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G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS ANDMEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BYSENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIXWILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be,over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutionalpowers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among theseco-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legalluminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the

filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls withinthe one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawnsthat this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it isneither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure fromthe Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolatedoctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes forabsolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper theofficial acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power iswielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where thedelicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what isin the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, servethem with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the ConstitutionalCommissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation ofthe Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers andemployees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upona resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,


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and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majorityvote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with thecorresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days fromreceipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution withthe Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House,the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, theSenators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the SupremeCourt shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Membersof the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any officeunder the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, andpunishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted andapproved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding theprevious House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' HouseImpeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode of InitiatingImpeachment. Impeachment shall beinitiated only by a verified complaint forimpeachment filed by any Member of theHouse of Representatives or by anycitizen upon a resolution of endorsementby any Member thereof or by a verifiedcomplaint or resolution of impeachmentfiled by at least one-third (1/3) of all theMembers of the House.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OFIMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGSAGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 16. ImpeachmentProceedings Deemed Initiated. Incases where a Member of the Housefiles a verified complaint of impeachmentor a citizen files a verified complaint thatis endorsed by a Member of the Housethrough a resolution of endorsementagainst an impeachable officer,impeachment proceedings against suchofficial are deemed initiated on the daythe Committee on Justice finds that theverified complaint and/or resolutionagainst such official, as the case may

be, is sufficient in substance, or on thedate the House votes to overturn oraffirm the finding of the said Committeethat the verified complaint and/orresolution, as the case may be, is notsufficient in substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or aresolution of impeachment is filed orendorsed, as the case may be, by atleast one-third (1/3) of the Members ofthe House, impeachment proceedingsare deemed initiated at the time of the


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filing of such verified complaint orresolution of impeachment with theSecretary General.

RULE V

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. Noimpeachment proceedings shall beinitiated against the same official morethan once within the period of one (1)year.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation OfImpeachment Proceedings. Within aperiod of one (1) year from the dateimpeachment proceedings are deemedinitiated as provided in Section 16hereof, no impeachment proceedings, assuch, can be initiated against the sameofficial. (Italics in the original; emphasisand underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements andexpenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief

Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices

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of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the publictrust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and DidagenPiang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of ArticleXI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by anycitizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within tensession days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and bya majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, togetherwith the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session daysfrom receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted todismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet

been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the HouseCommittee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 byRepresentatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) againstChief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned HouseResolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at leastone-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of thesecond impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]oimpeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition forCertiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious andarbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right tobring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrarychanges in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and praysthat (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue awrit of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of theConstitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and topromulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House ofRepresentatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are oftranscendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondentHouse of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a


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writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachmentagainst the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public fundsnecessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibitionenjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standito bring petitions ofthis nature in the cases ofChavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition

for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition forProhibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to theSenate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachmentto the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, asmembers of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings areinitiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom bedeclared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senselessspending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the

Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolutionendorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) thisCourt enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachmentcomplaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting anyproceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, thatthe filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the HouseImpeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of aTemporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second

impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibilityto uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanentlyenjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the HouseImpeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which theyclaim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations ofFilipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting furtherproceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaintand the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are ofnational and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantialinterest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with theConstitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment tothe Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella andTeodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they actedwithout jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."


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In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have anabiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they aretrying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senatefrom trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachmentcomplaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and thatthe House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To DeclareComplaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null andvoid.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachmentcomplaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachmentcomplaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited fromtransmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles ofImpeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibitionthat (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House ofRepresentatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited fromaccepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they beprohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this

Court,18

prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House ofRepresentatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petitionbearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules asnull and void for being unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief.In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry intothe administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a directviolation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachmentcomplaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack ofquorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on orbefore October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganibaninhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate thepetitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on thepetitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and(d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain thestatus quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render thepetitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much lessprohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution,

from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions bedismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authorityand jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the ChiefJustice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidatedpetitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oralarguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating thatinsofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filingof the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court


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commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitionspertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277,160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it wouldunnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matterin question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Courtto Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention inG.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition inIntervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimenteland Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court onNovember 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time;

and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standiof petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad argumentsand opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows:(1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachmentproceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3)the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the secondimpeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)


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Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 caseofAngara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, didnot contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten ormarred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which canbe called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integralor constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the

power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereigntyhowever limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under asystem of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. TheConstitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers andagencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had notprovided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then thedistribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of goodgovernment mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as theyshould be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, thepossession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has beenset at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power isgranted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such

powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And whenthe judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligationassigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establishfor the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is intruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under theConstitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after fullopportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated toactualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice orexpediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not onlybecause the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actualcases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in theexecutive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches ofgovernment and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessaryconsequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, suchpower has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803leading case ofMarbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itselfis first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of theconstitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts,as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review wasexercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and formerSupreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectivelyacknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse,or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shallgovern.


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To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself whichemploys the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except wheretechnical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through ChiefJustice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but thatis where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express theobjective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are

employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer'sdocument, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, itslanguage as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to thetext of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on thepostulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction isreduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with theintent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it hasbeen held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of thetimes, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason

which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to beaccomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculatedto effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, itdeclared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional constructionthat the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary taskin constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of thepeople in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitutionwere guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,

through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitutionmerely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adoptedsubsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance andits terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separatedfrom all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to bebrought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing ona particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of theConstitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can bemade to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render everyword operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of CivilLiberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order toarrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail assaid proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the


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constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for theirvotes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellowcitizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe theconstitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it wasunderstood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoringsupplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial reviewthat respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution hasexcluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume ajudicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach ofjudicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes theapplication of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative toimpeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondentsSpeaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in thecase ofNixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriatesince it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbsthe system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack

of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51

Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent toisolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot becredited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI,Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to thelegislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Norcan it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determineconstitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longercontrolling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held inthe case ofGarcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudencesome of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although

the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In thecolorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while thepower of judicial review is only impliedlygranted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the PhilippineSupreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given anexpanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch orinstrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the Houseof Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House ofRepresentatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiateimpeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), ArticleXI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one

and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts betweenCongress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible,the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness andpride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows thatthe Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certainwell-defined limits, or in the language ofBaker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise ofsuch discretion, through the power of judicial review.


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The cases ofRomulo v. Yniguez58 andAlejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachmentpower is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus tocompel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senateor its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held thatthe petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed theConstitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court

declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of acongressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Cosetengv. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based onproportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission onAppointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power isvested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.InAngara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective ofwhether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of amember of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings wouldupset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowedto defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that nobranch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated inAngara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by theConstitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) theperson challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that hehas sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at theearliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunityof argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attemptat abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency oflegislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because thelegislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases andcontroversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executiveand legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standior legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustainedor will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether aparty alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens thepresentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

IntervenorSoriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the ChiefJustice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury.Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito

Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing totaxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 andthat procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have keptthemselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72Amicuscuriae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in thecase of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitionersstanding.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civilprocedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the


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Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important tonote . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating towhether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directedtowards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of themerits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been

personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters whoactually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stakein the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues uponwhich the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

x x x

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured bythe judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invokethe vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the barand of the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have beengiven standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must beable to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustainingsome direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that theperson complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to besubjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves theassertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money isbeing deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid orunconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficientinterest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of theenforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members ofthe public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This Court opts to grantstanding to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachmentand the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as alegislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers andprivileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the

outcome will affect their vital interests,85

the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legalprofession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it withstanding. Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows thatit has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight asprecedents.86It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fullyprotect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in aclass suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whetheror not they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by thedivergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Sincepetitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.


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picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legalproceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the ChiefJustice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned.The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House ofRepresentatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the allegedunconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagalholds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President

Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter onquestions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the HouseImpeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles ofImpeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that theArticles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure theHouse Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned secondimpeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and,therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court isshown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rulewith definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power isexclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a bodywhich is bereft of power to grant it.

Justiciability

In the leading case ofTanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. Inother words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are tobe decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authorityhas been delegated tothe Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the

wisdom, not legality,

of a particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance oftaking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political questiondoctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of thetherein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functionsconferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case ofJavellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue ofwhether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizancethereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereigncapacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during theMarcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power ofjudicial review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among thethree major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing withwhich to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will ofGod, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read theprovisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.


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x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

x x x

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicialpower? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights whichare demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. Ina decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell

your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically todischarge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that toenforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable orenforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government,the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered dividedinto three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere andindependent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is

vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well asthose of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch ofgovernment or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as toconstitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicialpower but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty tosettle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject ofthe judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Courtalone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictionalquestions. But there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whetherthe government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of

jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.

x x x

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numericalneed for votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?


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MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice itsays, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover allpossible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judiciapower.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; itis also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief JusticeConcepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." Fromthis clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not

truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political innature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of casestaken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areaswhich the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held ina recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rivalclaims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate thatobligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicabilityof the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if wewere to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it

under the expandedjurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110

x x x(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The Americancase ofBaker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutionalcommitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards forresolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; orthe impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinatebranches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or thepotentialityof embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)


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Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to acoordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) theimpossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are notseparate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others arealso present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our currentconcept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they shouldpass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the questionof whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courtsare duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shallthus now apply this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under theConstitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an

unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional forviolating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. Moreimportantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachableoffense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of thelegislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimesand betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than byalluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standardtherefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicialpower under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided wheneverpossible. Thus, in the case ofSotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to beunconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presentssome other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional

question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will beunavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 ofRepublic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that theessential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case orcontroversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have beenopportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision ofthe case itself.118[Emphasis supplied]


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Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota orcruxof thecontroversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectivelyraise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whetherone, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudicationthat "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied." 119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint isinvalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry

petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid oflegislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy ofthe judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of theconstitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the secondimpeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutionallaw touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by thefacts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds insupport of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Courtin Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation inaccordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall berespected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Itsexercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation mustbe "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in oraffected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must berespected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitionersCandelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only byRepresentatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4),Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of theHouse, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, thesame did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution ofimpeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro andFuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement."Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of RepresentativesGilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint toautomatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed,"not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement,they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justiceunder Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by anycitizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within tensession days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and bya majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together


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with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session daysfrom receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply,there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed andverified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution ofEndorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not theresolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least oneMember whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues tothe provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota orcruxof the presentcontroversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised thisissue as a ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for decidingthe instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but theefforts presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier bythe fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments andissues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instantcontroversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress areunconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second

impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court,

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