fiscal decentralisation in spain guillem lópez-casasnovas d. phil in economics univ. de york prof....

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FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL - Econpubblica CNEL - Econpubblica UniversitàBocconi UniversitàBocconi Milano. July 4th 2003. Milano. July 4th 2003.

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Page 1: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN

Guillem López-Casasnovas

D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York

Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia

CNEL - Econpubblica CNEL - Econpubblica UniversitàBocconiUniversitàBocconi

Milano. July 4th 2003.Milano. July 4th 2003.

Page 2: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

GENERAL OVERVIEW ON FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN

SPANISH CONSTITUTION 1978GENERAL LAW FOR THE FINANCE OF AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES 1980 - BASQUE (FORAL) COMMUNITIES (INCLUDING NAVARRA) - AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES (CC.AA.) * ORDINARY STATUS CC.AA. (BASICALLY WITHOUT HEALTH EXPENDITURE, UP 2002): ART. 143 (9) * PARTICULAR STATUS (HISTORIC CC.AA.

(Plus others) ART. 151 (4: CATALONIA, ANDALUSIA,GALÍCIA, VALENCIA)

FINANCE FOR HEALTH CARE, OUT OF THE GENERAL FINANCING SYSTEM -UP 2002- (AROUND ONE THIRD OF THE REGIONAL FINANCE), BASICALLY UNDER CAPITATIONHEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION REPRESENT TWO THIRDS AT LEAST OF THE CC.AA. EXPENDITURE

Page 3: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

MULTIJURISDICCIONAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: CONSOLIDATED TOTAL EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS

1979 1990 1997 2001Central 88.0 67.5 63.8 58

CC.AA. 0.1 19.2 23.9 25 CC. LL. 11.9 13.9 12.3 17

Source: MEH. Dirección General de Coordinación con las Haciendas Territoriales, yBoletín estadístico del Banco de España For 2001, it does not include Social Security.

FINAL PUBLIC CONSUMPTION(BASICALLY, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ WAGE

BILL)

% Central State: 59

CC.AA.: 22 Local Authorities: 19

However, on current expenditure (excluding final consumption and capitalspending), ie. basically social expenditure, 87% is central

Page 4: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

T H E B A S C R E G I M E : B A S C C O U N T R Y / N A V A R R A

E C O N O M I C A G G R E E M E N T W I T H A F I N A N C I A LC O N T R I B U T I O N ( C U P O ) F O R T H E S E R V I C E S S T I L L U N D E RT H E C E N T R A L S T A T E R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y

T A X R E V E N U E C O L L E C T I O N A T T H E R E G I O N A L L E V E LA N D H I G H E R F I S C A L A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y I N F I N A N C I N GT H E T R A N S F E R E D S E R V I C E S

C A V E A T S O N T H E L E V E L O F I N T E R T E R R I T O R I A LS O L I D A R I T Y A N D O N W H E T H E R T H I S S Y S T E M C O U L D B EE X T E N D E D T O O T H E R C C . A A .

P E R C A P I T A D I F F E R E N C E S R E L A T E D T O R E G I O N A L P O W E R A N DF I N A N C I A L E X P E N D I T U R E C A P A B I L I T I E S ( 1 9 9 9 ) $ O r d i n a r y C C . A A . 1 . 4 5 0 S p e c i a l S t a t u s C C . A A . 2 . 6 6 5

B a s q u e r e g i o n s 3 . 3 2 3R e m e m b e r , h o w e v e r , a t a n u n e q u a l l e v e l o f t r a n s f e r s

Page 5: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

BASIC MECHANISMS OF FINANCE

1980 - 1991 ---> FINANCING THE EFFECTIVE COSTS OF THETRANSFER (UP TO 1987 BY LAW, AFTERWARDS, BY FACTS)

1991 - 1996 ---> IDEM, BUT ALLOCATED ON A CENTRAL

STATE REVENUE SHARING PROCEDURES, BASED ONWEIGHTED PARAMETERS (POPULATION, FISCAL EFFORT,DENSITY, ...)

1996 - 2001 ---> PREVIOUS METHOD +INCLUDING REVENUE COLLECTED FROM THE PERSONALINCOME TAX (30% SEGMENT), WITH ADDITIONAL FINANCEACCORDING TO ITS EVOLUTION OVER A PREDETERMINEDREVENUE BENCHMARK, EITHER DUE TO A HIGHERDYNAMIC FISCAL COMPLIANCE, AN INCOME TAXREVENUE ELASTICITY GREATER THAN ONE OR TOREGIONAL ‘SURCHARGES’ (NOT SO FAR APPLIED),

+ FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS (IN OPERATION)

Page 6: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

Revenue Profile of CC.AA. (%) 1998

Historic (art. 151) Ordinary (art.143) Taxes

- own (new) 4.0 7.2 - state transferred 10.5 18.9 - territorial share personal income tax revenues 5.8 14.7 - own personal income tax revenues 5.6 4.6

total 25.9 45.5 Transfers - from central

government 63.4 21.4 * general transfers 21.5 9.2 * Health and Social services 36.1 2.1 * Solidarity Fund (FCI) 1.6 1.9- from the EU 8.6 27.8

Page 7: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

TYPES OF TRANSFERS

TRANSFERS CONDITIONED UNCONDITIONED

For financing Specific to levelling % share on centralPublic services ‘essential’ public services tax revenues(current and capital) (not so far in operation)

Investment aggreements Territorial allocation ofpersonal income taxrevenues

For development Interterritorial Compensationpurposes Fund -------------(capital spending) European Structural Funds -------------

Source: Monasterio & Suarez, 1998

Page 8: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

FROM AN AUTONOMOUS FISCALDECENTRALISATION POINT OF VIEW:

1986 - 1996 ---> REVENUE TRANSFER OF SOME TAXES(ON PERSONAL WEALTH, INHERITANCE TAXES,WEALTH TRANSFERS, ...), JUST A 10% OF

TOTAL REVENUES (70%, CENTRALTRANSFERS)

1997 ---> 30% OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAXREVENUES ON A TERRITORIAL

BASIS + LEGISLATION POWERS ON THIS(+ - 20%)

2001 ---> THE FORMER SYSTEM EXTENDED TO AHIGHER % OF PERSONAL

INCOME TAX + PETROL, ALCOHOL ANDTOBACCO TAXES + VAT + minor

Page 9: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

SOLIDARITY INTERTERRITORIAL FUND(FCI)

(COORDINATED WITH EUROPEAN FUNDS SINCE 1987)

AFTER 1989, LIMITED TO CC.AA. WITH INCOME PER CAPITABELOW 75% OF THE EUROPEAN AVERAGE

DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO POPULATION (87.5%), DISPERSION(6.9%), GEOGRAFICAL EXTENT (3.0%), MIGRATION BALANCE(1.6%), UNEMPLOYMENT (1.0%)

FROM 1992, CHANNELES 35% OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNEMENTNEW PUBLIC INVESTMENT

AVERAGE: 48 CAN $ PER CAPITA (1991), EXCLUDING EUROPEAN

FUNDS. FIGURES RANK FROM 1 TO 4

Page 10: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

100% s/ energía/ power

40% s/ tabaco/ Tobacco

35% IVA/ VAT

33% IRPF/personal income tax

100% s/ succesiones i donaciones/ inheritance/inheritance

100% s/ transmisiones i AJD/ wealth transfers

100% tasa s/ juego/ gambling

100% impt s/ patrimono/ wealth

40% s/ alcoholes/alcohol

40% s/ hidrocarburos/ petrol

100% s/ matriculación/ car registration

The new Tax revenue sharing initiative (1-I- 2002)

Page 11: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

Main features

Integration oh health care, with safegards(2002-...)

- Level: At the actual registered Cost (1999)

Increasing during 3 years at GDP nominal

- General source of revenues(0.75) Publicly covered Population. + 0.245 Pop. >65 años

+ 0.005 Insularity factor

Future evolution: Earmarked at ITEn (non transferable centraltaxes)

Plus some specific complementary funds (...)(for cross-boundary flows of patients)

Page 12: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

PRESENT SITUATION

Level of Regional Debt and Average finance pc 1997-2001adjusted by the level of Responsibilities (Spanish average 100)

Regional Debt as a %of Regional GDP 31-

12-2001

All competencesEcluded health ans

solidarity (FCI) Funds

ANDALUCIA 9.6 101.1

ARAGON 4.6 106.4

ASTURIAS 5.3 93.45

BALEARES 2.8 83.5

CANARIAS 3.5 112.1

CANTABRIA 3.4 113.6

C.-LA MANCHA 3.6 106.2

C.Y LEON 3.5 115.8

CATALUÑA 9.1 99.1

EXTREMADURA 7.2 115.6

GALICIA 9.6 110.5

MADRID 6.3 89.3

MURCIA 4.4 91.0

LA RIOJA 3.9 112.3

C.VALENCIANA 11.4 87.5

TOTAL 7.2 100BASCCOUNTRY

3.9

Source: Bank of Spain and E. Bandrés & A. CuencaRevista Aragonesa de Administración Pública no 20, 2002,page 64.

Page 13: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

Per capita Public Health Expenditure(average 100) (2002).

SANIDADSANIDAD

(Variables)SANIDAD

(Ajustada)

ANDALUCIA 98 95 96

ARAGON 109 106 109

ASTURIAS 112 107 110

BALEARES 86 103 101

CANARIAS 96 101 99

CANTABRIA 110 103 121

C.-LA MANCHA 97 104 102

C.Y LEON 100 106 104

CATALUÑA 105 102 103

EXTREMADURA 102 101 103

GALICIA 101 104 102

MADRID 95 95 93

MURCIA 97 95 96

LA RIOJA 96 104 123

C.VALENCIANA 100 100 98

TOTAL 100 100 100

COEF. VAR. 6.7 3.9 8.3

First column: former system; second Column: new system without ad hoccompensation at the moment of the transfer; third column: Final expenditure setled down for centarl financing purposes Source: Urbanos (2003)

Page 14: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

PRESENT SITUATION

SEARCH FOR STABILITY WITHOUT “CLOSING” THE SYSTEM DISCUSS: - ENLARGING THE BASKET FOR TAX REVENUE

SHARING PURPOSES (OTHER THAN THE PERSONALINCOME TAX) TO INCREASE FINANCIAL AUTONOMYAND FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY (?)

- ‘AUTONOMY’ DOES NOT MATCH WITH “FINANCIALGUARANTEES” DEFINED ON A MOVING AVERAGETERMS STRATEGY, INDEPENDENTLY OF FISCALEFFORT

Page 15: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

SOME CAVEATS

NEED OF A MORE CLEAR SPECIFICATION OF REGIONAL SOLIDARITY FUNDSAND GREATER EXPENDITURE MONITORING FOR THEM, IS CERTAINLYNEEDED

FOR CATALONIA , THE FISCAL UNBALANCE BETWEEN CENTRALLY

COLLECTED REVENUES AND EXPENDITURE ALLOCATED, ROUND 9% OFTHE CATALAN GDP YEAR BY YEAR

AN EQUALIZATION OF THE AVERAGE PER CAPITA INCOMES BYPUBLIC TRANSFERS, HOLDING UNALTERED THE INTERNALPATTERN OF INCOME UNEQUALITY, WOULD REDUCE JUST AN 11%OF THE SPANISH PERSONAL INCOME DISPARITIES

ANDALUSIA, HAVING IMPROVED PER CAPITA INCOME ABOVETHE AVERAGE, HAS REGISTERED A LOWER THAN AVERAGEREDUCTION IN ITS GINI COEFFICIENT ON INTERNAL INCOMEDISTRIBUTION DISPARITIES

Page 16: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

SOME KEY POINTS FOR THE FUTURE:

WILL CATALONIA BE CAPABLE, WITH AROUND A 20%

HIGHER PER CAPITA INCOME, DESACCELERATE THEINCREASING DEMANDS FOR WELFARE (HEALTH ANDEDUCATION), BY RECEIVING BELOW OR JUST THESPANISH STANDARD AVERAGE PER CAPITAL FINANCE?

DOES SOLIDARITY MEAN FULLY EQUALIZATION,INDEPENDENTLY OF FISCAL EFFORT AND THE WHOLEPROCESS OF INCOME GENERATION?

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REGIONALEARNED PER CAPITA INCOME AND THE FINALLYAVAILABLE PER CAPITA INCOME (AFTER TAXESAND SUBSIDIES) FOR CATALONIA IS TWICE THEAVERAGE DIFFERENCE FOR THE WHOLESPANISH. IS THIS POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE?

Page 17: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

IN BRIEF, CATALONIA IN SPAIN

15.8% OF POPULATION 14.7% OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 19% OF GDP 23% OF INCOME TAXES (FISCAL EFFORT)

ESTATUT DE CATALUNYA:

GENERAL STATEMENT ON FINANCE: : AVERAGE LEVEL ON FISCAL EFFORT

AND POPULATION SHARE

A FISCAL AGGREEMENT OF THE ‘BASQUETYPE’ WOULD INCREASE AVAILABLEREVENUES FOR CATALONIA A 30 TO 50%

Page 18: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

Annexe 1-

Les revenus des autonomies en 1998

revenu par famille brutdisponible per capita

(Espagne =100)

Convergence réelleavec l’Union Européenne

(moyenne UE=100)Andalousie 78.43 58.86Aragon 109.77 88.67Asturies 93.92 69.54Îles Baléares 143.36 125.82Îles Canaries 95.29 79.43Cantabrie 97.91 75.71Castille-La- Manche 83.24 64.14Castille-Léon 97.64 74.67Catalogne 119.03 100.7Pays valencien 100.69 81.25Estrémadure 79.99 59.67Galice 90.86 68.74Madrid 113.27 103.05Murcie 84.96 65.13Navarre 114.44 95.43Pays basque 113.2 93.36La Rioja 112.37 91.46Ceuta 82.01 62.4Melilla 77.38 58.11

Moyenne Espagnole 100.00 81.45

Page 19: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

La croissance des revenus des autonomies (en % constants) 1995-99 (%)

Moyenne 95-99 Croissance accumulée 95-99

Andalousie 3,43 14,42Aragon 3,23 13,57Asturies 2,58 10,71Îles Baléares 3,29 13,82Îles Canaries 3,99 16,95Cantabrie 3,47 14,61Castille-La- Manche 3,59 15,17Castilla-León 2,50 10,40Catalogne 3,28 13,79Pays valencien 3,73 15,76Estrémadure 3,07 12,84Galice 2,95 12,34Madrid 4,04 17,18Murcie 4,11 17,50Navarre 3,59 15,15Pays basque 3,54 14,92La Rioja 3,96 16,80Ceuta et Melilla 3,00 12,53

Moyenne Espagnole 3,47 14,61

Source: INE, 2000

Page 20: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

Annexe 2-

À propos de la différence en revenus et en dépenses sanitaires publique :

une comparaison entre pays

Some data on Health care expenditure:FINANCE YEAR 1999.

FINANCE FINANCEPER CAPITA* p.c (SNS=100)

ANDALOUSIE 101.927 99,04CANARIES 100.460 97,61CATALOGNE 108.214 105,14PAYS VALENCIEN 102.814 99,90GALICE 104.160 101,20GESTION TRANSFÉRÉE*** 104.034 101,08GESTIÓN NON TRANSFÉRÉE 101.350 98,47S.N.S.*** 102.920 100COEF. DE VARIATION**** 0,0285

* En pesetas. Calculée sur la base de la population résidente au 1er juillet 1998 (INE).

** En pesetas. Calculée sur la base de l’index régional de parité du pouvoir d’achat en 1998 (Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya).

*** Sauf Pays basque et Navarre.

Page 21: FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN SPAIN Guillem López-Casasnovas D. Phil in Economics Univ. de York Prof. In Public Finance Univ. Pompeu Fabra. Catalonia CNEL

Coeffcients of variation on Public Health Expenditure per capita and on GDP per capita, 1997 (or around)Unweighted by populationStates Coef. var (PHExp pc) Coef.var (GDPpc)Australie 0,077501261 0,170656321Allemagne 0,202306246 0,352884521Canada 0,306891579 0,259610384France 0,131183155 0,185638061Italie 0,103893794 0,269550661Suède 0,102744462 0,097980906Espagne 0,027464087 0,16799999RU 0,102919565 0,116031873WeightedStates Coef. var (PHExp pc) Coef.var (GDPpc)Australie 0,056245992 0,07716817Allemagne 0,143079048 0,233900136Canada 0,080830943 0,126293752France 0,125511933 0,277026573Italie 0,089808538 0,268621807Suède 0,087837144 0,109060605Espagne 0,021105161 0,163707875RU 0,15182091 0,092255009

Remarquez que les observations concernant le Yukon et le NorthWestern pèsent très peu.L’Île de France a un poids très élevé (elle dévie peu en DS et beaucoup en Revenus)Déviations fortes en DS dans de nombreuses régions.