fm 5-02, operational environment coming in 2013

US TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity

Complex Operational Environment

and Threat Integration Directorate

Red DiamondTRISA

NEWSLETTER DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

FM 5-02 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT COMING IN 2013 Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

by Ms Penny Mellies Deputy Director CTID

The Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) is producing a new field manual (FM) on the operational environment (OE) FM 5-02 Operational Environment will explain the operational environment (OE) concept and provide guidance on procedures for its application in military operations training and doctrine development The FM will prescribe procedures for OE analysis and its applications in exercise design and the operations process The target audience of this FM 5-02 includesmdash

Commanders and staffs assigned to all Army company and higher-level organizations

Army personnel involved in either operational or intelligence analysis

Exercise directors and planners

Force developers

Doctrine developers at all levels

The OE concept is extremely important in Army operations training and doctrine development Yet to this date its critical explanatory documents have been TRADOC G-2 Operational Environment white papers the TC 7-100 series of OPFOR publications and TC 7-101 Exercise Design FM 5-02 will provide the Army with a comprehensive guide on the components and use of the OE that does not currently exist in any formal manner

All distribution will occur digitally via the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) and the Army Publishing Directoratersquos repository Current project date of publication is summer 2013

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

FM 5-02 Coming 1

Kidnapping TTP 4

Kachin Guerrillas 6

VBIED TTP 14

HT Reconstitution 17

How to Use WEG 20

Threat Symbology 23

CTID Daily Sum 30

Red Diamond is a newsletter published each month by TRISA at CTID Send your suggestions to CTID on article content

ATTN Red Diamond

Dr Jon H Moilanen CTID Operations BMA and Mrs Angela Wilkins Chief Editor BMA

Fort Leavenworth KS Volume 4 Issue 3 MAR 2013

FM 5-02

Operational

Environment

TBP 2013

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONApproved for public release distribution is unlimited

HEADQUARTERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DRAFT IN PROGRESS

Red Diamond Page 2

Send Your RFI Do you have a ldquothreatsrdquo topic you would like discussed in the TRISA Red Diamond Submit your request for information and we may include a CTID response in a future

issue of the Red Diamond

RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST

by Dr Jon H Moilanen CTID Operations and Chief Red Diamond Newsletter

This issue of the TRISA Red Diamond spotlights several aspects of Hybrid Threat (HT) and real-world vignettes of the many diverse threats that range from small criminal or insurgent organization actions such as an assault and kidnapping recent surface-to-surface (SS) anti-ship cruise missile developments and recurring guerrilla unit operations in an insurgency Other vignettes include a suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against a forward operating location in an insurgency Ongoing training and doctrine literature in progress at TRISA-CTID includes FM 5-02 Operational Environment This Army field manual to be published in 2013 willmdash

Explain the operational environment (OE) concept and provide guidance on the procedures for its application in military operations training doctrine and leader development

Present the procedures for OE analysis and its applications in exercise design and operations process

The TRADOC G2 Worldwide Equipment Guide is in the review process for an update by the end of 2013 Other Threat training and doctrine developments include Training Circular 7-1003 Irregular Opposing Forces to be published in 2013 An article on tactical symbols for

irregular forces indicates a continuation of Threat actions stated in Training Circular 7-100 Hybrid Threat TRISA and its Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) describe the varied current and future CONDITIONS that represent

challenges and opportunities for training readiness and adaptive Army leadership Email your topic recommendations to

Dr Jon H Moilanen CTID Operations BMA CTR jonhmoilanenctrmailmil and Mrs Angela M Wilkins Chief Editor BMA CTR angelamwilkins7ctrmailmil

Complex Operational Environmentand Threat Integration Directorate

TRISA

Complex OEmdashHybrid Threat

WE are at WAR on TERROR

Know the Threat ndash

Know the Enemy

(Photo US Army SSG Shane Hamann)

Trained

Ready

Adaptive

Decisive

Get Your Copy of ldquoDecisive Action Training EnvironmentrdquoAccess AKO with password

httpswwwusarmymilsuitedoc26833763

TRISA WOT Poster No 06-13US Army TRADOCG2 Intelligence Support Activity

Red Diamond Page 3

Directorrsquos CornerThoughts for Training Readiness CTID

by Jon Cleaves Director Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate

From the early days of our transition from a Soviet-based training model for threats we have been extremely sensitive to the issue that opposing force (OPFOR) soldiers must simultaneously provide the right counter-tasks actions and signatures while acting as a threat and maintain their proficiency on their own ldquoBluerdquo skills This challenge is consequential and we have known from the start that we must be sensitive to it To that end we have brought to the absolute minimum the number of things a soldier must do differently in order to properly act as a component of a hybrid threat (HT) for training We did not create for example a new type of OPFOR symbology or an alternate ldquothreat languagerdquo When we reviewed all the Army tasks in the AUTL we were very careful to only create an OPFOR task that differed in key nature from its potential ldquoBluerdquo counterpart Soldiers acting as OPFOR crew a machine gun and call for fire in the same way they would in their past and future units

However that review did reveal twenty-four task sets that must be accomplished in a manner different from companion US doctrinal tasks that might have similar natures These tasks are detailed with performance measures in Appendix B of TC 7-101 Exercise Design This counter-task review is updated periodically to keep current with changes in both US doctrine and Hybrid Threat techniques and has continually confirmed the need for these tasks to be executed as shown in TC 7-101 Additional comprehensive information on the execution of these tasks can be found in the TC 7-100 series especially TC 7-1002 Opposing Force Tactics This is not a small point It is incorrect for example to execute a company attack using US doctrine while acting as OPFOR This task needs to be executed using one or more of the tasks Assault Raid Ambush or Reconnaissance Attack There are very specific threat replication reasons for this

As always we stand ready to help with understanding and executing any aspect of Hybrid Threat tactics

Jon jonscleavescivmailmil

___________________________________________________________________________________________

CTID Red Diamond Disclaimer The Red Diamond presents professional information but the views expressed herein are those of the authors not the Department of Defense or its elements The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material that they reference The Red Diamond staff reserves the right to edit material Appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the US Army for information contained therein

Red Diamond Page 4

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT THREAT TTP KIDNAPPING AT KATSINA

OE and Threat within Complex Conditions

by Laura Deatrick Operational Environment (OE) Assessment Team (ISC-CG CTR)

During the night of 19-20 December 2012 several gunmen simultaneously attacked the police station and a residence in Rimi town Katsina State Nigeria Some of the attackers killed two Nigerians wounded a third and kidnapped a French engineer at the residence The others bombed the police station which was destroyed in the resulting fire The OEA Team Threat Report Kidnapping in Katsina examines the details of the attack and possible training implications

The nineteenth of December 2012 started out as a typical evening in Rimi town Katsina State Nigeria Francis Collomp a French national had settled into his residence for the night An engineer by trade Collomp had agreed to do one last mission for Vergnet SA a French company that was contracted by the Nigerian

government to build the nearby wind farm He had elected to be in country over the holidays so his fellow engineers could spend the time at home with their families The night watchman and a local policeman were on guard duty and a neighbor had come over to visit the watchman and charge his cell phone

Late in the evening around 30 armed men in three vehicles drove into town from the direction of the Katsina-Kano highway Breaking into two groups one element began to attack the local police station with small arms fire The other proceeded to the residence where the engineers stayed when in-country Storming the compound the attackers shot and killed the night watchman and the visiting neighbor and wounded the policeman (see figure 1)

Figure 1 Kidnapping sequence at Katsina

1 Attackers enter town 2 Group splits into two 3 First element attacks police station 4 Second element attacks residence 5 Second element exfiltrates to vicinity of police station 6 First element bombs police station 7 Re-formed group exfiltrates

Red Diamond Page 5

They kidnapped Mr Collomp and then headed back toward the police station At the reappearance of their colleagues the first group threw an explosive device at the station which detonated and set the building on fire The re-formed group then drove from the urban area toward the highway

Several aspects of this event will make it of interest to trainers and scenario writers First it is an excellent scenario of MI and MP units It would be easy to mimic in the home-training environment and the small number of attackers allows for efficient use of role-players Finally additional complexity is added due to the two-pronged attack the foreign national target and the possible insider angle

The Kidnapping in Katsina Threat Report provides information to the Army training community on the December attack In addition to an event review and accompanying diagram the report considers the likely actors and their motives provides an analyst assessment of the attack and examines training implications

STRATEGIC PLAN GOAL 1 EMBED AT CONCEPTS IN TRAINING-DOCTRINE

Army Publishes Antiterrorism Strategic Plan Phase III 2013-2016

Red Diamond Page 6

Guerrilla Force A group of irregular predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held hostile or denied territory

Insurgency The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority

Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 8Nov2010 as amended through 15 Feb 2013

IRREGULAR FORCES KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ARMY

Guerrilla Units in an Insurgency

by Marc Williams Training and Leader Development TeamJMRC and NTC LNO (ISC-CG CTR)

A Current Operational Environment

For the past year severe fighting has been taking place in northern Myanmar an event seldom reported in the Western press The Burma National Army called ldquoTatmadawrdquo has been battling a guerrilla force known as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) the military arm of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) Dubbed an insurgency by the Myanmar government the KIA has been conducting a primarily defensive campaign in the Kachin State to protect the KIO headquarters in the city of Laiza

KIA is a guerrilla force of primarily ethnic Kachin people who are Christian located on the border with China (foothills of the Himalayas) Ethnically they are closely related to the Tibetan people Tatmadaw is comprised of primarily Burman Buddhists in southern Myanmar

Observations and lessons learned from this conflict can assist trainers and scenario writers in developing an operational environment that effectively stresses the training unit

Background and History

Revolutionary hero Aung San (father of Aung Suu Kyi) crafted a constitution for Burma known as the ldquoPanglong Agreementrdquo In 1942 he was assassinated and years of upheaval followed In 1962 a military coup emplaced a junta of ruling generals Multiple ethnic and private armies in the many States sprang up and most were eventually incorporated into Tatmadaw or the Border Guard Force

Leading up to the founding of the KIOKIA was the central governmentrsquos decision to take over all of the schools in Kachin State replace Kachin language and history classes with Burmese lessons and declare Buddhism as the state religion The national slogan was ldquoOne country One language One religionrdquo It became clear that there was no chance of the internal autonomy promised to the Kachin through diplomacy alone

Today the KIO has a full civilian government based in Laiza that provides services to most of Kachin State KIO services and level of development include native language schools teacher training colleges immigration for their borders civilian police a TV station newspapers libraries hospitals a nurse training college a sustainable hydro power station and many other government departments1

For years the Kachin have rankled at their inability to control their own destiny with no voice in Burmese politics A ceasefire between Tatmadaw and the KIA held until 2011 after the government demanded the KIA join a state-run Border Guard Force and tensions over a proposed dam on the Irrawaddy River control over jade mines and an extension of the Shwe oil-and-gas pipeline into China ignited fighting between KIA and Tatmadaw in February 20122 The road-to-war timeline includes

March 2012 Tatmadaw stages a major Division exercise with the 99th Light Infantry Division (LID) 99th LID is based at Meiktila and had all 10 assigned battalions in this exercise supported by armor and artillery units

April 2012 Tatmadaw begins buildup of forces in Myitkyina and Bhamo The KIA views this as a direct threat

May ndash November 2012 Sporadic fighting takes place as Tatmadaw units begin to maneuver but plan their major attacks for Burmarsquos dry season (December to April)

Red Diamond Page 7

December 2012 Tatmadaw elements focus their attacks on Laja Yang 17 km from Laiza However armor units are used ineffectively and coordination for close air support is weak The KIA effectively forces Tatmadaw into piecemeal battles that are heavy in casualties Government forces bog down and do not take control of Bumre Bum until 30 December 2012

Figure 1 Typical terrain in Kachin State

Recent Events

18 January 2013 The government ldquoannounced that the military would unilaterally stop fighting in the KIArsquos Lajayang territory however reports of ground offensives and artillery strikes targeting rebel positions continued to surfacerdquo3

19 January 2013 The governmentrsquos Peace Making Work Committee invited the KIA to resume peace talks but the rebel army rejected the request and demanded that the government negotiators speak to the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) ndash an umbrella organization made up of 11 ethnic militias including the KIA In the Mai Ja Yang area the Burma Army fired 105mm artillery and 120mm mortars on KIA positions for most of the day The Burma Army fired mortars near Lajayang between 10am and 2pm Approximately 150 troops moved into the Lajayang area with helicopters to resupply4

20 January 2013 Tatmadaw infantry attacks against KIA positions on Hkaya Bum and Hpakant (Burma Army Military Operation Command [MOC] 7 attacked KIA Battalion 6) supported by indirect fire systems5

21 January 2013 Tatmadaw units burn houses in Na Long 15 km west of Laiza6

22 January 2013 Residents of Na Lung Man Mau and Man Sai (6 km west of Laiza) are ordered to leave their homes by Tatmadaw7

22-26 January 2013 Tatmadaw units make repeated infantry attacks on Hkaya Bum with artillery and mortar support Hkaya Bum is taken by 1330 26 January 20138

04 February 2013 Emergency peace talks were held and both sides ldquoagreed to hold a political dialoguemdashas opposed to just ceasefire talksmdashand to establish a monitoring system to implement a ceasefire between warring government troops and Kachin guerrillas in the countryrsquos north9

Figure 2 Tatmadaw Emblem

Red Diamond Page 8

Organization Tatmadaw evolved from a group of Burmese independence fighters referred to as the ldquo30 Comradesrdquo in charge of the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) After independence they were renamed the Burmese National Army with Bogyoke Aung San appointed as defense minister Tatmadaw is currently the second largest military in Southeast Asia (Vietnam Peoplersquos Army is the largest) The strength of the Myanmar army is estimated at 500000 with counterinsurgency experience continually since 1948 This is a conventional army with full combined arms capability including a Bureau of Special Operations divided across 11 regional commands The Kachin State is the responsibility of the Northern Command

At the tactical level Tatmadaw is organized into nine light infantry divisions but the basic maneuver unit is the battalion There are 337 infantry battalions including 266 light infantry battalions A standard battalion has an authorized strength of 27 officers and 723 enlisted A light infantry battalion is around 500

Artillery and armor units are not independent but deploy in support of infantry operations There are 10 artillery operations commands with 12 battalions each (six light three medium one MRL one ADA and a target acquisition battalion) Light field artillery battalions consist of three field artillery batteries with 36 field guns or howitzers (12 guns per battery) Medium artillery battalions consist of three medium artillery batteries of 18 field guns or howitzers (six guns per one battery) Tatmadaw artillery uses GPS fire control systems There are five armor operations commands An armored division in the Myanmar Army is composed of a headquarters three armored tactical operations commands (each with one Mechanized battalion with 44 infantry fighting vehicles) two tanks battalions equipped with 44 main battle tanks each one armored reconnaissance battalion one field artillery battalion and a support battalion The support battalion is composed of an engineer squadron two logistic squadrons and a signal company

Nationwide there are 14 medical battalions in Tatmadaw In the Northern Command (Kachin State) support is provided by the 9th field medical battalion in Mohnyin and the 11th field medical battalion in Bhamo Each field medical battalion consists of three field medical companies with three field hospital units and a specialist team each

In this conflict Tactical Military Operations Command (MOC 21) is based at Bhamo and includes the 99th LID Reinforcements are operating under a theater-level Bureau of Strategic Operations in Myitkyina and include battalions from the 33rd 66th and 88th light infantry divsions10

Figure 3 Myanmar Army Regional Military Commands

Equipment Tatmadaw is equipped with Type 90 II main battle tanks (MBT) BTR-3 armored personnel carriers (APC) Carl Gustav M3 anti-tank rifles (in violation of EU sanctions11) and Chinese 25T trucks12 Indirect fire systems includes field artillery (155mm 130mm 122mm 105mm 76mm 75mm howitzers and mountain guns) 122mm self propelled and towed multiple launch rockets Tatmadaw has air defense guns and surface to air missiles Strike air capability comes from MiG-29 Fulcrum combat aircraft Mi-35 Hind attack helicopters and K-8 Karakorum jet trainers Small arms include FN HampK and Kalashnikov family of rifles MG-42 machineguns rocket propelled grenades and mortars (60mm 81mm 82mm and 120mm)

Red Diamond Page 9

Training Military schools were originally established on the Japanese military model and have later modifications Schools include a basic combat training school artillery school two combat forces schools armor school armor school electronic warfare school engineer school information warfare school and a special forces school There is a military academy for producing officers medical and nursing schools a technological college a command and general staff college and a national defense college

Regular exercises have emphasized coordination of light infantry armor and strike air capabilities Some officers are trained in other countries especially in India and China As part of the US ldquorebalancerdquo to Asia Tatmadaw officers attended the US Pacific Commandrsquos Exercise Cobra Gold February 11-21 2013 Training was in Chiang Mai Thailand and other attendees included the US Thailand Japan South Korea Indonesia Malaysia and Singapore

Tactics For Operation Thunderbolt Tatmadaw forces focused on controlling roads leading into Laiza and capturing the high ground surrounding it Laiza is in a valley next to the Irrawaddy River on the Chinese border The commanding heights around the city provide clear views and line-of-sight for any attacking force The overall plan appears to have been to overcome KIA defensive positions burning homes as they progressed take control of the Bumre Bum mountains and force the KIA to the negotiation table From the mountains Tatmadaw artillery can range Laiza without the risk of hitting China13 No move has yet been made to invade the Laiza urban area though airstrikes and indirect fire have hit the city Operation ldquoThunderboltrdquo marks the first time the Myanmar Air Force (MAF) ldquohas conducted a sustained campaign in support of ground forcesrdquo14

Cyber Attacks While there is no evidence yet of cyber attacks on either side Google warned journalists in Myanmar of attacks on Gmail accounts in June 2012 In a blog post directed at specific users Google warned those ldquowho we believe may be the target of state-sponsored attacksrdquo The warning spoke of malware and phishing attempts and further included ldquoYou might ask how we know this activity is state-sponsored We canrsquot go into the details without giving away information that would be helpful to these bad actors but our detailed analysismdashas well as victim reportsmdashstrongly suggest the involvement of states or groups that are state-sponsoredrdquo15

NBC Weapons The Kachins have alleged the use of ldquoyellow rainrdquo attacks in Mai Ja Yang for defoliation efforts They have further alleged the use of ldquopoison-gas embedded mortar shellsrdquo in October and November 2011 However none of these allegations has been confirmed by a disinterested agency Burma is one of a signatory nation of non-proliferation of nuclear biological and chemical weapons in accordance with 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare The country also singed 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons Convention and Chemical Weapons Convention16

Combat Effectiveness Given the slow advance of supposedly highly mobile units the inability to coordinate close air support and ineffective use of armor on established roads Tatmadaw appears to be ineffective in large-scale combined arms operations Burmese air assets have been somewhat effective against fixed KIA positions and the urban terrain of Laiza but have not been a decisive piece of the ground operation Given these shortcomings victory is the final measure and Tatmadaw controls the high ground around the KIA headquarters and has forced them to the negotiation table The political fallout from the high casualty rate and international revelations of numerous war crimes has yet to be felt by the Burmese government

Figure 4 Kachin Independence Army Flag

Kachin Independence Army

Organization Despite being a primarily guerrilla force the KIA is developing into a more conventional military force with military style organization training and even a School of Officers KIA is organized in regional battalions and brigades with distinctive unit insignia

KIA is a light infantry force of 5000-7000 Soldiers divided five regional Brigades and organized into Battalions There are five brigades geographically assigned (including one in the Shan State) and one mobile brigade The KIA battalion is approximately 100 men commanded by an officer and an NCO Units are entirely male though there are all-female units present in the KIA structure However videos have not shown any women fighting The KIA follows a classic Maoist structure Command and control (C2) uses Chinese repeater stations for communications with hand-held sets

Red Diamond 0

Equipment

Mobility Ground vehicles include H3 Hummers Toyota Hilux trucks Toyota Highlanders UAS jeeps and multiple other jeepland rover type vehicles There is no aviation capability in the KIA Elephants motorcycles and bicycles are used in jungle areas for mobility17

Weapons Primarily Kalashnikov family of rifles SKS rifles light and heavy machineguns light and heavy mortars but no other indirect fire systems There are no air defense systems Multiple types of grenades Liberal use of homemade mines

Uniforms KIA has been observed using a mixture of OD green fatigues forest pattern BDU-style field uniforms and newer digital camouflage patterns Headgear is a combination of light field caps and older Chinese helmets not the Kevlar-style helmets currently used in the Peoplersquos Liberation Army (PLA) There is some photographic evidence of lightweight bulletproof vests and flak jackets

Training Basic training is three months long and includes rifle marksmanship field craft jungle warfare individual movement techniques and small unit tactical movement Basic trainees are given wooden models of AK-47s because of a lack of actual weapons for training Later training includes manufacture and emplacement of anti-personnel (AP) landmines but there have been numerous (40+) fatalities from mishandling mines since 2011 KIA has a school of officers

Tactics KIA uses primarily standard mobile tactics of ambushes and raids one would expect from a light infantry force Once Tatmadaw began its offensive operations however the KIA was forced into an area defense Numerous photos in news sources and videos posted on LiveLeak Vimeo and YouTube show KIA fighters using defensive fighting positions with no overhead cover Unlike American doctrine of infantry fighting positions the KIA positions appear to be a series of trenches with dugouts for cover from artillery but the individual Soldier must expose himself to fire his weapon

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has accused the KIA of serious abuses including using child soldiers and antipersonnel landmines HRW explains that landmines are emplaced without comprehensive mapping and in fact manufactures its own AP mines18

ldquoThe difference between Kachin and Burmese landmines is that the KIO mines blast shrapnel inside the body whereas the Burmese ones is not shrapnel but a blunt force explosion usually taking the entire limbrdquo

Dr La A Interview with Human Rights Watch 16 November 2011

Combat Effectiveness KIA was surprisingly effective in inflicting casualties on Tatmadaw during its buildup and initial attacks toward Laja Yang This light infantry force with no anti-armor weapons no air defense systems and no artillery caused a combined force of four LIDs to take nearly 30 days to move 17 kilometers Had they been able to incorporate multiple battle positions with interlocking fields of fire with concentrated mortar fire the outcome may have been even bloodier for Tatmadaw KIA chose to fight as a conventional force rather than shifting into a strictly insurgent type of fighting with endless IEDs night raids and ambushes and non-uniformed fighters blending into the local population

KIA was very vulnerable to air attacks Relying on fixed defensive positions with little or no overhead cover and poor camouflage led to more casualties However KIA forces shot down either a Mi-17 ldquoHiprdquo or Mi-2 ldquoHopliterdquo with heavy machinegun fire Video footage from 31 December or 01 January show a K-8 being hit by ground fire and dropping into an uncontrolled descent19

Red Diamond Page 11

Assessing a Current Situation Tatmadaw holds the high ground surrounding Laiza and both sides have agreed to a ceasefire and negotiations These negotiations are taking place in Chiang Mai Thailand

Casualties from fighting The Tatmadaw casualty figures have not been released by the government as of the writing of this article In September 2012 the Kachin News Group calculated the number to be as high as 10000 in 11 months of fighting KIA reported losing 700 of their own between June 2011 and September 2012 This number includes ldquoat least 200 killed from accidents involving landmines planted by the KIArdquo20

Internally displaced persons (IDP) The Free Burma Rangers (FBR) estimates there are 100000 IDPs in Kachin State alone The Kachin News Group estimates 66000 IDPs in the IDP camps The UN estimate is 75000

Status of ceasefire The current ceasefire between KIA and Tatmadaw is holding with ongoing negotiations taking place in Chiang Mai Thailand However on 14 February 2013 fighting broke out in Tangyang township between the 199th BN36th BDE Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) and Tatmadawrsquos 322 Light Infantry Battalion21

With over 200000 IDPs there and in the Karen State from earlier fighting coupled with the 100000 in the Kachin State the Myanmar government is faced with an even larger humanitarian problem

Figure 5 FBR documents Myanmar Army Damage

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) and International Organizations Many NGOs are assisting with the IDPs and casualties for this conflict Notable among these are the FBR who provide medical and humanitarian relief to both IDPs and KIA soldiers who have been wounded in the fighting FBR volunteers are trained in medical dental land navigation and jungle survival FBR also documents human rights violations in the conflict White Holding Hands charity delivered cash and clothes blankets and toys to IDPs in Manwein village Bhamo district22

On 28 February 2013 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) arrived in Laiza for the first time in nearly nine months23 They brought ldquoaid shipments to camps located in areas not controlled by the governmentrdquo24 This particular convoy had been delayed by the BNArsquos 437th Infantry Battalion

The United Nations (UN) relief shipments were stopped in July 2012 by the Myanmar government Following the ceasefire and de-escalation of violence the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) World Food Programme (WFP) UN Childrenrsquos Agency (UNICEF) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) travelled between 17 and 21 February to Hpakant area west of the Kachin State capital The inter-agency visit was the first to the area since January 2012 in which UN staff were able to reach internally displaced people25

Red Diamond Page 12

Other Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Kachin State

Training Applications for Complex Environments

Scenario Development This conflict provides a complex operational environment that can be replicated in training A governmentrsquos conventional force highly resourced with combined arms capability versus a guerrilla force attempting to fight conventionally all with international pressure on both sides to produce a ceasefire agreement Other actors include civilians of multiple ethnicities with six linguistic groups attempting to survive on battlefields and maneuver for political power after the fight Then there are multiple NGOs all with competing agendas and requiring different levels of coordination and support Scenario writers will find plenty of ideas from Operation Thunderbolt

OPFOR Training TC 7-1002 Opposing Force Tactics provides the baseline for how an OPFOR operates in a training environment However use of situations as shown by the KIA can influence how an OPFOR operates Fast moving dismounted troops using minimal weapons and relying on their unique understanding of the local terrain can slow or halt a heavier force US OPFOR doctrine recognizes offense as the decisive form of military action while the defense is the stronger form of military action The purpose of an OPFOR defense is to (1) protect personnel and equipment (2) restrict freedom of movement (3) control key terrain and (4) gain time The KIA was effective in restricting movement and controlling key terrain did manage to gain time for the political process to work but fell short in protecting their personnel OPFOR training units can use the lessons from Thunderbolt to counter BLUE units

Table 1 Examples of Nongovernmental Organizations in Kachin State NAME OF ORGANIZATION TYPE OF NGO PROGRAM

Medicins Du Monde (MDM) France International HIVAIDS and STDs Artsen Zonder Grenzen Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland (AZG)

Netherlands International Malaria TB HIVAIDS reproductive health and STDs primary health care nutrition water and sanitation

World Concern Development Organization (WC)

USA International World Concern Myanmars programs include primary health care WATSAN HIVAIDS nutrition food security micro-finance and natural resource management

Swiss Foundation for Development Cooperation (SWISSAID) ndash Myanmar Programme

Switzerland International Sustainable agriculture natural resource management capacity building organization development through support to local Myanmar organizations

Population Services International (PSI)

Canada International HIVAIDS reproductive health malaria STI TB safe water system behavior change communication

Metta Development Foundation Local founded by Lahpai Seng Raw

Grass root development program for rural people HIVAIDS

Shalom Foundation Local founded by Rev Lahtaw Saboi Jum of former Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) General Secretary

Reconciliation among Christian Churches HIVAIDS

Red Diamond Page 13

In the final accounting the purpose of an OPFOR is to stress the BLUEFOR unit By focusing on the commanderrsquos training objectives tailoring an OPFOR and training that OPFOR in counter-tasks this becomes an effective tool for training US forces for potential combat operations We know the future threat is a Hybrid Threat composed of conventional paramilitary terrorists and criminal elements The KIA is an excellent model of an effective paramilitary organization that can be replicated in training to stress the BLUEFOR

Endnotes 1 The KIOKIA Free Kachin Campaign no date 2 Adam Skolnick ldquoThe Jesus-Kissed War-Fringed Love-Swirled Rangersrdquo Outside magazine 7 November 2012

3 Nang Mya Nadi ldquoBurmese army continues to target rebel positions near Laizardquo Democratic Voice of Burma 22 January 2013

4 ldquoBurma army attacks against the Kachin since ceasefire declaredrdquo Free Burma Rangers 22 January 2013



7 ldquoBurma army attacks continue in Kachin Staterdquo Free Burma Rangers 29 January 2013


9 Aye Aye Win ldquoBurma reaches deal with rebels to ease tensionsrdquo The Irrawaddy 5 February 2013

10 Anthony Davis ldquorsquoThunderboltrsquo reveals Tatmadaw shortcomingsrdquo Janersquos Defence Review 23 January 2013 p 21

11 ldquoSwedish arms in Burma arrived via Indiardquo The Local 13 December 2012

12 Roy Kamphausen David Lai and Andrew Scobell ldquoBeyond the Strait PLA Missions other than Taiwanrdquo Strategic Studies Institute

April 2009 13

Nang Mya Nadi ldquoBurmese army continues to target rebel positions near Laizardquo Democratic Voice of Burma 22 January 2013 14

Anthony Davis ldquoMyanmar launches air strikes against KIArdquo Janersquos Defence Weekly 09 January 2013 pg 17 15

Eric Grosse VP Security Engineering ldquoSecurity warnings for state sponsored attacksrdquo Google Online Security Blog 5 June 2012 16

ldquoEvidences reveal Burma Army uses WMDrdquo The Kachin Post 28 November 2011 17

Ryan Libre ldquoWhen will it be The struggle for self determination in northern Burmardquo documentary film preview accessed 24 January 2013 18

Matthew F Smith ldquoUntold miseries Wartime abuses and forced displacement in Burmarsquos Kachin Staterdquo Human Rights Watch March 2012 ISBN 1-56432-874-0 19

Anthony Davis ldquoMyanmar launches air strikes against KIArdquo Janersquos Defence Weekly 9 January 2013 p 17 20

Edward Chung Ho ldquoTime for Thein Sein to come clean about Burmese losses in Kachin staterdquo Kachin News Group 22 September 2012 21

ldquoNegotiators meet with Shan delegation as skirmishes erupt in Burmardquo Democratic Voice of Burma 14 February 2013 22

Nay Thwin ldquoNGO to deliver aid to Kachin Staterdquo 1 May 2012 Democratic Voice of Burma 23

ldquoMyanmar Aid reaches victims of violence in Kachinrdquo ICRC News Release 1331 24

ldquoICRC aid convoy allowed access to Laiza after delayrdquo Kachin News Group 1 March 2013 25

ldquoMyanmar UN aid reaches people in conflict-affected Kachin areardquo UN News Centre 1March 2013

SPACECOUNTERSPACE AREA OF INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT FOR WEG

OPFOR Systems in an Expanding Operational Environment

by Jennifer Dunn and Steffany Trofino Threat Integration Team (DACDAC)

As part of CTIDrsquos mission to update the Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) we will be adding a new area of open source research that will address Threat space and counterspace capabilities For the purposes of this initiative space will be defined as OPFOR systems and capabilities that enable operations beyond the atmosphere This environment will be an

Red Diamond Page 14

important addition to the WEG as it pertains to operations being conducted in the space domain a domain that the WEG has not fully explored as of yet

Topics will address foreign space capabilities (satellites launching systems and ground stations) and discuss the benefits these systems provide to the actors in a particular operational environment (OE) After addressing the capabilities and benefits of these systems we will shift our focus to identifying the known weaknesses and vulnerabilities of US and allied systems that may be leveraged by the Threat

As CTID determines where to best integrate space and counterspace developments in the current WEG we invite any ideas or areas of interest from the community that may direct some of our research and analysis Please contact Mrs Jennifer Dunn Jennifervdunncivmailmil or Ms Steffany Trofino steffanyatrofinocivmailmil with questions comments and suggestions for this space and counterspace initiative

THREAT TTP SUICIDE VEHICLE BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

Threat Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP)

by Jim Bird Operational Environment (OE) Assessment Team (Overwatch CTR)

Veterans of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) know only too well that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings are anything but a novelty in the Afghan theater of operations A new OEA Team Threat Report Abiding Threat at Camp Chapman examines a recent terrorist attack at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman Afghanistan as well as its implications for the information warfare (INFOWAR) arena The connection between a vehicle borne IED (VBIED) that killed four Afghan nationals (and wounded several others) on 26 December 2012 and an insider attack that occurred almost exactly three years earlier at the same general location lies essentially in interpretations given both events by the international news media

The day after Christmas 2012 a suicide bomber detonated a VBIED at the main entrance to FOB Chapman near Khost City Afghanistan The attack occurred as Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) personnel halted a minivan entering the

compound in accordance with the basersquos standard operating procedure After pausing briefly at the checkpoint the minivan driver advanced a few yards farther before setting off the device that killed himself a security officer nearest the vehicle a civilian passerby and two unfortunate local drivers who made their living by bringing passengers to and from their daily workplaces on the FOB Although the blast shook windows in buildings two miles from the scene the base perimeter remained intact and no US personnel were killed or wounded in the incident (see figure 1 next page)

The 26 December 2012 suicide bombing at FOB Chapman is an excellent example of a strike and detonate VBIED attack depicted in the TRADOC G2 Handbook No 107 C3 A Soldierrsquos Primer to Terrorism TTP Tactics Techniques and Procedures in Complex Operational Environments The following shows a close-up graphic representation of the incident based on available open source descriptions The graphic is not to scale and all locations are approximate

Aside from what this tactical VBIED attack teaches about enemy TTP there are INFOWAR considerations also Statements issued by the Taliban in the

Red Diamond Page 15

immediate aftermath of the December 2012 incident gave no indication that it was timed to draw public attention to a previous suicide bombing that occurred at Camp Chapman three years earlier On 30 December 2009 an insider attack killed seven Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees and the Chief of Jordanrsquos General Intelligence Directory The 2009 bombing inflicted more casualties on the CIA than any other single incident in the previous 25 years and caused the temporary shutdown of the CIA office in Khost City until a replacement team could be assembled and dispatched to the area Predictably it also made a big splash with international news agencies

Al Jazeera was hardly alone in suggesting a linkage between what in actuality were two distinct events separated in time by three years By following suit and portraying the 2012 attack on FOB Chapman as a sequel to the earlier bombing the collective effect of media coverage conferred strategic significance on what in fact amounted to little more than an unsuccessful enemy attempt to penetrate a FOB perimeter Tactically and operationally the latest attack on Camp Chapman will have little if any impact on the outcome of the Afghan war Viewed from the perspective of information warfare however the December 2012 episode should serve as a reminder to commanders of the mediarsquos potential power to impart strategic significance to relatively minor tactical occurrences Published accounts of the after-Christmas suicide bombing emphasized a perceived undiminished ability of the Taliban to attack targets almost at will throughout Khost Province over a decade into the OEF deployment

Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED

Figure 1 Camp ChapmanndashSuicide VBIED TTP

The 26 December suicide bombing at FOB Chapman also illustrates the potential of a single individual to instill fear in a local population out of all proportion to the small number of casualties actually inflicted The VBIED blast occurred between 0730 and 0800 indicating that it was timed to inflict a maximum number of casualties as local nationals employed by the US arrived at the FOB to begin their workday This interpretation meshes with the Taliban spokesmanrsquos comment attributing the motivation behind the attack to a desire to kill and injure Afghans who work for

Red Diamond Page 16

the Americans and who support the regime of President Hamid Karzai Finally the 26 December terrorist attack at FOB Chapman underscores the need for deployed forces to keep their guard up as the Coalition drawdown continues especially on the anniversaries of previous terrorist attacks

Several aspects of this event will make it of interest to the Army training community It drives home the point that no static facility is ever totally secure especially if a threat actor is willing to die in an attack It also reminds readers that a small force or single individual can inflict serious damage either in a physical sense or by undermining the credibility of security forces Finally it suggests that this type of suicide bombing is easily replicated needs few role players and requires minimal logistical support In sum the ldquoAbiding Threat at Camp Chapmanrdquo Threat Report provides information to the Army training community on the December 2012 attack on FOB Chapman and examines it from the information warfare implications

IRANrsquoS SEA-SKIMMING CRUISE MISSILE NOOR

Cruise Missile Threat in Complex Operational Environments

by Steffany Trofino Threat Integration Team (DAC)

During the 2 January 2013 Iranian military exercise Velayat 91 Iran successfully test fired the indigenously designed Noor surface-to-surface (SS) anti-ship cruise missile citing enhancements to the missilersquos guidance systems The Iranian Noor cruise missile is an upgraded variant of Chinese C-802 with technology extracted from C-802K which is the air launch cruise missile (ALCM) variant The missilersquos propulsion system is powered by Toloue-4 engine an Iranian version of the French Microturbo TRI 60 engine

In January 2004 Iranian officials announced it has begun to manufacture the DM-3B mono pulse radar for use in the Noor missile system According to Iranian officials DM-3B is a millimeter-wave active radar used in the last stage of missile flight to acquire and home the missile in on its designated target In January 2013 Iranian officials claimed the missile system has a range of 200 kilometers and that it has no need of an over-the-horizon targeting system due to enhancements claimed by Iran to the missilersquos guidance system Its velocity is twice the speed of sound and it travels just a few yards above water (sea skimming) making it nearly undetectable by radar

Origins of the Iranian Noor System Chinese C-802

The Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missile was developed by China HaiYing Electro-Mechanical Technology Academy (CHETA) also known as 3rd Aerospace Academy located in the southwest suburbs of Beijing Iran was the first export customer of the Chinese C-802 missile importing sixty C-802 missiles Iranrsquos first successful test firing of the Noor system took place during October 2000 with Unity-79 war games

Reports from early 2000 indicated that North Korea and Iran were jointly developing an advanced version of the C-802 cruise missile The C-802 missiles initially imported by Iran from China were not equipped with advanced system capabilities A land-based C-802 was launched by Hezbollah in July 2006 striking the Israeli naval ship INS Ahi-Hanit off the coast of Beirut Lebanon The attack claimed the lives of four Israeli crewmen

Updated Specifications

After successfully testing the Noor missile system in January 2013 Iranian officials indicated there are improvements in the missilersquos electronic systems with more jam-resistant radar and better target acquisition algorithms To date little is known on the specifications of the claimed enhancements made to the missilersquos guidance system

Recent known specifications of the Iranian Noor system include the following

Engine Toloue-4 turbojet engine

Operational range 170-180 km +- 225 km for ALCM version

Flight altitude Sea-skimming

Guidance INS and Terminal AR (DM-3B MMW)

Speed 09 Mach

Terminal-Phase (m) 5 or 7

Cruise-Phase (m) 20

Warhead Weight (kg) 175 kg Semi Armor Piercing

Launch Platform TEL Naval platform Aerial

Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms

Currently Iran claims it is mass producing the missile and it is carried by multiple Iranian warfare platforms This includes the air-launched C-802K (Qaem) which can be carried by F-4s and Su-24s Naval platforms include launch cells on board Alvand and Mowj class frigates the Bayandor corvette KamanSINA FACs and Thondar missile boats Land-based platforms are notable in that many are designed to operate covertly or can be disguised as civilian trucks Moreover equipping the launch trucks with basic surface-search radars also provides a degree of mobility allowing the Iranian military to operate with less support equipment which enhances Iranian coastal defense missions

Since 1998 US Naval experts such as Admiral Scott Redd as well as former CIA Director John Deutch have warned of the dangers the original Chinese C-802 posed

to US Forces operating in the Persian Gulf With recent enhancements a supersonic sea skimming cruise missile allows virtually no response time to intercept the missile due to its ability to travel a few meters above the water line Iran also claims to have enhanced the Noorrsquos guidance system in cooperation with North Korea and the tests conducted this year showed the missile to hit all designated targets As conflict throughout the Middle East spreads allied states to Iran such as Syria and Lebanon are reportedly using variants of the Noor missile system From its inception the C-802 has been deemed a powerful weapon in the arsenal of those who possess the system Over the years the missile has been proliferated enhanced and modified proving to be a valid threat to US and allied naval forces operating throughout the Persian Gulf Thus further developments of the system should be closely monitored

Figure 1 Noor Anti-ship Cruise Missile and Naval Launch Platform

HYBRID THREATS AND THE ART OF RECONSTITUTION OF THE FORCE

Threat in Complex Operational Environments

by Walter L Williams Training Education and Leader Development Team Leader (DAC)

A unit may be considered combat ineffective because of number of equipment losses casualties morale unit cohesion leadership and training One could easily make the case that the culture or sub-culture of a force could be a factor in the combat effectiveness of a force Discussing strength percentages to estimate if a Hybrid Threat remains combat effective is fundamental to applying methods in the art of unit reconstitution Consideration of strength percentages also serves as a ldquobeginning point in discussions that try to answer the elusive question of quantifying acceptable attrition rates necessary for commanders and staffs to use in modeling training and actual combat situations and still accomplish their missionrdquo 1

In his article ldquoAttrition and Combat Breakpoint Decisionsrdquo Gerald Halbert defines a breakpoint as ldquoany action that causes a commander to change his combat posture due to enemy activity It is important that commanders and their staffs understand how a simple maneuver or attrition can cause a breakpointrdquo For example an 80 strength attacking force may encounter a 50 to 40 strength defending force reinforced or supported by indirect and aerial fires (as well as effective use of the terrain) that causes the attacking force to transition from an offensive posture and to a defensive posture due to attrition of a force However throughout the course of history ldquothere [have been] indications that it is not the absolute number of casualties that causes a force to break off an attack or give up the defense but rather the number of casualties inflicted during a given period The great range of casualty rates possible before reaching a

Red Diamond Page 18

breakpoint indicates that there may be no magic or single number of casualties that a military force can take and remain combat effectiverdquo2

Attrition of a force can occur either by attacking a force or defending against a force In some cases the skillful art of maneuver can make it obvious to an enemy force that it cannot execute its assigned mission as planned Thus the issue for a commander becomes do we really have to attrite the force or execute a maneuver in such a way the enemy either retreats or surrenders

Such was the case of the large British-led coalition surrendering to a numerically smaller Japanese assault force in Singapore during the World War II Malayan campaign The British Imperial garrison on Singapore consisted of 146000 troops who were well trained equipped and had sufficient ammunition and supplies They were facing a Japanese assault force of 35000 troops who were exhausted and severely depleted of key logistical supplies such as ammunition and food It seemed that the Japanese assault force was on its last leg or gasping for breath but 130000 British Australian and Indian officers and soldiers surrendered to the Japanese on 15 February 1942 During the entire Malayan campaign the Japanese suffered 9000 casualties out of 60000 troops On the other hand the British-led coalition force suffered 16000 casualties out of a force of 146000 This translated to the Japanese loss of 15 to a British coalition loss of 11 The surrender of the British-led coalition could be attributed to a combination of equipment losses casualties morale unit cohesion leadership training and water

It is important to recognize that during the design of an exercise a trainer or modeler may seek a specific strength percentage or number to use in describing the overall posture for an attacking or defending force The desired strength percentage becomes even more difficult as a trainer employs a force that is not only representative of a composite of tactics techniques and procedures (TTP) found worldwide but is hybrid in nature as well Table 2 Hybrid Threats Unit Combat Effectiveness presents a series of strength percentages (developed by TRISA-Threats) to use during the design of an exercise employing a Hybrid Threats force Table 1 also provides a summary of actions that may be employed by a Hybrid Threat commander as the strength percentage decreases A discussion of the tactics that a Hybrid Threats force may employ can be found in the TC 7-100 series of publications Table 1 ndash Hybrid Threats Unit Combat Effectiveness

STRENGTH LEVEL STATUS REMARKS

80 or greater Combat Capable

70 - 80 Combat Capable with minor deficiencies or losses

Unit uses adaptive tactics to compensate for losses or deficiencies

30 - 69 Combat Capable with significant deficiencies or losses

Unit is assigned a special mission or role combined with adaptive tactics to compensate for losses or deficiencies

Less than 30 Unit requires reconstitution Generally the unit is withdrawn from the battle for reconstitution

Hybrid Threat Force Reconstitution

Reconstitution is performed in support of all combat operations Although it is mainly a command and operations function the actual refitting supply personnel fill and medical actions are conducted by logistics units There are two methods for conducting reconstitution reorganization and regeneration

Reorganization is action taken to shift resources internally within a degraded unit to increase its level of combat effectiveness Reorganization is normally done at unit level and requires only limited external support such as supply replenishment maintenance assistance and limited personnel replacement When continuity of the mission is of paramount importance composite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat operations

Red Diamond Page 19

Regeneration is an action taken to rebuild a unit through large-scale replacement of personnel equipment and supplies Additionally it is action taken to restore command and control (C2) and conduct mission-essential training Overall the effort is directed at restoring the unitrsquos cohesion discipline and fighting effectiveness

The Hybrid Threat personnel and equipment replacement operations are based on unit strength reports and include the coordinated support and delivery of soldiers or warriors returning from medical facilities The unit strength report is used to assess a unitrsquos combat power plan for future operations and assign replacements on the battlefield The unit strength report includes both personnel and equipment readiness status The following are methods employed by the Hybrid Threat to reconstitute personnel losses

Individual Replacements The Hybrid Threat can use the system of individual replacements in both peacetime and wartime The sources of the replacement personnel are school graduates reserve assignments medical returnees and normal assignments

Incremental Replacements The Hybrid Threat can incrementally replace entire small units such as weapons crews squads and platoons The replacements may be obtained from training units or reserve forces They may be also composed of medical returnees and individual replacements during wartime

Composite Unit Formations Composite units may be formed from other units reduced by combat operations Composite units may be constituted up to operational strategic command (OSC) level

Whole-Unit Replacement The Hybrid Threat uses whole-unit replacement when massive losses occur as a result of combat operations Company-level and above units are brought forward from reserve forces to replace combat forces rendered ineffective

Weapon systems replacement is simply a procedure for providing a weapon system to a combat unit It involves processing the vehicle or equipment from a storage or transportation configuration to a ready-to-fight condition It also involves the integration of a completely trained crew with the weapon system For example a battle damaged or maintenance incapable weapon system such as an APC or SP howitzer may be replaced and delivered to the unit by a maintenance crew The maintenance crew returns to the maintenance or supply area once via an accompanying vehicle Or the weapon system may be delivered by a crew composed of incremental replacements Equipment replacement such as trucks radios and individual and crew-served weapons may be either by individual systems or components

It is important to note that this article is the tip of the iceberg in a discussion of attrition rates for combat effectiveness and methods of reconstitution of a Hybrid Threats force The issue of quantifying an attrition rate or strength percentage to determine a unitsrsquo combat effectiveness will continue to be elusive for years to come What is required is a general consensus on a start point to determine combat effectiveness

Endnotes 1 Gerald A Halbert ldquoAttrition and Combat Breakpoint Decisionsrdquo How They Fight Armies of the World NGIC-1122-203-98 6 March 1998 p 1 2 Ibid p 1

TRADOC G2 ldquoINSIDER THREATrdquo VIDEO IN MCLL TOP TEN WEBSITE DOWNLOADS

The Marines Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) listed the ldquoInsider Threats in Afghanistanrdquo videotape as the ldquoNo 1rdquo download of the top ten downloads from the MCCLL website in January 2013 (MCCLL Newsletter February 2013)

The Simulations Directorate of the Army TRADOC G2 Training Brain Operations Center (TBOC) produced this unclassified training and situational awareness tool

Training BrainOperations Center

Red Diamond Page 20

Collaboration from several organizations included the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Army TRADOC Culture Center and the TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) and its Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID)

The data collection analysis and development of observations and lessons learned from several insider threat attacks indicate tasks conditions and standards for pre-deployment training and operational missions once deployed Situational awareness and protection of the force requires everyonersquos diligence in mission conduct

HOW TO UNDERSTAND AND USE A WEG SHEET

Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG) and Threats in Complex Operational Environments

by Jon Cantin Threat Integration Team (BMA CTR)

The World Wide Equipment Guide (WEG) is the Armyrsquos primary publication for Threat equipment and weapons The WEG is divided into three volumes ndash Ground Systems Airspace and Air Defense Systems and Naval Littoral Systems ndash each containing information on individual pieces of equipment platforms and weapons To fully utilize this product it is important to know how to read and understand the information on the WEG sheet WEG sheets are organized into the following sections

① A photo or graphic representation of the equipment (in this example the Russian 23-mm SP AA Gun System BTR-ZDBTR-ZD Improved) Note that the AA Gun and the BTR chassis are two separate entities that are combined to form the Gun System This section provides the latest image of equipment from different angles and profiles In many cases the system is highlighted ndash for example radar gun system or missile ndash to give the user an accurate picture to identify its different components and parts

② A graphic representation is provided to assist in identification and recognition of both the system and chassis The most commonly used tracked or wheeled platform is displayed and other variants are noted in the technical information portion of the WEG sheet In this example the BTR ndashZDBTR ZD Improved chassis is the primary mover for this system and is displayed with a photo and a graphic

③ The box next to the graphic provides information on the weapons and combat load for a typical system This is subject to change based on ammunition availability and supplyresupply system constraints

④ The technical information block provides technical information on the weapons ranges crew armament and ammunition It addresses

proliferation (how many countries use it) and the age of the system Aspects such as fire control reload time gun elevation speed mobility and traverse are noted Units can use the information in the technical section to determine rates of march emplacementdisplacement times and other variables to create a realistic Threat model for training Other variants and upgrades are explained in as much detail as possible Variants can be as simple as an upgrade to an existing system or a modified version of a particular system developed by a country or state that cannot afford the original

⑤ The Notes section provides additional information on employment and alternate variants of the system not covered in previous sections When reading a WEG sheet is important to remember that modifications and upgrades to equipment are becoming more prevalent as nations and paramilitaryterrorist groups face financial constraints The WEG sheet provides the most up to date information available on current and developing equipment that can be used for training and real world deployment preparation

Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM

Alternative Designation BTR-3D

incorrect name from translation error

Date of Introduction 1979-1980

Proliferation At least 1 country

Description

Crew 7 2 for vehicle and 5 for gun

Combat Weight (mt) 8 est

Chassis BTR-D APC chassis

Chassis Length Overall (m) 588

Height Overall (m) 63

Width Overall (m) 263

Automotive Performance See BTR-D

Vol 1 p 2-9 The BTR-ZD is one of only

a few SP air defense

systems which can swim

Radio R-123

Protection See BTR-D Vol 1 p 2-9

ARMAMENT

Gun

Caliber Type 23-mm gas-operated

Name ZU-23 (see p 7-5)

Number of Barrels 2

Breech Mechanism Vertical Sliding

Wedge

Rate of Fire (rdmin)

Cyclic 1600-2000

Practical 400 in 10-30 rd bursts

Feed 50-rd ammunition canisters fitted on

either side of the upper mount

assembly

Loader Type Magazine

Reload Time (sec) 15

Traverse (0) 360

Traverse Rate (0sec) INA

Elevation (0) -10to +90

Elevation Rate (0sec) 54

Reaction Time (min) 8 (est)

Fire on the Move No in 8 sec stop

Missile Launcher

Use SAM noted for each tier For Tier 2

use SA-18 For Tier 1 use SA-18S

FIRE CONTROL

Sights wmagnification

Optical mechanical sight for AA fire

Straight tube telescope for ground targets

Optional Sights See ZU-23MZU-23M1 below

Missile support equipment Gunlauncher has a

night sight (thermal Mowgli-2 2 gen II or II night

vision goggles) One man operates a 1L15-

1azimuth plotting board and Pelengator RF

direction-finder (see p 6-57)

Other Fire Control

Fire control radars can be used off-chassis A

simple optional addition is the FARA-1 or MT-

12R MMW BSR It can be attached and bore-lined

to the gun Guns use air watches and forward

observers and are linked to AD nets

VARIANTS

BTR-ZD can tow or portee-mount the system

Usually the vehicle and gun are landed apart The

gun is towed out of the landing zone then

mounted on the vehicle Vehicle holds 2 SAM

launchers In the earliest units the vehicle had no

AA gun rather had 6 MANPADS launchers

reload racks and launch crews (1-2)

Tier configurations include employing updated

versions of the gun system and SAMs In early

versions (Tiers 2 - 4) the SAM launchers are

shoulder-mounted In the latest version (Tier 1)

they are mounted on the gun The SAMs usually

launch first at approaching targets

ZU-23M Replaces optical sight with an EO fire

control system employing a ballistic computer with

day TV thermal night channel laser rangefinder

and auto-tracker Hit probability increases 10-fold

over the ZU-23

For OPFOR simulations this is the Tier 2 airborne

(abn) SPAAG capability

ZU-23M1 Upgrade mounts a Strelets SA-18

18S24 MANPADS launcher which can aim

track and launch with the ZU-23M FCS The FCS

adds a digital monitor A single operator can use

the missile at ranges out to 6000+ m then shift to

gun when the target is in range Chinese light

mech infantry use the Iron Eagle LSV with a rear-

mount ZU-23M1-type gun missile system

BTR-ZD Improved BTR-ZD with ZU-23M1

The system also uses a FARA-1 radar for fire

control SAM is SA-24 This system is the Tier 1

airborne SPAAG capability

MAIN ARMAMENT AMMUNITION

Can fire the same ammunition as ZSU-23-4 Best

mix for modern versions (ZU-23M and ZU-23M1)

is 1200 APDS-T and 1200 FAPDS

Rounds ballistically matched No HEI required

Type APDS-T and Oerlikon FAPDS-T

(Frangible APDS-T) NOTE FAPDS-T is

ballistically matched to the APDS-T round

Range (m) 0-2500+ Effective

Altitude (m) 0-1500+ Effective

Projectile Weight (kg) 0189 API-T

Muzzle Velocity (ms) 1180

Fuze Type API-T Base igniting

Self-Destruct (sec) 11

Penetration (mm) 19 1000 m API-T

16+ 1500m FAPDS-T

(helicopter simulant laminate array)

Type 23x152 HE-I HEI-T API-T TP

Range (m)

Max Effective 2500 2000 against light

armored ground targets such as LAVs

Altitude (m) 0-1500

Projectile Weight (kg)

HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type

HE-I Point detonating

HEI-T Point detonating


Missiles

Name SA-18 Tier 2 SA-18S Tier 1

Range (m) 500-6000+

Altitude (m) 10 (0 degraded Ph) - 3500

Other Missiles Tier 3 is SA-16 4 is SA-14

NOTES

Vehicle mount arrangements can be executed in the field Similar ad hoc mounting of AD gun machinegun rocket or grenade launchers is used by paramilitary

forces with commercial or military trucks pick-up trucks cars or utility vehicles to create technicals When the gun is mounted on the vehicle it can tow a trailer

with additional ammo and supplies The gun can also be used in a ground support role including use for high-angle fire in urban and defilade environments

Russian 23-mm SP AA Gun System BTR-ZDBTR-ZD Improved

Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun

BTR-ZDBTR ZD Improved

Technical Information

Weapons and Combat Load

Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22

ARMY ANTITERRORISM THEME 2QFY13 ldquoARMY CYBER THREATrdquoT3 REVIEW

by CTID Operations

The TRISA Threat Terrorism (T3) Advisory actively promotes the Armyrsquos antiterrorism quarterly themes as part of the Army Strategic Antiterrorism Plan Phase III (2013) The 3QFY13 T3 Advisory series will emphasize initiatives of TRISArsquos Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) in support of the Army Strategic Antiterrorism Plan goals

HQDA Antiterrorism Themes

FY 20132d Quarter theme was

Army Cyber Threat

Report Suspicious Activity

Everyone has a role

Create Situational Awareness

Red Diamond Page 23

IRREGULAR FORCE SYMBOLS HOW TO PORTRAY THE IRREGULAR THREAT

by Jon H Moilanen CTID Operations and Threats Terrorism Team

Threat Irregular Forces in Complex Operational Environments

How does the US Army portray Threat irregular forces in its training professional education and leader development How do Army leaders ensure an effective appreciation of Threat capabilities and limitations that can affect mission success in a particular operational environment (OE)

A standardized manner of describing and illustrating these Threats is a critical enabler to effectively communicate common understanding among US forces allies and partners of Threat irregular forces Creating a clear situational awareness of Threat irregular forces is an essential requirement of any mission analysis in a complex OE

Todayrsquos operational environments include a complex array of actors entities or forces that are or can be suspected to be part of a hybrid threat Hybrid threat as defined in the Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 Unified Land Operations is ldquothe diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces irregular forces terrorist forces andor criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effectsrdquo Irregular forces are ldquoarmed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces police or other internal security forces (JP 1-02 and JP 3-24)

Irregular Forces

Symbols for Irregular Forces

Military Symbols in Complex Environments

Insurgents-Guerrillas-Criminals-Terrorists

To provide a robust adaptive and opportunities-based Threat inclusive of irregular forces for Army and joint training Army Regulation 350-2 Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program designates the TRADOC G2 as the responsible official to lead and manage the OPFOR program across the Army This Threat portrayal is dynamic in a recurring application use of lessons learned and insights from contemporary operational missions and Threats training exercises and Army experiments and tests on Army capabilities tactics and operations

An OPFOR is ldquoa plausible flexible military andor paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces (doctrine tactics organization and equipment) used in lieu of a specific threat force for training and developing US forcesrdquo (AR 350-2) Although OPFOR Threat regular forces or special purpose forces (SPF) can advise and liaison with irregular forces neither regular forces nor SPF are a focus in this article about irregular opposing forces

Irregular opposing forces as part of the Threat in Army training are typically categorized as insurgent organizations guerrilla units criminal organizations or terrorists Terrorists can usually be considered within one or more of these previous groupings or actors when by US Joint definition terrorism is ldquothe unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies Terrorism is often motivated by religious political or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually politicalrdquo (JP 1-02 and JP 3-072) However terrorists can also exist as an adherent to the agenda of another group special issue or ideology or be a truly independent actor

Red Diamond Page 24

The Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) of the US Army TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) uses a common symbology framework for insurgents guerrillas and criminal organizations Irregular opposing forces operate often among a civilian population Given the many noncombatants in almost any OE one of the dynamic aspects of portraying an irregular force is the active and passive supporter of an irregular force that lives and operates within a relevant population The following sections address insurgents guerrillas and criminals of a Threat irregular force

Common Symbology for Irregular Forces

Using a common symbology to portray irregular forces in complex operational environments is based on Department of Defense (DOD) and Army standards and norms that prescribe or guide how to effectively represent these types of threat The primary source for symbology is US Department of Defense (DOD) Military Standard-2525C Common Warfighting Symbology (November 2008) Another prime doctrinal reference for the US Army is Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02 Operational Terms and Military Symbols with Change 2 published in November 2012 This ADRP 1-02 has updates in progress but is yet to be published as an additional change document

Representing Threat irregular forces with standardized symbols promotes a common understanding of what actors are operating or influencing a particular operational environment (OE) Symbology for regular military forces is well established However representing Threat irregular forces such as insurgents guerrillas criminal organizations or terrorists requires a standard but must also be flexible to portray these diverse and often adaptive organizations units groups and associated affiliated or independent actors

Knowing the Threat

Currently the Armyrsquos has a series of training circulars (TC) that address Threat OPFOR for training This TC 7-100 series provides a composite Threat based on real-world threats and adversaries with topics ranging tactics exercise design and a Hybrid Threat (HT) for training Force structure and unclassified equipment data bases in documents such as the TRADOC G2 Worldwide Equipment Guide provide detailed information with which to tailor a Threat to a commanderrsquos training and mission requirements As a series of OPFOR field manuals transitions to training circulars these documents include contemporary tactics techniques and procedures (TTP) on Threat plans and actions (see figure 1 on Army TC 7-100 series and related TRADOC G2 literature)

The Rationale of Opposing Force Training Literature

To design a US Army training

and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment

To know the Opposing Force

WHO -- ORGANIZATION --

WEAPONS amp EQUIPMENT

2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002

To apply the WHAT and HOW

hellipArt amp Science of TACTICS

4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004

Figure 1 TC 7-100 series of Threat Opposing Force (OPFOR) training literature

Red Diamond Page 25

In mid-2013 the Army will publish Training Circular 7-1003 Irregular Opposing Forces on the Threat of insurgents guerrillas criminals other adversaries or enemies and noncombatants in an OE Actors such as noncombatants and active or passive supporters of Threat irregular forces are addressed in the context of an OE Tactical examples primarily at brigade and below level of offensive defensive and stability operations describe and illustrate types of irregular forces in a common manner of symbols and graphics The TRISA Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) is the author of TC 7-1003 (TBP 2013)

Composition of Threat Irregular Opposing Force Symbols

Threat irregular forces and its tactical symbols can be portrayed by color of the frame border and frame fill shape of the symbol frame icons within the frame and modifiers inside or amplifier text outside but adjacent to the symbol frame The following descriptions and illustrations focus on examples of guerrilla unit insurgent cell organization and criminal organization symbols

The Military Standard-2525C Common Warfighting Symbology states five basic colors for symbols and graphics The CTID presents training information from a ldquoThreatrdquo perspective Therefore the ldquoredrdquo color is considered a ldquoThreatrdquo forces color whereas a ldquobluerdquo color denotes an ldquoenemyrdquo of the Threat

The ldquogreenrdquo for neutral ldquoyellowrdquo for unknown and ldquopurplerdquo for civilian are explained within a tactical vignette or example narrative or illustration to ensure clear common understanding of a vignette or example (See figure 2 on color use for symbols and graphics in a particular action graphic vignette andor diagram)

Red Blue Green Yellow Purple [Threat] Enemy Neutral Unknown Civilian

Figure 2 Five basic colors for symbols

Purple Color for Civilian Symbols

DOD Military Standard 2525-C (2008) allows use of the color ldquopurplerdquo to designate

civilians and civilian units groups equipment and installations in order to be

distinct from the many other types of forces and activities CTID uses ldquopurplerdquo to

identify civilian entities operating within an area of responsibility Civilian symbols

suspected of being hostile to the Threat are tagged with a ldquoquestion markrdquo modifier

to the symbol

Composition of Tactical Symbols

A fully displayed tactical symbol is composed of a frame fill and icon The symbol may include text andor graphic modifiers and amplifiers that provide additional information (see figure 3 for composition elements with an example of a guerrilla squad)

The Threat frame is the diamond-shape geometric border of the symbol The frame symbology can indicate an entity as present planned or unknown entity The fill is the interior area within a Threat frame The frame color is used in a consistent manner in a diagram Color-scheme presentations can includemdash

Red outline with a white-fill interior space

Red Diamond Page 26

Black outline with a red interior space

Black outline with a white-fill interior space

G

Main

Defense

Element

Legend Frame Fill Icon amp Amplifiers Symbol Modifier

G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element

Figure 3 Tactical symbol frame fill icon modifier and symbol (examples)

If a color fill is not used in a diagram the interior of the frame is a fill of opaque white to distinguish the symbol from the hue or shading of a map or diagram background The icon provides a specific symbol inside the frame to portray the functional role or mission task performed by the cell unit group organization or individual that the frame represents One or more icons and modifiers can be within a frame (see figure 3 for icon example)

A modifier provides additional information about the icon within the frame to more effectively communicate symbol capability An amplifier also presents additional information with placement outside of the frame Information can be repositioned around the Threat symbol when such a change improves the clarity of the symbol related to a map or diagram background or other tactical symbols in its immediate vicinity (see figure 3 for modifier and amplifier examples) For example the purpose of the guerrilla squad amplifier of ldquomain defense element ldquoat figure 3 is described in more detail in chapter 3 of TC 7-1002 on opposing forces defensive operations

When a Threat regular force and irregular guerrilla unit task organizes it uses a--ldquotask force-likerdquo amplifier--placed over the unit echelon [size] modifier Neither the unit echelon nor the ldquotask force-likerdquo amplifier touches the Threat frame Free text fields outside of a Threat frame can be used to identify unit functions and capabilities (see figures 3 and 4) The OPFOR uses neither the reinforced (+) amplifier nor the detached-reduced (-) amplifier in its symbology

I I

OR

X X

OR T-72 M12 BMP-2Mw AT-5

Figure 4 Task organized BTG and CDET OPFOR symbols

Guerrillas Insurgents and Criminals

Irregular forces can include individual forces or combinations of forces such as insurgents guerrillas and criminals Organizational structure may be temporary exist for extended periods of time or remain intact as long as there is mutual benefit among organizations A fixed organizational structure is not a norm of irregular forces Guerrilla Unit Symbols The Threat guerrilla symbol frame is a red diamond-shape The crossed ldquoshoulder strapsrdquo icon that signifies ldquoinfantryrdquo is placed within the frame A capital letter ldquoGrdquo [theme font ldquoArialrdquo when produced with computer font] is inside the lower-center of frame and identifies the symbol frame as ldquoguerrillardquoA weapons or equipment icon [eg antitank] can also be

Red Diamond Page 27

inserted inside the frame when necessary to add functional clarity Guerrilla units use size-echelon amplifiers [eg team squad section platoon company battalion brigade] are placed centered outside and immediately above the frame apex (see figure 5) The echelon amplifier does not touch the Threat frame

G G G G

Brigade Battalion Company Platoon Section Squad Team

G

X

G G

Figure 5 Guerrilla tactical echelon symbols (examples)

Insurgents are not necessarily guerrillas and guerrillas are not necessarily insurgents Guerrilla forces can be an independent unit an affiliate to an insurgency or an adherent to aspects of an insurgency The CTID uses basic guidance from Military Standard-2525C to create a Threat insurgent symbol that is distinctly different from a guerrilla unit symbol Insurgent Organization or Cell Symbol The insurgent symbol frame is a red diamond-shape The insurgent symbol does NOT typically have a functional icon inside the ldquodiamondrdquo frame However a weapons or equipment icon [eg mortar icon] can be inserted inside the frame when necessary to add clarity A capital letter ldquoIrdquo [theme font ldquoEngravers MTrdquo when produced with computer font] inside the lower-center of frame identifies the symbol frame as ldquoinsurgentrdquo cell or organization The insurgent organization is composed of cells it is NOT called a ldquounitrdquo In special cases explained and illustrated in TC 7-1004 Opposing Force Organization (May 2007) some cells may have subordinate team structure The insurgent symbol does NOT use an echelon modifier [eg team squad platoon] above the frame An infantry icon is NOT used inside an insurgent frame (see figure 6)

INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell

(Information Warfare)

KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I

Figure 6 Insurgent tactical symbols (examples)

When appropriate amplifier text can be used to identify the relative known or suspected number of insurgents of an insurgent cell or other practical information This is particularly useful when an insurgent cell uses a military-like echelon title that can be misleading in size and capability (see figure 7)

I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group

250-300 ea Insurgents

Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents

Figure 7 Insurgent tactical symbol amplifiers (examples)

Red Diamond Page 28

The OPFOR has two categories of insurgent organization higher insurgent organization and local insurgent organization Both organizations have a similar cellular network structure with some additional capabilities and variations in the higher insurgent organization Detailed presentations of each cell are in FM 7-1004

Criminal Organizations

Criminal symbols apply a baseline graphic in Military Standard-2525C and adapt the icon modifiers and amplifiers to present the type of criminal organization threat A criminal organization affiliated with an insurgent organization or guerrilla unit uses a red diamond-shape frame The example (see figure 8) presents criminal symbols using a red frame border with white fill The basic modifier text is ldquoGANGrdquo Icons and modifiers include assassination murder extortion elements that can be as small as one to eight criminals or as large as a well-organized gang operation or cartel In some cases ldquoGANGrdquo may be used as a type of amplifier A large criminal organization with the network to grow or manufacture a base product transport and sell illicit drugs for profit and influence could be identified with a gang-cartel title

Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)

Figure 8 Criminal Symbols and Icons (examples)

Recognize Threat Irregular Forces

The US Army portrays Threat irregular forces with a standard symbology for its training professional education and leader development Appreciating Threat capabilities and limitations in clear and commonly understood symbols is essential to understanding a particular operational environment (OE)

Todayrsquos complex array of actors in an OE is often armed and confronts friendly forces operating in a relevant population with crucial decisions Who is or may be a noncombatant a potential Threat or an enemy What are the friendly forces rules of engagement (ROE) How do Threat irregular forces use these complex issues to their own advantage The diverse and dynamic combinations of irregular forces and their active and passive supporters in a relevant population are a norm of contemporary complex operations Whether symbols are hand-drawn or computer-generated using a common symbology for Threat irregular opposing forces is a way to enhance a precise visual and narrative ldquolanguagerdquo in land operations during training and operational missions of US Armed Forces

Note Future articles in the Red Diamond will present topics on the Threat irregular opposing forces to includemdash(1) structure and capabilities of the higher insurgent organization and local insurgent organization (2) the task-organized structure of a guerrilla company (HunterKiller) (3) the flexible capabilities of an insurgent cell (Multifunction) and (4) the adaptive nature of a Hybrid Threat (HT) and its use of irregular forces

THREAT TTP OBSERVATIONS IN TRAININGmdashHYBRID THREAT VS COMPLEX CONFLICT

by TRISAWargaming Experimentation Testing and Evaluation Directorate and CTID Operations

TRISArsquos Wargaming Experimentation Testing and Evaluation Directorate (WETED) is engaged in numerous activities in Army and Joint labs field sites classrooms and other venues One example is the Network Integrated Evaluation (NIE) in the BlissWSMR range area This training support effort is a cooperative enterprise between TRISA WETED and those responsible for building the Army combat brigade of the future

Red Diamond Page 29

Future Red Diamond issues will feature insights from TRISA WETED experiences of Threat opposing force (OPFOR) tactics and techniques that stress BLUFOR operations and mission command

THREAT PRODUCTS FOR COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS

by CTID Operations

For documents produced by TRISArsquos Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) of US Army TRADOC G2 with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access see httpswwwusarmymilsuitefiles11318389

Q Where do I go to e-retrieve TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat

A With AKO access see httpswwwusarmymilsuitedoc25952049 Q Do you have a question on a Threat or Opposing Force (OPFOR) issue that CTID can assist you with in identifying a solution A Send us a request for information (RFI) Q Do you have a question on using the Decisive Action Training Environment (v 20) in your training professional education or leader development venues A Send us an email with your issue

Sampler of Products TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat TC 7-101 Exercise Design TC 7-1002 Opposing Force Tactics DATE v 20 Decisive Action Training Environment Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)

CCOOMMIINNGG iinn 22001133 RAFTE-Africa Regionally Aligned Forces Training Environment TC 7-1003 Irregular Opposing Forces

Red Diamond Page 30

THREATS TO KNOWmdashCTID DAILY UPDATE REVIEW

by Marc Williams Training and Leader Development TeamJRTC LNO (ISC-CG CTR)

CTID analysts produce a daily CTID Daily Update to help our readers focus on key current events and developments across the Army training community Available on AKO each Daily Update is organized across the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) This list highlights key updates during the month

CTID Daily Update

US Army TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity

Fort Leavenworth Kansas

TRISA

Selected Topics for MARCH 2013

01 March India India hikes defense spending by 21

Al Qaeda AQAP releases 10th copy of Inspire features Adam Gadahn

04 March Brazil Brazil to get its first nuclear submarines

Afghanistan Drone strike kills Sheikh Dost Mohammed three others

06 March DPRK North Korea imposes ldquono fly no sailrdquo zones off both coasts

DR Congo 70 dead thousands flee DRC fighting

08 March Cyber warfare US engaged in lsquocyber cold warrsquo with China Iran

El Salvador MS-13 smuggles missile launchers teaming with Los Zetas

11 March DPRK North Korea voids 1953 armistice

Nigeria Ansaru terrorist group kills seven foreign hostages

13 March Canada Land mines grenades machine guns seized as Ontario police find huge weapons cache hidden homersquos walls

Syria Al Nusrah Front poised to take over last major city on Euphrates River

26 March Al Qaeda Al Qaeda brigade captures Syrian-Israeli-Jordanian border junction

Central African Republic Leader of CAR flees to Cameroon

27 March Mexico Bloody Zacatecas Fighting continues between Los Zetas and Gulf Cartel

Afghanistan 52 Taliban members killed in one day

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31

CTID Points of Contact

Deputy Director CTID

Ms Penny Mellies DAC

pennylmelliescivmailmil 6847920

Training amp Leader Development TeamRAF LNO

LTC Tom Georges USAR

thomascgeorgesmilmailmil 6847939

Training amp Leader Development Team Leader

Mr Walt Williams DAC

walterlwilliams112civmailmil 6847923

Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG)

Mr John Cantin BMA

johnmcantinctrmailmil 6847952

Operations Officer CTID

Dr Jon Moilanen BMA

jonhmoilanenctrmailmil 6847928

Director CTID DSN 552

Mr Jon Cleaves FAX 2397

jonscleavescivmailmil 9136847975

Training amp Leader Development TeamJRTC LNO

Mr Marc Williams ISC-CG

jamesmwilliams257ctrmailmil 6847943

Training amp Leader Dev TeamNTC amp JMRC LNO

Mr Mike Spight ISC-CG

michaelgspightctrmailmil 6847974

Threat Integration Team Leader

Mr Jerry England DAC

jerryjenglandcivmailmil 6847960

Threat Integration Team

Mr Kris Lechowicz DAC

kristindlechowiczcivmailmil 6847922

Training amp Leader Development TeamMCTP LNO

Mr Pat Madden BMA

patrickmmadden16ctrmailmil 6847997

OE Assessment Team Leader

Mrs Angela Wilkins BMA

angelamwilkins7ctrmailmil 6847929

OE Assessment Team

Mrs Laura Deatrick ISC-CG

lauramdeatrickctrmailmil 6847925

OE Assessment Team

Mr H David Pendleton ISC-CG

henrydpendletonctrmailmil 6847946

OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA

richardbburns4ctrmailmil 6847897

OE Assessment Team

Mr Jim Bird Overwatch

jamesrbirdctrmailmil 6847919


Ms Steffany Trofino DAC

steffanyatrofinocivmailmil 6847960


Mrs Jennifer Dunn DAC

jennifervdunncivmailmil 6847962

Training amp Leader Development Team

LTC Terry Howard USAR

terrydhowardmilmailmil 6847939

Determine tthhrreeaatt aanndd OOEE ccoonnddiittiioonnss

Develop and publish TThhrreeaatt mmeetthhooddss

Develop and maintain TThhrreeaatt ddooccttrriinnee

Assess Hybrid Threat tactics techniques and

procedures (TTTTPP)

Develop and maintain the DDeecciissiivvee AAccttiioonn

TTrraaiinniinngg EEnnvviirroonnmmeenntt ((DDAATTEE))

Develop and maintain the RReeggiioonnaallllyy AAlliiggnneedd

FFoorrcceess TTrraaiinniinngg EEnnvviirroonnmmeenntt ((RRAAFFTTEE))

Support tteerrrroorriissmm--aannttiitteerrrroorriissmm awareness

Publish OOEE AAsssseessssmmeennttss ((OOEEAA))

Support TThhrreeaatt eexxeerrcciissee ddeessiiggnn

Support Combat Training Center (CCTTCC) Threat

accreditation

Conduct ldquoAdvanced Hybrid Threat Tacticsrdquo

TTrraaiinn--tthhee--TTrraaiinneerr ccoouurrssee

Conduct ldquoHybrid Threatrdquo rreessiiddeenntt aanndd MMTTTT COE

Train-the-Trainer course

Provide ddiissttaannccee lleeaarrnniinngg (DL) COE Train-the-

Trainer course

Respond to rreeqquueessttss ffoorr iinnffoorrmmaattiioonn ((RRFFII)) on

threats and Threat issues

With AKO access--CTID products at wwwusarmymilsuitefiles11318389 Note Copy-paste CTID POC email address for one-on-one CTID contact and coordination

CTID Mission

CTID is the TRADOC G2 lead to study design document

validate and apply Hybrid Threat in complex operational

environment CONDITIONS that support all US Army and

joint training and leader development programs

YOUR Easy e-Access Resource

Red Diamond

Send Your RFI Do you have a ldquothreatsrdquo topic you would like discussed in the TRISA Red Diamond Submit your request for information and we may include a CTID response in a future

issue of the Red Diamond

RED DIAMOND TOPICS OF INTEREST

by Dr Jon H Moilanen CTID Operations and Chief Red Diamond Newsletter

This issue of the TRISA Red Diamond spotlights several aspects of Hybrid Threat (HT) and real-world vignettes of the many diverse threats that range from small criminal or insurgent organization actions such as an assault and kidnapping recent surface-to-surface (SS) anti-ship cruise missile developments and recurring guerrilla unit operations in an insurgency Other vignettes include a suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against a forward operating location in an insurgency Ongoing training and doctrine literature in progress at TRISA-CTID includes FM 5-02 Operational Environment This Army field manual to be published in 2013 willmdash

Explain the operational environment (OE) concept and provide guidance on the procedures for its application in military operations training doctrine and leader development

Present the procedures for OE analysis and its applications in exercise design and operations process

The TRADOC G2 Worldwide Equipment Guide is in the review process for an update by the end of 2013 Other Threat training and doctrine developments include Training Circular 7-1003 Irregular Opposing Forces to be published in 2013 An article on tactical symbols for

irregular forces indicates a continuation of Threat actions stated in Training Circular 7-100 Hybrid Threat TRISA and its Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) describe the varied current and future CONDITIONS that represent

challenges and opportunities for training readiness and adaptive Army leadership Email your topic recommendations to

Dr Jon H Moilanen CTID Operations BMA CTR jonhmoilanenctrmailmil and Mrs Angela M Wilkins Chief Editor BMA CTR angelamwilkins7ctrmailmil

Complex Operational Environmentand Threat Integration Directorate

TRISA

Complex OEmdashHybrid Threat

WE are at WAR on TERROR

Know the Threat ndash

Know the Enemy

(Photo US Army SSG Shane Hamann)

Trained

Ready

Adaptive

Decisive

Get Your Copy of ldquoDecisive Action Training EnvironmentrdquoAccess AKO with password

httpswwwusarmymilsuitedoc26833763

TRISA WOT Poster No 06-13US Army TRADOCG2 Intelligence Support Activity

Red Diamond Page 3







___________________________________________________________________________________________


Red Diamond Page 4










Red Diamond Page 5






Red Diamond Page 6



















Red Diamond Page 7



Recent Events









Red Diamond Page 8








Red Diamond Page 9











Red Diamond Page 10

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond







___________________________________________________________________________________________


Red Diamond Page 4










Red Diamond Page 5






Red Diamond Page 6



















Red Diamond Page 7



Recent Events









Red Diamond Page 8








Red Diamond Page 9











Red Diamond Page 10

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond










Red Diamond Page 5






Red Diamond Page 6



















Red Diamond Page 7



Recent Events









Red Diamond Page 8








Red Diamond Page 9











Red Diamond Page 10

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond






Red Diamond Page 6



















Red Diamond Page 7



Recent Events









Red Diamond Page 8








Red Diamond Page 9











Red Diamond Page 10

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond



















Red Diamond Page 7



Recent Events









Red Diamond Page 8








Red Diamond Page 9











Red Diamond Page 10

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond



Recent Events









Red Diamond Page 8








Red Diamond Page 9











Red Diamond Page 10

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond








Red Diamond Page 9











Red Diamond Page 10

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond











Red Diamond Page 10

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond

Equipment











Red Diamond Page 11










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond










Red Diamond Page 12


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond


















Red Diamond Page 13













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond













April 2009 13


















Red Diamond Page 14












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond












Red Diamond Page 15



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond



Perimeter Wall

Perimeter Wall

FOBInterior

FOBInterior

Legend

Insurgent

VBIED

Civilian

Vehicle

Civilian

Workers

Coalition

Soldier

Coalition

Security

Police

Fixed

Obstacle

Double-strand

Concertina

Triple-strand

Concertina

IEDI

Farmland

I

IED

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

FOBBuilding

I

IED



Red Diamond Page 16


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond


















Speed 09 Mach


Cruise-Phase (m) 20



Red Diamond Page 17

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond

Platforms










Red Diamond Page 18















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond















Red Diamond Page 19














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond














Red Diamond Page 20













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond













Red Diamond Page 21

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond

SYSTEM





Description











Radio R-123


ARMAMENT

Gun



Number of Barrels 2


Wedge


Cyclic 1600-2000




assembly



Traverse (0) 360






Missile Launcher



FIRE CONTROL










Other Fire Control






VARIANTS


















over the ZU-23






























16+ 1500m FAPDS-T



Range (m)



Altitude (m) 0-1500


HE-I 018

HEI-T 019


Fuze Type




Missiles


Range (m) 500-6000+



NOTES





Weapons amp

Ammunition Types

2 x 23-mm AA guns

HE-I or HEI-T

API-T or FAPDS

1 x SAM Launcher

SA-18

BTR-ZD Improved

2 x SAM Launcher

SA-18S

Typical

Combat Load

2400

Missiles 5

Missiles 10

23 mm SP AA Gun




Additional Notes

❶

❷

❸

❹

❺

Red Diamond Page 22


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond


by CTID Operations




Army Cyber Threat


Everyone has a role


Red Diamond Page 23







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond







Irregular Forces







Red Diamond Page 24





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond





Knowing the Threat




and education

1

To understand a

Decisive Action

training

environment




2

3

TC 7-100

WEG

Vol I

Vol II

Vol III

DATE

v 18mar13

TC 7-102

Operational

Environment

Considerations

for

Training

and

Education

Development

Final Draft

March 2013


HEADQUARTERS


TC 7-1003

TC 7-1002



4

TC 7-1001

TC 7-1004


Red Diamond Page 25














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond














to the symbol





Red Diamond Page 26



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond



G

Main

Defense

Element


G

Note White fill

Main

Defense

Element

Note Red fill

G

Main

Defense

Element

G

Main

Defense

Element





I I

OR

X X





Red Diamond Page 27


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond


G G G G


G

X

G G



INFO

WARI

I

Legend

Direct Action

Cell

(Multifunction)

Local

Insurgent

Organization

Direct Action

Cell


KI

Direct Action

Cell

(60-mm)

I

Direct Action

Cell

(Kidnapping)

I

Higher

Insurgent

Organization

I



I I I

Righteous Legion

Brigade

20-25 ea Insurgents

Rufflandia

Group


Free Will

Army

10-20 ea Insurgents


Red Diamond Page 28




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond




Kristino

CartelDRUGGANG GANG

A

GANG

M

GANG

S

Legend

Criminal Gang

(Generic)

Criminal Element

(Assassination)

Criminal Element

(Murder)

Criminal Element

(Extortion)Criminal

(Drug Cartel)









Red Diamond Page 29



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond



by CTID Operations






Red Diamond Page 30




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond




CTID Daily Update



TRISA


















_____________________________________________________________________________________________

Red Diamond Page 31












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






Red Diamond












Mr John Cantin BMA



Dr Jon Moilanen BMA


















Mr Pat Madden BMA





OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team



OE Assessment Team

Mr Rick Burns BMA


OE Assessment Team
















procedures (TTTTPP)









accreditation






Trainer course




CTID Mission






fm 5-02, operational environment coming in 2013

Documents