fire fighter face report no. 98-05, backdraft in ...complement is five fire fighters), engine 120...

The Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation andPrevention Program is conducted by the NationalInstitute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).The purpose of the program is to determine factors thatcause or contribute to fire fighter deaths suffered in theline of duty. Identification of causal and contributingfactors enable researchers and safety specialists todevelop strategies for preventing future similarincidents. To request additional copies of this report(specify the case number shown in the shield above),other fatality investigation reports, or furtherinformation, visit the Program Website at:

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/firehome.html

or call toll free 1-800-35-NIOSH

Backdraft in Commercial Building Claims the Lives of Two FireFighters, Injuries Three, and Five Fire Fighters Barely Escape--IllinoisOn February 11, 1998, two male fire fighters (thevictims), both 40 years of age, entered acommercial tire-service center to evaluate theinterior, with no smoke or fire showing from theexterior. The two fire fighters (the victims),along with 8 to 10 other fire fighters and officers,entered the front door of the showroom andobserved only light haze. However, when theyentered the service area, black smoke coveringthe top one-third of ceiling space wasencountered, but no visible fire. From theamount of smoke in the showroom, it was evidentthere was a smoldering fire somewhere; however,none of the fire fighters could locate the origin.Within minutes, all fire fighters in the interior ofthe building were caught in a hazardous backdraftthat claimed the lives of two fire fighters, andnearly claimed all those who were inside. NIOSHinvestigators concluded that in order to preventsimilar incidents, incident command mustanticipate all possible circumstances which maybe present in anticipation of rare and unexpecteddevelopments. To aid in this preparation, firedepartments should:

! ensure that command conducts aninitial evaluation of the incident scene

! ensure command makes the decision toventilate a truss roof based onconditions on arrival

! ensure fire fighters do not enter astructure fire during ventilation with apotential for backdraft or flashover

! ensure fire fighters conductingventilation on the roof are incommunication with command

! encourage municipalities review theircommercial building codes regardingexposed polystyrene insulation.

Backdraft in Commercial Building Claims the Lives of Two Fire Fighters, InjuriesThree, and Five Fire Fighters Barely Escape-Illinois

INTRODUCTIONOn February 11, 1998, two male fire fighterswere fatally injured while fighting a fire at acommercial tire service center. The two firefighters (the victims), along with 8 to 10 other firefighters and officers, entered the front door of theshowroom and observed only light haze.However, when they entered the service area,black smoke covering the top one-third of ceilingspace was encountered, but there was no visiblefire. From the smoke in the showroom, it wasevident there was a smoldering fire somewhere,but none of the fire fighters could locate theorigin. Both engine and truck officers madeextensive interior sweeps of the service area.However, within minutes, all fire fighters in theinterior of the building were caught in ahazardous backdraft that claimed the lives of twofire fighters, and nearly claimed all those whowere inside. On February 17, 1998, Ted A.Pettit, Chief of the Trauma InvestigationsSection, and Frank Washenitz, Safety andOccupational Health Specialist, traveled to Illinoisto investigate the circumstances surrounding thedeaths of the two fire fighters, and the near fatalinjuries of 8 other fire fighters. Meetings wereconducted with the Illinois Department of Laborinvestigators, the public affairs officer for the firedepartment, the director of employee relations,officers from the air-mask service, safety officersfor the fire department, the chief of the trainingacademy, fire department officers and fire fightersthat responded to the incident, and the presidentand vice-president of the IAFF Local #2 union. A site visit was conducted of the incident site, andpictures of the structure were obtained from thefire department.

The fire department involved in the incidentserves a metropolitan population of 2.7 million ina geographic area of 224 square miles. The fire

department is comprised of approximately 5000employees, of whom 4200 are fire fighters. Thefire department provides all new fire fighters withan extensive 4-month (65 training day) trainingprogram at their fire department trainingacademy, which covers all aspects of Level I andLevel II fire fighters training, and recommendedby the National Fire Protection Association.Upon successful completion of academy trainingand passing the Fire Fighter Level II examination,a fire fighter is assigned to a station. Thedepartment also requires that each fire fighterreceive 2 hours of training per shift. One victimhad 2 years of fire fighter experience, with 18years of paramedic experience, and the secondvictim had 9 years of experience as a fire fighter.

Although several fire companies were involved inthis incident, only those directly involved up tothe time of the fatal incident are cited in thisreport.

INVESTIGATIONOn February 11, 1998, at 2224 hours, the firedepartment received a call from the occupant ofa private residence at the rear of a commercial tireservice center, stating there was a fire in theinterior of the building. The service center (siteof the incident) was constructed of masonry blockwith a brick facade on a concrete slab foundation.The center measured 150 feet wide by 62 feet indepth, with a glass showroom attached to thefront, measuring 75 feet by 55 feet (figure).Above the parts room was a cockloft (unfinishedarea below the roof), where tires, Christmasdecorations, and miscellaneous items were stored(believed to be the area of origin of the fire). Thecockloft was accessible from the service area.The roof system of the service area wasconstructed of open wooden bow-string trusses,with unprotected polystyrene insulation glued to


the underside. The exterior of the roof was arubberized material, which had recently beenrepaired. The entrance to the service area was eitherthrough a standard passage door from theshowroom into the service area, or through anexterior metal garage door (entrance for cars tobe serviced), which was raised and lowered by anelectric automatic motorized system. Thoseunits responding initially were Engine 92 with aLieutenant, Engineer, and 2 fire fighters (normalcomplement is five fire fighters), Engine 120 witha Lieutenant, Engineer, and 3 fire fighters, Truck24 with a Lieutenant and 4 fire fighters, Truck 45with a Lieutenant and 4 fire fighters, andBattalion 21.

At 2228 hours, Engine 120 was the first companyto arrive at the service center, with Engine 92being the second company on the scene, thenTruck 45, Truck 24, and Battalion 21. None ofthe fire fighters reported seeing any fire or smoke,so one of the fire fighters radioed back todispatch to verify the address. The address wasconfirmed by dispatch, and at the same time aneighbor told the fire fighters he saw fire at therear of the building. At approximately 2230hours, the owner of the business arrived to unlockthe front door to the showroom. Approximately8 to 10 fire fighters from the first-arrivingcompanies entered the showroom; some firefighters reported no smoke showing, othersreported observing a light haze in the showroom,with the odor of a burning car. They opened thedoor to the service area, where black smokecovering the top one-third of ceiling space wasencountered. They entered with a charged 1 3/4-inch hose line, which was connected to a 2 1/2-inch leadout line. The Lieutenant from Engine120 walked deep into the service area along the

wall to the South in an attempt to locate the lightswitch panel. The fire fighters indicated that at notime did any them feel any excessive heat or seeany fire. When the fire fighters entered thebuilding, two fire fighters from Truck 45 in frontof the building, and two fire fighters from Truck24 went to the rear of the building. Theyascended ground ladders to the roof to cutventilating holes in the roof with axes. The firefighters on Truck 24 stated that there was nosmoke or fire showing when they arrived at therear of the building; however, they noticed thewindows were dark and smoky. One fire fighterpunched a small hole in one window with an axetip, and black smoke billowed out. This was seenand heard by the truck Lieutenant inside doing hissurvey in the service area. Within 5 to 8 minutes,the four fighters on the roof had chopped aventilation hole, approximately 4- or 5-footsquare. When they peeled back the opening,black smoke was emitting from the hole.However, within 30 seconds, flames also startedroaring up through the opening. All four fightersimmediately picked up their equipment anddescended the ladders to the ground.

At approximately 2243 hours, the 8 to 10 firefighters and officers who were inside the buildinghad advanced some 15 to 20 feet into the servicearea where thick black smoke was above them.They reported running into each other because ofthe poor visibility. At approximately 2245 hours,without warning, hot gases that had accumulatedalong the 20- foot-high ceiling ignited, causing abackdraft situation. This created a pressure wave,knocking the fire fighters off balance and to thefloor (it is conceivable that just before the time ofignition, the overhead garage door into theservice area was self-activated and raised,allowing additional air to fuel the fire - this wasdetermined by an examination by the city


electrical inspector and an electrical engineer thatthe motor and drive chain assembly had definitelyopened electrically as a result of the fire shortingout the low voltage side of the switch wires). The fire fighters became disoriented, could notfind the hose, and were scrambling and yelling inan attempt to escape the inferno they had beencaught in. Additionally, the molten polystyreneinsulation from the ceiling area falling down onthem. One of the fire fighters who had managedto escape through the service door to theshowroom, later said you could hear fire fightersrunning into and knocking over things, yelling,and screaming, trying to escape from the burningstructure. One fire fighter dove through theoffice window to escape the burning building. The escape from the service area was complicatedby the 20 cars stored in the service area, theintense heat, heavy black smoke, disorientationand panic from being trapped.

When the fire fighters exited the burningstructure, an immediate head count was taken,and it was discovered that two fire fighters weremissing. Rescue attempts by fire fighters toreenter the structure were numerous but futile, asthe entire service area became fully involved withfire, prohibiting entry and rescue the missing firefighters. Within 30 minutes, the entire truss roofcollapsed into the structure. CAUSE OF DEATHAccording to the medical examiner, the cause ofdeath for both fire fighters was carbon monoxideintoxication due to inhalation of smoke and soot.

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONRecommendation #1: Fire departments shouldensure that command conducts an initialevaluation of the incident scene upon arrival atthe fire scene. [1-3]

Discussion: At a minimum, initial evaluation orsize-up of a fire should include the following: (1)the fire is evaluated for size and location, (2) thestructure is evaluated for the combustibleconstruction, occupancy, floor area and height ofthe building, (3) exposures are evaluated in termsof hazards to life and/or hazards to nearbybuildings from flame damage and smoke, and (4)the resources at the scene are evaluated for theirability to extinguish the fire. Resources includethe number of apparatus, fire fighting personnel,water supply, and auxiliary appliances. Otherunpredictable factors should also be evaluated,such as the time of day of the fire (day/night) andthe weather conditions, such as extreme heat orcold. Circumstances sometimes are encounteredwhere size-up is a process of informationgathering conducted by incident command andcompany officers, in an effort to determine thesize and progression of the incident.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments shouldensure command decision to ventilate a trussroof is based on conditions upon arrival. [4]

Discussion: Since smoke is the main killer atfires, roof venting can be a life-saving tactic in anoccupied building. Ventilation is also necessaryto improve a fire environment so that fire fighterscan approach a fire with a hose line forextinguishment. However, window and doorventilation should be coordinated with fireextinguishment. Only after a charged hose line isin place and ready for extinguishment isventilation of windows and doors most effective.Command should determine if ventilation isneeded and where ventilation is needed. The typeof ventilation should also be determined, based onevaluation of the structure and conditions onarrival.


Recommendation #3: Fire departments shouldensure that fire fighters do not enter structuresduring ventilation where there is a potential forbuilt-up explosive gases to ignite and cause abackdraft or flashover as evidenced by smoke-stained windows at the rear of the building andpuffing smoke at the roof vents and rearwindows. [5]

Discussion: When fire fighters are conducting aninterior attack, there is a hazard potential for abackdraft or flashover. Backdraft is an explosioncaused by the rapid ignition of fire and gasesoccurring in a burning or smoldering confinedarea that has been closed up, thereby decreasingthe necessary oxygen for complete combustion.The trigger for a backdraft explosion is a suddenincrease in the percent of oxygen by volume, i.e.,the introduction of fresh air, which enters thestructure during the initial search and entryoperations, or various other operations.Flashover occurs when there is rapid ignition ofheated fire gases and smoke that has built up atthe ceiling level in a burning or smoldering room.Flashover is caused by thermal radiationfeedback. When all combustibles and fire gases inthe space have been heated to their ignitiontemperatures, simultaneous ignition of the entireroom occurs, involving the entire interiorspace/room. As demonstrated by this incident,the hazardous conditions of a backdraft can bepresent without any typical signs, such as heavygrey/yellow smoke pushing out of building joints,roof vents, and skylights.

Recommendation #4: Fire departments shouldensure that fire fighters conducting ventilationon the roof are in communication withcommand. [5]

Discussion: Fire fighters conducting roofventilation can see important size-up situationsnot visible to the fire commander at the streetlevel. Roof condition should be communicated tothe command officer, relaying information aboutthe presence of roof construction, fire conditionsbefore and after ventilation, and other unusualconditions. This will assist the command officerin developing a plan of attack and strategy.

Recommendation #5: Fire departments shouldencourage municipalities to review and amendtheir building codes as applicable regardingexposed polystyrene insulation. [6]

Discussion: Fire departments should conductpre-fire inspections of buildings within theirdistrict on a cyclical schedule. Those codeviolations that are discovered and that affect otheragencies, such as building departments, electrical,etc, should be brought to the respective agencies’attention. The unprotected polystyrene glued tothe underside of the truss roof in the service areacould constitute a building code violation. Thisalso provided a condition which providedabundant fuel to the fire which was probably of along smoldering origin, at or near an improperlyoperating exhaust fan (report by the firedepartment’s office of fire investigation) whichwas located on the roof, directly above the partsroom area. This long smoldering processallowed combustible gases to accumulate on theinterior of the truss roof, thereby, setting upconditions for a backdraft or flashover. Familiarization with the interior of buildingswithin a municipality will assist fire fighters andfire officers during a fire situation or emergency.

REFERENCES1. Essentials of Fire Fighting, International FireService Training Association, Published by


Oklahoma State University - Fire ProtectionPublications, 3ed, March 1995

2. Dunn Vincent, Systems Analysis, Size-up:Part 1. Firehouse, October 1996

3. Brunacini Alan, Fire Command, National FireProtection Association, Quincy, MA 1985

4. Collapse of Burning Buildings, Vincent Dunn,Publisher Penn Well, 1988

5. Safety and Survival on the Fireground,Vincent Dunn, Publisher Penn Well, 19926. National Fire Protection Association, NFPA1201, Chapter 14 Code Enforecement, NFPA,Quincy MA, 1994

fire fighter face report no. 98-05, backdraft in ...complement is five fire fighters), engine 120...

Documents