous land and territory has been the target of ADB and governments to seize control over untapped natural resources. In conducting development projects, the bank violated the right of Indigenous Peoples to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). Without the consent of the Indigenous Peoples, their lands are being transformed to sites of infrastructure projects, leading to forced displacement, loss of traditional livelihood, militarization of communities and environmental destruction. Moreover, “development” projects are still being pursued in areas despite ongoing ethnic armed conflict, contributing further to instability.

BOX 3. CAPITALIZING ON THE REGION’S NATURAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES.The extractive nature of the ADB’s “development” projects have also effectively exploited the people and the environment. Projects have led to the loss of livelihood and unsafe working conditions. Infrastructure projects have largely led to environmental degradation in the form of pollution, with hazardous waste or oil spills, irrigation problems, resource extraction, loss of biodiversity, and deforestation. Deployment of local armed forces to project sites have led to the militarization of communities, resulting in various human rights violations. Due to the lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms, the ADB remains non-compliant with social and environmental standards, leading to harmful effects on the people and the environment.

While the ADB’s current framework and processes already limit and pre-determine the space for civil society to voice out their concerns and grievances, armed forces have also violently suppressed voices of the communities, leading to illegal arrests and contributing to the shrinking of civic spaces. Furthermore, the ADB has continued to pursue these extractive projects in areas where there is continuing armed conflict, only aggravating the tensions and conflict in the community. In these cases, the vulnerable and marginalized populations like the Indigenous Peoples, women and children, farmers, fisherfolk and the urban poor are the most affected.

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ADB-funded projects in the region have largely caused displacement of peoples from their ancestral lands, homes and places of work. The Nam Ngiep I Hydropower in Laos, a 290-megawatt hydropower infrastructure to provide electricity, was pursued by the bank in the provinces of Bolihamsai and Xaysombone. While ADB claims the dam is a part of its poverty-reduction strategy for Laos, 90% of the generated electricity will be exported to Thailand.

Before the implementation of the project, reports show that an estimated number of 4,000 Laotians will be affected with the construction of the dam, but the bank pursued the project nonetheless. Out of the 4,000 affected peoples, 3,540 from 528 families would be forcibly relocated and 1,706 livelihoods would be affected, due to the loss of arable and productive land.20 Loss of arable land from the dam can also affect the food source of the local population, leading to hunger and malnutrition. Among those forcibly relocated from their ancestral lands are the Hmong and Khmu Indigenous Peoples. Military campaigns are also being used to drive out the Hmong in order to ensure the smooth implementation of foreign investment projects and other government-backed initiatives on their lands.21

The Nam Ngiep I Hydropower Project also has visible negative environmental impacts, with the loss of biodiversity, deforestation, pollution of water systems and disturbance in

the ecosystem. The dam will affect the unique biodiversity, endangering at least seven endemic species, due to the changes in waterflow and loss of habitat. While corporations and neighboring countries will be benefiting from this dam, the Lao people will be facing the brunt of the negative impacts of the ADB project.22

In the case of Sri Lanka, the “development” project financed by the bank has negatively impacted the Tamil fisherfolk in the regions of Jaffna, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Kilinochchi. As part of the Northern Province Sustainable Fisheries Development Project, the ADB has allocated USD 75 million to the government of Sri Lanka for the modernization of Point Pedro Harbor. The investment is stated to “revitalize the fisheries sector in the conflict-affected coastal regions of Jaffna, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Kilinochchi, and the project will promote employment in the Northern Province and increase fisheries production and livelihood opportunities.”23 However, the real cause for the aggressive promotion of the project by the Sri Lankan government has been Sinhalicisation, or to populate Tamil land with the Sinhalese. Point Pedro Harbor has long been a war zone between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil militia.

The Fishers’ Associations from these areas have been opposing the project, due to the loss of livelihood and the environmental degradation

it will cause. Tamil fisherfolk have lost access to the Point Pedro harbor, affecting their source of livelihood and food. The harbor is only accessed by large-scale mechanized bottom trawlers, who use destructive methods like trawling in these seas.24 Trawling is a fishing method that uses a boat to drag a net through the seafloor to catch marine species. These operators discard a lot of the catch that they deem is non-profitable, which also rids local fishermen of potential income. Furthermore, trawling has been proven to be detrimental to the seafloor as it dislodges sediment, coral and vegetation, destroying the marine ecosystem.25 While ADB has claimed that its project will provide employment and production, it has only contributed the opposite to local communities. The modernization of the harbor has limited the access of local fisherfolk to their own seas and contributed to environmental degradation due to trawling.

With the infrastructure project, the 524th division of the Sri Lankan army has been stationed in the area, establishing their base. Amid continuing tensions between Tamils and Sinhalese, land is being taken away from the indigenous population in Kilinochchi to expand a military town with houses for military personnel, the construction of new Buddhist temples, fields and an airstrip. Furthermore, indigenous Tamil lands have been used by the military to establish their own businesses. Leaders of Fishers’ Associations have accused the project as a “genocidal ‘development’ of fishery harbours.”26

Militarized ‘Development’ Projects

The ADB’s infrastructure projects disturb the traditional way of life and the environment of Indigenous Peoples. For instance, the ADB-funded SASEC Road Connectivity Investment Program (SRCIP) is a project under the South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) that aims to improve about 500 kilometers of a priority road section in North Bengal and North Eastern Region (NB-NER) of India. The Indigenous Peoples in Manipur have argued that these road infrastructure would affect at least 400 hectares of agricultural land in the Western and Eastern regions of Imphal and displace hundreds of households.

Furthermore, the bank’s negotiations for the SRCIP with the Indian government are taking place against a backdrop of indigenous struggles for self-determination. The aggressive promotion of the road project by the Indian government served to escalate tensions among the Indigenous Peoples in the area.

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To defend the project, the national government utilizes paramilitaries to suppress protests against ADB projects and movements for self-determination of the Indigenous Peoples. Indian authorities and paramilitaries have been instigating attacks, arrests and harassment of community leaders and human right defenders who represent the interests of the indigenous population.27

Meanwhile in Bangladesh, the ADB is supporting a number of infrastructure projects in the Chittagong Hills Tract (CHT), a province that historically experienced genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Jumma Indigenous Peoples in the 1960s and 1970s. During this time, Indigenous Peoples were expelled and their land was used to build reservoirs and

hydroelectric power plants. Despite the ongoing aggression against the Jumma, the bank has continued to pursue projects in the Chittagong Hills Tract. Without addressing the ongoing conflict and violence against the Indigenous Peoples, it has continued to profit from infrastructure projects in the area. From the water reservoirs, the bank has pursued projects to profit from water supplies in Chittagong, which has also affected access to water by the Bangladeshi population. In addition, the bank has launched rural and community “development” projects in the area, funding institutional development, capacity building and rural access in the form of roads and markets, village infrastructure, and the development of micro-agribusinesses.28

Despite the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in 1997 that recognizes the right of the Indigenous Peoples to their lands, the government of Bangladesh, with the help of the military, has forcibly settled the area with Bengalis, who have been harassing the Indigenous Peoples with the military. According to Amnesty International, violence, particularly sexual violence, against the Jumma people is routinely carried out by settlers and the military alike. In 2014 alone, the figures make for a repugnant reading, with 117 indigenous women having faced physical and sexual abuse, with a majority (57%) of these being children.29

In the face of increasing violence and exploitation of Indigenous Peoples and women in the Chittagong Hills Tract, ADB remains unscathed and unaccountable. The Asian Development Bank has ensured that they would be given immunity by the Bangladesh government through the President’s Order No. 3 of 1973 or The Asian Development Bank Bank Order, 1973. Citizens of Bangladesh are incapable of suing a case against the ADB, its management or employees for its projects and initiatives.30 The bank’s immunity has served to violate basic human rights and Indigenous Peoples’ rights and has shrunk civic spaces, leading to continued attacks on local communities, human rights activists and environmental defenders.

Conclusion

The Asian Development Bank is one of the major contributors of development finance in Asia Pacific, with the ability to influence and alter the development landscape of the region. Through loans, technical assistance and policy recommendations, the ADB claims to implement projects aimed at eradicating poverty and promoting economic growth. However, civil society organizations, peoples’ organizations and communities have long criticized ADB’s policies and projects, as these contribute to the corporate capture of development and the worsening state of fragility in the region.

The activities of the Asian Development Bank under the auspices of the “development of sustainable and inclusive development in the Asia-Pacific Region” have led to the corporate capture of development, with the pursuance of policy conditionalities and profit-oriented infrastructure projects. The ADB has

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promoted an enabling environment for the private sector to benefit from the “development” projects, at the expense of the realization of basic rights and services of the people. As a result, people lack access to the most basic services, leading to the weakening of the health care, energy, and social assistance sectors, a growth of social inequality and an increase in the country’s debt burden.

Profit-oriented infrastructure projects in the form of power plants, road improvement and irrigation systems, are pursued to encourage extractive economic activities. Behind these projects reveal the geopolitical, geo-economic interest of the bank and its major shareholders. The ADB’s extractive nature has largely exploited the people, by causing displacement and loss of livelihood, and the environment, with the loss of biodiversity, deforestation and pollution brought about by the projects.

These negative impacts have disproportionately affected the vulnerable sectors of society, such as the Indigenous Peoples, farmers, fisherfolk, women and children. In the implementation of its projects, the bank has forcibly displaced Indigenous Peoples out of their ancestral lands, caused livelihood loss for farmers and fisherfolk, and harassed women and children. Their projects have also led to environmental degradation, contributing to the climate crisis. Deployment of armed forces to project sites have only contributed

to the worsening state of fragility in the region, with deepening conflict, intensified military confrontation, and repression of activists and human rights defenders. Furthermore, the ADB has been financially backing authoritarian regimes by granting loans, despite their documented human rights violations. The bank’s projects and policies have effectively suppressed voices of the local communities, civil society organizations and peoples’ organizations. With these, the ADB has served as a driver of fragility, negatively impacting the state of peace and security of the region.

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Recommendations

For the ADB to veer away from being a driver of fragility and to truly contribute to a prosperous, inclusive, resilient and sustainable Asia Pacific, it must genuinely uphold development effectiveness principles in its projects and policies. Observance of the principles of country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and mutual accountability ensures the attainment of a rights-based and people-centered development.

Country Ownership. Moving away from the corporate capture of development is an essential condition for eradicating poverty, addressing inequalities, and in achieving genuine sustainability and inclusiveness of

development. The ADB must end conditionalities and cancel debts that further impoverish developing countries and fragile states. Assistance to the country should proceed from the main principle that the resources belong to the people. In this regard, the ADB must end the corporate capture of development that discards the democratic rights of the marginalized and vulnerable, in order to uphold a rights-based and people-centered approach to sustainable development.

Focus on Results. ADB projects must not be pursued based on the interests of its major shareholders and the private sector, but rather on the needs of the people. Development aid must not be used for the shareholders’ economic and political interests. ADB must ensure its infrastructure projects truly address the needs of the people, especially of the vulnerable and marginalized sectors. Development projects must not lead to additional burden on the people, in terms of increasing debt and the negative impacts these cause.

The bank’s policies and projects must not threaten the state of peace and security in the region. It must stop financing authoritarian states that violate human rights. Financing

for projects that have a danger of negatively impacting the people and the environment must also be halted. Infrastructure projects must not lead to the loss of livelihood, displacement of populations, militarization of communities, human rights violations, attacks on civil society and suppression of dissent. ADB must not be a driver of fragility in the region, and it should secure the exercise of rights of the people, especially those of the vulnerable and marginalized.

Inclusive Partnerships. With its current mechanisms for development, the ADB will only serve to widen gaps and inequalities in the Asia Pacific region. In doing so, priority should be given to the standards of the beneficiary country and accountability mechanisms should be inclusive in terms of people’s participation. Accordingly, ADB processes must be inclusive and participatory, ensuring that the democratic rights of civil society organizations, peoples’ organizations and communities are upheld in designing and implementing development projects. In order to foster inclusive and sustainable development, the ADB must forward a people-centered and rights-based approach in its projects and systems.

Transparency and Mutual Accountability. Its transparency and accountability policies must be rigorously reviewed and audited with CSOs and people’s organizations to develop effective country accountability mechanisms for achieving truly inclusive and sustainable results. Information and records about ADB projects in DMCs must be made public, for further transparency and accountability. The bank must also support and engage with civil society mechanisms that undertake monitoring of its projects, such as the CSO Aid Observatorio. The upcoming Safeguard Policy Review should reflect the development effectiveness principles and highlight the inputs of the civil society, especially those of the affected peoples and communities. Once finalized, the ADB must strictly implement its safeguards mechanisms to avoid and mitigate adverse impacts of its projects.

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Endnotes1. Asian Development Bank, “Strategy

2030: Achieving a Prosperous, Inclusive, Resilient, and Sustainable Asia and the Pacific,” July 2018, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/435391/strategy-2030-main-document.pdf.

2. IBON International, “The ADB’s Strategy 2030: Repackaging Neoliberalism?” April 2018. https://iboninternational.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/Policy%20Brief%20ADB%20online.pdf.

3. Asian Development Bank, Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations and Small Island Developing States Approach (Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank, June 2021), https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/699041/fragile-conflict-affected-sids-approach.pdf.

4. The Reality of Aid-Asia Pacific, Asian Development Bank: (Mis)shaping Development Cooperation and Effectiveness in Asia Pacific (Quezon City: IBON International, 2019).

5. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, “Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup,” 14 June 2021, https://aappb.org/?p=15812.

6. NGO Forum on ADB, “Letter to ADB regarding Myanmar,” 19 February 2021, https://www.forum-adb.org/post/letter-to-adb-regarding-myanmar.

7. Asian Development Bank, “India: COVID-19 Active Response and Expenditure Support Program,” 28 April 2020, https://www.adb.org/projects/54182-001/main#project-pds.

8. Asian Development Bank, “Philippines: COVID-19 Active Response and Expenditure Program, 22 September 2020, https://www.adb.org/projects/54138-001/

main#project-pds.9. “Indian authorities continue to stifle

dissent and persecute activists despite pandemic surge,” CIVICUS Monitor, 4 May 2021, https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2021/05/04/indian-authorities-continue -stifle-dissent-and-persecute-activists-despite-pandemic-surge/

10. “Philippines: Government should be held accountable for the killings of activists,” CIVICUS Monitor, 18 March 2021, https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/media-releases/4983-philippines -duterte-s-administration-should-be-held-accountable-for-the-killings-of-activists-and-human-rights-defenders.

11. David Hall. Why Public-Private Partnerships Don’t Work: The many advantages of the public alternative. Public Services International. February 2015. https://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/rapport_eng_56pages_a4_lr.pdf.

12. IBON International, IBON Primer on Public-Private Partnerships (Quezon City: IBON International, 2017), 14-16.

13. Asian Development Bank. “ADB Grant to Support Reforms Aimed at Diversifying Krygyz Republic’s Economy.” 17 September 2019. https://www.adb.org/news/adb-grant-support-reforms-aimed -diversifying-kyrgyz-republics-economy

14. Всемирная Организация Здравоохранения, Европейское Региональное Бюро. Управление финансированием здравоохранения и стратегическими закупками услуг в Кыргызстане, 2019. https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/412655/GHF_SPS_KGZ_-11-09-2019_RUS_WEB.pdf

15. Kate Geary, In the Dark: Secrecy and the Myingyan Public Private Partnership gas power plant in Myanmar, March 2020,

https://www.re-course.org/wp-content /uploads/2020/03/In-the-Dark.pdf.

16. Саипова М.Б. Обеспечение права доступа к чистой воде в международных документах и НПА Кыргызской Республики. https://ksla.kg/media/vestnik/2013_3/saipova_m_b.pdf

17. Специальный доклад Омбудсмена по чистой питьевой воде, 9 January 2018. https://ombudsman.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2488&catid =18&lang=ru&ltemid=149

18. Asian Development Bank, “Regional: Using Frontier Technology and Big Data Analytics for Smart Infrastructure Facility Planning and Monitoring,” 18 March 2021, https://www.adb.org/projects/54114-001/main#project-pds.

19. Indigenous Peoples Movement for Self-Determination & Liberation, “ADB: Anti-Development Bank?” August 2018, https://ipmsdl.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ADB-Primer-2018.pdf.

20. Valeria Quarataroli, “Nam Ngiep I Hydropower Dam, Lao PDR,” Environmental Justice Atlas, 16 October 2018, https://ejatlas.org/conflict/nam-ngiep-i-hydropower-dam.

21. Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization, Hmong in Isolation: Atrocities against the indigenous Hmong in the Xaisomboun Region of Laos (April 2021), https://unpo.org/downloads/2705.pdf.

22. Valeria Quarataroli, “Nam Ngiep I Hydropower Dam, Lao PDR,” Environmental Justice Atlas, 16 October 2018, https://ejatlas.org/conflict/nam-ngiep-i-hydropower-dam.

23. Asian Development Bank, “Sri Lanka: Northern Province Sustainable Fisheries Development Project,” 11 June 2020, https://www.adb.org/projects/49325-002/

main#project-pds.24. “Sirisena’s promo on harbour

‘development’ in Jaffna reveals imminent Sinhalicisation threat,” TamilNet, 28 August 2019, https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=39558.

25. Sashini Fernando, “User Rights: Conflict between Sri Lanka’s small scale fishermen and mechanized trawlers in Northern Sri Lanka,” Food and Agriculture Organization, http://www.fao.org/fishery/static/tenure-user-rights/root/volume6/C65.pdf.

26. “Genocidal port ‘development’ targets Point Pedro, KKS for Sinhalicisation of Jaffna,” TamilNet, 19 January 2017, https://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=38556.

27. Jiten Yumnam, “Development Cooperation, Militarism and Conflict in the Contiguous Areas of Bangladesh, North East India and Myanmar,” Reality of Aid Report 2018: The Changing Faces of Development Aid and Cooperation: Encouraging Global Justice or Buttressing Inequalities?. https://www.realityofaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/RoA-Full-Report2018FINAL3-min.pdf.

28. Asian Development Bank, “Bangladesh: Second Chittagong Hill Tracts Rural Development Project,” https://www.adb.org/projects/42248-013/main.

29. Robert Meganson, “Hidden Bangladesh: Violence and Brutality in the Chittagong Hill Tracts,” Amnesty International UK. 18 May 2020. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/groups/wirksworth-and-district/hidden-bangladesh-violence-and-brutality-chittagong-hill-tracts.

30. Hasan Mehdi. “ADB in Bangladesh: More Than Four Decades of Pillage & Devastation,” Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt, 8 May 2017, http://www.cadtm.org/ADB-in-Bangladesh-More-Than-Four.

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July 2021

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