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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL

COMBATINTELLIGENCE

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY · FEBRUARY 1951

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WARNING

Authority for release of this document to aforeign government must be secured from theAssistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

When this document is released to a foreigngovernment, it is released subject to the follow-ing conditions: This information is furnished with.the understanding that it will not be released toanother nation without specific approval of theUnited States of America, Department of the Army;that it will not be used for other than militarypurposes; that individual or corporation rightsoriginating in the information whether patentedor not will be respected; and that the informationwill be afforded substantially the same degreeof security as afforded by the United States ofAmerica, Department of the Army.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUALFM 30-5

This manual supersedes FM 30-5, 1 February 1946

COMBAT

INTELLIGENCE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY · FEBRUARY 1951

United States Government Printing OfficeWashington: 1951

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON 25, D. C., 12 February 1951

- FM 30-5 is published for the information and guidanceof all concerned.

[AG 350.09 (21 Dec 50)]

BY ORDEE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

OFFIOIAL: J. LAWTON COLLINS

EDWARD F. WITSELL Chief of Staff,Major General, USA United States ArmyThe Adjutant General

DISTmRBUTION:

GSUSA (10); Adm Svc (10); Tech Svc (10); Arm &Svc Bd (2); AFF (40); OS Maj Comd (5) ; AA Comd(2); Base Comd (3); MDW (2) ; A (20) ; CHQ (10);D (10); B (5) ; R (5) ; SBn (3) ; Bn (2); C (1);FC (2); USMA (50) ; Sch (10) ; PMS&T (2); PE .(5),OSD (3) ; Dist (2).

For explanation of distribution formula, see SR310-90-1.

UNCLASSFiqED-. ..K ./

FOREWORD

. . What enables the good general to strike and con-quer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men,is foreknowledge."

SUN TZU, On the Art of War

This manual sets forth the intelligence functions,the operations involved in the collection and process-ing of information, and the production and use ofcombat intelligence by divisions and lower units incombat. It contains the basic military intelligencedoctrine at these echelons for intelligence personnelof tactical units, and is the primary reference for allcommanders at these echelons. It is the basic manualupon which branch intelligence manuals will bebased.

CONTENTS

PART ONE. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE Paragraphs Page

Chapter 1. Introduction ------------------- 1-9 1

2. Intelligence OrganizationSection I. Military Intelligence Service

Organization - .. 10-12 11II. Tactical units -------------- 13-18 16

PART TWO. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

Chapter 3. Production of Combat Intelligence - 19-23 23

4. Collection-Sources and AgenciesSection I. Introduction ----------------- 24-26 27

II. Sources of information ------- _ 27-29 28III. Information collecting agencies - 30-33 35

Chapter 5. Processing Information --.------ - 34-42 47

6. Use of IntelligenceSection I. Employment by G-2-------_-- 43-52 66

II. Dissemination -- ---- --- 53-60 94

Chapter 7. Direction of the Collection Effort__- 61-77 114

PART THREE. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Chapter 8. ReconnaissanceSection I. Ground reconnaissance and

counterreconnaissance----- 78-83 141II. Air reconnaissance ---- ----- 84-96 149

Chapter 9. Exploitation of SourcesSection I. Personnel, documents, and cap.

tured mat6riel ----------- _ 97-101 169II. Maps ----------------- 102-105 174

III. Air photos --------------- 106-110 182IV. Air photo interpretation ----- 111-113 190

V. Weather and terrain ------ 114-117 193VI. Enemy order of battle------- 118-122 198

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Chapter 10. Counterintelligence Paragraphs PageSection I. Introduction --------------- 123-130 205

II. Counterintelligence opera-tions ---------- --------- 131-136 215

III. Counterintelligence pro-cedures --------------- - 137-140 219

Chapter 11. Communication Intelligence andCommunication Security

Section I. Introduction --------------- 141-143 225II. Communication intelligence___ 144-148 229

III. Communication security ----- 149-153 232

Chapter 12. Training and Standing OperatingProcedure.

Section I. Training ------------------ 154-163 241II. Standing operating procedure- 164-166 250

Chapter 13., Planning.Section I. Intelligence planning methods_ 167-170 255

II. Planning for special opera-tions -------------------- 171-163 263

Appendix I. References ------------ ----------- 267II. Example of Intelligence Estimate-Division-- 269III. Example of Periodic Intelligence Report-

Division ---------------- ----------- 276IV. Guide to Determination of Indications ----- 282V. Example of Intelligence Annex-Division__- 298VI. Form for Tactical Study of the Weather and

Terrain -------- - --------- 301Index ---------------------------------------- 305

VI

This manual supersedes FM 30-5, 1 February 1946

PART ONE

MILITARY INTELLIGENCECHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE

This manual is published primarily for the useand guidance of all concerned with combat intelli-gence at the division, regimental, and battalionechelons.

2. SCOPE

a. For divisions and lower units this manual de-scribes the organization which produces intelligence;the production of intelligence from information; themeans and methods of obtaining information;counterintelligence organization and functions; com-munication intelligence and communication secu-rity; and intelligence training and planning.Sufficient references are made to activities at corpsand higher echelons to furnish minimum basicguidance.

b. Details of procedures and techniques of manysubjects and operations related to combat intelligenceare omitted from this manual when they are con-tained in other intelligence manuals and basic branchmanuals.

c. This manual contains samples of forms used

by the intelligence officer to aid him in the produc-tion of intelligence, and forms and examples of theintelligence estimates, reports, plans, and studies forwhich the intelligence officer is responsible.

3. INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COM-MANDER

The commander is responsible for all intelligenceactivities of his command. He is responsible forseeing that his command, within the limits of itscapabilities, gathers all pertinent information of theenemy, the weather, and the terrain, and transmitsthis information to all other units that require it.The commander is also responsible for the conversioninto intelligence of all information that is pertinentto his command, and for the dissemination of thisintelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent units.Furthermore, in connection with the security of hiscommand, the commander is responsible for appro-priate counterintelligence measures.

4. MEANING OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

The term "intelligence officer," as used in this man-ual, includes the assistant chief of staff, G-2, of unitsprovided with a general staff, and, where appropri-ate, the intelligence officer, or S-2, of lower units.

5. MILITARY INFORMATION

Military information includes all documents, facts,material, photographs, diagrams, maps, reports, orobservations of any kind which may serve to throwlight on a possible or actual enemy or theater of oper-ations. No information should be neglected. In-2

formation that seems unimportant at first glancemay, upon being compared with other information,assume primary importance. The value of infor-mation is increased when the circumstances concern-ing its origin, including the time when it was ob-tained, are known; in fact, failure of reporting unitsto include these circumstances will often make theinformation valueless to the recipient. Negative in-formation is often of great value, and sometimes ismore important than positive information. Nega-tive information may at times be all-important. In-formation of enemy inactivity in one direction, forexample, may lend great weight in analysis of otherpossible courses of enemy action.

6. INTELLIGENCE

a. Definition. Military intelligence is knowledge,acquired by the collection, evaluation, analysis, inte-gration, and interpretation of all available informa-tion concerning a possible or actual enemy or areasof operations, including weather and terrain. It in-cludes deductions concerning current and futureenemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probablecourses of action which can affect the accomplish-ment of our mission. It is used as a basis for alloperational plans and estimates. Military Intelli-gence also includes counterintelligence.

b. Strategic Intelligence. Strategic intelligencepertains to the capabilities, vulnerabilities, andprobable courses of action of foreign nations. It isproduced primarily for use of high level militarycommanders charged with the planning and execu-tion of national security measures in time of peace

3

and with the conduct of military operations in timeof war.

c. Comnbat Intelligence. Combat intelligence ismilitary intelligence required for use in a combatsituation, whether based upon information collectedlocally or provided by higher headquarters. Combatintelligence has two objectives-

(1) To reduce to a minimum all uncertaintiesregarding the enemy, weather, and terrain,and thus to assist the commander in makinga decision and the troops in executing theirmissions.

(2) To assist the commander in applying coun-terintelligence and security measures thatwill conceal from the enemy our intentionsand activities and will neutralize or destroythe effectiveness of enemy intelligenceactivities.

7. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Counterintelligence is that aspect of intelligencerelating to all security control measures, both activeand passive, designed to insure the safeguarding ofinformation, personnel, equipment, and installationsagainst the espionage, sabotage, or subversive activ-ities of foreign powers and disaffected or dissidentgroups or individuals which constitute a threat tothe national security. It is accomplished throughpassive means such as secrecy discipline and throughactive means such as seizure of enemy agents and sab-oteurs. It includes the detection of treason, sedition,and disaffection within the ranks and among thecivilian employees of the Army. It deals with the4

neutralization or destruction of the effectiveness ofactually or potentially hostile intelligence and sub-versive activities.

b. Counterintelligence is inseparable from intelli-gence. By its very nature, counterintelligence makesvaluable contributions to the over-all production ofintelligence. Surprise, an important principle ofwar, is not dependent alone on reliable intelligenceof the enemy and rapidity of movement; it may alsobe attained from the efficiency of a well organizedand soundly operated counterintelligence system andfrom the effectiveness of the counterintelligencemeasures employed.

8. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMBAT INTELLIGENCEAND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

a. Both combat intelligence and strategic intelli-gence are concerned with information of militarysignificance on foreign powers and with areas ofactual or possible operations. Basically, they usethe same techniques: available information on thesubject of interest is assembled, examined, com-pared with other information, and interpretedso as to arrive as closely as possible at the truth.Such distinction as exists is chiefly in terms of'scope,perspective, and level of use.

(1) Combat intelligence is produced largely inthe field in time of war. It is used mainlyby tactical commanders and their staffs. Itis concerned with a relatively local situa-tion; namely, the enemy forces opposing-acombat unit, and the weather and terrain

as they affect that unit. The productionof combat intelligence generally involvesrapid evaluation and interpretation of cur-rent information, and prompt disseminationof the intelligence produced.

(2) Strategic intelligence is produced contin-uously, both in peace and in war, usually bytheater and higher headquarters, or by agen-cies under their control. It is used mainlyby senior military commanders and theirstaffs in connection with strategic plans andoperations. It is not limited to .a local sit-uation. Rather, it is concerned with allfactors that contribute to the war potentialof nations. Unlike combat intelligence,.strategic intelligence is seldom producedrapidly. For the most part, it is the re-sult of an assembly of much detailed infor-mation. Its production requires the serv-ices of specialized personnel and takes muchtime.

b. Many of the subjects of interest to combat in-telligence and strategic intelligence are closely re-lated. In some instances, they. are identical. It isimportant that this be recognized at all echelons.

(1) Although strategic intelligence is used pri-marily at strategic levels, its influence is feltby all members of the armed forces. Thedetermination of national capabilities andvulnerabilities requires the collection andprocessing of a large amount of detailed in-formation. Much of the resultant intelli-

6

gence is very useful in localized combat situ-ations. Examples are maps and charts; de-scriptions and studies of beaches, ports,rivers, towns, and other critical terrain fea-tures; studies of transportation and com-munication systems; and data 6n soil traffic-ability, climate, and hydrography. All thisintelligence is initially produced for strate-gic purposes in peacetime. Most of thestrategic intelligence about foreign armedforces is readily translated into combat in-telligence. This is clearly seen in the ex-ample of detailed studies of the identities,strengths, and'command structures of for-eign armies, navies, and air forces (order ofbattle). Such studies are produced forstrategic purposes both in peace and war.They are immediately available, on the out-break of hostilities, to the field commanderwho must depend on strategi&C intelligencefor his initial material on the enemy and thearea of operations. Hence, in the produc-tion of strategic intelligence during peace,preparations must be made for its use byfield commanders.

(2) Similarly, much information collected bycombat intelligence agencies is of great in-terest at the strategic echelon. Some, likeorder of battle information, is converted intoboth combat intelligence and strategic in-telligence. Other information may havelittle use at the combat echelon, but will bevery significant for strategic intelligence

7

purposes. Examples are, information ob-tained from prisoners of war relative toenemy political and economic conditions;and captured materiel that may throw lighton the enemy's munitions industries. Com-manders and staffs of combat echelons willhabitually report such information, or itssources, to higher authority.

9. INTELLIGENCE SECURITY

a. General. Intelligence security is counterintelli-gence within the intelligence service. It is an in-dividual responsibility of all persons, military orcivilian, who now perform, or who have ever beenengaged upon, duties or activities of an intelligencenature. This responsibility does not cease withtransfer to other duties, retirement, or release toprivate pursuits.

b. Object. The object of intelligence security isthe preservation of absolute secrecy regarding thenature, type, extent, and success of our intelligenceservices and their activities.

c. Aspects. Intelligence security embraces fivemain aspects. These are-

(1) Sources. The development of sources ofinformation, sufficiently numerous and de-pendable to meet the exacting requirementsof intelligence, is a long, delicate, and costlyprocess. The disclosure of a source can beaccomplished in many startlingly easy ways.Neglect of intelligence security can quicklydeprive us of more sources of important, and

8

perhaps vital, intelligence than can the op-posing forces of potentially hostile andenemy intelligence services.

(2) Methods. Every intelligence service pos-sesses certain methods or techniques whichit prizes more highly than others becausethese particular methods have consistentlypaid greater dividends than have the others.If, however, the degree of intelligence secu-rity surrounding the less productive methodswere lowered it is possible that other na-tional intelligence services would be quickto assume that such methods were not con-sidered valuable. They would immediatelyintensify their search for, and counter-measures against, the first-class techniques.Furthermore, an intelligence service cannever be certain that any currently nonpro-ductive method may not suddenly become avaluable source of information. Ob-viously, even the slightest relaxation of in-telligence security must never be condoned.

(3) Information. The quantity, type, degreeof accuracy, and urgency of informationsought or already obtained are sure indica-tions of current interest and possible futureintentions. They also reveal the extent ofintelligence coverage. Any disclosure ofthese or of a lack of certain types of infor-mation would give a most valuable insightinto the objectives, strength, weakness, orfailure of our intelligence operations.

(4) Results. The results of intelligence opera-

9

tions are elements of the foundation uponwhich decisions are based. Any alert andefficient intelligence service, once aware ofthe results of our intelligence activities,could formulate a reasonable estimate as tothe direction in which our decisions mightlead. In addition, such valuable informa-tion would serve to alert an opposing intelli-

.gence service to the weaknesses in their coun-terintelligence system. Corrective measureswould then serve to deprive us of furtherexploitation in that field.

(5) Personnel. Because it affects directly allother aspects, the subject of personnel isdoubtless the most important element in thefield of intelligence security. Individualsentrusted with intelligence duties must bechosen for such assignments not only becauseof the possession of requisite professionalabilities but also because they are consideredto be of unimpeachable loyalty, discretion,and integrity. Those responsible for select-ing persons for intelligence duties mustmake a point never to approve any individ-ual, however brilliant or efficient, againstwhom the slightest doubt exists regardinghis loyalty, discretion, or integrity.

10

CHAPTER 2

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

Section i. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICEORGANIZATION

10. GENERAL

Current intelligence organization provides cellularteams or detachments of intelligence specialists forattachment to combat units, and minimum numbersof organic intelligence specialists assigned to com-bat units. The Military Intelligence Service (MIS)Organization (T/O & E 30-600) furnishes thetheater of operations specialists as required. Thespecialists now organic to the intelligence sections ofdivisions are air photo interpreters and order ofbattle personnel. These specialists can be efficientlyand economically employed throughout a campaignor war regardless of the mission, the situation, or thelanguage spoken by friendly civilians or allied orenemy military personnel. All other intelligencespecialists required by a division G-2 section arefurnished by the Military Intelligence Service Or-ganization, as normally attached detachments or assupplementary detachments, except for Counter In-telligence Corps personnel who are attached by the-ater (T/O & E 30-500). The Military IntelligenceService Organization also includes augmentationteams for those specialists who are now organic tothe division.

926264°--51 2

11. COMPOSITION, BASIS OF ALLOCATION, ANDFUNCTIONS

a. A military intelligence service organizationmay be a group, battalion, company, or platoon, con-sisting of appropriate headquarters and administra-tive teams and any combination of the many intel-ligence specialist teams. For composition and basisof allocation of MIS teams refer to T/O & E 30-600.

b. The primary functions of the intelligence spe-cialist teams that comprise a military intelligenceservice organization are shown in figure 1. Theprimary functions of the specialists who are organicwithin the type G-2 section of division (fig. 2) areidentical with those of the military intelligence serv-ice teams bearing the same title.

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a. It furnishes cellular teams of intelligence spe-cialists for normal attachment to intelligence sec-tions of divisions and higher tactical headquartersor to supplement, during operations, intelligencespecialists already assigned or attached to these in-telligence sections.

b. It furnishes cellular teams of headquarters andadministrative personnel whenever the number of at-tached specialists is 40 or more individuals.

c. It provides a parent organization for all mili-tary intelligence service teams, administering thoseteams that are awaiting attachment, as well as thosewhich have already been attached to G-2 sections.Thus a direct chain of headquarters is provided toadminister all teams. and individuals wherever theymay be operating. This insures action being takenin such matters as promotions, individual transfers,pay, records, equipment, and other matters.

Section II. TACTICAL UNITS

13. DIVISION

a. The duties of the division intelligence officer(G-2) are outlined in FM 101-5.

b. A type organization of the intelligence (G-2)section of a division is shown in figure 2. The sec-tion contains organic order of battle specialists andair photo interpreters. Interrogators, normally at-tached during combat, may become organic if specifi-cally authorized by Department of the Army. Whenrequired, military intelligence specialist teams maybe provided as attachments.

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14. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.

a. The branch may be augmented by the attach-ment of additional military intelligence service spe-cialist detachments from the corps or army organiza-tion. The exact strength of the combat intelligencebranch will vary with these attachments and withthe number of stenographers and draftsmen assignedto the G-2 section from the organic pool allotted tothe general staff sections in the division tables oforganization. The combat intelligence branch is di-vided into two duty teams to permit 24-hour opera-.tion. These duty teams are supervised by the offi-cers assigned to the branch. The organic and-attached specialists operating with the combat intel-ligence branch may be assigned to either duty teamas the need arises.

b. Functions of the combat intelligence branchare shown in figure 3.

15. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

a. The counterintelligence branch assists the G-2in formulating and supervising counterintelligencemeasures or activities, which include counterespio-nage, countersabotage, and countersubversive opera-tions within the division and in the division area.Specific functions are shown in figure 3.

b. There are no organic commissioned or enlistedcounterintelligence personnel in the G-2 section ofdivisions; however, the counterintelligence branchblock in figure 2 is shown by a solid line, becausenormally it will always be a functional part of the

18

division G-2 section. The branch is headed by anorganic officer of the G-2 section, assigned by G-2.However, if none is available, the commander of thenormally attached Counter Intelligence Corps de-tachment may act as the Counter Intelligence BranchChief as well.

16. ALLOCATION OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERV-ICE UNITS

Each division will normally receive the attach-ments shown in figure 2, and additional teams neededto supplement the organic specialists. If the ag-gregate of intelligence specialist personnel attachedto a division headquarters reaches 40 or more in-dividuals, a platoon headquarters detachment (sepa-rate) may be attached. Military intelligence serviceadministrative teams are allocated on the basis shownin T/O & E 30-600.

17. ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

Army Security Agency (ASA) support at divisionis furnished by a communication reconnaissance liai-son detachment which is attached from the Com-munication Reconnaissance Battalion at Corps (T/O& E 32-500). This detachment will assist G-2 incryptologic matters, arrange for direct operationalassistance by higher ASA organizations in mattersof communication security and communication in-telligence, and perform technical intelligence func-tions in relation to captured cryptologic material(Ch. 11).

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18. UNITS BELOW DIVISION

a. The intelligence officer (S-2) of regiments, bat-talions, and commensurate units keeps his com-mander informed of the enemy situation. IHedetermines the enemy capabilities, their relativeprobability of adoption, and their effect upon theaccomplishment of the mission of the unit. He col-lects and disseminates information and intelligenceconcerning the enemy, weather, and terrain. Heassists his commander in the formulation and super-vision of counterintelligence measures.

b. Generally, the detailed duties of a unit S-2 aresimilar to the duties discussed in this. manual andthose outlined in FM 101-5 for the G-2 of divisionand higher units. The unit S-2 is assisted in theperformance of duties by organic intelligence per-sonnel, troops, and in some instances intelligencespecialists attached from higher headquarters. Forthe specific intelligence organization within varioustype units, refer to appropriate branch field manualsand tables of organization and equipment.

i2

PART TWO

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONSCHAPTER 3

PRODUCTION OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

19. STEPS

a. The production of combat intelligence may bedivided into four steps-

(1) Collection of information.(2) Processing of the collected information to

produce intelligence.(3) Use of the resulting intelligence.(4) Direction of the collection effort.

b. These steps are concurrent. At the same timethat new information is being collected, other infor-mation is being processed, and intelligence is beingused. The entire operation must be constantlydirected.

c. The four steps are the lowest common denom-inator of the operational cycle of intelligence. Eachis indispensable. If one step fails, the entire in-telligence process will fail.

20. COLLECTION

For purposes of logical presentation only, thismanual will consider the collection of informationas the first of the four steps in the operational cycle.

23

Collection is the systematic exploitation of sourcesof information by collecting agencies and the deliv-ery of the information thus obtained to the properintelligence section. Provision is made for the nec-'essary collecting agencies in tables of organizationand equipment and by the attachment of intelligencespecialists. (Collection sources and agencies arediscussed in detail in chapter 4.)

21. PROCESSING

After the information has been collected and de-livered, it must be processed into intelligence. In-formation is not intelligence. Information is con-verted into intelligence by recording, evaluation, andinterpretation. Recording is subordinate to, andmust not hamper, evaluation and interpretation. Re-cording is the least critical component of processing.Evaluation and interpretation are the decisive ac-tions that transform information into combat in-telligence. The intelligence officer is assisted in eval-uation and interpretation by the organic intelligencesection, by attached specialist teams, and by othermembers of the staff. (Processing is discussed indetail in chapter 5.)

22. USE

a. The chief use of combat intelligence is its im-mediate integration by the commander into his con-tinuing estimate of the situation. This requires theintelligence officer to concentrate on the intelligenceestimate so that he can give the commander an ap-praisal of the enemy situation at any moment. The

24

only way he can be assured of doing this is by usingevery significant item of newly produced intelligenceto keep his estimate current. The intelligence esti-mate must always be directed toward the missionof the unit so that the commander can analyze theeffect of this intelligence on his own possible coursesof action and thus reach a decision.

b. If intelligence is to be used effectively, it mustbe disseminated. The object of dissemination is toinsure that intelligence reaches the individuals orunits concerned in time to serve their purposes.Urgent information and intelligence should be trans-mitted promptly to the commander and other staffsections and to lower, higher, and adjacent head-quarters. Intelligence reports, conferences, andmessages are the general headings under which themany methods of dissemination' may be grouped.(Use of combat intelligence is discussed in detail inchapter 6.)

23. DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

a. After presentation of the intelligence estimateto the commander, the fourth step of combat intelli-gence production (direction of the collection effort)becomes operative. The intelligence estimate in-cludes all pertinent intelligence currently available.The commander's estimate of the situation will indi-cate additional information and intelligence requiredto answer fully all specific questions regarding theenemy, the weather, and the terrain. These vitalquestions of the commander are known as the essen-tial elements of information (EEI). EEI resultfrom a lack of explicit intelligence. They announce

25

to the command and its agencies the items of infor-mation and intelligence that are necessary to a com-plete understanding of the situation. The intelli-gence officer, in coordination with other staff sec-tions, assists the commander in determining EEI.

b. The collection plan is the intelligence officer'sprogram for securing the answers to the EEI. Inthe plan, the EEI are analytically broken down anda scheme of collection is formulated. The actualorders and requests to the selected collecting agenciesare the end product of the collection plan. Theseintelligence directives and requests indicate the in-formation desired and the time and place of report-ing it.

e. The receipt of specific directives and requestsby the collecting agencies completes the operationalcycle of combat intelligence. The entire operationaleffort is dominated by the mission. When a newmission is announced, the intelligence officer mustalways be prepared to give an intelligence estimate.EEI will almost invariably result, imparting newimpetus to the continuing operational cycle by re-direction of the collection effort. (Direction of thecollection effort is discussed in detail in chapter 7.)

26'

CHAPTER 4

COLLECTION-SOURCES AND AGENCIES

Section I. INTRODUCTION

24. SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTION

The commander must be assured of continuing re-liable information as to the disposition, strength,composition, and movement of hostile forces, as wellas information on weather and terrain. He mustuse every means at his disposal to gain informationof the enemy forces on his front, and of enemy forceson other fronts and in other areas, which may affectthe preparation and execution of his plans. A fail-ure to exploit every source of information may denyimportant information of hostile dispositions, move-ments, and operations, and consequent decisiveexploitation of enemy weaknesses. Because hisprimary function is to keep the commander andothers informed of the enemy situation and capabili-ties, and the area of operations, the intelligence offi-cer is faced with the continuing problem of employ-ing efficiently all available collecting agencies togather this necessary information.

25. DIFFICULTIES IN COLLECTION

The difficulties involved in obtaining adequateinformation and in arriving at reliable conclusionsbased thereon are many. These difficulties are due

926264 °-51 3 27

principally to the fact that the interests of the enemydemand that he make every possible effort to foilattempts made to gain information. He will con-ceal his movements by every means possible. Todo this he will make use of ground, cover, darkness,and weather conditions; and he will supplementnatural cover with camouflage. He will resort toany tactical measures that offer a reasonable chanceof obtaining secrecy or surprise. He will enforceboth a strict censorship and communication securitymeasures to prevent leaks of information. He maydistribute false information and institute othermeasures to deceive our collecting agencies. He willsometimes adopt a course of action that may appearillogical. The opposition of the enemy's interest toour own, as well as the independence of his will,makes him more or less an unknown factor in everysituation. To a lesser degree, the weather and theterrain also are unknown factors.

26. SOURCES AND AGENCIES

Sources of information differ from collectingagencies in that agencies are the means employed toobtain enemy information, whereas the source is theactual origin from which the desired informationis obtained. Agencies are under our guidance andcontrol; sources as a rule are not.

Section II. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

27. GENERAL

a. Sources of information are the person, thing,or action from which information of the enemy,

28

weather, or terrain is derived. Sources are extensiveand varied. At the outset of operations the intelli-gence officer will not be devoid of information fromwhich to produce intelligence for initial estimatessince many sources of information will be availableto him. These include order of battle books, enemyweapons and equipment handbooks, terrain studies,and other reference materials prepared by or for theAssistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, GeneralStaff, United States Army, and similar agencies.Other sources must be uncovered or developed by theintelligence officer and his collecting agencies asoperations progress. Considerable effort and inge-nuity are required if full advantage is to be takenof all possible sources.

b. Through his collecting agencies and fromsources of information the intelligence officer obtainsinformation in three categories-the enemy, theweather, and the terrain. Some of the types of in-formation collected are-

(1) Unit identifications.(2) Boundaries and other details of the enemy's

dispositions.(3) Movement of enemy troops.(4) Location of enemy observation posts and

command posts.(5) Emplacements of artillery, and automatic

weapons.(6) Presence of armor.(7) Location of supply points.(8) Location of defensive works and obstacles.(9) Daily routine of the enemy.(10) Routes most frequently used by the enemy.

29

(11) The effect of weather on terrain and visi-bility, for example, trafficability, fog or haze.

(12) Light data (for an example, see par. 2,app. II).

(13) Status of roads, bridges, and rivers.(14) Favorable observation points of the

terrain.(15) Soil trafficability.(16) Areas which afford concealment or cover.

c. Information can be evaluated only if there isknowledge of the degree of accuracy and reliabilityof the source, the circumstances under which theinformation was obtained, and the relationship ofthe source and the collecting agency. (Evaluationis discussed in chapter 5.)

28. DETERMINATION OF SOURCES

In determining which sources of information toexploit, the following questions must be considered:

a. What type-of information is required?b. Of the available sources, which are the most

reliable ?c. Will the appropriate agencies be able to exploit

the sources in time?

29. DESCRIPTION OF SOURCES(ch. 9)

a. Enemy Military Personnel (F.M 30-15).

(1) One of the best sources of informationavailable to ground units is enemy militarypersonnel, including prisoners of war,wounded, dead, and deserters. From pris-

30

oners of war, information is obtained onenemy identifications, troop dispositions,combat efficiency and training, contem-plated movements, arms, equipment, morale,roads, fortifications, and effects of our psy-chological warfare. In order to obtainmaximum information, care must be takento handle prisons of -war skillfully from thetime of their capture throughout all inter-rogations.

(2) Enemy deserters are handled as prisonersof war, but are segregated from them.However, since the enemy may "plant"false deserters, reports of examination ofdeserters should bear a notation at the headof the report: "Information from deserter."

(3) Enemy wounded and dead are searched fordocuments and marks of identification andprovide an -excellent source for order of bat-tle and other information.

(4) Prisoner of war interrogators operate underthe supervision of G-2 to obtain informa-tion from enemy military personnel. TheG-2 will furnish his interrogators with EEIand other guidance concerning the specificinformation desired. Interrogators basetheir interrogation plan on current EEI.

b. Enemy Documents (FM 30-15). When exam-ined systematically by competent personnel, captureddocuments reveal information on the enemy's orderof battle, plans, organization, armament, morale, tac-tical methods, and on his codes, ciphers, and othercryptomaterial. Documents are' cataloged, exam-

31

ined, and handled so as to disclose maximum infor-mation of immediate tactical value. This procedureis followed by a more detailed study for strategicimplications. Information from documents is moreauthentic and reliable than that from enemy militarypersonnel because it is less biased and less representa-tive of personnel opinion than is information ob-tained from prisoners of war.

c. Enemy Materiel (FM 30-15). Information oftechnical, tactical, and strategic value can be obtainedfrom items of equipment captured from the enemyor overrun by our own troops. When properly proc-essed, it furnishes all echelons with intelligence forboth immediate and future use. Reports on the en-emy use of materiel against our forces provide tech-nically trained specialists information with which todetermine the characteristics or functions of mat6-riel. Such reports thereby enable the commander'stechnical staff to advise him on countermeasures ormethods of exploiting new ideas for our own benefit.

d. Enemy Signal Communication (ch. 11 and par.17). Intercepted enemy signal communications area source of information on enemy forces, plans, move-ments, operations, and locations of units and head-quarters. The division intelligence officer has accessto this source of information from higher head-quarters and from the communication reconnaissanceliaison detachment attached to the division.

e. Enemy Activity, Weather and Terrain. Thesesources are usually exploited as a result of direct ob-servation by such agencies as observers, reconnais-sance patrols, listdeing posts, and gas sentries.

32

f. Air Photos. Air photos provide information onthe terrain, the enemy's use of the terrain and enemyactivity. In conjunction with maps, air photos pro-vide reliable and recent information on the terrain,and, in addition, information as to enemy fortifica-ti6ns, installations, lines of communication, locationof his forces, gun positions, and similar activities.Trained air photo interpreters study and make de-tailed analyses of the air photos for the intelligenceofficer.

g. Maps and Terrain Models.

(1) Maps are the basic source of informationused by the intelligence officer in makingtactical terrain studies and preparing ter-rain estimates. The intelligence officer pre-pares and maintains defense and situationmaps. Defense maps are maps overprintedwith detailed information on enemy fixeddefensive installations. Situation mapsshow the current disposition of enemyforces.

(2) A terrain model is a three dimensionalgraphic representation of an area, showingthe conformation of the ground, modeledto scale and usually colored to emphasize thevarious physical features. The verticalscale is usually exaggerated without severedistortion to convey the aspect of relief,.Terrain models with exaggerated scales maybe used for special studies and in oral pres-entation of special estimates.

33

h. Weather Forecasts and Studies.(1) A weather forecast is a prediction of

weather conditions for the future. Theforecast describes the most probable, antici-pated meteorological conditions that are ex-pected to prevail for a given location for adefinite period of future time.

(2) There are three classes of weather fore-casts-long range, a prediction for a periodlonger than 48 hours; medium range, a pre-diction for a period between 12 and 48hours; and short range, a prediction for aperiod of approximately 12 hours.

(3) Climatological studies and special weatherforecasts for specific needs may be obtainedupon request to appropriate agencies.

(4) Weather service is furnished to the Armyby the Air Weather Service, whose detach-ments are available at corps and higherheadquarters. Divisions and lower unitsreceive weather forecasts through intelli-gence channels.

i. Miscellaneous.(1) Refugees, civilians, escapers, and evaders

are possible sources of information on com-munication centers, supply dumps, troopconcentrations, location of defenses, weap-ons emplacements, command post signs andsymbols, artillery positions, and othermatters. Information from these sourceswill vary in importance to the commander,depending on the time element, the localeand the type of operation.

34

(2) Enemy press and radio broadcasts aresources of information on enemy organiza-tion, assignment of important military andpolitical matters, status of the nationaleconomy, psychological reactions of theenemy population, and casualty data. Suchof this information as is of interest to thedivision and lower units can be securedthrough the attached Communication Re-connaissance Liaison Detachment.

(3) Other sources of information include stra-tegic and tactical terrain studies preparedby various agencies, all intelligence studiesof other echelons or units, and referencematerials prepared by or for the Office ofthe Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelli-gence, General Staff, United States Army,and similar agencies.

Section III. INFORMATION COLLECTING AGENCIES

30. GENERAL

a. A collecting agency is any person, unit, or in-strumentality that acquires information by research,observation, or interrogation of a source, and throughwhich information may be obtained. At all echelonsof field command from the battalion upwards, theintelligence officer is aided in the performance ofhis duties by specialized collecting agencies. In abroad sense, however, all troops are in a position tocollect information. Intelligence is not solely theaffair of a few specialists.

35

b. Commanders depend on their intelligence offi-cers to exploit the means at their disposal to gaininformation of the enemy. Intelligence officerstherefore must effectively employ all available in-telligence agencies.

G. Figure 4 shows the intelligence agencies organic,attached, or available to an infantry division. Otherdivisions are similar, with slight modifications toconform with differences in organization.

31. TYPES OF COLLECTING AGENCIES

Collecting agencies are of three types-intelligencepersonnel, troops, and special information services.

a. Intelligence Personnel. This type includesthe intelligence section and attached personnel withexclusive intelligence duties. Some of this person--nel-observers, interrogators, translators, and inter-preters-collect information.

b. Troops. The term "troops" refers to the or-ganic and supporting units of divisions and lowerunits which collect information, for the most part,by actual contact with the enemy. This type com-prises ground reconnaissance units, and infantry, ar-tillery, engineer, and tank units. All of these unitsare capable of collecting information from the battlearea. Normally, this is accomplished by patrolling;by capturing prisoners; by securing enemy docu-ments, equipment, and materiel; and by ground andaerial observation.

o. Special Information Services. Special infor-mation services are those agencies that are, in gen-eral, technical or highly specialized. With the ex-ception of the Army Security Agency, they are

36

operated by the branches, usually in the interest ofthe branch concerned. They may be attached, or-ganic, or available at higher echelons. Usually, spe-cial information services do not depend upon actualcontact with the enemy to gain information. Close

r--

I Ad joc r nt -- -- -- -- Ad

L….S2J -S_ I. coLn I Tasch Svc I

I Of I lintel Det

Fig . In e, etryn() Risont

SiRisCO D T Ron j I 3ntalond bCewnltheiea

3 Countel I g Ud n | 3 Inmtn snont, Rs do 5-2

iAA AW i Sieli ; nl pBn5-2S- Rgpt | S-2

ReconSLC LEGEND

lice, quartermaster ordnance, signal, medicaOrl, andir . n c aIncel inat ds oilObln

chemical units; shelling report personnel; cooperat-

3737

ing air forces; and technical service intelligencedetachments.

32. TYPES OF TROOPS

a. Reconnaissance Units (par. 81). Reconnais-sance units normally found within ground combatelements include an intelligence and reconnaissanceplatoon in each infantry regiment; a reconnaissanceplatoon in each tank and armored infantry battalion,a reconnaissance company in each infantry and air-borne division, a reconnaissance battalion in eacharmored division, an armored cavalry regiment(light) in each corps, and in some instances anarmored cavalry regiment (light) in each army.Reconnaissance units are organized, equipped, andtrained to perform mounted or dismounted missionsemploying infiltration tactics, fire, and movement.They possess excellent radio communication facili-ties, great mobility on roads, good cross-country mo-bility, great fire power, and trained reconnaissancepersonnel. However, their continuous operation isdependent upon favorable road conditions, favorableweather, and a constant fuel supply. Mechanizedreconnaissance patrols do not operate quietly orwith maximum effectiveness at night. Reconnais-sance units are capable of performing the followingtypes of missions:

(1) Searching within assigned zones or areas oralong designated routes.

(2) Covering an exposed flank or gap betweerunits.

(3) Gaining contact in meeting engagements.

38

(4) Patrolling dismounted.(5) Manning observation posts.

b. Infantry Units.(1) Because of the infantry combat role of clos-

ing with the enemy, every infantry unit hasopportunities to collect information by var-ious means. Infantry fights for informa-tion or uses other means, such as scouting,patrolling, and observing from the groundand air; interrogating prisoners of war,civilians, and repatriates; and examiningcaptured documents and mat6riel. Withregard to the collection of information, aninfantry unit has the following advantages:

(a) It maintains physical contact with theenemy.

(b) It operates under all weather conditions.(c) It obtains detailed information of the

enemy by fighting, observing, and listen-ing.

(d) It operates efficiently at night.

(2) The infantry's principal limitation is itsrestricted mobility because of foot move-ment. It cannot obtain as broad a pictureof the enemy situation as can mounted re-connaissance units, armor, and air units.Suitable intelligence missions for an in-fantry unit are those that can be performedconcurrently with its combat mission, suchas determining the local enemy situation (toinclude location, strength, dispositions,identifications, attitudes, combat effective-ness, and local reserves) and the character-

39

istics of the area of operation to the im-mediate front.

(e) Counterfire Units. Counterfire platoons, in-fantry regiments, and counterfire squads, armoredinfantry battalions, locate enemy machine guns andmortars by sound-ranging methods. These methodspermit locating targets that cannot be detected visu-ally by reason of being masked by enemy defensivepositions, ground forms, vegetation, darkness, smoke,haze, or fog.

d. Tank Elements of Armored Units.

(1) Tank elements of armored units seldomoperate dismounted and, therefore, arenormally limited to observation from theirtanks or vehicles in gathering information.Tank elements have the following advan-tages for collecting information:

(a) They travel at moderate speeds on roadsand have cross-country mobility.

(b) Their armor provides considerable pro-tection against fire.

(c) They have an excellent system of radiocommunication.

(d) They are capable of rapid penetrationof enemy areas.

(2) Tank elements have the following limita-tions:

(a) Their operations are limited by mine-fields and other obstacles.

(b) Their operations are limited by unfavor-able weather, certain types of. terrain,poor visibility, and darkness.

40

(c) Continuous operation is dependent uponconstant resupply of fuel, spare parts,and ammunition.

(3) Collecting missions appropriate to tankelements are essentially similar to infantrycollecting missions, although wider anddeeper coverage can be expected in manycases. Dismounted patrolling may be con-ducted in stabilized situations when de-tailed information of the enemy or enemy-held terrain is desired.

e. Field Artillery Units. Field artillery is anorganic component of all divisions. Artillery unitshave contact with the enemy in a visual sense; theymaintain constant observation of the enemy and ofenemy-held terrain. In carrying out its primaryrole of supporting the infantry by fire, the artillerylocates and destroys enemy targets. The primaryduty of the artillery intelligence system is to locateenemy targets and to keep accurate information onthe position of front lines. Artillery intelligenceofficers obtain these data from forward observers,liaison officers with front-line infantry units, airobservers in light aircraft organic to division artil-lery, countermortar radar sections of direct supportbattalions, survey and reconnaissance elements, shell-ing reports and shell fragment analysis, and groundobservation posts. The artillery wire and radiocommunication system permits rapid signal com-munication. Unlike the infantry, however, artillerydoes not have the ability to obtain enemy identifica-tions and other detailed information from physicalcontact with the enemy. Among the types of in-

41

formation which intUlligence officers may expect toreceive from the artillery are the location of enemyartillery, mortars, machine guns, antitank guns, anti-aircraft artillery, troop concentrations and move-ments, strong points, assembly areas, observationposts, command posts, and terrain information.

f. Antiaircraft Units. Antiaircraft units providethe intelligence officer with such information ofenemy aerial activity as the number, type, and ac-tivity of enemy aircraft; friendly targets attacked;and number of enemy planes destroyed or damaged.All antiaircraft units are in the communication netof the antiaircraft artillery intelligence service(AAAIS), which operates an aircraft warning serv-ice throughout the army area. The subordinateantiaircraft intelligence officer can relay these at-tack warnings to the intelligence officer.

g. Countermortar Radar Sections, Division Artil-lery. The primary mission of these sections is tolocate enemy mortars so that-counterfire may neutral-ize or destroy them. A secondary mission is todetect enemy movements. Countermortar radar sec-tions depend on radar to locate enemy mortars.There are several factors that limit the operatingefficiency of a radar set, among which are adverseweather conditions (especially heavy rain), physicalobstructions, and enemy countermeasures.

h. Engineer Units. Each division has an assignedengineer combat battalion and may obtain supportfrom engineer units at higher echelons. Engineersengage primarily in duties requiring technical skilland special equipment. In the course of such duties,they obtain information on the transportation routes,

42

soil trafficability, topography and resources of thearea of operations, and on enemy fortifications andinstallations. Engineer units furnish informationand intelligence on the tactical effect of new engineermat6riel in the hands of the enemy (or a novel useof some already known enemy equipment), and onaspects of terrain from an engineer point of- view,particularly stream forecasts and hydrographic,trafficability, and terrain studies. They preparetechnical terrain studies used in the preparation ofterrain estimates. Special engineer units prepareterrain models and topographic maps and mapsupplements.

33. DESCRIPTION OF SPECIAL INFORMATION SERV-ICES

a. T'he Arnmy Security Agency. Communicationintelligence, and communication security support atdivision is provided by communication reconnais-sance units either attached to the division or availableat higher headquarters (par. 17 and ch. 11).

b. Military Police Units. Military police units,by patrolling rear areas, controlling refugees andthe civilian population, and handling prisoners ofwar, frequently obtain information of both intelli-gence and counterintelligence value.

c. Ordnance and Quartermaster Units. Ordnanceand quartermaster units furnish intelligence and in-formation regarding the characteristics, capabilities,and limitations of the enemy's ordnance and quarter-master materiel. The information collected by divi-sion ordnance and quartermaster units will probably

926264°-51 4

be hasty and incomplete. Detailed intelligence onenemy mat6riel will come from studies made bytechnical service intelligence detachments at higherechelons.

d. Signal Units. Signal units assist the intelli-gence officer by providing information and intelli-gence on enemy signal equipment. Photographersof signal units may be used for intelligence purposes.

e. Medical Units. Medical units furnish infor-mation and intelligence on medical and public healthaspects of the enemy and of the area of operations.They may also obtain information and documentsfrom wounded personnel, enemy as well as friendly.

f. Chemical Units. Chemical units furnish in-formation of enemy chemical, radiological and bio-logical activity to include the kind of agent used;location, size, and duration of concentration or con-tamination; effect of agents; chemical tactics; thepresence of gas munitions or radiological or biologi-cal agents in captured enemy munitions dumps andother installations; and the appearance of any newor unusual enemy chemical equipment. They alsoassist in gas alerts.

g. Shelling Report Personnel.

(1) Shelling report and crater analysis person-nel determine the activity, location, caliberand method of employment of enemyartillery. Although shelling report teamsare not provided in tables of organizationand equipment, each artillery battalion andartillery headquarters usually maintains oneor more of them. Shelling report teamsand all other personnel of units have a con-

44

tinuing duty to submit reports of shellingin their area to their supporting artillery,no matter how meager their informationmay seem.

(2) By analysis of shelling reports the artilleryintelligence officer collects information onthe disposition and activities of enemyartillery. He provides the division intelli-gence officer with such information. Astudy of the movement and grouping of theenemy artillery, of the areas which theenemy artillery has shelled, and of theenemy artillery activity, is of particularvalue in arriving at an estimate of enemycapabilities and at the relative probabilityof adoption of a particular course of action.

h. Tactical Air Force (ch. 8). A tactical air forcenormally operates with the army. Its information-collecting facilities are available to intelligence offi-cers of divisions and lower echelons through intelli-gence channels. It can reach far behind the enemyfront lines and by either photo or visual reconnais-sance missions can obtain information otherwise notavailable. Air photo interpretation furnishes in-formation regarding the enemy and the terrain.Visual reconnaissance missions provide informationprimarily on terrain and on transient targets.

i. Technical Service Intelligence Detachments(TSID).

(1) These detachments are composed of repre-sentatives of the various technical servicesand furnish information concerning varioustypes of enemy equipment. Detachments

45

may be attached to the appropriate specialstaff sections of corps and armies. Ingeneral, they are not attached to divisionsbecause of the small area under division con-trol. The division intelligence officer, how-ever, will receive their reports through therespective technical services, and intelli-gence produced as a result of their activitythrough intelligence channels.

(2) There is a difference between the work oftechnical service intelligence detachmentsand the information which. all technicalservice personnel can offer. For example,an ordnfance maintenance officer in a com-bat area may observe an abandoned enemytank and give the local S-2 or G-2 informa-tion which will lead to the identification ofa new enemy unit in the area. The sametank, when inspected by the ordnance tech-nical service intelligence detachment, maythen provide the theater intelligence officerwith detailed data as to the characteristicsof that particular tank model.

46

CHAPTER 5

PROCESSING INFORMATION

34. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROCESSING

a. Processing is the means by which informationis transformed into intelligence. Processing in-cludes recording, evaluation, and interpretation.After information has been collected, the intelli-gence officer will sort, group, and record it by subjectsin order to facilitate comparison and study; he willevaluate it in order to determine its pertinence,credibility, and accuracy; and he will interpret itto determine its significance. Only then does theprocessed information become intelligence.

b. Proper recording, evaluation, and interpreta-tion of information produces intelligence that isconcise, free from irrelevant matter, and ready forimmediate use. Such intelligence will convey notonly facts but also the significance of those facts, to-gether with all deductions drawn from their studyin the light of other intelligence already at hand.

c. The time at which information is recorded de-pends upon its urgency; and the extent to which itis evaluated and interpreted depends upon the re-liability of its source and the agency reporting it.For example, a flash warning of an air attack froma subordinate unit commander would be dissemi-nated immediately because of its urgency and wouldrequire no evaluation or interpretation because of the

47

reliability of the reporting agency. Recordingwould be the final step. On the other hand, infor-mation obtained from an enemy deserter is recordedwithout delay and would be carefully evaluated andinterpreted prior to its dissemination because of thedoubtful reliability of its source. The more urgentthe information, the more rapid is its processing.Even if the procedure is hasty, the reliability, mean-ing, and significance of the information is weighedas carefully as the urgency of the situation permits.

d. The intelligence officer is assisted in the processof recording, evaluation, and interpretation by theintelligence personnel organic to his unit, by attachedintelligence specialist teams, and by other membersof the unit staff.

35. RECORDING

a. Recording arranges information in a systematicmanner to facilitate its being processed into intelli-gence. Incoming information is examined at onceby the intelligence officer on duty for items of immedi-ate tactical importance before any recording is done.On these items he takes necessary action promptly(par. 22b), after which the information is systemati-cally arranged, sorted, grouped, and listed by sub-jects, so that items of the same kind may be kept to-gether for convenience of comparison, study, andreporting. From the standpoint of combat intelli-gence, there are four general aids by means of whichthe mechanics of recording are accomplished-

(1) Intelligence (or G-2) journal (par. 36).(2) Enemy situation map- (par. 37).

48

(3) G-2 work sheet (par. 38).(4) Intelligence files (par. 39).

b. The aids listed in a above are necessary in thepreparation of intelligence reports and serve as con-venient means of reference for the commander andfor members of his staff. However, the intelligenceofficer of every unit should adapt his procedures tothe needs of his uVit. Simplification of procedureswill be especially necessary at the battalion and regi-mental echelons. An efficient intelligence officer willnot allow himself to be engulfed in a mass of paperwork. In all situations the maintenance of recordsis subordinate to the mission of assembling and inter-preting information and producing and using intelli-gence. Action comes first; records are of secondaryimportance.

36. INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL

a. The intelligence journal (or G-2 journal) isthe daybook of the division intelligence section. Theintelligence staff of battalions and regiments recordtheir activities in the unit daily journal, maintainedby the executive. The journal contains briefs ofimportant written and oral messages received andsent, as well as notations of periodic reports, orders,records of important conferences, and similar mat-ters pertaining directly to the intelligence section.It is an official permanent record of a unit and theprimary record of operations of the intelligencesection of the headquarters. The journal is closeddaily or at the end of a phase or period as directed.At division one copy is submitted to the chief of staff

49

for consolidation with the other journals of the head-quarters. The journal, supported by the journal file,maps, overlays, and other pertinent documents, isused in preparing the unit command report. (FM101-5 and AR 345-105.)

b. After examination by the intelligence officer onduty for any items of information of immediate tac-tical importance, and subsequent action, all incomingitems of information are next rkcorded in the jour-nal. The original entry is never altered, but may besupplemented by subsequent entries. If the item isreceived or issued in oral form, it should be summar-ized in written form and handled as a regular mes-sage. If the item is in documentary form, the entrymay consist of a reference and brief synopsis ofcontents. (See fig. 5 for sample journal sheet.)

37. ENEMY SITUATION MAP

a. General. The enemy situation map is kept-bythe intelligence officer of each combat unit. - Upon itis recorded graphically all available informationof the enemy for reference and study. The situationmap supplements, but does not take the place of, thework sheet.

.b. Scale. The situation map should be of a scale .appropriate to the size and mission of the unit. Gen-erally, the smaller the unit, the larger the scale re-quired because of the amount of detailed informa-tion which must be recorded. Higher headquartersshould have on hand copies of all maps used bysubordinate units, so that there will be no danger ofreports or messages referring to places not shown onmaps available at the higher headquarters. Each

50

major unit should prescribe the operation map foruse in its own and next subordinate headquarters.This standardization will reduce chances for error.When reports refer to a map other than the pre-scribed operation map, the map used will be identi-fied unless the grid reference system specified forthe operation is used.

c. Scope. The map area should include the ter-rain in possession of our own troops as well as thatheld by the enemy. Information of the enemy thatis of importance to the command is placed on themap by means of symbols or conventional signs.Care is taken to prevent the map from becomingtoo cluttered. The information posted will varywith the size of the unit; the smaller the unit, themore detailed will be the information recorded. Thelocation of the command posts of higher, lower, andadjacent units; the boundaries between major subor-dinate units; the location of friendly reconnaissanceunits; and (when there is an appreciable distancebetween our lines and those of the enemy) the traceof our front line, constitute the minimum friendlyinformation that should be shown on the enemysituation map. Division enemy situation mapsshould show the location of enemy units down tobattalions. To be useful, the situation map must becurrent.

d. Cooperation With Operations Officer. All in-formation concerning the enemy is furnished to theoperations officer (G-3 or S-3). By mutual agree-ment between the intelligence officer and the opera-tions officer, draftsmen of one section may enter per-tinent information on the situation map of the other

51

CLASSIFICATION

G-2 Sec, 101st Inf DivLANCASTER, SC211200 Jun 19-

to221200 Jun 19-

TimeSNo.erial Time Incidents, messages, orders, etc. Action

In Out

21 21 101st Recon-At (1020-1320) M1300 1 1245 moving S on Hwy 521.1420 2 1330 101st, Recon-Brg at (1027- MST

1292) destroyed 1315; creek5 ft wide. Fordable.

1525 3 1500 V Corps-Estimated inf regt MSTmoving NW on Hwy 341.Head of colm at KERSHAW.

1620 4 1540 101st Recon-Document (div MSTbdry) from pilot IX Corps1530.

1630 5 V Corps-Document (div bdry)from pilot IX Corps 1530.

CLASSIFICATION

Entries in the G-2 journal are made as follows:Under the column headed "Time" . . . enter the actual

time the message arrived at your section or departedfrom it, in the "In" and "Out" columns, respectively.

Under the column headed "Serial number" . . . enter thejournal number of the message, numbering consec-utively for each journal period.

Under the column headed "Time dated" .. enter the timethe message was dated or both the time and date of themessage, if the date is other than for the existing journalperiod.

Figure 5. Example of journal sheet for division intelligencesection.

52

Under the column headed "Incidents, messages, orders,etc." . . . enter and underline the agency from whichthe message was received or to which it was sent; thenenter briefly the substance of the message in topic form.Use only one line of the journal if possible.

Under the column headed "Action taken" . . . enter thedissemination which was made of the information con-tained in the message. Use the symbols, M, S, and T:M (Map), posted on the situation map; S (Staff), dis-seminated to the commander and the appropriate staffmembers; T (Troops), disseminated to higher, lower, andadjacent echelons. When pertinent, specific staff officersand specific units may be indicated.

Figure 5.-Continued

section. In order that the intelligence officer mayestimate enemy capabilities that may affect our fu-ture plans, he keeps abreast of operational planning.

e. Timeliness. The situation map is kept con-stantly up to date, new sheets being used when neces-sary. A tracing or copy of the information on themap, showing the situation as known at the closeof the period, may accompany the periodic intelli-gence report.

f. Joint Situation Maps. In some headquarters,particularly in those of battalions and regiments, asingle situation map may be kept jointly for all staffsections under the supervision of a designated offi-cer. At division it is advisable for the intelligenceand operations sections to maintain separate situa-tion maps in order not to interfere with each otherand to keep the amount of detail on each map at aminimum.

53

g. Materials. The current situation is preferablyposted on a transparent substance, such as tracingpaper or acetate. This method preserves maps, andthe tracing paper provides simplicity in transcrip-tion of map data. The transparent material isplaced on top of the map and the desired informationis traced or posted on the tracing paper. This isknown as an "overlay." In rapidly moving situa-tions, data may be posted on the map itself. Inmore stable situations, this is not the best procedurebecause of map shortage, waste, and because the mapsoon becomes cluttered with symbols. Where photo-graphic facilities are available, prints of the situa-tion map may accompany the periodic intelligencereport (par. 33d).

h. Symbols (FM 21-30). The situation map oroverlay should be kept as simple as possible. Au-thorized conventional signs, military symbols, andabbreviations are used. Where symbols are requiredother than those authorized, they may be improvised,provided tley are readily recognizable; otherwise,it is better to make a written notation on the mapitself. An alternative method of referring to itemsfor which there are no symbols or which require someexplanation is to note the journal entry number per-taining to the item on the margin of the map withan arrow pointing to the location of the item on themap.

i. Clarity. Neatness and clarity are essentials to.a good situation map. All symbols and signs areposted clearly and accurately. Symbols should besufficiently large to be seen from a reasonable dis-stance, so as to allow several persons to study the

54

map at the same time. Symbols should be postedhorizontally, that is, so that they may be read with-out turning the map or overlay. In some cases thisis not possible; for example, the symbols for trenches,mine fields, tank traps, and barbed wire must con-form to their actual position on the ground.

j. Colors. Enemy information is normally postedin red and friendly information in blue. When onecolor is used for both, enemy unit symbols are shownin double lines (FM 21-30). Symbols for minefields, demolitions, road blocks, and other engineerobstacles, when installed by our own troops, areposted in green. Gassed areas are posted in yellow.

3 [ 6

010730Figure 6. Method of indicating date and time a unot is

reported.

k. Time.

(1) The date and time a unit was reported oridentified is posted below the symbol (fig. 6).This is very important when the informa-tion concerns a moving unit such as acolumn of troops. The indication of timehas no reference to the time the informationwas posted.

(2) Information is posted at the earliest prac-ticable time after receipt (par. 34). Delaymay cause incomplete or late dissemination.Delay may also lead to omission and conse-

55

quent inaccuracy in the intelligence esti-mate and periodic intelligence report.

1. Keeping Map Up To Date. Only current in-formation should appear on the situation map. Be-fore removing information from the map, however,make sure that it is of no further value, or, if it isof value for report purposes, that it has been properlyrecorded.

m. Posting Unconfirmed Information and Un-known Details. It is desirable to use a consistentmethod for posting unconfirmed information and un-known details. One method is to show unconfirmedinformation by question marks, and simply to omitposting symbols for any details that are unknown(fig. 7). The symbols shown in figure 7 would beposted in red (j above).

n. Enemy Order of Battle. An identification listkept at the top margin of the situation map showswhich enemy units are facing our own. This listis known as an order of battle list or chart. Useof such a list may not be necessary if an order ofbattle section is available.

o. Crowding of Map. Every effort should bemade to avoid crowding symbols on the situationmap. When the situation map becomes too clut-tered with symbols it should be revised, and iden-tified units consolidated where possible. The useof a supplemental situation map of a different scalewill be of value in static situations.

38. G-2 WORK SHEET

a. Purpose. The purpose of the work sheet is tofacilitate systematic arrangement of information re-

56

Presence of unit unconfirmed. [

Unit is known to be present, butsize and type are unknown. l

Infantry unit confirmed, size un-known.

Infantry battalion confirmed,identification unknown.

Infantry battalion confirmed;reported (but not confirmed)to be element of 26th Inf 26?Regt; identification of battal-ion unknown.

2d Bn, 26th Inf Regt. 2 26

Figure 7. Method of indicating unconfirmed information orunknown details.

ceived by the intelligence section, so that all itemsbearing on a particular subject will be grouped to-gether for ready reference and comparison. In thisrespect, the work sheet differs from the journal, inwhich information is entered chronologically. Thework sheet is an aid to the preparation of estimates,

57

summaries, and reports. It is a convenient memo-randum for the intelligence officer, but is not a per-manent document. It should be kept up to date-Dbsolete items being lined out or withdrawn. When-ever an intelligence officer has need for a personalmemorandum to assist him in keeping abreast of achanging situation, the work sheet is a useful device.

b. Form. No specific form is prescribed for awork sheet. Regardless of form used, items of in-formation are extracted from incoming messages andreports and are recorded on the proper page of thework sheet, so they may be subsequently studied.For convenience, the work sheet may consist of pagesof a loose leaf notebook that are indexed along theside with the headings used in the periodic intelli-gence report (see fig. 8). All items (messages) bear-ing upon the same subject are entered on the samepage of the work sheet. Some messages may relateto more than one subject and therefore provide en-tries for more than one work sheet page. In usingthe form, enter the serial number of the message(same number as entered in the journal), the timethe activity occurred, the source of the information,and an extract of the message itself. An illustra-tive entry for the work sheet is as follows: "J-2,091200 Apr, from 1st Engr C Bn: Bridge at YUTAN(21-46) bombed and destroyed. Estimated out ofaction for 30 hours." This item comes from journalentry number 2. The incident happened at 1200on 9 April and the information was received fromthe 1st Engineer Combat Battalion. Many intelli-gence officers, in actual practice, find it advisable tounderscore the more important elements of an entry.

58

CLASSIFICATION 1a. Forward area*.

lb. Rear areas.

Ic. Defensive organi-sation.

Id. Administrativeinstallations.

2b. New enemy tacticsand weapons or othermateriel.

2c (1) Administra-tire units,

G 2 WORK SHEET2c (2) Air forces.

2c (3) Antiaircraftdefenses.

From:hour and date 2c (4) Antitank units

To:hour and date 2c (5),Armored units.'

!leadquarters:2c (6) Artillery (in-eluding rockets).

Place:__

2c (7) Cavalry.

2c (8) Chemical war-fare.

2c (9) Engioeers.

2c (10) Guided mis-siles.

NorES: 2c (11) Infantry.Numbers on tabs tefer to paragraphs In

periodic intelligence report. 2c (12) Reconnasis-The classification will be stamped at sance.the top and bottom of each page.A loose leaf notebook with tabbed sep. c (13) Other ele-arators may be used. As pages be- ments.come obsolete they may be discarded.

3. Other intelligencefactors.

4. Counter-intelligence,

CLASSIFICATION

Figure 8. Typical G-2 work sheet.

926264°-51 5 59

When one item of information confirms another, anotation of that fact should be made in both entries,either. by noting the journal entry number or thepage and paragraph of the work sheet.

39. INTELLIGENCE FILES

a. The journal file contains the original or a copyof all messages or documents that are entered inthe intelligence journal. It supports the journal.

b. The information file is a suitably indexed andcross-referenced file of all information that may beof future value. It should include supplementarysituation maps or overlays taken from the situationmap. For instance, during a period of stabilizationor inactivity, much information will be collectedthat is of no immediate interest, but which maybecome invaluable when an attack is ordered. Ifthis information is published solely in periodic re-ports as it comes in, it may be disregarded and for-gotten, and may not be available when needed. Itshould therefore be placed in a file, where it will beavailable for immediate check against new informa-tion. Such information will cover enemy order ofbattle information; defenses; condition of roads,railways, and bridges; location and contents of sup-ply establishments; location of enemy reserves; andother similar items.

c. The order of battle files consist of unit historycards for recording enemy unit identifications, his-tory, and other pertinent details. A unit history cardis started when a new enemy unit is identified. Asadditional information is received, it is entered onappropriate cards. These cards will aid an ihtelli-

60

gence officer to determine what portion of an identi-fied enemy unit is engaged, or may be engaged againsthis unit, and to estimate its combat efficiency fromthe approximate strength in personnel, weapons, andequipment.

40. EVALUATION

Evaluation is the appraisal of an item of informa-tion in order to determine its pertinence, the credi-bility of the source or agency, and the accuracy ofthe information.

a. Pertinence of Information. Immediately afterreceipt by the intelligence section, information isexamined in order to determine the degree in whichit is relevant, and its possible value. This involvesa consideration of the following:

(1) Is it information of the enemy or of thecharacteristics of the area of operation ?

(2) Is it information needed immediately and,if so, by whom?

(3) Is it information of future value?(4) Is it information of value to this unit or

to lower, higher, or adjacent units?

b. Credibility of Source and Agency. The credi-bility or worthiness of belief of the source and col-lecting agency is also determined before theintelligence officer can evaluate the information. Thefollowing are some of the important pointsconsidered:

(1) To what extent is the source accurate andreliable?

61

(2) Has the collecting agency sufficient training,experience, and ability to report accuratelythe information in question ?

(3) Under conditions existing at the time (suchas time and space, means employed, andvisibility), could the information have beenobtained?

c. Accuracy of Information. The accuracy ortruth of the information itself must be determinedseparately from the credibility of the source andagency. This is determined by considering thefollowing:

(1) Is the purported fact or event at allpossible?

(2) Is it confirmed or corroborated by other in-formation from a different source or agency?

(3) In what respects does it agree or disagreewith available information covering thesame point, particularly information knownto be correct?

(4) If it is at variance with information fromanother source and agency, and the conflict-ing items cannot be reconciled, which in-formation is more likely to be correct?

41. RATING THE SOURCE, AGENCY, AND THE IN-FORMATION

a. Credibility.(1) The credibility of the source and agency is

rated by the intelligence officer according tothe following standard system:

A-Completely reliable.

62

B-Usually reliable.C-Fairly reliable.D-Not usually reliable.E-Unreliable.F-Reliability cannot be judged.

(2) An "A" rating for a source should be givenonly under the most unusual circumstances;when, for example, an informant is an in-telligence officer of long experience and widebackground. A rating of "B" indicates aninformant of known integrity; "C," "D,"and "E" ratings indicate a proportionatelydecreasing degree of reliability. An "F"rating is assigned when nothing is knownconcerning the background or reliability ofthe informant.

(3) Ratings of agencies will generally fall incategories "A," "B," or "C."

b. Accuracy.(1) The accuracy of an item of information is

indicated by the use of numerals, as follows:

I-Report confirmed by other sources.2-Report probably true.3-Report possibly true.4-Report doubtfully true.5-Improbable report.6-Truth cannot be judged.

(2) It is important to remember that the numer-ical ratings are independent and distinctfrom the lettered ratings. When theseratings are used together, the number "1"need not necessarily accompany the letter

63

"A ;" number "2," the letter "B ;" and so on.An improbable report may come from areliable source or agency; or a report whichis probably true or confirmed by other in-formation from a different source or agencymay come. from an unreliable source oragency. Furthermore, with regard to "1"report confirmed by other sources, it shouldbe noted that the sources must be independ-ent. For example, if a report by an enemyprisoner that his artillery battery is locatedat a certain point is confirmed by interpreta-tion of an air photo of the point-the pris-oner and the air photo are independentsources.

42. INTERPRETATION

a. General. Up to this point, the intelligence of-ficer is concerned with assembling, cataloging, andevaluating information. He is now faced with theproblem of analyzing the evaluated information todetermine its significance with respect to informationor intelligence already at hand. This process ofcritical analysis is known as interpretation.

b. Significance of Information.(1) Interpretation of evaluated information re-

quired determination, first, of its conform-ity or nonconformity with existing infor-mation, and second, of its effeot upon theexisting estimate of the situation. Perti-nent considerations are-

(a) What does this information mean in con-nection with what is already known ?

64

(b) Does it alter, confirm, refute, or add sig-nificance to information previously re-ceived ?

(c) Does it tend to confirm or refute the ex-isting estimate of the enemy situation ?

(2) Correct interpretation leads to accurateconclusions concerning the enemy's capabili-ties and his probable courses of action.

c. Bearing on Current Intelligence Estimate. Aseach new item of information is processed, the in-terpretation placed upon its affects in some way thecurrent intelligence estimate. The conclusions al-ready drawn are altered or confirmed; new capabil-ities are determined, old ones are discarded; therelative probability of adoption of the enemy'scourses of action become clearer. The estimate iscontinuously revised and kept up to date in the lightof new intelligence.

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CHAPTER 6

USE OF INTELLIGENCE

Section I. EMPLOYMENT BY G-2

43. INTRODUCTION

The ultimate use of intelligence is to assist thecommander in making sound and timely decisions.It also assists the troops and the staff to execute theirmissions and to meet their responsibilities. In orderfor intelligence to be of use, it is given to the com-mander and to all others who need it, in the form thatwill furnish the greatest assistance and in time toserve their purposes. It is presented to the com-mander in the intelligence estimate. It is trans-mitted to lower, higher, and adjacent units for theirpossible use. This process is known as dissemination.

44. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

a. The commander makes his decision on the basisof his continuing estimate of the situation. Themore complete and up to date the estimate, the moreeffective will be the selected course of action. Theestimate of the situation must therefore embody sig-nificant conclusions from all available intelligence.The intelligence officer arrives at his conclusions andpresents them to his commander in the intelligenceestimate. In substance, the intelligence estimatebrings together significant aspects of the area of op-

66

erations and of the enemy situation, presents the ene-my's capabilities, analyzes them in relation to oneanother, and considers each enemy capability in rela-tion to the friendly mission. With the intelligenceestimate, the commander is able to balance these fac-tors against his own possible courses of action andthereby to choose his own most favorable course ofaction. This is stated in his decision. Like the es-timate of the situation, the intelligence estimate is acontinuing process. As the factors with which it isconcerned change, it is revised. Preparation of theintelligence estimate is a constant and basic respon-sibility of the intelligence officer.

b. An intelligence estimate will be given to thecommander by the intelligence officer either.upon theinitiative of the intelligence officer (that is, when hedeems that the situation so warrants) or when re-quired by the commander. It may be comprehensiveor fragmentary. Regardless of the manner of pres-entation, it should so far as practicable be based ona prescribed form. Such a form is desirable in thatit furnishes a checklist which helps to prevent omis-sion of important items.

45. FORM OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

a. The prescribed form (b below) summarizescharacteristics of the area of operations, the enemysituation, and the enemy capabilities; analyzes themin relation to one another; and considers each enemycapability that can affect the friendly mission. Cer-tain conclusions are drawn, if justified, ,concerningthe relative probability of adoption of the enemy

67

capabilities. Finally, the effect of the enemy coursesof action on the friendly mission is considered.

b. 'Following is the prescribed form of the intelli-gence estimate. (Appendix II is an example of anintelligence estimate.)

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing section and headquartersPlaceDate and time

CHARTS OR MAPS

1. MISSION. State the task and its purpose.a. If mission is multiple, determine priorities.b. If there are intermediate tasks, such tasks should be

listed.2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

a. Considerations affecting the possible enemy courses ofaction and our mission. Determine and analyze thosefactors which will influence choice by the enemy of acourse of action as well as those which affect thecapabilities of the enemy to act. Consider such of thefollowing and other factors as are involved:(1) Characteristics of the area of operations.

(a) Weather (or climatic conditions) (annex, ifapplicable)-.

1. Statement of existing situation.2. Tactical effects on enemy capabilities to act.S. Tactical effects on mission of own command.

(b) Terrain (annex, if applicable).(c) Hydrography (annex, if applicable).(d) Politics (annex, if applicable).(e) Economics (annex, if applicable).(f) Sociology (annex, if applicable).

Note. Subheadings for any of the above, or any additionalfactors which are discussed, should be similar to those in-dicated under weather above.

68

(2) Enemy situation.(a) Strength, including combat efficiency.(b) Composition.(c) Dispositions, including fire support.(d) Recent and present significant activities (in-

cluding enemy's knowledge of our situation).(e) Status of supply.(f) Reinforcements.

b. Enemy capabilities.(1) Note all possible courses of action within the capa-

bilities of the enemy which can affect the accom-plishment of the mission:

(2) Discussion and analysis of subparagraph 2b (1) tojustify (when possible) the selection of relativeprobability of adoption of enemy capabilities.

(3) Relative probability of adoption of enemy capa-bilities.

3. EFFECT OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION ON OURMISSION.

/s/G-2

CLASSIFICATION

46. PREPARATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The following instructions explain the preparationof the intelligence estimate. In actual practice onlythose paragraphs will be included in an estimate forwhich the intelligence officer has the pertinent infor-mation and intelligence.

a. If the estimate is published for circulationwithin the headquarters, the heading shows "G-2Section, Div"; if the estimate is published forcirculation outside the headquarters, the heading

69

drops the "G-2 Section" and shows only the unitdesignation, that is," Div."

b. Paragraph 1 states the mission of the com-mander or unit.

c. Paragraph 2 presents the situation and thepossible enemy courses of action.

(1) Paragraph 2a (1) analyzes pertinentcharacteristics of the area of operations.These characteristics may include weather,terrain, hydrography, politics, economics,sociology, and any other factors that mayaffect the friendly mission or the enemycapabilities. Discussion of each character-istic is arranged as follows-first, the exist-ing situation with regard to the factor;second, the tactical effects of the factor onthe enemy capabilities; and, third, thetactical effects of the factor on our mission.All of the characteristics named above maynot be applicable in a particular situation,as at the lower echelons of command. Forexample, an infantry division G-2 wouldnormally consider only weather and terrain.On the other hand, at theater all the char-acteristics named (and possibly others)would be considered. In some cases theymight be elaborated on to such an extentthat an annex would be required.

(2) Paragraph 2a (2) deals with the enemysituation. Thei enemy strength, composi-tion, dispositions, significant activities,status of supply, and reinforcements arecovered. Much of this is best shown on a

70

map, sketch, or overlay. The foregoingterms are defined as follows:

(a) "Strength, including combat efficiency."The numerical fighting strength availableto the enemy in the particular operationconcerned. The basic unit strengths con-sidered may vary, depending on the levelof command at which the estimate is made.Account must be taken of the current com-bat effectiveness (quality) of enemy units.

(b) "Comnposition of the enemy forces." Thestructure or make-up of the force, suchas the number of infantry battalions in aregiment and what types of units (suchas infantry, motorized, armored, and air-borne)- are in an enemy division. Thisparagraph also includes intelligence onenemy order of battle.

(c) "Dispositions, including fire support."The arrangement on the ground of thevarious units of the enemy force. Anexample might be, "The enemy has twoinfantry battalions, supported by one fieldartillery battalion, located on ridge A-Bwith one infantry battalion in local re-serve as crossroads C."

(d) "Recent and present significant activities(including enemy's knowledge of our situ-ation) ." This summarizes significant cur-rent enemy activities. Furthermore, if itis reasonable to believe that the enemy hasspecific knowledge of our situation and in-tentions, this should be noted. An ex-

71

ample would be the enemy's capture ofcertain of our personnel known to havebeen bearing a current operation order.

(e) "Status of supply." Whether or not theenemy supply situation is'such that it cansupport the enemy forces in the impend-ing operation. An example is. the statusof food, fuel, and ammunition.

(f) "Reinforcements." Combat units otherthan those locally available that couldlogically affect the accomplishment of ourmission. (For meaning of "locally avail-able," see paragraph 49c.)

(3) Paragraph 2b (1) lists the enemy capa-bilities that can affect the accomplishmentof our mission. (See par. 47 for a detaileddiscussion of enemy capabilities.)

(4) (a) Having determined the enemy capabili-ties, the intelligence officer then analyzeseach one in paragraph 2b (2) in orderto justify, when possible, the selection ofthe relative probability of adoption.This justification usually must consist ofdefinite information of enemy dispositionswhich favor one or more capabilities andmilitate against others. Under excep-tional circumstances, even though theenemy dispositions may not favor anyparticular capability, a thorough knowl-edge of the enemy's tactical doctrine,recent performances, national psychology,and the character and mentality of theenemy commander may justify an indica-

72

tion of priority. The basis for indicatinga priority must be clearly stated.

(b) Selection of relative probability of adop-tion is based on interpretation of intelli-gence that indicates future enemy action.For example, if enemy troop movementstoward the front lines are reported by re-connaissance, this might indicate that theenemy does not plan to withdraw, butrather is preparing to attack, or tostrengthen his defense. The manner inwhich artillery is employed is anotherexample of an indication of the futureactions of the enemy. If the major part ofthe enemy's artillery is well forward,offensive action is indicated. If, on theother hand, the bulk of his artillery isecheloned in depth, defense or withdrawalis indicated. By analyzing such indica-tions it is possible for the intelligence offi-cer to determine the relative probabilityof adoption by the enemy of a particularcourse of action. Care must be taken thatrelative probability is stated only when itcan be justified by indications. If thereare no indications to justify the selectionof a particular enemy course of action asthe most probable of adoption, the intelli-gence officer should state that fact. Thebases for determining the relative proba-bility are sound indications and knownfacts, not guesswork.

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(5) The intelligence officer after thoroughlyanalyzing the capabilities, then lists the rel-ative probability of their adoption in para-graph 2b (3).

d. In paragraph 3, the intelligence officer discussesthe effect of each enemy capability on the accomr,plishmenrt of the friendly mission. An examplewould be-"If the enemy launches an attack againstour north flank prior to our attack, we will havedifficulty in reaching the high ground at PEACH-TREE."

e. If the estimate is published for circulationwithin the headquarters only, G-2 signs it and noauthentication is required. If the estimate is pub-lished for circulation outside the headquarters, it isover the commander's name and G-2 must authen-ticate it.

47. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. General. Enemy capabilities are considered inthe commander's estimate and are discussed in theintelligence estimate, the periodic intelligence re-port, and in the intelligence annex. Their most im-portant application is the use made by the com-mander in iris estimate of the situation.

b. Definition. Enemy capabilities are thosecourses of action of which the enemy is physicallycapable, and which, if adopted, will affect the ac-complishment of our mission. Two requirementsmust be present: the enemy vmust be physicallvcapable of adopting the particular course of action;if adopted, the course of action must affect the ac-complishment of our mission.

74

c. Meaning of "Affect." It is readily understoodthat all possible enemy courses of action that mightinterfere with the accomplishmnent of our missionare of interest to the commander. Their considera-tion, in conjunction with other factors, assistsgreatly in making correct plans and decisions. How-ever, in some instances, enemy courses of action thatwould actually favor the accomplishment of our mis-sion become important. One of these may becomedominant in a particular situation. Knowledge of apossible course of action that favors the accomplish-ment of our mission may prepare the commanderto take advantage of a weakness developing in theenemy situation. This may enable him to save hismen, time, and materiel. He may also be able togain a more favorable position from which to con-tinue action against the enemy. The intelligenceofficer is alert to situations in which favorable enemycapabilities may have an important bearing on theaction. Enemy capabilities that favor the accom-plishment of our mission must not be overlooked.

d. Doctrine of Capabilities. Commanders mustbe certain that they base their actions, dispositions,and plans upon estimates of enemy capabilities ratherthan upon estimates of enemy's intentions. An esti-mate of the enemy capabilities can be objectivelyformulated because it is based upon knowledge ofenemy strength, dispositions, activities, organization,and means. But enemy intentions can seldom bedetermined. The enemy commander may changehis mind frequently, or higher commanders maychange his orders. Furthermore, the enemy maypromulgate false orders and rumors, which in' them-

926264--51-6 75

selves would indicate an action different from thatwhich he actually intends. The enemy may also takemeasures to give a false impression of his capabili-ties, but .it will be more difficult to do this than tospread false information about his intentions.

e. Capability Work Sheet. The following is anextract of an enemy capability work sheet.- It pro-vides a means of recording the answers to the fourquestions discussed in paragraph 49 for any onecapability. A form such as this is of value, at leastuntil experience is gained, in that it facilitates sim-plicity and completeness of the formed statements.

ENEMY CAPABILITY WORK SHEET

What:

Where:-

In what strength:

When:-

48. STEPS IN THE CALCUCATION OF ENEMY CAPA-BILITIES

The following steps will assist in the calculationof enemy capabilities:

a. From consideration of the mission, determinethe general courses of action that will affect the ac-complishment of the friendly mission.

b. Under the general courses of attack and de-fense, determine particular courses of action that areapplicable to the situation. These may be depend-ent to some extent on the areas of tactical significance.

c. Determine where particular courses of actioncan be initiated (areas of tactical significance deter-mined from weather, terrain, and enemy locations).

76

d. Enemy strength considered in particular coursesof action under attack and defense includes onlyenemy troops locally available.

e. All other enemy units in or near our zone ofaction or opposite our sector of defense are listedin a reinforcement table (par. 49c). The time andplace each unit can be committed may be includedin the table.

/. The withdrawal capability states merely thatthe enemy can withdraw, usually beyond our objec-tive, at any time.

49. DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The statement of an enemy capability answers fourquestions in regard to each possible enemy course ofaction. These four questions are: what? where?in what strength? and when.?

a. What? The what is a course of action that willinterfere with or favor the accomplishment of ourmission.

(1) Four broad courses of action are generallyavailable to the enemy-to attack, to de-fend, to reinforce (in conjunction with at-tack or defense), or to withdraw. Figure9 shows how these courses of action inter-fere with or favor the accomplishment ofour various missions.

(2) General courses of action may be brokendown into particular courses of action. Forinstance, an attack might be a penetration,an envelopment, or a piecemeal attack.The number of particular courses of action

77

Mission Enemy action Effect on mission

1. a. To attack to seize Attack ------ Interfere with.a terrain objec- Defend ----- Interfere with.tive. Reinforce--.. Interfere with.

Withdraw -- _ Favor.

b. To attack to de- Attack ----- Interfere with.stroy the enemy. Defend ---- Interfere with.

Reinforce ---- Interfere with.Withdraw -- Interfere with.

2. To defend or with- Attack ----- Interfere with.draw. Defend ------ Favor.

Reinforce ---- Interfere with.Withdraw---- Favor.

Figure 9. Enemy courses of action and their usual effect.

selected is dependent, to some extent, onthe answers to the other three questions.

b. Where? The where designates the point orarea of possible activity by the enemy. This is de-termined from three factors: the area of operations'(including weather and terrain), enemy dispositions,and our own situation. Exceptions arise in the caseof reinforcement or withdrawal. In reinforcement,the 'where is some logically chosen point which re-serves must reach in order to reinforce the enemy orto affect our mission. In withdrawal, the where maybe simply "beyond our unit objective."

(1) Weather and terrain. Under existing andpredictable conditions of weather, the ter-rain may provide avenues of approach, logi-cal corridors, or favorable routes of entryinto our position from the front, flanks, or

78

rear. Likewise, crosscompartments mayfurnish strong defensive positions to theenemy. Certain terrain, possibly in con-junction with weather and its effects on ter-rain, may prohibit or curtail types of enemyaction such as armored attack or motorizedcross-country movement. If terrain subdi-visions are made, then each subdivision, inconjunction with a specific course of action,becomes an area of tactical significance.If the terrain does not lend itself tosubdivision, the entire area may be con-sidered as one unit. There is no govern-ing the selection of these areas of tacticalsignificance. However, all potential areasof enemy action will be covered, and thenumber of areas of tactical signficance se-lected must not be so great that the enemycapabilities become confusing.

(2) Enemiy dispositions. Known enemy dis-positions may emphasize certain areas eventhough such emphasis may violate logicalterrain subdivisions. The direction andpoint of an attack and the location of adefensive position might be indicated fromenemy dispositions.

(3) Own dispositions. Dispositions of our ownand adjacent friendly units also have abearing on selection of areas. Gaps in theline which provide danger spots may bepresent within our own unit or between ourunit and an adjacent unit. Open flankspermit envelopment by the enemy. Secure

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flanks deny this course of action to theenemy.

c. In what strength? The current enemy situa-tion provides us with the present enemy strengthsand dispositions. By using these data and ascer-taining what enemy units can be moved to givenpoints, the strength the enemy can employ in carry-ing out any particular course of action is determined.This calculation is made as follows:*

(1) First, constitute the enemy organization.Logical assumptions may be necessary inorder to decide which reserve units belongto the regimental reserves and which be-long to the reserve of division and higherechelons.

(2) Second, use enemy troops locally availableto compute strengths for the attack and de-fense capabilities. "Locally available" ap-plies to units in contact and the reserves ofsuch units. A division G-2 considers re-serves of enemy regiments as locally avail-able; a regimental intelligence officer con-siders reserves of enemy battalions as locallyavailable; and a battalion intelligence officerconsiders reserves of enemy companies aslocally available.

(3) Third, list all other enemy units (reservesand other units in or near the friendly zoneof action or opposite the friendly sector ofdefense), their location, and the time each

*Experience with a particular enemy in the field will permit thedevelopment of various "rules of thumb" that may differ from theacademic rules shown here.

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was last reported, in a reinforcement table(see fig. 10). Calculate the data required

to complete the reinforcement table by ap-plying rules given in d below and in para-graph 50.

REINFORCEMENTSTime last Point of Ti.me. Time

Unit Location p d Re-rreported reinforcement (mor) (one fot)

Figure 10. Suggested form for reinforcement table.

(4) In computing the in what strength of anenemy course of action, the size of the enemyunit considered varies at different echelons.,Divisions generally measure enemy strengthby enemy battalions; regiments by com-panies; and battalions by platoons. Corpspractice in this respect varies. In dealingwith the divisions subordinate to the corps,the corps intelligence officer usually refersto enemy strengths in terms of battalions;whereas, in dealing with the army, he willusually refer to enemy strengths in termsof divisions.

(5) Troops already committed to action inanother zone or sector are not considered.

(6) The estimate of enemy strength must beaccurate, to assist the commander in arriv-ing at his decision. When positive infor-mation of enemy casualties is available aclose approximation of strength can bemade. Serious depletion of enemy unitsmay be reported to the commander either as

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a percentage of normal (T/O & E) strength,or by translating the strengths into equiva-lent enemy units. For example, an enemyregiment only thirty per cent effective isroughly equivalent, in combat effectiveness,to one battalion. No attempt should bemade to guess the enemy strength, if it isnot known and cannot be estimated. Astatement such as "with a force of uwnnownsize" is preferable to that of "with threebattalions" if there is no basis for the latterassumption.

(7) Troops that may be employed to close withour own forces should be used as the basisfor determining strength. Supportingarms, designated as such, should be included,however, in the statement of strength. Thefollowing is an example: "... with sixbattalions of infantry supported by fourbattalions of artillery."

d. -When? The when of a particular course ofaction is derived from calculations of time and spacewith due regard for conditions of weather and light.As a result of tirme and space calculations, certainenemy courses of action may be eliminated fromfurther consideration if the possible time of enemyaction is too late to interfere with or favor the execu-tion of our mission. These calculations are made inthe same manner in which we compute time andspace for our own units except that certain factorsare not included in enemy time. When appropriate,a statement of the time required by the enemy tocarry out, as well as to start, a particular course of

82.

action, once he begins to move, should be included.This is especially pertinent when the enemy is de-fending, in order to give a true picture of the enemy'scapabilities after we have penetrated or envelopedthe flank of the enemy's position.

(1) The following methods are used in makingtime and space calculations:

(a) Select some logical point which the enemymust reach in order to initiate a particu-lar course of action.

(b) Determine nearest enemy unit that caninitiate the course of action, and its pres-ent location.

(c) Compute the minimum time required tomove from present location (from (b) toposition determined in (a)).

(d) Add time required to close sufficient por-tion of enemy unit to affect our mission.

(e) Add the preceding times to the time lastreported. This will give earliest time atwhich the enemy course of action can af-fect our mission.

(2) Factors considered in computations are-

(a) Distance between enemy force andfriendly positions.

(b) Available routes of approach (considermore than one route if available toenemy).

(c) Type of unit.(d) Rate of march of unit under most favor-

able conditions.(e) Closing time for column.

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(3) Factors. not considered. in computationsare-

(a) Entrucking or detrucking time. Whenmotor transportation is available, no ad-ditional time allowance is made for thisoperation because the enemy may be en-trucked and ready to move at the time heis located and is capable of detruckingwhile his column is closing.

(b) Time required to issue extra ammunition.This could have been accomplished priorto the start of movement.

(c) Time required for detailed reconnais-sance. This could have been accom-plished in advance.

(d) Time required to issue orders to subordi-nate units. This could have been 6om-pleted prior to commencing operation.

(e) Time required for deployment. The en-emy can deploy as he approaches the lineof departure.

50. RULES FOR CALCULATING ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Following are rules for calculating enemycapabilities:

(1) Starting time and place are time and placeunit was last reported.

(2) Select logical point unit must reach to starta particular course of action.

(3) March distance is distance from (1) to (2)above.

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(4) Arrival time is starting time plus marchtime plus closing time. This total time isrounded off to the nearest 5 minutes. Incase of a withdrawal, closing time is notcomputed. In case of a piecemeal attackor defense, compute the arrival time of thenearest enemy unit that can initiate theaction; closing time is not computed.

(5) Compute foot marching time for reinforce-ments for all distances; compute motormarching time for distances greater than5 miles only. If a unit is observed intrucks, compute only the motor marchingtime.

(6) Consider a foot march of over 20 miles as aforced march; use forced march graph inFM 101-10.

(7) Consider motor march of over 120 miles asa forced march. This cannot be continuedindefinitely but must be adjusted to actualconditions.

(8) At the beginning of morning nautical twi-light (BMNT) (FM 101-10), if the columnis not closing, change the rate of march fromnight to day. If the column is in the process,of closing at BMNT, continue to close thecolumn at the night rate of march.

(9) At the end of evening nautical twilight(EENT) (FM 101-10), if the column is notclosing, change the rate of march from dayto night. If the column is in the processof closing at EENT, continue to close thecolumn at the day rate of march.

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(10) To move an enemy infantry battalion,move and close entire unit.

(11) To move an enemy infantry regiment orcombat team, move and close two infantrybattalions (except when part of a divisionmovement (12) below.)

(12) To move an enemy infantry division, moveand close two entire infantry regiments.

(13) In determining the when of an enemy cap-ability, consider that a unit of regimentalsize or larger is ready for coordinated actionwhen two-thirds of the combat elements ofthe unit have closed.

(14) In determining enemy time and space fac-tors for a marching column (foot or motor),the head of the column is the point fromwhich measurements are made.

b. Table I presents time lengths and rates ofmarch for typical units. The figures in the table area guide only. In actual operations, it will be neces-sary for the intelligence officer to make his own tablesof march rates and time lengths based on experiencewith the particular enemy concerned. The figuresused are the same as those used for computing timeand space for our own units except that certain fig-ures are not included in enemy time (par. 49d (3)).

51. AIR CAPABILITY

In addition to the enemy land capabilities, theremust always be included in the list an air capability,if one exists.

a. In the case of division and corps, the data forthis capability is taken from the army intelligence

86

Table I. Time Lengths and Rates of March for Typical Units

Time lengths (minutes)

Men on foot I Motors

Unit Cross-country Roads Night Day

Close OpenNight Day Night Day column column1 mph 1 mph 2 mph 2~6 mph 75veh/mi 20veh/mi

10 mph 15 mph

Inf div ------ 324 216 162 130 382 703Inf regt ------- 108 72 54 44 45 90Inf bn ------- 36 24 18 15 10 19Tk bn .... . ----- 17 33Arty bn ..------ 15 29Armd div - ------ 396 791Armd CC ------ ----- ---- - 69 139

I Figures are for column of twos.

estimate. For example, a division estimate mightread-

* . * x *

"2....

(1) ...

(. . .) The enemy can be expected to attack within-- Army area with as many as 150fighter sorties and 75 bomber sorties daily."

b. In the case of the field army and the army group,two statements with respect to the enemy air capa-bility are made in the intelligence estimate. These

87

are-a statement of the enemy's air capability; andan estimate, after analysis, of his probable air activ-ity within the area of responsibility of the field armyor the army group.

(1) The first of these statements covers what isalmost always a remote possibility (themaximum air capability), but it must bestated. It is always possible for the enemy,within 1 day, to 'concentrate upon the areaof one field army the total effort of all hisaircraft which can reach that area. Thisnormally requires consideration of all hisaircraft within 1,000 miles, or even greaterdistances. For example-

* * * * *

"2.

b. ....

(1) . . .

* * * * *

(. . .) Enemy air capability. Based upon an esti-mated strength of 750 fighter and 250bomber aircraft, the enemy can attack -Army area with a maximum of 1,250 fightersorties and 400 bomber sorties daily."

* * * * *

(2) The second of these statements is the con-clusion drawn from an analysis by A-2 ofthe tactical air force, or the tactical .aircommand, of the anticipated enemy offen-sive air activity within the area of respon-sibility of the field army or the army group.

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Such a statement might be-* * * * *

"2.

b....(2) . . .* e * * *

(. . .) Probable enemy air activity. The enemycan be expected to attack Within -Army area with as many as 150 fightersorties and 75 bomber sorties daily."

(3) The information contained in these twostatements is furnished to G-2 of the fieldarmy by A-2 of the tactical air force, andto G-2 of the army group by A-2 of thetactical air command.

52. EXAMPLE OF STATEMENT OF ENEMY CAPABILI-TIES

a. General Situation. At 011900 July, the U. S. 1stInfantry Division captured Hill 100. At this time,an order was received from corps. Extract of orderstates--"Corps continues attack in zone at 020600July. The 1st Infantry Division will attack in as-signed zone, seize Hill 101, prepared to continue theadvance to the north." Both flanks of 1st InfantryDivision are secure.

b. Special Situation. Aggressor situation and* other data, as known by the intelligence officer, areas follows:

(1) Aggressor situation at 011900 July. Seesketch in figure 11.

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Div, Obj

".2 . [

' 2tP[ X

LEGEND

Friendly Unit 1Jl

US Enemy Unit

Div Obj

O I 2mi

Figure 11. Tactical situation.

90

(2) Foot elements of combat team movingsouth, now at point just north of Hill 102,marching in column of twos.

(3) Army estimates that the enemy can be ex-pected to attack within the Army area withas many as 150 fighter sorties and 75bomber sorties daily.

(4) The 1st Infantry Division commander di-rects the intelligence officer to be prepared

"to present the enemy capabilities at 012000July.

(5) End of evening nautical twilight is 012130July.

c. Determination of Enemy Capabilities.(1) The friendly mission is to attack in zone at

020600 July, seize Hill 101, and be preparedto continue advance to the north. The en-emy can delay the accomplishment of thismission by attacking, by defending againstattaok, and by reinforcing the enemy troopsnow in contact. The enemy can favor theaccomplishment of the friendly mission bywithdrawing beyond the division objectiveprior to the attack.

(2) Under attack, only one particular course ofaction is selected, that is, a frontal attack.Both flanks are secure and no other formof enemy ground attack appears feasible.On an enemy capability work sheet underwhat, frontal attack is entered. The whereis along our front. The in what strength,considering forces locally available, is threeinfantry battalions supported by one ar-

926264°-51 7 91

tillery battalion. Combat team north ofHill 102 is probably in division reserve andwill be treated under the reinforcementcapability. The when of the attack capa-bility is now. This capability appearsbelow on the work sheet.

What: Frontal attackWhere: Along our frontIn what strength: Three infantry battalions

supported by one ar-tillery battalion

When: Now

Statement form: "The enemy can attack nowalong our front with three infantry bat-talions supported by one artillery battalion."

(3) Under defense, again only one particularcourse of enemy action is selected. Thatcourse of action is to defend on Hill 101.The what is to defend; the where is on Hi71101; the in what strength is three infantrybattalions supported by one artillery bat-talion; the when is now.

What: DefendWhere: On Hill 101In what strength: Three infantry battalions

supported by one ar-tillery battalion

When: Now

Statement form: "The enemy can defend nowon Hill 101 with three infantry battalionssupported by one artillery battalion."

(4) The next general course of action open tothe enemy is his capability of reinforcing

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his present units in contact. The what isto reinforce; the where is any logical pointwhich the reinforcement must reach in orderto reinforce the elements in contact. RoadJunction 200 is selected, The in whatstrength is the combat team reported at011900 July near Hill 102. The when in-volves enemy time and space computationsand is determined as follows:

(a) Point at which reinforcement becomeseffective.--Road Junction 200,

(b) Only the arrival of foot elements of in-fantry is computed, since it is customaryin enemy time and space calculations toassume that all motorized and armoredelements of the combat team can be inplace to support foot elements by the timethe foot elements are in position.

(c) Only travel and closing time are com-puted.

(d) Example:

Time last reported ----------------------- 1900Travel time (4'/2 miles at 2Y2 mph) ----- 0148Closing time (2 bn at 15 min each) ------ 0030

Arrival time _------------------------ 2118

What: ReinforceWhere: Road Junction 200In what strength: Regimental combat teamWhen: 2120Statement form: "The enemy can reinforce the

attack or defense of the regimental combat teamnow on Hill 101 with a second regimental combatteam by 012120 July."

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(5) Withdrawal capability. Statement form:"The enemy can withdraw beyond the divi-sion objective any time prior to our attack."

(6) Air capability. Statement form: "Theenemy can be expected to attack within theArmy area with as many as 150 fightersorties and 75 bomber sorties daily."

Section II. DISSEMINATION

53. REQUIREMENTS FOR DISSEMINATION

a. One object in disseminating intelligence isto insure that the various intelligence staffs at dif-ferent echelons of command have the same facts withregard to the enemy. This will insure that com-manders at various echelons of command have thesame general intelligence picture and will not be atvariance with each other in planning their opera-tions on the basis of intelligence received or pro-duced.

b. In the dissemination of intelligence, there aretwo general problems-dissemination to lower andadjacent units, and dissemination to higher unitsand within the producing headquarters. Of thesetwo problems, dissemination to lower and adjacentunits is the more difficult and the more critical.This is because-

(1) The requirement of timeliness is generallymore critical because of the greater rapidityof change of the intelligence picture at thelower echelon.

(2) A much greater amount of detail is required.This requirement of details complicatesthat of timeliness.

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(3) All pertinent intelligence produced athigher headquarters by specialized meansat their disposal must be disseminated tolower echelons.

(4) Intelligence for higher echelons is limitedto a relatively few recipients, while thatfor lower echelons includes a much largernumber.

54. CRITERIA FOR DISSEMINATION

The adequacy of intelligence dissemination maybe judged in order of priority, by the followingcriteria:

a. Information and intelligence must be placed inthe hands of the ultimate user in time to permit hisevaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans,and initiation of action under the existing situationbefore the intelligence picture has changed.

.b. Only essential intelligence that can be used bythe unit concerned will be disseminated.

c. The importance and priority of the intelligencefurnished will be carefully considered. The meansselected for dissemination will provide a minimumof interference with other signal communicationtraffic.

d. The disseminated matter should be in such formthat the recipients may readily locate details of in-terest to them.

55. METHODS OF DISSEMINATION

a. Conferences. The exchange of information be-tween the various intelligence sections of higher,

95

lower, and adjacent units is facilitated by frequentpersonal contacts (including telephone calls) or con-ferences between the staff officers concerned. Liai-son officers should be used to the utmost. It is goodpractice for the intelligence officer at each echelonperiodically to visit, send liaison officers, or to callby telephone or radio each subordinate intelligenceofficer. The frequency will vary with the intensityof activity and with the number of reports sent inby subordinate units.

b. Messages. When it is impossible for the intel-ligence officer to transmit important information inperson or by telephone, special messages may betransmitted by airplane, motorcycle, or motor mes-senger; radio, telegraph, or other rapid means of sig-nal communication. All messages must be clear, con-cise, and complete. Communication security meas-ures accorded a message must be commensurate withthe classification of its content and adequate for theprotection of the sources and agencies which fur-nished the information for the message.

c. Intelligence Documents.

(1) Periodic intelligence report. This docu-ment sums up the information that has beencollected, evaluated, and interpreted duringa given period. It is a convenient meansfor keeping higher, lower, and adjacentunits informed of the enemy situation asdetermined by the unit preparing the report.It frequently contains important informa-tion that has been disseminated by meansof special messages (par. 56 and app.III).

96

(2) Intelligence annex. Paragraph 1 of thisannex may contain a summary of the enemysituation, or it may refer to intelligenceestimates, or to the latest periodic report.Paragraph la of the operation order maycontain a brief summary of the enemy situa-tion, however, if this intelligence is morethan six to eight lines in length, it is prefer-able to place it in an intelligence annex(par. 75 and app. V).

(3) Intelligence estimate. Preliminary esti-mates are designed to assist the commanderin arriving at his concept of the operation.Detailed intelligence estimates are designedto reach conclusions on the details of plansand to assist the commander to make his de-cision. The entire estimate may be com-mitted to writing, or the form may be usedonly as a checklist (par. 45 and app. II).

(4) Maps. Maps are essential and valuableinstruments of dissemination if they areaccurate. They should be used in conjunc-tion with air photos to ensure that data onthem are up to date.

(5) Situation maps and overlays. These docu-ments depict in graphic form the locationand disposition of enemy forces and instal-lations. They lend themselves readily torapid interpretation of intelligence, therebysaving much time. Special situation mapsand overlays are used for disseminationwhenever the enemy situation changesrapidly.

97

(6) Technical intelligence sumxnaries. Thesepublications offer a complete resum6 of in-telligence on such subjects as enemy weap-ons, equipment, and technical methods.They are not intended for use by other thaninterested specialists because of the com-prehensive scope of their contents.

(7) Tactical studies of the weather and terrain.These studies furnish detailed informationon weather and terrain in respect to climateand weather, drainage, relief, soil, vegeta-tion, and lines of communication. The bulkof these studies may appear on maps oroverlays. Weather information is usuallydisseminated to subordinate units by meansof radio reports, messages, or bulletins (par.116 and app. VI).

(8) Order of battle books and pamphlets. Thedesignations, identifications, strengths, andcompositions of units as well as the per-sonalities and histories of commanders, arecontained in order of battle books andpamphlets (par. 122).

(9) Prisoner of war interrogation reports. Theinformation included in these reports mustbe carefully processed before being dissemi-nated as intelligence. Prisoners are not con-sidered a wholly reliable source, and allinformation must be checked against thatobtained from other sources. However,once a true evaluation has been made, theintelligence is often of great value as theprisoner has actually operated in the situa-tion he describes.

98

(10) Air photo interpretation reports. Thesereports present and identify enemy activi-ties and installations and are the most relia-ble source of current information of terrainunder the enemy's control. Air photos havelimited value until interpretation has beenperformed and reported (par. 113).

(11) Translations of captured documents.When properly evaluated, captured docu-ments furnish accurate and valuable infor-mation inasmuch as they are written by theenemy and provide definite enemy plans,orders, or results of operations.

(12) Special reports. Particular enemy tacticsand personalities are contained in specialreports which are transmitted to using agen-cies by the most rapid means.

(13) Intelligence summary (IS UM).(a) An intelligence summary is a compilation

of intelligence. Its uses and contents de-pend upon the needs of the echelon pre-scribing submission. Prior to an opera-tion or at other appropriate times higherechelons may publish an intelligence sum-mary of one or more volumes which con-tains a detailed r6sume of all availableintelligence. In tactical units, intelli-gence summaries are used as brief con-solidated reports of intelligence previous-ly disseminated during a prescribedperiod.

(b) No specific form for an intelligence sum-mary is prescribed. Its organization

99

varies according to purpose and content.At lower echelons of command the in-telligence summary contains a telegraphiccondensation of the principal importantitems of intelligence that have resultedfrom information received and dissem-inated over a certain period. The sum-mary does not take the place of regularand spot dissemination of information,but provides a means by which the unitintelligence officer can periodically re-view the information received and con-solidate all items into a r6sume for theperiod. Most intelligence summaries willinclude-

1. Issuing unit.- 2. Time and date of issue.

3. Summary of enemy activity for the period.4. Location of mine fields and road blocks.5. New identifications.6. Enemy movements.7. Estimated number of vehicles destroyed.8. Weather and condition of ground.9. Estimate of the situation with deductions.

10. Name of officer sending ISUM.(c) An example of an intelligence summary

is-

"To VI Corps100th Inf Div ISUM for period end-

ing 030730 Jan 49.Aggressor continued defensive atti-

tude in division zone except for local at-tack with estimated 400 men, 5 medium type

100

tanks and no repeat no artillery support at0515 in vicinity of X487850. Attack re-pulsed. Four tanks knocked out. Twelveprisoners taken identifying 1st Bn., 17thAggressor Inf. Regt. Estimate purposeof attack to seize stronger defensive terrainin vicinity of hill 405. Two aggressor jetfighters bombed and strafed in vicinity ofX592863,at 0800; one shot down. No iden-tification. Patrol reports battery of 150'sat X603292. Unconfirmed IPW reportsstate ammunition supply in front lines run-ning low. Snow continues. Ground froz-en hard and will support all types of ve-hicles. Enemy is capable of defending hispresent position including making local at-tacks to improve his defensive position orwithdrawing to stronger position.

SMITH, G-2"(d) The period covered by the intelligence

summary and the time of disseminationare prescribed by each higher headquar-ters for its next subordinate unit. Sum-maries are usually disseminated to lowerunits, the next higher headquarters, unitstaff and commander, and to adjacentunits.

56. PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

a. General.(1) The periodic intelligence report is a sum-

mary of the enemy situation, operations andcapabilities, and of the weather and terrain.

101

It is prepared by intelligence sections ofdivision and higher headquarters. Intelli-gence sections of units below the divisionusually have their intelligence summariesincluded in a situation report. The periodof time to be covered by the report is eitherdesignated by the next higher headquartersor is specified by the unit commander in theabsence of such instructions. Normally, thereport is prepared and submitted daily foreach preceding 24 hours. However, alonger period may be covered by the report,especially in higher headquarters.

(2) If the report is for 24 hours, the period cov-ered should be from 1800 one day to 1800the following day, in preference to a 2400to 2400 period. This period will insuretimeliness in the dissemination and receiptof intelligence on enemy activities for thatpart of a day which is generally most active.Reports will be received at other units intime to compare them and to use intelligencethey contain in planning operations for thefollowing day. The 1800 to 1800 'periodavoids harassing the limited number of in-telligence and liaison personnel, and mes-sengers, in division and lower staffs. The2400 to 2400 period interrupts the rest ofstaff officers and messengers during a nor-mally quiet period. Dissemination of re-ports is generally too late to receive properconsideration in planning operations forthe following day (par. 54).

1.02

(3) Periodic intelligence reports are intendedprimarily for use during contact with theenemy. They also assist units not engaged,for they permit all commanders to keep intouch with the general situation of theenemy and with the local situation at pointswhere the unit is likely to be engaged.

b. Importance. The periodic intelligence reportis the primary means of disseminating military in-telligence. Although intelligence contained in thesummary will have been disseminated previously inthe form of "spot reports," and in brief telephone orteletype summaries covering a shorter period of time,the periodic report is nevertheless unique in its com-pleteness and scope. It contains a summation ofthese former reports, and presents as well the enemyactivities and trends as viewed over the longer in-terval. In addition, it presents other data such asenemy capabilities, and intelligence to include orderof battle, translation of captured documents, inter-rogation of prisoners of war reports, and similarmiscellaneous items.

57. FORM OF PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

One form is used by all commands by merely de-leting those parts which are not applicable for theusing unit. However, in the discussion followingthe illustrative form, its use by ground combat unitsreceives primary consideration. (Appendix III isan example of a periodic intelligence report.)

103

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing headquartersPlace of issueDate and time

Periodic Intelligence Report No.Period covered: (Date and time to date and time.)Charts or maps:

(Omit paragraphs and subparagraphs not applicable)

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. (Show onmap or overlay when possible.) Give a brief r6sum6 ofthe enemy situation including location, identification,strength, organization, disposition, and movement ofenemy forces (including reserves), and installationsfor administrative support.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. Summary. Give a brief resume6 of the operations of

enemy forces as a whole, stressing the significance ofdevelopments indicating the continuation of a partic-ular course of action, or the adoption of a new courseof action.

b. New enemy tactics, and weapons or other materiel.c. Operations of enemy component elements.

(1) Administrative units.(2) Air forces.(3) Antiaircraft defenses.(4) Antitank units.(5) Armored units.(6) Artillery (including rockets).(7) Cavalry.(8) Chemical warfare.(9) Engineers.(10) Guided missiles.(11) Infantry.(12) Reconnaissance.(13) Other elements (list alphabetically as separate

subparagraphs).

104

3. OTHIER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.a. Estimated enemy losses (prisoners and casualties).b. Enemy combat efficiency.c. Morale.d. Status of enemy administrative support.e. Location and nature of enemy administrative instal-

lations.f. Weather.g. Terrain and defensive works.h. Any pertinent intelligence factor not otherwise covered.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Brief resum6 of counter-intelligence situation during the period.

a. Espionage.b. Sabotage.O. Treason.d. Sedition.e. Subversion.f. Disaffection.g. Political.h. Propaganda and rumors.i, Miscellaneous.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enumeration of all courses of action that the enemyis physically capable of adopting and which if adoptedwill affect the accomplishment of the mission of thecommand.

b. Discussion and analysis of subparagraph 5a.c. Conclusions as to relative probability of adoption of

enemy capabilities.

CommanderAnnexesDistributionAuthentication

CLASSIFICATION 105

58. PREPARATION OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCEREPORT

a. Paragraph 1. This paragraph, since it mainlyconcerns identifications, strengths, organizations,dispositions, movements, and other enemy factors, isbest indicated on an overprinted map, sketch map,or overlay. Other intelligence not suitable to thatmeans of presentation should be written. The G-2work sheet (fig. 8) is indexed to facilitate the prepa-ration of a brief written r6sum6 for paragraph 1, ifsuch a r6sum6 should be required or desired by theintelligence officer. Four convenient and logicalsubparagraphs for a r6sume of the enemy situationare: forward area, rear area, defensive organization,and administrative installations.

(1) The forward area paragraph contains ar6sume of the enemy situation from the lineof contact back to and including the posi-tions of the enemy supporting artillery. Itdescribes the front line, identifications offorward enemy units, list of their strengths,dispositions, flanks, boundaries, and caliberof artillery.

(2) The paragraph on the rear area includesthe enemy situation behind his supportingartillery. It is concerned mainly with thereserves of divisions and higher units, whichcan affect the operations. Consequently, in-telligence of enemy units in this area shouldbe presented as for units in the forwardarea. In considering enemy reserves, how-ever, the intelligence officer should not men-

106

tion every known reserve along the entirefront. The list should include only thoseenemy units, which, according to locationand organization, are physically capableand can be reasonably expected to be em-ployed against one's own unit. Judgmentand experience are necessary to prepare thisparagraph accurately.

(3) Enemy defensiove organization considers theenemy's organization of the ground for de-fensive purposes, and the location of ob-stacles, road blocks, mine fields, observationposts, command posts, and fortifications.

(4) The last paragraph contains intelligence ofthe enemy administrative installations forsupport, to include their location, kind,scale of activity, and size.

b. Paragraph 2. Enemy Operations DuringPeriod, contains three parts and is of particularimportance.

(1) The first part, paragraph a, fulfills theneed of a brief summary or thumbnailr6sumn of enemy operations, with specialstress on how these operations indicateenemy courses of action. Preparation ofthis part should be withheld until the restof the report has been completed. Thisparagraph is prepared for the convenienceof commanders, staff officers, and others,who are interested in the over-all pictureof the enemy's activities and what they in-dicate. It supplies the essence of theenemy operations during the period. Only

926264--51 8 107

the main enemy operations are considered.The significance of these operations by theenemy is stressed to indicate the continuingof a current course of action or the adop-tion of new courses of action. Intelligencefor this paragraph is obtained by analyzingthe intelligence listed in the work sheet forthe remaining two paragraphs. Only thehighlights or critical items of intelligenceare included, and then in condensed style.The importance of this paragraph justifieshaving it stand out in the report. Twomeans to accomplish this are: to indent thesummary, or to indent and inclose it ina box.

(2) The second part, paragraph 2b, consists ofintelligence of new enemy tactics, weapons,and other materiel. Dissemination of thisintelligence is essential in order that coun-termeasures can be developed and employedby our troops.

(3) The last part, paragraph 2c, contains in-telligence of operations of enemy com-ponent elements during the period of thereport. While paragraph 2a contains thehighlights or a summary of enemy activity,paragraph 2c includes a detailed and ex-plicit account of that activity. This para-graph furnishes the broad intelligencecoverage which is desired by the intelligencespecialists. Armored, engineer, infantry,and other intelligence specialists can finddetailed intelligence of a particular part of

.108

the enemy operations during the period inthis section. Again, only the more impor-tant items 'should be included. If the op-erations of a certain component are of nointelligence value during the period, thenthat part of the paragraph should beomitted. The decision to include a com-ponent in the report will be a matter foreach individual writer to determine.

c. Paragraph 3. Other Intelligence Factors in-cludes subheadings for enemy losses, combat effi-ciency, and morale. Additional paragraphs includestatus, location, and type of administrative installa-tions. Other factors, including weather and terrain,are also listed in this paragraph. Changes to thealready published terrain information as well ascurrent weather conditions and forecasts are itemsincluded under these factors. If any of these fea-tures have been covered in other parts of the report,then they should not be included a second time.

d. Paragraph 4. Normally, the content of theparagraph on Counterintelligence is relativelylimited in a division periodic intelligence report.However, in each successive higher headquarters, thedetails contained in this paragraph increase. Thefeature of considerable counterintelligence detail willbe particularly applicable to a service unit periodicintelligence report originating in a communicationszone headquarters. Regardless of the headquarters,details of espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, sub-version, disaffection, and enemy propaganda are eachlisted when such information is available.

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e. Paragraph 5. This paragraph and paragraph2b of the intelligence estimate are identical. Thereare three parts to it. First, is a listing of the enemycapabilities. These can be determined only aftera careful analysis has been made of all available in-telligence. As in the estimate, only those capabilitieswhich are considered of high priority or reasonablelikelihood should be included. The two remainingparts of this paragraph are a discussion and analysisof the capabilities and their relative probability ofadoption.

f. Annexes. Much pertinent intelligence, which istoo detailed for inclusion in the main body of thereport, can be included in annexes. A reader in-terested in more detail on a particular item-such asorder of battle summaries, prisoner of war interrogattion reports, intelligence of a technical nature, enemydocument translations, long-range weather forecasts,and other specific intelligence subjects--finds amplifi-cation in the annexes on these special aspects. Onecaution in the preparation of annexes is that eachone be carefully considered to ensure that the reportdoes not become unreasonably bulky. -

g. G-2 Work Sheet (par. 38 and fg. 8). An im-portant aid to the intelligence officer in the prepara-tion of the periodic intelligence report is the G-2work sheet. The form of the work sheet provides ameans of indexing and cataloging information foreasy inclusion in the report. The arrangement ofthe pages of the work sheet follows the sequence ofthe paragraphs in the periodic intelligence report.

110

59. QUALITIES OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCEREPORT

The four principal qualities which should charac-terize a periodic intelligence report are brevity,clarity, interest, and pertinence.

a. Brevity. An intelligence report should be briefbut complete, In this respect, there are two aims(brevity and detail) to be satisfied by the periodic in-telligence report, and these conflict. Brevity isneeded for the commanders, staff officers, and otherswho require a brief summary of the enemy operationsand the significance of these operations in relation tocurrent and future probable courses of enemy action.This requirement can be met by paragraph 2a of thereport. On the other hand, detail is needed by manyother readers, who are keenly interested in the mostcomplete information concerning various aspects ofenemy activity. This is accomplished in paragraph2c of the report.

b. Clarity. This may be obtained by stating theknown intelligence and admitting the lack of desiredinformation. Many intelligence officers, and otherstaff officers, write ambiguous and confusing state-ments to conceal a lack of information. Such apractice must be avoided. Furthermore, uncon-firmed information must be so labeled. Unless sucha policy is followed, other headquarters, using the in-formation as a basis for plans, may become victimsof a false enemy situation.

c. IZiterest. One way to make the report interest-ing is to consider the news appeal of the intelligence.

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Some items not only are interesting, but occasionallyentertaining as well. A second way to maintain in-terest is to eliminate abbreviations and unnecessaryreferences to coordinates. Any reader who finds amass of abbreviations or coordinates in the report,and who may not have a map immediately available,soon will lose interest in reading the report. Somecoordinates are essential and are included; however,their constant repetition should be avoided. Ab-breviations are seldom necessary. Another way tocreate interest is to make frequent use of illustra-tions. Sketches, overlays, maps, photos, and otherforms of pictorial presentation add to the attractive-ness and interest of the report. Division reproduc-tion facilities are not as readily available as at higherechelons; nevertheless, a resourceful division G-2 canalways find an expedient to vary the method of pre-senting his material and thus add to the interest ofhis report. Although the report should be interest-ing, it must also achieve a high professional standard.Interest is a desirable feature but not at the expenseof quality.

d. Pertinenee. Intelligence in the periodic reportmust be both relevant and timely. The scope ofenemy activity to be included will vary with eachheadquarters, as small units will include considerablymore detail of the enemy opposing them than willa higher headquarters.

60. DISSEMINATION OF THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE'REPORT

Distribution of the periodic intelligence report in-cludes, as a minimum, staff sections of the unit head-

112

quarters, headquarters of the next two higher andsubordinate echelons, and the adjacent units. Fur-ther dissemination may be made as deemed neces-sary. At the division, such a distribution would in-clude headquarters from battalions through army.Classification of the report, which is usually secretin combat, may limit further distribution to lowerunits.

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CHAPTER 7

DIRECTION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

61. SIGNIFICANCE OF DIRECTION

a. The intelligence officer is constantly revisinghis plans for collecting information. Items of in-formation secured by the collection agencies willindicate new lines of investigation. Lack of successby one agency will necessitate new orders or requestsfor the desired information. New essential elementsof information will require preparation of a newcollection plan. Direction of the collection effortmust be dynamic and continuing throughout anoperation.

b. Direction consists of three successive pro-cedures-

(1) Determination of the essential elements offormation.

(2) Preparation of a collection plan.(3) Issuance of orders and requests for infor-

mation to the agencies concerned.

62. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential elements of information (EEI) com-prise the specific information of an actual or poten-tial enemy and of the terrain, hydrographic, andmeteorological conditions which a commander needsin a particular situation in order to accomplish hismission. In effect, EEI are the commander's cur-

114

rent, high-priority intelligence requirements. Theymay also include requirements for information orintelligence based on requests from higher, lower, oradjacent units. EEI focus the attention and activi-ties of all collecting agencies and intelligence per-sonnel on specific information which is required ata particular time.

b. While the primary mission of all collectingagencies is to satisfy the requirements arising fromthe EEI, these agencies must also transmit all addi-tional information that comes to their attention.This primarily concerns the basic order of battle,terrain, and other data which are necessary for theunderstanding and appreciation of informationwhich comes in answer to EEI. Also, much infor-mation about the enemy must be collected for theprimary purpose of aiding the collection effort it-self. For instance, information about the enemy'svehicle numbering system must be collected andprocessed into intelligence which is then sent forwardto the collecting agencies so that they may collectcurrent order of battle information, based on specificapplication of the developed numbering system.

63. FORM AND CONTENT OF EEI

a. EEI are preferably stated in question form.The questions stimulate the thinking of all concernedand also indicate the inquiring attitude of the com-mander. They should be in clear, concise, simplelanguage. Generally they refer to-

(1) Enemy capabilities that can interfere withor favor our operations, elaborated upon asto details of time, place, and strength.

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(2) Enemy strength, composition, disposition,and reinforcement not covered by enemycapabilities.

(3) Terrain, including natural and artificialobstacles.

(4) Meteorological conditions.(5) Information desired by higher, adjacent, or

lower headquarters.

b. Of the factors that the commander considers inmaking his own estimate of the situation, those per-taining to the enemy, the weather, and the terrainare at the best changeable, and at the worst unknown.Having reached and announced his decision, there-fore, the commander's knowledge of the latest situa-tion and the enemy capabilities may be inadequateto provide a sound basis for the future employmentof his unit. He must consider the possible enemyreaction to his contemplated course of action. Hemust consider the things that the enemy may dobetween the time the decision is announced and thetime the course of action is to be executed. He mustalso consider the effects of weather and terrain onhis plans. Finally, he must consider the directivesor requests for information from higher or adjacentheadquarters.

64. DESIGNATION OF EEI

a. Responsibility. The commander is responsiblefor the designation of the EEI. In designating theEEI, the commander is assisted by his staff, princi-pally by his intelligence officer. The latter, in coop-

116

eration with other staff officers who are concerned,must be prepared at all times to recommend appro-priate EEI, and to present the important considera-tions that govern their selection. The EEl arenormally announced by the intelligence officer at staffconferences, after approval by the commander.

b. EEI from Higher Headquarters. The EEI fora given situation will not be the same at all echelonscomprising an integrated unit such as a division.At each echelon, from the division to the battalion,the EEI will change in character at each lowerechelon and as the combat situation changes. EEIannounced by a higher headquarters, therefore, arenot copied verbatim by a lower headquarters. How-ever, they may be used as a checklist by the lowerheadquarters to ensure that no enemy capability isoverlooked. In addition, the lower headquarters candetermine what information is of particular impor-tance to the higher headquarters. Some of the EEImay be the same, based upon similar capabilities oftheir respective opposing forces. EEI must be com-patible with the missions of the lower unit, andwithin the physical capability of the unit to obtainanswers to them. The capabilities of the enemyopposed to the lower unit may be different from thoseof the enemy opposing the higher unit. For ex-ample, the capabilities of the enemy opposing a divi-sion might be limited to "defense," "delay," or"withdrawal." On the front of a subordinate bat-talion, the enemy might not only have the capabilityof "attack" but might do so in order to cover thewithdrawal of the larger force.

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65. DETERMINATION OF EEI

a. Sound judgment, for which no rules can be sub-stituted, is essential in determining EEI appropriateto a current mission and situation. The followingwill be useful as guides in determining EEI:

(1) What enemy courses of action will mostseriously affect the accomplishment of themission or the operation of the plan ?

(2) What is the next major decision which canbe foreseen at this time?

(3) What information is required to preventsurprise of the command ?

(4) What information of the enemy, weather,or terrain is required in order to plan futuremaneuvers ?

(5) What information compatible with our mis-sion has been requested by higher or ad-jacent units ?

b. In determining the EEI pertaining to theenemy, no guess as to the enemy intentions is desired(par. 47 d). Instead, a systematic search is directedfor facts that will disclose progressively the con-firmation or elimination of adoption of enemy coursesof action to which the inquiries relate.

66. DISSEMINATION OF THE EEl

The EEI are disseminated to the command in anyor all of the following ways:

a. Paragraph 3x of the operation order.b. Paragraph 2 of the intelligence annex to the

operation order (app. V).c. Fragmentary form to units of the command.

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d. Orally by the commander to members of hisstaff.

67. ANSWERS TO EEI

a. Relative to the Enemy. EEI concerning theenemy may be answered only after a careful check ofevaluated and interpreted information against allpossible courses of action open to the enemy. Theintelligence officer endeavors to verify or disprovethe hypothesis relative to each enemy capability. Todo this he assembles all available facts possible con-cerning the enemy situation. By eliminating as manyof these hypotheses as possible, in the light of ascer-tained facts, the intelligence officer narrows down theoriginal courses of action open to the enemy to thosecourses of action that are still available to him.Changes in the situation may result in new capabili-ties, resulting in changes of the EEI. Unless theenemy has irrevocably committed himself, any at-tempted deduction as to his probable intentions isa guess that is likely to prove misleading and toresult in faulty decisions. Commanders should notexpect to require their intelligence officers to attemptsuch deductions.

b. Relative to Weather and Terrain. EEI re-lating to the weather and terrain may be answeredas soon as sufficient credible information is availableupon which to base a conclusion.

68. EXAMPLE OF EEI

a. Based on the situation given in the example inparagraph 52 and figure 11, the Commanding Gen-

119

eral, 1st Infantry Division, announced his decisionto attack with two regiments. He further announcedthe EEI for the attack to be-

(1) Will the enemy reinforce the unit now onHill 101 before 0600 tomorrow? If so,,when, where, and in what strength ? Spe-cial attention to the combat team on Hill102.

(2) Will the enemy attack us in our presentpositions prior to 0600 tomorrow? If so,when; with what troops?

(3) Will the enemy continue to defend in hispresent positions? If so, how will he or-ganize his defenses; with what troops?

(4) Will the enemy withdraw beyond the di-vision's objective prior to our attack?

(5) What antitank obstacles or natural barriersto tank employment are there in the divi-sion zone, north to and including the divi-sion's objective?

b. After receiving the EEI the intelligence officeranalyzes them,; listing as indications items that willbe needed to answer the questions asked or impliedby the wording of the EEI.

69. INDICATIONS

a. Definition. Indications are those evidences ofenemy activities, either positive or negative, that maypoint toward the adoption or rejection of a particularcourse of action by the enemy. The absence ofpositive indications in one direction may tend tostrengthen those pointing in another.

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b. Application. In their application to militaryintelligence, indications may reveal progressively theimpending course of action of the enemy. Beforethe enemy can adopt a certain general course ofaction, certain preparations must be made by him.The maxim "coming events cast their shadows be-fore" expresses the relationship of indications tothe answers for the EEL. We seek the events thatcast the "shadows" in order to determine what eventswill-follow. The events we look for include thedispositions and actions of the enemy. We seek todetermine how he and the terrain will appear, andwhat he will be doing if he adopts the course ofaction referred to by the particular EEI. In thecollection plan, indications are arrived at by a de-tailed analysis of the EEI and include all detailsneeded to obtain the information to answer the par-ticular EEI under consideration.

c. Determination of Indications. The analysis ofthe EEI by the intelligence officer points to the spe-cific items of information that will be clues to theanswers for the EEI. These specific items of infor-mation are determined in the light of-

(1) An understanding of the terrain and theuse made of it by the opposing forces. Thisincludes an appreciation of the enemy'sprobable knowledge of the terrain held byour own forces.

(2) A thorough knowledge of the organization,equipment, and tactical and logistical meth-ods of the enemy.

(3) A knowledge of the personalities of com-manders and the performance record orhistory of enemy units.

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d. Guide to Determination of Indications. It isimpracticable to prescribe a rigid set of indicationsthat would be applicable for a given set of EEI-just as a standard set of EEI will not suffice for everytactical situation. However, examples of indica-tions for EEI concerned with attack, defense, with-.drawal, reinforcement, delaying action, local defeatand terrain are included in Appendix IV, Guide toDetermination of Indications. In operations thesemust be modified according to knowledge gained ofthe enemy's actual tactical doctrine and procedures.

70. EXAMPLE OF INDICATIONS

a. Following are some indications for the first EEIin the example given in paragraph 68:

(1) Movement south of the combat team now atHill 102.

(2) Increased traffic toward our position.(3) Identification of new units.(4) Increased aggressive patrolling.(5) Additional command posts and supply or

evacuation installations.(6) Strengthening of defenses on Hill 101.

b. The EEI, and their analysis to determine ap-propriate indications, form the basis of the collectionplan.

71. THE COLLECTION PLAN

a. After the EEI are announced, definite and pre-cise orders or requests for obtaining the required in-

122

formation are given to the collecting agencies. Toprevent omission or conflict, the intelligence officerprepares the collection plan; which consists first ofan analysis of the EEI, and second of the collectionscheme based on this analysis. It is usually made inchart form, and is available for reference to all per-sonnel of the intelligence section. It is solely awork sheet and is not disseminated. A suggestedform for the collection plan is shown in figure 12 ).

b. The intelligence officer, during combat, maylimit his collection plan to a mental analysis of theEEI and then a decision as to the assignment of col-lecting agencies to procure the information. Hemay also prepare fragmentary notes that may de-velop into an abbreviated collection plan. However,when time and other conditions permit, it is desirableto complete a detailed plan. In any event, the intel-ligence officer follows an orderly process of consider-ing each fundamental factor (EEI), the indications,the orders or requests to the collecting agencies, andthe time and place at which the information is to bereported. Thereby he avoids omission of details andprevents conflicts in the assignment of orders or re-quests to collecting agencies.

72. PREPARATION OF THE COLLECTION PLAN(fig. 12)

a. Period Covered. The collection plan is pre-pared to cover the period of operations required bythe mission of the commander. It will be subse-quently modified to conform to new decisions re-quired by the development of the situation.

926264°--51 9 123

b. EEl (column 1). In this column are listedthe EEI as announced for the projected operation orsituation.

c. Indicatiois (column 0). In this column the in-telligence officer briefly records the analysis of theEEI, setting down as indications those items whichanswer the questions asked or implied by the wordingof the EEl. These indications of possible enemyaction will furnish the basis for definite reconnais-sance missions. Certain EEI will require very littleanalysis by the intelligence officer in order to trans-form them into suitable reconnaissance missions. Ifthe information to be obtained gives a direct answerto the inquiry contained in an EEI, analysis is un-necessary. For example, EEI relating to the exist-ence of natural obstacles usually require no analysisother than a map study, supplemented by informa-tion from other sources, to determine whether or notthe obstacles exist. Other EEI, however, are sub-jected to careful analysis in order to determine whatindications will answer the inquiries containedtherein.

d. Basis for Specific Orders or Requests (column3). After analyzing the EEI and recording theindications corresponding to each, the intelligenceofficer next writes the basis for the specific orders to'the collecting agencies and the requests to be madeto higher, adjacent, or supporting units. The actualorders or requests are then prepared from notes con-tained in this column. Often two or more of theseentries may be combined into one message or para-graph of an order to an agency. In order that hemay give each agency specific instructions as to the

124

exact information to be secured and where it is to besought, the intelligence officer makes a careful studyof the situation map. Several agencies with differingcharacteristics and limitations may be employed inestablishing one definite fact that bears on an EEI.

e. Agencies To Be Employed (column 4). In thiscolumn, the intelligence officer lists, in the spacesprovided at the top, all agencies he may employ. Heassigns them missions which will be stated in ordersor requests, by checking the agency or agencies thathave or can get this information. To employ theavailable collecting agencies properly in the searchfor information, it is essential that the intelligenceofficer be thoroughly familiar with their character-istics and that he cooperate closely with the opera-tions officer. Care is taken to select the agencies bestsuited to get the information desired, as well as toprevent overloading an agency with missions.Whenever possible, more than one agency or sourceof information should be used in obtaining eachitem required. The agencies selected should becircled, as shown in figure 12.

f. Time and Place at Which I-nformation Is To Bereported (column 5). From a knowledge of theplan of operations gained by close cooperation withthe operations officer, the intelligence officer deter-mines when and where necessary information mustbe reported in order to be of use to the commander.-In determining the time at which information mustbe available, the intelligence officer is guided by thefact that information arriving too late is of no value,and information arriving in advance of its actualneed is likely to be out of date and inaccurate at the

125

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time projected operations are undertaken. In de-termining when information will be reported, theintelligence officer considers the time required toissue necessary orders to all echelons of commandinvolved in the mission, the time required to executethe mission, and the time required to report itsresults.

73. EXAMPLE OF COLLECTION PLAN

a. Figure 12 O is an example of a partial collec-tion plan based on the situation, mission, and thefirst EEI and its indications given in the precedingexamples (par. 52, 68, and 70). It is lacking indetail because of the schematic nature of the situa-tion. It reveals some of the thought processes andother steps in preparing the collection plan.

b. Columns (3), (4), and (5) of the collection planare the basis for the collection scheme, and furnishthe data for specific orders and requests to collectingagencies.

74. ORDERS AND REQUESTS

a. General. In addition to his own requirementsfor information, a commander may receive recon-naissance missions or demands for specific informa-tion from higher headquarters as well as requestsfor information from lower and neighboring units.Positive action for securing this information is takenby the intelligence officer. He is authorized by hiscommander to issue orders for the collection of in-formation to subordinate units of the command

130

(coordinating such directives with the operationsofficer), and to request specific items of informationfrom neighboring and higher units.

b. Purpose. Orders and requests are necessary toobtain the desired results from the collection plan.They may or may not be repeated in the intelligenceannex, depending on the time available.

e. Form. Orders or requests may be in the formof written messages, overlays, or marked maps.

(1) Message. Figure 13 is an example of amessage directing the collecting of informa-tion based on items (4) and (5), columns(3), (4), and (5), figure 12 (.

TrHES SPACES fOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED I MSG CEN NO. I HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMEIT TO MESSAGC (SCLUFTCOsTOA)MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. DATE 1 Ju1y 19 ....

To CO lst Inf

AS ODTAINED, NSATIVYE DAILY AT 0500 AND 2400,

STARTING 012400 JUL 19..., REPORT NUMBER, SIZE,COP1OSITION, ROUTES OF ENEMY PATROLS ENICOUNTEtED

YOUR ZONE; NEW IDENTIPICATIONS.

Co lt Inf Div-CO 1st OFFICIIDAL ESI-GNATION OF SENDE 0 . ...IVTNORZIOE T10 /s/ Smith, Lt ColSENT I CIEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SICNATURE AN

DGRACE OF WR"IER

Figure 13. Message directing collection of information.

131

(2) Overlay or marked map. These are issuedto amplify messages by indicating graphi-cally the areas or localities to be recon-noitered.

d. Transmittal. Two methods of transmittingorders to subordinate units and agencies for the col-lection of information are through fragmentaryorders and paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex tothe operation order. In view of the infrequency ofissue of the operation order as compared tothe continual need for information, the mostcommon method of issue is by fragmentary order.Requests for information to neighboring and higherunits may be transmitted through personal contact,radio, telephone, teletype, or any other means that-will insure prompt and adequate receipt of the neces-sary information. The means of transmission to beemployed will be governed by the urgency of thesituation and the security classification required.

(1) Fragmentary orders. The basis for ordersrequesting specific information from thevarious collecting agencies is found in col-umn (3) of the collection plan, figure 12.Maps, sketches, or overlays having brief in-structions written on them may accompanyorders or may themselves be the orders.

(2) Intelligence annex. The intelligence annexis a means of disseminating intelligence andof issuing intelligence instructions to a com-mand for an impending operation. It mayor may not confirm the orders and requestsfor information that have been made infragmentary form, depending on whether

132

, or not the orders or requests are obsoleteby the time the annex is issued. As indi-cated earlier, paragraph 3 of the annex isthe formal means of implemnenting the col-lection plan. Annexes are normally pre-pared for all operations. They are indis-pensable in operations preceded by long pe-riods of planning.

75. FORM OF INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

a. Following is the form for the intelligence an-nex. (See app. V for example of an intelligenceannex.)

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing headquartersPlace of issueDate and time

Annex - (Intelligence) to Operation Order

CHARTS OR MAPS

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. Refer to overlay(or map) and latest intelligence summary (or docu-ments). showing the enemy situation.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION. Each es-sential element of information will appear under a sepa-rate lettered paragraph in the intelligence annex.

3. RECONNAISSANCE-AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.a. Orders to subordinate and attached units. A separate

numbered paragraph covering detailed instructions foreach unit from which a report to this headquartersis required.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units. Aseparate numbered paragraph pertaining to each unit,not organic or attached, from which information isrequested.

133

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCU-

MENTS, AND MATERIEL.a. Prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, inlhabitants, and

other persons.b. Captured documents.c. Captured materiel.

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS. List maps and photo-graphs, vertical and oblique, that will be supplied, withnumber of each class to each unit; instructions con-cerning special requisitions and distribution.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

(Commander)Appendixes.Distribution.Authentication.

CLASSIFICATION

The form of an intelligence plan is the same asthat of an intelligence annex, with the addition of aneighth paragraph as follows:

8. AUXILIARY AGENCIES.a. Instructions for agencies assigned to the command.b. Instructions and recommendations for agencies support-

ing the command.c. Recommendations for other agencies.

A ninth paragraph, titled "MISCELLANEOUS,"may be added if necessary. Its use should be avoidedby lower echelons. At army or higher levels it maybe required in order to include such matters as train-ing, intelligence funds, and other subjects that cannotbe appropriately discussed under other paragraphs,

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76. PREPARATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

a. Heading. The number for the operation orderand the number for the intelligence annex areassigned by the operations officer (G-3).

b. Summary of Enemy Situation. If reference isnot made to an overlay or the latest intelligence re-ports, a brief summary of enemy information shouldbe given. It must be pertinent to the operationcovered by the operation order, and include the loca-tion, identification, strength, organization, disposi-tion, and movements of enemy forces, including re-serves, installations for administrative support, andcapabilities.

c. Essential Elements of Information.

(1) This paragraph is included primarily tofocus the attention of lower unit comand-ers and others who receive the annex onthe items of information with which thecommander is primarily concerned. Unitsand agencies receiving the annex extractany EEI that pertain to their missions andthat they are physically capable of answer-ing. Lower units add these EEI to theirown for incorporation into their orders.

(2) In the event publication of the intelligenceannex is deferred, or is omitted entirely, theEEI should appear in paragraph 3x of theoperation order. EEI are not published inboth- places except when the commanderldesires that certain ones be emphasized.

d. Reconnaissance and Observation Missions. Ifany particular paragraph of the intelligence annex

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can be called most important, it is this paragraph.Current orders and requests for information areconfirmed, and the collection plan formally imple-mented. In this paragraph the commander directshis subordinate commanders to gather the specificinformation required to answer the EEL. Here, too,the commander requests the same type of vital infor-mation desired from higher, adjacent, and cooperat-ing units. In both paragraphs 3a and 3b, the unitsare listed in the same sequence as they appear in theoperation order.

e. Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents,and Matriel. (Ch. 9.) This paragraph is partlya matter of standing operating procedure. How-ever, changes required by a particular situation mustbe added.

(1) Paragraph 4a contains instructions, includ-ing special provisions, for segregating andhandling enemy personnel, refugees, andrepatriates, that will insure their maximumexploitation as sources of information.Special types of information required fromprisoners may be included. Preparation ofthe subparagraph is coordinated with G-1and G-4.

(2) Paragraph 4b contains instructions forhandling and processing captured docu-ments from the time of their acquisition totheir receipt by specified intelligence per-sonnel. Special instructions for forwardingdocuments or search for a special type docu-ment may be included.

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(3) Paragraph 4c designates items or types ofenemy materiel required for examinationand includes specific instructions for proc-essing and disposition. Specific types ofmat4riel desired may be listed. Prepara-tion of this paragraph is coordinated withG-4 and pertinent technical services.

f. Maps and Photographs (ch. 9).(1) G-2 mus1t consolidate the requests and re-

quirements for both maps and air photos.Map distribution is somewhat standardizedand prescribed in a table such as that foundin FM 101-10. Theaters of operation willprepare similar tables to suit their needsbased on experience. Current availabilityof maps may curtail issue. Air photodistribution requires a great deal of plan-ning because of the many factors that mustbe considered.

(2) Preparation of paragraph 5 is coordinatedwith G-3.

g. Counterintelligence. This paragraph is largelycovered by standing operating procedure. Manyspecial operational instructions having counterin-telligence aspects will be listed in the operation orderor in other annexes. Examples are restrictions onartillery registration (which appear in the artilleryannex) and radio silence (which appears in the sig-nal annex). These items also may be included inthe counterintelligence paragraph of the intelligenceannex.

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h. Reports and Distribution. Any or all of thefollowing items may be covered in this paragraph:

(1) Period to be covered by routine reports, anddistribution.'

(2) Routine and special reports required fromsubordinate units.

(3) Distribution of routine and special reportsfrom higher headquarters.

(4) Periodic or special conferences of intelli-gence officers.

(5) Distribution of special intelligence studies,such as defense overprints, air photo intel-ligence reports, and order of battle overlays.

(6) Special intelligence liaisofi when indicated.

i. Appendixes.

(1) The number and type of appendixes willbe determined by the echelon and by thetype of the projected operation. Appen-dixes will contain material of limited in-terest, or which involves considerable detail.Higher headquarters-theater and army-will generally employ more appendixesthan divisions because of the volume of de-tailed instructions and the number of sub-ordinate agencies and commands involved.Material covered in great detail in an ap-pendix is covered only by a few generalstatements in the appropriate paragraphof the annex and by a reference to theappendix.

(2) Appendixes that may be included are-(a) Enemy situation, which may be a map,

overlay, summary, or combination there-

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of whenever a current estimate, summary,or periodic intelligence report has notbeen published separately.

(;b) Combat intelligence plan, which includesEEI and reconnaissance and observationmissions. This appendix is used whendetail and volume is too great for inclu-sion in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the annex.

(c) Air reconnaissance plan, including bothvisual and photo missions and proceduresfor submitting requests.

(d) Weather and terrain studies, disseminatedby higher headquarters or prepared byG-2, assisted by the engineer officer.

(e) Map and photo plan, covering the distri-bution of maps and air photos.

(f) Tide, moon, and sun tables.(g) Counterintelligence plan, when instruc-

tions are too detailed for complete cov-erage in paragraph 6.

(h) Special theater studies.(i) Intelligence administrative' plan, which

may cover reports, funds, special intelli-gence, liaison, and other administrativedetails.

j. Distribution. The annex is not always distrib-uted with the operation order, although it usuallyhas the same distribution. It may accompany theoperation order, or it may be issued before or afterthe operation order.

k. Authentication. Since the annex is publishedover the name of the commander, the G-2 of theissuing unit personally signs his last name.

926264°-51 10 139

77. COMPLETING THE CYCLE

The issuance of orders and requests to collectingagencies rounds out the operational cycle of combatintelligence, and collection of information beginsanew. The intelligence effort is guided by the mis-sion of the command. When a new or an additionalmission is announced, the intelligence officer mustbe prepared to present an intelligence estimate in thelight of this mission. The resultant EEI will givenew impetus to the cycle by redirection of the col-lection effort. Thus the cycle functions con-tinuously.

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PART THREE

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 8

RECONNAISSANCE

Section I. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE ANDCOUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

78. GENERAL

a. Reconnaissance is directed effort in the field togather information of the enemy, terrain, or re-sources, which is undertaken by an appropriate ele-ment of the Armed Forces.

(1) Distant reconnaissance is the exploration ofobjectives that lie outside immediate strik-ing range of a force, but about which de-tailed information is essential for militaryplanning. Distant reconnaissance is usu-ally performed by armored reconnaissanceunits. Such units must be balanced com-bat forces capable of operating on an exten-sive front and beyond the supporting rangeof other ground combat units. It is espe-cially desirable to supplement their opera-tions with air reconnaissance.

(2) Close reconnaissance supplements distant

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reconnaissance by exploring regions near athand. It may be conducted by infantry,artillery, engineer, and armored units.Close reconnaissance by infantry is constantand intensive when the opposing forces arein contact and especially during combat.Patrols are used to the maximum extent.

(3) Battle reconnaissance is made during orimmediately before battle, when ini closecontact with the enemy. Battle reconnais-sance includes reconnaissance by fire andreconnaissance in force.

(a) Reconnaissance by fire is a method of re-connaissance in which fire is placed on asuspected enemy position to cause the en-emy to disclose his presence by movementor by returning the fire.

(b) Reconnaissance in force is an attack by a'considerable force of troops used to dis-cover and test the enemy's position andstrength. Troops engaged in a recon-naissance in force usually make a localattack with a limited objective.

b. During operations, reconnaissance is one of theprimary means of obtaining information vital to theintelligence effort. Superiority of reconnaissancemay prove the deciding factor in an obscure situa-tion by providing the commander information neces-sary to make a sound decision.

c. The techniques of reconnaissance employed bythe several branches are described in their respectivefield manuals.

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79. RESPONSIBILITY

Reconnaissance to gain information for tacticaloperations is a function of command. The com-mander must initiate and maintain constant recon-naissance. Staff responsibility for planning and as-signing reconnaissance missions and for the trainingand supervision of reconnaissance units and person-nel rests with the intelligence officer. In carryingout his responsibilities the intelligence officer mustclosely coordinate security measures relative to recon-naissance units, orders to patrols, and training ofreconnaissance units and personnmel with the opera-tions officer.

80. PRINCIPLES

Basic principles of reconnaissance that apply toall branches are-

a. Gain Contact as Soon as Possible and MaintainIt Throughout the Operation. Information on thelocation, strength, and movement of enemy troopunits must be gained at the earliest practicablemoment. Contact with the enemy, once gained, mustbe continuously maintained. The nearer the ap-proach to the enemy, the more intensive is the recon-naissance. Ground reconnaissance elements gainand maintain contact with the enemy and, by workingthrough gaps and around the flanks and the rear,endeavor to ascertain the strength, movements, com-position, and dispositions of the enemy's main force,and the approach of enemy reinforcements. Armyaircraft may be employed to supplement and comple-ment the execution of reconnaissance by ground units

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with due regard to the vulnerability of these aircraftto enemy action.

b. Report All Items of Information, Regardless ofWhether They Are Negative or Seemingly Unim-portant. Much information has significance thatmay not be readily apparent at the time of its collec-tion or to the individual collecting it. All items mustbe reported. It is important to receive negative in-formation in order to know what, the enemy is notdoing, or where he is not, at any given time. Thisaids in determining enemy capabilities and probablecourses of action. Small bits of seemingly irrelevantor unimportant information may be the key to theentire picture in a higher headquarters. No in-formation should be overlooked or cast aside.

e. Move Freely About the Terrain; Fix on theEnemy, It is impossible to maintain contact with amoving enemy by staying in one place; nor can themaximum information be obtained if reconnaissanceis confined to canalized routes (roads, valleys, andridge lines). Reconnaissance agencies must moveabout the country, keeping pace with the activity ofthe enemy. They must fix on the enemy, not on theirown troops.

d. Fight Only When Forcing the Enemy to RevealHis Position, or When the Mission Requires It. Itis costly both in time and force for a reconnaissanceagency to engage in combat. Combat should be re-sorted to only when necessary to save the reconnais-sance force from annihilation or capture, or whenthe mission requires that the enemy be forced to re-veal his disposition through combat. Normally re-connaissance should be by stealth and observation of

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the enemy and should be conducted without hisknowledge. Patrols that engage in useless combatdelay the return of information to their commandersand often reveal their own disposition or intentionsof the larger unit commander.

e. Report Informnation in Tine to be of Value.The most valuable information may be utterly worth-less if received too late. To execute an operationplan requires a certain minimum of time. The re-connaissance agency must return the information tothe commander in time for him to make his decision.There may appear to be conflict between this prin-ciple and that of reconnaissance by stealth, or thatof avoiding combat with the enemy. However, theprinciple of time is paramount.

81. AGENCIES

The following reconnaissance agencies are gen-erally available for reconnaissance missions:

a. Armored reconnaissance units (regiments, bat-talions, companies, and platoons (par. 32)).

b. Patrols (all arms, any size unit).

(1) A patrol is a detachment sent out from alarger unit for the purpose of gathering in-formation or carrying out some harassing,destructive, mopping-up, or security mis-sion.

(2) There are two general types of patrols, asdetermined by their assigned missions-re-connaissance patrols and combat patrols.

(a) Reconnaissance patrols are patrols sentout to obtain information, to maintain

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contact with the enemy, to capture pris-oners for questioning, or to observe aparticular area.

(b) Combat patrols may be required to fightto accomplish or to help accomplish theassigned mission. Combat patrols se-cure information as a secondary mission.

e. Light aviation (FM 20-100).

82. MISSIONS

The intelligence officer must prepare suitable mis-sions to agencies in order to obtain desired informa-tion. Missions are usually derived from the col-lection plan (par. 71). In determining missionsthe following should be borne in mind:

a. Missions must be assigned according to thecapabilities and limitations of the agency employed.Obvious as this precept may seem, it is often violated.

b. Missions must be specific, leaving no doubt asto the type of information desired. The assignmentof a vague reconnaissance mission will result in vagueand unsatisfactory information. Broad generaliza-tions such as "report strength and disposition of theenemy" should be avoided. Furthermore, the spe-cific time that the information is desired should beincluded.

c. In assigning reconnaissance missions it is quitelikely that more than one mission may be assignedto. any one agency at a given time. In this case,there must be a definite priority assigned to thesemissions. This priority is determined by the im-portance of the information requested and the time

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it is desired. By indicating priorities, the intelli-gence officer assures proper attention to the mostimportant missions.

d. In order to avoid needless duplication of effort,conflicting reconnaissance, and the possibility of com-bat between friendly units (particularly at night),all reconnaissance missions are coordinated throughthe intelligence officer. This does not present manydifficulties, inasmuch as there should be an over-allreconnaissance scheme and close liaison between theintelligence officers at various echelons.

e. In preparing and assigning reconnaissance mis-sions, the bulk of agencies should be assigned to themost vital tasks. Rather than spreading availableagencies thinly over a wide area or series of missions,the most critical mission should be selected and con-centrated upon until it is satisfactorily completed.This does not imply that all other missions shouldbe neglected for a single task. However, reason-able concentration of a majority of agencies on theimportant missions will achieve better results in ashorter time, without prej udicing necessary coverage.It is also good practice to reserve a few agencies, ifpossible, for pushing reconnaissance on new missions.

83. COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE

a. General. Counterreconnaissance is a preven-tive action intended to protect friendly troops fromenemy reconnaissance. It consists of measures takento screen a command from hostile observation.

b. Forms. Counterreconnaissance may take eitherof two forms-

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(1) The defensive screen. This action is pro-tective and is intended to prevent enemyreconnaissance from entering certain areas.It is essentially passive, being establishedbehind natural obstacles with limited ave-nues of approach, thus canalizing anyreconnaissance effort of the enemy.

(2) The offensive screen. This type of counter-reconnaissance meets the enremy's reconnais-sance and destroys it. The offensive screenmay be moving or stationary in accordancewith the activities of the forces beingscreened.

c. Principles. Counterreconnaissance is based ondifferent principles than reconnaissance. They are--

(1) Destroy or neutralize hostile reconnaissanceelements by combat.

(2) Counterreconnaissance forces fix on thefriendly forces being screened, rather thanon the enemy.

(3) The screening force is echeloned in depth.This permits mutual support and preventsany deep penetration by enemy 'reconnais-sance into the area being screened.

d. Relationship to Reconnaissance.

(1) Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissancecomplement one another and cannot bereadily separated. Good reconnaissance as-sures, simultaneously, a certain amount ofsecurity. On the other hand, the activityof a counterreconnaissance force providesa certain amount of reconnaissance.

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(2) When units are assigned simultaneously tothe mission of reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, the order must state ex-plicitly which has precedence. In forces ofsufficient size, a part of the force may beassigned each task.

Section II. AIR RECONNAISSANCE

84. MISSION

The mission of reconnaissance aviation is to gatherand process information for the air force to which itis assigned, and for the Army, Navy, or joint forceswith which the parent air force is cooperating.

85. AIR-GROUND COOPERATION

a. Army forces and tactical air commands in atheater are employed in joint operations as com-ponents of an air-ground team. Close relationshipis essential to the successful accomplishment of theirseparate and common missions. To this end, paral-lel echelons of command cooperate in planning andexecuting joint operations. Cooperation extendsthrough all echelons of air and army command;joint planning and command decisions are normallylimited to army group-tactical air command andarmy-tactical air force echelons.

b. Exchange of enemy information between airforce and army units is of vital importance to eachin accomplishing its operational mission.

e. The air force is capable of furnishing armyunits with reports of visual air reconnaissance andwith air photos.

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(1) Visual reconnaissance can effectively searchan area or a route either by means of aplanned mission or by radio instructionswhile airborne. A valuable feature ofvisual reconnaissance is its ability to adjtstlong-range artillery fire.

(2) Air photos furnish detailed information ofthe enemy and the terrain and a means ofstudying a given area over a considerable.period of time to ascertain changes in enemyinstallations.

d. Army units are capable of furnishing infor-mation that will assist air force units in best employ-ing air effort. Such information includes enemy air,antiaircraft artillery, guided missile, and radar in-stallations; production facilities; and other targetinformation.

86. AIR-GROUND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

a. Air-ground intelligence cooperation is largelygoverned by the air-ground operations system (FM31-35).

b. The army intelligence system for air-groundintelligence cooperation includes four echelons-divi-sion, corps, army, and army group. Discussion inthis manual is limited to the first three echelons.

(1) At corps and army, air-ground intelligencefunctions are performed by a G-2 Air.

(2) At division, the chief of the air photo inter-pretation detachment, or other individualdesignated by G-2, acts as G-2 Air. Inaddition to supervising the air photo inter-

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pretation detachment, the acting G-2 Air,under supervision of G-2 and in coordina-tion with other staff sections to insure ful-fillment of their needs, prepares and for-wards the division's requirements for aerialreconnaissance to corps. Priority is indi-cated in requests to insure coverage of themost essential items in the event air forceunits cannot fulfill all requests. G-2 Airalso assists in dissemination of air recon-naissance information. In turn, corps G-2Air considers requests from divisions forvisual and photo reconnaissance with thoseof other corps units, and then transmits aconsolidated request to army.

c. The principal air intelligence agency serving atactical air force is the tactical reconnaissance wing,whose reconnaissance unit is the tactical reconnais-sance group. The group normally consists of threeday-reconnaissance squadrons, one night-reconnais-sance squadron, and a reconnaissance technicalsquadron.

(1) The day-reconnaissance squadrons fly bothvisual reconnaissance missions and dayphoto missions.

(2) The night-reconnaissance squadron fliesonly night photo missions.

(3) The reconnaissance technical squadron de-velops the negatives and makes prints of allphotos obtained by the reconnaissancesquadrons. It also studies air photos ofenemy air installations to assist in determin-ing air order of battle, and studies and re-

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ports upon other air force targets, some ofwhich may be of interest to army troops.

87. AIR-GROUND PROCEDURES FOR AIR RECON-NAISSANCE MISSIONS

Figure 14 demonstrates the step-by-step proced-ure involved in requesting and executing a visualreconnaissance mission and an air photo mission un-der routine conditions and under emergency condi-tions. Time intervals shown between each step inroutine missions are reasonable and may be expectedto be met under operating conditions in combat.Time intervals shown under the emergency proce-dure are optimum figures and are based on the as-sumption that the request 'vill be assigned toppriority by division, corps, army, and the tacticalair force.

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ROUTINE PROCEDURE FOR ALL TYPE MISSIONS

1.12. DIVISION. G-2-

a. Consolidates all requests from regiments, division artillery, anddivision staff.

b. Arranges missions in order of priority and assigns prioritiesto requests.

c. Forwards division requests to corps (about 1700).3. CORPS. G-2 Air-

a. Consolidates requests from divisions, corps artillery, and corpsstaff.

b. Arranges missions in order of priority and assigns prioritiesto requests.

c. Forwards corps requests to Army (about 1800).4. ARMY. G-2 Air-

a. Consolidates requests from corps and Army staff.b. Arranges missions in order of priority and assigns priorities to

requests.c. Presents Army requests during a planning conference with A-2,

tactical air force (TAF), and reconnaissance officer TAF,(about 2000).

5. TAF. Reconnaissance officer-a. Prepares TAF reconnaissance plan.b. Prepares reconnaissance paragraph of the TAF operation order.

6. ARMY. G-2 Air forwards (about 2200)-a. To ground liaison officers (GLOs) at reconnaissance wing:

(1) Information from which they prepare to help brief recon-naissance pilots.

(2) Information of any changes in the operating schedule ofthe G-2 air net and reconnaissance broadcast.2

b. To photo reproduction unit.(1) Priority lists for interpretation of photos to be taken on

approved photo missions.(2) Distribution data for photos and photo interpretation

reports.7. TAF. A-3-

Forwards TAF operation order, copy of which goes to recon-naissance wing, which contains any necessary modifications ofcurrent reconnaissance plan (about 2200).

Figure 14. Air-ground intelligence procedures-air recon-naissance missions.

'Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.2 The reconnaissance broadcast is a periodic broadcast over the

G-2 air net. Army, corps, and divisions listen to the broadcast atthe prescribed times and record the information disseminated.

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EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR ALL TYPE MISSIONS(PROCEDURES ASSUME NO AIRCRAFT ARE AIR-BORNE IN VICINITY OF RECONNAISSANCE TARGET)

1. Regiment.-Telephones emergency request to division (1030).

2. DIVISION. G-2-Approves and forwards request to Army via G-3 Air net (1040).

3. Corps.-Monitors net; indicates approval by silence.

.4. ARMY. G-2 Air-a. Receives request and assigns it first priority and presents re-

quest to TAP reconnaissance officer (1045).b. Alerts GLOs at reconnaissance wing to be prepared to brief for

mission (1050).5. TAF. Reconnaissance officer-

a. Approves request; assigns it first priority.b. Orders reconnaissance wing to execute mission (1055).

6. l

7. 1

Figure 14.-Continued.

1Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

926264°-51 11 155

VISUALRECONNAISSANCE

MISSIONS ONLY PHOTO MISSIONS ONLY

S. GLOs- 8. GLOs-Assist in briefing pilots Assist in briefing pilot

(0700). (0700).9. During mission, pilots radio 9. (Photo missions may also re-

important information to tac- port information by means oftical air control center tactical air observation net.)(TACC). Army, corps, and (0730-1030).division monitor transmis-sions by means of reconnais-sance intercept facility (0730- -0930).

10. Pilots return from mission 10. Pilot returns from mission(0940). (1100).

11. GLOs- 11. GLOs-a. Assist in interrogation of a. Assist in interrogation of

pilots. pilot (1105).b. Forward any pertinent in- b. Forward any pertinent in-

formation to army, corps, formation (rare in aand division via recon- photo mission) to army,naissance broadcast, tele- corps, and division viaphone or teletypewriter reconnaissance broadcast,(1010). telephone, or teletype-

writer (1115).12.1

13. Recon Tech Sq-a. Develops film (1145).b. Makes three prints from

each negative (1230).e. Delivers negatives, t w o

prints and sortie plot tophoto reproduction unit(1235).

14. Photo Reproduction Unit-a. Makes first phase or imme-

diate interpretation ofphotos (1300).

b. Prepares additionnttiiutsrequired (1400).

Figure 14.--Continued.

Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

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VISUALRECONNAISSANCE

MISSIONS ONLY PHOTO MISSIONS ONLY

8. GLOs- 8. GLOs-Assist in briefing pilots Assist in briefing pilot (1105).

(1105).9. During the mission, pilots 9. (Photo missions may also re-

radio important information port information to TACC byto TACC. Army, corps, and tactical air observationdivision monitor transmis- net.) (1130-1230).sions by means of reconnais-sance intercept facility (1130-1215).

10. Pilots return from mission 10. Pilot returns from mission(1225). (1240).

11. GLOs- 11. GLOs-a. Assist in interrogation of a. Assist in interrogation of

pilots (1230). pilot (1245).b. Forward any pertinent in- b. Forward any pertinent in-

formation to a r m y, formation (rare in acorps, and division via photo mission) to army,reconnaissance broadcast, corps, and division viatelephone, or teletype- reconnaissance broadcast,writer (1245). telephone, or teletype-

writer (1250).12. 1 12. Photo Reproduction Unit-

Sends interpreter to recontech sq to make immediateinterpretation on negativesor wet prints (1230).

13. 1 13. Recon Tech Sq-a. Develops film (1325).b. Makes three prints from

each negative (1330).c. Delivers negatives and two

prints and sortie plot tophoto reproduction unit(1400).

14. 1 14. Photo Reproduction Unit-Makes immediate interpreta-

tion of negatives or wetprints, see item 12 (1415).

Figure 14-Continued.

1 Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

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15. GLOs or Photo Reproduc-tion Unit-

Forwards pertinent results ofp h o to interpretation toarmy, corps, and divisionvia reconnaissance broad-cost, telephone, for teletype-writer (1305).

16.1

17. Photo Reproduction Unit-a. Prepares annotated photos

and written reports(1330).

b. Arranges for reproductionof annotated photos inquantity required (1430).

C. Arranges for delivery ofannotated prints andwritten reports to re-questing division, and tosuch other units as arespecified in item Ob. De-liveries are made byArmy aircraft or motorvehicle.

OFigure 14-Continued

1 Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

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15. 1 15. GLOs or Photo Reproduc-tion Unit-

Forwards results of interpre-tation to army, corps, anddivision via reconnaissancebroadcast, telephone or tele-typewriter (1420).

16. DIVISION. G-2-- 16. DIVISION. G-2-Forwards information to the Forwards information to re-

requesting regiment by tele- questing regiment by tele-phone or by other means phone or by other means(1250). (1425).

17. Photo Reproduction Unit-a. Prepares annotated photos

and written r e p o r t s(1430).

b. Arranges for reproductionof annotated photos inquantityrequired (1500).

c. Arranges for delivery of an-notated prints and writ-ten reports to requestingdivision and to suchother units as are desig-nated by army G-2 Air.Deliveries are made byArmy aircraft or motorvehicle.

Figz!re 14-ContinuedI Blank spaces indicate steps omitted.

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88. IMPORTANCE OF AIR RECONNAISSANCE

a. One of the most important and least evidentmeans by which tactical air support influences thesuccess of army operations is air reconnaissance.Without reliable air reconnaissance beyond the lim-its of visual ground observation, a commander fightsblind except for patrol reports and reports of prison-ers of war, enemy deserters, refugees, and agents.

b. The results of air reconnaissance come to unitsbelow the field army from a multitude of agencies.They come direct from visual air reconnaissance air-craft by interception of the reconnaissance radio fre-quency. The air photo interpretation unit and theground liaison officer at the reconnaissance wingtransmit information via the reconnaissance radiobroadcast. The air photo interpretation unit pro-vides detailed terrain and defense studies, togetherwith annotated photos and mosaics or overprintedmaps. Army, corps, and division G-2's transmit in-formation obtained by the tactical air force in theform of periodic intelligence reports, intelligenceannexes to operation orders, and special messages.

89. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION

a. Tactical reconnaissance aviation gathers infor-mation by visual reconnaissance missions and airphoto missions.

b. Visual and photo air reconnaissance are comple'-mentary. Together they provide current informa-tion of enemy activity and enemy defenses from theline of contact to areas deep in the enemy rear. Theimportance of such detailed information of enemy

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activities and defenses must not be overlooked by anyarmy unit commander in war.

c. The coordination of the operation of tactical re-connaissance aviation to serve the needs of both airand ground forces is described in FM 31-35.

90. RECONNAISSANCE TARGETS

a. Targets for reconnaissance aviation are classi-fied by the air force as fixed, transient, and fleeting.

(1) Any structure or object which is not subjectto movement is a fixed target. Photo mis-sions are usually employed in preference tovisual reconnaissance missions in gatheringinformation about fixed targets.

(2) Transient targets are installations or struc-tures temporarily used by the enemy. Thistype of target includes military camps,bivouacs, supply installations, ammunitiondumps, anci pontoon bridges.

(3) Fleeting targets are objects that move andinclude concentrations of troops, vehicles ofall kinds, watercraft, and aircraft.

b. Visual reconnaissance missions are usually em-ployed in preference to photo missions in gatheringinformation about transient and fleeting targets. Acareful analysis or examination of the type of infor-mation required about the target will give an indi-cation of the type mission to employ in gatheringthe required information. Instances in which bothtypes of missions are employed against the same tar-get to gather the same information will be rare.

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91. VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

a. Visual reconnaissance missions are flown byteams of two fully armed, fighter type aircraft whichcarry limited camera equipment. The pilot of oneof the planes is the visual observer, while the otherplane serves as fighter escort. Visual reconnaissancemissions avoid combat, and use their armament onlyin self-defense. The information is gathered on avisual reconnaissance mission primarily by visualobservation. The camera equipment is used to sup-plement the pilot's observations by recording doubt-ful or unidentifiable objects for further study byphoto interpreters, or to make limited vertical oroblique strips of such items as short lengths of road.Photographing any sizable area for detailed studyis not a normal assignment for a visual reconnais-sance mission. The principal services that an armyreceives from visual reconnaissance missions are cur-rent visual information about fleeting targets andvisual adjustment of artillery fire.

b. There are four general types of visual recon-naissance missions: area search, road search, routereconnaissance, and artillery adjustment.

(1) Area search is used in flat or rolling terrainwhich is not heavily wooded, or in any ter-rain where troops may travel cross-countrywith reasonable ease. Under such circum-stances the reconnaissance mission mustexamine all of the assigned zone, not justthe communications lines.

(2) Road search is used in zones where cross-country movement of troops would be seri-

162

ously hindered by terrain. In such zonesthe reconnaissance mission goes over andover the communications lines withoutattempting to make any particular examina-tion of the rest of the zone.

(3) Route reconvnaissance missions cover roads,railroads, and waterways in and beyond thezones where regular search is used. Theyare carried out on a town-to-town or point-to-point basis along a specified route ratherthan being restricted to a specific zone.

(4) Artillery adjustment missions are used toadjust the fire of medium, long-range, andvery long-range artillery when the targetscannot be observed from the ground or froman army aircraft.

c. (1) An artillery adjustment mission of shortduration may be combined with a routereconnaissance mission when the artilleryadjustment has been completed.

(2) Missions assigned to search zones may con-duct route reconnaissance en route to andfrom their zones.

(3) Other than these two, it is not normal toassign more than one type search to onemission.

92. REQUESTS FOR VISUAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Normally, requests for visual air reconnaissancewill include the following minimum information:

a. Areas, routes, or targets to be covered.b. Time the coverage is desired.

163

c. Significance of desired information (justifica-tion for request)..

d. Specific information desired.e. Indicate that the forward air controller will

be in a position to notify the fire direction centerwhen the reconnaissance aircraft is approachingthe front lines, so that, if necessary, the artillerymay cease firing.

f. Ordinates of ground fires in the area to besearched.

93. LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF VISUAL AIRRECONNAISSANCE

Visual air reconnaissance must necessarily concernitself with securing information about localized tar-gets. Its most effective operation is in the locationof transient targets.

a. The limiting factor in the quantity of informa-tion secured by visual means is that it must beobtained by that part of the pilot's mind which isnot occupied in flying a high-performance single-place airplane.

b. The limiting factor in the quality of informa-tion secured by visual means is the difficulty inmaking accurate observations of targets while pass-ing over or near them at a five or more mile-a-minutespeed.

c. An additional difficulty, not often considered,is that of- orientation and location, since the pilot isrestricted to the use of a relatively small-scale map.

d. The justifying factor which overcomes theselimitations is the rapidity with which information

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about transient or fleeting targets may be relayedto friendly units capable of attacking such targetsbefore they cease to exist because of deployment ordeparture.,

e. When visual air reconnaissance units supple-ment their visual observations with cameras theselimiting factors diminish.. The detailed accuracy oftheir information increases-but the time required toprocess and disseminate such information also in-creases sharply.

94. AIR PHOTO MESSIONS

a. Day Photo Missions.(1) Day photo missions are usually flown by a

single fighter-type aircraft from which thearmament has been removed in order toaccommodate the camera equipment. Theseaircraft must depend on speed, maneuver,and altitude for protection from hostileaircraft and antiaircraft artillery. Photomissions are flown at high altitudes-in ex-cess of 20,000 feet when cloud conditionspermit.

(2) Dicing missions are exceptions to the alti-tudes mentioned above. In a dicing mis-sion a photo plane takes low-altitude verti-cal and oblique photos of a highly defendedarea, such as a beach or a front-line area.Dicing coverage is used only when large-scale vertical photography will not producethe required information. In this type mis-sion the battle damage and the casualtyrates are very high. Dicing missions are

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exceptional missions and are used only whenthe required information is urgent.

(3) Gathering information by visual observa-tion is not a normal part of a day photomission.

b. Night Photo Missions.(1) Night photo missions are flown by single

light-bomber type aircraft which have beenfitted with camera equipment and a sourceof illumination, currently the flash bomband the flash projectile. The area whichcan be covered by night photo missions isquite small when compared to day photocoverage, but the night photo plane can bepositioned over its target quite accuratelyby electronic means and it can obtain in-formation about enemy night activity notpossible by other means.

(2) Gathering information by visual observa-tion on a night photo mission is impractical.

95. REQUESTS FOR AIR PHOTO COVERAGE

Requests for air photo coverage from division andlower echelons will be made through intelligencechannels and will include the distribution required,methods of reporting information, priority, and dateand time deadline. Such requests should specify-

a. Area of objective to be covered (state coordi-nates or indicate by map overlay).

b. Approximate scale. For obliques, state ap-proximate direction, altitude, and type-high orlow, and specify the foreground line.

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c. Purposes for which photos are intended (anypertinent details which will materially aid in thesatisfactory accomplishment of the mission).

d. Number of prints desired. (Requirementsmust be reproduced by the Engineer photo reproduc-tion unit.)

e. Priority relative to other requests of theorganization.

f. Deadline of date and time of delivery (latesttime the photos or information will be of value).

g. Point of delivery.

96. LIMITATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF AERIALPHOTOGRAPHY

a. Limiting factors in the use of aerial photog-raphy are-

(1) Time lapse between exposure of film anddissemination of information (normally 4to 12 hours).

(2) Weather.(3) Light.(4) Enemy defenses.(5) Jungle or heavily wooded terrain.(6) Scale errors caused by the inability of the

camera to portray objects in their true geo-metric relationship to each other.

b. Aerial photography permits preparation anddissemination of detailed analyses of enemy installa-tions in broad areas.

(1) Its outstanding characteristic is its abilityto subject such areas to day-by-day or week-by-week comparative analyses. Such anal-

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yses are prepared by air photo interpreterswho can make detailed examinations of eachunit of an enemy installation,

(2) A scarcely less outstanding characteristicis its ability to furnish current informationconcerning enemy terrain. This informa-tion, supplemented 'by information fromother sources, provides the best meansto make accurate, comprehensive terrainestimates.

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CHAPTER 9

EXPLOITATION OF SOURCES

Section I. PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, ANDCAPTURED MATERIEL

97. GENERAL

This section is a general discussion of the intelli-gence aspects of prisoners of war and other personnelwho have recently been under enemy control; enemydocuments; and captured equipment. For detailedprocedures and techniques on these subjects, refer toFM 30-15.

98. PRISONERS OF WAR

a. Value of Prisoners of War. Prisoners of wardivulge information, advertently or inadvertently,through interrogation. They frequently carry per-sonal or official documents which, either alone orwhen compared with other known data, reveal newinformation or confirm that which is already onhand. The condition of their clothing and equip-ment, and their very demeanor may often throwsome new light on the enemy picture. Prisonersmay have a more or less intimate knowledge of theenemy situation and capabilities-they are, afterall, elements of the enemy armed forces.

b. Training and Prisoners of War. There is adirect relationship between the training given a unit

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in the handling of prisoners of war and the qualityand quantity of information obtained from them.The commander must insure that adequate trainingin this subject is given all personnel. Training em-phasizes the necessity for the taking of prisoners, itincludes the proper methods for handling and ex-amining prisoners of war, and it shows the individ-ual soldier how correct handling of prisoners is ofdirect benefit to him. In addition to its value in theproduction of intelligence, such training has acounterintelligence value. In case of capture, thetrained soldier will know his rights under the GenevaConvention and will have a better appreciation ofthe need for withholding information from theenemy.

c. Techniques of Handling Prisoners of War.The value of prisoners of war as a source of informa-tion may be greatly reduced if they are improperlyhandled. The techniques of segregation, search,evacuation, and interrogation discussed in FM 30-15,should be applied whenever possible in handlingprisoners.

99. ESCAPERS, EVADERS, AND REFUGEES

a. Intelligence officers should not overlook the in-telligence value of civilians, repatriates, escapers, andevaders. Our own or allied military personnel whohave evaded or escaped capture, as well as repatriatedcivilians of our own or allied countries, frequentlyhave information of value to our forces. They areusually not only willing, but also eager, to divulge it.

b. Until their identity is proved, escapers, evaders,and friendly civilians must be segregated and unob-

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trusively guarded to prevent information falling intohands of planted enemy agents. They are processedas outlined in FM 30-15.

100. ENEMY DOCUMENTS

a. General. An enemy document may be any formof recorded information relative to enemy armies orcountries. Enemy documents are both personal (let-ters, pay cards, diaries, and pictures) found onprisoners or enemy dead, and official (maps, orders,manuals, records, official photographs, and similaritems).

b. Value as Sources of Informnation. When ex-amined systematically by competent personnel, en-emy documents may provide necessary information.As sources of information, enemy documents haveone unique feature-they are prepared by the enemyfor his Oqwn information and guidance and are, there-fore, just as clear, concise, and accurate as he canmake them. He does not intend that we will ever seethem. In effect, then, when we get an enemy docu-ment, the enemy voluntarily tells us all he knows'about the particular subject the document covers;he will tell it again and again in the same way asoften as we wish to study the subject.

c. Processing. The flow of enemy documents isthrough command channels from the original finderto battalion and then through intelligence channelsfrom battalion to their final destination. Below di-vision, documents are delayed for only a minimum oftime for processing and quick inspection for infor-mation of immediate tactical value to the unit thenin possession.

925264-51 -12 171.

d. Training. Troops can be trained-in the'proces-sing of enemy documents and thus assist the intelli-gence officer in his duties. Training may be.accom-plished by including in unit training the search forenemy documents, recognition of documents, and howto get them into the proper channels. The intelli-gence officer coordinates with the operations officer sothat time will be provided.for this instruction intraining programs. Interest in this training amongtroops may be increased by. using exhibits of varioustypes of enemy documents, by demonstrations on theproper and improper handling of captured docu-ments, and by instruction in the value to the com-mand of such documents, both in military operationsand by reducing casualties in combat. Troops canbe made to realize their value by use of simple slo-gans, such as, "Everything new, goes to G-2." Per-sonal visits by the intelligence officer, his assistants,and intelligence specialists to various units to givepart of the documents training will emphasize itsimportance to troops.

e. Souvenirs. Troops may be induced to turn indocuments if unit commanders are authorized to re-.turn certain material as souvenirs to them after ithas been determined to be of no military value. Asuccessful practice is to maintain a supply of knownvalueless documents to be issued as souvenirs on-the-spot in exchange for documents turned in by troops.Individuals wishing to regain possession of.specificitems turned in, should be permitted to tag themwith their name and unit.

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101. CAPTURED MATERIEL

a. General. The weapons and equipment of anenemy are important to us, although this may not beimmediately apparent to combat units. Prisonerstalk as soon as they are captured, documents can betranslated by interpreters who are readily available,but captured mat4riel must be studied by expertsbefore we can learn much, although immediate ex-amination of captured enemy materiel may often beof value in determining enemy order of battleinformation.

b. Objectives. There are four major objectivespossible from the proper handling of captured enemymateriel:

(1) Prompt development of effective counter-weapons and countertactics.

(2) Prompt exploitation of new ideas for ourown benefit.

(3) Early deductions as to the state of enemyresources for war.

(4) Use by our forces of enemy materiel, to in-clude the provision of literature and otheraids to assist in troop training.

c. Responsibilities With Respect to Captured Ma-teriel. FM 30115 discusses the responsibilities ofindividuals and agencies with respect to capturedmateriel. The role of technical service intelligencedetachments (TSID) is of particular importance(par. 33). These detachments collect and studyenemy materiel for their respective technical servicesand prepare reports evaluating its components, use,effectiveness, and when applicable, instructions totroops in its handling, use, and maintenance. These

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reports are disseminated through technical servicechannels of the responsible technical service. Theintelligence officer is responsible for disseminatinginformation used to produce intelligence, and pro-ducing and disseminating intelligence on enemymat6riel. Dissemination is through intelligencechannels.

Section II. MAPS (FM 101-10)

102. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The intelligence officers of divisions and lowerunits prepare plans and policies and exercise staffsupervision over all activities concerning militarymaps.

b. The division engineer is charged with the pro-curement, storage, and distribution of militarymaps, under the general staff supervision of thedivision G-2. He submits requisitions for maps tothe corps engineer.

c. The intelligence officer of units below divisionis charged with the procurement, storage, and dis-tribution of military maps. He submits requi-sitions for maps to the division engineer.

103. MILITARY MAPS

The term military maps refers to all maps (otherthan aeronautical and hydrographic charts) usedfor military purposes. Military maps are classi-fied generally according to the military use for whichthe map is -best suited. This classification dependslargely upon the scale, which is indicative of theaccuracy and is a criterion as to the amount of detail

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shown upon the map. Certain general classifica-tions are also commonly used to indicate the ex-tent of geographic information given, as well as themanner in which it is portrayed.

a. Military Classification.(1) By scale.

(a) Small scale: 1: 600,000 and smaller.(b) Medium scale: larger than 1: 600,000, but

smaller than 1: 75,000.(c) Large scale: 1: 75,000 and larger.

(2) By use or description.(a) General: maps smaller than 1: 1,000,000-

utilized for general planning purposes.(b) Strategic: 1: 1,000,000-utilized for stra-

tegic planning purposes.(c) Strategic-tactical: 1:250,000 (1:500,000

alternate) -for use when other scales areunsuitable or unavailable.

(d) Road: 1: 250, 000-for tactical and ad-ministrative troop movements.

(e) Tactical: 1:50,000 (1: 100,000 alter-nate) -for tactical and administrativepurposes.

(f) Artillery: 1: 25,000-for artillery firecontrol.

(g) Photomap: 1:25,000 (1: 1,500 alter-nate) -for tactical and administrativepurposes.

(h) Towon plan: 1: 12,500.b. General Classification.

(1) Topographic map. A map which presentsrelief or the vertical position of features inmeasurable form as well as their horizontal

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position. An embossed map: is a:standardtopographic map printed upon a: plasticbase, and deformed to produce: the verticaldimensions, as indicated by the contourlines, at an exaggerated scale.

(2) Planimetric map. A map presenting onlythe horizontal position of features.

(3) Photomap. A term used generally todenote reproduction of an air photo ormosaics on which additional data such asplace, names, grid lines, and marginal datahave been placed. When suitable maps formilitary purposes do not exist, the verticalair photo in its various forms must be re-garded as a useful and acceptable pro-visional map. When suitable maps areavailable, the air photo is used to supplementthe information on the map. When at suffi-cient scale, the air photo furnishes muchdetail lacking on even the best topographicmap. However, images on air photos ap-pear not in accordance with their militaryvalue but in accordance with their light-re-flecting qualities. A contact print of aphoto is more legible than a lithographiccopy of the same photo.

104. REQUIREMENTS

a. General. Timely planning is necessary to in-sure that sufficient quantities of suitable maps areavailable to units, at the time and place needed. Thebasic factors which govern such planning are-

(1) The area of map coverage.

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(2) The map scales required.(3) Initial allowances.(4) Replacement requirements.

b. Area of Map Coverage. Area coverage is thenumber of sheets of the same scale required to in-clude the piece of terrain being considered. The ex-tent of the area of present and projected operationsprovides the basis for the map coverage required.In general, an actively engaged unit needs mapcoverage of an area wider than that included withinits tactical boundaries. This overlap is required forplanning, tactical security, and coordination withadjacent units. The number of map sheets at eachscale is determined by use of a map index. An out-line of the area of which coverage is required ismarked on the index. The included sheets are thencounted and listed by appropriate identificationsymbol. In determining area coverage, the G-2 co-ordinates with the G-3, the engineer, and other staffofficers and agencies.

c. Map Scales Required. The map scales requiredare determined according to the needs of the users.These needs are influenced by such factors as thetype of unit, character of the terrain, the type ofoperations, the extent of the opposition encountered,and the speed of movement. Small-scale maps areused for general planning and strategic studies ofhigher commanders. Large-scale maps are intendedfor the technical and tactical needs of the infantry,and other appropriate users. Maps covering the areaof present and proposed operations are, in accord-ance with availability and economy, of as large scaleas necessary to provide the detail of information re-

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quired. Coverage outside the area of immediateinterest is of smaller scale.

d. Initial Allowances.(1) Initial allowances prescribe the number of

copies of map sheets, by type or scale, whichcan be requisitioned by each organizationwithout further approval. Initial allow-ances must furnish units and individualswith a sufficient number of copies of mapsheets to provide adequate coverage at eachscale required. Difficulties of productionand distribution, as well as the weights in-volved, necessitate economy in map issue.Various factors such as the strength, com-position, and functions of a unit are com-bined with experience data to determinethe quantities of maps to be allowed theunit in tables of initial allowances. Theallowances prescribed in FM 101-10 arebased on experience of World War II andare to be considered as a guide only.

(2) Tables for determining map requirementsand discussions of the subject frequentlyemploy the terms "sheet" and "copy." Theterm sheet is used to describe a map of givenscale which covers a given area of ground.It is a single piece of paper. The termcopy designates any exact counterpart orfacsimile of a sheet. Physically-as an im-printed piece of paper-a sheet and a copyare identical. The difference is a matterof :word usage. As used in connection withmap requirements, the term sheet conveys

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the idea of an area of terrain cartographi-cally depicted on a piece of paper. Theterm copies connotes quantity.

(3) The actual determination of initial map re-quirements can be illustrated by the pro-cedure employed by a division in calculat-ing the needs of all its subordinate units.The job is done by G-2, G-3, and the di-vision engineer. G-3 outlines the opera-tional plan. G-2 and G-3 decide on thetypes and scales of the maps to be used.The engineer advises on the availability ofmaps, including types and scales.. In ac-cordance with the plan for future tacticaloperations, G-2 marks the projected bound-aries of the division and its subordinateunits and the over-all area for which cover-age is desired. This area will extend for-ward of the present lines to include objec-tives of the current operation. . Allowancemust be made for the time necessary forprocurement and distribution. G-2 willalso inform the engineer of other factorsinvolved in the scheme of maneuver whichare pertinent to map requirements.

(4) With the information obtained from G-2and the data contained in experience tables,the engineer is now ready to calculate maprequirements for all units of the divisionand division headquarters. The procedureis as follows:

(a) Lay out the projected division area forwhich coverage is desired on the mapindex of the scale being considered.

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(b) In the division area outlined on the mapindex, indicate the tentative battalion andregimental .boundaries. Project theseboundaries sufficiently forward to coverthe entire area for which map coverage isdesired at each scale.

(c) List the identifications of the sheets re-quired to cover the area included withinthe boundaries of each echelon 'of com-mand from battalion to division inclusive.

(d) From the experience tables, determinethe number of copies of each sheet re-quired at each echelon.

(e) List the total number of copies of eachmap sheet required. These are planningfigures for initial issue.

(5) In the above illustration, it was assumedthat the division was calculating its owninitial allowances. In most situationsinitial allowances for a division will be de-termined at army echelon. However, thesame procedure is followed to determineexact distribution within the unit.

e, Replacement Requirenents. Replacement re-quirements are calculated by applying a percentagefactor to the number of copies required for initialissue. The sum of the initial requirement, plus thereplacement requirement for each sheet, representsthe total number of copies of each sheet which armymust be prepared to distribute. For replacementpercentage factors, see FM 101-10.

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105. DISTRIBUTION

a.(1) The distribution of maps must fit the oper-

ational plan. Therefore, only the particu-lar map sheets which cover the area of in-terest are of any immediate use to troops.Changes in tactical plans may not affectother supplies, but they do have an immedi-ate effect on map requirements. The dis-tribution.system must respond instantane-ously to such changes if the required mapsare to be provided in time. This sensitiv-ity to the tactical situation demands closestaff supervision of map supply.

(2) Premature issue of maps not of immediateinterest is wasted effort because the mapswill probably be lost or discarded; they maybe voided by a change in operational plan;and once issued, they can seldom be with-drawn for reissue to another unit.

(3) In a mobile situation, detailed issue to indi-viduals and small units is difficult to achieve.The bulk of maps needed to cover any sub-stantial area makes it impractical to supplya unit with maps for any prolonged periodof mobile operations.

(4) Logistical limitations prevent maintainingexcessive reserves of maps. Hence, mapdistribution must be carefully controlled toprevent waste.

b. Maps are valuable sources of information con-cerning the area. of operations; they are intelligence

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doouments. From the distribution standpoint, theymust be considered as intelligence documents ratherthan as items of supply and must be handled sepa-rately by an independent system set up exclusivelyfor this purpose. Corps, primarily a tactical head-quarters, is an integral part of the system. Divisionsrequisition and draw their maps from corps and notdirectly from army, as in the case of other supplyitems.

c. The intelligence annex to the operation orderprovides a written means of indicating the maps tobe used during an operation. In paragraph 5 of theannex the intelligence officer lists the maps whichwill be supplied, with the number of each classi-fication or scale to each unit, including instructionsconcerning special requisitions and distribution(App. V).

Section III. AIR PHOTOS

106. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The intelligence officer of divisions and lowerunits prepares plans and policies and supervises allactivities concerning air photos at his echelon. Inaddition, he is charged with the procurement, storage,and distribution of air photos.

b. The division intelligence officer submits requestsfor air photos to the corps G-2 Air.

c. The intelligence officers of units below divisionsubmit requests for air photos to the division G-2.

d. The division engineer may be called upon byG-2 for assistance in the storage and distribution ofair photos when large quantities are handled.182

107. TYPES OF AIR PHOTOS

a. An air photo is a photograph taken from anaircraft.

b. The following are types of air photos:

(1) Vertical photo. An air photo made witha camera the optical axis of which is ap-proximately vertical to the earth's surface,or the film of which is as nearly horizontalas is practicable. It has inherent, but rela-tively small, errors of scale and azimuthresulting from tip and tilt, variations inrelief, and optical distortions.

(2) Composite. An air photo made with acamera having one principal lens and twoor more surrounding and oblique lenses.The several resulting photos are correctedor rectified in printing so as to permit as-sembly as verticals with the same scale.

(3) Oblique photo. An airphoto taken withthe camera axis intentionally directed be-tween the horizontal and the vertical.

(a) A high oblique includes the horizon.(b) A low oblique does not include the

horizon.(4) Stereopair. Two air photos to which a por-

tion of the total area projected thereon iscommon. Examination of such pairs witha stereoscope gives an exaggerated third-dimensional view of the terrain which isincluded in the area of overlay of bothphotos.

(5) Wide-angle photo. An air photo taken

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with a camera:which has a wide-:angle lensthat will: photograph a cone of approxi-;mately 90°.

(6) Vectographs. Two especially- printed over-lapping air photos that give the illusion ofthe third dimension when viewed withpolaroid spectacles.'

(7) AnaglypIhs. Similar to vectographs, butviewed with red and green spectacles.

108. AIR PHOTO COVERAGE

The term air photo coverage denotes ground arearepresented on air photos, photomaps and mosaics.Three types of air photo coverage are basic cover, in-telligence photography, and mapping photography.

a. Basic cover consists of aerial photography of agiven area obtained for mapping and/or general in-telligence requirements. In the latter use it is com-pared with later pictures to facilitate identificationof changes. It is distributed in quantity to sub-ordinate ground and air units to furnish general in-formation of terrain in a particular area. Thephotos may be of noncurrent date but should be capa-ble of stereoscopic study. Basic cover extends fromthe line of contact to a depth of 100 miles or moreinto enemy-held territory. For greatest effectivenessit should be at scale 1: 12,500 or larger. It is usedas a map supplement to provide information on ter-rain and on fixed enemy installations. The tacticalair force is charged with the production of the nega-tives, which are turned over to the engineer air photoreproduction unit for quantity reproduction anddistribution of prints.

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b. Intelligence photography consists of air photosof current date which are interpreted by trainedpersonnel to obtain intelligence of enemy installa-tions and terrain under -enemy control. The photosare ordinarily furnished in limited quantity andmust be capable of stereoscopic study. Intelligencephotography is divided into front-line cover andcover of areas deep in enemy territory. Either ofthese may be supplemented by obliques.

(1) Front-line cover consists of current verticalstereopairs of an army area, extending fromthe line of contact to a depth of 15-20 milesinto enemy-held territory. For maximumeffectiveness its scale should be 1: 10,000 orlarger. Thle depth to which front-line cover"is flown is usually determined by'.the maxi-mum range of friendly artillery, or the loca-tion of selected objectives during an offen-sive operation. It is flown daily as weatherpermits or as requested by the army. Thetactical air force is charged with the pro-duction of the negatives, which are turnedover to the army for interpretation, quan-tity reproduction, and distribution.

(2) Cover of areas deep in enemy-held territoryis a normal daily requirement of an army.Its scale varies with the individual need,and is specified by army G-2 Air in eachinstance.

c. Mapping photography is aerial photographysuitable for mapping. It is usually taken at muchsmaller scales than any of the above (1:35,000 to

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1': 60,000), and cannot successfully be used to sup-plant any of them.

d. Extensive basic cover and mapping photogra-phy ordinarily cannot be obtained during operations.In addition to abortive reconnaissance missions dueto enemy action, weather conditions are usuallyfavorable only a small portion of the time.

109. MOSAICS

A mosaic is an assembly of two or more over-lapping air photos. A picture of a larger area thancould be recorded on one photo is thus presented.There are three types of mosaics: controlled, uncon-trolled, and strip.

a. A controlled mosaic is laid on ground controlto provide an accurate representation of distancesand directions. It can be made quite accurate ifsufficient control data exists, but its preparation isslow and tedious.

b. An uncontrolled mosaic is made without thecheck of scale or position which would be given bya framework of control points. In comparison witha controlled mosaic its preparation is quite rapid,but it is much less accurate.

c. A strip mosaic consists of one strip of air photostaken on a single flight. Depending on the time andthe amount of control available, it may be controlledor uncontrolled.

110. PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Air photos are often used as map substitutes orsupplements to provide detailed information on ter-

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rain and enemy defenses. They are especially usefulwhen sufficient maps of proper accuracy and scaleare not available. In planning for procurement ofair photos, a distinction must be made between dailyintelligence photography and basic cover (par. 108).Basic cover must be planned for well in advance,otherwise, it will never be provided to front-linetroops. It must also be realized that under idealconditions adequate quantities of aerial photographsmay be made available. However, under extremeadverse operational conditions the quantity fur-nished will be in proportion to the success of theair reconnaissance missions.

b. The following is an example of basic cover re-quired by a division in combat with two regimentsabreast and one in reserve (fig. 15). In this ex-ample, each front-line regiment has two battalionsabreast and one in reserve. An infantry regimentneeds six sets of cover of the regimental zone. Fromtwo regimental sets, each front-line battalion getstwo sets of photos of its own front. From thesephotos all patrols can be conveniently briefed. Onlythe reserve battalion of the regiment receives photosof the entire regimental front. The reserve bat-talion requires two sets of cover of the regimentalsector in order that it may be prepared for actionin any locality within the regimental zone of action.Two regimental sets are retained by each front-lineregimental headquarters. One of these is usuallyreserved for regimental support weapons. Com-panies and platoons have limited facilities for tak-ing care of photos; thus full sets should not go belowbattalions. Just as the reserve battalion needs sets

926264--51 13 187

I xx xxII II X I II

OVSISONAL 1 J 2 , t 2I ,2

2 ! X a 12

_7 TOT L 6 6 1 1 123

Figure 15. Distribution of basic cover (schematic).

of the entire regimental zone, the reserve regimentin the division needs cover of the entire division zone.It is desirable that this regiment be issued six divi-sional sets. Each artillery battalion, including theantiaircraft artillery battalion, plus division artil-lery headquarters, needs a full set of the- divisioncover, since artillery fires cover the entire divisionfront. The engineer battalion, tank battalion, andthe reconnaissance company, need at least one seteach. Thus the division needs a minimum of 23divisional sets. Such an allowance, however, willnot give the division G-2 any reserve photos to re-place losses and to equip units sent into areas forwhich they have no photo cover. Nor will it fur-

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nish overlap of adjacent zones or sectors. Whenavailability permits, such overlap should be pro-vided. A recapitulation of the preceding figuresfollows:

Reginiental Divisionsets sets

Division headquarters--------------------------------- 21st Infantry __________--_-------------- 6 *62d Infantry __________--------------- 6 Jf3d Infantry (reserve) _______________.__-------------- 6Division artillery___ -_---------------- ------_--------- 6Reconnaissance company __----__--------------------- 1Engineer combat battalion----------------------------- 1Tank battalion_--__-__------------------------------- 1

Total ____--- ------------------------ --- 23

*A front-line regiment has half a division set.

c. Photo reproduction units with the army shouldbe capable of reproducing approximately 25,000photoprints per day of intelligence photography.Coverage of an army front normally requires 3,000prints; thus, approximately 8 prints of each photocan be made daily. Obviously, army is definitelylimited in its intelligence photography to corps, andit follows logically that corps is limited in its intelli-gence photography to divisions. The division willusually receive only one copy of intelligence photog-raphy of the division front. When its intelligencevalue has diminished, intelligence photography maybe used to supplement basic cover of divisional units.

d. Actually, the division G-2 does not arrange fordistribution beyond regiment and separate battalions,but he must understand the needs and problems ofbattalions and companies in order to arrive at the

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most equitable and efficient distribution of photoswithin the division.

e. Information and instructions on air photos arepublished in the same manner as for maps (par. 105).

Section IV. AIR PHOTO INTERPRETATION

111. GENERAL

a. Interpretation of air photos assists in determin-ing the identity and physical characteristics of fea-tures of terrain, works of man, and the nature andextent of land, sea, or air activity, including informa-tion on the installations, strengths, dispositions, andactivities of the enemy.

b. Detailed photo interpretation is accomplishedby air photo interpreters who study stereopairs andreport on all installations and activities seen. Airphoto interpreters, are able to interpret "indications"and discernible features associated with activitiesthat in themselves may be hidden.

c. Interpretation of air photos taken at daily,weekly, or monthly intervals makes it possible to keepaccurately abreast of all activity at airdromes, ports,factories, communication lines, defense positions,and other enemy installations. This "repetitive" or"routine" comparative cover is the basis of intelli-gence produced from air photo interpretation.-

d. Air photo interpretation is accomplished by thefollowing processing units:

(1) Reconnaissance technical squadrons (par.86).

(2) Air photo interpreter units.

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112. AIR PHOTO INTERPRETATION OPERATIONS

a. The air photo interpreters assigned to divisionheadquarters work as a part of the G-2 section (fig.2). They are responsible for the following:

(1) Detailed interpretation of all air photos ofthe unit area.

(2) Disseminating air photo interpretation re-ports on enemy installations and activities.

(3) Preparing uncontrolled mosaics for use bythe division.

(4) Briefing patrols and furnishing annotatedair photos of areas of reconnaissance.

(5) Furnishing reports and. annotated airphotos to tie engineer on bridge and roadconditions and fording sites.

(6) Verifying and evaluating information ob-tained from other sources.

b. The air photo interpreters assigned to the head-quarters of division artillery work as part of the S-2section. Their primary responsibility is the locationof artillery targets.

113. AIR PHOTO ONTERPRETATION REPORTS

a. Form. Air photo interpretation reports areissued in a variety of forms, ranging from an oralsummary on the te'ephone giving location of an en-emy position, to a complete series of volumes de-tailing the entire defense, communications, and ter-rain situation of a theater of operations. All re-ports are issued in the form most easy to use. De-tailed writing is kept to a minimum, and annotated

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air photos, mosaics, overprinted maps, or overlaysare used wherever possible.

b. Classes. Reports are divided into two classes:

(1) Immediate reports are made immediatelyafter film is developed, sometimes from thenegative itself or from wet prints. Theyare disseminated at high priority, and gen-erally concern enemy artillery positions,new bivouac areas, movements of reserves,new defenses, damage assessment, and simi-lar information of immediate tacticalimportance.

(2) Detailed reports are generally based oncomparative studies of photography re-peated over a period of time.

c. Use of Reports. The principal uses of air photointerpretation reports are-

(1) Prior to operations:(a) Map compilation.(b) Map correction.(e) Studies of beaches.(d) Terrain studies.(e) Communications studies.(f) Detailed enemy defense studies.(g) Operational planning.(h) Briefing assault troops.

(2) During operations:(a) Interpretation of front-line cover.(b) Briefing patrols.(c) Information for counterbattery purposes.(d) Studies of enemy positions and strong

points.(e) Terrain studies and estimates.

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(/) Information for trafficability maps.(g) Studies of enemy mine fields, bivouac

areas, command posts, and similar instal-lations.

(h) Information of fords and streams.(i) Information of enemy supply movement.(j) Information relative to tactical deploy-

ment of our own forces (lines of depar-ture, assembly areas, avenues of approach,and defiladed areas).

Section V. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

114. GENERAL

a. Importance. An analysis of the effect of allof the conditions of weather and' terrain upon ourown forces and upon the enemy constitutes the basisfor estimates made by the commander and the staff.The answer sought is the best utilization of theweather and terrain by our own forces in order toincrease our chances for success, and in order to assistin the deduction of the likely capabilities of theenemy.

b. Definitions.

(1) Weather. Weather, as differentiated fromclimate, is the day-to-day changes in atmos-pheric conditions. Climate refers to theaverage conditions encountered in extendedperiods.

(2) Terrain. From a military viewpoint, ter-rain is an area of ground considered as toits extent and natural features in relationto its use for a particular operation.

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(3) Tactical study of weather and'terrain. Ananalysis of the area of probable militaryoperations to determine the effect of theweather and terrain on the courses of actionopen to opposing forces in the, area.

115. INFLUENCE OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN

a. Weather.(1) The effect of weather on military operations

is becoming felt to an increasing degree.The primary factors to be considered areprecipitation, fog or ground haze, tempera-ture, wind, cloud conditions, phases of themoon, and the dawn and twilight cycles ofthe sun.

(2) Weather affects terrain by changing thetrafficability of the soil and the conditionof streams.

(3) Weather affects operations by influencingvisibility insofar as dust, fog, rain, snow,and light and darkness are concerned.

(4) A commander's plan of action must be basedon evaluation of the advantageous featuresof the weather.

b. Terrain.(1) The character of the area or region of mili-

tary operations often has a decisive influenceupon the course of operations. The moreimportant factors to be considered in eval-uating terrain include not only natural fea-tures, such as- ridges, streams, bodies ofwater, beaches, woods, and open spaces, butalso such man-made features as roads,

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bridges, airfields, docks, railways, dams, andtowns. The effect of weather on terrain,particularly as it changes the capability ofthe soil to support cross-country movement,often has a decided influence on militaryoperations.

(2) Ground forms, such as a succession of ridgesand valleys, influence military operations byaiding or hampering the movement of mili-tary forces. An advance parallel to theridges and valleys is easier than movementacross successive ridges.

(3) The salient features of a commander's planof action are usually determined so as totake full advantage of favorable terrainfeatures.

116. PREPARATION OF TACTICAL STUDIES OFWEATHER AND TERRAIN

a. Responsibility. The intelligence officer ischarged with primary staff responsibility for initiat-ing, coordinating, and insuring timely completionand dissemination of tactical studies of weather andterrain. These studies are based on technical dataassembled by the intelligence section, assisted by theengineer and other technical experts. Evaluationand interpretation of weather and terrain factors andtheir effects vary from the point of view of differentusers. Consequently, preparation of tactical studiesof weather and terrain is participated in by eachstaff section concerned, and the completed studyrepresents the joint effort of the staff. Such studies

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should always be directed towards fulfilling the needsof the commander and other users in making deci-sions and executing the mission of the command.

b. Form. A form for the preparation of a tacticalstudy of the weather and terrain is shown in appen-dix VI.

117. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

a. Weather. Weather information is obtainedfrom the Air Weather Service through intelligencechannels. The intelligence officer obtains, interprets,and disseminates this information. The AirWeather Service provides the following information:

(1) Short, medium, and long range forecasts(par. 29).

(2) Current weather information: informationof the current weather at any specified pointor area.

(3) Climatological studies: climate informationfor any area.

(4) Special information or forecasts, includ-ing-

(a) Chemical forecast.(b) Ballistic data.(c) Surf and swell forecasts.(d) Time, tide, and light data.

(5) In conjunction with the engineers theweather service prepares stream level andsoil trafficability forecasts.

b. Terrain.(1) Maps and air photos. Maps and air photos,

supplemented when practicable by ground

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and air reconnaissance, form the basis forstudying terrain. In many cases mapsmarked in special ways simplify this study.Occasionally a series of special maps or over-lays, on each of which is emphasized aseparate item of military importance, suchas roads, streams, or relief, is necessary.Oblique, stereoscopic, colored, and infraredphotographs are helpful in studying ter-rain and man-made changes to the terrain.Enlarged town and city plans showing loca-tions of prominent buildings, names ofstreets, and other features are essential forstudies prior to operations against a town orcity.

(2) Terrain models. Terrain models of thearea selected for detailed study, generallyfor special operations such as amphibiousor airborne operations and the attack offortified areas, may be prepared. Theseare particularly helpful in operational andlogistical planning, and operational briefingof troops.

(3) Hydrographic charts. A study of hydro-graphic charts is essential in amphibiousoperations or in the defense of beaches andshore lines.

(4) Special maps. In mountain and winteroperations, special maps prepared from allavailable data, showing snow depths to beexpected on the ground, are valuable formaking logistical and tactical plans. Mapsshowing timbered areas will also be of value.

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(5) Reconnaissance and traffceability reports.A thorough study of available reconnais-sance reports is essential to proper evalua-tion of terrain prior to any operation.Trafficability reports concerning groundconditions which affect the movement oftanks are considered when contemplatingany mechanized action.

Section VI. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

118. GENERAL

a. Enemy order of battle is the manner in whichthe enemy has organized and disposed his militaryforces. Intelligence on order of battle includes dataon the strength, equipment, location, disposition, or-ganization, identity, tactical doctrines and methods,combat efficiency, and movement of enemy forces,together with records of performance of identifiedunits and with personnel data on the commanders.

b. In the production of military intelligence inpeace or in war, every country and possible theaterof operations is studied by the Department of theArmy. These studies include order of battle factorsas well as many others. One result of such studiesis the compilation of order of battle books which areavailable during time of war to units and to intelli-gence officers at all echelons.

c. Order of battle books is the basis from whichorder of battle personnel start in the developmentof their own order of battle files (par. 39), at theoutset of operations. Order of battle files are thefoundation of current intelligence on enemy order of

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battle during military operations. If not constantlykept up to date, order of battle files will rapidly losetheir value. Since these files are used by field collect-ing agencies, such as PW interrogators, as well asby intelligence officers in the production of intelli-gence, it is extremely important that a wide exchangeof order of battle information be made in order thatall units and all eche'ons will benefit as new informa-tion is obtained. This exchange is made throughthe medium of order of battle reports.

119. SOURCES OF CRDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION

The sources of order of battle information vary,particularly in importance, with the echelon under-consideration. Some of the more important sourcesare prisoners of war, captured documents and mate-riel, intercepted communications, enemy press andradio broadcasts, civilians, refugees, and escapers.As with any other information, order of battle dataprocured from any of these sources is evaluated andinterpreted and, where necessary, substantiated byother means.

120. IMPORTANCE OF ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMA-TION

Since the study of order of battle is to determinewhat enemy forces exist, their strength, and how theyare organized and disposed, a large portion of theintelligence estimate is directly based thereon. Thecapabilities of the enemy to affect the accomplish-ment of our mission can only be properly statedwhen based on recent order of battle data. Sincethe commander requires intelligence of the enemy,

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the weather, and the terrain in order to make a deci-sion, the direct importance of order of battle in-formation to the commander is apparent.

121. PRINCIPAL FACTORS IN ORDER OF BATTLE

a. Strength. There are three principal measuresof strength: personnel, number of units, and arma-ment.

(1) Personnel strength should be broken downin every possible way: by branch of service,by rank and grade, by method of recruit-ment, by nationality (if the army in ques-tion contains more than one nationality),and by degree of training.

(2) The number of units should be stated by'type and echelon: higher headquarters(army groups, armies, corps); divisions(distinguishing by types); and separatebrigades, regiments, battalions, and smallerunits.

(3) Strength in armament consists of a tabula-tion of all the principal types of weapons:heavy, medium, and light tanks; artillerypieces of various calibers; mortars; machineguns; and rifles. Strength figures are re-quired at all echelons. The strength ofthe entire enemy army in personnel, units,and armament is as much a part of orderof battle information as is the strength inone small area.

b. Unit Identification.(1) Knowledge of the exact designation of every

unit in the enemy army being studied is the200

goal of order of battle work. Systems ofnomenclature and numbering are all-impor-tant. A knowledge of the common (or ver-nacular) designations of units and typesof organizations will often reveal much re-garding the structure of the army and themissions of special units. For example, thesystem of numbering used for any giventype of unit often reflects the mobilizationplan. There frequently is a standard rela-tionship between the numbering of divi-sions and that of their component regi-ments. Besides their regular numbers andtype designations, units in many armieshave special names; these may indicate thehome station, provincial origin, former com-mander, or any other attribute. Examplesare the Gross-deutschland Division (Ger-man), the Moscow Division (Soviet), andthe Folgore Division (Italian).

(2) Lacking knowledge of the specific numbersand type designations of units, other meansmay be used to identify them. These in-clude Army post office numbers, code names,unit insignia, and even the names of theircommander or their home stations. A com-plete order of battle of an army could bedrawn up onf the basis of these partial iden-tifications. Frequently, knowledge of theseattributes will prove invaluable in establish-ing the regular designation of units, sincereports may refer only to the name of thecommander of the unit.

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c. Command Structure. Besides identifying andlocating the units which compose a given militaryforce, the command relationships which exist amongthem should be determined.- For any one unit, thisstudy includes the next higher unit to which itis subordinate, as well as the various 'lower unitswhich are subordinate to it. A distinction is madebetween organic and attached units at each eche-lon. Knowledge of the command structure is in-dispensable to determining the capabilities of theforce for offensive or defensive action.

d. Disposition. The disposition of military forcesin any area includes the exact location of the head-quarters of each identified unit and the deploymentof all of its troops. If the exact location cannotbe determined, the general location should be stated.At times the location of an unidentified unit of agiven type can be learned, while on other occa-sions, a unit may be identified in the 'area underscrutiny but its location within that area may be un-known. Implied in the statement of headquarterslocation and deployment of troops is the matter ofboundaries. Enemy boundaries rarely coincide withour own, and knowledge of the location of enemyboundaries assists considerably in formulating op-eration plans.' Lacking captured documents whichactually show the boundaries, knowledge of theirlocation can best be determined from interroga-tion of prisoners. The identification of the unitfrom which captured and the place of capture, inconjunction with a study of the map will often-suggest probable boundaries. In addition, a closeexamination of enemy movements and groupings,

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and of his command structure and tactical doctrine,will aid materially in the determination of enemyboundaries.

e. Military Personalities. Closely linked withthe preceding order of battle subjects is the study ofmilitary personalities. This study cannot be di-vorced from the study of identification, location, andcommand structure of units. The study of com--manders, including those of subordinate units, is oneof the best means of establishing unit identifications.Everything possible should be learned about each in-dividual: his full name, variants, and aliases; pres-ent rank and position; place and date of birth;provincial or class origin; education and militaryschooling; family, political, and other affiliations;military ability; special aptitudes; character, andpast career. Knowledge of the personality of acommander will aid materially in estimating thecapabilities of his command.

f. Unit History. It is not enough to know thespot location, present commander, and current com-position of an identified unit. Its entire history-from the time, place, and circumstances of its activa-tion through all its subsequent movements, changesin command, and changes in composition and sub-ordination-will be found necessary in order ofbattle work. Such data will not only have a bear-ing on the tradition, morale, and combat effectivenessof the unit, but may prove invaluable in establishingpresent unit identifications. During the past war,for example, German prisoners of war sometimes re-fused to give the identification of their units butwould talk freely about their past campaigns and

926264°-51- 14 203

commanders. Accurate unit histories then made itpossible to establish the identification withoutdifficulty.

122. TRAINING IN ORDER OF BATTLE

a. During time of peace, effective training in orderof battle techniques and practices is difficult toachieve. To alleviate this deficiency a fictitious en-emy called "Aggressor" has been developed by theDepartment of the Army. In preparation of Ag-gressor, effort has been made to inject as much real-ism as possible. In doing this, an imaginary coun-try with fictitious historical background has been de-veloped. Four field manuals describing Aggressorand his armed forces have been published:

(1) FM 30-101, The Maneuver Enemy;(2) FM 30-102, Handbook on Aggressor Mili-

tary Forces.(3) FM 30-103, Aggressor Army Order of

Battle.(4) FM 30-104, Aggressor Army Representa-

tion Operations and'Equipment.

b. FM 30-103 is, in effect, an order of battle book.The forms used in the manual for tabulation of datamay be followed by intelligence personnel to preparetheir order of battle files.

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CHAPTER 10

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

123. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy intelligence services are presumed tobe at least as efficient as our own. They will useall the methods employed by us for obtaining infor-mation. Intelligence services do not usually acquirevital information by obtaining one all-revealing fact,but principally as the result of correlating small,and possibly individually insignificant, items ofinformation.

b. The information most likely to be sought byenemy intelligence includes the following:

(1) The capabilities and limitations, intentions,plans, and employment of our forces.

(2) The composition, strength, dispositions,armament, equipment, training, and moraleof our forces.

(3) Our logistical and administrative systems;sources arid availability of supplies; vulner-able points in our production, transporta-tion, and storage systems; and lines ofcommunication.

(4) Developments in tactical doctrine, arma-ment, mat6riel, and equipment.

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(5) Casualties in men and materiel. Results ofenemy activities, whether favorable orunfavorable.

(6) The organization, functions, scope of re-sponsibility, personalities, operational pat-terns, sources, methods, and results achievedby our intelligence and counterintelligenceagencies.

(7) Progress and objectives of our scientific andtechnical research.

(8) Civilian morale.(9) Biographic data concerning our command-

ers and other important individuals.

c. Among the more important sources, methods,

and agencies from which the enemy may derive in-formation in the field are-

(1) Observation and reconnaissance, land, sea,and air.

(2) Prisoners of war and refugees.(3) Communication intelligence.(4) Documents.(5) Press and radio (television) communiques,

news photographs, and published surmisesby editorial writers and columnists.

(6) Careless talk.(7) Secret agents.(8) Travelers.

124. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Purpose. Counterintelligence consists of thosemeasures, either passive or active, designed to con-ceal from the enemy our intentions and activities,

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and to neutralize or destroy the effectiveness ofenemy intelligence activities. Surprise, one of themost important of the principles of war, may bederived from the efficiency of a well-organized andsoundly operated counterintelligence system, andfrom the effectiveness of the counterintelligencemeasures employed.

b. Scope. Counterintelligence includes, but is notconfined to, the measures and activities employed inthe detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity,and disaffection, and the detection and prevention ofenemy espionage and sabotage. Counterintelligenceis necessary in peace and war.

c. Control. Centralization of control is the es-sence of efficient counterintelligence. Counterintelli-gence activities are normally conducted under thestaff supervision of the unit AC of S, G-2. CounterIntelligence Corps detachments attached to tacticalechelons are under command of the commander ofthe unit to which attached and will carry out suchsecurity duties as he may direct (SR 380-310-1).

d. Responsibility. Counterintelligence activitiesare not the exclusive concern of unit intelligence offi-cers and intelligence specialists, but are participatedin, to a considerable extent, by all members of themilitary service. The full cooperation of all person-nel is an essential requirement to the successful neu-tralization of enemy and unfriendly intelligenceorganizations.

125. SIMILARITIES TO INTELLIGENCE

a. Counterintelligence, like intelligence, dependsin large measure upon numerous and diversified

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agencies and methods for the collection of informa-tion. Many of these agencies are the same as thoseemployed for intelligence purposes.

b. Another comparison. between counterintelli-gence and intelligence is the interest of the two inenemy order of battle. Although the degree of in-terest is mutual, their approach to the subject is madefrom two distinctly different points of view. In-telligence is concerned with the manner in which theenemy has organized and disposed his military forcesfor the conduct of military operations. Counterin-telligence is concerned with the organization,strength, doctrine, techniques, efficiency, and capa-bilities of all enemy and unfriendly intelligence,counterintelligence, and subversive services -andagencies.

c. An additional similarity is found in the greatdependence which is placed upon tactical and servicetroops by both counterintelligence and intelligence.Tactical and service units are employed in collectinginformation regarding the enemy for intelligencepurposes, and in the simultaneous enforcement ofsecurity measures in order to satisfy counterintelli-gence requirements.

126. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CHANNELS

a. Normally, counterintelligence information andreports are transmitted through G-2 channels fol-lowing the chain of command except where specialdirectives indicate different procedures. In allcases where the time element is vital, direct com-munication between counterintelligence units anddetachments is authorized. Such communication

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will be reported promptly to the G-2 of the commandor technical service concerned.

b. Periodic intelligence reports usually contain asection devoted to counterintelligence matters. Allcounterintelligence directives are issued in the nameof the commander and are distributed through eithercommand or G-2 channels, depending upon the na-ture of the directive.

127. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DUTIES OF. THE IN-TELLIGENCE OFFICER

a. The intelligence officer, in cooperation withother staff officers, is responsible to the commanderfor the formulation of counterintelligence plans andpolicies in consonance with those of higher head-quarters, and for staff supervision of the executionof such plans and policies by units and agencieswithin the command. At division and higher head-quarters specially qualified personnel will be as-signed to assist the intelligence officer in thisfunction.

b. The duties of the intelligence officer with respectto counterintelligence usually include-

(1) The planning and execution, through intel-ligence and other military and civil agen-cies, of all active and passive measuresdesigned to preserve secrecy and to neutral-ize or destroy the effectiveness of hostileintelligence.

(2) The planning, in coordination with otherstaff sections, of methods and proceduresfor deceiving the enemy; and the conduct of

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counterintelligence phases of such opera-tions.

(3) Assistance in the conduct of counterpropa-ganda activities.

(4) The coordination with counterintelligenceagencies in the conduct of such investiga-tions as may be necessary. The investiga-tions are conducted by Counter IntelligenceCorps personnel, and in some instances byother military or civil investigative agen-cies. They include background investiga-tions of military and civilian personnel,citizens, and aliens to determine their re-liability as to security, and complaint in-vestigations when sabotage, espionage,treason, sedition, subversion, or disaffectionare suspected.

(5) The imposition of such military and civilcensorship restrictions as circumstances mayrequire.

128. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS PERSONNEL(T/O & E 30-500)

a. Division.

(1) Military personnel engaged exclusively oncounterintelligence duties at division areselected, thoroughly screened, and tech-nically trained commissioned and enlistedpersonnel organized into detachments ofvarying size. These detachments are at-tached to divisions for the execution ofcounterespionage, countersabotage, and

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countersubversive missions. The command'ing officer of a CIC detachment is respon-sible for the planning, supervision, direc-tion, and control of the investigativeactivities of his detachment personnel, bas-ing his action on the counterintelligencemission of the command (SR 380-310-1).Each detachment is provided with organictransportation and technical equipment.

(2) A division will normally have attached oneadministrative and headquarters detach-ment and one operations detachment (fig.2).

(3) No Counterintelligence staff officer is as-signed to a division staff; therefore, thecounterintelligence staff duties at divisionsmay be performed by the senior CIC detach-ment officer.

(4) CIC detachments may be made adminis-tratively self-sufficient by the additionthereto of mess and motor maintenance per-sonnel also provided for in T/O & E 30-500.

(5) Detachments are numerically designated,for example "470th Counter IntelligenceCorps Detachment," in order issued by TheAdjutant General, Department of theArmy, at the time of activation.

b. Uniform and Credentials.(1) Uniform regulations for Counter Intelli-

gence Corps personnel are issued by theDepartment of the Army or theater head-quarters. Considerable latitude in dressis normally given to Counter Intelligence

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Corps detachments because of the nature oftheir duties, however, personnel of tacticalCounter, Intelligence Corps detachmentsnormally wear the uniform prescribed forcombat troops.,

(2) Appropriate credentials are issued toCounter Intelligence Corps personnel.Such credentials are honored whenever pre-sented, and authorize the bearer to accom-plish his official duties without interferencefrom military police and similar authori-ties. Normally, Counter Intelligence Corpspersonnel with tactical detachments willwear the military uniform with metalUnited States insignia and without insigniaof rank.

129. COLLECTING AGENCIES

It has been pointed out in paragraph 125 thatmany of the same collecting agencies are used in theintelligence and counterintelligence processes. Ofthose which serve in the dual capacity, the follow-ing are listed to indicate their usefulness to an intelli-gence officer in accomplishing his counterintelligencemissions.

a. Interrogators. Prisoners often provide excel-lent sources of information concerning the extent ofthe enemy's knowledge regarding our true situationand capabilities, together with indications as to themanner in: which such information was obtained.Some prisoners can furnish information, from timeto time, on enemy intelligence personnel whose char-

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acteristics and whereabouts are of interest to coun-terintelligence.

b. Interpreters aind Translators. When counter-intelligence specialists lack the appropriate linguisticabilities with which to obtain information frominhabitants of the area of operations, the interpreterdetachment can provide valuable assistance. Trans-lators are of value in making preliminary transla-tions of enemy intelligence documents and otherpapers which have been captured or otherwiseacquired.

c. Air Photo Interpreters. Air photo interpretersare used extensively in accurately locating counter-intelligence targets in enemy-held territory. Suchinstallations as spy schools, sabotage supply points,intelligence communications centers, and related tar-gets can be effectively bombed from the air throughinformation obtained from captured secret agentsand verified by air photos.

d. Army Security Agency (ASA). The commu-nication intelligence and communication securityfunctions performed by communication reconnais-sance field units of higher headquarters and the com-munication reconnaissance liaison team at divisionassist counterintelligence. Such duties as the secu-rity monitoring of friendly radio and wire commu-nications, locating clandestine transmitters, andintercepting enemy intelligence communications areamong the major contributions which they make to-ward the counterintelligence effort.

e. Antiaircraft Units. The air warning serviceoperated by the antiaircraft artillery provides radarand related surveillance against enemy aircraft

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which may be the means by which secret agentsand equipment are introduced into areas under fourcontrol.

f. Military Police Units. Military police units andpersonnel of the Criminal Investigation Divisionoften acquire information of considerable counter-intelligence value.

g. Technical Service Intelligence Detachments(TSID). Certain of these detachments provide ad-vice regarding the characteristics and capabilities ofenemy sabotage devices, signal communication equip-ment, and similiar technical matters.

h. Air Weather Service. Weather forecasts assistin determining those periods when time, light, andweather will best serve the interests of enemy clan-destine operations, especially the movement by air,land, or sea, of spies and saboteurs,

130. RELATIONS WITH MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Of necessity a considerable number of securitymeasures will apply directly to the civil population.The security control of the civil population is acommand responsibility normally exercised throughthe agencies of military government-civil affairswhich operate in close coordination with CounterIntelligence Corps personnel. In general, all regu-lations are issued by military government authoritiesin the form of proclamations, laws, ordinances, andother enactments which are enforced by military andcivil police and other agencies. Wherever practica-ble, military government detachments will serve asthe channel for counterintelligence dealings with the

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civil population. Counter Intelligence Corps per-sonnel may deal directly with civilians if circum-stances so dictate and provided their procedures con-form with. Military Government policies. In anycase, a close relationship must always be maintainedbetween counterintelligence detachments and mili-tary government detachments. A fundamentalcounterintelligence principle which must never beignored is that the security of military interests willtake full priority over the welfare and convenienceof the civil population in zones of military operations.

Section II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

131. TYPES OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

a. In a theater of operations, the theater com-mander issues counterintelligence directives for allsubordinate echelons of command. Such directivesalso form the basis upon which the operational em-ployment of counterintelligence detachments is de-termined. The specific duties and responsibilitiesof counterintelligence detachments will not be pre-cisely the same in all theaters, or closely parallel inany two. In general, however, all theater counter-intelligence operations fall normally within fivegeneral categories:

(1) Military security.(2) Civil security.(3) Port, frontier, and travel security.(4) Censorship.(5) Special operations.

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b. Many of the specific functions listed under eachtype of operation in the following paragraphs willseldom be encountered at division or lower unitechelons. However, division and lower unit intelli-gence officers should be familiar with all types ofcounterintelligence operations should they be re-quired to implement them from time to time.

132. MILITARY SECURITY

Military security is protection that results frommeasures taken by a command to protect itself fromespionage, observation, sabotage, annoyance, or sur-prise. It includes those counterintelligence measureswithin or directly pertaining to the armed forcesand to specific military operations. Examples are-

a. Secrecy discipline.b. Special safeguarding of classified military in-

formation and equipment.e. Communication security.d. Security of troop movements.e. Security control of accredited correspondents.f. Special handling of evaders and escapers.g. Base and unit censorship.h. Countersubversion within the armed forces.i. Countersabotage.j. Concealment.k. Counterreconnaissance.1. Counterintelligence control of prohibited areas.mn. Special handling of prisoners of war.n. Security control of friendly secret agents.

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o. Security control of all relations with resist-ance groups operating in enemy territory.

p. Tactical measures, as required, in combat areas.

133. CIVIL SECURITY

Civil security encompasses those counterintelli-gence measures affecting the nonmilitary nationals ofbelligerent and nonbelligerent states permanently ortemporarily residing'under command jurisdiction.Such measures include the following:

a. Systematic registration of civilians includingneutrals and enemy aliens.

b. Control of circulation.c. Curfew.d. Censorship.e. Suspect political groups.f. Security screening of labor.g. Passes and permits.h. Radio and wire communication monitoring.i. Security control of immigration.j. International commerce, especially controls over

trade with neutral states.k. Neutral diplomatic and consular officials and

staffs.1. Security responsibilities of special police

agencies.nM. Counterintelligence functions of civilian de-

fense agencies.n. Restricted areas.o. Interrogation and detention centers.p. Refugees and displaced persons.q. Counterpropaganda, civil population.r. Shop safety and protection.

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134. PORT, FRONTIER, AND TRAVEL SECURITY

Port, frontier, and travel security consists of thespecial application of military and civil securitymeasures to the counterintelligence control of air-ports, seaports, land and sea frontiers, internationalair boundaries, coast lines, and all nonmilitary travelinto and out of a theater of operations. Examplesare-

a. Security control of seaports.b. Security control of airports.c. Establishment of frontier crossing points.d. Jurisdictional responsibilities of Army, Navy,

Air, and civil authorities.e. Security control of merchant seamen and crews

of commercial aircraft.f. Coast line and land-frontier patrols.g. Military travel permit system.A. Security screening and control of frontaliers

(legal daily frontier crossers).i. Landing, shore-leave, and fishing permits.j. Countersabotage in yards, docks, and port in-

stallations and equipment.

135. CENSORSHIP

Censorship is surveillance over communications,such as correspondence, telegrams, news dispatches,motion pictures, and radio broadcasts to prevent in-formation of military value from reaching the enemy.It is accomplished by the systematic channelizationand technical examination of all communications,other than official matter. Byproducts of censor-ship operations will be the detection of illicit hostile

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activities and the collection of information for in-telligence purposes (FM 30-28, TM 30-235, andTM 30-236).

136. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special operations include the specialized employ-ment of active counterintelligence techniques andprocedures in the conduct of secret operations againsthostile and unfriendly intelligence organizationsand activities. Examples of these operations are-

a. Radar surveillance against parachutists andother clandestine landings.

b. Communication intelligence and communica-tion security monitoring operations.

c. Intelligence security.d. Compilation and appropriate dissemination of

counterintelligence target data.e. Deployment and operation of special counter-

intelligence units./. Operation of special interrogation centers for

processing captured enemy agents.g. Deceptive measures and offensive counterintelli-

gence operations as required.

Section IIW. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES

137. COUNTERINTEL.IGENCE ESTIMATE

The formulation of an estimate of enemy intelli-gence capabilities is a primary and continuing re-sponsibility of the senior counterintelligence officerat all echelons. To serve its purpose the estimatemust be based on a broad and thorough knowledge

926264°-51 115 219

of the organization, training, equipment, doctrine,techniques, order of.battle, and deployment of allenemy overt and covert intelligence services andagencies; and a critical analysis of our own deficien-cies in the field of counterintelligence. The counter-intelligence estimate is a thorough examination ofthe enemy intelligence measures which will affect theaccomplishment of our mission. This will revealdeficiencies which must be corrected, and measuresto be taken to prevent the success of the enemy intel-ligence effort. The regular form for the intelligenceestimate (par. 45), with slight modifications, is suit-able for the counterintelligence estimate. In formu-lating paragraph 2 of the estimate, consideration isgiven to enemy intelligence and subversive capabil-ities in the order listed:

a. Conlection of Information.

(1) Overt methods.(a) Reconnaissance, ground and air, includ-

ing photo.(b) Communication intelligence.(c) Prisoners of war, deserters, and refugees.(d) Captured documents, including maps, or-

ders, and letters.(e) Interception of radio and television broad-

casts.(f) Interrogation of captured secret agents.

(2) Covert methods. Espionage, all types.

b. Sabotage.

(1) Military.(2) Political.(3) Economic and industrial.

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c. Guerilla Warfare.(1) Semimilitary operations.(2) Minor armed uprisings.

d. Underground.(1) Political and refugee.(2) Escape and evasion.(3) Criminal.

e. Assassination and Abduction.(1) Military and political leaders.(2) Personnel performing critical duties.

f. Unfriendly Nations. Miscellaneous activities.g. Analysis of our own and allied counterintelli-

gence deficiencies:

138. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK SHEET

Upon completion of the counterintelligence esti-mate, the necessary counterintelligence measures andoperations-according to category-are set forth inthe manner prescribed in the counterintelligencework sheet (see fig. 16). When the work sheet iscompleted the counterintelligence plan is ready tobe drafted. The work sheet is not disseminated.

139. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

The counterintelligence plan is prepared as anappendix of the intelligence annex to the operationorder. Its contents are as detailed as the situationdemands. Standing operating procedure is not re-peated in the plan, except for emphasis. When acounterintelligence plan is not published, counter-intelligence instructions are included in paragraph6 of the intelligence annex.

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140. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

Generally, certain counterintelligence measureswithin military units, except those falling within thecategory of special operations, may be reduced tostanding operating procedure (SOP) and will notnormally be repeated in operation orders or otherpublications.

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CHAPTER 1 1

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ANDCOMMUNICATION SECURITY

Section O. INTRODUCTION

141. THE ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

a. Communication intelligence and communica-tion security functions are performed by Army Se-curity Agency (ASA) personnel organized into acommunication reconnaissance group to support eacharmy. Assigned to the group are communicationreconnaissance battalions (each consisting of a head-quarters and headquarters detachment, communica-tion reconnaissance company, security, and a com-munication reconnaissance company, intelligence)normally attached to Corps (T/O & E 32-500).

b. Normally, at division, Army Security Agencysupport consists of a communication reconnaissanceliaison team, part cf the headquarters and head-quarters detachment. communication reconnaissancebattalion at Corps (par. 17). The team may be aug-mented when necessary by assigning or attachingappropriate teams from communication reconnais-sance units at higher headquarters.

c. With the exception of communication recon-naissance liaison teams, communication intelligenceand communication security units are not ordinarilyattached- or assigned at echelons lower than corps.

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However, monitoring, direction-finder, and inter-cept teams from corps Army Security Agency unitsmay habitually operate well forward in the divisionarea. Results of their operations are available todivisions and lower units through the communica-tion reconnaissance liaison team at division. Com-munication intelligence produced by communicationreconnaissance units for consumption at divisionlevel will be disseminated through special intelli-gence channels to the division G-2.

142. FUNCTIONS OF COMMUNICATION RECON-NAISSANCE UNITS-

a. Liaison units perform communication intelli-gence security planning and coordination within acommand.

b. Communication intelligence units producecommunication intelligence by interception, positionfinding, and analysis of enemy radio and wire signalcommunication.

c. Communication security units monitor friendlycommunication systems, from the security stand-point. They prepare reports on the degree of se-curity practiced by the various communication cen-ters and nets of friendly units within an assignedarea and make recommendations for improvementof communication security.

d. The communication reconnaissance liaison teamat division assists the G-2 by performing such ofthe following duties as are applicable:

(1) Participating in the preparation of intelli-gence and counterintelligence plans by-

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(a) Anticipating communication security re-quirements and making appropriate rec-ommendations.

(b) Advising G-2 on the capabilities and lim-itations of communication reconnaissanceunits under specific conditions and re-questing missions that insure their em-ployment to maximum advantage for thedivision

(2) Supervising the operations of such com-munication reconnaissance teams withwhich it may be augmented and insuringthat they rccomplish their assigned missionsand operate in close technical coordinationwith similar units at the next higherechelon.

(3) Interpreting regulations and advising G-2and the d-vision signal officer on the appli-cation of principles pertaining to communi-cation security.

(4) Providing technical assistance to the divi-sion signal officer in the preparation of thoseparts of tie signal operations instructionswhich relate to communication security.

(5) Visiting communication centers periodi-cally to inspect their communication se-curity practices.

(6) Making specific recommendations for theimprovement of communication securitythroughout the command based on the find-ings of communication security units andcommunication center inspectors.

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143. DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

a. The division G-2 includes the communicationintelligence and communication security require-ments of the division in his intelligence and counter-intelligence plans. To the communication recon-naissance units attached or assigned to the divisionhe prescribes missions which are in keeping withtheir special capabilities. The communication re-connaissance liaison detachment must, at all times,know the current tactical situation, and be suppliedwith all collateral information that may be of assist-ance in the conduct of operations. G-2 evaluatesthe information furnished by the communication re-connaissance units serving his headquarters andavailable from higher headquarters, along with in-formation collected by other agencies. Communica-tion intelligence is used in accordance with specificinstructions issued by higher echelons.

b. Division and lower unit intelligence officersemploy the data collected by communication securityunits to maintain and improve the security of theirorganizations, particularly signal communications,and to estimate the amount and type of informationthat may have fallen into enemy hands as a result ofthe insecure use of signal communications. The in-telligence officer's evaluation of the probable effectof a serious breach of communication security maycause the commander to change his course of action.

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Section II. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

144. GENERAL

a. Communication intelligence is derived from thestudy of intercepted enemy communications. Spe-cifically, it includes a study of-

(1) Intercepted electrical communications (andassociated procedure transmissions), to-gether with captured written communica-tions to which communication securitymeasures have been applied.

(2) Visual and sound signals.(3) Enemy cryptologic material, including

documents.(4) Reports of interrogations of prisoners of

war on the above subjects.

b. Communication intelligence techniques of pri-mary interest to the intelligence officers of divisionsand lower units are interception, radio position-finding, and traffic analysis.

145. INTERCEPTION

Interception is the foundation of the communica-tion intelligence effort. The practicability of inter-ception varies with the means of communicationemployed by the enemy. In modern tactical opera-tions, control is exercised by the commander pri-marily through electrical means of signal communi-cation and these are the means that are mostvulnerable to interception. Of the electrical meansof signal communication, radio is by far the most

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prolific source of communication intelligence. Wirecommunication is of secondary importance.

a. Radio. Intercepted material falls into threegeneral classes:

(1) Plain text messages the majority of whichcontain only unclassified information.Sometimes through error, or because of thepressure of a tactical situation, the enemytransmits classified information in the clear.When such information is intercepted, it istranslated and forwarded to the intelligenceofficer in the shortest practicable time be-cause it ordinarily requires immediateaction to be of value.

(2) Crypto-communications, which must becryptoanalyzed and translated before theirfull value can be realized.

(3) Communication procedural transmissions,which are valuable in the production of in-telligence by traffic analysis.

b. Wire. While relatively less vulnerable thanradio, enemy wire communication is susceptible tocommunication intelligence measures. With sometypes of wire lines, physical tapping may not benecessary because interception can be accomplishedby electric induction. Regardless of enemy safe-guards, wire lines of normal length are-potentialsources of information.

146. RADIO POSITION FINDING

Radio position finding enables the approximatelocation of enemy military headquarters to be deter-

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mined by establishing the positions of the radiotransmitters which serve them. In moving tacticalsituations the data obtained by radio position findingis particularly valuable in keeping enemy order ofbattle up to date. Position finding is most effectivelyperformed in close coordination with interceptionand traffic analysis.

147. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

Traffic analysis is employed to reconstruct enemycommunication networks. This information in turnprovides extensive order of battle information be-cause communication networks are based on com-mand channels. Detailed information on the funda-mentals of traffic analysis is contained in TM 32-250.

148. CATEGORIES OF COMMUNICATION INTELLI-GENCE

There are two nncjor categories into which mostcommunication intelligence falls:

a. Technical. Information relating to the com-munication security procedures and material em-ployed by the enemy comprises the technical category.Usually it is not of direct interest to the combatintelligence officer.

b. Nontechnical. The nontechnical category iscomprised of information relating to enemy tacticsand strategy which his communication security meas-ures have been invented to protect. This informationis of direct interest to the combat intelligence officerand includes data on-

(1) The organization of enemy communicationnetworks.

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(2) The geographical locations of enemy radiotransmitters.

(3) The organization, equipment, strength,identity, and disposition of enemy forces.

(4) Enemy orders, reports, and plans.(5) Movements of' enemy units and personnel.(6) Indications of impending action and other

information of tactical and strategic value.

Section III. COMMUNICATION SECURITY

149. GENERAL

a. Communication security is the protection result-ing from all measures designed to deny to unau-thorized persons information of value which mightbe derived from communications. In general, theprimary means used will be that which combines thegreatest facility and speed of installation and opera-'tion with the required secrecy and dependability.Since all agencies and means are subject to enemyinterception, protective measures must be taken tokeep the information gained by the enemy to aminimum.

b. The components of communication security arecryptosecurity, transmission security, and physicalsecurity.

150. CRYPTOSECURITY

a. General. Cryptosecurity results from the pro-vision of technically sound cryptographic systemsand their proper use. Authorized codes and ciphers,when properly used, are adequate to provide security

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against enemy intelligence. AR 380-5 sets forth thebasic rules governing the use of cryptographic sys-tems. In addition, each code or cipher system is ac-companied by instructions which apply specificallyto that system. No person will attempt to use anycryptographic system until he is thoroughly familiarwith both the general and the specific instructions.

b. Cryptograms. A cryptogram is the encryptedversion of the literal plain text of a communication.The resulting commu-nication is written in unintelli-gible text or in language which conveys a hiddenmeaning. The information contained in a crypto-gram, and not the cryptographic text itself, is as-signed a security classification. Therefore, once amessage has been encrypted, there should be no plain-language indication on the face of the message of itssecurity classification.

e. Use of Cryptograms.(1) All classified messages which are to be

transmitted by electrical means or by othermeans where danger of enemy or unauthor-ized interception exists will be encrypted,except in the following situations in whichit may be most expedient to transmit mes-sages in the clear:

(a) TacticaZ operations. When classified in-formaticn, if intercepted by the enemy,cannot be acted upon in time to influencethe situation, and time cannot be sparedfor encrypting, the commanding officer orhis authorized representative may orderthe transmission of a message in plainlanguage. Such written messages will be

233

marked "send in clear" over the signatureof the commander or his authorized repre-sentatives.

(b) Small units. Commanders of unitssmaller than a division may authorize thenormal transmission in clear text of mes-sages which are to be acted upon immedi-ately in rapidly moving situations.

(2) TOP SECRET messages will never, underany circumstances, be transmitted by elec-trical means in the clear.

d. Messages To Be Encrypted. Special careshould be taken to see that messages which are to beencrypted are kept brief and clear. Unnecessarylength taxes encrypting personnel and facilities, re-sults in delays, increases probability of errors intransmission and encrypting, and increases the abil-ity of the enemy to solve the message.

(1) Messages will be shortened by the deletionof unnecessary words.

(2) The message writer will spell out, eitherin full or abbreviated form, punctuationmarks to be included in the message. Num-bers will be spelled out in full.

(3) Authorized abbreviations should be usedwhenever practicable (SR 320-50-1).

(4) Addresses and signatures within classifiedmessages will be reduced to a minimum.

151. TRANSMISSION SECURITY

Transmission security results from all measuresdesigned' to protect transmissions from interceptionand traffic analysis.

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a. Radio. Radio is the quickest means of estab-lishing communication and, with certain tacticalunits, the only practicable means. It is, however, theleast secure because radio is more vulnerable to enemyinterception than any other means of transmission.The mere fact that a radio station is on the air is asource of information to the enemy. The extensiveuse of intercept stations and direction-finders enablesthe enemy to record virtually all important trans-missions that are made and to locate the positions ofthe radio stations concerned. This gives him an op-portunity to follow troop movements and to learnthe identity, strength, plan, or tactical dispositionof a military force. It must be presumed that enemyinterception takes place every time a transmitter isplaced in operation.

(1) Traiging. The fact that radio is the leastsecure of the means used for transmittingmessages makes it necessary that every op-erator receive a thorough course in radioprocedure as part of his training for theoperation of Army radios.

(2) Discipline. Radio transmission securityembodies the maintenance of circuit dis-cipline and the suppression of all super-fluous transmissions. Lack of discipline,improper training, as well as negligence,inaccuracy, and laxity, are responsible forthe violations which constitute the dangersto security.

b. Wire. A wire system includes all means ofcommunication utilizing wire lines, such as tele-phone, telegraph, and teletypewriter. Standardiza-

926264°-51 16 235

tion in installation, maintenance, and operation ofwire systems is necessary to insure efficient and re-liable wire communication.

(1) Land-line interception. All known meth-ods of electrical communication are liable tointerception. Wire communication, how-ever, offers greater security than radio andshould, if practicable, be used in preferenceto radio when security is the major factorin the transmission of a classified message.Despite its greater security, messages trans-mitted by wire can be intercepted by phys-ical and inductive tapping. Physical tapscan be detected, but interception by induc-tion can completely escape detection.

(2) Cable interception. Underwater cable isless vulnerable to interception than landlines, and such interception requires evengreater technical knowledge and equipment.In most cases, the interception of cable mes-sages requires the use of ships at sea; andsuccess is reduced because of the hazardsof weather and the danger of detection byair and naval patrols.

c. Authentication. If all messages could behanded personally to the addressee by the originator,there would be no need for authentication. In theabsence of personal identification, however, some re-liable system of authentication is necessary

(1) Types of authentication. The two prin-cipal types of authentication are messageauthentication and station authentication.

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The term "station authentication" includesboth radio net and telephone authentication.

(2) Message authentications. Telephone sys-tem users, communication center personnel,and station (radio, visual, or wire) operat-ing personnel are the personnel directlyconcerned with authentication. When acommunication center is involved, a clerkat the originating headquarters authenti-cates outgoing messages. At the receivingheadquarters the authentication is checkedby the receiving clerk. When a communi-cation center is not involved in the trans-mission of a message, the originatorauthenticates the message and the addresseechecks the authentication.

(3) Station authentication. Station authenti-cation is performed by the operators exceptin the case of telephone conversations,where both the calling and called parties ex-change authentication directly before pro-ceeding.

(4) Wheui to authenticate. The commandingofficer is responsible for authentication, anddetermines when it will be used within hisunit. Authentication is particularly im-portant when-

(a) Instructions are issued to open or closea radio or wire system.

(b) A radio net is opened.(c) A station reports into a radio net.(d) Messages are transmitted in the clear.(e) An extremely important message is trans-

mitted.237

(f) Instructions contained in communicationsappear to rescind, change, or conflict withprevious orders.

(g) Instructions are issued to change radiofrequencies and when initial station con-tact is made after such change.

(h) Radio traffic is transmitted to silent sta-tions.

(i) Enemy activity is suspected in a radio orwire system.

(j) Radio silence is directed or lifted.(5) Misleading measages. Misleading messages

may be originated by the enemy for trans-mission by radio and other means of com-munication, and authentication should berequired for any message that arouses sus-picion.

(6) Training. Authentication involves only anegligible delay when personnel are welltrained for its use. For that reason and inorder to impress personnel with the im-portance of authentication, messages andoperating conditions simulating contin-gencies listed above should be introducedas soon as practicable after the beginningof the unit training period.

d. Friendly Traffic Analysis. Traffic analysis isperformed on friendly radio communications to de-termine how much intelligence can be gleaned bythe enemy from a study of the volume and directionof our traffic flow, and from the external charac-teristics of messages such as calls, precedences, andgroup counts. Over a given circuit it can be as-

238

sumed that the enemy records and interprets thenumber of messages handled. Friendly trafficanalysis shows how important military activities arerevealed by unusual traffic patterns, and it furnishesthe data necessary for instituting an effective pro-gram of countermeasures. It is' not the aim of atraffic security program to distribute message trafficin such a manner that there is an artificially uniformflow of traffic. It is desirable, however, that messagetraffic on a given circuit follow an established pat-tern, avoiding deviations in volume and directionwhich might inform the enemy of impending tacticaloperations.

152. PHYSICAL SECURITY

a. Physical security results from all measuresnecessary to safeguard classified communicationequipment and material from 'access thereto by un-authorized persons.

b. From production to destruction classified com-munication documents and material must be safe-guarded from physical compromise which can occurin two ways: by outright loss and by exposure to ex-amination by the enemy or by other unauthorizedpersons.

c. Under ordinary conditions physical loss is pre-vented by the observance of established require-ments for the transmission, handling, storage, androutine disposition of classified matter. Detailedregulations for the distributing and accounting ofregistered cryptomaterial are contained in TM32-225. When capture is imminent, physical com-promise of classified communication material ordi-

239

narily can be prevented by the prompt and thoroughexecution of emergency destruction plans whichhave been prepared well in advance of the occasionand regularly rehearsed by the personnel who are incharge of the material.

153. COMMUNICATION SECURITY PERSONNEL

a. Cryptographic Security Officer. A crypto-graphic security officer will be designated at eachheadquarters using cryptographic systems. In gen-eral, he supervises compliance with procedures nec-essary for the physical and cryptographic securityof documents and devices, and acts as custodian forsuch documents and devices.

b. Cryptographic Personnel. P e r s o n n e 1 whohandle classified cryptographic matter must bethoroughly trustworthy. They must be well trainedand efficient, and aware of the dangers to securityof carelessness, negligence, and loose talk. Crypto-graphic personnel report every violation observed inincoming traffic to the cryptographic security officer,who in turn reports it to the office of record for thecryptographic system used. When reporting suchviolations, personnel should have it impressed uponthem that they are not "turning someone in." Vio-lation reports are not designed to be punitive; theyare intended to correct bad habits and to clarify in-structions. Since the rules and instructions per.taining to the subject of cryptographic security arecomplicated, personnel violating security endangercommunication in a way that 'is difficult to amend.Proper correction is effected only through full coop-eration of all personnel concerned.

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CHAPTER 12

TRAINING AND STANDING OPERATINGPROCEDURE

Section I. TRAINING

154. PURPOSE

The purpose of intelligence training is to insureefficient performance of intelligence duties by everyofficer and enlisted man.

155. SCOPE

Intelligence specialist training in all echelons ofcommand will include appropriate instruction in thecollection, recording, evaluation, and interpretationof information of the enemy and the terrain; in thedissemination and use of combat intelligence; inassisting the commander to direct the intelligenceeffort; and in counterintelligence. However, train-ing in intelligence will not be restricted to personnelassigned to the intelligence sections of variousheadquarters. Appropriate instruction in this sub-ject will be given to all officers and enlisted men be-cause all military personnel have combat intelligenceresponsibilities. Personnel assigned to intelligenceduties will be given additional and more thoroughinstruction appropriate to their assignment.

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156. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The Commander.. Intelligence is produced forthe commander, and he should understand his needfor intelligence. Training in this field is his respon-sibility. He will insure that all officers and enlistedmen have an understanding of their intelligenceduties. In battalions and larger organizations, he isassisted in carrying out this responsibility by anintelligence officer.

b. The Intelligence Officer

(1) The responsibility of the intelligence officerfor the training of his section must be em-phasized. If his own section thoroughlyunderstands the practical application of in-telligence techniques and theories and isimbued with a spirit of cooperation, he willhave laid a sound foundation for efficientintelligence operations within the unit. Hewill have gained not only the respect of thelower intelligence sections, but also a desireby them to acquire and furnish him with allpossible information of the enemy.

(2) The intelligence officer in coordination withthe operations officer is als6 responsible forsupervising the training of intelligence sec-tions of all subordinate echelons. He pre-pares the intelligence training program,conducts intelligence schools, makes staffvisits, observes intelligence training, con-ducts tests, and assists the lower units inobtaining training aids and instructors whoare specialists in certain fields.

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c. Relationship With the Operations Officer. Closecooperation and coordination must exist between theintelligence and operations officers in the trainingphase just as in the operational phase. The opera-tions officer is charged with the staff responsibilityfor all training, but it is the intelligence officer whoprepares the intelligence part of the unit trainingprogram and who supervises its execution. He in-forms the operations officer of the amount of timeneeded for intelligence training and of requirementsfor facilities, training aids, and instructors; thenin collaboration they work out the details. The closerelationship between the intelligence and operationsofficers in accomplishing the training mission doesnot end with the publication of the formal trainingprogram. If the intelligence officer understands theentire training program and is earnestly cooperatingwith the operations officer, he can provide much in-telligence training that is not specifically reflected inthe training program. Such training is conductedconcurrently with other types of training (par. 160).If properly planned and executed, it will enhance thevalue of the other training. Its success will largelydepend upon the imagination and ingenuity of theintelligence officer. A few of the many ways inwhich this sort of training can be carried out are-

(1) To prepare and submit route sketches andreports of observations in connection withroad marches.

(2) To submit messages concerning the "enemy"during squad, platoon, and other combatexercises.

243

(3) To have terrain studies prepared for theoperations officer in order to assist him inhis preparation of terrain exercises.

(4) To act as the "enemy" in field exercises, andto report on what was observed.

157. CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL TO BE TRAINED

Although all personnel receive training in intelli-gence, for the purpose of scheduling and conductingtraining it is convenient to divide them into threegroups:

a. Intelligence section personnel.b. Reconnaissance units and special information

services.c. All other personnel.

158. TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE SECTION PER-SONNEL

a. The training program for intelligence sectionpersonnel will include the following subjects:

(1) Intelligence agencies (their organization,functions, capabilities, and limitations).

(2) Description of sources.(3) Methods of collection and transmission of

information.(4) Recording and filing information, to include

preparing overlays and posting situationmaps.

(5) Examination of personnel, documents, andcaptured materiel.

(6) In war, the enemy armed forces; in peace,the maneuver enemy (pars. 122 and 163).

244

(7) Counterintelligehce and security measures.(8) Theory and practice of observation.(9) Military sketching, map reading, and air

photo reading.

b. In addition, officers and selected enlisted per-sonnel will be trained in such subjects as the follow-ing to the extent required by their duties:

(1) Evaluation of information.(2) Interpretation of information.(3) Estimate of the enemy situation.(4) Determination of enemy capabilities.(5) Dissemination of information and intelli-

gence.(6) Capabilities and limitations of ground and

air reconnaissance and air photo interpre-tation.

(7) Terrain evaluation.(8) Order of battle analysis.(9) Intelligence specialist teams (their organi-

zation, functions, capabilities, and limita-tions).

(10) Intelligence and counterintelligence plan-ning.

(11) Intelligence standing operating pro-cedure.

159. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING OF RECONNAISSANCEUNITS AND SPECIAL INFORMATION SERVICES

The reconnaissance battalion and company, theintelligence and reconnaissance platoons of the in-fantry regiments, the reconnaissance section of engi-neer combat battalions, the artillery reconnaissance

245

agencies, and the reconnaissance platoon of the tankand armored infantry battalions, as well as specialinformation services (par. 33), must be given spe-cialized training in their appropriate duties. Theseduties are covered in detail in appropriate fieldmanuals.

160. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING OF ALL OTHER PER-SONNEL

a. Each soldier is a potential information col-lecting agent and therefore must be trained in col-lecting and reporting information. He should beable to report on such things as enemy attitude, de-fensive or offensive; fire received; obstacles, naturaland artificial; and terrain, including cover, conceal-ment, and trafficability. Reports are limited onlyby the inability of the soldier to see, think, and re-WWerm7ber. The combat front-line soldier is thefoundation of information collecting. Since ourmilitary personnel are a potential source of informa-tion to the enemy, instruction must also be givenin counterintelligence and defense against enemypropaganda.

b. All officers and enlisted men in a division re-ceive training in the following:

(1) Intelligence subjects.

(a) Scope and purpose of combat intelli-gence.

(b) Secrecy discipline.(c) Defense against enemy propaganda.(d) Collecting and reporting information.

246

(e) Observation.(f) Haridling prisoners of war, enemy de-

serters, civilians, escapers and evaders,and captured documents.

(g) Safeguarding of captured supplies andequipment.

(h) Use of countersigns.(i) Shelling reports.(j) Enemy identifications (uniforms, mecha-

nized vehicles, and aircraft).(k) Use of enemy weapons.(1) Counterintelligence.(m) Characteristics of the enemy armed

forces.(2) Related subjects.

(a) Message writing. This includes trainingin the objective reporting of facts, ratherthan subjective reporting of the individ-ual's interpretation of facts.

(b) Map and air photo reading, and use ofthe compass.

(c) United States Army organization.(d) Camouflage.

161. METHODS OF INSTRUCTION

a. The methods of instruction prescribed by FM21-5, Military Training, are applicable to intelli-gence training. The principles of preparation, ex-planation, demonstration, application, examination,and discussion may be followed throughout.

b. Specialized intelligence'training is best accomp-lished by centralized instruction.

247

c. When the division is assembled as a unit or itsvarious elements are in close proximity to each other,a division intelligence school should be establishedby the division intelligence officer. This school willinclude instruction for all officers and selected non-commissioned officers of the division assigned to in-telligence duties. It will include subjects listed inparagraph 158.

d. Subsequent to the division school, subordinateunits of the division should conduct intelligenceschools. The objective of these schools is to trainthe regularly assigned intelligence personnel andselected men from battalions and companies. Theseschools are conducted by the intelligence officers ofthe various units with the assistance and under thesupervision of the division .intelligence officer.Students in the division school should instruct inthelower unit schools. The course.is practical as wellas theoretical. Tests for proficiency include a prac-tical demonstration of ability to perform the variousduties of the intelligence section.

e. A system of schools within the division enablesthe intelligence officer to establish standard practicesthroughout the command. It also promotes under-standing, confidence, and cooperation between all in-telligence officers of the command.

/. Training is not concluded with the completionof the divisional and subordinate intelligenceschools, but continues and is perfected by repetition.During periods of relief from active operations, op-portunity should be taken to correct deficiencies andcomplete the training of replacements.

248

162. CREATING INTELLIGENCE CONSCIOUSNESS

a. In order to instill in every soldier and officer anappreciation for his intelligence obligations, the in-telligence officer will create and maintain intelligenceconsciousness throughout the organization. Themanner in which this is accomplished depends to alarge degree on the imagination and initiative ofunit intelligence officers.

b. Intelligence training should be included in alltypes of field exercises and maneuvers, from squadproblems to exercises involving the largest com-mands. A squad, in an exercise in which it is learn-ing to maneuver, should find some "enemy" uponwhich it is expected to report accurately. Marchesmay have their monotony broken by sudden "at-tacks" or "enemy fire." "Documents" and "prison-ers" may become an interesting and instructive partof field problems. Practically all troop trainingshould involve some "enemy" activity upon which itis necessary to report. Not only will the promptand accurate reporting of information become ha-bitual with the troops, but zest will also be added totheir training and they will become better fightingmen..

163. MANEUVERS

a. The employment of aggressor forces in tacticalexercises will permit realistic training in every as-pect of combat intelligence, from the collection ofinformation by reconnaissance units and other agen-cies to such specialized procedures as order of battle

249

(par. 122), interpretation of air photos, and exploi-tation of documents and prisoners of war. Further,it will help in making commanders, their staffs, andthe troops always conscious of the enemy as a realand vital force to be reckoned with in every tacticalplan and operation (FM 30-101, FM 30-102, FM30-103, and FM 30-104).

b. Intelligence measures that may be employed inmaneuvers include tactical (visual) and photo-graphic air reconnaissance; ground reconnaissance(both by day and night) by combat elements;ground observation; surveillance of our own signalcommunications and the interception of "enemy"communications; supervision in all units of meas-ures for the safeguarding of military information;use of camouflage and camouflage discipline; restric-tions on the use of lights; identification of aircraft;preparation and distribution of air photos as supple-ments to maps; policies regarding maps to be usedand map allowances; and the requisition and distri-bution of maps.

Section II. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

164. GENERAL

a. The purpose of standing operating procedure(SOP) is to reduce the number and length of ordersthat are issued. It establishes a regular procedureto be followed unless situations arise that call forspecific orders or instructions. No fixed form foran intelligence SOP can be prescribed. Its contentand scope will vary with the echelon of command,with the theater of operations, wvith the training

250

and experience of the unit, and with the enemy. Inany event, certain salient. points should be covered.

b. The intelligence officer is responsible for twoSOPs: a general intelligence SOP for the command(which becomes the intelligence paragraph of thedivision SOP), and an SOP for his own section.The outline forms presented in the following para-graphs are suitable for a division.

165. OUTLINE FORM FOR INTELLIGENCE PARA-GRAPH, DIVISION SOP

INTELLIGENCE

a. Reconnaissance and observation.(1) Air.(2) Ground.

(a) Patrols.(b) Observation posts.

(3) Radar units.(4) Engineers.(5) Air warning.(6) Information to be reported at once.(7) Combat propaganda.

b. Measures for handling personnel, documents, andmateriel.

(1) Prisoners of war.(a) Initial interrogation.(b) Searching.(c) Segregation.(d) Selected prisoners of war.(e) Interrogaticn by prisoner of war specialists.(f) Suspect civilians.(g) Security of command posts.

(2) Documents.(a) Instructions to troops on necessity of turning in

documents.(b) Marking of documents.

926264--51--17 251

b. Measures for handling personnel, documents, andmateriel--Continued

(2) Documents-Continued(c) Document searches.(d) Responsibility of unit intelligence officers.(e) Documents found on prisoners of war.

(3) Materiel.(a) Particular items desired.(b) Guarding and reporting.(c) Souvenirs.

e. Maps and air photos.(1) Requests for air photos.(2) Requests for maps and other intelligence aids.(3) Basis of map distribution.(4) Distribution of air photos.(5) Disposition of maps, air photos, and other intelli-

gence aids upon relief of unit.

d. Counterintelligence.(1) Security of information.(2) Radio and radar silence.(3) Communication security monitoring.(4) Censorship.(5) Compromise of countersign, parole, codes, or'other

classified matter.(6) Camouflage, dispersion, and light discipline.(7) Escapers and evaders.

e. Reports and distribution.(1) Special reports.(2) Routine reports.(3) Spot reports.(4) Contents of reports.(5) Negative reports.(6) Division reports to subordinate units.(7) Reports from higher headquarters.

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166. OUTLINE FORM FOR SOP, DIVISION G-2 SEC-TION

G-2 Section(Headquarters)(Date)

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE, G-2 SECTION

1. ORGANIZATION.2. RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES.3. SHIFTS.4. DETERMINATION OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF

INFORMATION.5. COLLECTION PLAN.6. MISSIONS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS.7. REQUESTS TO HIGHER AND ADJACENT HEAD-

QUARTERS.8. RECQRDS AND FILES.

a. Situation map.b. Journal.e. Work sheet.d. Files.

9. PRODUCTION.a. Summaries.b. Estimates.c. Terrain studies.d. Annexes.

10. DISSEMINATION.a. Own headquarters.b. Subordinate units.c. Adjacent units.d. Higher headquarters.

11. LIAISON.12. PLANS.13. WAR ROOM.14. COMMAND POST MOVEMENT.15. HEADQUARTERS AND G-2 SECTION SECURITY.

a. Signal communication and communication security.b. Security of information.c. Visitors.d. Security checkl.

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16. MAPS, AIR PHOTOS, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCEDOCUMENTS.

a. Procurement.b. Allocation.c. Distribution and disposition.

17. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS.18. REPORTS.

a. Spot (or immediate).b. Periodic.c. Order of battle.d. Interrogation.e. Air photo interpretation.f. From higher and adjacent headquarters.

19. AUXILIARY AGENCIES.a. Military Intelligence Service.b. Technical service intelligence detachments.c. Army Security Agency (Communication Reconnaissance

Organization).20. COMBAT PROPAGANDA.21. ESCAPERS AND EVADERS.22. STAFF VISITS AND SUPERVISION.23. COORDINATION WITH OTHER GENERAL AND

SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS.24. TRAINING.

a. Rotation of duties.b. Advice and assistance to subordinate sections and aux-

iliary agencies.c. Collaboration with higher headquarters sections.

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CHAPTER 13

PLANNING

Section'l. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING METHODS

167. GENERAL

Like any other staff section, the intelligence sectionplans all activities for which it is responsible. In-telligence planning begins before the planning ofother staff sections. Until an initial intelligenceestimate had been presented, little organized anddetailed operational planning can begin. Accord-ingly, intelligence planning will always provide forthe information that will be necessary for the otherstaff sections to begin their planning. Throughoutany operation the intelligence officer will be pre-pared to give an estimate for the next operation, orto revise the current estimate to meet changed condi-tions.

168. COORDINATION IN PLANNING

a. Only rarely can the intelligence officer concludehis actions by himself. Almost invariably, any planshe proposes, orders he recommends, or action hetakes, require coordination with one or more staffofficers or general or special staff sections. The im-portance of such coordination cannot be emphasizedtoo strongly. An intelligence officer who fails torecognize where coordination is necessary is certain

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to cause confusion and delay in his headquarters,with consequent confusion and possible failure inoperations.

b. The following list indicates some of the staffcoordination necessary in planning by the divisionintelligence officer:

Prisoners of war____---__-- G-1, provost marshal, G-4,surgeon.

Censorship_________-------- G-1, public information offitcer.

Use of combat troops for in- G-3.telligence missions.

Escort, supervision, and G-3, public information offi-briefing of visitors. cer, headquarters co m-

mandant.Location and construction G-3, engineer, artillery officer.

of observation posts.Examination of captured G-4, special staff.

equipment.Needs for maps, air photos, All.

and studies.Map procurement, storage, G-3, engineer officer.

and distribution.Air reconnaissance, photo G-3 Air, air liaison officer,

and visual. artillery officer.Communication security..____ G-3, signal officer, Army Se-

curity Agency.Civilian internees --_.---_ _ G-1, provost marshal, civil

affairs officer.Intelligence training_______ G-3.Psychological warfare---___ G-3, special staff (including

psychological warfare offi-eer, if present).

Procurement and replace- G-1.ment of intelligence spe-cialists.

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169. INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PHASES

Intelligence planning is a continuing process.Based on an analysis of planning tasks, periods canbe established at the end of which certain aspectsof the planning must be completed before the plancan be further developed. Division of the planningperiod into phases facilitates coordination betweenthe staff sections engaged in planning. The se-quence of intelligence planning phases is generallyas follows:

a. Preliminary Phase (before the receipt of aspecific operational mission). Before the comple-tion of a current operation, and before the com-mander receives any directives or orders for furtheraction, his staff must be considering what this fur-ther action is likely to be. This applies particularlyto the intelligence officer, for when the commanderreceives a directive or warning for further action,the intelligence officer must have immediately avail-able sufficient information for the commander tosnake preliminary estimates and decisions. Thissituation may also exist when a headquarters isorganized or at the beginning of any war or cam-paign.

b. Initial Phase (from receipt of mission to com-mander's decision). When a unit receives a newmission, all available pertinent information of theenemy and the area of operations is furnished tothe staff so that definite operational, administrative,and logistical planning may be initiated. Thesecurity measures contained in the unit standingoperating procedure are reviewed to determine ifthey are adequate for the security of the planning

257

and the operations. A preliminary estimate is alsoprepared and presented at the initial staff conference.This preliminary phase of intelligence planningends after the initial requests for additional infor-mation are made to other headquarters and agencies,and when essential data (including a preliminaryestimate) and intelligence aids are made availableto other staff sections.

c. General Planning Phase (fromX commander'sdecision to D-day, H-hour). This phase, which ineffect begins the definite planning period, featuresthe concurrent preparation of various plans andstudies. The most important are-

(1) Determination of the essential elements ofinformation required to complete the plan-ning phase.

(2) Preparation of a counterintelligence planfor the security of the operation.

(3) Completion of plans to obtain all necessaryinformation not immediately available.

(4) Preparation of a plan for securing and dis-tributing intelligence aids. These aids in-clude material such as charts and modelsof the area of operations, gridded maps,air photos and mosaics, air photo interpre-tation reports, sketches and diagrams, hy-drographic charts, and intelligence sum-maries.

(5) The intelligence estimate is prepared aftercareful evaluation and interpretation of allavailable information. Preliminary esti-mates, which are based on initial and sub-sequent assumptions and changes in the

258

known enemy and friendly situation, aremade throughout the planning phase (App.II).

(6) Determination of essential elements of in-formation including those prepared earlierwhich are still applicable, and those whichconcern the operational phase.

(7) Preparation of a collection plan based onthe essential elements of information whichwere approved by the commander. Thisplan is used only by the intelligence sec-tion concerned in order to assign collectionmissions (pars. 71-73).

(8) Preparation of an intelligence plan.

d. Operational Phase (from D-day, H-hour to ac-comnplishment or change of mission). Intelligenceplanning during the operational phase provides forcollecting and reporting information as obtained,and disseminating intelligence produced from thisinformation. Existing intelligence must be revisedcontinuously as new intelligence is developed. Thecollection plan is altered as the situation developsso as to reflect current intelligence needs. Finally,preliminary plann-z.g (a above) continues in orderto anticipate likely future action.

170. THE INTELLIGENCE PLAN

(par. 75)

a. General. The intelligence plan is one of sev-eral annexes to an operation plan. The purposeof this annex, as of any annex to an operation planor order, is to present the details pertinent to one

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function or technique-in this case intelligence-and thereby to keep the body of the operation planbrief, clear, and simple.

b. Form. The form of an intelligence plan isthe same as that of an intelligence annex, with theaddition of an eighth paragraph, "Auxiliary Agen-cies," and a possible ninth paragraph, "Miscellane-ous." Several appendixes will normally accom-pany the plan (pars. 75-76).

c. Paragraphs in the Intelligence Plan.

(1) Srummary of the situation. Reference maybe made to an intelligence estimate, whichmay be included as a separate annex tothe operation plan.

(2) Essential elements of information. Onesubparagraph lists the essential elementsof information that concern the command.Additional subparagraphs outline the typesof information required during specificplanning and operational phases. Usually,reference is made to the "Combat Intelli-gence Plan" which contains the essentialelements of information in detail.

(3) Reconnaissance and observation missions.The types of information collecting agen-cies, and their employment and responsi-bilities, both in general and for specificplanning and operational phases, is in-cluded. Reference may be made to the"Combat Intelligence" and "Air Recon-naissance" plans which contain further in-structions concerning these missions.

260

(4) Measures for handling personnel, docu-ments, and captured materiel. Each ofthese sources of information is discussed inseparate subparagraphs, generally with re-spect to their value, methods of processing,and special handling of particular types ofpersonnel, documents, and equipment.

(5) Maps and air photos. Major instructionsregarding supplies and distribution ofplanning and operational maps, air photos,defense overprints, and relief models areannounced in this paragraph. Referencemay be made to the "Air Reconnaissance"and "Map and Photo" plans which containadditional instructions concerning thesetwo items.

(6) Counterintelligence. This paragraph con-tains instructions on counterintelligencemeasures diuring both planning and-opera-tional phases, and also regarding specialcounterintelligence measures, counterintel-ligence agencies, and reports. Referencemay be made to the "CounterintelligencePlan" for details.

(7) Reports and distribution. A subpara-graph on re-orts lists the types of requiredintelligence reports and states how andwhen they will be submitted by subordinateheadquarters. A second subparagraphoutlines the intelligence publications thatwill be prepared and distributed by theheadquarters issuing the plan. One sub-paragraph describes intelligence dissemi-

261

nation policies. Reference may be made tothe "Combat Intelligence" and "Intelli-gence Administrative" plans for more com-plete instructions on reports and distri-bution.

(8) Auxiliary agencies. A subparagraph un-der this heading indicates the employmentof specialized intelligence agencies in plan-ning and operational activities. Othersubparagraphs list-

(a) Agencies that are controlled by the intel-ligence officer.

(b) Agencies under the administrative con-trol of higher headquarters but whoseforward elements are under the intelli-gence officer's operational control.

(c) Agencies that are supervised by otherstaff sections but which require close co-ordination by the intelligence officer.

(9) Miscellaneous. This paragraph discussesintelligence personnel, intelligence train-ing, espionage, tactical propaganda, liaison,intelligence funds, and organization of theintelligence section. It should be used, onlywhen material cannot be included in thefirst eight paragraphs nor in appendixesthereto.

d. Scope. Many factors must be considered todetermine the amount of detail to be included in aplan. Some of these factors are the mission, thearea of operations, and the application of establishedpractices. Others are the combat experience of thecommand, 'the provisions of'its standing operating

262

procedure, and the adoption of new procedures.Each separate intelligence plan will stem from a dif-ferent set of factors. Based upon his determinationof the detail required, the intelligence officer mayadopt part or all of the form shown in appendix V.

Section II. PLANNING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

171. GENERAL

a. The planning processes outlined in paragraphs167 through 170 may be used in any type of opera-tion; however, certain special operations may requireslight additions to the processes or shifts in empha-sis or in timing.

b. These special operations may be divided intotwo general types. The first type involves specialoperational methods; it includes airborne and am-phibious operations. The second type involvesspecial conditions of enivironmaent; it includes opera-tions in areas of extreme conditions of climate orterrain. Both types of special operations may takeplace simultaneously.

c. Planning for special operations illustrates theuse of strategic intelligence in combat operations,already noted in chapter 1. Strategic intelligence,produced for the most part prior to hostilities, pro-vides the chief back'og of intelligence for such plan-ning. It must be c-acked and supplemented by cur-rent reconnaissance.

172. AIRBORNE AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

a. Planning for airborne and amphibious opera-tions must take into account the following:

263

(1) A preliminary marshalling phase. Coun-terintelligence plans must cover this pre-liminary phase as well as the actual com-bat phase.

(2) Each action is an "initial engagement."There is no accumulated combat intelligencebackground of local details, as there is incontinuous land operations. Intelligencefurnished to participating units must beextensive and detailed.

(3) Combat troops are completely committed toaction at the beginning of operations. De-tails of coordination cannot be modified oradjusted as combat develops but must becarefully planned and directed prior toinitial contact.

(4) Objectives are always at a distance whichis beyond the ground reconnaissance capa-bilities of the participating army forces.Reconnaissance missions must be adjustedto the types and limited number of agenciesthat will be able to perform them.

b. The preceding considerations usually requireemphasis on the following points:

(1) Inasmuch as the attacking units are espe-cially vulnerable in assembly, transit, andat the moment of landing, the principal ob-ject of counterintelligence will be to pre-serve secrecy concerning the time, routes,and objectives of the operations.

(2) Because of the critical nature of the actuallanding, the intelligence effort will be di-rected to the production of accurate, com-

264

plete, and detailed data on the landing areas.(3) Because of the sudden commitment to ac-

tion, dissemination of detailed intelligenceand distribution of intelligence aids in mostcases includes the individual soldier. In anormal land action, the small unit enteringaction moves slowly enough so that its leadercan orient himself as he moves forward.In an amphibious or airborne action therewill be no opportunity for this progressiveorientation; it must be accomplished priorto commitment.

e. In airborne and amphibious operations it maybe advisable to have two intelligence plans: one toprovide the necessary security, intelligence, and or:ganization prior to the assault; and one to governintelligence activities in combat.

d. For details of intelligence for airborne andamphibious operations, refer to appropriate fieldmanuals.

173. OPERATIONS IN EXTREMES OF ENVIRONMENT

a. The intelligence problems peculiar to extremesof weather and terrain come under three generalheadings:

(1) The problem of reporting and interpretingthe significance of abnormal conditions ac-curately, and early enough so that our unitswill be able to take steps to meet them.

(2) Problems of impeded communications thatmust be considered in planning reports, dis-tribution, and dissemination.

265

(3) Problems of impeded visibility or restrictedoperating conditions that must be consid-ered in planning reconnaissance.

b. These problems usually entail the following:

(1) Determining and reporting the environ-mental conditions is a matter of research,usually at higher headquarters. This in-formation must be interpreted so as to in-dicate appropriate operational techniques;the types of weapons, clothing, equipment,and rations that should be used; as well asany additional special or modified equip-ment that must be obtained or improvised.

(2) Communications may be affected by greatdistances, difficult terrain, extreme heat orcold, rain and ice, and electrical disturb-ances. Any or all of these conditions mayexist at the same time.

(3) Observation-land; naval, and air-may beseriously restricted by lack of daylight, pre-cipitation, fogs, clouds, or dust. Inclementweather may restrict or prohibit the move-ment of many reconnaissance agencies.

c. Foresight will overcome many of the difficultiesjust noted, as for example, the provision for signalcommunication facilities that will not be adverselyaffected by the environment, or the provision forenough duplication of means to insure the desiredresults.

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APPENDIX I

REFERENCES

AR 300-15 Mapping and Charting.AR 345-105 Records and Reports.AR 380-5 Safeguarding Military Information.SR 110-1-1 Index of Army Motion Pictures and

Film Strips.SR 310-20-3 Index of Army Training Publications.SR 320-5-1 Dictionary of United States Army*

Terms.SR 320-50-1 Authorized Abbreviations.SR 380- Military Security, Counterintelligence

310-1 Corps.FM 6-130 Field Artillery Intelligence.FM 20-100 Light Aviation.FM 21-5 Military Training.FM 21-8 Military Training Aids.FM 21-30 Military Symbols.

(Joint)FM 30-15 Examination of Enemy Personnel,

Repatriates, Civilians, Documents,and Materiel.

FM 30-28 Military Intelligence, Military Cen-sorship.

FM 30-101 The Maneuver Enemy.FM 30-102 Handbook on Aggressor Military

Forces.FM 30-103 Aggressor Army Order of Battle.FM 30-104 Aggressor Army Representation.

926264°--51 18 267

FM 31-35 Air-Ground Operations.FM 100-5 FSR, Operations.FM 101-5 Staff Officers' Field Manual, Staff

Organization and Procedure.FM 101-10 Staff Officers' Field Manual, Organ-

ization, Technical, and LogisticalData.

TM 30-215 Counter Intelligence Corps.TM 30-235 Military Intelligence Civil Censor-

ship.TM 30-236 Prisoner of War Censorship, Military

Intelligence.TM 32-225 Distributing and Accounting for Reg-

istered Cryptographic Material.TM 32-250 Fundamentals of Traffic Analysis

(Radio-Telegraph).T/O & E Counter Intelligence Corps Detach-

30-500 ment.T/O & E Military Intelligence Service Organ-

30-600 ization.T/O & E Communication Reconnaissance Or-

32-500 ganization.Dictionary of United States Military

Terms for Joint Usage.JANAP 121 Joint Communication Instructions,

Part I--General.JANAP 122 Joint Communication Instructions,

Part II-Security.

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APPENDIX II

EXAMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE-DIVISION

CLASSIFICATION

G-2 Section20th Inf DivTEBANU 6037,050700 Jul

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 4

Map: FARBEN, 1: 50,000, TEBANU-QUILMIN

1. MISSION. Seize high grd GIRONNE 4442-PIDNDU4245-PERU School 4749; protect crossing of I Corps atQUILMIN 5326.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

a. Considerations affecting the possible enemy courses ofaction and our mission.

(1) Characteristics of the area of opn.(a) Wea.

1. During pd 5-8 Jul, wea will be clear and warm.Visibility will be unrestricted. Wind will befrom SE at 5-8 mph. Temperature will rangefrom high of about 75° to low of about 60 °.Moon will be full on 5 Jul.

Light Data

SUN- SUN- MOON- MOON-BMNT BMCT RISE SET EECT EENT RISE SET

5 Jul 0330 0413 0444 1939 2010 2053 2002 04146 Jul 0330 0413 0444 1939 2010 2063 2046 05077 Jul 0332 0413 0445 1938 2009 2051 2124 06048 Jul 0333 0414 0446 1938 2008 2051 2156 0705

269

2. If Aggressor defends, clear wea will afford himgood obsn over our avenues of approach intohis psn. Any Aggressor atk will be affordedgood cross-country mobility due to lack of pre-cipitation. Wind direction does not favor Ag-gressor use of smoke.

S. Clear wea will favor us by affording good visibil-ity and soil trafficability, thereby permitting usto use our air, armor, and arty. Wind directionfavors our use of smoke.

(b) Terrain.

1. Critical terrain features are-Ridge extending SW-NE through S-edge of

CHENAY 4444.Ridge from vic GIRONNE extending SW-NE

through N edge of CHENAY including highgrd extending S from vic PERU School.

High grd vie HAYE 3752.Ridge extending S from vie FORVILLE 4352.Brg over RANCE River at QUILMIN.

2. Obsn and fid of fire:The high grd now held by Aggressor gives him

excellent obsn over approaches into his psn.High grd vie HAMON 4143, PENDU, and S of

PERU 4749 provide Aggressor excellent obsnover UDY Creek-CHENAY area as well asover the area to N of MEEN Creek.

Fld of fire in area are generally restricted bynumerous folds in grd.

Best fid of fire in area lie to E and NE ofCHENAY.

Almost continuous wooded area along ridgeGIRONNE-PENDU-PERU School severely re-strict fid of fire in N portion of our zone.

However, lid of fire to N toward-MEEN Creekfrom this ridge are generally good.

Fld of fire are particularly limited in vic ofCHENAY.

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3. Obstacles:There are no natural obstacles to our adv.

CHENAY is a major artificial obstacle. Soiltrafficability is good throughout area exceptalong the beds of CARGO, UDY, and MEENCreeks, all of which are fordable withoutprep at numerous places.

4. Concealment and cover:Only limited concealment is provided by the

vegetation in the S part of our zone.CHEINAY affords good concealment and goodcover. Protection from grd obsn and fire isafforded by abundant folds in the grdthroughout the area. Excellent conceal-ment is provided by the woods along theGIRONNE-PERU School ridge.

5. Avenues of approach available to Aggressorare--Along high grd extending S from PERU

School; UDY Creek valley; CARGO Creekvalley.

6. Avenues of approach available to our forces intoAggressor psn are-Along high grd extending from vie 4845 N to

PERU School.UDY Creek valley.CARGO Creek valley.

7. Road net is excellent for both Aggressor and ourforces.

8. Terrain now held by Aggressor favors def in hispresent psn.

9. Terrain does not favor our atk initially. Wewill be fighting uphill with Aggressor holdingsuperior obsn.

10. Best approach. Our best avenue of approachinto Aggressor psn is along high grd extendingfrom vic 4845 N to PERU School because it-

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Avoids cross-compartments and the ob-stacle CHENAY.

Possesses adequate room for maneuver.Permits obsn of Aggressor's entire psn.Facilitates use of armor due to excellent

soil trafficability on high grd.Insures early possession of good road net

leading deep into Aggressor psn.

(2) En sit.

(a) Str. Div is opposed by aprx 5 inf bn, a hv tk bn,an armd recon bn, and an est 3 bn of arty, Mo-rale of these trp is excellent. Aggressor unitsare 90 percent str in pers and equip. Combatefficiency is excellent. 0-2, First Army, est thatAggressor can be expected to atk within the armyarea with as many as 300 ftr sorties and 150 bmrsorties daily.

(b) Composition. Units consist of elm of 16th and17th Inf Regt, 620th Hv Tk Bn, all part of theAggressor 8th Inf Div; 603d Armd Recon Bn. Itis est that arty spt these forces is Aggressor8th Div Arty less one It bn which is known to bespt 44th Inf in vie of JANOU.

(c) Dispositions. See overlay 2 (omitted).

(d) Recent and present significant activities.Aggressor forces opposing our div have taken up

an excellent def psn along high grd extendingSW-NE just S of CHENAY.

Aggressor is-

Improving and strengthening his psn through-out area.

Dumping engr sup vic BOCHE School.Constructing road blocks and laying mines in

vie CHENAY.

Aggressor has made no attempt to adv beyondpresent pSn. His patrols have been inactive.

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I Corps rept: Interrogation of prisoners of warindicate Aggressor is planning an atk againstI Corps units.which have crossed the RANCERiver. Aggressor units now in contact with20th Inf Div have been ordered to hold presentpsn until reinf.

Aggressor CT 44 formerly biv at BREIL 6930 ishv engaged with our 55th Inf Div vie of JANOU7352.

Since early 2 Jul, Blue recon has been hv engagedwith Aggressor at FROLOE 2558 in attempt toseize brg at PENHOUET 2060.

Air recon rept at 050700 Jul colm of about 100empty trk was observed moving into ROLLES0621. No trp mvmt from ROLLE were ob-served at that time.

(e) Status of sup. It is est that Aggressor sup sitis such that sustained opn can be spt.

(f) Reinf. Est Aggressor inf bn vie of HAYE. LargeAggressor force believed to be an inf div loc inthe vic of ROLLE.

b. Enemy capabilities.

(1) Enumeration of en capabilities. Aggressor can-(a) Atk now, along our front, with 5 inf bn, a hv

tk bn, and an armd recon bn, spt by an est 3 bnof arty.

(b) Defend now in his present psn or on successivepsn to HAYE area with 5 inf bn, a hv tk bn, andan armd recon bn, spt by an est 3 bn of arty.

(c) Atk with 5 inf bn, a hv tk bn, and an armd reconbn, spt by an est 3 bn of arty, enveloping eitherour NE or SW flank with additional str and attimes listed below:

Mtr Foot1. Est inf bn vie 050800 051115

HAYE. (or 60 min after start- (or 4 hr 15 min aftering mvmt) starting mvmt)

S. Est inf div vie 051740 081900ROLLE.

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(d) Reinf his atk or def with fol units at the time listed:Mtr Foot

1. Est inf bn vie * 050745 050940HAYE. (or 45 min after start- (or 2 hr, 40 min after

ing mvmt) starting mvmt)2. Est inf div vie 051740 081900

ROLLE. (or 10 hr, 40 min after (or 84 hr after mvmt ismvmt is started) started)

(e) Withdraw tonight during hr of darkness beyondHAYE area.

(f) Be expected to atk within First Army area withas many as 300 ftr and 150 bmr sorties daily.

(2) Discussion and analysis.

(a) There are no indications that Aggressor will atkprior to substantial reinf.

(.b) Def by Aggressor in present psn is indicated by-Employment of inf on good def terrain.Improvement and strengthening of psn through-

out area.Dumping of engr sup in vic BOCHE School 4346.Arty disp in depth.Const of road blocks and laying of mines in

CHENAY.Aggressor patrols are inactive.Aggressor has made no attempt to adv.Aggressor trp are disp on relatively broad front.Aggressor units in contact have been ordered to

hold present psn until reinf.

(c) There are no indications that Aggressor hasactually started to reinf units in contact with ourdiv. However, early reinf is indicated by I Corpsrept to effect that-

Aggressor is planning an atk against I Corpsunits E of RANCE and has ordered unitsnow in contact with this div to hold presentpsn until reinf.

274

(d) The only indication of Aggressor def on successivepsn is the orgn of the grd in the HAYE-BRIGSchool area. In view of (c) above, this courseof action is not considered likely.

(e) There is no indication of Aggressor withdrawalbeyond the HAYE area.

(f) All or any part of Aggressor air can be cone in divzone. Air atk is a continuing threat.

(3) Relative probability of adoption of en capabilities.

(a) Def of present psn with forces now in contactwith aval air spt.

(b) Atk with aval units against our brghd with avalair.

(c) Either (a) or (b) reinf by est inf bn vic HAYEand est inf div vic ROLLE.

3. EFFECT OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION ON OURMISSION.

a. An atk or def by Aggressor with forces now in contactmay delay but will not prevent the accomplishmentof our mis.

b. Delay on successive psn or withdrawal tonight will fa-vor accomplishment 'of our mis.

v. Reinf by est Aggressor inf bn in vic of HAYE alone willnot materially affect accomplishment of our mis.

d. If Aggressor employs all of his reinf to spt an atk ordef or to envelop our NE or SW flank, it is doubtfulthat our mis can be accomplished without additionalreinf.

e. The cone of all of Aggressor air effort in our zone willdelay accomplishment of our mis.

/s/ SMITHG-2

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APPENDIX III

EXAMPLE OF PERIODIC INTELLIGENCEREPORT-DIVISION

CLASSIFICATION

72d Infantry DivisionCONDE-SUR-HUISNE 9099091900 Aug 19 -

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 50

Period covered: 081800 to 091800 Aug 19 -

Map: FRANCE, 1: 50,000, REMALARD-CHARTRES

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. Annex 1.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.a. Summary. Enemy action generally consisted of delay-

ing tactics. Enemy troops in contact defendedprincipally with small arms fire, and withdrew priorto engaging in close combat. A small-scale infantry-tank counterattack was made at 0430 east of MONT-LANDON 0399. Three similar counterattacks weremade in the vicinity of MAGNANES 0496, from 0600to 0900. None of these attacks was successful. De-fensive positions are being constructed northwest andsouth of CHAMPROND-EN-GATINE 0799 and eastof the LOIR River.

b. New enemy tactics, and weapons or other materiel.Minefield south of CHAMPROND-EN-GATINE ex-tending from 071995 to 075987 contains new type ofplastic mine which cannot be detected with minedetectors. 561st Engineer Technical Service Intelli-gence Detachment notified and furnished two minesfor study.

276

c. Operations of enemy component elements.

(1) Air forces. Ten enemy fighters strafed and bombedthe division area in three attacks between 1800 and2000 yesterday. Twelve planes attacked divisionarea between 1600 and 1730 today. The strength ofeach attack varied between two and six planes.One of yesterday's air attacks against the 214thInfantry injured six soldiers, destroyed one truck,and damaged four other vehicles. An air attacklate this afternoon in the division artillery areakilled two soldiers, injured seven others, and dam-aged three howitzers. Enemy air also attackedalong the principal axial and lateral roads. Oneplane was destroyed by antiaircraft fire nearMONTLANDON at 1710 today.

(2) Armored units. Enemy tanks were employed inthree counterattacks in the 216th Infantry zone andone in the 215th Infantry zone. Attacks were ofplatoon strength except for one of two-platoonstrength in the 216th Infantry zone. This tankeffort was costly for the enemy. Of the 24 tanksreported in action during the period, 10 were eitherdestroyed or damaged. A tank company movingsouth into the division zone on the GAINVILLE2010-COURVILLE-SUR-EURE 2003 Road was at-tacked by our fighter aircraft. Four tanks werereported as damaged and two destroyed. Tacticalair reconnaissance reported no movement of thearmored concentration 5 miles west of PARIS.This concentration has been identified by a prisoner(patrol leader captured vicinity THIRON) as the12th Armored Division.

(3) Artillery (including rockets). Enemy artillery sup-port was light to moderate, with defensive and in-terdiction fires. Heaviest shelling was in the zoneof the 216th Infantry. FRETIGNY 9997 received40 rounds light caliber last night, two medium cali-ber concentrations of 40 rounds each at 0850 this

277

morning, and intermittent shelling from 1400 to 1600today. Rocket fire was received on the recentlycaptured position at LE MONT ROUSSET, 9801 andHill 274 at 0197. Enemy artillery employment dur-ing the night consisted of 14 reported harassing andinterdiction missions on roads, crossroads, and vil-lages in the forward areas. Two light battalionsand one medium battalion were-located opposite thedivision.

(4) Engineer. Enemy is erecting wire entanglementsand laying mine fields east of the EURE River be-tween CHARTRES and DREUX. Mine fields havebeen located by patrols on high ground along roadsnorthwest and south of CHAMPROND-EN-GATINE(Annex 1). Fields will be marked by 100800 July.

(5) Infantry. Enemy continued stubborn resistance,holding with. small arms fire until outflanked, andthen withdrawing with a minimum of close combat.

(6) Reconnaissance. Aggressive enemy patrolling dur-ing the night was reported in the zones of the 211thArmored Cavalry and the 215th Infantry. Patrolswere of squad strength in the vicinity of THIRON,ST DENIS D'AUTHOU 0094, LE MONT ROUSSET,and Ridge 987997. Five enemy were captured andsix were killed. Enemy reconnaissance patrol of sixvehicles attempted to overrun road block at GAU-FEUILLU 0091. One light tank of the 6th Recon-naissance Company was destroyed before patrolwithdrew.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE FACTORS.

a. Estimated enemy losses. Sixty-eight prisoners of warwere captured and 35 enemy were reported killed.Effective combat strength of the 2d Battalion, 146thInfantry, is estimated at 65 percent and that of the1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, at 60 percent.

b. Enemy combat efficiency. Combat efficiency is esti-mated as fair. The factors of understrength units,

278

good morale, and a shortage of ammunition contribute

to the above over-all rating.

c. Morale. Prisoners of war and captured documentsindicate that enemy morale is good. Several prisoners

stated that despite their recent defeats, and our su-periority in air, armor, and artillery support, morale

was good in their units.

d. Location and nature of enemy administrative installa-tions. Six supply installations are located in ourzone. Prisoner of war reports that the ammunitioninstallation supplying this area is located atCHARTRES at 356024. Antiaircraft artillery gunbattalions are permitted 15 rounds each, of armor-piercing and high explosive per gun per day.

e. Weather.(1) Weather during the period was generally clear with

scattered clouds. There was a slight ground hazeuntil 0800. After 0800 visibility was unrestricted.Wind was generally from south 10 to 15 miles perhour. Minimum temperature was 480 F. at 0345 andmaximum temperature was 840 F at 1518.

(2) Weather forecast for period 100001 Aug to 110001Aug: clear to scattered cumulus clouds at 8,000 feet.Ceiling unlimited. Visibility 8 to 10 miles withslight smoke and haze. Wind generally south tosoutheast 5 to 10 miles per hour. Minimum tem-perature 52° F. Maximum temperature 89° F.

f. Terrain and defensive works. Soil trafficability duringperiod was excellent. Stream levels continue low.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Espionage. Two enemy agents were seized by the roadguard at RJ 973915 when they attempted to cross ourline. The agents confessed that they were a part ofa group of four, selected to obtain information of ourlocations and movements between NOGEINT-LE-ROTROU 8892 and LA LOUPE 0408.

279

b. Propaganda and rumors. Enemy propaganda leafletshells were fired at ST DENIS D'AUTHOU. Propa-ganda theme contrasted war conditions at the frontand at home. Our troops who surrender were prom-ised to be among the first to be repatriated after thewar is over.

5. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Courses of action. The enemy can-

(1) Continue to delay in his present positions or insuccessive positions between line of contact andCHARTRES-DREUX area east of the EURE Riverwith four infantry battalions and one tank com-pany supported by three artillery battalions.

(2) Reinforce his present position or any of the suc-cessive defensive positions with the unidentified in-fantry force in the vicinity of woods 1692 by 110300August and with the armored division west ofPARIS by 110700 August.

(3) Attack from present positions or any of the succes-sive defensive positions after 111100 August withthe units now in contact plus the armored divisionwest of PARIS and the unidentified infantry forcein the vicinity of the woods at 1692.

b. Discussion and analysis of courses of action.

(1) Delay in successive positions is indicated by thedefensive construction northwest and south ofCHAMPROND-EN-GATINE and east of the LOIRRiver, as well as the location of small supply instal-lations in rear of these positions. However, themore complete defensive positions being constructedeast of the EURE River shown on air photos, indi-cate a determined stand in the CHARTRES-DREUXarea.

(2) Although the majority of the enemy's actions pointto his employment of delaying tactics, he has a lim-ited reinforcement capability. The unidentifiedforce in the woods at 1692 is capable of moving dur-ing the night. The armored division in the vicinity

280

of PARIS has not moved at the present time. How-ever, since the distance is not great and the roadsare suitable for movement, it also has the capa-bility of moving overnight into the battle area. Asthe enemy 'retreats toward the CHARTRES-DREUX area, the distance between the line ofcontact and the units above will be less, and theircapability for reinforcement will be correspondinglygreater. Until there is some indication of move-ment from these positions this capability must begiven a lower priority than delay.

(3) An enemy attack must be considered as long'asenemy reserves are available. Until additionalindications supporting this capability are noted, itmust be given a lesser priority of adoption than theother courses of action which have been discussed.

c. Relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities.The order of adoption by the enemy of the capabilitiesenumerated in a above is believed to be-

(1) Delay with forces now in contact in present andsuccessive positions.

(2) Delay with forces now in contact in present andsuccessive positions reinforced with the unidentifiedinfantry force in the vicinity of woods at 1692 andthe armored division west of PARIS.

(3) Attack from present or successive positions withforces now in contact reinforced by the unidenti-fied infantry force in the vicinity of woods at 1692and the armored division west of PARIS.

JONESMajor General

Annex: 1-Enemy Situation (overlay) (omitted).Distribution: XOFFICIAL:

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APPENDIX V

EXAMPLE OF INTELLIGENCE ANNEX-DIVISION

CLASSIFICATION

1st Inf DivZELLE 4671, BUTTANO111900 Jul -

Annex 1 (Intel) to OPNO 8

Map: BUTTANO, 1: 50,000, ZELLE-PAGT

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. See Periodic IntelRept No 19, this hq, 111800 Jul -.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.a. Will. Aggressor cont to defend the SERE River psn?

If so, with what orgn of the grd, to include loc andactivities of local res?

b. Will Aggressor reinf his units now in contact? If so,when, where, and with what forces? Sp attn to infdiv at MARD.

o. Will Agressor atk prior to 120600 Jul? If so, when,where, and with what forces? Particular attn to theavenues of approach SE of FEROO 3959 and NE ofERGE 3678.

d. Will Aggressor withdraw beyond the div obj prior toour atk?

e. What natural or artificial obstacles or barriers existwithin the div zone? What are their type and extent?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.*a. Orders to subordinate and attached units.

*Completed only to extent necessary to demonstrate preparation.

298

(3) 1st Inf.

(a) Rept, as obtained, to div CP; negative rept every4 hr beginning 112000 Jul:

1. Instl of dml, obstacles, and mine fid front presentpsn.

2. Evidences of fortification of bldg in zone, par-ticularly in vic ALERTE 3074.

S. Entrenching and erection of bands of wire alongpresent LC.

4. Progress of entrenching in areas vie 3277 and3069.

5. Changes in loc and in est str of en forces nearDATO 3169 and N of ALERTE 3074.

6. Rearward mvmt of en trp along roads: RUSTA3274-KUNA 2776-LUNO 2828; DATO-LUNO.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.(1) I Corps is requested to provide info of-

(a) Evidence of fortification of bldg, particularly invie of 2677 and 2664.

(b) Extent of entrenching in areas vic 2664 and 2679.

(c) Occupied and unoccupied arty psn in div zone,particular attn to psn RUSTA.

(d) Changes noted in loc and est str of en forces be-tween LUEI 2873 and NOJUO 2876.

(e) Rearward mvmt of en trp along roads: XUELLI3274-RAMOGf 2776-ELLAMB 3841 ;. DATO-LUNO.

(f) Rearward mvmt of en trp along road: VILLEJOSSE 5285-LAMBALLE.

(g) Loc of CP and sup and evac instl in area: LUNO-TEOC 1500-DRAUSO 2074.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCU-MENTS, AND MAT1ERIEL. PW of rank of col orhigher and other PW of special interest will be reportedto div G-2 w/o delay.

926264--51 20 299

5. MAPS AND PHOTOS.a. Maps. Distr of map, BUTTANO, 1: 50,000, ZELLE-

PAGT, as shown below. Distr is automatic and rqnwill not be submitted.

Div hq and div trp ______-_______---_________ 3001st Inf_---__-- ___.--------- -___-_----------- 2002d Inf _-_______-- ___-__--- - _____--..___ ...-- 2003d Inf _---_________----___._______--_ -______ 2001st Div Arty _________-___-___---------------- 3001st Recon Co _______-------- ___------------- 501st Engr C Bn _________-________--__________ 501st Tk Bn _____________-______------------__ 100

b. Photos. The following air photos will be furnished:(1) Basic cover of div zone (1: 10,000, aprx) six copies

each regt; six copies div arty; 1 copy div engr, 1stTk Bn, 1st Recon Co.

(2) Annotated air photos will be distributed auto-matically, when available.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.a. Appendix A, Counterintelligence Plan.b. To preserve secrecy of atk plans, the following meas-

ures will be adopted:(1) All units. Prior to atk, coordinate patrolling with

2d Inf Div and ensure all members of patrols wearshoulder patches of 2d Inf Div and that they carryno other ident.

(2) Div Arty. Coordinate use of Army aeft with 2dInf Div to ensure min number of planes in air over1st Div front at any one time prior to our atk.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. Effective 120800 Julunits will submit ISUMS at 0800, 1200, 1600 and 2000daily, in lieu of times heretofore in effect. JONES

App: A-Counterintelligence Plan (omitted). MAJGENDistr: Same as OPNO 8.OFFICIAL:

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300

APPENDIX VI

FORM FOR TACTICAL STUDY OF THEWEATHER AND TERRAIN

CLASSIFICATION

Issuing headquartersPlace of issueDate and time

1. PURPOSE AND OTtHER LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS.Consider the purpose for which the study is being made

and such other factors as serve to limit the area to be

studied or aspects thereof. These factors may include,according to circumstances, the mission, the enemycapabilities, and the commander's decision.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA.a. Climatic or weather conditions. Depending on the time

interval between the preparation of the study and theproposed use of the area, describe existing or pre-

dicted meteorological conditions to include precipi-tation, temperature, fog, cloud conditions, moon phases,wind, sunrise, sunset, and when appropriate, magneticphenomena.

b. Topography. Use specially prepared and colored maps

or overlays and photographs to illustrate each of thefollowing characteristics, and the effect of predictedweather conditions upon them.

(1) Relief and drainage systems. Illustrate by layer-contouring, ridge-lining, hill-topping, or relief-shad-ing the configuration of the ground, including slopes

of hillsides, c'iffs, bluffs, or critical slopes for per-sonnel and vehicles; and by solid or broken linesand conventional symbols the configuration and con-dition of streams, including depth, slope, and con-dition of banks and bottom, as well as the locationof crossing sites.

301

(2) Vegetation. Indicate the location of woods, includ-ing types of trees, diameter of trunks, density ofplanting, and existence of undergrowth, as well asthe types of vegetation in nonwooded areas, whethernatural or cultivated.

(3) Surface materials. Indicate the type and distribu-tion of soils and subsoils in the area and determinethe soil trafficability.

(4) Cultural features. Describe or illustrate the man-made changes in the topography, including roads,railroads, bridges, tunnels, towns, industrial areas,and fortifications.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA. From a consid-eration of the weather and the topography determinethe following factors:

a. Critical terrain features. Consider any terrain fea-tures that appear to be critical for either combatant,such as a dominating hill or ridge, the shoulders ofa defile, a highway, a built-up area, or a communi-cations center.

b. Observation and fields of fire. Indicate by map the in-fluence of hills, vegetation, fog, night, snow, and pre-cipitation.

o. Obstacles. Consider natural and artificial obstacles,such as swamps, dense woods, rivers, unstable soil,mine fields, areas contaminated with chemical, bio-logical or radiological agents, and other man-madebarriers.

d. Concealment and cover. Consider the concealment af-forded by woods, cultivated fields, fog, night, or snowcovered areas, as well as the cover provided by ditchesand valleys.

e. Avenues of approach. Consider the road and rail net,terrain corridors, cross compartments, and soil traf-ficability.

302

4. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE AREA. Summarize theeffect of the weather and the topography of the area.Consider the principal critical terrain features and theavenues of approach to them, including such factorsas suitability for night operations, the use of heavyarmor, and special obstacles to be breached, under eachof the following headings:

a. Effect on enemy capabilities.

b. Effect on courses of action required to accomplish ourmission.

(Initiating staff officer)

303

INDEX

Aerial photography, limitations and capa- Paragraph Pagebilities ------------------- 96 167

Aerial (Air) photo interpreters .---------- 129 212Agencies, collecting:

Counterintelligence -. . 129 212Credibility of ----------------------- 40, 41 61, 62Defined ,--- 30 35Differentiated from sources .--------- 26 28Employment of .------------------ 72 123Rating of ,------------.. 41 62Types .-------------------------- 31 36

Aggressor --------------------------. 123, 163 204, 249Air-ground cooperation ---..-. 85 149Air-ground intelligence organization .. . 86 150Air-ground procedures for air reconnais.-

sance missions ----------------------. 87 152Airborne operations, planning -----------. 172 263Air capability- ------. .......... 51, 52 86, 89Air photos:

As sources --- 29 30In terrain studies ----------------- 117 196Procurement and distribution ------- 110 186Responsibility for --------------- -- 106 182Types ---------------------------- 107 183Value ---------------------------- 85 149

Air photo coverage .--------- 108 184Air photo coverage, requests for -------- 95 166Air photo missions .-. .................. 94 165Air reconnaissance, importance of ------- 88 160Air weather service ----------------- 29, 117, 129 30, 196,

212Amphibious operations, planning -------- 172 263Anaglyphs 107 183Annexes ----------------------------- 58 106Antiaircraft units:

As collecting agencies -- - 32 38In counterreconnaissance ----------- 129 212

Appendixes .-........................ 76 135Area search -- - - - 91 162Armored reconnaissance units ----------- 32, 81 38, 145Army Security Agency (ASA) ---- 17, 33, 129, 141 19, 43,

212, 225

304

Paragraph Page

Artillery adjustment mission ---------- 91 162Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence,

General Staff, U. S. Army ------------ 27, 29 28, 30Authentication ------------------------ 151 234

Background investigations -------------- 127 209Basic cover:

Defined -------- ------------- 108 184Distribution of -------------------- 110 186

Battle reconnaissance ------------------ 78 141Brevity, periodic intelligence report ----- 59 111

Cable interception ----- - --------- 151 234Calculations, time and space ------- -- 50 84Capabilities, doctrine of ---------------- 47 74Capability work sheet --------- ---- 47 74Captured mat6riel. (See Mat6riel.)Censorship ---------------- - 135 218Chemical agencies, in collection --------- 33 43Civil security. (See Security.)Clarity, periodic intelligence report ------ 59 111Close reconnaissance -------.- - 78 141Collecting agencies. (See Agencies.)Collection:

Defined --- ------------ 20 23Difficulties in ------------- ------ 25 27Significance of ----------- ---- 24 27

Collection plan:Example of -------- ----- 73 130Preparation of ...................._ 72 123Purpose of ------- -- - - 23 25Use --------------------------- 71 122

Colors, for posting information ---------- 37 50Combat intelligence ----- ---- ------ 6, 8 3, 5Combat intelligence branch, division ----- 14 18Combat intelligence, production of:

Collection ---------------------- 20 23Direction of the collection effort ---- 23 25Processing ------------------------ 21 24Steps ---------------------------- 19 23Use --------------- -------------- 22 24

Command structure, in order of battle .... 121 200Communication intelligence:

Categories ------------------------ 148 231Duties of intelligence officers ------- 143 228How derived --- --------- ------ 144 229

Communication intelligence teams ------- 141 225Communication intelligence units ------- 142 226Communication reconnaissance liaison de-

tachment - .--- 17, 141, 142 19, 225,226305

Communication Reconnaissance Organiza- Paragraph Pagetion ------------------ - ---------- 17, 33, 141 19, 43,

225Communication reconnaissance units, func-

tions- .............. 142 226Communication security:

Defined- ------- 149 232Duties of intelligence officers ------- 143 228Means --------------------------- 149 232Personnel ----------- 153 240Teams --------------------------- 141 225Units ---------------------------- 142 226

Composite --------------- 107 183Controlled mosaic --------------------- 109 186Counterfire units, as collecting agencies___ 32 38Counterintelligence:

Defined -------------------------- 7 4Paragraph in the intelligence annex_ 76 135Purpose -------------------------- 124 206Relations with military government_ . 130 214Scope ---------------------------- 124 .206Similarities to intelligence ---------- 125 207

Counterintelligence branch, division 15 18Counterintelligence channels ------------. 126 208Counterintelligence duties of the intelli-

gence officer .----------------------- 127 209Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC):

Credentials ------------------------. 128 210Investigations- ..-............ 127 209Personnel _ - 128 .210

Counterintelligence estimate -------------. 137 219Counterintelligence operations, types -.... 131 215Counterintelligence plan .---------------- 139 221Counterintelligence work sheet ..- . ...... 138 221Countermortar radar sections as collecting

agencies ----------------------------- 32 38Counterreconnaissance ------------------ 83 147Courses of action, enemy ---------------- 49 77Credentials, Counter Intelligence Corps .. 128 210Cryptograms ..-..... .................. 150 232Cryptographic personnel -............... 153 240Cryptographic security officer- . .......... 153 240Cryptosecurity. (See Security.)

Day photo missions ------------------.. 94 165Dav reconnaissance squadron -------. . 86 150Dicing missions -----------------------. 94 165Direction of the collection effort:

In production of combat intelligence-.. 23 25Significance of -.------.. 61 114

306

Dissemination: Paragraph PageCriteria for --- -------- ----------- 54 95Methods ------------------- 55 95Object of ------------------------ 22, 53 24, 94

Distant reconnaissance ----------------- 78 141Division intelligence officer (G-2) -- ___ 13 16Documents, enemy. (See Enemy docu-

ments.)Documents, intelligence ---------------- 55 95

Enemy capabilities:Calculation of ------------------- 48 76Defined ----- __-- ------------ 47 74Determination of ---------------- 49, 52 77, 89Example of statement of -------- 52 89Rules for calculating --------------- 50 84

Enemy documents ----------------- 29, 100 30, 171Enemy intelligence- ........----------- 123 205Enemy intentions -_-- - 47, 65, 67 74, 118,

119Enemy situation map ------------------ 37 50Engineer units, as collecting agencies ---- 32 38Escapers ---------------------------- 99 170Essential elements of information (EEI):

Answers to ------ .---------------. - 67 119Defined -------------------------- 62 114Designation of -------------------- 64 116Determination of ------------ 65 118Dissemination of ----- ----- 66 118Example of ----------------------- 68 119Form and content ----------------- 63 115In direction ---------------------- 23 25Preparation of collection plan ------- 72 123

Evaders ------------------------------ 99 170Evaluation --------------------- 21; 27, 34, 40 24, 28,

47, 61Field artillery units, as collecting agencies_ 32 38Fixed targets -..-.-.-.-.-.-.--------- 90 161Fleeting targets --------- ------------ 90 161Forecasts ----------------------------- 29, 117 30, 196Fragmentary orders -------- - 74 130Frontier security. (See Security.)Front-line cover ----------------------- 108 184

G-2 work sheet-----------------------.. 38,58 56, 106General maps .----------------------- - 103 174Ground forms ------ ---- 115 194Ground liaison officer ------------------ 88 160Guide to determination of indications._ 69, App. IV 120, 282

Hydrographic charts ----------- 117 196

307

Indications: Paragraph PageApplication .----------------------- 69 120Defined .......................... 69 120Determination .---------------- - --- 69 120Example of -------------.. 70 122In collection plan .--------------- - . 72 123

Infantry units, as collecting agencies .. . .32 38Information:

Accuracy of ----------------------. 40, 41 61, 62Pertinence of ---------------------. 40 61Processing of ---------------------- 21 24Rating of ------------------------- 41 62Significance of --------------------- 42 64Sources of ------------------------ 27 28Time reported ---------------------- 72 123Types ---------------------------- 27 28

Information file ----------------------- 39 60Intelligence:

Defined -------------------------- 6 3Use of ---------------------------- 43 66

Intelligence annex:Example ----------- -------------- App. V 298Form ---------------------------- 75 133In dissemination ------------------- 55 95In transmittal of orders and requests__ 74 130Preparation of ------------------- 76 135

Intelligence consciousness --------------- 162 249Intelligence cycle ---------------------- 77 140Intelligence documents, in dissemination__ 55 95Intelligence estimate:

Based on order of battle ------------ 120 199Example ------------------------- App. II 269Form ---------------------------- 45 67In dissemination ------------------ 55 95Preparation of -------------------- 46 69Purpose -------------------------- 44 66Relation to interpretation ----------- 42 64Use ----------------------------- 22 24

Intelligence files ----------------------- 39 60Intelligence journal -_-_---__ ____------_ -36 49Intelligence methods .------------------ 9 8Intelligence officer:

Meaning of ----------------------- 4 2Responsibilities for training ---- ---- 156 242

Intelligence organization, units below divi-sion_____--------------------------- 18 22

Intelligence personnel ------------------ 9, 31 8, 36Intelligence photography --------------- 108 184Intelligence plan ---------------------- 170 259Intelligence responsibilities of the com-.

mander ---------------------------- 3 2

308

Intelligence schools. (See Schools.) . Paragraph PageIntelligence section, division ------------ 13 16Intelligence security ----------- ------- 9 8Intelligence summary (ISUM) ---------- 55 95Intelligence training. (See Training.)Intentions. (See Enemy intentions.)Interception -------------------------- 145 229Interest, periodic intelligence report -- 59 111Interpretation--- --------------------- 21, 34, 24, 47,

42 64Interpreters --- ----------- 129 212Interrogators ---- ----------- 29 30

Joint situation maps ----- ----------- 37 50Journal file ------- ----------- 39 60

Land-line interception --------------- 151 234Liaison and communication team ------- 17 19Liaison and communication units ------- 142 226Light aviation ------------------------ 81 145

Maneuvers --------------------------- 163 249Map distribution ---------------------- 105 181Mapping photography ----------------- 108 184Map requirements --------------------- 104 176Maps:

As sources ------------------- 29 30As intelligence documents -- - 105 181In terrain studies: ------- ..---- 117 196Responsibility for ----------------- 102 174Use in dissemination --------------- 55 95

Materials, for posting ------------ - 37 50Mat6riel:

As source ---------------------- 29 30Captured _----------------------- 101 173

Medical units, as collecting agencies ----- 33 43Messages:

Cryptographing of ------------ 150 232In collection --------- ------- 74 130In dissemination ------------- 55 95

Methods of instruction ----------------- 161 247Military forces, disposition of ----------- 121 200Military information ------------------ 5 2Military intelligence- -------------- 6 3Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Organ-

ization:Allocation of units to division ------- 16 19Composition, basis of allocation, and

functions ------------ 11 12General _---------..------ 10 11Mission -------------------------- 12 13

309

Paragraph PageMilitary maps --.......-------------- 103 174Military personalities, in order of battle_ 121 200Military personnel, enemy ------ -- - 29 30Military police units:

As collecting agencies -------------- 33 43In counterintelligence -------------- 129 212

Military security. (See Security.)Missions. (See Reconnaissance missions.)Mosaics ------------------------------ 109 186

Night photo missions ------------------ 94 165Night reconnaissance squadron --------- 86 150Oblique photo ------------------------ 107 183Orders and requests:

Basis for ------------------------- 72 123In direction ---------------------- 23, 74 25, 130Transmittal of ------------------- 74 130

Order of battle:Defined ---------- -------------- 118 198Importance of ------------------ 120 199In counterintelligence -------------- 125 207Preparing enemy situation map 37 50Principal factors ------------------ 121 200Sources of information -------------- 119 199Training ----------..- ------------ 122 204Value of captured material ------' 101 173

Order of battle books --------------- 55, 118, 122 95, 198,204

Order of battle files -----------______ 39, 118, 122 60, 198,204

Ordnance units, as collecting agencies ---- 33 43Overlays ----------------------------- 74 130

Patrols, definition and types ------------ 81 145Periodic intelligence report:

Dissemination of -------------- 60 112Example ------------------------- App. III 276For counterintelligence ------------- 126 208Form for ------------------------- 57 103Preparation of -------------- 58 106Purpose -------------------------- 56 101Qualities of ----------------------- 59 111Use -56 101

Photo air reconnaissance --------------- 89 82Photo interpretation ------------------- 111 190Photo interpretation operations --------- 112 119Photo interpretation reports ------ - 55, 113 95, 191Photo interpretation unit -------------- 88 160Photo interpreters --------------------- 111, 112 190, 191Photomap ------- - ------------------ 103 174310

Paragraph PagePhoto reproduction unit --------------- 110 186Physical security. (See Security.)Planimetric map ---------------------- 103 174Planning:

Airborne and amphibious operations__ 172 263Coordination in -168 255Extremes of environment --------- 173 265Importance of - 167 255Phases ------------------- 169 257

Port security. (See Security.)Posting enemy situation map ---------- 37 50Prisoners of war ----------------------- 98 169Processing ---------------- 21, 34 24, 47Radio interception ---------------- 145 229Radio position finding ---------------- 146 230Radio transmission security -------------- 151 234Rating the source, agency and the informa-

tion ------------------------------- 41 62Reconnaissance:

Defined -------------------------- 78 141Principles of - 80 143Purpose of --------------- 78 141Responsibility for ------------------ 79 143

Reconnaissance agencies ----------- 81 145Reconnaissance aviation, mission -------- 84 149Reconnaissance by fire .--- --- 78 141Reconnaissance in force ----------------- 78 141Reconnaissance missions ---------------- 82 146Reconnaissance reports ------- - 117 196Reconnaissance targets__: --- _ _ -_ 90 161Reconnaissance technical squadron ------ 86 150Reconnaissance units:

As collecting agencies _------ ------ 32 38Intelligence training of ------------- 159 245

Recording --------------------------- 21,34,35 24,47,48

Recording aids ------------ ----- 35 48Refugees ----------------------- _ 99 170Reinforcement table ------------- 49 77Relationship, combat and strategic intelli-

gence ------------------------------ 8 5Road maps ------------........- 103 174Road search b------------------------- 91 162Route reconnaissance -------------- 91 162Schools, intelligence training ------------ 161 247Security:

Civil ----------------------------- 133 217Cryptosecurity --------------- 150 232Intelligence ----------------------- 9 8

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Security-Continued Paragraph PageMilitary .------ ---------------- 132 216Physical - --------- --- -- - 152 239Port, frontier, and travel ----------- 134 218Transmission .------- .-----. 151 234

Shelling report personnel, as collectingagencies ------------- -------.- 33 43

Signal communication, enemy ------. . 29 30Signal units, as collecting agencies -------- 33 43Situation maps and overlays ............. 55 95Sources:

Compared to agencies .............. 26 28Credibility of .------- -------------- 40, 41 61, 62D efined .------------------------- 27 28Description of -------------------- 29 30Determination of - ------ -------- 28 30Miscellaneous - - -. . 29 30Protection of ------------------ 9 8Rating of ------------------------- 41 62

Souvenirs ------------- --------------- 100 171Special information services:

As collecting agencies -------------.. 31 36Description ----- -------- - 33 43Intelligence training -------- - 159 245

Special maps 103, 117' 174, 196Special operations:

Counterintelligence ------------- - 136 219Planning ---- - -------- 171 263

Special reports ------- ----------- -- 55 95Standing operating procedure:

Counterintelligence ---------- -- 140 224Outline form for intelligence para-

graph, division SOP ------------- 165 251Outline form G-2 section, division_-_ 166 253Purpose ------------------------ 164 250

Stereopair .------------ -.------------- ·107 186Strategic intelligence:

Compared to combat intelligence . 8 5Defined --------------------------- 6 3Use in special operations ----------- 171 263

Strategic map _----------- ------------ 103 174Strength, order of battle -------------- 121 200Strip mosaic ----------- ------ 109 186Symbols, posting ---------------------- 37 50

Tactical air force, as collecting agency --- 33 43Tactical maps - ----------------------- 103 174Tactical reconnaissance aviation -- 89 160Tactical reconnaissance group-_ -------- 86 150Tactical reconnaissance wing -- 86 150

312

Paragraph Page

Tactical study of weather and terrain ---- 55, 95, 193,114, 116, App. VI 195, 301

Tank elements of armored units, as collect-ing agencies ----------- --- 32 38

Technical intelligence summaries -------- 55 95Technical service intelligence detachments

(TSID):As collecting agencies -------------- 33 43In counterintelligence -------------- 129 212Responsibilities with respect to cap-

tured materiel ------------------ .101 173Terrain:

As source -- --------------------- 29 30Defined ------------------------ 114 193EEI -.--------------------------- 67 119Importance -......-------------- 114 193Influence of ---------- -- - .. 115 194Sources of information for ---------- 117 196

Terrain models-__----------- ---------- 29, 117 30, 196Time lengths and rates of march -------- 50 84Topographic map --------------------- 103 174Trafficability reports ------------------ 117 196Traffic analysis ----------------------- 147 231Traffic security analysis ---------------- 151 234Training, intelligence:

Authentication ------- ----------- 151 234Categories of personnel ------------- 157 244Creating intelligence consciousness___ 162 249Intelligence section personnel ------- 158 244Maneuvers ----------------------- 163 249Methods of instruction -------------- 161 247Other personnel -----------.-------- 160 246Purpose -------------------------- 154 241Reconnaissance units and special infor-

mation services ------ ------- 159 245Responsibility ------------------- 156 242Scope ---------------------------- 155 241

Transient targets ------------------ 90 161Translators -------------------------- _ 129 212Transmission security. (See Security.)Travel security. (See Security.)Troops:

As collecting agencies_ - -- - - 31 36Types for collecting agencies -------- 32 38

Uncontrolled mosaic ------- ---------- 109 186Uniform, Counter Intelligence Corps ---- 128 210Unit history, in order of battle - . ...... 121 200Unit identification, in order of battle . .. 121 200Use of intelligence -----------------_-- 22 24

313

Paragraph Page

Vectograph --- - - ------- 107 183Vertical photo --------------- ---- 107 183Visual air reconnaissance:

Employment ------------------ 90 161Limitations and capabilities -------.. 93 164Request for ---------------- 92 163Use - ------------- 85, 89 149, 160

Visual reconnaissance missions .- 90, 91 161, 162

Weather:As source --- ---------- 29 30EEI ------------.. ................ 67 119General .---------- ------------- 114 193Influence of -----------------------. 115 194Sources of information for ----------. 117 196

Weather forecasts ---------------------. 29, 117 30, 196Weather studies ----------------------.. 29 30Wide-angle photo -. .................... 107 183Wire interception ---------------------. 145 129Wire transmission security .------------- 151 234

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