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Environment and Development Economics 10: 3351 C 2005 Cambridge University PressDOI: 10.1017/S1355770X04001767 Printed in the United Kingdom

Rise, fall, and persistence in Kadakkodi:

an enquiry into the evolution of a community

institution for fishery management in

Kerala, India

ANTONYTO PAUL

Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum, Kerala, India, 695 011.

E-mail: [email protected]

ABSTRACT. Against the backdrop of a community-basedfishery managementinstitutioncalled kadakkodi, this paper addresses the question of how institutions evolve, innovate,or disintegrate. It explains how institutional evolution is determined by factors likerelative resourceendowment,technology, cultural endowment,and inherited institutionalstructures. The strength of such informal institutions in facilitating effective resourcemanagement admitted, the paper argues that in the wake of increasing resource-related,technological, cultural and institutional heterogeneities, they may fail to perform andhence are no panacea to the problems of resource management. Such predicaments maycall for complementary formal institutions whose supply, however, would depend on thecost of collective action.

1. IntroductionMost of the worlds major fisheries are now fully exploited and at least one-third of them are over-exploited (FAO, 2001). As more and more economiespursue the path of economic globalization, market-induced pressure onfishing is expected to further increase. Unless appropriate management

institutions are in place, fisheries the world over could fall into irreversibledecline; and not only the fisheries, but the lives of millions of peoplewho depend on fishing for their livelihood. Some of the more traditionalfishing communities have had informal institutional arrangements formanaging their fisheries, which evolved in specific ecological, social andcultural contexts (Feeny et al., 1990). A number of other fisheries haveboth formal regulations of the state and informal arrangements, whilst

I am grateful to J.-P. Platteau, Partha Dasgupta, Karl Goran-Maler, David Starret,

K.N. Nair, John Kurien, and V. Santhakumar, for their comments and suggestionsat various stages of preparation of this paper. Earlier versions of this paper werepresented at Beijer Research Seminars at Luxor Durban and at ICTP Trieste


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34 Antonyto Paul

others are completely devoid ofany institutional arrangements. Moreover,in the course of time, many such institutions have undergone changes,innovations and even disintegration (Baland and Platteau, 1996), leaving

us to wonder how institutional evolutions take place. Are they the result ofspontaneous movements or incremental changes? Which factors influenceinstitutional evolution? Such questions and concerns have become pivotalto New Institutional Economics (Drobak and Nye, 1997). This paper is anattempt to contribute to the study of institutional evolution through thecase of an ancient fishery management institution in Kerala.

The Kadakkodi, or Kadal kodathi (which literally means sea court) is atraditional institutional arrangement in the marine fishery sector of Kerala.It was intended to provide not only a conflict resolution mechanism akinto the caste panchayats of rural India (Baxi, 1982), but also a resource

management system to be developed and administered by the communityof fishermen itself (women had no active role in kadakkodi). However, asyet, no serious research seems to have addressed the functioning of thisinstitution, not to speak of its evolution.

The evolution of kadakkodi on the coast of Kerala reveals an interestinggeographical pattern. Two extreme situations exist: the southern coastwhere the system did not develop at all and the northern-most coastaldistrict (Kasargod) where the system is strong and claims a long history ofuninterrupted functioning. In between these two extremes lies the rest ofthe northern coast where the system was strong in the past, but has faced

either disintegration or restructuring. Taking a clue from this geographicalpattern, an attempt is made in this paper to explain the evolution of thekadakkodi system by focussing on the factors and processes that resulted inthe following phenomena:

1 the persistence of kadakkodi system in Kasargod, the northern-mostdistrict of Kerala;

2 the absence of the system in the south;3 the disintegration of the system in some of the northern coastal

villages;

4 the survival of a restructured system in a few other northern coastalvillages.

Both primary and secondary data have been used in the study. Secondarydata pertaining to fish production, fishing effort, income from fishing,fishing population etc. were collected from the published documentsof various research organizations and the State Fisheries Department.As very little has been written on the kadakkodi system, much of thedata on its nature, functions, and evolution had to be collected throughprimary sources. Primary data collection was done mainly throughsemi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with fishermen,kadakkodi functionaries, and other key informants of the coastal villages.The interview schedule consisted of questions on the access and the


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Environment and Development Economics 35

KASBA

KOTTIKULAM

KASARAGOD

KANNURCHALIL

THYIL

THALASSERY

MAHECHOMBALA

BADAGARA-

KURIYADI

PUTHYAPPA

CHALIYAM

PARAPPANANGADIKOOTTAI

PUTHUPONNANI

KARNATAKA

WYNAD

KOZHIKODE

MALAPPURAM

PALAKKAD

THRISSUR

AZHEECODE

MUNAMBAM

PALLIPURAM

CHELLANAM

ERNAKULAM

IDUKKI

KERALA

INDIA

N

0 60 kms

TAMIL NADU

KOTTAYAM

PATHANAMTHITTA

KOLLAM

CHETTIKADPUNNAPARAPURAKKAD

ALAPPUZHA

THOTTAPALLY

KARITHURA

LEGENDPUTHENTHURA

NEENDAKARA

State boundary

District boundaryState capital

District headquarter

THANKASSERYKOLLAM

ANJENGOTHIRUVANANTHAPURAM

VIZIHINJAM

ARABIAN SEA

Figure 1. Map of the study area

villages out of the total 222 marine villages in the state (see figure 1) witha view to capturing the above-mentioned pattern of evolution of kadakkodi.The interviews were held during the year 199899.

The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 provides


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36 Antonyto Paul

2. Background of the study

2.1. Kerala fishery an overview

Kerala is one of the nine maritime states of India, situated on the south-western tip of the Indian peninsula. It is a small narrow state with a coastlineof about 600 km, a maximum breadth of 150 km and an area of 39,000 sq. km.Kerala is well known for its time-honoured tradition of fishing and fishtrade: its fishery is acclaimed for high productivity (Velupillai, 1940; Day,1865). The Kerala coast is also the most densely populated in India, havinga population density of 2,330/sq. km. (Kurien, 2001). It is unique in that thefishing community is almost equally distributed between three differentreligions: Hindus (33 per cent), Muslims (31 per cent), and Christians(36 per cent). Nevertheless, irrespective of their religion, the fishing

community belongs to the lower strata of the Indian caste hierarchy andtheir standard of living leaves much to be desired.Until the introduction of mechanised gill-netters and bottom trawlers

through the Indo-Norwegian Project (INP) in the early 1950s, fishingtechnology was predominantly artisanal or traditional. It was marked bythe use of oars or sails for propulsion, selective and passive gears; by lowcapital commitments, the use of traditional knowledge and fishing skills forsubsistence purposes. Sales were limited to local markets, and there wasegalitarian ownership of fishing implements and the owners themselveswere the workers. However, with the arrival of INP, another sector, that

consists of trawlers, gill-netters, and purse seiners, popularly known as themechanized sector, emerged and gained strength. Recently, the fishingsector has become more complex in terms of technology. The most importantfactor has been the emergence of a new segment within the traditionalsector, namely, a motorized segment that uses traditional crafts fitted withoutboard motors for propulsion. As an offshoot of motorization, the gearand craft size have increased enormously with commensurate increase incapital investment.

2.2. Kadakkodi: nature and functionsInstitutional arrangements for fishery management were not alien tothe Kerala fishery. There are community-based informal institutions aswell as formal ones. The most important community-based managementinstitution is the kadakkodi system. Kadakkodi, though it literally meanssea-court, is in fact more than a court for it functions as a legislative,executive, and judicial body that enforces regulations for fishing operationsand resolves conflicts. It is a very old institutional arrangement that hasprevailed for centuries throughout the marine villages of northern Keralaand is still active in some coastal villages in the area. Commonality

in their functions and regulations notwithstanding, the administrativestructure ofkadakkodis varies across space. There are three distinct types ofkadakkodi:


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close to the beach and the kadakkodis are anchored to these temples.The ministers of the temple, called Kshethresanmar or Achanmaract as magistrates in the kadakkodi, while the Kadavanmar are the

messengers. Each kadakkodi consists of Achanmar, Kadavanmar, Templecommittee members, and Valakkars (owners of fishing implements).This is the pothuyogam (general body), which has the legislativepower to enforce fishing regulations.

2. Multi-communityThe fishing communities in Kannur, Kozhikode, Malappuram, andEranakulam districts are heterogeneous in terms of religion. Thanks tothis multi-community composition, the kadakkodis in those districts de-veloped a secular structure. The general body consists of valakkars and

they select an executive body consisting of a president, vice-president,a few committee members, and a messenger.

3. FederatedAlltheseven kadakkodis in Vadakara taluk in the Kozhikode district forma Federation. Apart from the respective general bodies and executivebodies for each kadakkodi, there is an Action Committee comprisingselected members from each kadakkodi. The convenor of the ActionCommittee is called Sipayi (sepoy).

2.3. Kadakkodi rules on fishingA body of rules evolved over time to regulate fishing operations, althoughthey are now few in number compared with the past. Currently, we couldindentify only three rules:

1 prohibition of night-fishing during the south-west monsoon season(June, July, and August);

2 prohibition of the use of gill-nets during the south-west monsoonseason;

3 fishery-related conflicts should be brought in front of the kadakkodis forresolution.

It deserves special mention that no rules on conservation were observedby the kadakkodis, even in the past; nor were there any strict access rules.This might have been because fishermen considered the sea as an endlessbounty.

The third rule was found to be of paramount importance in the fisherysector and it provided a very efficient system of conflict resolution. Usualissues that require settlement by the kadakkodis are problems of credit-tyinglabour relations, compensation for destruction of fishing crafts/gear, anddisputes over certain schools of fish targeted by other groups. The trial


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38 Antonyto Paul

3. Evolution of KadakkodiA lot of emphasis has been given in the literature to technology andresource endowment in explaining institutional innovations (Ostrom, 1990,

1992; North, 1990; Wade, 1988). The impact of socio-political and culturalaspects on institutional evolution has also been highlighted (Ruttan andHayami, 1984; Peters, 1987). Ruttan and Hayami (1984) provide a rathercomprehensive version of the evolutionary model of institutional changeas endogenous to the economy. In their model, institutional evolutionis viewed in the standard supply and demand framework. The sourcesof demand for institutional evolution are changes in relative resourceendowments1 and technology, while the supply of institutional evolutiondepends on the supply cost incurred for collective action to bring aboutchanges. This, in turn, involves struggles among various interest groups

and their power structures. Cultural endowment2

, including religion andideology, and the inherited institutions, are seen as important variablesinfluencing the supply cost.

The empirical data collected from the interviews have confirmed theimportance of resource endowment, technology, cultural endowment,and other already existing institutional structures in understanding theevolution ofkadakkodi.

Very little has been written on kadakkodis. Even oral history on the originsofkadakkodis wasdifficult to trace from interviews with fishermen. However,we did obtain certain important clues regarding the disintegration and

reorganization ofkadakkodis in some of the marine villages in recent times pieces of information that help to understand the transformation ofkadakkodi. For instance, by the late 1970s and early 1980s the kadakkodi systemhad disintegrated in some of the villages. Yet to our surprise, during thesame period, at Vadakara taluk in the Kozhikode district and at Payyoli andMahe, kadakkodis underwent restructuring, but withstood disintegration.In the Kasargod district, kadakkodis persisted without undergoing muchalteration at all. Interestingly, in the southern coastal Fishery of Kerala noother such systems evolved. These four disparate developments, namely,disintegration, restructuring, persistence, and non-emergence ofkadakkodis

are hereby analysed in order to understand the processes and determinantsof institutional evolution.

3.1. Disintegration ofKadakkodiIt was by the late 1970s that the kadakkodi system disintegrated in villageslike Chalil, Dharmadam, Chalium, Puthiyappa, and Azheekodu, and inthe early 1980s in the villages of Kannur, Quilandy, and Parappanangady.Our investigation into the processes of this disintegration has shown that

1 Changes in relative resource endowment would mean changes in relative accessto factor endowments, product demand, and income stream from the resource


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factors, such as resource endowments, technology, cultural endowment,and institutional factors have contributed to the process.

Resource endowment and technologyFrom very ancient times, the coastal fishery of Kerala, which is regardedas a common-pool resource (CPR) of nature, has remained a de factocommon property, with users mostly belonging to the traditional fishingcommunities. CPRs are inherently subject to the so-called common poolresource problems, which Ostrom et al. (1994) classify into appropriationproblems and provision problems. Appropriation problems are theexternalities that are caused to a resource user (appropriator) by thewithdrawal of a resource flow by other appropriators. Such appropriationexternalities may be accentuated by technological externalities, that is, ex-

ternalities caused by the use of heterogeneous technologies for resourceextraction, and, by assignment problems, which refer to the problemsof externalities arising from heterogeneity in the spatial or temporaldistribution of the resource flow. Provision problems are those that affect theprovision activity; namely, the conservation or enhancement of the resourcestock.

Initially, thanks to homogeneous technology used within the fishery,appropriation problems were not felt severely by fishermen. However, withthe introduction of mechanized fishing (which included a considerableincrease in the number of mechanized trawlers in the coastal waters in

the late 1970s), technological externalities, and the resultant appropriationexternalities, began to affect the traditional fishing communities moreprominently. Almost all aspects related to the resource endowments oftraditional fishermen showed a declining trend, whether fish production,output per boat, value accrued, or, above all, the real income per worker. Atroughly the same time, a contrasting trend was seen in the real income oftraditional fishermen vis-a-vis their counterparts in the mechanized sector(see figure 2). Statistical estimation using an exponential fit has shown asignificant (at 5 per cent level) negative growth rate (4.28 per cent) inper capita real income for the traditional sector, compared with a positive

growth rate of 1.39 per cent (not significant) for the mechanized sector.Such a disparity was well reflected in the respective standards of living,particularly in the coastal villages, where both groups of workers were inclose proximity (Srivastava et al., 1986).

The same period witnessed the greatest shrinkage of fishing spaceavailable to the traditional fishermen because of the proliferation ofmechanized boats. From a fishing area of 0.22 sq. km per craft in the 020 metre depth range it fell to 0.17 sq. km by 1980. As a consequence,there were unpleasant encounters and conflicts between the two groups ofworkers, which discouraged many traditional fishermen from setting out tosea (Kalawar et al., 1985). The competition for resource and space increasedfurther with the introduction of purse seiners in 1979.


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40 Antonyto Paul

Real Income per Worker (1970-92)

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

Rupees

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982/83

1985

1987

1989

1991

Yea r

Mechanised T ra di ti on al

Figure 2. Real income per worker sector-wiseSource: Computed from Government of Kerala, Statistics for Planning (variousyears).

which the trawler operators began to experience with the rapid increasein the number of trawlers, and realization by trawler operators thatcertain valuable species were more abundant at night. As more andmore mechanized boats started night trawling the traditional fishermen,who used only to fish during daytime thanks to the kadakkodi regulationprohibiting night fishing, began to experience a significant decline in theircatch. They were unequivocal in blaming this upon the spread of nighttrawling. Unfortunately the kadakkodis had no control over the mechanizednight trawlers and gradually, on their own initiative, the traditionalfishermen groups ventured into night fishing, even though there was no

collective decision by the kadakkodis to revoke the ban on night fishing.Thus, for the first time, an important fishing regulation of the kadakkodiswas undermined. All interviewees from the northern coast admitted thatthis was the first factor that eroded the strength ofkadakkodis.

How the externalities of night trawling, and the consequent violation ofthe kadakkodi rules against night fishing led to the collapse of the kadakkodiinstitution might be better understood if we analyse those processes usingsimple game models.

A game-theoretic illustration of the collapse of the Kadakkodi systemLet us consider, for simplicity, two traditional fishermen who struggleto choose between night fishing (in addition to day fishing) and purely


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Fisherman 2

C D

C 100, 100 - 50 , 150

Fisherman 1

D 150 , -50 0 , 0

Figure 3. Unregulated night fishing as a PD game

as well (call this strategy of defection D) fishing effort increases, but theaverage income per unit of effort decreases, due to the negative externalitiesupon daytime fishing stocks. Consequently, it can be assumed that the

net revenue does not increase. Finally, if only one of the two fishermenchooses night fishing and the other persists with day fishing, the formerwill get a net revenue of Rs 150, while the latter suffers a net loss of Rs50. This situation is represented by the pay-off matrix shown in figure 3.Note that the first number in each cell is the pay-off accruing to the rowplayer (fisherman 1) while the second number refers to the column player(fisherman 2).

Given the pay-off structure of this game, we find it a typical PrisonersDilemma (PD) game with a unique Nash equilibrium (D, D). Both thefishermen go for night fishing and end up with zero profit. Indeed, both

would have been better off, and collective gain would have reachedthe maximum, had they restrained from night fishing. However, it isunderstandable for either of them to choose night fishing. As Roemerstates, Everyones welfare can be improved by exercising a restraint thatno one has any interest to exercise in the state of nature (Roemer, 1988: 2,quoted in Baland and Platteau, 1996: 30). Nevertheless, the outcomes ofthese strategies change when there is an institution that monitors andsanctions defection. This is well illustrated in the case of night fishing beingeffectively restrained by kadakkodis endorsing fines and other punishmentson defectors. For example, if the kadakkodis imposeafineofRs60( F = 60) onthe defector and compensate the victim (various services rendered by thekadakkodis to the fishermen may be viewed as indirect payments), the pay-off matrix transforms into that of another game where mutual cooperationwould become the unique equilibrium outcome(see figure 4).3

Unfortunately, a Pareto-optimal situation is jeopardized by the techno-logical externalities generated by mechanized trawlers. Intensive nighttrawling results in appropriation externalities for traditional fishermen,which reduce their fishing incomes. This reduction might be more with theC, C pay offs than with D, C pay offs due to the prevalence of negativeexternalities. If so, the new pay-off matrix (without fine) for the twotraditional fishermen whose pay offs are affected by the operation ofmechanized trawlers (which are not modelled) is shown in figure 5.


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42 Antonyto Paul

Fisherman 2

C D

C 100, 100 10 , 90

Fisherman 1

D 90 , 10 0 , 0

Figure 4. Night fishing regulated with fine (F= 60)

Fisherman 2

C D

C 70, 70 -60, 140

Fisherman 1

D 140, -60 -2 0, -20

Figure 5. The fishing game affected by externalities of night trawling (without fine)

Fisherman 2

C D

C 70, 70 20, 60

Fisherman 1

D 60, 20 -100, -100

Figure 6. The fishing game affected by externalities of night trawling (with fine, F= 80)

Here, (D, D) is the Nash equilibrium, wherein both the fishermen havea dominant strategy to defect. It is clear that, even with a fine of Rs 60, the

outcome cannot be improved. One way of bringing about a Pareto-superiorNash equilibrium would be through raising the fine to Rs 80. The resultingpay off would be as follows with C, C as the equilibrium (see figure 6).

Yet it is difficult to justify increases to fines in a context where traditionalfishermen have already become poorer owing to the negative externalitiesof mechanized trawling; no wonder that none of the kadakkodis ventured toraise the fine during the said period. The collapse of kadakkodis because ofthe increasing violation of the kadakkodi rules against night fishing which,in turn, resulted from the reaction of the traditional fishermen to theincrease in night trawling, can be understood alternatively by assuminga subsistence constraint of, for example, SRs 80. Given the subsistenceconstraint Rs 80, each fisherman tries to defect and evade paying a fine


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least in three ways:

(a) larger reduction of pay offs for a cooperative strategy than for adefection strategy;

(b) the inability ofkadakkodis to enhance the fine due to rising impov-erishment of traditional fishermen;

(c) the possibility of income from cooperative fishing falling belowsubsistence levels.

A few more technology-related factors were instrumental in theweakening of the kadakkodi system. Motorization of the traditional fishingcrafts was just one of them. Until 1980, almost all village fishing groupsused to fish in the same area and land at the same landing centres atroughly the same time. This system provided a sense of a well-defined

boundary to village fishing activity. However, motorization diluted sucha notion, enabling fishermen to go faster and farther for their catch,landing at markets of their choice. As a result, communication betweenfishermen declined. It will be recalled that clearly defined boundariesbetween resources and resource users, and the consequent repeatedinteractions of the resource users, are among the principles for successfulCPR management (Ostrom, 1990: 91; Baland and Platteau, 1996).

An offshoot of motorization was ring seine technology, which startedin central Kerala. As it spread north, it faced severe protests, especiallyin localities where the kadakkodis were strong, on account of the fact that

these gears appropriated a very large share of the landings. Nonetheless,the success stories of ring seines from nearby villages tempted some to jointhe bandwagon. This paved the way for rifts within kadakkodis, where somemembers were for, whilst others were against, ring seine technology. Protestwaned gradually as the pro ring seine group recruited more members intoits fold.

Another factor contributing to the collapse of the kaddakodi was thesudden boom in the flow of migrant fishermen. The migration phenomenonis intimately related to the technological heterogeneity that prevails in thefishery. For instance, fishermen in the south, especially from Trivandrum

southwards, are well known for their expertise in hook-and-line fishingand drift-net operation compared with their counterparts in other areas ofKerala. Hence, the circulation of fishermen from southern Kerala towardsthe north for hook-and-line and drift-net fishing has long been a tradition.A steep increase in the magnitude of migration has been observed since1980, and since then a detailed study of labour migration from four villagesin Trivandrum, from where the highest number of fishermen migrate to thenorthern districts, has shown that their number increased four- to five-fold(Rajan, 2001).

With the growing number of immigrants to the northern districts,conflicts with local fishermen increased, as the former took little noticeof the local rules and customs. The kadakkodi functionaries found it difficult


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44 Antonyto Paul

externalities and consequent appropriation externalities, which shook thevery fabric of the kadakkodi system.

Institutional factorsThe spread of ring seine technology caused certain institutional problems aswell. As noted earlier, valakkars were the only members of kadakkodis whoowned fishing craft. But, the huge investment requirement of ring seineunits led to the emergence of a new ownership pattern, namely, the sharesystem of ownership. In this system, groups of fishermen jointly invest(often by taking advantage of institutional credit) in the fishing units. Thisdevelopment caused much confusion with regard to membership status inkadakkodis. Valakkars objected to giving membership to share owners andthe latter, in turn, challenged the exclusive membership of valakkars. The

weakening of kadakkodis at Chalium, Mahe, Puthiyappa, Azheekode, andPallipuram was largely due to this membership problem.The mushrooming of primary cooperative credit societies in the coastal

villages during the 1980s deserves a special mention in this context. Themain purpose of establishing the societies was to finance the share systemof ownershipof ring seine units.Formation of the societies, however, createda political divide (see also Kurien, 1992). The two major political groups, theCongress and the Communist (Marxist) parties, were in direct competitionfor the upper hand. At the same time, political heterogeneity among thefishermen under the same kadakkodis started to increase. Subsequently, it

was realised that an important cause for the decline ofkadakkodis in Kannur,where political consciousness is high, was the political divide.

Cultural endowmentMany of our respondents emphasised the role of leadership in maintainingthe kadakkodi system. Cooperation among fishermen cannot be sustainedunless they are confident of fair play from kadakkodi leaders. If the leadersturn a blind eye to those violating the rules, the cooperating fishermenwould realise that they are the ones losing out, which might prompt themto opt for a Tit-for-Tat (TFT) strategy, and, ultimately, total defection. The

presence of able and impartial leadership is certainly an asset in the culturalcapital of a community, but, at the same time, its shortage was a seriousconstraint for some of the kadakkodis: Parappanangadi is a good example ofthis.

In addition, as we shall discuss further, social capital was not as strong inthe villages as on the Kasargod coast. By the term, social capital we meanthe behavioural patterns of trust and cooperation (Solow, 1999) that createand strengthen relations among persons and organizations (Coleman, 1988).It is known that social capital can help citizens to resolve collective actionproblems smoothly with the use of institutional mechanisms (Putnam, 2000:21). As a result, variations in the levels of social capital are reflected in theextent and quality of such institutions.


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restructured. For instance, take the seven kadakkodis of Vadakara taluk inthe Kozhikode district. Even though the forces of change in technologyand resource endowment were similar to those discussed above, certain

institutional changes introduced by the kadakkodi leadership successfullycounteracted the negative forces of disintegration. In order to understandthe implications of these strategies let us take the case of the kadakkodi atChombala, which initiated the restructuring process.

The Chombala kadakkodi followed a four-part strategy. First, when itwas observed that fishermen tended to violate the kadakkodi rules againstnight fishing, kadakkodi leaders assembled the pothuyogam (general body)to discuss the problem. The ill effects of night fishing were explained,especially those during the monsoon season when the sea is very rough.The pothuyogam thereupon decided to uphold the ban on night fishing but

at the same time restricted it to the monsoon period. Such a move was verystrategic, for not only did it placate the fishermen but asserted the authorityof the kadakkodi.

Second, it was observed that with the new system of share ownership offishing implements, the valakkars interest in kadakkodis started waning.Therefore, kadakkodi leadership proposed giving membership to shareowners and fishworkers in the kadakkodi without infringing the role ofvalakkars. Thanks to the introduction of such liberal membership, almost allfishermen in the village began taking an active interest in kadakkodi affairs.This institutional innovation could circumvent the problems arising from

heterogeneous ownership patterns of fishing implements.The third strategy was the formation of a federation of all the seven

kadakkodis of Vadakara taluk. Such collaboration enhanced their bargainingstrength, which meant that they could attend to new needs and challengesin the fishery sector. Fourth, the kadakkodi started taking up new activitiesover and above its usual functions, for example, the restoration of thekerosene subsidy from the state and the introduction of the auction systemfor marketing fish as a replacement for the exploitative system of credit-cum-marketing through the agency of tharakans (middlemen). Moreover,such activities could serve as by-products, which facilitated collective action

(Olson, 1965), and gave the federation an advantage in dealing with theproblems caused by immigrant fishermen. In brief, the Chombala kadakkodi,with its institutional authority, was able to resist the negative externalitiesof technology and resource appropriation.

The presence of able, fair-minded, and innovative leaders was a greatasset for the kadakkodis, and their impartiality helped to prevent politicaldifferences from tarnishing the kadakkodis reputation. Moreover, theelement of trust among the fishermen was found to be relatively higherwithin the villages, which also have a tradition of religious harmony. Suchcultural factors have helped these kadakkodis to withstand disintegration.

3.3. Persistence ofKadakkodi: the case of Kasargod


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46 Antonyto Paul

in the very cultural endowment of the fishing community in this locality.The temple-centricity of their kadakkodis and the role of the Achanmaras magistrates gave a religious semblance to kadakkodis in Kasargod; the

economic issues related to fishing along with all other important socialissues come under the purview of kadakkodi. Thus in Kasargod, kadakkodibecomes a socio-economic and religious institution. To borrow the phraseof Granovetter (1985), kadakkodi remains here, to a large extent, sociallyembedded and this commands strict adherence from its members.

The people in these villages form a close-knit community, belonging tothe same caste of Hindu-Araya, a social status of which they are very aware.Within the community there are three illams (sub-castes) called ponnillam,kachillam, and karillam, and there exists illam exogamy that keeps thecommunity inter-connected. It is found that in these close communities

reputation is very important, and ostracism is a grave and most fearedsanction in the kadakkodis of Kasargod even today.Certain factors related to resource endowment have also contributed to

the persistence of kadakkodis. For instance, although negative externalitiesof mechanized fishing are present, this fishing community does not feelthem as severely as elsewhere, because the owners of mechanized boatsin Kasargod were mostly the traditional fishermen themselves. Anotherfactor relates to fish landing and marketing. Developed fishing harbours orcentralized landing centres do not exist in Kasargod. Instead, what prevailsis a dispersed fish-landing system. The fishermen land their catches in their

respective villages and their wives take headloads of fish to the wholesalemarket (hence, marketing middlemen are few in Kasargod coast). It isapparent that this kind of fish-landing and marketing system allows forinteraction among fishermen of the same village, although it reduces inter-village interaction. Another feature is that most of the Achanmar who actas magistrates in the kadakkodis are themselves practicing fishermen, whichprovides a horizontal structure to the kadakkodis, and acts as an addedincentive for other fishermen to comply with the kadakkodi rules.

Again, the problems associated with migrant fishermen do not arise inKasargod for two reasons: first, natural reefs that attract hook-and-line

fishermen from the south are relatively few in the Kasargod sea; second,marketing middlemen, which give local support and assistance to migrantsin most of the villages, are virtually absent in Kasargod. When questioned,our respondents expressed satisfaction with the fairness and ability of theirAchanmar.

3.4. Non-emergence ofKadakkodis on the south coastSeveral factors constrained the development of kadakkodis on the southcoast: the specificities of resource endowment, technology, and culturalendowment, and a sort of institutional lock-in being the more prominentones.

The marine environment of southern Kerala, especially from Trivandrum


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surf, little access to backwater, an open sand beach as the only landingcentre for fishing craft, and a large variety of fish species in small quantities(PCO-SIFFS, 1991). In addition, coral reefs are more prominent in the south.

Fishing technology that developed in the south is suited to this specificenvironment. Kattamaram, the simplest form of fishing crafts, made bytying together three or four logs, is the predominant method. Thanksto its low manufacturing cost, many individual fishermen could acquireownership of kattamarams, and they can be operated from anywhere onthe beach with just one to three crewmembers. The low labour requirementis also conditioned by the large variety of fish species in small quantities,thanks to which fishermen have to use selective and smaller gears. Such anenvironment has led to an atomistic or, at the most, a family-based patternof fishing that requires little dependence on, and interaction with, fellow

fishermen, although, admittedly, personalized interactions shape normsand values.Another important technological specificity observed in the south

may be referred to as, to borrow a VeblenAyresian phrase, ceremonialencapsulation of technology (see Bush, 1987). Moving northward fromKollam, fishing technology becomes characterized by large fishing crafts(plank canoes) in which 2030 people at a time go fishing. Althoughsuch an environment offers rich prospects for interactions and collectiveendeavours among fishermen, the prevailing ownership pattern of thesecapital-intensive fishing implements they are owned exclusively by the

janmies (local landlords) hinders all such prospects. The janmies appointtheir tenants to work in those crafts, which divides the coastal societyinto capitalist-landlords and tenant-fishermen classes, and the relatedproduction becomes a sort of bonded labour.4 Such a situation could becharacterized as ceremonial encapsulation of technology by the landlords,whose ceremonial values are mostly feudalistic.5 All possible avenues foralternative institutional arrangements that could have emanated from thetechnological opportunities were prevented by an institutional lock-in.

Prevalence of vertical social structures is another feature of the southernvillages. These, like autocratic regimes and hierarchical religions that

are characterized by superiorinferior relationships among the members,are found to dampen mutual trust and cooperation (Banfield, 1958;Putnam, 1993). In the south, besides the capitalist landlordworking tenantrelationship, dominance of Catholic religion appears to be another socialstructure. The vast majority of fishermen in southern Kerala belong to

4 In most of the marine villages this relationship is exploitative rather than a patronclient relationship as observed by the scholars (Platteau and Abraham, 1987). Theexploitative element, as we explain subsequently, is more explicit in the pattern of

distribution of fishing incomes.5 VeblenAyres model of institutional change explains the possibilities ofencapsulation of technological changes by the ceremonial values in society


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48 Antonyto Paul

Table 1. Repayment of loans from Matsyafed as on 31 March 1999 (in000 rupees)

Percentage ofDistrict Demand Collection collection

Trivandrum 492.28 231.02 46.93Kollam 785.44 358.96 45.93Alappuzha 948.03 400.07 42.20Eranakulam 579.08 265.98 45.93Trichur 479.03 251.74 52.55Malappuram 509.55 255.70 50.18Kozhikode 612.58 392.88 64.14Kannur 320.92 198.14 61.74Kasargode 225.89 225.70 99.92

Source: Unpublished data from Matsyafed (on request).

the Catholic Church, which is unique among religions in the degree ofcentralization of belief and behaviour, a centralization which seems to havesteadily increased to this day (Ferrero, 2002: 335). For example, on theKerala coast, the Church hierarchy is dominant enough to claim obediencefrom the followers, though there is no initiative from the authorities tobuild up horizontal fellowship among the followers (Dietrich and Nalini,1989).

Moreover, levels of social capital are low in these villages compared with

the north. We have made use of four crude indices to measure the same:1. Trustworthiness: After the pattern of the World Value Survey (ICPSR,

1994) we put a broad question to our interviewees asking whetherthey think that most of the people in their village could be trusted.Interestingly, while around 50 per cent of the respondents from thenorth answered positively, the corresponding proportion from thesouth was just 15 per cent.6

2. Loans repayment: Repayment of loans may be considered an indicatorof trustworthiness, because ability alone does not warrant repayment

unless there is also the willingness to repay. Coleman argues thattrustworthiness essentially means that obligations are repaid (Coleman,1988).7 In our study, we have considered repayment of loans taken byfishermen from Matsyafed (a cooperative federation managed by thegovernment to provide financial and technical support to traditionalfishermen) (see table 1). The repayment schedule is quite revealing.Repayment by the fishermen of southern Kerala (Trivandrum, Kollam,

6 In the north, the positive response was highest in Kasargod (around 65 per cent)followed by Vadakara taluk (around 55 per cent) and the rest of the northern

coast (around 30- per cent).7 Empirical cases also support our contention. Mazzucato and David (2000) describehow in Burkina Faso the cattle-owning class (Gourmantche) selects trustworthy


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Alappuzha, and part of Eranakulam districts) is far lower than thatof their counterparts in northern Kerala. Still more significant is thenear-total repayment made by borrowers in Kasargod district.

3. More feuds in the south: It is observed that feuds are relativelymore common in the southern coastal villages than in the north(Dietrich and Nalini, ibid). There are several instances of immediateemotional outburst even on trifling matters. Other communal tensionsoccur, albeit sporadic, between Christian and Muslim fishermen in theSouth.

4. Failure of Thanguvallam units (Ring seine units): Alappuzha districtand the southern parts of Eranakulam district are well known as thethanguvallambelt of Kerala. Thanguvallum units are large fishing craftsused in the operation of ring seines. The capital investment required for

these units is quite high, varying between Rs 500,000 to Rs 1,000,000.As it is difficult to mobilize such large sums individually, the generalpattern of ownership in this belt turned out to be group ownership.The fishermen were so enthusiastic that hundreds of thanguvallamscame up in this belt in the 1980s. However, much to the chagrin ofthese fishermen, within a few years of operation, caused most of theseunits to become dysfunctional. (Interestingly, some of these units werepurchased by fishermen in the north and they continue to performrather satisfactorily.) Our study ofthanguvallams in Alappuzha districtrevealed that an important factor which led to their collapse was want

of trust and unity among the share-holders.

In all the four indices the southern coast lags behind the north. One reasonfor the under development of social capital may be historical. Whereascreation of social capital is often found to be the legacy of long traditionsof historical development (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995), the fishingcommunities in southern Kerala were historically under the grip of vertical(social and religious) structures that impeded its development.

4. Conclusion

Our analysis of the evolution of kadakkodi has brought to focus the roleof resource endowment, technology, cultural endowment, and the alreadyexisting institutional structures in determining the trajectory of institutionalevolution, whether it be the persistence of the kadakkodi system in Kasargod,its non-development on the southern coast, its disintegration in some of thenorthern villages or its restructuring in Vadakara taluk. Among the differenttypes ofkadakkodis, the temple-centric and nested forms were found to bemore resilient to forces of disintegration. It was also observed that able, fair-minded, and innovative leadership (which is a major asset in the culturalcapital of a society), and higher levels of social capital, facilitated thedevelopment of communitarian institutions, whereas those societies thatwere historically under the grip of vertical social structures lagged behind


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50 Antonyto Paul

increasing heterogeneities of various dimensions, especially technologicalexternalities, like increasing night trawling and distributional conflicts fromthe introduction of ring seines, kadakkodis failed to function efficiently. Also,

most of the kadakkodis were not successful in tackling the problems causedby the steep increase in the inflow of migrant fishermen from the southwho possessed diverse fishing skills. Kadakkodis cannot, therefore, be lookedupon as a panacea for all problems faced by the resource users. Wideningtechnological externalities may call for complementary formal institutions.The supply of such institutions would, however, depend on cost-effectivecollective action.

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