FMIFRP 12-110

Fighting on Guadalcanal

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 140 129921 00

FMIFRP 12-110

Fighting on Guadalcanal

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 140 129921 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-0001

26 September 1991

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-1 10, Fighting on Guadalcanal, is published to en-sure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine orto be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category of pub-lications: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication is essentially the after-action report of the Marines and soldiers who foughtand defeated the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Published initially in 1943, this publication was commissionedby General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Guadalcanal was the first offensiveground campaign conducted against the Japanese in World War II. Both Marines and soldiers were veryinexperienced, and Guadalcanal proved to be the critical learning experience on how to meet and defeata tenacious and proficient enemy in very difficult terrain under most adverse conditions. Viewpoints andsuggestions came from every level within the First Marine Division and the Army's America! Division.The focus, however, is at the small-unit level where the experiences of the combatants are very vivid andvery personal. Interesting and instructional, it is a book which every Marine should read and absorb themany experiences highlighted.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF TFLE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. AULILDMajor General, U.S. Marine Corps

Director, MAGTF Warfighting CenterMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 14012992100

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-0001

26 September 1991

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-110, Fighting on Guadalcanal, is published to en-sure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine orto be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 series are a special category of pub-lications: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere.

2. SCOPE

This reference publication is essentially the after-action report of the Marines and soldiers who foughtand defeated the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Published initially in 1943, this publication was commissionedby General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Guadalcanal was the first offensiveground campaign conducted against the Japanese in World War II. Both Marines and soldiers were veryinexperienced, and Guadalcanal proved to be the critical learning experience on how to meet and defeata tenacious and proficient enemy in very difficult terrain under most adverse conditions. Viewpoints andsuggestions came from every level within the First Marine Division and the Army's Americal Division.The focus, however, is at the small-unit level where the experiences of the combatants are very vivid andvery personal. Interesting and instructional, it is a book which every Marine should read and absorb themany experiences highlighted.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF TITLE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. AULILDMajor General, U.S. Marine Corps

Director, MAGTF Warfighting CenterMarine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION: 14012992100

FOREWORD

of viewmen in the Solomon Islands, Lt. Colonel

P. Reeder, Jr., of the Operations Di-vision of the War Department General Staff,was designated a my personal representative.He reported to Major General Vandegrift,

Maj or4..rmy, on Guadalcanal, and discussed withmany officers and soldiers thei.r experiences injungle fighting against the Japanese.

The stories of these men as told to ColonelReeder have been printed for your informa-tion. The American Marines and Dough-boys show us that the Jap is no superman.He is a. tricky, vicious, and fanatical fighter.But they are beating him clay after day.Their's is a priceless record of the gallantryand resourcefulness of the American fightingman at his best.

Soldiers and officers alike should read thesenote.s and seek t.o apply their lessons. Wemust cash in on the experience which theseand other brave men have paid for in blood.

To secure the point.

Rus se 1

of the fighting

TI. S. NI. C., and General Patch, U. S.

FOREWORD

To secure the point of view of the fightingmen iii the Solomon Islands, Lt. Colonel

P. Reecier, Jr., of the Operationsvision of the War Department General Staff,was designated as my personal representative.He reported to Major General Vandegrift,TI. S. M. C., and Major General Patch, U. S.4imy, on Guadalcanal, and discussed withmany officers and soldiers their experiences mjungle fighting against the Japanese.

The stories of these men as told to ColonelReecler have been printed for your informa-tion. The Americanboys show us that the Jap is no superman.

vc ious,But they are beating him clay after day.Their's is a priceless record of the gallantryand resourcefulness of the American fightingman at his best.

Soldiers and officers alike should read theseapply their lessons.

must cash in on the experience which theseand other brave men have paid for in blood.

Russel Di-

He is a tricky,

Marines and Dough-

and fanatical fighter.

notes and seek t.o We

MAJOR GENERAL 1/ANDEGRIFT, Com-manding General First Marines Division.

"I desire to thank General. Marshall forthe message which he has just sent me. Ipassed this message of congratulations on tomy men.

"My message to the troops of General Mar-shall's in training for this type of warfareis to go back to the tactics of the French andIndian days. This is not meant facetiously.Study their tactics and. fit in our modernwea.pons, and you have a solution. I referto the tactics and leadership of the days ofROGER'S RAINGERS)'

(V)

MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT, Com-manding General First Marines Division.

"I desire to thank General. Marshall forthe message which he has just sent me. Ipassed this message of congratulations on tomy men.

"My message t.o the troops of General Mar-shall's in training for this type of warfareis to go back to the tactics of the French andIndian days. This is not meant facetiously.Study their tactics and fit in our modernwea.pons, and you have a solution. I referto the tactics and leadership of the days ofIROUER'S RANGERS

(V)

1

GUNNERY SERGEANT H. L. BEARDS-LEY, Company G, Fifth Marines.

"I been in the Marines 16 yeaTs, and I beenin three expeditions to China and five engage-ments since I have been in the Solomons. Iwill say that this 1942 model recruit. we aregetting can drink more water than six oldtimers. We have to stress water disciplineall t.he time. They don't seem to realize whatreal water discipline is. We have too manyNCO's in the Marines who are 'namby-pam-by' and beat around the bush. Our NCO'sare gradually toughening up and are seeingreasons why they must meet their re.ponsi-bilities. Respectfully speaking, Sir, I thinkthat when officers make a NCO, they shouldgo over in their miids, 'what kind of NCOwill he make in the field.' "

SERGEANT MAJOR B. METZGER, FifthMarines.

"I have just been promoted from FirstSergeant. In the fire fighting the MarineFirst, Sergeant 1elps the Company Corn-nandei. He checks up on tiic Comnpam

1

GUNNERY SERGEANT H. L. BEARDS-LEY, Company G, Fifth Marines.

"I been in the Marines 16 yeaTs, and I beenin three expeditions to China and five engage-ments since I have been in the Solomons. Iwill say that this 1942 model recruit. we aregetting can drink more water than six oldtimers. We have to stress water disciplineall t.he time. They don't seem to realize whatreal water discipline is. We have too manyNCO's in the Marines who are 'namby-pam-by' and beat around the bush. Our NCO'sare gradually toughening up and are seeingreasons why they must meet their responsi-bilities. Respectfully speaking, Sir, I thinkthat when officers make a NCO, they shouldgo over in their minds, 'what kind of NCOwill he make in the field.' "

SERGEANT MAJOR B. METZGER , FifthMarines.

"I have just been promoted from FirstSergeant. In the fire fighting the MarineFirst, Sergeant helps the Company Corn-nander. He checks up on tiic Comnpam

2

•a whole, even down to checking on the evacu-ation of the wounded. I was available to theCompany Commander for any emergency or-ders during the fire fight. Teach your sol-diers., Sir, that when a man is hit in the as-sault to leave him there. Too many of ourmen suddenly became first-aid men.

"Your men have to be rugged and rough,and to win they must learn to disregardpoliteness and must kill."

PLATOON SERGEANT H. IR. STRONG,Company A, Fifth Marines.

"Some of my men thought their handgrenades, were too heavy. They tossed themaside when no one was looking. Later theywould have given six month's pay for onehand. grenade.

"I hear that in the new jungle kits the menwill get water sterilizing tablets. These willhelp as my men dip water out of streams."

PLATOON SERGEANT F. T. O'FARA,Company B, Fifth Marines.

"After the Japs had been located, my pta-toon has gained the element of surprise bymoving in fast. with b.ayonets and handgrenades.

2

•a whole, even down to checking on the evacu-ation of the wounded. I was available to theCompany Commander for any emergency or-ders during the fire fight. Teach your SQl-diers, Sir, that when a man is hit in the as-sault to leave him there. Too many of ourmen suddenly became first-aid men.

"Your men have to be rugged and rough,and to win they must learn to disregardpoliteness and must kill."

PLATOON SERGEANT H. IR. STRONG,Company A, Fifth Marines.

"Some of my men thought their bandgrenades were too heavy. They tossed themaside when no one was looking. Later theywould have given six month's pay for onehand. grenade.

"I hear that iii the new jungle kits the menwill get water sterilizing tablets. These willhelp as my men dip water out of streams."

PLATOON SERGEANT F. T. O'FARA,Company B, Fifth Marines.

"After the Japs had been located, my pla-toon has gained the element of surprise bymoving in fast. with bayonets and handgrenades.

3.

"In turn, they have surprised us by beingin a defensive position on the reverse slopeof a ridge. I think the snipers look for BARmen." (Note by Col. Ecison: "No doubtabout this. In one engagement, in one pla-toon, every BAR. man was hit.")

PLATOON SERGEANT IR. A. ZTJLLO,Company C, Fifth Marines.

"Sir, I would like to tell you that a man'skeenness or dullness of eye may determinewhether or not he will live. Ten men in myplatoon were killed because they walked upon a Jap 37mm gun. I went up later, afterthe girn had been put out by our mortars, tohelp briiag back the dead. The Japanese gunwas so well camouflaged that I got withinfour feet of the gun before I saw it."

CORPORAL W. A. McCLTJSKEY, Com-pany D, Fifth Marines.

"Sir, the other day on 'Bloody Ridge,'riflemen protecting our light machine gunspulled out and left us. We were doing okayat the time, but their pulling out caused ourwhole outfit to withdraw. I think men inthese rifle companies should receive trainingin the work and in the mission of the ma-

3.

"In turn, they have surprised us by beingin a defensive position on the reverse slopeof a ridge. I think the snipers look for BARmen." (Note by Col. Ecison: "No doubtabout this. In one engagement, in one pla-toon, every BAR. man was hit.")

PLATOON SERGEANT IR. A. ZTJLLO,Company C, Fifth Marines.

"Sir, I would like to tell you that a man 'skeenness or dullness of eye may determinewhether or not he will live. Ten men in myplatoon were killed because they walked upon a Jap 37mm gun. I went up later, afterthe gun had been put out by our mortars, tohelp bring back the dead. The Japanese gunwas so well camouflaged that I got withinfour feet of the gun before I saw it."

CORPORAL W. A. McCLTJSKEY, Com-pany D, Fifth Marines.

"Sir, the other day on 'Bloody Ridge,'riflemen protecting our light machine gunspulled out and left us. We were doing okayat the time, but their pulling out caused ourwhole outfit to withdraw. I think men inthese rifle companies should receive trainingin the work and in the mission of the ma-

4

chine gun company. They should be ableto act more intelligently."

SECOND LIEUTENANT ANDREW CIII-SICK, Fifth Marines.

"I think that in the regimental supplythere should be extra canteens so when anoutfit gets in a place like the 'table plateau'where there is no water, an extra canteen ofwater can be issued. Sir, this would reallyhelp our men stay in there. (Note by Col.Edson: 'This idea is being used on certainparts of the terrain here. The turn-over inthe canteens will be great if this is continued,but it is a big help at times. At one time wehad a battalion without water for 24 hoursand only two men were evacuated by heat èx-haustion—Major Lou Walt was the BattalionCommander.') My flank men in each squadin the advance are responsible to maintaincontact with the squad on the right or left.Of course, we have a base squad."

MARINE GUNNER E. S. RUST, FifthMarines.

"I hate to admit it, but it's the truth; whenwe got here, a lot of our young men wereconfused at night. They were not used tojungle at night. They could not use their

4

chine gun company. They should be ableto act more intelligently."

SECOND LIEUTENANT ANDREW CIII-SICK, Fifth Marines.

"I think that in the regimental supplythere should be extra canteens so when anoutfit gets in a place like the 'table plateau'where there is no water, an extra canteen of• water can be issued. Sir, this would reallyhelp our men stay iii there. (Note by Col.Edson: 'This idea is being used on certainparts of the terrain here. The turn-over inthe canteens will be great if this is continued,but it is a big help at times. At one time wehad a battalion without water for 24 hoursand only two men were evacuated by heat èx-haustion—Major Lou Walt was the BattalionCommander.') My flank men in each squadin the advance are responsible to maintaincont.act with the squad on the right or left.Of course, we have a base squad."

MARINE GUNNER E. S. RUST, FifthMarines.

"I hate to admit it, but it's the truth; whenwe got here, a lot of our young men wereconfused at night. They were not used tojung'e at night. They could not use their

5

compasses at night, and we did not haveenough compasses.

"We have 'earned that when we get off thebeaten trails, it seems to confuse the Japs,and we have better success."

PLATOON SERGEANT J. C. L. HOL-LINGS WORTH, Company H, FifthMarines.

"When we move around on these jungletrails, we have learned to have men at therear of each platoon who carry light loadsso they can get their weapons into actionquickly to help overcome ambush fire fromthe rear.

"Put the big rugged men into the heavyweapons company.

"Some of our new men were so scared ofour hand grenades when they were first is-sued, that they jammed down the cotter pin.Then, later in actor they could not pull thepin!

"I noticed, and I pointed this out to my pla-toon, that when men get hit, the men close byget to yellin', 'Corps man, Corps man, Corpsman,' and they get so excited sometimes thatthey actually forget. to use first-aid packets.

"In first-aid traimng', teaeli cmTeCt use of1 fl 1 ( F (V

5

compasses at night, and we did not haveenough compasses.

"We have learned that when we get off thebeaten trails, it seems to confuse the Japs,and we have better success."

PLATOON SERGEANT J. C. L. HOL-LINGS WORTH, Company H, FifthMarines.

"When we move around on these jungletrails, we have learned to have men at therear of each platoon who carry light loadsso they can get their weapons into actionquickly to help overcome ambush fire fromthe rear.

"Put the big rugged men into the heavyweapons company.

"Some of our new men were so scared ofour hand grenades when they were first is-sued, that they jammed down the cotter pin.Then, later in actjor they could not pull t.hepin!

"I noticed, and I pointed this out to my pla-toon, that when men get hit, the men close byget to yellin', 'Corps man, Corps man, Corpsman,' and they get so excited sometimes thatthey actually forget. to use first-aid packets.

"In first-aid training', teach correct use of1 1 fl i1)' ii 1 ( F (V

6

'cause what you gonna do when the Corps mangets hits

"I'd give $75.00 for a pair of tennis shoesto rest my feet and for use in night work. Ihave only been in the Marine Corps fouryears, but I have learned that you have gotto develop a sense of responsibility in themen wearing chevrons.

"In action we. have had unauthorized per-sons yelling, 'Cease firing,' or 'Commencefiring..' This caused confusion."

PLATOON SERGEANT GEORGE E. AHO,Company F, Fifth Marines.

"I put five years in the U. .S. Army beforejoining the Marine Corps. Sir, I like theMarines better than the Army because theaverage Marine officer is closer to his menthan the average Army officer whom I ob-served. We have comradeship in the MarineCorps. Also, the Marine enlisted men aremore Spartan-like. I believe, Sir, we babyour soldiers too much in peace-time. I hopewe are not doing this now. (I asked

.

Col..Edson. what kind of NOO Sergeant AhO was,and he told me he was one of the outstandingmen in his Regiment, and that he was a. veryrugged individual.)

6

'cause what you gonna do when the Corps mangets hits

"I'd give $75.00 for a pair of tennis shoesto rest my feet and for use in night work. Ihave only been in the Marine Corps fouryears, but I have learned that you have gotto develop a sense of responsibility in themen wearing chevrons.

"In action we. have had unauthorized per-Sons yelling, 'Cease firing,' or 'Commencefiring..' This caused confusion."

PLATOON SERGEANT GEORGE E. AHO,Company F, Fifth Marines.

"I put five years in the U. .S. Army beforejoining the Marine Corps. Sir, I like theMarines better than the Army because theaverage Marine officer is closer to his menthan the average Army officer whom I ob-served. We have comradeship in the MarineCorps. Also, the Marine enlisted men aremore Spartan-like. I believe, Sir, we babyour soldiers too much in peace-time. I hopewe are not doing this now. (I asked

.

Col..Edson what kind of NCO Sergeant AhO was,and he told me he was one of the outstandingmen in his Regiment, and that he was a. veryrugged individual.)

7

"In our training for this jungle warfarewe had a great deal of work in hand-to-handindividual combat, use of ife, jiujItsu, etc.With the exception of bayonet fighting wehave not used this work. I have been inmany battles since I hit this island and Ihave never seen anyone use it.

"Bring back the siga1 flags; needed badly."Sir, tell the Army to get the knee mor-

tar. It's hell."Sir, every man should have a watch."We could use pack artillery here."Our Battalion Commander, Major Walt,

wants every last man in our Battalion toknow as much as he does about the situation.It pays.

"Get rid of the gold-bricks. It's better tobe short-handed having good men around thanhaving a lot of undependables."

CORPORAL J. S. STANKUS, CompanyFifth Marines.

"Unnecessary firing gives your positionaway, and when you give your position awayhere, you pay for it.

"It's helpful in using the field g'ass iii thistropical sun to cup your hand over the frontend in order to keep out the glare.

7

"In our training for this jungle warfarewe had a great deal of work in hand-to-handindividual combat, use of knife, jiujitsu, etc.With the exception of bayonet fighting wehave not used this work. I have been inmany battles since I hit this island and Ihave never seen anyone use it.

"Bring back the signal flags; needed badly."Sir, tell the Army to get the knee mor-

tar. It's hell."Sir, every man should have a watch."We could use pack artillery here."Our Battalion Commander, Major Walt,

wants every last man in our Battalion toknow as much as he does about the situation.It pays.

"Get rid of the gold-bricks. It's better tobe short-handed having good men around thanhaving a lot of undepeiadables."

CORPORAL J. S. STANKUS, CompanyFifth Marines.

"Unnecessary firing gives your positionaway, and when you give your position awayhere, you pay for it.

"It's helpful in using the field glass iii thistropical sun to cup your hand over the frontend in order to keep out the glare.

8

"The men in my squad fire low at the baseof the trees. There is too •much high firinggoing on. I have observed the Japs often getshort of ammunition. They cut bamboo andcrack it together to simulate rifle fire to drawour fire. They ain't supermen; they're justtricky bastards.

"Put 'bug dope' in your jungle equipment."A palmetto log looks sturdy for use in

machine gun emplacements and dugouts, butit is spongy and rots. I have seen it collapseand pin the gun. It is better to use the hardwood."

SECOND LIEUTENANT H. M. DAVIS,Fifth Marines.

(Promoted on the field of battle)."Travel light. For example, to hell with

the mess equipment! We used our mess cupand spoon for the first 15 days here and en-joyed our chow. You don't have to live likea gentleman in jungle warfare. Our messequipment is too bulky for this type of war-fare and makes noise.

"Not every man can lead a battalion. Findout who can lead your battalions before yougo into the combat areas. (Remark by Col.Edson: 'I would like to concur in that state-ment.')

8

"The men in my squad fire low at the baseof the trees. There is too much high firinggoing on. I have observed the Japs often getshort of ammunition. They cut bamboo andcrack it together to simulate rifle fire to drawour fire. They ain't .supermen; they're justtricky bastards.

"Put 'bug dope' in your jungle equipment."A palmetto log lOoks sturdy for use in

machine gun emplacements and dugouts, butit is spongy and rots. I have seen it collapseand pin the gun. It is better to use the hardwood."

SECOND LIEUTENANT H. M. DAVIS,Fifth Marines.

(IPrômotecl on the field of battle)."Travel light. For example, to hell with

the mess equipment! We used our mess cupand spoon for the first 15 days here and en-joyed our chow. You don't have to live likea gentleman in jungle warfare. Our messequipment is too bulky for this type of war-fare and makes noise.

"Not every man can lead a battalion. Findout who can lead your battalions before yougo into the combat areas. (Remark by Col.Edson: 'I would like to concur in that state-merit.')

9

"We learned from the Nips to make the'stand-up covered Japanese spider hole..'(Camouflaged American fox-ho'e.)

"In de'fense in t.he dense jung'e sometimesyou make a line—then, on other types of ter-rain you make strong points.

"In an advance in a jungle it is hard for aplatoon leader to keep control of his men.Corporals and their men must be taught toact indliviclually.''

PLATOON SERGEANT C. M. FEAGIN,Company I, Fifth Marines.

"We are learning the hard way to movequietly in this jungle.

"I have been fired at many times by snipersand haven't seen one yet.

"The sabers which the Japanese officerscarry have proved to .be worthless. I killedtwo Japs who came at me with sabers ana Igot them first by shooting them. But, Iwished I bad 'in reserve' a good jungle knife.I don't meati a bob, which we should havefor cutting trails, but a knife with a 12-inchblade of good steel. We could use thisagamst these Japs as well as cutting vinesthat catch on us at night" (Note: Manymen expressed their wish for a jungle knifesuch as described here. This desire is being

9

"We learned from the Nips to make the'stand-up covered [apanese spicier hole..'(Camouflaged American fox-hole.)

"In de'fense in t.he dense jungle sometimesyou make a line—then, on other types of ter-rain you make strong points.

"In an advance in a jungle it is hard for aplatoon leader to keep control of his men.Corporals and their men must be taught toact individually.''

PLATOON SERGEANT C. M. FEAGIN,Company I, Fifth Marines.

"We are learning the hard way to movequietly in this jungle.

"I have been fired at many times by snipersand haven't seen one yet.

"The sabers which the Japanese officerscarry have proved to .be worthless. I killedtwo Japs who came at me with sabers ana Igot them first by shooting them. But, Iwished I bad 'in reserve' a good jungle knife.I don't meati a bob, which we should havefor cutting trails, but a knife with a 12-inchblade of good steel. We could use thisagamst these Japs as well as cuttmg vinesthat catch on us at night.!' (Note: Manymen expressed their wish for a jungle knifesuch as described here. This desire is being

10

omitted in further remarks to avoid repeti-tion.)

MOTOR SECTION SERGEANT T. E.RIJMBLEY, Company I, Fifth Marines.

"Our 60mm mortars are fine weapons ifyou have observers who know their stuff. Themortar was not stressed enough in our training. I love our mortar.

"If the numbers on the mortar sight wereluminous, with a luminous strip on the stick,we would not have to use the flashlight. Thisflashlight business is dangerous."

CORPORAL FRED CARTER, Company 1,Fifth Marines.

"On the Matanikau River we got to firingat each other because of careless leadershipby the junior le.aders. We are curing our-selves of promiscuous firing, but I shouldthink new units would get training to makethe men careful.

"We learned not to ftre unless we had some-thing to shoot at; Doing otherwise disclosesyour position and wastes ammunition.

"Sergeant Dietrich of Company I, of ourRegiment, recently used his head. One nightwhen the Japs advanced, a Jap jumped into

10

omitted in further remarks to avoid repeti-tion.)

MOTOR SECTION SERGEANT T. E.RIJMBLEY, Company I, Fifth Marines.

"Our 60mm mortars are fine weapons ifyou have observers who know their stuff. Themortar was not stressed enough in our training. I love our mortar.

"If the numbers on the mortar sight wereluminous, with a luminous strip on the stick,we would not have to use the flashlight. Thisflashlight business is dangerous."

CORPORAL FRED CARTER, Company 1,Fifth Marines.

"On the Matanikau River we got to firingat each other because of careless leadershipby the junior le.aders. We are curing our-selves of promiscuous firing, but I shouldthink new units would get training to makethe men careful.

"We learned not to ftre unless we had some-thing to shoot at. Doing otherwise disclosesyour position and wastes ammunition.

"Sergeant Dietricli of Company I, of ourRegiment, recently used his head. One nightwhen the Japs advanced, a Jap jumped into

11

Sergeant Dietrich's fox hole. Sergeant Diet-rich pulled the pin of a hand grenade and.jumped out. There was a hell of an explosionand one less Nip.

"I have been charged twice by the Japs. inbayonet charge. Oir Marines can out-bayo-net fight them and I know our Army men wiUdo the same. (Note by Cot. Edson: 'mci-dentally, in the last push we executed. 3 bayo-net charges.')

"A Japanese trick to draw our fire was forthe hidden Jap to work his bolt back andforth. Men who got sucked in on this andfired without seeing what they were firing at,generally drew automatic fire from anotherdirection.

"Every scout should be taught to look inthe trees. I was a scout and. got shot in theshoulder by a Jap ix a tree. I look m thetrees now.

"We take turns being scouts; so, all shou'dbe trained as scouts."

SERGEANT 0. J. MARION, CompanyFifth Marines. A Platoon Guide.

"You crawl in the advance—unless you areto ehaige. aicl make it. The reason for thisis that. all men lit, are hit from the kimes

5í)(; 4G—42---——-2

11

Sergeant Dietrich's fox hole. Sergeant Diet-rich pulled the pin of a hand grenade and.jumped out. There was a hell of an explosionand one less Nip.

"I have been charged twice by the Japs. inbayonet charge. Our Marines can out-bayo-net fight them and I know our Army men willdo the same. (Note by CoL Edson: 'mci-dentally, in the last push we executed. 3 bayo-net charges.')

"A Japanese trick to draw our fire was forthe hidden Jap to work his bolt back and.forth. Men who got sucked in on this andfired without seeing what they were firing at,generally drew automatic fire from anotherdirection.

"Every scout should be taught to look inthe trees. I was a scout and got shot in theshoulder by a Jap in a tree. I look in thetrees now.

"We take turns being scouts; so, all shouldbe trained as scouts."

SERGEANT 0. J. MARION, CompanyFifth Marines. A Platoon Guide.

"You crawl in the advance—unless you areto charge. and make it. The reason for thisis that all men hit. are hit from the knees

í)(; 4G—42---——-2

12

up, except for ricochets. We have craw'edup to within 25 yards of a machine gun fir-ing over our backs. The Japs don't depresstheir machiiie guns. (Note by Col., Ecison:'I saw men of Company L doing this.')

"Men get killed rushing to help a woundedman. If. the wounded man would crawlabout t.en yards to his flank, he can generallybe aided in safety, as the Japs seem to firedown lanes in the jungle. (Remark bj Col,Edson: 'We have taught our men that thebest way to aid a wounded man is to. pushahead so that the wounded man can be caredfor by the Corps Men.)

"The men have to be trained individually,for. when t.he fire fight starts, the Corporalcan't see all of his men and further, whenthe order for attack is given, any number ofmen are unable to see the man, on his rightor left. So you see, Sir, it takes guts formen to get up and move forward when thesignal is given. The men have to depend onone another and have confidence in .eachother.

"I was in one advance when the Japs letus come through and' then rose up out ofcovered fox holes and shot us in the back.The best cure for that is a rear guard look-ing towards the rear."

12

up, except for ricochets. We have crawkdup to within 25 yards of a machine gun fir-ing over our backs. The Japs don't cleprestheir machine guns. (Note by Col., Ecison:'I saw men of Company L doing this.')

"Men get killed rushing to help a woundedman. If. the wounded man would crawlabout ten yards to his flank, he can generallybe aided in safety, as the Japs seem to firedown lanes in the jungle. (Remark by Col,Edson: 'We have taught our men that thebest way to aid a wounded man is to. pushahead so that the wounded man can be caredfor by the Corps Men.)

"The men have to be trained individually,for. when the fire fight starts, the Corporalcan't see all of his men 'and further, whenthe order for attack is given, any number ofmen are unable to see •the man, on his rightor left. So you see, Sir, it takes guts formen to get up and move forward when thesignal is given. The men have tO depend onone another and have confidence in •eachother.

"I was in one advance when the Japs letus come through and then rose up out ofcovered fox boles and shot us in the back.The best cure for that is a rear guard look-ing towards the rear."

13

CORPORAL E. J. BYRNE, Company L,Fifth Marines.

"Get used to weird noises at night. Thisjungle is not still at night. The land crabsand lizzards make a hell of a noise rustlingon leaves. And there is a bird here thatsounds like a man banging two blocks ofwood together. There is another bird thatmakes a noise like a dog barking. Ithought, Sir, this might give you an idea foryour training."

CORPORAL F. R. McALLAN, CompanyL, Fifth Marines.

Sometimes the information doesn't getdown to us and then we are really in thedark. When we get the orders. and informa-t.ion we can get in there and pitch better.

"My platoon is the best one in the com-pany because we are like a baseball team.Our Lieutenant is like the Captain of theteam. lie is close to us and we like him andyet respect him. We have a wonderfulplatoon. I am not bragging. That's a fact!(Note: When I read this to Col. dson atthe end of the day, he was so delighted thathe sent a runner to find out who CorporalMcAllan's platoon leadei was.)

13

CORPORAL E. J. BYRNE, Company L,Fifth Marines.

"Get used to weird noises at night. Thisjungle is not still at night. The land. crabsand lizzards make a hell of a noise rustlingon leaves. And there is a bird. here thatsounds like a man banging two blocks ofwood together. There is another bird thatmakes a noise like a clog barking. Ithought, Sir, this might give you an idea foryour training."

CORPORAL F. R. McALLAN, CompanyL, Fifth Marines.

Sometimes the information doesn't getdown to us and. then we are really in thedark. When we get the orders. and. informa-tion we can get in there and pitch better.

"My platoon is the best one in the com-pany because we are like a baseball team.Our Lieutenant is like the Captain of theteam. lie is close to us and we like him andyet respect him. We have a wonderfulplatoon. I am not bragging. That's a. fact!(Note: When I read this to Col. clson atthe end of the day, he was so delighted thathe sent a runner to ftnd out who CorporalMcAllan's platoon leader was.)

14

"Some men used. to lag behind in the ad-vance. They have finally learned to rkeep upas lagging is unsafe for all.

"This BAR I have here is my bestfriend."

COLONEL MERRITT A. EDSON, COm-manding Officer, Fifth Marines. (Colo-nel Edson was a Battalion Commanderof the Raider Battalion. He was giventhe Fifth Marine Regiment and hasmade. it into one of General Vande-grift's best regiments. He is an out-standing leader and has been recommended by General Vanclegrift for theMedal of Honor).

"If I had to train my regiment over again,I would stress small group training and thetraining of the individual even more than wedid when we were in training.

"There must be training in difficult obser-vation, which is needed for the offense. it i.smy observation that only 5% of the men canreally see while observing.

"The offensive is the most difficult to sup-port, as you canot tell exactly where yourtroops are.

"Whether the Japs will continue to fight asthey do no'w, I don't know. They defend on

14

"Some men used. to lag behind in the ad-vance. They have finally learned to rkeep upas lagging is unsafe for all.

"This BAR I have here is my bestfriend."

COLONEL MERRITT A. EDSON, COm-manding Officer, Fifth Marines. (Colo-nel Edson was a Battalion Commanderof the Raider Battalion. He was giventhe Fifth Marine Regiment and hasmade. it into one of General Vande-grift's best regiments. He is an out-standing leader and has been recom-mended by General Vanclegrift for theMedal of Honor).

"If I had to train my regiment over again,I would stress small group training and thetraining of the individual even more than wedid when we were in training.

"There must be training in difficult obser-vation, which is needed for the offense. It S

my observation that only 5% of the men canreally see while observing.

"The offensive is the most difficult to sup-port, as you cannot tell exactly where yourtroops are.

"Whether the Japs will continue to fight asthey do nov, I don't know. They defend on

L5

the low ground in the jungle. They digstanding trenches, extremely well camou-flaged.

"We need the rifle grenade, or a weaponto fill the gap between hand grenade and themortar. We need to dig the Nip out of hishole under banyan trees, etc.

"We need. the knee mortar badly. Thename "knee mortar" is a misnomer. It isnot fired frOm the knee. One of my mentried this and broke his leg. The followingare reasons in its favor:

"1. It is a one-man load."2. A man can carry ten rounds on his

person besides his weapon."3. It has a high rate of fire."4. It gives to the Platoon Commander

a weapon of this type which is immediatelyavailable to him.

"5. This mortar uses the Jap all-purposehand grenade—ranges 50 yards to 650, I be-lieve.

"The Japs have three (3) of these mortarsin a Mortar Squad in each Rifle Platoon.They have two ammunition carriers per mor-tar. It can be lowered to a low angle andplaced against a log and shot straight outfurther than a. hand grenade.

"I would recommend one change in theprojectile. The Japs have too much high ex-

L5

the low ground in the jungle. They digstanding trenches, extremely well camou-flaged.

"We need the rifle grenade, or a weaponto fill the gap between hand grenade and themortar. We need to dig the Nip out of hishole under banyan trees, etc.

"We need the knee mortar badly. Thename "knee mortar" is a misnomer. It isnot fired frOm the knee. One of my mentried this and broke his leg. The followingare reasons in its favor:

"1. It is a one-man load."2. A man can carry ten rounds on his

person besides his weapon."3. It has a high rate of fire."4. It gives to the Platoon Commander

a weapon of this type which is immediatelyavailable to him.

"5. This mortar uses the Jap all-purposehand grenade—ranges 50 yards to 650, I be-lieve.

"The Japs have three (3) of these mortarsin a Mortar Squad in each Rifle Platoon.They have two ammunition carriers per mor-tar. It can be lowered to a low angle andplaced against a log and shot straight outfurther than a. hand grenade.

"I would recommend one change in theprojectile. The Japs have too much high ex-

16

plosive in the projectile and.. the case is tocthin. We get a lot of casualties from it., butthey are minor wounds.

"I recommend substituting the M1919—A4(the light machine gun) for the heavy ma-chine gun for offensive operation in thejungle. The heavy machine gms are neededand are very valuable in the defense. I ameven considering substituting BAR's for thelight machine guns in the offensive.

"I think that the Battalion Heavy Weap-ons Company should have t.he 60mm mortarto use in addition to the 81mm mortar. Ilike the 81 but it cannot keep up in certainsituations because of its weight and its heavyammunition.

"I think that in each of our squads thereshould be two BAR's instead of one.

"I suggest that you have maneuvers withball ammunition where possible, even if youget a few casualties.

"The tendency is to overload the infantry-men with. ammunition. It seems to be thestandard practice to start out with a beltfull plus two bandoliers. We soon found outthat 25 rounds was enough for two or threedays if you do not have targets to shoot. at.(Note: Our infantrymen approaching Buna

16

plosive in the projectile and.. the case is tocthin. We get a lot of casualties from it, butthey are minor wounds.

"I recommend substituting the M1919—A4(the light machine gun) for the heavy ma-chine gun for offensive operation in thejungle. The heavy machine guns are neededand are very valuable in the defense. I ameven considering substituting BAR's for thelight machine guns in t.he offensive.

"I think that the Battalion Heavy Weap-ons Company should have the 60mm mortarto use in aclthtion to the 81mm mortar. Ilike the 81 but it cannot keep up in certainsituations because of its weight and its heavyammunition.

"I think that in each of our squads thereshould be two BAR's instead of one.

"I suggest that you have maneuvers withball ammunition where possible, even if youget a few casualties.

"The tendency is to overload the infantry-men with. ámmimition. . It seems to be thestandard

.

practice to start out with a beltfull plus two bandoliers. We soon found outthat 25 rounds was enough for two or threedays if you do not have targets to shoot. at.(Note: Our infantrymen approaching Buna

17

in the jungles of New Guinea were carrying40 rounds.)

"Two ammunition pockets in the beltshould be converted to grenade pockets.Each man should have two hand. grenades.If you don't do that, develop slip-openpockets, which can be quickly opened andwhich will carry two hand grenades.

"Our Marine field shoes have too heavy a'top' which chafes. It should have a typeof hob-nail as it slips on the jungle grasses.Rubber shoes are needed for night work.

"Our basic training is all right. Empha-size scouting and patrolling and really learnit and apply it. In your training put yourtime and emphasis on the squad and platoonrather than on the company, battalion andregiment.

"Your principle of the Command Post upand to the front is certainly true here.

"In your scouting and patrolling, and your'traning 'in patience' (which •you shouldhave) have the men work against each other.Same thing for squads and platoons in theirproblems.

"We should develop better snipers. TheJapanese snipers are really annoying. Allcommanders, up to include the regiment,must realize you cannot clear out all the

17

in the jungles of New Guinea were carrying40 rounds.)

"Two ammunition pockets in the beltshould be converted to grenade pockets.Each man should have two hand grenades.If you don't do that, develop slip-openpockets, which can be quickly opened andwhich will carry two hand grenades.

"Our Marine field shoes have too heavy a'top' which chafes. It should have a typeof hob-nail as it slips on the jungle grasses.Rubber shoes are needed for night work.

"Our basic training is all right. Empha-size scouting and patrolling and really learnit and apply it. In your training put yourtime and emphasis on the squad and platoonrather than on the company, battalion andregiment.

"Your principle of the Command Post upand to the front is certainly true here.

"In your scouting and patrolling, and your'traning in patience' (which you shouldhave) have the men work against each other.Same thing for squads and platoons in theirproblems.

"We should develop better snipers. TheJapanese snipers are really annoying. Allcommanders, up to include the regiment,must realize you cannot clear out all the

18

snipers before you advance. Some will beleft, but they won't be particularly effective.Annoying, yes. You can get these snipersby small groups from the reserves. SomeJapanese snipers, which were by-passed inthe attack, hi.d for two or three days andthen quit. Some will hang around insideyour lines for a month.

"The Japanese night attacks, of course,have limited objectives; and sometimes with-drawing afer dark as much as fifty yardswill fool them and they won't know whereyou are.

"The 'smoking lamp' goes out at dark andjou ha.ve got to be quiet.

"In the Raiders we adopted the custom ofdropping all rank and titles. We used nick-names for the officers. All ranks use thesenicknames for us. We did this because theNips caught onto the names of the officersand would yell or speak in the night, 'Thisis Captain Joe Smith talking.. A Companywithdraw to the next hill.' So we adoptednicknames as code words. Captain Walt be-came 'Silent Lou'. My nickname was 'RedMike'. An example of the use of thesenickiiarnes as code words is: One night theJaps put down smoke and they yelled 'gas.'We were green at that time and two of our

18

snipers before you advance. Some will beleft, but they won't be particularly effective.Annoying, yes. You can get these snipersby small groups from the reserves. SomeJapanese snipers, which were by-passed inthe attack, hid for two or three days andthen quit. Some will hang around insideyour lines for a month.

"The Japanese night attacks, of course,have limited objectives; and sometimes 'with-drawing afLer dark as much as fifty yardswill fool them and they won't know whereyou are.

"The 'smoking lamp' goes out at dark andjou ha.ve got to be quiet.

"In the Raiders we adopted the custom ofdropping all rank and titles. We used nick-names for the officers. All ranks use thesenicknames for us. We did this because theNips caught onto the names of the officersand would yell or speak in the night, 'Thisis Captain Joe Smith talking.. A Companywithdraw to the next hill.' So we adoptednicknames as code words. Captain Walt be-came 'Silent Lou'. My nickname was 'RedMike'. An example of the use of thesenicknames as code words is: One night theJaps put down smoke and they yelled 'gas.'We were green at that time and two of our

19

ompanies withdrew leaving A Companyexposed oi. its two flanks. In this instanceI was a Battalion Commander. CaptainWalt called me on the voice radio to informme of the situation. He was cautious andused the nickname as follows: He said, 'Whois speakingV and. I said, 'Red'. He said,'What name do you identify with 'Silent'?I said, 'Lou.' He said, 'That is correct.'So, we both know that. we were talking toeach other and were not tafldng to theenemy. He explained the situation to me.At the end of his conversation, a voice brokein and said in perfect. English, 'Our situa-t.ion here, Colonel Edson, is excellent.Thank you, Sir.' This was the enemyspeaking.

"A value of night. training is that it letsmen learn the normal noises of the woods atnight. Woods are not silent at night.

"The Japanese is no superman. He has thesame limitations that we have. They havethe advantage of experience. With, propertraining, our Americans are better, as ourpeople can think better as individuals. En-courage your individuals and bring them out.

"Discontinue the use of tracers for nightfiriig. They give away your position.

"Both our riflemen and machine gunnersmust be taught to shoot low.

19

)ompanies withdrew leaving A Companyxposecl oi its two flanks. In this instanceI was a Battalion Commander. CaptainWalt called me on the voice radio to informme of the situation. He was cautious andused the nickname as follows: He said, 'Whois speakingV and. I said, 'Red'. He said,'What name do you identify with 'Silent'?I said, 'Lou.' He said, 'That is correct.'So, we both know that. we were talking toeach other and were not talking to theenemy. He explained the situation to me.At the end of his conversation, a voice brokein and said in perfect. English, 'Our situa-tion here, Colonel Edson, is. excellent.Thank you, Sir.' This was the enemyspeaking.

"A value of night training is that it letsmen learn the normal noises of the woods atnight. Woods are not silent at night.

"The Japanese is no superman. He has thesame limitations tha.t we have. They havethe advantage of experience. With, propertraining, our Americans are better, as ourpeople can think better as individuals. 'En-courage your individuals and bring them out.

"Discontinue the use of tracers for nightfiring. They give away your position.

"Both our riflemen and 'machine gunnersmust be taught to shoot low.

20

"This leadership business resolves itselfdown to being hardboiled. By that I meangetting rid of the poor leader, even if youlike him personally, because this. is a life anddeath affair. This: goes right on down to thenon-coms.

"At Tulagi the Japanese used wooden bul-lets. I saw some of these wooden bullets.My theorj for their use is that they weredeveloped for troops which were to infiltratebehind our lines and .shoot us in the back.These wooden bullets could not carry farenough to injure their attacking troops."

(Note: Colonel Edson asked me at the endof the day to read back to him what eachman had said when he was interviewed.Notes by Colonel Edson which appear, weremade after the men had been interviewed.)

MAJOR LOU WALT, 0. 0. 2nd Battalion,Fifth Marines. (Note: Col. Edson toldme that. Major Walt was one of his bestleaders, and one of the best men he hasever seen in action. Major Walt. is ayoung man of about 35 years of age.He is extremely rugged and looks like afullback on a football team. I talked tohim over 20 minutes before I was able to

20

"This leadership business resolves itselfdown to being hardboiled. By that I meangetting rid of the poor leader, even if youlike him personally, because this. is a life anddeath affair. This: goes right on down to thenon-corns.

"At Tulagi the Japanese used wooden bul-lets. I saw some of these wooden bullets.My theorj for their use is that they weredeveloped for troops which were to infiltratebehind our lines and shoot us in the back.These wooden bullets could not carry farenough to injure their attacking troops."

(Note: Colonel Edson asked me at the endof the day to read back to him what eachman had said when he was interviewed.Notes by Colonel Edson which appear, weremade after the men had been interviewed.)

MAJOR LOU WALT, C. 0. 2nd Battalion,Fifth Marines. (Note: Col. Edson toldme that Major Walt was one of his bestleaders, and one of the best men he hasever seen in action. Major Walt. is ayoung man of about 35 years of age.He is extremely rugged and looks like afullback on a football team. I talked tohim over 20 minutes before I was able to

9

21

sing'e original note as hisseem to echo Col. E cison's.)can report officially to you that we had

men killed in one company in the last as-sault! 4 of these men were killed by awounded sniper who had three holes in him.

my CP.- He was camouflagedpassed over for dead.Plt themshoulder to shoulder.on. the Matanikau River.

Iap Territory

riese beach head was a. thick jungle with

we captured in. this action."At 6:30 p. m. they smoked our two right

companies, and when the. smoke had en-veloped these two companies, they broke out.

make a ide as

He was laying in thick brush 15 yards fromand had been

You have to KILL toout. They attack in bunches,

An example: we were(See fig. 1.) Our

Matanikau River ____Jcp 8ridehead150 Japs n here

S1NDSPIT

FIGr 1.

Companies were at half strength. This wasa Raider Battalion plus two companies ofthe 3d Battalion, Fifth

camouflaged

ii\ffarines. The. Japa-

standing—type fox holes.had with them in their beach head 6 heavymachine guns and 8 light machine guns which

They

21

single original note as hisseem to echo Col. E dson's.)can report officially to you that we had

9 men killed in one company in the last. as-sault! 4 of these men were killed by awounded sniper who had three holes in him.He was laying in thick brush 15my CP.-. He was camouflagedpassed over for dead.put themshoulder to shoulder.on the Matanikau River.

Jap Territory

nese beach head was a. thick jungle withcamouflaged standing-type fox holes. Theyhad with them in their beach head 6 heavymachine guns and 8 light machine guns whichwe captured in this action.

''At 6:30 p. m. they smoked our two rightcompanies, and when the. smoke had en-veloped these two companies, they broke out.

make a Id e as

yards fromand had been

You have to KILL toout. They attack in bunches,

An example: we were(See fig. 1.) Our

Matanikau River _________

Jcp 8ridehead150 Japs n here

FIGr 1.

Companies were at half strength.

SANDSPIT

the 3d Battalion, Fiftha Raider Battalion pius two companies of

This was

Marines. The. Japa-

22

They came out in a mass formation, 20abreast, yelling, bayonets fixed, automaticweapons working, rear ranks throwing handgrenades, (heavy arrow in. the above sketchshows the Japanese route). They were, try-ing to escape to the sand spit at the mouth ofthe river in order to cross the river to getback. Our right front company had justcompleted a double-apron barbed-wire fence.When the Japanese hit the left flank of theright• company, they killed 9 out of the first11 men they met. Then they hit the barbed-wire. Two of our heavy machine gunsopened up, shooting down along this barbed-wire fence and dispersed their attack. Itgot dark—quickly like it does here. Therewas smoke, Japs and Marines all mixed up.Three Jap officers were, swinging their two-hand swords. There ws hand-to-hand fight-ing all night long... We mopped them up atdaybreak. We killed 78 Japs. They killed12 Marines and wounded 26 of us.

"The Jap has a great deal of respect forour hand grenade, and it is a valuable weaponto us. Do jou eve'r practice throwing it inwooded country?

"The Jap is not 'an individual fighter. Hewon't fight with a bayonet unless backed upwith a dozen other Japs.

22

They came out in a mass formation, 20abreast, yelling, bayonets fixed, automaticweapons working, rear ranks throwing handgrenades, (heavy arrow in. the above sketchshows the Japanese• route). They were, try-ing to escape to the sand spit at the mouth ofthe river in order to cross the river to getback. Our right front company bad justcompleted a double-apron barbed-wire fence.When. the Japanese hit the left flank of theright• company, they killed 9 out of the first11 men they met. Then they hit the barbed-wire. Two of our heavy machine gunsopened up, shooting down along this barbed-wire fence and dispersed their attack. Itgot dark—quickly like it does here. Therewas smoke, Japs and Marines all mixed up.Three Jap officers were swinging their two-hand swords. There ws hand-to-hand. fight-ing all night long... We mopped them up atdaybreak. We killed 78 Japs.

.

They killed12 Marines and wounded 26 of us.

"The Jap has a great deal of respect forour hand grenade, and it is a valuable weaponto us. Do you eve'r practice throwing it inwooded country?

"The Jap is not an individual fighter. Hewon't fight with a bayonet unless backed upwith a dozen other Japs.

23

"Here is something that I know the Armyteaches, Sir, but I would like to say it, as wereally believe in it hem, and that is don't puttroops in a skirrnish line until actual physicalcontact is made. Keep 'em in squad columns,with two scouts in front of each squad.Sometimes making files between the columns.

"As in the Basic Field Manual, each manshould know the objective. I make, myPlatoon Leader designate an objective every100 yards in the jungle, and. they work to itand reorganize. They don't push off for thenext objective until they. get word from theCompany Commander. This method, wehave found, insures control.

"I control my companies exactly the sameway. I set up objectives for each company.When the companies reach their objective,they report. Aftei- the reorganization, we goahead.

"I think reserves in the attack should bekept up close so that they can be committedimmediately. The Reserve Company Com-mander continually reconnoiters the groundand is ready to commit his company at oncewhen ordered to do so. If the Reserve Com-pany is not on its. toes and has to take timeout for reconnaissailce, this may delay themto sneii an ex1ent that their effort. iiiav be

23

"Here is something that I know the Armyteaches, Sir, but I would like to say it, as wereally believe in it hem, and that is don't puttroops in a skirnish line until actual physicalcontact is made. Keep 'em in squad columns,with two scouts in front of each squad.Sometimes making files between the columns.

"As in the Basic Field Manual, each manshould know the objective. I make, myPlatoon Leader designate an objective every100 yards in the jungle, and. t.hey work to itand reorganize. They don't push off for thenext obj ective until they

,

get word from theCompany Commander. This method, wehave found, insures control.

"I control my companies exactly the sameway. I set up objectives for each company.When the companies reach their obj ective,they report. Aftei- the reorganization, we goahead.

"I think reserves in the attack should bekept up close so that they can be committedimmediately. The Reserve Company Corn-mander continually reconnoiters the groundand is ready .to conmiit his company at oncewhen ordered to do so. If the 'Reserve Com-pany is not on its. toes and has to take timeout for reconnaissance, this may delay themto sneli. an. extent that their effort. iiiav be

24

useless—the situation may change if thejcannot act at once. I keep my best. CompanyCommander in reserve.

"In the attack we always use the. telephonesfrom Regiment. to the Battalion. The jungleis thick, but. the wire can be made to keep up.The wire is supplemented by the TBX radio.If we get held . up, the wire goes right out. tothe companie.s from the Battalion."

PLATOON SERGEANT C. C. ARNUT,H & S Company, Fifth Marines. ChiefScout for the Regimental IntelligenceSection. (Note: When Col. Edson sentfor his best fighters, be did not includePlatoon Sergeant Arndt. After I gotthrough talking to these men, two ofthem came up to me ad said, "Sir, youdid not see Sergeant Arndt. He hasbeen on more patrols and does morescouting than any man in the Regiment..Could we get him for you, Sir?")

"I practice walking quietly over rocks,twigs, grass, leaves, through vines, etc. Ipractice this around this bivouac area. Ireceived, instructions in scouting and patrol-ling at Quantico, but I still practice thisaround here in the bivouac area. I believebecause I )1'actice this is the reason I am

24

useless—the situation may change if thejcannot act at once. I keep my best CompanyCommander in reserve.

"In the attack we always use the. telephonesfrom Regiment to the Battalion. The jungleis thick, but the wire can be made to keep up.The wire is supplemented by the TBX radio.If we get held . up, the wire goes right out tothe companie.s from the Battalion."

PLATOON SERGEANT C. C. ARNDT,H & S Company, Fifth Marines. ChiefScout for the Regimental IntelligenceSection. (Note: When Col. Edson sentfor his best. fighters, be did not includePlatoon Sergeant Arndt. After I got.

through talking to these men, two ofthem came up. to me and said, "Sir, youdid not see Sergeant Arndt. He hasbeen on more patrols and does morescouting than any man in the Regiment..Could we get him for you, Sir?")

"I practice walking quietly over rocks,twigs, grass, leaves, through vines, etc. Ipractice this around this bivouac area. Ireceived instructions in scouting and patrol-ling at Quantico, but I still practice thisaround here in the bivouac area. I believebecause I practice this i.s the reason I am

25

still alive. Some of the other NCO'slaugthed at me because I am always seeinghow quietly I can walk around and becauseI go out and practice on my own. But theyhave stopped laughing because I have beeion more patrols than any man in the Regi-iiient, and I am still alive.

"When I am scouting and come to anopenmg in the jungle, and. have to cross it,I generally run across quickly and quietly.Going slow here may cost a scout his life.Different types of terrain calls for differentmethods.

"Here is the way Japs patrol. I was outon the bank of the river with another man.We were observing and were carefully cam-ouflag'ed. We heard a little sound and thensaw two Japs crawl by about 7 feet awayfrom us. These Japs were unarmed. Westarted to shoot them, but did not do so aswe remembered our mission. Then, 15 yardslater came 8 armed Japs. They were walk-ing slowly and. carefully. We did not shootas our mission was to gain information.When III got back, we had a lot of discussionas to why the two Japs in front were notarmed. Some of the fellows said maybe itWas a form of Japanese company pirnisli—merit. I believe they were the point of the

25

still alive. Some of the other NCO'slaughed at me because I am always seeinghow quietly I can walk around and because1 go out and practice on my own. But theyhave stopped laughing because I have beenon more patrols than any man in the Regi-ment, and I am still alive.

"When I am scouting and come to anopening in the jungle, and have to cross it,I generally run across quickly and quietly.Going slow here may cost a scout his life.Different types of terrain calls for differentmethods.

"Here is the way Japs patrol. I was outon the bank of the river with another man.We were observing and were carefully cam-ouflaged. We heard a little sound and thensaw two Japs crawl by about 7 feet awayfrom us. These Japs were unarmed. Westarted to shoot them, but did not do so aswe remembered our mission. Then, 15 yardslater came 8 armed Japs. They were walk-ing slowly and carefully. We did not shootas our mission was to gain information.When I got back, we had a lot of discussionas to why the two Japs in front were notarmed. Some of the fellows said maybe itwas a form of Japanese company punish-ment. I believe they were the point of the

26

patrol and were unarmed so they could crawlbetter.

"You can tell Jap troops in the distanceby their short, choppy step." (Remark byCoL Edson : This is. true and we think thereason for their short, choppy stride is be-cause they wear wooden shoes in Japan.)

COLONEL DEMIJTH, Division ArtilleTyCommander, America Division.

"The tactics and technique of our artilleryfire as taught by the Field Artillery SchQolat Ft. Sill are okay, and are good here onGuadalcanal.

"However, we have learned we have to fire3600 here. A'so due tO the way these Japscrawl around in the jung'e, we have to paymore attention to the. local security around ourpositions."

COLONEL AMOIR LE R.. SIMS, Commaiid-ing Officer, Seventh Marines, 1st MarineDivision.

"Is the Army stripping dowi to essentialsin eqUipmenH

"Teach not to waste ammunition. Learnto make every shot count.

Don't spare your artillery. Make the mostof it. Every time you get enough hforrna-

26

patrol and were unarmed so they could crawlbetter.

"You can tell Jap troops in the distanceby their short, choppy step." (Remark byCoL Edson : This is. true and we think thereason for their short, choppy stride is be-cause they wear wooden shoes in Japan.)

COLONEL DEMIJTH, Division ArtilleryCommander, Americal Division.

"The tactics and tec.hniqie of our artilleryfire as taught by the Field Artillery Schoolat Ft. Sill are okay, and are good here onGuadalcanal.

"However, we have learned we have to fire3600 here. Also due tO the way these Japscrawl around.. in the jungle, we have to paymore attention to the local security around ourpositions."

COLONEL AMOR LE R.. SIMS, Command-ing Officer, Seventh Marines, 1st MarineDivision.

"Is the Army stripping dowi to essentialsin equipment

"Teach not to waste ammunition. Learnto make every shot count.

Don't spare your artillery. Make the mostof it. Every time you get enough informa-

27

tion, even if the target is not profitable, getaitillery fire on it. They hate it.

"Try to get the Japs on the move; keepbouncing them around; don't let them get set.When you let them get set, they are hard toget out. We have had a great deal ofcess with the 81mm mortar and with artillery

an example (fig. 2)

FIGuRE 2.

We have the Japs surrounded with theirbacks to the river. The .3close contact with the enemy.that we had a large number of Japs sur-rounded and that the best way to get themout was to place field artillery and. 81mm fireon them. However, the problem was to putthis fire on the enemy and not on our owntroops. The movement which we executed wascarefully cooixlinated with .the artillery andwith the mortars.

5O3G4G'—42__3

Each Battalioi, at a cer-

fire. Here is

S

c.

suc-

S

JAP SN

C Dense

C 'I

c 7rrnT C

It075.s

Range

4000 yds

Battalions were inIt was obvious

27

tion, even if the target is not profitable,artillery fire on it. They hate it.

get

"Try to get the Japs on the move; keepbouncing them around; don't let them get set.When you let them get set, they are hard to

FIGuRE 2.

We have the Japs surrounded with theirbacks to the river. The .3close contact with the enemy.that we had a large number of Japs sur-rounded and that the best way to get themout was to place field artillery and 81mm fireon them. However, the problem was to putthis fire on the enemy and not on our owntroops. The movement which we executed wascarefully coordinatedwith the mortars.

5O3G4G'—42__3

with the artillery andEach Battalion, at a cer-

get out. We have had a great deal of suc-cess with the 81mm mortar and with artilleryfire. Here is

S

c.

an example (fig. 2) S

S

JAP SN

C Dense

C 'I

cC /

It075.$

Range

4000 yds

Battalions were inIt was obvious

28

tam time, was to withdraw just before thefiring was due to start. We were very care-ful to explain to the men what we were doingso that they would not get a mistaken ideaof.the order, for withdrawing. The maneuverwas successful. Over 500 Japs were killed inthis action. We had 44 Marines killed and63 wounded. Our men were nOt hurt by theartillery and mortar fire, of course, but werekilled and wounded in the fighting which tookplace before the withdrawal. After the firingceased, we went in and mopped up in hand-to-hand fighting.

"Our Battalion Commanders in theSeventh Marines know that in reporting in-formation a.t once and, if t.hey need help toask fOr it and not just try to bull' thingst.hrough that they are enabling Regiments toact as a team, in the right maimer and in theright direction.

"I have a wonderful S—2 Section in thIsRegiment. I have been working on this S-2Section for over 2 years. I have been puttingmy best men in this .2 Section, and it has paidme. We insisted that •the Battalions havegood 2 Sections. You cannot do any betterthan your information.

"Concentrate on communications. We de-pend to a large extent on wire communica-

28

tam time, was to withdraw just before thefiring was due to start. We were very care-ful to explaii to the men what we were doingso that they would not get a mistaken ideaof. the order for withdrawing. The maneuverwas successfuL Over 500 Japs were killed inthis action. We had 44 Marines killed and63 wounded. Our men were nOt hurt by theartillery and mortar fire, of course, but werekilled and wounded in the fighting which tookplace before the withdrawal. After the firingceased, we went in and mopped up in. hand-to-hand fighting.

"Our Battalion Commanders in theSeventh Marines know that in reporting in-formation a.t o'nce and, if they need help toask fOr it and not just try to bull' thingsthrough that they are enabling Regiments toact as a team, in the right manner and in theright direction.

"I have a wonderful 5—2 Section in thisRegiment. I have been working on this S-2Section fQr over 2 years. I have been puttingmy best men in this .2 Section, and it has pai.dme. We insisted that 'the Battalions havegood 2 Sections. You cannot do any betterthan your information.

"Concentrate' on communications. We de-pend to a large extent on wire' coinmunica-

29

tions. It is tough work, but it can be done.I have had to loan the Communications IRe-giinental. Section men to help carry wirethrough tough places, but I want communica-tions. Your information has to be timelyand properly evaluated.

"A Regimental Commander caimot be im-patient. Don 't push your Battalion Oom-manders uniless you feel there is a reluctanceon their part.

"Our great leader, General Vandegrift,gives me a job and lets me handle the situa-tion with a regiment in my own way. He isnot impatient with. me. Impatience wouldruin the best plans A mapped plan may notturn out to be feasible. So, we have learnedhere not to be impatient.

"The forward observer of the artillery hasfurnished me with valuable information.Our system is to put the Artillery ObserverGroup with each battalion and keep the Artil-lery Liaison Officer with the Regiment.

"Are you teaching your Regimental Com-manders to understand how to use artillery

"It has been impressed upon us here thatlogistics have to be correctly planned. Thescience of logistics turns out to be your life.In this Regiment., I have a fine forceful Exe-cutive Officer, Lt. Col. Frisbee. I use the

29

tions. It is tough work, but it can be done.I have had to loan the Communications Re-gimental. Section men to help carry wirethrough tough places, but I want communica-tions. Your information has to be timelyand properly evaluated.

"A Regimental Commander caimot be im-patient. Don't push your Battalion Oom-manders unless you feel there is a reluctanceon their part.

"Our great leader, General Vandegrift,gives me a job and lets me handle the situa-tion with a regiment in my own way. He isnot impatient with me. Impatience wouldruin the best plans:. A mapped plan may notturn out to be feasible. So, we have learnedhere not to be impatient.

"The forward observer of the artillery hasfurnished me with valuable information.Our system is to put the Artillery ObserverGroup with each battalion and keep the Artil-lery Liaison Officer with the Regiment.

"Are you teaching your Regimental Corn-manclers to understand how to use artillery

"It has been impressed upon us here thatlogistics have to be correctly planned. Thescience of logistics turns out to be your life.In this Regiment., I have a fine forceful Exe-cutive Officer, Lt. Col. Frisbee. I use the

30

Executive Officer in the rear echelon seeiiigthat the S—4 funct.ions and that supplies getup. Don't misunderstand me. The Execu-tive Officer lets the S-4 run his job. liechecks and aids him if he needs help.

"Here is a thought. I wou]d like to leavewith the Regimental Commanders. Pickyour officers for common sense. Basic FieldManual knowledge is fine, but it is uselesswithout. common sense. Common sense is ofgreater value than all the words in the book.I am 2 deep in my battalions in regard toBattaiion Commanding Officers. That is,each, one of my Battalion Executive Officersis a potential Battalion Commander. Thereason for this is if the Battalion Com-mander gets killed or sick, I won't be caughtout on a limb. My Battalion Commandersuse their Executive Officers in the same wayI use my. Regimental Officers. I back up myExecutive Officer. I never see a BattalionCommander or a Staff Officer about adniin-istration unless they see the Executive Officerfirst. My Executive Officer and I a.re ateam. He is responsible to see that my poli-cies are' carried out.

"I make my Staff Officers get out of thisCP—not to snoop on the troops, but to helpthe battalions and acquaint themselves with

30

Executive Officer in the rear echelon seeingthat the 5—4 functions and that supplies getup. Don't misunderstand me. The Execu-t.ive Officer lets the S-4 run his job. liechecks and aids him if he needs help.

"Here is a thought I wou]d like to leavewith the Regimental Commanders. Pickyour officers for common sense. Basic FieldManual knowledge is fine, but it is uselesswithout common sense. Common sense is ofgreater value than all the words in the book.I am 2 deep in my battalions in regard toBattalion

.

Commanding Officers. That is,each, one of my Battalion Executive Officersis a potential Battalion Commander. Thereason for this is if the Battalion Com-mander gets killed or sick, I won't be caughtout on a limb. My Battalion Commandersuse their Executive Officers in the same wayI use my. Regimental Officers. I back up myExecutive Officer. I never see a BattalionCommander or a Staff Officer about adniin-istration unless they see the Executive Officerfirst. My Executive Officer and I are ateam. He is responsible to see that my poli-cies are' carried out.

"I make my Staff Officers get out of thisCP—not to snoop on the troops, but to helpthe battalions and acquaint themselves with

31

the general situatIon. Insist on night train-big, but don't train day and night. If I\vere training my Regiment again, working 7days a week, I would train three nights andfour clays.

"Our orders to our Marines on the per-imeter defense are, 'You stay on your posi.-tion and do not pull back. If they bustthiough.you, we'll plug up the hole, but youstay there.'

"Our Battalion Commanders have learnednot to pull a company, out of action to useit. elsewhere. For example (fig. 3):

/B C U /

FIQuRE 3.

If a company is needed at point. 'X' don'tsend companies who have been committed at'B', 'C', or 'D'. Send -another companyfrom somewhere else. If you make the mis-takes of 'milling around', as we call it, youwill expend men's lives. It is always ex-pensive. I have never seen it to fail to costtwo times as much as the original commit-ment.

"This Regiment can out-yell the Japs, out-fight them, out-bayonet them, and out-shootthem. This yelling, as in hand-to-hand ac-

31

the general situatIon. Insist on night train-big, but don 't train day and night. If Iw-ere training my Regiment again, working 7clays a week, I would train three nights andfour clays.

"Our orders to our Marines on the per-imeter defense are, 'You stay on your posi-tion and do not pull back. If they bustthiough you, we'll plug up the hole, but youstay there.'

"Our Battalion Commanders have learnednot to pull a company, out of action to useit. elsewhere. For example (fig. 3) :

/B C U /

FIQuRE 3.

If a company is needed at point. 'X' don'tsend companies who have been committed at'B', 'C', or 'D'. Send -another càmpanyfrom somewhere else. If you make the mis-takes of 'milling around', as we call it, youwill expend men's lives. It is always ex-pensive. I have never seen it to fail to costtwo times as much as the original commit-ment.

"This Regiment can out-yell the Japs, out-fight them, out-bayonet them, and out-shootthem. This yelling, as in hand-to-hand ac-

.32

tion, is important. It is like .a foothall team

keelMarines

We'll killFriikiiñ I'

"The Regimentali his personalintErested in.'great interest.

LIEUTENANT ('OLONEL .L. B. P tiLLER,:0. 0. 1st Battalion, 7th Regiment, U. S.Marines, First ]arifle Division.

(Note: Lt. Col. Puller is being recommendedby General Vandegrift for the• Medal cfHonor for, leading his Battalion, withholes in him, continually for .24 hours. Imet.laim on the day he came out of the hos-pital. Lt. Col. Puller had considerableexperience in jungle warfare in Haiti.)

"In handing my companiesCompany Commander's word for what is go-rng on. You have to do this to get anywhere.In order t.o get a true picture of what is go-

that talks it. up."The Japs yell at.

1' More blood. f Or the Emperor 1'us, "Marines,, we're gonna

Theyell bad.,. 'You

you .1.Japs.. More blood for

Commander.: must makewatch and be, greatly

sanitation. Because of ourin sthiitatiOn,. our.. sick, list .

islist riin.s lowerlower than normal. Our

than 40 men per battálion"

7

I take the

.32

tion, is important. It is like .a foothall team

LIEUTENANT COLONEL IL. B. P tiLLER,:0. 0. st Battalion, 7th Regiment, U. S.Marines, First ]airie Division.

is beingby General Vandegrift .f.orthe Medal cfHonor for, leading his Battalion, withholes in him, continually for .24 hours. Imet.laim on the day he came out of the ho.s-pital. Lt. Col. Ptiller had considerableexperience in jungle warfare in HaIti.)

my companiesCompany Commander's word for whatrng on. You have to do this to get anywhere.In order to get a true picture of what is go-

that talks it. up."The Japs yell at.

keel you.!Marines

More blood, fOr the Emperor 1'us, "Marines,, we're gonna

Theyell bad.,. 'You

•you.1.Japs..We!fl killFriiikiiñ I'

"The Regimental

More blood for

it his pe:rsonalint.rested .

j11.

great interest.

duty'to watchsanitation. Becausein sanitation,, our.

Commander.: must makeand be, greatly

of...Oursick list

.is

lower than normal. Our sick list runs lowerthan 4O men per hattalion "

(Note: Lt. CoL Puller recommended

7

"In handing I take theis go-

33

ing on in this heavy country, I make my staffget up where the fighting is. This CommandPost business will ruin the American Armyand Marines if it isn't watched. Hell, ourplatoons and squads would like the commandpost in the attack if they are not watched!As soon as you set up a Command Post, allforward movement stops.

"The 'walky-talky' the Japs have operates.Why can't we have a similar one

"To HELL with the telephone wire withadvancing troops. We can't carry enoughwire. We received an order. 'The advancewill stop until the wire gets in.' THIS ISBACKWARDS!

(flI Go, w/o ordersCo

Point,'A Co moves forward, as

x8 'Gomdrshown, and deploys)

/3 c)3 3 XEI 0 (This group stands tastA Bn Hq Group

3 ICo

(Mortar Sec moves forward,4 Mortar Sec if necessary)

X Train it present(AC" Co—Train guard, moves

Co forward w/o orders)

FIGURE 4.

"The staffs are twice as large as theyshould be. The Regimental staff .is too large.I have 5 staff officers in the Battalion and

33

ing on in this heavy country, I make my staffget up where the fighting is. This CommandPost business will ruin the American Armyand Marines if it isn't watched. Hell, ourplatoons and squads would like the commandpost in the attack if they are not watched IAs soon as you set up a Command Post, allforward movement stops.

"The 'walky-talky' the Japs have operates.Why can't we have a similar one

"To HELL with the telephone wire withadvancing troops. 'We can't carry enoughwire. We received an order. 'The advancewill stop until the wire gets in.' THIS ISBACKWARDS!

(flI Go, w/o ordersCo

Point,'A Co moves forward, as

x8 'Gomir shown, and deploys)

/3 c)3 3 XEI 0 (This group stands tastA Bn Hq Group

3 I

& (Mortar Sec moves forward,

3* Mortar Sec if necessary)

Train it present

I) (AC" Co—Train guard, movesCo forward w/o orders)

FIGURE 4.

"The staffs are twice as large as theyshould be. The Regimental staff .is too large.I have 5 staff officers in the Battalion and

34

I could get along with less. The officershave to dress and look like the men. Onetime the COmmandant of the Marine Corpsasked me why our patrols failed in Haiti. Ireplied, 'Because of the officers' b&ldingroll.' In Haiti at that time the officer. hadto have a pack mule, and the enlisted mensaw the officers lying arouiid in luxury, etc.The patrols were actually held up for thispack mule. Your leaders have to be upfront. Thos& that won't get up there, andare not in physical shape to keep up with themen,. will cause plans to fail.

"It is okav to say that an outfit cannot besurprised, but it is bound to happen in thistype of warfare;. so, therefore, your outfltsmust know wha to do when amounect

''Calliiig back Commanding Othce]:s toBattalion and Regimental CF's to say, 'howare things going ?' is awful.

"My Battalion moving through junglecountry, acting alone, operates as follows(see fig. 4):

"A. platoon of D Company is attached toeach rifie company because of the heavycountry. C Company watches the rear.Each company is responsible for its flank.This is a time-tested and proven formationwhich works. If attacked. from a flank, faceand adjust.

34

I could get along with less. The officershave to dress and look like the men. Onetime the Commandant of the Marine Corpsasked me why our patrols failed in Haiti. Ireplied,. 'Because of the officers' beddingrolL' In Haiti at that time the officer. hadto have a pack mule, and the enlisted mensaw the officers lying around in luxury, etc.The patrols were actually held up for thispack mule. Your leaders have to be upfront. Tbos& that won't get up there, andare not in physical shape to keep up with the

men,. will cause plans to fail."It is okay to say that an outfit cannot he

surprised, but it is bound .t happen in thistype 0± warfare; so, therefore, our oufi:must kno \ha to do when amoined.

''CalImg back Commanding Othee]:s toBattalion and Regimental CF's to say, 'Howare things going .?' is awful.

"My Battalion moving through junglecountry, acting alone, operates as follows(see fig. 4):

"A. platoon of D Company is attached toeach rifie company because o.f the heavycountry. C Company watches the rear.Each company is responsible for its flank.This is a time-tested and proven formationwhich works. If attacked. from a flank, faceand adjust.

35

"In marching or in camp, we have learnedhere that you must have an all-around cle-fense.

We need more intrenehing shove's.c-five shovels to men who have wire cutters.You neec both the wire cutter and shovels.

"I wish we had the Mi rifle, and when weget eleved fr'orn Gua.claicanal, I am goingto make every effort to get it.

I consider it iinpei'atie that the Armyand Marines be ecuipp ed with knee mortaisaiicl only carry one type gfeiac.e. Hwe thehand grellacle fit m the knee mortar and beof use as ahancl grenade and. also a a

ou neelL a m±e g'ienac.iei 1a eicjuaci for use agaii.lst eiemy rnhiiiellts."

The follo\vin is the resuh of a conferencewith of the best. NCO's in the First Bat-talion of the Seventh Marines. TheseXCO 's were selected by Lt. Col. Puller:

"The Japanese fire is not. ahvay•s aimed.It is harassing fire and scares recruits. Get.the recnaits so they are used to overheadfire. 'Japs who have infiltrated signal toeach other with their rifles by the number ofshots. We get these birds by constantpatrolling.

35

"In marching or in camp, we have learnedhere that von must have an. all-around de-fense.

We need more intrenehing shovels.c-five shovels to men who have wire cutters.You need both the wire cutter and shovels.

"I wish we had the Mi rifle, and when weget relieved fr'om Gua.daica.nal, I am goingto make every effort to get it.

''I consider it iinpei'atie that the Armyand Marines be ecuipp ed with knee mortarsand oniy carry one type grenade. Have thehand grenade fit in the knee mortar and beof use as ahancl grenade and. also at a

on neecL a. rne gIenacLiei in eaisquad for use against enemy machirenests."

The fol1owin is the result of a conferencewith of the best. NCO's in the First Bat-talion of the Seventh Marines. TheseXCO 's were selected by Lt. Col. Puller:

"The Japanese fire is not. always aimed.It is harassing fire and scares recruits. 0-ct.the recruits so they are used to overheadfire. 'Japs who have infiltrated signal toeach other with their rifles by the number ofshots. We get these birds by constantpatrollmg.

"The snipers tie

36

their guns in the trees sothey, can't .drop it carelessly. or if wounded.In putting theirtrees, they lash them in and have relief menready to go up the tree.

"Their machine gunss earch.

"AJap trick:"

The mortar menThe Japanese letrounds.wounded 2.

don't traverse and

thought they were safe.them fire two or three

killed 3 and

"The rifle grenade demoralizes the Jap.Japanese prisoner, told me in English, 'That

Sir.'anese sew grass and leaves to their shirts andhats.

"They hit, hell outdon 't wait until they

our points.. Theycould get more men.

light machine guns in the

JAP LIGHTM.G.. IN

BANYANTREE

60mm MORTARON REVERSE SLOPE

FrGuRc 5.

They cracked down,

30 calibre cannon is terrible,

A

The Jap-

of

"The snipers tiethey, can't drop itIn putting their

ready to go up the tree."Their machine

search."AJap trick:"

The mortar menThe Japanese let

wounded 2.

36

their guns in the trees socarelessly. or if wounded.

light machine guns in the

guns

and have relief men

don 't traverse and

"The rifle grenade, demoralizes the Jap.Japanese prisoner, told me in English, 'That'

Sir.'anese sew grass and leaves to their shirts andhats.

"They hit, hell outdon 't wait until they

of our points.. Theycould g.et more men.

trees, they lash them in

JAP LIGHTM.G.. IN

BANYANTREE

60mm MORTARON REVERSE SLOPE

FrGuRc 5.

rounds.

thoughtthem

they were safe.

They cracked down,fire two or three

killed 3 and

30 calibre cannon is terrible,

A

The Jap-

37

They seek to delay us. When the point goesclown, teach men to get behind big trees, ifclose, but not behind saplings.

"If you shoot their officers, they millaround. Their NCO's are poor. Yoit cantell thej are officers by their sabers andleather p'itttee.s.

"A ]ot of these Japs who infiltrate haveiadios. Think of this advantage in respectto artillery, mortar fire, location of troops.etc.

"My platoon found 9 Japs slipping behindour. lines. (Note by Lt. Col. Frisbee, IRegi-mental Executive Officer: We have killed 38Japs behind our lines during, the period ofAugut .7, 1942,. to November 29, 1942.)

"Their outpost at times is in trees. I sawone tree which was rotten inside. The Jap-anese had a light machine gun and gunnerdown inside, and they had built a. trap dooron our side. Every once in a while the doorwould open, and they would poke the machinegun

.out and fire. We took care of this.

"When we cease firing, they cease firing.When we fire, they open up. They do thisto conceal their positions."

37

They seek to delay us. When the point goesclown, teach men to get behind big trees, ifclose, but not behind saplings.

"If you shoot their officers, they millaround. Their NCO's are poor. Yoit cantell thej are officers by thei'r sabers andleather p'itttee.s.

"A ]ot of these Japs who infiltrate haveradios. Think of this advantage in respectto artillery, mortar fire, location of troops.etc.

"My platoon found 9 Japs slipping behindour. lines. (Note by Lt. Col. Frisbee, IRegi-mental Executive Officer: We have killed 38Japs behind our lines during, the period ofAugust .7, 1942,. to November 29, 1942.)

"Their outpost at times is in trees. I sawone tree which was rotten inside. . The Jap-anese had a light machine gun and guiinerdown inside, and they had built a. trap dooron our side. Every once in a while the doorwould open, and they would poke the machinegun

,out and fire. We took care of this.

"When we cease firing, they cease firing.When we fire, they open . up. They do thisto conceal their positions."

38

LIEUTENANT SHEPPARD, Seventh Ma-rines. (Promoted on the Field of

Battle.)"Sir, how abotit trainüig in the field with

short rations Put your patrols out from3 to 5 days; every officer in the outfit. to par-ticipate. If I were Commanding Geneia1ofa training base, all people who missed one-third of the training would drop back to thenext unit. I believe that the units shouldhave a minimum of 90 days' training injmi.gle warfare. I would stress in this train-ing team work between the leaders in. allthits. Liaison. between support plans andall leaders. Liaison between artillei'v andinfantry.

"If I were t.raining my unit again. Iwould really have some high-class patroltraining. I would. do .everything with thesepatrols I could possibly think of to includelosing them and making them go across coan-try without maps or compasses.

"The Japanese do a lot of yelling at hmes,and .at other times are deadly silent. Onenight some Japanese got in our marchingcolumn. We discovered them and bayoiiethd.them.

38

LIEUTENANT SHEPPARD, Seventh Ma-rines. (Promoted on the Field ofBattle.)

"Sir, how about training in the field withshort rations Put your patrols out from3 to 5 days; every officer in the outfit. to par-ticipate. If I were Commanding Geneia1.ofa training base, all people who missed one-third of the training would drop back to thenext unit. I believe that the units shouldhave a minimum of 90 clays' training injungle warfare. I Ould stress in this train-ing team work between the leaders in. allunits. Liaison between support plans andall leaders. Liaison between artillery andinfantry.

"If I . were training my unit again. Iwould really have some high-class patroltraining.

.

I would. do .everything with thesepatrols I could possibly think of to includelosing them and making them go across coun-try without maps or compasses.

"The Japanese do a lot of yelling at times,and at other times are deadly silent. Onenight some Japanese got in our marchingcolumn. We discovered them and bayoiietëdthem.

39

"At another time, I, myself heard a Iapa-nese yell in good English, 'K Company,forward!'

The Japs don't like our men yelling backat them."

MASTER GUNNERY SERGEANT R. M.FOWLE, Seventh First. Ma-rine Division.

(Note : Master Gunnery Sergeant Fowle hasbad.. 24 years service in the U. S. Marines.)

"Sir, the first thing I would like to say isthat this Japanese sni er busmess has beenover-emphasized. They talked and tallecl tous a;)out the Japanese snipers and macIc theseyoung men of rnii.e jittery. You can't seethe sniper anyhow until ou start to attack,and as his fire, until the, attaeR starts, is veryinaccurate, there is no use to worry. I thinkthis sniper business should be debunked.They hide under binyan trees and just poketheir muzzle through a hole and fire, in-cliscriminately. When the attack starts, theywill come out. Those you by-pass in the at-tack must be mopped up later.

"We learned not to get excited or go offhalf-cocked where there is noise. The Jap-anese make noise to mislead us. They shotoff some fire crackers at the start, but we have

39

"At another time, I, myself heard a Iapa-nese yell in good English, 'K Company,foi'ward!'

The Japs don 't like our men yelling backat them."

MASTER GUNNERY SERGEANT R. M.FOWLE, Seventh Marines, First. Ma-rine Division.

(Note : Master Gunnery Sergeant Fowle hasbad.. 4 years service in the U. S. Marines.)

"Sir, the first thing I would like to say isthat this Japanese sniper busmess has beenover-emphasized. They talked and tallecl tous aoout the Japanese snipers and macIc theseyoung men of rnii.e jittery. You can't seethe sniper anyhow until you start to attack,and as his fire, until the, a.ttaei starts, is veryinaccurate, there is no use to worry. I thinkthis sniper business should be debunked.They hide under binya.n trees and just poketheir nmzzle through a. hole and fire, in-cliscriminately. When the attack starts, theywill come out. Those you by-pass in the at-tack must be mopped up later.

"We learned not to get excited or go offhalf-cocked where there is noise. The Jap-anese make noise to mislead us. They shotoff some fire crackers at the start, but we have

40

learned that where the noise is, he ain't.You never hear him move. He sleeps in thedaytime and does his work at night.

"It must be impressed and drilled intoyoung soldiers not to throw away their equip-ment.. Our young men did this at first, andwe regretted it, as.Jater we needed the equip-ment. We actually found some of our newequipment, which had been thrown away, inthe hands of the enemy.

"Some of our men got killed because theyexamined Jap mortar shells. There werehundreds of •these shot at us which turnedout to be duds. The recruits pushed theplungers. Resuh—inst ant death.

"Officei's and NCO's, during shellin.g,should move around and talk to the men.Quiet them down. If you don't do this, someof them will walk around with their fingerson their triggers and they get to imaginingthings. And along this line, we learned topost douMe sentinels—one man to quiet an-other.

"We learned to digsmall covered fox holes.Slit trenches are best. We had men smother-ed to death in too large holes. Don't putmore than. 3 men in any hole unless the holehas a support on top big enough to stop a 500pound bomb.

40

learned that where the noise is, he ain't.You never hear him move. He sleeps in thedaytime and does his work at night.

"It must be impressed and drilled intoyoung soldiers not to throw away their equip-ment.. Our young men did this at first, and.we regretted it, as: later we needed the equip-ment. We actually found some of our newequipment, which had been thrown away, inthe hands of the enemy.

"Some of our men got killed because theyexamined Jap mortar shells. There werehundreds of these shot at us which turnedout to be duds. The recruits pushed theplungers. Result—inst ant death.

"Officers and NCO's, during shelling,should move around and talk to the men.Quiet them down. If you don't do this, someof them will walk around with their fingerson their triggers and thy get to imaginingthings. And along this line, we learned topost double sentinels—one man to quiet an-other.

"We learned to digsmall covered fox holes.Slit trenches are best. We had men smother-ed to death in too large holes. Don't putmore than 3 men in any hole unless the holehas a support on top big enough to stop a 500pound bomb.

41

"Teach the yotmg fellows to look over theground and look in. the trees and to learnwhere. the enemy probably will be. THEJAPS WILL BE IN THE TOUGHESTPLACES AD NATURALLY ON THEBEST cTROUND.

"All my time in the Marines I have seenmen bmch up, and I have talked about thisand niake my NCO 's talk about this all thetime. The men seem to fear separation.

"The BFM's state that a. mortar roirnclmust not be opened until the round is readyto be fired. This, in my opinion, is imprac-tical during battle, becaise to deliver a largevolume of fire, you have to have hundreds ofiouncls opened and prepared for firing.Some of the containers for the mortarroimcls get wet and have to be cut hi orderto get the round out. This takes up time.On occasion, it. takes the entire ammunitionsquad and all available hands to cut openammunition. Result may be, when 'Ceasefiring' is given you have numerous rounds

• open. These roum:Is, when exposed to theatmosphere, become wet or damp, makingthem dangerous to fire at a later time, be-cause the increments won't birn uniformallyand the round falls short. We have had around fall as great as 600 yards short of de-

41

"Teach the yoimg fellows to look over theground and look in the trees and to learnwhere. the enemy probably will be. THEJAPS WILL BE IN THE TOUGHESTPLACES AND NATURALLY ON THEBEST TROUND.

"All my time in the Marines I have seenmen bunch up, and I have talked about thisand make my NCO 's talk about this all thetime. The men seem to fear separation.

"The BFM's state that a. mortar roundmust not be opened until the round is readyto be fired. This, in my opinion, is imprac-tical during battle, because to deliver a largevolume of fire, you have to have hundreds ofrounds opened and prepared for firing.Some of the containers f or the mortarrornids get wet and have to be cut hi orderto get. the round out. This takes up time.On occasion, it. takes the entire ammunitionsquad and all available hands to cut openammunition. Result may be, when 'Ceasefiring' is given you have numerous rounds

• open. These rounds, when exposed to theatmosphere, become wet or damp, makingthem dangerous to fire at a later time, be-cause the increments won't burn uniformallyand the round falls short. We have had around fall as great as 600 yards short of de-

42

livery, firing at a range of 2700. I recoin—mend that aclthtional ncrernents be issued inwaterproof containers in order to remedythis condition. Also we need additionalcartridges for misfires.

"The Japs are man-monkeys, and they runaround considerable. In order to competewith these man-monkeys from Japan, yougot to be in excellent shape and you got tobe tough. We can lick them and we. aredoing it all the time, Sir.

"I have seen some awful attempts at. in-clividual cooking. However, some of my menhave got to the point where they ean makejam tarts.

"Sanitation—I know it's right! To vio-late it causes billions of flies and sickness.Some lousy 'tindisciplined recruits defecatedin fox holes, which caused trouble in theclark. We. learned that individual cansshould be buried. Some of the recruitsthrew the empty cans in the creek. Then, Iheard that the next battalion came along andwent. in swimming and. cut their feet. Whenyou occupy a position for several days in thetropics, the sanitation problem. becomes tre-menclous. The young officers and NCO'smust get after this at the start and keep afterit all the time."

42

livery, firing at a range of 2700. I recom-mend that additional increments be issued inwaterproof containers in order to remedythis condition. Also we need additionalcartridges for misfires.

"The Japs are man-monkeys, and they runaround considerable. In order to competewith these man-monkeys from Japan, yougot to be in excellent shape and you got tobe tough. We can lick them and we. aredoing it all the time, Sir.

"I have seen some awful attempts at in-dividual cooking. However, some of my menhave got to the point where they ean makejam tarts.

"Sanitation—I know it's right! To vio-late it causes billions of flies and sickness.Some lousy indisciplinecl recruits defecatedin fox holes, which caused trouble iii theclark. We. learned that hiclividual cansshould be buried. Some of the recruitsthrew the empty cans in the creek. Then, Iheard that the next battalion came along andwent. in swimming and. cut their feet. Whenyou occupy a position for several days in thetropics, t.he sanitation problem. becomes tre-mendous. The young officers and NCO'smust get after this at the start and keep afterit all the time."

43

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRISBEE,Executive Officer, Seventh Marines.

"I hope the Army is being toughened up.We toughened up by bivouacing—not camp-ing—at the combat ranges. We lived atthese combat ranges. In order to teach ourplatoons to keei off the road, we made theplatoons rnaich in the fields alongside theroad when they moved from one combat areato another.

se insist on overhead cover for fox holesbecause of the Japanese mortar fire.. In do-lug this you have to guard against the menbuilthng these fox holes up too high abovethe 1eve of the ground.

'Thè other day we received a. peculiarorder which w.e carried out, but in which Idid not believe. We were ordered to estab-lish Platoon listening posts. In my opinionI thought this was in error, as the listeningpost should either be a squad or a company.The platoon was no good, as it was not strongenough.

"Tiy to teach youi men not to steal fromeach other and adjacent units. If you couldd.o this, you will save yourself a lot oftrouble.''

J t34U ° —4 :———4

43

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRISBEE,Executive Officer, Seventh Marines.

"I hope the Army is being toughened up.We toughened up by bivouacing—not camp-ing—at the combat ranges. We lived atthese combat ranges. In order to teach ourplatooiis to keei off the road, we made theplatoons march in the fields alongside theroad when they moved from one combat areato another.

SVe insist on overhead cover for fox holesbecause of the Japanese mortar fire.. In do-ing t.his you have to guard against the menbuilding these fox holes up too high abovethe level of the ground.

'Thè other day we received a. peculiarorder which we carried out, but in which Idid not believe. We were ordered to estab-lish Platoon listening posts. In my opinionI thought this was in error, as the listeningpost should either be a squad or a company.The platoon was no good, as it was not strongenough.'1y to teach your men not to steal from

each other and adjacent unit.s. If you coulddo this, you will save yourself a lot oftrouble.''

O 34U° —4 ——4

44

LIET1TENANT COLOYEL N. H. HAYYE-KAN, C. 0. 211 Battalion, Seventh Ma-rifles. (Medal of Honor men in Haiti.)

"It pays in the attack in the jungle to usethe heavy machine guns. There is a thtier-ence of opinion, as you have noticed. on thisniattei. It's hard work, yes, but don't over-took the vahe—moral and ot.herwie—ancldon't forget about the high rate of fire. Ifyou ditch the heavy machine guns aiclstitute the lights in their place, you must re-member that you will be up against, the Jap-anese machine gun.

"c-five more attention to the training of theSimm mortars. and the coorc1Lmation of theseweapons with the foot troops. We were tOOslow in getting the Si into action when theywere needed. Get 'em into action fast.

"Be careful about withdrawing the menunless all the men know what it is about. Ifyou don't do this, you are liable to make themen panicky.

'' -.-

IN ow this next idea may soimd straige tosomeone who may read your notes in an officefar away, but it i a very practical meais ofcontrolling a imirch on a willthng trail in thishot coimtry. Marches here in the tropicaljimgle, where the air is hot - and so steamythat there seems t.o be no air, takes a lot out

44

LIET1TENANT CQLOYEL N. H. HAYYE-KAN, C. 0. 2d Battalion, Seventh Ma-rifles. (Medal of Honor men in Haiti.)

"It pays in the attack in the jungle to usethe heavy machine guns. There is a ditier-ence of opinion, as you have noticed, on thismatter. It's hard work, yes, but don't over-look the value—moral and ot.herwis c—anddon't forget about the high rate of fire. Ifyou ditch the heavy machine guns and sub-stitute the lights in their place, you must re-member that you will be up against, the Jap-anese machine gun.

"c-five more attention to the training of theSimm mortars. and the coordination of theseweapons with the foot troops. We were tooSlOW in 'getting the Si into action when theywere needed. Get 'em into action fast.

"Be careful about withdrawing the menunless all the men know what it is about. Ifyou don 't do this, you are liable to make themen panicky.

'' -.-

IN ow this next idea may sound strange tosomeone who may read your notes in an officefar away, but it i a very practical means ofcontrolling a march on a winding trail in thishot country. Marches here in the tropicaljungle, where the air is hot - awl so steamythat there seems t.o be no air, -takes a lot out

45

of the men. The weak ones will say-, whenthe march gets toigh, 'hold it iip ! As a re-su.lt this will be passed on ip to. the front andthe column will stop when you don't ant itto. So, as a result, we use the letter

.

'H'plus a nurnera meaning to halt. The leadersaiid the point know what numeral we. willuse, and we change the numeral. For ex-imple we will rise '112' the first two hours;then '117', etc.

"We had an Army Company of theInfantry attached to my Battalion. Theyhad heard so much about the Japs they wereScared to death. Some of these men weresent out on a patrol and while on this patro12 were killed and 3 were wounded. Tho.enot killed or wounded were in a terrible stat.cof mind. They must leatn to grit their teethand bear it, and that we can and are beatingthe Japs. The Captain of this company wasscarecl too. They had the wrong attitude.

"I am screaming for gloves to use in han-dling barbed-wire. You cannot put up abarbed-wire fence in a hurry if you are bare-handed.

''You must. realize that there is suchthing as' not attaeking when ordered to do soWe have, got to get to the point where themen go ahead when orcleiecl, and clanm the

45

of the men. The weak ones will say, whenthe march gets tough, 'hold it up ! As a re-sult. tii].S will be passed on up to. the front andthe colunm will stop when you don't yant itto. So, as a result, we use the letter

.

'H'plus a numeral meaning to halt. The leadersand the point know what numeral we willuse, and we change the numeral. For ex-ample we will use '112' the first. two hours;then '117', etc.

"We had an Army Company of theInfantry attached to my Battalion. Theyhad heard so much about the Japs they werescared to death. Some of these men weresent out on a patrol and while on this patrol2 were killed and 3 were wounded. Thosehot killed or wounded were in a terrible stateof mind. They must learn to grit their teethand heal' it, and that we can and are beatingthe Japs. The Captain of this company wasscared too. They had the wrong attitude.

"I am screaming for gloves to use in han-dling barbed-wire. You cannot put up abarbed-wire fence in a hurry if you are bare-handed.

''You must. realize that there is such athings as' not attacking when ordered to do so.We have, got to get to the point where themen go ahead when ordered, and clanm the

46

hindmost. Corporals must be indoctrinatedwith leadership t.o overcome this, and allranks have got to have the 'hate'.

"We had a sad accident the other day. Aman hung a hand grenade on a bandolier.A vine puiieci the pin—two men were killed.Empty bancloliers are okay in which to placehand grenades. We have had hand grenadesleft around at night. Then a Company, wewill say, gets an order to move and handgrenades are lost..

"We did not start taking quinine and ate-brine soon enough when we hit. Guaclalcanal.We are paying for this now:

Conference with three 2nd Lieutenantsand 5 old NCO's of the 2nd Battalion, Sev-enth Marines.

"The basic. principle of leadership iii theU. S. Marine Corps is that the individual istold of his responsibility in different situa-tions and is held to it.

"You gotta have conficlerìce in each other.When signals to move forward are given,you must have confidence that. the men nextto you .zill move forward even if you can-not' see them We have that kind of confi-deuce in this Battalion.

46

hindmost. Corporals must be indoctrinatedwith leadership t.o overcome this, and allranks have got to have the 'hate'.

"We had a sad accident the other day. Aman hung a hand grenade on a banclolier.A vine puiieci the pin—two men were killed.Empty bandoliers are okay ha which to placehand grenades. We have hd hand grenadesleft around at night. Then a Company, wewill say, gets an order to move and handgrenades are lost..

"We did not start. taking quinine and ate-brine soon enough when we hit. Guadalcanal.We are paying for this now:

Conference with three 2nd Lieutenantsand 5 old NCO's of the 2nd Battalion, Sev-enth Marines.

"The basic principle of leadership in theU. S. Marine Corps is that the individual istOld of his responsibility in different situa-tions and is held to it.

"You gotta have confidence in each other.When signals to move forward are given,you must have confidence that the men nextto you .zi1l move forward even if you can-not' see them. We have that kind of confi-dence in this Battalion.

47

WTë have developed signals m our Bat-talion which are not recorded in aiiv textbook. I recommend that. your troop do thesame.

"One night when we had a position on asteep ridge, the Japs attacked up the ridge.We piillecl the pins of hand grenades and letthem roll down hill. Don't forget to count.'one Jap dead, two Japs dead' before throw-ing the grenade. We had a Marine killed inthis Battalion because he forgot. to count. anda Jap picked up the hand grenade and threwit back.

"We love the heavy machine gun."The Thompson sub-machine gun or car-

bine is needed, as they execut.e their att.acken masse. We understand time carbine willhave more penetrating power than theThompson.

"We have two American Indians we use as'talkers' on the telephone or voice radio whenwe want to transmit secret or important mes-sages.

"Don't forget. the Japs make noise when theymove too. They are not supermen.

"Be mean and kill 'eni. Kill. 'em dead.Our motto in this Platoon is 'No prisoners.' '

47

We have developed signals in our Bat-talion which are not iecorclecl in aiiv textbook. I recommend that. your troops do thesame.

"One night when we had a position on asteep ridge, the Japs attacked up the ridge.We piil1ed the pins of hand grenades and letthem roll clown hill. Don't forget to count.'one Jap dead, two Japs dead' before throw-ing the grenade. We had a Marine killed inthis Battalion because he forgot. to count. anda Jap picked up the hand grenade and threwit back.

"We love the heavy machine gun."The Thompson sub-machine gun or car-

bine is needed, as they execut.e their att.acken masse. \Te understand the carbine willhave more penetrating power than theThompson.

"We have two American Indians we use as'talkers' on the telephone or voice radio whenwe want to transmit secret or irnportant mes-sages.

"Don't forget. the Japs make noise when theymove too. They are not supermen.

''Be meaii and kill 'em. Kill. 'em dead.Our motto in this Platoon is 'No prisoners.' '

48

SECOND LIEUTENANT P. A. CLRK.Seventh Mariies.

(Promoted on the field of battle—this officerwas interviewed in the hospital wherelie was recuperating from wounds.)

'We have a lot of trouble. in my Platoonwith water discipline; We also have troublewith men bunching up in order to talk toeach other. They seem to do this eventhough it means death.

"We have learned to make reconnaissancebefore moving into an area. -We scout forambushes. We have learned to be quiet, listenand look. I sure like to see that artillerycome down on an area before we move into it.

"The big problem which we have not solvedcompletely yet to my mmd is maintainingcontact in the attack between units in thisjungle, especially between battalions.

"It. takes guts to go up on the Japaneseposition to throw grenades and to attack.

This reconnaissance, which is so important,is also hard work because the Japs move theirclef ensive positions.

"I was on my first patrol here, and we weremoving up a. dry stream bed. We saw 3 Japscome down the river bed out. of the jungle.The one in front was carrying a white flag.We thought they were surrendering. When

48

SECOND LIEUTENANT P. A. CLARK.Seventh Marines.

(Promoted on. the field of battle—this officerwas interviewed in the hospital wherehe was recuperating from wounds.)

'We have a lot of trouble. in my Platoonwith water discipline. We also have troublewith men. bimching up in order to talk toeach other. They seem to do this eventhough it means death.

"We have learned to make reconnaissancebefore moving into an a1ea. -We scout forambushes. We have learned to be quiet, listenand look. I sure like to see that artillerycome clown on an area before we move into it.

'The big problem which we have not solvedcompletely yet to my mind is maintainingcontact in the attack between units in thisjungle, especially between battalions.

"It. takes guts to go up on the Japaneseposition to throw grenades and to attack.

This reconnaissance, which is so important,is also hard work because the Japs move theirclef ensive positions.

"I was on my first patrol here, and we weremoving up a. dry stream bed. We saw 3 Japscome clown. the river bed out. of the jungle.The one iii front. was carrying a white flag.We thought. they were surreiiclering. When

49

they got up tO us, they dropped the whiteflag and. then all 3 tL.rw hand grenades. Wekilled 2 of these Japs, but 1 got away. Ap-parently they do not mind a sacrifice in orderto get information. They are tricky bas-tards.

"The mortars are very effective here. Anexample: We were movm2 up a trail. Wewere stopped by machine gun fire. I withdrew the platoon and spread out off the trail,tormrng a skirmish line. I sent word backto the mortars to set up. They had to cutdcwn some trees in order to set up poper•ly.The OP man comes forward and gets theazimuth and paces off the range as best hecan. Then the mortars open up.''

MAJOR BUSE. Assistant U-—3 Ofl GeneralVanclegrift 's Staff.

''We have had to multiply Our unit of firein hand grenades by five. The yellow coloron hand grenades is poor. Why can't theybe painted black, as the yellow color enablesthe Japs to throw them back. When we havetaken a defensive position, as we have now toprotect the airfield, due to the dense junglewe do not take up a formation which wewould •use on more open terrain, like the ter-rain in the States. That is, here we general

49

they got up tO us, they dropped the whiteflag and then all 3 tL.rw hand grenades. Wekilled 2 of these Japs, but 1 got away. Ap-parently they do not mind a sacrifice in orderto get information. They are tricky bas-tards.

"The mortars are very effective here. Anexample: We were movin up a trail. Wewere stopped by machine gun fire. I with-drew the platoon and spread out off the trail,tornnng a skirmish line. I sent word backto the mortars to set up. They had to cutdcwn some trees in order to set up ProPerly.The OP mail comes forward and gets theazimuth and paces oft the range as bes hecan. Then tile mortars open up.''

MAJOR BUSE. Assistant G—3 on GeneralVandegrift 's Staff.

'',Te have had to niultiplv our unit of firein hand grenades by five. The yellow color011 hand grenades is poor. Why can't theybe painted black, as the yellow color enablesthe Japs to throw them hack. When we havetaken a defensive position, as we have now toprotect the airfield, due to the dense junglewe do not take up a formation which wewould use on more open terrain, like the ter-rain in the States. That is, here we genera11

50

do not establish strong points. We have ashoulder-to-shoulder defense with mobile re-serves in the rear.

"I am being sent back foi' a rest. We havebeen in action continually here from August7, 1942, until this date—November 26, 1942.What we all marvel at is how General Van-degrift can stand it so much better than wedo. It must be his character."

GENERAL ED SEBREE, Assistant DivisionCommander, Americal Division.

"We have found it profitaNe to bring suc-cessful patrol leaders back to the OP's of themortars and artillery and let them directthe fire. We get •these patrol leaders backto these point.s as soon as possible. Thebasis of this type of warfare is scouting and.patrolling.

"You asked about individual cooking.Yes, in my opinion the troops should knowthis, but it is not practical for units who arenot close to water to cook that way, as theycannot clean their mess gear properly anddysentery is the result. These units put the'C' ration—stew or bean—can to their mout.hand eat that way. You will notice as yougo to the 164th Infantry that the RegimentalCommander is relieving units who have been

50

do not establish strong points. We have ashoulder-to-shoulder defense with mobile re-serves in the rear.

"I am being sent back for a rest. We havebeen in action continually here from August7, 1942, until this date—November 26, 1942.What we all marvel at is how General Van-degrift can stand it so much better than wedo. It must be his character."

GENERAL ED SEBREE, Assistant DivisionCommander, Americal Division.

"We have found it profitable to bring suc-cessful patrol leaders back to the OP's of themortars and artillery and let them directthe fire. We get these . patrol leaders backto these point.s as soon as possible. Thebasis of this type of warfare is scouting and.patrolling.

"You asked• about individual cooking.Yes, in my opinion the troops should knowthis, but it is not practical for units who arenot close to water to cook that way, as theycannot clean their mess gear properly anddysentery is the result. These units put the'C' ration—stew or bean—can to their mout.hand eat that way. You will notice as yougo to the 164th Infantry that the RegimentalCommander is relieving units who have been

51

taking it hot and heavy from the enemy, andalso units who are on that ridge up t.herwhere there is no water and where the sui.is beating down in that heavy thick tropieagrass.

MAJOR BEN. J. NORTHRIDGE, C. 0. 2Battalion, 164th Infantiy.

"We like this Mi rifle, but we don't likethe way the front end shines.

•'If I could train nw men over again, Iwould put officers and men in slit trenchesand drop bombs nearby to overcome fearWe were all scared to death at first.. Letovercome this fear. How about firing somt.captured 25 caliber ammunition out of captirecl rifles to let officers and men know thsound; also captured .Jap machine gun ammunition out of captured machine gmls.

"We are learning to get shoes off men a.

night. if the tactical situation permits. If 11

could train my Battalion again I would havsome maneuvers in which things were madEto go wrong—communications upset., etc.and I would observe which leaders are wgood and replace them on the spot—not latei• "I rnderstanc1 that. in the U. S., troops ii

training for this type of warfare are prac-ticing firing at short. ranges. That is fine

51

taking it hot and heavy from the enemy, andalso units who are on that ridge up therEwhere there is no water and. where the suris beating clown in that heavy thick tropieagrass.

MAJOR BEN. J. NORTURIDGE, C. 0. 2Battalion, 164th Infantiy.

"We like this Mi rifle, but we don't likethe way the front end shines.

•'If I could train niv men over again. Iwould put officers and men in slit trenchesand drop bombs nearby to overcome fearWe were all scared to death at first.. Letovercome this fear. How about firing som€captured 25 caliber ammunition out of captured rifles to let officers and men know thsound; also captured .Jap machine gun ammunition out of captured machine guns.

"We are learning to get shoes off men anight. if the tactical situation permits. If 11

could train my Battalion again I would havsome maneuvers in which things were machto go wrong—communications upset, etc.and I would observe which leaders are ngood and replace them on the spot—not latei• "I understand that. in the U. S., troops h

training for this type of warfare are prac-ticing firing at short. ranges. That is fine

52

"The Japanese powder is more smokelessthan ours. We need smokeless powder.''(Note: The reason the Japanese bullet, whenit is fired, does not make as much smoke isprobably because not as much powder is needed. to propel a 25 calihr bullet as is neededto send a 30 caliber bullet on its way.)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANK RICH-ARDS. C. 0. 1st Battalion, 164th In-fantrv.

'We don 't have enough ammunition carry-ing bags. We Should have this for the mor-tars. We need these bags for other types ofammunition too. I do not know how manyas we have not experimented—all I knowis we need them. We need grenade carrierstoo. How to carry water anti rations aromclin this jungle to the troops on the line is abig problem.

"Train patrols in stalking certain posi-tions. I consider this very important. IfI were training my Battalion again, I wouldhave training in patience. I would havepatrols wait for the enemy to expose him-self. The move around too. They have toreliev themselves and have to get food. Iwould have the men in this patience trainiiigbe made to stay still for hours at a time.

52

"The Japanese pOwdeT is more smokelessthan ours. We need smokeless powder.:'(Note: The reason the Japanese bullet, whenit is fired, does not make as much smoke isprobably because not as much powder is neecled to propel a 25 caliber bullet as is neededto send a 30 caliber bullet on its way.)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANK RICH-ARDS. C. 0. 1st Battalion, 164th In-fantrv.

'We don t have enough ammunition carry-ing bags. We should have this for the mor-tars. We need these bags for other types ofammunition too. I do not know how manyas we have not experimented—all I knowis we need them. We need grenade carrierstoo. How to carry water ant.l rations aromiciin this jungle to the troops on the line is abig problem.

"Train patrols in stalking certain posi-tions. I consider this very important. IfI were training my Battalion again, I wouldhave training in patience. I would havepatrols wait for the enemy to expose him-self. The move around too. They have torelieve themselves and have to get food. Iwould have the men iii this patience trainingbe made to stay still for hours at a time.

53

"We are not cai'rying mess kits—toobulky.''

CAPTAIN H. L. CROOK, C. 0. 3d Battalion,164th Iifantrv.

\Ve need better trained scoits. The poorscouts lose their lives.

"When we first got here the Japanese fooledis as they like to place their machine guis oithe reverse slope of the ridge, shooting up-\va1'ds

"Our rifle grenades have been effectiveagainst hidden machine gun positions. ouhave to KILL these Jap before they willleave. Just turning a large volume of fie ihis direction will not make him leave.

"The time to have air observation is \vhel:we attack. At other times when our planes gcover, the Japanese keep clown and keep still.'

CAPTAIN JOHN A. G-OSSETT, C. 0. Cornp any H, 164th Infantry.

"Teach the men capacities of the haicl gre-nacles; and handing men! I thought I knevhow to han.clle men, but since I have been hei(I have revised my ideas as I have learnedgreat. deaL I have learned the primitiverough aiicl tumble way. You can't. pat all me

53

"We are not carrying mess kits—toobulky.''

CAPTAIN H. L. CROOK, C. 0. 3d Battalion,164th Infantry.

\Ve need better trained scouts. The poorscouts lose their lives.

"When we first got here the Japanese fooledus as they like to place their machine guns onthe reverse slope of the ridge, shooting up-\\Tar ds.

"Our rifle grenades have been effectiveagainst hidden machine gun positions. ouhave to KILL these Japs before they will].eave. Just turning a large volume of fie iihis direction will not make him leave.

"The time to have air observation is \vbel:we attack. At other times when our planes gcover, the Japanese keep clown and keep still.'

CAPTAIN JOHN A. G-OSSETT, C. 0. Company H, 164th Infantry.

"Teach the men capacities of the hand gre-nacles; and handling mcii! I thought I knevhow to handle men, but since I have beemi hei(I have revised my ideas as I have learned tgreat. deaL I have learned the primitiverough allcl tumble way. You can't. pat all me

54

on the back. You have to be rough with somemen in order to get results. It is not niv na-ture to be rough, but I am forciig myself, andI have learned which of my men 1 can pat onthe back and which I have to deal with iii thehardest manner."

CAPTAIN JOHN A. DAWSON, C. 0. Corn-pany B, 164th Infantry.

"If I could train my company again, Iwould have some maneuvers on which the menwere deprived of food, water and comforts inorder to find out which NCO's and men can'ttake it. I would relieve these people. Thistype of maneuver would teach men toknow andexpect hardships. It will lessen the shockwhen they come up against the real thing in thepresence of the enemy.

"It is important that the entiie squadknow the BAR. Not just 2 men. Reason,think of the BAR .inen who are woimcled, getkilled, and become sick and have to beevacuated.

"They don't. appreciate the principle ofreconnaissance here, or give us time for thisvery important flung. v e must have timeto do this ns it saves lives and puts us in theproper position.

54

on the back. You have to be rough with someniel]. in order to get results. It is not my na-tm'e to be rough, but I am forcing myself, andI have learned which of my men 1 can pat onthe back and which I have to deal with iii thehardest manner."

CAPTAIN JOHN A. DAWSON, C. 0. Corn-pany B, 164th Infantry.

"If I could train my company again,would have some manuvers on which the menwere deprived of food, water and comforts inorder to find out which NCO 's and men can'ttake it. I would relieve these people. Thistype of maneuver would teach men toknow andexpect hardships.

. It will lessen the shockwhen they come up against the real thing in thepresenc.e of the enemy.

"It is important that the entire squadkiiow the BAR. Not just 2 men. Reason,think of the BAR inen who are wounded, getkilled, and become sick and have to beevacuated.

"They don't. appreciate the principle ofreconnaissance here, or give us time for thisvery important thrng. v e must have timeto do this as it saves lives and puts us in theproper posit.ion.

55

Our Battalion Pioneer Section must havebetter and more complete training in carry-ing food, water and ammunition and in cut.-ting trails.''

SERGEANT L. B. LANG, Platoon Sergeant,Company E, 164th Infantry.

Are we getting more small hand radiosMan, they're sure needed, for communicationwithin the Company and within the Battalionis tough.

"Sir, are our men in the U. S. receivingindividual training G? I notice here that. whenI have to put 2 men out for say 48 hours,most of the men are upset unless they havea NCO along.

"For Pete's sake, Sir, teach the hien notto be 'trigger happy' (Note: An expressionused on Guaclalcanal for men who are verynervous and who fire without seeing theenemy. This type of man is dangerous andhas caused a lot of trouble. He has also giventhe position away.)

"Are. we getting a glass sight for the Mlfor sniper work a?''

55

"Our Battalion Pioneer Section must havebetter and more complete training in carry-ing food, water and ammunition and in cut-ting trails.''

SERGEANT L. B. LANG, Platoon Sergeant,Company E, 164th Infantry.

"Are we getting more small hand radiosMaii, they're sure needed, for communicationwithin the Conipaiiy and within the Battalionis tough.

"Sir, are our men. in the U. S. receivingindividual training I notice here that. whenI have to put 2 men out for say 48 hours,most of the men are upset unless they havea NCO along.

For Pete 's sake, Sir, teach the men notto be 'trigger happy' (Note: An expressionused on Guadalcanal for men who are verynervous and who fire without seeing theenemy. This type of man is dangerous andhas caused a lot of trouble. He has also giventhe position away.)

"Are we getting a glass sight for the Mlfor sniper works?"

56

SERGEANT P. L. GOLDEN1 Compaity F.164th Infantry.

(Note by Col. P. E. Moore, C. 0., 16'4th In-fantry: Sergeant Golden is an outstand-ing NCO in this Regiment.)

•"The biggest thing Ihave learned since Ihit Guaclalcanal is that the Japanese camou-flage is miles ahead of ours. Their individualcan camouflage himself a lot better than ours.We must piactice and train in this.

"Every man shouTd be equipped with a com-pass, and must know how to use the compass.The dumbbells who don't know howto use onehave to be helped instead of being able to hell)themselves. Those who don't know how to usea compass can hell) you or theii NC'O 's.

"I have been on 20 pat1os in the last 40clays, and ill most all of these patrols we wentout from 2 to 5 miles. Getting connnunica-tions back to the girn position is an awful prob-em. Can you help us

LIEUTENANT JOHN S. CTRAVES, PlatoonLeader, Company C, 164th Infantry.

"The bi:gest thing I have learned siice I hitthis island is that leaclei'ship and initiative is soinhi)o1ta1t here. The Platoon Leader can onlybe in one spot at a time, and men must be

56

SERGEANT P. L. GOLDEN1 Company F.164th Infantry.

(Note by Col. P. E. Moore, C. 0., 16'4th In-fantry: Sergeant Golden is an outstand-ing NCO in this Regiment.)

•"The biggest thing I have learned since Ihit Guadalcanal is that the Japanese camou-flage is miles ahead of ours. Their individualcan camotiflage himself a lot better than ours.We must practice and tram in. this.

"Every man shouTd be equipped with a com-pass, and must know how to use the compass.The dumbbells who don't know howto use onehave to be helped instead of being able to hell)themselves. Those who don't know how to usea compass can't.help you or their NC'O's.

"I have been on 20 patrols in the last 40days, and 111 most all of these patrols we wentout from 2 to 5 miles. Getting conililUnica-tions back to the gun position is an awful prob-lem. Can you help us 6?

LIEUTENANT JOHN S. CTRAVES, PlatoonLeader. Company C, 164th Infantry.

"The biggest thing I have learned since I hitthis island is that leadership and initiative is soimi)ortallt here. The Platoon Leader can onlybe in one spot at a time, and men must be

57

trained to act correctly on their own. I havenever seen this type of training'."

SERGEANT W. V. DEMOSS, Squad Leader,Company C, 164th Infantry.

"Sir, I would like to say that there is noplace for recruits here, We need trained sol-cliers who have initiative and know what is theright thing to do. The jungle here is so thickthat the Squad Leaders cannot get around allof the time to see men and to tell them whatto do.''

STAFF SERGEANT A. L. CHAPMAN, Pla-toon Sergeant, Company G-, 164th Inn-try.

"We want better field glasses. Cant we eta glass for spotting men in foliage ndalong this line how about some taining inshooting at vague targets, at c'ose raiiges. indense woods. And, Sir, I wou'd suggest sometraining in throwing hand grenades in woods."

SERGEANT C. W. ARROWOOD, Com-pany F, 164th Infantry.

"Mv message for you to take back. Co'onel,is to stress real seoiting and patrolling andto teach them to go the hard way.

57

trained to act correctly on their own. I havenever seen this type of training'."

SERGEANT W. V. DEMOSS, Squad Leader,Company C, 164th Infantry.

"Sir, I would like to say that there is noplace for recruits here. We need trained sol-cliers who have initiative and know wha.t is theright thing to do. The jungle here is so thickthat the Squad Leaders cannot get around allof the time to see men and to tell them whatto do.''

STAFF SERGEANT A. L. CHAPiAN, Pla-toon Sergeant, Company G, 164th Inan-try.

"We want better field glasses. Cant we geta g'lass for spotting men in foliage Andalong this line how about some training inshooting at vague targets, at close ranges, indense woods. And, Sir, I would suggest sometraining in throwing hand grenades in woods.''

SERGEANT C. W. ARROWOOD, Com-pany F, 164th Infantry.

"My message for you to take back. Colonel,is to stress real scouting and patrolling andto teach them to go the hard way.

58

"I have been on 15 iatio1s and each timea patro' was fired 011, the man. with a net onhis helmet drew the fire. I have seen .25caliber bullets go through our new helmet; so,as for me, I use a fatigue field hat. (Note:I talked to a man who showed me his steelhelmet wit.h a .25 caliber bullet hole in it.The man received a slight head wound. Hewas convinced, and so am I, that if he hadnot. had on his steel helmet when this bulletwas fired at him, he would have been killed.)

"The Jap knee mortar gives us hell. Theycome in fast, thick and accurate. Can't wehave oneV'

COLONEL B. E. MOORE, C. 0. 164th In-fantry.

(Note: When I saw Colonel Moore, he wasinterviewing a patrol and patrol leaderwho had just come back. They had beenon a reconnaissance for 15 hours. Thepatro eacler had been met at. an ad-vance position and, as he had valuableinformation of t.he enemy, he was con-ducted by• 'jeep' to the observation postof the artillery where he directed artil-lery fire; then returned to the Co1onewhere he made his report. The patroland its 'eader were nearv exhausted.

58

"I have been on 15 iatio1s and each timea patrol was fired 011, the man with a net onhis helmet drew the fire. I have seen .25caliber bullets go through our new helmet; so,as for me, I use a fatigue field hat. (Note:I talked to a man who showed me his steelhelmet wit.h a .25 caliber bullet hole in it..

The man received a slight head wound. Hewas convinced, and so am I, that if he hadnot. had on his steel helmet when this bulletwas fired at him, he would have been killed.)

"The Jap knee mortar gives us hell. Theycome in fast, thick and accurate. Can't wehave one

COLONEL B. E. MOORE, C. 0. 164th In-fantry.

(Note: When I saw Colonel Moore, he wasinterviewing a patrol and patrol leaderwho had just come back. They had beenon a reconnaissance for 15 hours. Thepatrol leader had been met at an acT-vance position and, as he had valuableinformation of t.he enemy, he was con-ducted by• 'jeep' to the observation postof the artillery where he directed artil-lery fire; then returned to the Colonelwhere he made his report. The patroland its leader were nearly exhausted.

59

Colonel Moore liadoii hand small samplebottles of brandy which he issuej onesmall sample bottle to each two men. Hemade theni dilute this brandy with waterrn their canteen cups. It was noticeablethat. this helped them. The following in-tei'view took place after the patrol hadbeen dismissed. One could not. bearound Colonel Moore very long with-out realizing that he is a leader andRegimental Commander, in every senseof the word.)

"The Ml rifle is a fine rifie. It is doingfluTe work here.

"The greatest problem is leaders, andhave to find some way to weed out the weakones. The platoon leaders who cannot corn-mrnd, who cannot foresee things, and whocannot act on the spur of the moment in auemergency are a distiuct detrimeut.

"It is hot here, as you caxi see. Meu strug-gle; they ge heat exhaustion. They comeout vomiting, and throwing away equipment.The leaders must be leaders aud they mustbe alert t.o establish straggler lines and STOPthis thing.

"The men have been taught t.o take salttablets, but the leaders don't see to this. Re-sult, heat exhaustion.

59

Colonel Moore had on hand small samplebottles of brandy which he issued onesmall sample bottle to each two men. Hemade theni dilute this brandy with waterin their canteen CUps. It was noticeablethat. this helped them. The following in-terview took place after the patrol hadbeen dismissed. One could not. bearound Colonel Moore very long with-out realizing that he is a leader andRegimental Commander, in every senseof the word.)

"The Ml rifle is a fine rifie. It is doingfluTe work here.

"The greatest problem is leaders, andhave to find some way to weed out the weakones. The platoon leaders who cannot com-mand, who cannot foresee things, and whocannot act on the spur of the moment in anemergency are a distinct detriment.

"It is hot here, as you can see. Men strug-gle; they ge heat exhaustion. They comeout vomiting, and throwing away equipment.The leaders must be leaders and they mustbe alert t.o establish straggler lines and STOPthis thing.

"The men have been taught t.o take salttablets, but the leaders don't see to this. Re-sult, heat exhaustion.

.60

"Many of the junior leaders have not usedtheir heads at times. In their training, Irecommend you put them up against situa-tions where they MUST use their heads.For example, 0. 0. Company L reports hehad onlv 3o men; that •the rest had heat. ex-haustion. He did not have sense enough torest his men, make them take salt, etc.

"The good leaders seem to get killed; thepoor leaders get the men killed. The bigproblem is leadership and getting theshoulder straps on the right people.

"Not one man in 50 can lead a patrol inthis jungle. If you can find, out who thegood patrol leaders are before you hit thecombat zone, you have found out something.

"I have had to get rid of about 25 offlcer.sbeeause they just weren't leaders I I had toMAKE the Battalion Commander weed outthe poor junior leaders. This process is con-tinuous. Our junior leaders are finding outthat they must know more about their men.

"The good leaders Imow their men."i\Totes given by a U. S. Marine on Guadal-

canal:"For patrols from 1 to 10 days duration I

suggest a pack whose contents are as fol-lows:

The top half of our piesent pack to con-thin:

.60

"Many of the junior leaders have not usedtheir heads at times. In their training,

.

Irecommend you put them up against situa-tions where they MUST use their heads.For example, 0. 0. Company L reports hehad onlv 3o men; that •the rest had heat. ex-ha.ustion. He did not have sense enough torest his men, make them take salt, etc.

"The good leaders seem to get killed; thepoor leaders get the men killed. The bigproblem is leadership and getting theshoulder straps on the right people.

"Not one man in 50 can lead a patrol inthis jungle. If you can find out who thegood patrol leaders are before you hit thecombat zone, you have found out something.

"I have had to get rid of about 2.5 officer.sbecause they just weren't leaders! I had toMAKE the Battalion Commander weed outthe poor junior leaders. This process is con-tinuous. Our junior leaders are finding outtha.t they must know more about their men.

"The good leaders Imow their men."i\Totes given by a U. S. Marine on Guadal-

canal:"For patrols from 1 to 10 days duration I

suggest a pack whose contents are as fol-lows:

The top half of our present pack to con-thin:

61

Dehydrated itio11s. and type ''D''rations r the period expected.

1 or 2 eanteells, depe1lding on the terra i which you are operating.

Medical kit containing: banclaids, sulfa,atebrine, salve for protection againstsldn infection, tablets for the pun-fication of water of a squad's can-tee 115.

1 cake of soap1 pair extra socks1 pair shoe laces1 shirt, flannel or woolenAll above in rubber bag.1 poncho1 can of oil and cleaning gear for

weapon where such is not part ofthe weapon you carry.

The following equipment:

Good field giasse.s for all leaders clownto sergeants in rifle units, and tosquad leaders in weapons squads.

Compass—same distributionBush knife 12" blade made of good

steel for all handsHelmet for allCamouflage net. for all helmetsMosquito net, head, for allIntreiiching shovel for all

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Dehydrated rations and type ''D''rations ov the period expected.

1 01' 2 eanteens, depe1ldiflg on the terrain in which you are operating.

Medical kit containing: bandaids, sulfa,atebrine, salve for protection against1dn infection, tablets for the pun-fleation of water of a squad's can-te eiis.

1 cake of soap1 pail' extra socks1 pair shoe laces1 shirt, flannel on woolenAll above in rubber bag.1 poncho1 can of oil and cleaning gear for

weapon where such is not part ofthe weapon you carry.

The following equipment:

Good field glasses for all leaders clownto sergeants in rifle units, and tosquad leaders in weapons squads.

Compass—same distributionBush knife 12" blade made of good

steel for all handsHelmet for allCamouflage net for all helmetsMosquito net, head, for allIntren ching' shovel for all

62

We ne&l a rubber bag which will keepeverything dry and can be used for floatingconteits across streams. Must be lig'ht andrugged.

I also favor canvas leggings, greased shoesand hobnails for footing in climbing hills, apair of flannel gloves for protection againstinsects while sleeping.

Officers and men must be in identical uni-form.''

The following was dictated to a steno-grapher, in my piesence, by Colonel G. C.Thomas, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staffto Maj oi General Yandegrift:

"We are operatmg our staff strictly alongLeavenworth lines I learned while a studentthere. Job has been too big and clerks too fewto engage in lengthy orders. Campaign hasbeen fought with almost a total absence ofpaper work, and we have gotten over thatjump by continuous, close personal contactbetween troop commanders and staff. Thismethod was practicable because we have, notbeen operating a very large area.

"Our successful Commanders are invari-ably those who understand the use of in-fantry weapons. The work of our artilleryhas, I feel, been exceptional. Our forwardobservers have been right in the front line,

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We ne&l a rubber bag which will keepeverything dry and can be used for floatingcontents across streams. Must be light andrugged.

I also favor canvas leggings, greased shoesand hobnails for footing in climbing hills, apair of flannel gloves for protection againstinsects while sleeping.

Officers and men must be in identica.l uni-form.".

The following was dictated to a steno-grapher, in my piesence, by Colonel G. C.Thomas, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staffto Maj or General Yandegrift:

"We are operating our staff strictly alongLeavenworth lines I learned while a studentthere. Job has been too big and clerks too fewto engage in lengthy orders. Campaign hasbeen fought with almost a total absence ofpaper work, and we have gotten over thatjump by continuous, close personal contactbetween troop commanders and staff. Thismethod was practicable because we have notbeen operating a very large area.

"Our successful Commanders are invari-ably those who understand the use of in-fantry weapons. The work of our artilleryhas, I feel, been exceptional. Our forwardobservers have been right in the front line,

63

a1cl artillery fire has caused the enemy manycasualties.

"We feel that we have been successful.We have caused the enemy eiormous lossesin men. Our battle casualties to date exceed3500, of which about one-third have beeiikilled in action.

'Most. of the fighting here has beei car-ned out at extremely close range, and therehas been as much throwing of hand grenadesas in firing a weapon. No previous 'report,.or even c&mment, on our enemy and onifighting has been made. Foi one thing, wedo not. want to appear boastful; for another,we have been literally so busy we have not hadtime to really think things out.

"Concerning our enemy, several t.hings areapparent. All of his efforts have been iii theform of attacks on a narrow front at ratherwidely separated points. These were mass at-tacks, and although orders and operationsmaps captured have shown that. they were tobe simultaneous attacks, this was never thecase. Our feeling is that his failure to esti-mate the terrain difficulties caused the lack ofcoordination. The result has been favorableto us, as it has permitted the shifting of ourall too small reserves from one area to another.

63

and artillery fire has caused the epemy manycasualties.

"We feel that we have been successful.We have caused the enemy enormous lossesin men. Our battle casualties to date exceed3500, of which about one-third have beenkilled in action.

'Most. of the fighting here has been ear-ned out at extremely close range, and therehas been as much throwing of hand grenadesas in flriiig a weapon. No previous 'report,or even c&mment, on our enemy and onifighting has been mcicie. For one thing, wedo not want to appear boastful; for another,we have been literally so busy we have not hadtime to really think things out.

''Concenung' our enemy, several thing's areapparent. All of his efforts have been iii theform of attacks on a narrow front. at ratherwidely separated points. These were mass at-tacks, and although orders and operationsmaps captured have shown that. they were tobe simultaneous attacks, this was never thecase. Our feeling is that his failure to esti-mate the terrain difficulties caused the lack ofcoordination. The result has been favorableto us, as it has permitted the shifting of ourall too small reserves from one area to another.

64

"We believe that the enemy has dispersedhis efforts and has therefore failed to make.any gain a.t any oiie j)Oiflt. When given hischoice, he operates exclusively at. night. As Isaid before, he attacks on a very narrow front,practically en masse. This leads to many'purple nights' when we watch longingly forsunise. The result for him has been almostcomplete annihilation in every case. As faras we can determine, these various attackinggroups are started out, and there are indications that they pass out of real control oftheir higher leaders. We have never seenanything to indicate that. any effort has beenreinoreecl after the initial push has 'beenmacic.

'4The Japanese soldiers fight with a sort offanaticism and never surrender. We havetaken practically no prisoners. Officersabout. to be taken prisoner sometimes commitsuici.cle. Perhaps of greatest assistance to ushas been captured orders and maps. A greatdeal of information has been gotten from cap-tured diaries. Our interpreters on the spotwere able to get from captured orders in-formation on which we have successfully op-erated at once. It causes me to want neverto write another order.

64

"We believe that the enemy has thsperseclhis efforts and has therefore failed to make.any gain at any one j)Oiflt. When given hischoice, he operates exclusively at. night. As Isaid before, he attacks on a very narrow front,practically en masse. This leads to many'purple nights' when we watch longingly forsunise. The result. for him has been almostcomplete annihilation in every case. As faras we can determine, these various attackinggroups are stai'tecl out, and there are indica-tions that they pass out of real control oftheir higher leaders. We have never seenanything to indicate that. any effort has beenreinorcecl after the initial push' has 'beenmacic.

'4The Japanese soldiers fight 'with a sort offanaticism and never surrender. We havetaken practically no prisoners. Officersabout. to be taken prisoner sometimes commitsuicide. Perhaps of greatest assistance to ushas been captured orders and maps. A greatdeal of information has been gotten from cap-tured diaries. Our interpreters on the spotwere able to get from captured orders in-formation on which we have successfully op-erated at once. It causes me to want never'to write another order.

65

"The Japanese try all of the tricks, makenil of the noises, and infiltrate as many snipersas is reported they did in Bataan and Malaya.These things have little effect on good troopswho hold their positions, which they can dowith safety and fight. them when they comeup. So far as I have been able to determine,thouh we have had hundreds of snipers inour position, only one maii has been killed bya sniper. We usually get everyone of them.Don 't woiry about them. They a.re clucks onthe pond when daylight comes.

"In their air attacks and in their groundoperations, the Japanese appear to follow verydefinite patterns. Each attack appears to bethe same. They are easily disconcerted bysurprise an.cl if they fail to succeed in what isapparently the on'y way they know how tofight, they become ineffective. We have care-fully avoided night attacks, making all of ouroffensive moves by day. Our officers feel thatthe Japs have placed so much stress on nightfighting t.hat they cannot or do not fight wellat all in the daytime.

"Our officer casualties have been high, be-cause it is necessary for the officer to be prac-tic ally in t.he firing line in jungle fighting;otherwise he loses control. We have lost anumber of Company Cornman.ders and quite a

65

''The Japanese try all of the tricks, makeall of the noises, and infiltrate as many snipersas is reported they did in Bataan and Malaya.These things have little effect on good troopswho hold their positions, which they can dowith safety and fight. them when they comeup. So far as I have been able to determine,thouh we have had hundreds of snipers in0u1 position, Ofli one rnaii has been killed bya sniper. We usually get everyone of them.Don't worry about them. They are clucks onthe pond when daylight comes.

"In their air attacks and in their groundoperations, the Japanese appear to follow verydefinite patterns. Each attack appears to bethe same. They are easily disconcerted bysurprise and if they fail to succeed in what isapparently the only way they know how tofight, they become ineffective. We have care-fully avoided night attacks, making all of ouroffensive moves by day. Our officers feel thatthe Japs have placed so much stress on nightfighting that they cannot or do not fight wellat all in the daytime.

"Our officer casualties have been high, be-cause it is necessary for the officer to be prac-tically in the firing line in jungle fighting;otherwise he loses control. We have lost anumber of Company Commanders and quite a

66

few Battalion Commanders. We have man-aged to keep up our officer replacement byfield promotions of selectec noncommissionedofficers who have proven themselves in battle.It is not. 1ikey that the Division will receiveany officers no matter how long it may operate.

"This account is hasty, disconnected andrarnbliiig, but I have attempted to get clownjust a few of the points on which I believe wehave some conclusion."

The following is a. digest of lessons learnedin the tactics. of Jungle Warfare as a result ofinterviews which are attached:

1. Troops must receive a high degree of in-dividual training to prepare for jungle war-fare. The individual in combat will berequired to act. on his own a large part of thetime. This is clue to the dense foliage. How-ever, indivIduals must feel the very presenceo their squad leaders and other leaders, andknow that they are important members of ateam which can lick the enemy. The leadersmust take pains to carefully explain to theprivates what their responsibilities are, andwhat •is expected of them in each situation.Furthermore, weak individuals who carniot betrusted to act correctly without supervision

66

few Battalion Commanders. We have man-aged to keep up our officer replacement byfield promotions of selected noncommissionedofficers who have proven themselves in battle.It is not likely that the Division will receiveany officers no matter how long it may operate.

"This account is hasty, disconnected andrambling, but I have attempted to get clownjust a few of the points on which I believe wehave some conclusion."

The fOllowing is a. digest of lessons learnedin the tactics. of Jungle Warfare as a result ofinterviews which are attached:

1. Troops must receive a high degree of in-dividual training to prepare for jungle war-fare. The individual in combat will berequired to act on his own a large part of thetime. This is clue to the dense foliage. How-ever, indivIduals must feel the very presenceof their squad leaders and other leaders, andknow that they are important members of ateam which can lick the enemy. The leadersmust take pains to carefully explain to theprivates what their responsibilities are, andwhat is expected of them in each situation.Furthermore, weak individuals who cannot betrusted to act correctly without supervision

67

must be weeded out, preferably before they ar-rive ii the Combat Zone.

Individuals must have thorough practice inthrowing hand grenades in woods. They mustreach a much higher degree of profi.cieney inthe art of camouflage. This will require con-stant application in the training period.

B's- realistic training a large amount of fearcan be overcome in the individual. He shouldknow before he reaches the Combat Zone whatit feels like t.o have bombs explode near him.what a sniper's bullet sounds like, and whatoverhead machine gun and artillery fire soundlike.

The piowess of the enemy must NOT beover emphasized. American soldiers and ma-rines can whip the Jap and they are doing SOevery day. Many men stated that they hadbeen talked to so much about. the .Japaieesnipers that at first they were afraid.

Individual riflemen mist mow the tacticalrelationship between the machine gun andtheir rifle in order to be able to act. intel-ligently.

Training in observing and firing at. vaguetargets must be emphasized.

2. In training, scouting and patrolling mustbe emphasized. Major General Vandegrift,Crniiniaiidiiig the First Marin.e Division, states

67

niust be weeded out, preferably before they ar-rive iii the Combat Zone.

Individuals must have thorough practice inthrowing hand grenades in woods. They mustreach a much higher clegi'ee of proficiency iiithe art of camouflage. This will require con-stant application in the training period.

By realistic training a large amount of fearcan be overcome in the individual. He shouldknow before he reaches the Combat Zone whatit feels like to have bombs explode near him.what a sniper's bullet sounds like, and whatoverhead machine gun and artillery fire soundlike.

The prowess of the enemy must NOT beover emphasized. American soldiers and ma-rines cail whip the Jap and they are doing Soevery day. Nany men stated that they hadbeen talked to so much about. the Japanesesnipers that at first they were afraid.

Individual riflemen must know the tacticalrelationship between the machine gun andtheir rifle in order to be able to act. intel-ligently.

Training in observing and firing at vaguetargets must. be emphasized.

2. In training, scouting and patrolling mustbe emphasized. Major General Vandegrift,Coniniaiidiiig the First Marine Division, states

68

that jungle warfare against the Japanese isa. question of going back to the tactics of theFrench and Indian days, with these tactics acT-justed to fit in with our modern weapons.

Men should receive training in patience.Our national character is foreign to this idea.We are an impetuous people. Training in pa-tience is. needed as sometimes the men will berequired to remain motionless and quiet forhours at a. time.

3. T0i every man can lead a patrol success-fully in the jmigle. The gooct patrol leadersshould be discovered in the training period.

In training, patrols should be sent. out from10 to 15 hours at a time. Due t.o the slow wain which a patrol moves, it is necessary tokeep patrols out for long periods of time.The problem of getting communication backfrom the patrol to friendly territory in thejungle is a hard one. It must be made easierby training. Patrols should be confrontedwith unusual situations.

4. The Japanese knee-mortar is needed.An all-purpose hand grenade, which, in ad-clition to being used as a hand grenade, can beused in the knee-mortar and as a rifle gre-nade, should be adopted.

Mortar squads must learn to set up quicklyand be able t.o operate inwoocleci terrain.

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that jungle warfare against the Japanese isa. question of going back to the tactics of theFrench and Indian days, with these tactics ad-•justecl to fit in with our modern weapons.

Men should receive training in patience.Our national character is foreign to this idea.We are an impetuous people. Training in pa-tience is. needed as sometimes the men will berequired to remain motionless and quiet forhours at a. time.

3• every man can lead a patrol success-fully in the jungle. The good patrol leadersshould be discovered in the training period.

In training, patrols should be sent. out from10 to 15 hours at a time. Due t.o the slow wayin which a patrol moves, it is necessary tokeep patrols out for long periods of time.The problem of getting communication backfrom the patrol to frieiidlly territory in thejungle is a hard one. It must be made easierby training. Patrols should be confrontedwith unusual situations.

4. The Japanese knee-mortai is needed.An all-purpose hand grenade, which, in ad-clition to being used as a hand grenade, can beused in the knee-mortar and as a rifle gre-nade, should be adopted.

Mortar squads must learn to set up cuicklyand be able t.o operate in wooded terrain.

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5. All units must receive P1CtiCe in theprobein of n1aintainiii contact in the aclvaiieeiii the jungie.

6. In the following interviews there aremany reniarks on leadership. The kadershipshown by the 5th and 7th Reginients of theU. S. Marines stands out because of their reatwealth in experienced officers and NCO 's. Onthe other hand the remark of Colonel B. F.Moore. Conirnawling Officer of the 164th In-fantry, emphasizes the great. problems in theleadership which confronted a partiallytrained reiment which had been rushed tothe Comba.t Zone.

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5. All units must receive P1aCtiCe in theproblem of maintaining contact in the advanceiii the jungle.

6. In the fo1lowin interviews there arein any remarks on leadership. The leadershipshown by the 5th and 7th Reginients of theU. S. Marines stands out because of their reatwealth in experienced officers and NCO 's. Onthe other hand the remark of Colonel B. F.Moore. Commanding Officer of the 164th In-fantry, emphasizes the great. problems in theleadership which confronted a paitia1lytrained re2'iment which had been rushed tothe Comba.t Zone.

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