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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Trust and confl ict: representation, culture and dialogue / edited by Ivana Marková and Alex Gillespie. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–415–59346–5 (hbk.) 1. Intergroup relations. 2. Trust—Social aspects. I. Marková, Ivana. II. Gillespie, Alex, Ph. D. HM716.T78 2011 302.4—dc22 2011000350

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Contents

List of contributors vii Series Editor’s foreword viii Preface xii

Introduction: Confl ict and trust in dialogical perspective 1 IVANA MARKOVÁ

PART I Symbolic systems and basic trust 15

1 Trust and symbolic systems: Religion and nationhood 17 GEOFFREY HOSKING

2 Mnemonic communities and confl ict: Georgia’s national narrative template 37 JAMES V. WERTSCH AND NUTSA BATIASHVILI

3 The dynamics of trust and non-trust 49 JAAN VALSINER

PART II From categorization to social representation 71

4 Different and yet human: Categorization and the antecedents of intergroup trust 73 MONICA RUBINI AND AUGUSTO PALMONARI

5 Intergroup trust and contact in transition: A social representations perspective on the Cyprus confl ict 83 CHARIS PSALTIS



vi Contents

6 The essentially Other: Representational processes that divide groups 105 MAARIS RAUDSEPP AND WOLFGANG WAGNER

7 Social categorization and bao in the age of AIDS: The case of China 123 LI LIU

PART III Situated trust/distrust: Points of contact 137

8 Dialogical dynamics of trust and distrust in the Cuban Missile Crisis 139 ALEX GILLESPIE

9 Trustworthiness at stake: Trust and distrust in investigative interviews with Russian adolescent asylum-seekers in Sweden 156 PER LINELL AND OLGA KESELMAN

10 Confession as a communication genre: The logos and mythos of the Party 181 IVANA MARKOVÁ

Concluding comment: Contact without transformation: The context, process and content of distrust 201 ALEX GILLESPIE

Author Index 217 Subject Index 222



Concluding comment Contact without transformation: the context, process and content of distrust

Alex Gillespie University of Stirling, UK

The preceding chapters provide theoretical and empirical analyses of the dynamics of trust/distrust in contexts of confl ict. Both distrust and confl ict imply at least two different perspectives. The social world is perspectival (Mead, 1932) and it is in the interaction between the perspectives of individuals and groups that the phenomena of distrust and confl ict arise. However, recognising that individuals and groups have different perspectives is just the fi rst step in appreciating the full complexity of these social relations. As Ichheiser (1943) outlined, when two indi-viduals or groups interact we need to understand not only what each thinks about themselves and the other, but also what each thinks the other thinks about them. Trust and confl ict thus need to be understood within this matrix of interacting perspectives and metaperspectives (Gillespie, 2007). The present fi nal chapter focuses upon how perspectives actually interact in relations of distrust.

How do the representations of self, other, and other’s view of self interact? How do these representations change through interaction? Moreover, how might representations be insulated from change through contact? Specifi cally, what is the role of trust/distrust at the point of contact? And how might trust/distrust fa cilitate/inhibit transformation through contact? The argument developed in the present chapter is that trust/distrust is a key component in opening up or closing down meaning structures to transformation through contact.

The chapter starts with a brief review of research on the contact hypothesis, and draws out three criticisms. First, the literature has sought an essentialist theory of contact and thus neglected the broader context in which any social interaction is embedded. Second, the literature has focused upon statistical averages while neglecting the microgenetic processes through which representations are trans-formed (or, as I will suggest, not transformed). Third, although it is recognised that successful contact should change representations of self and other, the actual meaning of these representations has been ignored. The second half of the chapter attempts to move beyond these three criticisms by advancing some ideas as to how we can study the process and content of interacting representations of self and other. The focus is on the processes which facilitate and inhibit change through contact. The concept of ‘semantic barriers’ will be introduced to theorise how representing the other as untrustworthy can protect the self from a transfor-mative encounter with the other.



202 Concluding comment: contact without transformation

Contact: context, process and content It has been a long-standing common sense assumption that contact between groups in confl ict is an appropriate means to reduce confl ict. However, Gordon Allport (1954) showed that groups living side by side tend to engage in more confl ict than groups living a short distance apart, thus challenging any simplistic conception of the contact hypothesis. Reviewing the available literature Allport proposed that contact could be benefi cial when certain conditions were met, namely, the contact should be between people of equal status, sharing a common goal, with the parties being inter-dependent, and supported by laws and customs.

Since Allport’s (1954) classic insights on intergroup contact there has accumu-lated a substantial empirical literature on the contact hypothesis. This literature has been propelled forward by the repeated discovery that contact is more complex than initially thought (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). Thus each wave of new studies adds yet more variables and conditions. In order to account for the fact that contact is often not enough, a large array of mediating variables have been put forward. One of the most important fi ndings is that there is a difference between contact which is perceived to be interpersonal as compared to intergroup (i.e. when social identity categorizations rather than personal identity categorizations are salient). Thus, for contact to reduce confl ict, both parties should perceive each other as typical group members, such that when behaviour inconsistent with the group stereotype occurs, it has a chance to change the group stereotype (Rothbart & John, 1985). But this is just one of many amendments to the contact hypothesis. The literature shows that the success of contact varies with individual differences, frequency of contact, forms of institutional support, the degree to which people volunteer for the contact, the extent of stereotyping, the extent of disconfi rming behaviour, the degree to which the contact is direct or indirect, the degree to which the contact is superfi cial or intimate, and the extent to which the contact is face-to-face in contrast to being mass mediated. Important effects have also been found for the type and extent to which alternative categorizations are made salient, such as superordinate and mixed categorizations (see Chapter 4 , by Rubini and Palmo-nari, in the present volume). Authors have even broadened the conditions to include things such as a common language and a prosperous economy (Wagner & Machleit, 1986).

Although some people might like to view the accumulation of fi ndings as indic-ative of a rapidly advancing fi eld, one can also interpret such accumulation as indicative of a problem. Specifi cally, the accumulation of theoretically discon-nected empirical variables indicates the lack of a substantive and generalisable conception of what contact actually is. Pettigrew (1998) comes close to diag-nosing the problem in his review of the literature. He identifi es four criticisms, two of which I want to highlight and subsequently elaborate.

First, Pettigrew (1998, p. 69) criticises the literature, and thus the contact hypothesis, for having become “an open-ended laundry list of conditions – ever expandable and thus eluding falsifi cation.” The problem is that new studies keep turning up new situational factors for optimum contact, in part because the



Concluding comment: contact without transformation 203

previously assumed set of factors proved ineffectual. Adding variables weakens the theory at a conceptual level, and also provides an explanatory mechanism for why contact does not work in any particular case. Moreover, it is also often the case that contact is benefi cial even when few of the listed conditions are met. That is to say most of the variables identifi ed are only important sometimes . Pettigrew’s proposed solution is to distinguish between facilitating factors and essential conditions. Thus there would emerge a core set of variables which would be seen to be essential for contact to reduce prejudice, and these would be complemented by a secondary set of variables which would enhance the effects of contact, but which are not essential for a positive outcome.

Second, Pettigrew (1998, p. 70) criticises the literature for ignoring “the processes by which contact changes attitudes and behaviour.” The ‘laundry list’ of variables explicates the conditions for productive contact, but it does not theorise why change occurs (or does not occur) under the various conditions. The list of variables identifi es ‘when’ contact will lead to positive change, but it remains silent on ‘how’ that change actually occurs. Pettigrew’s own approach to this limi-tation is to argue that contact can reduce prejudice and confl ict by having positive effects on the representation of the outgroup, the representation of the ingroup, behaviours and emotional ties. Positing these four mediating variables between the conditions of contact and the outcome of contact, Pettigrew maintains, will enable us to understand ‘how’ contact produces its potentially positive effects.

The following three sub-sections present three critiques of much of the litera-ture on contact. The fi rst two elaborate and radicalise Pettigrew’s two critiques outlined above. Once these critiques are elaborated, Pettigrew’s proposed solu-tions, I will argue, become insuffi cient. The third sub-section outlines a third critique which Pettigrew did not address, namely the failure to study the content, or meaning, of representations. These three critiques put the impetus on devel-oping an approach to studying contact which focuses on context, process and content. The latter part of the chapter works towards that aim by drawing lessons and inspiration from the foregoing chapters.

From universal conditions to contextual particularities

Pettigrew’s (1998) suggestion that we need to distinguish essential conditions from facilitating factors assumes that there is a context-independent and funda-mentally invariant structure of benefi cial contact which can be abstracted out of/from the varieties of possible forms of contact. But what are the grounds for assuming a set of context-independent ‘essential’ conditions for successful contact?

The empirical studies in the present volume do not support the assumption. The present volume analyses trust/distrust in situations of confl ict and contact in a variety of contexts, and the emphasis is on the particularity of the given socio-historical context and the localised genre of interaction. It is not the commonali-ties across the empirical studies which are most important, rather, the key lies in that which is particular to each context. Let me illustrate with some examples.




One of the defi ning particularities of the distrust in Cyprus, analysed by Psaltis in Chapter 5 , is that the violent confl ict occurred almost 40 years prior to the opening of the checkpoints and thus the possibility for contact. For decades after the confl ict there was almost no contact between the two sides. This long-standing segregation between North and South Cyprus means that there is little ambiguity about defi ning the groups. The problems of trust are largely a function of the fact that parallel systems of governance, media, and education have evolved each of which sustains a divergent perspective on the issue. However, in the research reported by Liu ( Chapter 7 ), on HIV/AIDS in China, we fi nd a completely different context. Liu shows us that in China, sometimes the outgroup (people with HIV/AIDS) are also the ingroup (family members). People with HIV/AIDS are not segregated from other members of society; indeed, they are usually indistinguish-able from others. In Cyprus and China, when trying to understand the dynamics of distrust and contact, it is these particularities, not the commonalities, which deserve our focus.

Consider also the diversity in Part III, which presents analyses of the three genres of brinkmanship, interrogative interviewing and forced confessions. In brinkmanship, Gillespie ( Chapter 8 ) shows that the relation of confl ict is symmet-rical by virtue of the fact that nuclear war would annihilate both sides. It is this particularity of ‘mutually assured destruction’ which gives each side a degree of trust in the rational action of the other. In the interrogative interviews, analysed by Linell and Keselman ( Chapter 9 ), the interaction is asymmetrical because the caseworker has little to lose and the applicant for asylum has a lot to lose. However, the caseworker cannot know everything and thus needs to rely on the applicant to help construct the narrative of the case – that is to say, the applicant has the power to tell stories. It is this latter particularity which can make the caseworker suspi-cious and the applicant cautious. Finally, in the confessions analysed by Marková ( Chapter 10 ) we can see the most asymmetrical of interactions. Initially the confessor does not even know what they are to confess. The confessor is caught within a system which inculcates distrust of the self, and in which what was previ-ously assumed to be normal becomes reinterpreted, by the confessor and their audience, as the seeds of anti-Communist activity. While it is easy, indeed sensible, to distrust a country which puts nuclear weapons in Cuba or a person applying for asylum who has been caught stealing, it was diffi cult to distrust an initially trusted comrade and respected member of the Party. It is the particularity of turning strong trust into distrust which characterises the show trials under Stalin. This particularity explains why the public confessions were needed. These confessions, by virtue of the authority of the confessor, were able to turn trust into distrust and thus make the impossible possible. Such confessions have no place within brinkmanship, because distrust is given at the outset. Indeed, if there were such a confession it is likely that it would be distrusted and an ulterior motive suspected.

Considering the wide variety of forms of confl ict and distrust it seems to make little sense to isolate ‘essential’ elements of contact, or to seek to identify what is common across this diversity. Each empirical study in the present volume has




analysed the particular social dynamics and the particular historical and cultural context of each relation. Each relation is taken as a different communicative activity type (Linell, 2009), in the sense that each relation is endowed with its own peculiar social-communicative logic within which interaction needs to be under-stood. To focus only on commonalities in the reported studies would entail ignoring the determining particularities of each relation.

However, this is not to argue that there is nothing which transcends the particu-larities of each context. Key concepts such as representation, dialogue, identity, categorization and trust/distrust enable generalising theoretical conceptualisation.

However, these concepts are not presented as ‘essential’ conditions, rather they are sensitising ideas which open up both similarities and differences between contexts. There are patterns to be found in the dynamics of trust and confl ict, but to reduce all points of contact to one pattern would be to oversimplify the phenomenon.

From mediating variables to microgenetic processes

Regarding Pettigrew’s second criticism, that there has been a neglect of process, Pettigrew proposes introducing some mediating variables such as representation of the ingroup, representation of the outgroup, behaviour and emotion. The problem is that Pettigrew’s conception of ‘process’ only extends as far as variables which can be inserted into statistical models somewhere between the input of ‘essential conditions’ and the output of reduced prejudice. But this conception of process is very weak. A stronger conception of process can be found in Blumer’s (1969, p. 39) insistence that researchers study “what is actually going on,” in Valsiner’s (1998) insistence that the bedrock of psychology will always be ideographic studies, and Duveen and Lloyd’s (1990) theorisation of microgenesis as the motor of transformation. While Pettigrew understands ‘process’ in terms of mediating variables existing as statistical abstractions, these stronger conceptualisations of process focus on what actually occurs step-by-step within a particular case.

The problem is that statistical abstractions can be obfuscating. According to the statistical mean that combines men and females into one sample, humans have one testicle and one breast! Equally, if we think of traffi c as a process, we might ask, do people drive on the left or right? If we consider only the mean, then the answer is that people drive about two thirds over from the left on the right hand side of the road. Yet, again, this is a very rare occurrence. If one analysed the vari-ability, one would fi nd that there are actually two clear sub-groups, namely, one group which drives on the left and another larger group which drives on the right. One might argue that the statistical analysis simply needs to discriminate these two groups to become accurate. But, the statistical mean for either group will never conform to the exact path driven by a given driver on a particular road. Nor will it be able to account for why this driver took the particular path that she took. To explain an accident one appeals not to the statistical average, but the particu-larity of a visual distraction, verbal distraction, lapse of attention, road works, blinding evening sun, ice patch and so on. When Blumer and Valsiner write about studying the process which is actually going on, they are referring not to statistical




abstractions, but the ‘on-line’ microgenetic sequence of stimuli, thoughts, and actions which led to a particular trajectory – even if that particular process may never be repeated again.

In the case of distrust and contact, asking the question “what is actually going on?” should lead us away from survey research towards in-depth analyses of points of contact. Exemplary in this regard is the study by Linell and Keselman ( Chapter 9 ). They write: “trust and distrust come to life precisely in discourse and interaction” (p. 177). In their analysis of a particular, context-bound, point of contact, they are able to identify the distrust sequences which turn-by-turn reveal the build up of distrust. Such an analysis has no ‘mediating variables,’ instead what it reveals is the actual process of distrust arising within a situation tran-scending sociocultural pattern of interaction, namely the genre of the asylum interview. Particularity and abstraction are both evident. In the excerpts presented by Linell and Keselman, explanation entails utilising generalised concepts such as importance of contradictions for creating suspicion, institutional authority, cultural knowledge and power. What is added to the analysis is the identifi cation of the ‘mediating moments’ (Cornish, 2004) when this or that more general concept becomes manifest in the process and alters the actual course of events. These are not ‘essential’ or ‘facilitating’ variables which have a stable relation to the phenomenon of distrust, rather, what we can say is that within this particular genre of interaction the contextual logic of the situated interaction played out in this particular way. And because our understanding of these concepts is dynamic, we can also generalise at a theoretical level. We can speculate that within another interactional context, they might play out a different way, or indeed, might not be relevant at all – and even if that were the case, it would not mean that they were not essential in the present case.

Rather than a mechanical set of relations, we need to develop a set of dynamic concepts which can combine in multiple ways to create ‘working models’ or simulations of different contexts. It makes no sense, for example, to state that ‘contradictions lead to distrust’ – even though in the interrogative interviews contradictory comments by the asylum-seekers in Linell and Keselman’s excerpts lead to distrust and the contradictory letters received by ExComm from Khrush-chev lead to distrust. It is possible that the reverse could occur, in which the abscence of not contradictions, but a lack of contradictions, could lead to suspi-cion. Imagine a case in which the lawyers for a person accused of murder try to plead insanity. In this case, contradictions in the defendant’s behaviour might be taken as indicative that the murder was not a pre-meditated plan, but a result of an irrational outburst, and thus the defendant’s plea of insanity should be trusted. The prosecution might seek to reinterpret the defendant’s behaviour as a non-contradictory, rationalised course of action. The absence of contradictions, in such a case, might make the jury distrustful of the plea of insanity. The point is thus not only that contradictions can neither be classifi ed as essential or facili-tating distrust, but that in order to understand what contradictions do in a given situated interaction one needs to analyse the actual process through which the contradictions mediate the sequence of events.




The neglect of content

There is a third problem with the literature on contact which Pettigrew (1998) does not recognise in his review, namely, the neglect of representational content. Much of the literature on the contact hypothesis is modelled upon the natural sciences. This is clearly evident in Pettigrew’s search for ‘essential conditions’ criticised above. While one can legitimately discuss the essential conditions for water to freeze, or the essential and invariant conditions for a body to fall, one cannot sensibly discuss the essential conditions for reducing prejudice or increasing trust. Unlike the objects studied by the natural sciences, humans are subjects with their own representations of events. Thus, as social scientists, not only do we need to understand the context and process of an interaction, but we also need to understand how the parties interacting understand their own interaction.

Dostoevsky (1864/1972, pp. 33–34) articulates the peculiar reactivity of humans in a criticism of some people’s desire to create a social science “with mathematical accuracy, so that all problems will vanish in the twinkling of an eye” and “everything will be eminently sensible.” The problem with such ambi-tions, Dostoevsky suggests, is that humans are not so obedient:

I shall not be in the least surprised if, for example, in the midst of the future universal good sense, some gentleman with an ignoble, or rather derisive and reactionary air, springs up suddenly out of nowhere, puts his arms akimbo and says to all of us, ‘Come on, gentlemen, why shouldn’t we get rid of all this calm reasonableness with one kick, just so as to send all these logarithms to the devil?’

(Dostoevsky, 1864/1972, pp. 33–34)

Even more than being rational, humans want to be, and to be seen to be, indepen-dent. Humans have ideas, sometimes dangerous ideas, about the world and about their own place in it. Moreover, these ideas, regardless of their veracity, have consequences. It is the interaction of these ideas with the world and the subse-quent reactivity of humans which “sends all systems and theories to the devil” (Dostoevsky, 1864/1972, p. 34).

In social science this basic idea was famously articulated by Thomas (1928, p. 572), who wrote: “If men defi ne situations as real, they are real in their conse-quences.” Accordingly, Thomas advocated studying “the total situation”, which includes both “the situation as it exists in verifi able, objective terms, and as it has seemed to exist in terms of the interested persons.” Von Uexkull’s (1934/1992, see also Valsiner, Chapter 3 in the present volume) concept of Umwelt provides an evolutionary equivalent to Thomas’ total situation. The same point was made by Koffka (1935; Farr, 1996), using somewhat different terminology. Koffka distinguished the geographic environment from the behavioural environment, the latter being the environment which includes the interests, perceptions and ideas of the behaving organism. Again, he insisted on the need to study both the objective geographical environment and the behavioural environment. Thomas’ theorem




and Koffka’s concept of the behavioural environment are consolidated in Mosco-vici’s (1984) concept of social representation as environment. Representations, in Moscovici’s sense, are not simply constructs in the mind, rather they are the envi-ronments within which people live and act. These representations as environment are deeply social creations, drawing upon collectively produced and sustained narrative templates (see Wertsch and Batiashvili, Chapter 2 in the present volume) and saturated with power, institutions and history.

When Pettigrew (1998) writes that contact can change representations of the outgroup and the ingroup, he fails to take due account of what those representa-tions actually are. It is not enough to know whether these representations become more or less prejudiced. There are many different ways in which people can be prejudiced or distrustful. To understand change through contact, one needs to engage with the actual content of the representations. As Bauer and Gaskell (1999, p. 175) write, “a representation without content is an oxymoron.” In short, we need to deal with the problem of meaning.

Consider the empirical analysis presented by Raudsepp and Wagner ( Chapter 6 ). The Estonian nationals represent the Estonian Russians as essentially different, as different by virtue of culture, genes, and even species. That is to say, some of the Estonians represent the Estonian Russians as unable to become Estonian nationals. The content of these representations (with key dialogical oppositions between civilisation/barbarism and human/animal) is necessary to understanding why the distrust is so entrenched and so unlikely to change through contact alone. In contrast, imagine a scenario where the other is represented as distrustful, not due to an essen-tial difference, but rather due to a desperate circumstance. Imagine, for example, the case of a close friend with a drug addiction. In such a case one might not trust the person in relation to a range of activities (where they are going, why they are late, where they have been and so on). Yet, if the causes of the addiction are represented as situational and abnormal (e.g. due to stress, an illness, or a bad infl uence) then the representation extends the possibility of change to the friend. Thus, even though one might trust one’s friend even less than a national outgroup (e.g. Estonian Russians), the representation itself, due to its content, is more likely to be open to change.

Contact without transformation How can we study transformative contact in a way which takes account of context, process and content? Let us agree with Pettigrew (1998) that transformative contact occurs when there is a change in the way that the ingroup and outgroup are represented (which entails behavioural and emotional changes). But, let us go beyond Pettigrew to grapple with the context, process and content of that repre-sentational change. Thus we take up Psaltis’ ( Chapter 5 , p. 97) challenge “to conceptualise contact as a microgenetic process of social interaction.” However, instead of the usual focus on contact leading to transformation, I want to focus upon contact without transformation.

A genuine encounter with alterity means being open to being transformed by the other (Levinas, 1991); it entails representing the outgroup as something




beyond the ingroup, and representing the ingroup as unfi nalised. However, change can be threatening and accordingly semantic systems, such as the representation of self and other, will often work to resist change and maintain pre-existing mean-ings. The literature on contact has been so keen to identify the conditions for posi-tive change that there has been little consideration of when and why no change occurs. The key question is: Why, regardless of the conditions, does contact sometimes not produce any transformation in the representation of the ingroup or the outgroup?

Meaning structures, such as social representations, are socially produced, replete with consequences for social relations and future actions. These symbolic environments are rich with personal and group investments and they create iden-tity positions for both self and other, for the ingroup and the outgroup. It is because of these tangled investments that transforming representations of self or other is often resisted. “We tend,” Hoskings ( Chapter 1 , p. 23) writes, “to throw up barriers against people whose symbolic world is very different from our own.” There is, in short, a conservative tendency to avoid destabilisations of the semantic environ-ment. For this reason, Hoskings suggests, we often avoid encounters with alterity and instead seek to interact with people whose meaning structures overlap with our own.

However, in the contemporary world it is increasingly diffi cult to avoid contact with destabilising points of view (Moscovici, 1984). Encountering alterity is a defi ning feature of late modernity. But, rather than becoming, in a simple sense, more tolerant of diversity, it is evident that people are also very good at protecting their meaning structures from destabilising alternatives. Symbolic structures often contain the means of preserving their integrity even in the face of threat. As Valsiner ( Chapter 3 , p. 51) writes:

The incoming messages from the collective-cultural domains may be neutral-ized, rejected, or accepted with modifi cation by the active persons within their personal-cultural spheres. These active recipients may generate counter-messages that are externalized to become parts of the collective-cultural highly variable set of social suggestions.

The mechanisms through which incoming meaning is neutralised, rejected or incorporated can be understood as analogous to the human immune system. The human body has, broadly speaking, three layers of defences against foreign bodies, such as diseases. The fi rst level of defence is the skin, which is the basis of the physical and psychological distinction between self and other (Farr, 1997). If pathogens breach the skin, then the second layer of defence, the innate immune system, provides immediate but not specifi c defence. The innate immune system causes infl ammation, and provides support for antibodies and white blood cells. The third layer of protection is the adaptive immune system. The adaptive immune system adapts to the specifi c and often novel features of the pathogen, but it takes time to evolve suitable resistance. The acquired immunity provided by the adaptive immune system is the basis of vaccination.




The adaptive immune system is of particular interest in the present context because pathogens are not only remembered but the means of defence are stored. Non-self cells express antigens that the adaptive immune system is able to distin-guish from the antigens expressed by self cells. When the adaptive immune system activates B and T cells to replicate and fi ght off a pathogen, a minority of these offspring will become memory cells with a long lifespan. Thus after the attack, the body contains a small number of memory cells for the specifi c pathogen, and should the same pathogen be encountered, these memory cells will be triggered and replicate rapidly, thus quickly neutralising the now familiar threat.

Vaccines develop the adaptive immune system by presenting the immune system with an agent that resembles a disease-causing microorganism. The pres-ence of the agent stimulates the adaptive immune system to recognise and destroy the actual disease-causing microorganism, such that at a later point in time if the immune system encounters the disease it will be rapidly neutralised.

McGuire (1961) took the adaptive immune system as an analogy for his theory of resistance to persuasion, known as inoculation theory. Writing during a high point in the Cold War, McGuire and his colleagues were very keen to understand how to win the ideological battle with Communism. They found that people could be ‘inoculated’ against persuasion. First, the receiver should be warned of an impending attack on their beliefs or attitudes. Second, the attack should contain a weak argument, which although strong enough to exercise the defences, is not suffi ciently strong to overcome them. It has been shown that the more active the receiver becomes in the defence process, the more their pre-existing views are strengthened. It has also been found that the inoculation confers resistance to argu-ments that are not even in the inoculation message (Pfau et al. , 1990). Successfully fi ghting off a persuasion attempt seems to solidify people’s adherence to their position. McGuire and Papageorgis (1962) make the analogy thus:

Just as we develop the disease resistance of a person raised in a germ-free environment by exposing him to a weakened form of the virus so as to stimu-late, without overcoming his defenses, so also we would develop the resis-tance to persuasion of a person raised in an ideologically aseptic environment by pre-exposing him to weakened forms of the counter-arguments, or to some other belief-threatening material strong enough to stimulate, but not so strong as to overcome, his belief defenses.

(McGuire & Papageorgis, 1962, p. 25)

McGuire’s inoculation theory and the associated research suffer from the same shortcomings as the contact hypothesis. First, the context has been neglected: it makes a difference who is trying to persuade whom of what, with what interests and consequences. Second, process has been neglected: the research tells us nothing about the microgenetic mechanics of how the persuasion message is resisted. Third, the content of the persuasive messages and the inoculations have been largely ignored, and all messages intended to persuade are treated as inter-changeable. The remainder of the present chapter tries to take forward the idea of




inoculation by addressing these three critiques in order to understand how distrust, as a contextual and contentful process, can inhibit transformation through contact.

Rigid representations of self and other The concept of ‘semantic barriers’ theorises the content and process of interacting representations. Semantic barriers refer to the specifi c ways in which incoming meanings, or alterity, are neutralised and blocked such that they do not destabilise existing meaning structures. Moscovici (1976/2008) and Gillespie (2008) have begun to identify the nature and function of semantic barriers which are used to resist alternative and potentially transformative representations. They have identi-fi ed the creation of rigid oppositions, negative associations, prohibitions and taboos, separations, stigmatisation, undermining the motive of the other, and bracketing the other’s perspective as mere ‘beliefs’ and ‘thoughts’ as mechanisms through which alterity is neutralised. To return to the analogy of the adaptive immune system, semantic barriers are the mechanism for attacking and isolating alien meanings from having any undesirable or destabilising effects. The present section focuses upon rigid oppositions between self and other.

According to Moscovici (1976/2008) one of the most prominent ways in which a representation is protected from destabilising alternatives is through a system of rigid oppositions. Rigid oppositions can take many contentful forms. In Mosco-vici’s study of the representation of Psychoanalysis amongst Communists in France, the opposition was between ‘American/Capitalist Psychoanalysis’ and Communism. In the present volume, interesting oppositions between self and other, which work to block transformation, are evident in the chapters by Raudsepp and Wagner, Marková, and Liu.

Let us fi rst consider Raudsepp and Wagner’s ( Chapter 6 ) analysis of the confl ict between Estonians and Estonian Russians. The Estonians refer to the Estonian Russians as unchanging wolves and wild beasts, as essentially barbaric and fascist. The Russians are said to lack “logical reason” and possess fundamentally different brains. One Estonian even writes that the Russians have the “Mongol gene of robbing, killing and hating work.” By conceptualising the difference in terms of deep-seated oppositions such as human/animal and civilized/barbaric, and empha-sising that this is a difference of blood, brains, and genes, the opposition is made natural and immutable. This opposition is a semantic barrier for transformation because on the one hand the other is represented as being so different and alien that their view on the world is irrelevant and on the other hand because the oppo-sition between self and other is so rigid that it presents little scope for change. The Estonian Russian other is not even endowed with an alternative representation worthy of engaging with, and, even if it were engaged with, the representation of self and other is already fi nalised.

Rigid representations of self and other are also clearly evident in Liu’s ( Chapter 7 ) analysis of the representation of HIV/AIDS in the People’s Republic of China; however, a peculiar contextual and contentful twist is introduced. In China,




HIV/AIDS is considered to be dirty in two senses: it is represented as related to bacteria on the one hand and immorality on the other. It draws meaning from the deep-seated oppositions of clean/dirty, moral/immoral, and civilised/barbaric. Liu’s participants distinguish the causes of AIDS. People who have been infected due to homosexual activity are described as violating “the natural law”, those who have been infected through drug use are described as “the scum of society”, and those who have been infected through selling blood are described as “lazy” and wanting “to get something for nothing”. The primordial nature of these opposi-tions makes the case superfi cially similar to the way in which some Estonians represent Estonian Russians as essentially different. However, there are important differences which Liu’s analysis draws out. Liu shows how rigid representation of people with HIV/AIDS clashes with the meanings associated with family when, for example, the person with HIV/AIDS is a family member. Rigid as the opposi-tion seems, it encounters an even more unquestionable set of meanings: “That is say, even if my family member like my mother is infected with the disease, I’m pretty sure that I will not go away from her. I prefer that I’m infected by her. I’m her son. I prefer to die” (Liu, Chapter 7 , p. 132). The family relation is one of “bones and fl esh” and it is the contentful details of that representation which ‘trump’ the seemingly rigid opposition between people with and without HIV/AIDS in China.

In Marková’s ( Chapter 10 ) analysis of the Moscow Trials we also fi nd rigid representations of ingroup and outgroup, but it is complicated by a transfer of meaning. The overarching opposition is between being a traitor and being a Communist. The former was to be distrusted and the latter to be trusted. But the particular semantic construction which Marková articulates in her analysis is that the Party was, at a semantic level, made to be synonymous with Communism. Thus, not only was there an opposition, but there was also a transfer of meaning from Communism, perceived to be unconditionally good and trusted, to the political institution of the Communist Party. This transfer of meaning meant that: “Whoever doubts about the Party is no longer a communist” (Marková, Chapter 10 , p. 187). Accordingly, within this particular semantic universe, it became impossible for people to question the Party to any degree without also questioning Communism. Due to this transfer of meaning, dissent was silenced. Not only did individuals not want to be seen to question the Party, but they could not, at a psychological level, question the Party because that would entail doubting their own commitment to Communism. Thus, the analysis provided by Marková is distinctive in the present volume because, in part due to this specifi c transfer of meaning, it deals not only with distrust of the other but also distrust of oneself.

The point which these three examples intend to make is not only that rigid oppositions can block changes in the representation of self and other, but also that rigid oppositions, as semantic barriers, play out differently in different contexts. The process of trust/distrust can only be understood, in these studies, by taking account of the broader sociocultural context and also the content of people’s representations.




Distrust: a semantic barrier to transformation The analyses contained in the present volume highlight the role of distrust as a distinctive semantic barrier to the transformation of the representation of self and other through contact. Distrusting the source of alternative and potentially chal-lenging meanings provides a powerful mechanism for neutralising those mean-ings. This is particularly evident in the ‘distrust sequences’ analysed by Linell and Keselman ( Chapter 9 ). Their analysis of the interaction between caseworkers, applicants seeking asylum and interpreters exemplifi es the attention to context, process and content being advocated in the present chapter.

Linell and Keselman show how distrust arises out of contradictory accounts and misunderstandings about roles, responsibilities and rights. Misunderstandings by the asylum-seekers about who they are talking to lead to different accounts being given, contradictions being detected, and thus suspicion among caseworkers that something is being concealed. What is particularly interesting is that once distrust is established, then it becomes very diffi cult for the asylum-seekers to have their account of events accepted at face value. Once distrust sets in, then there is a need to cross check everything. But, because not everything can be cross checked, the distrusted applicant is at a disadvantage – their case becomes limited to verifi able details. The way in which Anton’s caseworker resists being persuaded by what Anton says is clearly evident in the following excerpt:

but you must understand that what you are telling us we must evaluate on the basis of what you are saying if we then can check up what you say and discover that it is not true, how on earth can you believe that we will believe in everything else you say that we cannot check up

(Linell & Keselman, Chapter 9 , p. 169)

Having identifi ed some discrepancies in the stories Anton has been telling, this caseworker has become suspicious. The caseworker subsequently looks for contradictions, and thus, the situation tends toward the discovery of more contra-dictions. Anton, the applicant for asylum, feels the impermeability of the case-worker’s meaning structures to his own account of events. He says to his interpreter: “If they don’t want to listen to me let them believe that I am lying, they don’t listen at all.” Because Anton is distrusted, his utterances have become ineffectual.

The way in which distrust protects meaning structures from transformation, even in the context of close contact, is evident in a study by Gillespie et al. (2011) which included an examination of how Irish nationals represented asylum-seekers. In the following excerpt, Aidan, an Irish national from Cork, gives his rather blunt justifi cation for refusing to dialogue with asylum-seekers:

I just don’t like to talk to most asylum seekers, like, especially you know that most of them are either on the run from the law in their own country and if they go back to their own country they’ll get prosecuted for this or that, and




our country doesn’t wonder why they’re so afraid to go back to their own country, ‘oh they’ll probably get killed’ or something like that , you know they make up all these excuses.

Aidan says that he avoids talking with asylum-seekers because he distrusts their motive. He speculates that they have come to Ireland to escape legitimate punish-ment for grievous crimes. He is even willing to give voice to the alternative view point (italicised), namely, that if the asylum-seekers are returned “they’ll probably get killed.” But even the starkness of this alternative point of view is insuffi cient to permeate Aidan’s semiotic defences. Such claims are, Aidan contends, “excuses,” and thus he is able to dismiss the most legitimate reason for asylum. Given his assumption, that asylum-seekers are trying to avoid legitimate punish-ment in their home countries, Aidan is able to dismiss whatever an asylum-seeker might say, because such people would say anything to escape deportation and thus nothing they say can be trusted.

The trust/distrust distinction needs to be understood within the context of situ-ated action. The distinction is a means to guide action (see Valsiner, Chapter 3 ). That which is distrusted is treated differently from that which is trusted. If an alternative set of meanings is tainted with distrust, then it is, in a semantic sense, in quarantine and its transformative neutered. In Aidan’s case, distrust neutralises asylum-seekers’ assertions that their lives are in danger, and thus protects Aidan from any transformative engagement with them.

Conclusion: from particularity to generalisable theory Although the present chapter has focused on how changes in the representation of self and other instigated by contact can be resisted, the present chapter does not suggest that contact cannot lead to either a reduction in prejudice or an increase in trust. Such a conclusion would be simplistic and run counter to the historical record, which shows that sometimes contact does produce desirable effects. More-over, such a conclusion would run counter to the main argument of the present chapter, namely, that we need to focus on the variability of, not just context, process and content, but also outcome.

Acknowledging the variability and complexity of the phenomenon is chal-lenging. If we accept the arguments being made in this book that each instance of trust and distrust is context-sensitive and dependent upon the meanings of the situ-ation from each party’s point of view, then a search for either essential or medi-ating variables of successful contact appears misguided. The sociocultural context has, potentially, an infi nite number of aspects which could become important within a confl ict. Equally, the meaningful ways in which parties in confl ict can represent each other are, potentially, infi nite. Any attempt to provide a ‘laundry list’ of these factors as either essential or facilitating is going to be exhausting instead of exhaustive.

But, acknowledging the complexity does not mean that we cannot develop a set of useful concepts for analysing contact. It means we need to move away from




simplistic mechanistic concepts, and we need to put our concepts on a different epistemological basis. Concepts do not need to refer to universal phenomena or interventions which have predictable effects to be useful. Concepts can be revealing and sensitising, they can turn apparent simplicity into realistic complexity, and they can reveal novel courses of action and intervention. I would argue that trust/distrust is an inherently dynamic concept which is sensitising. As the chapters in this book demonstrate, the dynamics of trust/distrust are, on the one hand, pervasive, yet on the other hand, contextual, processual and contentful. Trust/distrust does not have a linear relationship to transformation of the represen-tations of self and other. Instead of mechanising human interaction, trust/distrust makes visible the dialogicality of human interaction. Trust/distrust, as a dynamic concept which is contextual and contentful, helps us understand how a given relation of confl ict plays out at the point of contact.

The main contribution of the present volume is in demonstrating how confl ict, trust and contact can be studied systematically while also taking account of context, process and content. Instead of trying to predict the outcome of an instance of contact ‘with mathematical accuracy,’ the present analyses work towards a dynamic ethnographic understanding of each setting which uncovers the particular sociocultural logic at work. The analyses attempt to rise to the chal-lenge of the manifest complexity of trust and confl ict and are premised upon non-mechanistic epistemological assumptions (Marková, 2008). By analysing the genre of an interaction, its processual unfolding, the contextual constraints upon the actors, and the content of their representations, the chapters present the reader with a rich working model of each setting. Instead of offering simplistic predic-tions, the analyses offer a fl exible understanding of the particularities of each situation. These particularities are theoretically conceptualised, such that they enable speculation and interrogation of additional contexts, and thus theoretical generalisations. What the present volume argues for is, not an avoidance of theory, but, a new type of theory which avoids oversimplifying mechanistic assumptions.

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