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11 Confidential

Intelligence MemorandumPossible Cease-Fire Lines in the Sinai and the Golan Heights,

and a Discussion of the Jerusalem Situation

Confidential111

30 October 1973No. 2458/73

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30 October 1973

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Possible Cease-Fire Lines in the Sinai and the GolanHeights, and a Discussion of the Jerusalem Situation

Introduction

This paper presents alternative cease-firelines.for Arab and Israeli forces in the Sinai andthe Golan Heights, discusses the situation in Jeru-salem, and briefly comments on the Allon Plan. Inselecting the positions and configurations of thelines, consideration haz been given to pertinent ter-rain, economic, and sociological factors as well asto the current military and political situation.Together the proposed cease-fire lines provide apossible basis for a phased withdrawal. Each linewould pose problems of major proportions for USpolicy these are not discussed in the paper.

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Cease-Fire Lines Between Israel and Egypt: Possible Options

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The Sinai

The Israeli-occupied Frontier Province ofSinai includes all the land between the Suez Canaland the Israeli border as well as the triangular-shaped Sinai Peninsula which lies between the Gulfof Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. A narrow coastalplain in the north is terminated by a series ofplateaus and hills that become increasingly rugged

" to the south where many peaks reach elevationsgreater than 2,400 meters (8,000 feet). Most ofthe Sinai is barren desert. The major water sourceis the Wadi al Arish, outlet for a vast undergroundriver system fed by rain from the southern mountains.Where this "river"'system is close to the surfacethere are both natural oases and fields irrigatedby water from wells. Most of Sinai's 100,000 in-habitants live in the vicinity of the oasis of AlArish in coastal villages, in small scattered oases,and in the higher country in the south near St.Catherine's Monastery. True nomads in the Sinaiprobably number no more than 2,000. Oil reservesfound along the western coast and offshore in theGulf of Suez are the most important economic re-sources. The southern tip of the peninsula com-mands the narrow Strait of Tiran,which links theGulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea. It was Egyptianclosure of this strait to Israeli shipping thattriggered the 1967 war.

Five cease-fire plans for the Sinai are out-lined below:

Plan A. The Israeli forces would pull backto new defensive positions east of the Suez Canal.Their line would extend due south from a point ap-proximately 60' kilometers (37 miles) from the canal

- on the Mediterranean coast, jog slightly to thewest around the Giddiand Mitla passes, and thenrun due west to a point on the Gulf of Suez ap-proximately 25 kilometers (16 miles) north of RasSudr. This would permit the Israelis to retainall their settlements, all their major airfields

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and major military bases, and the critical terraincontrolling the Giddi and Mitla passes as well asthe oil wells and tank farms on the Gulf of Suez.The observer line would be along the main north-south road some 25-30 kilometers (16-19 miles) eastof the canal. The Egyptians would withdraw to thewest of the canal. As a second version of thisplan the Egyptians could be stationed along astrip some 10 kilometers (6 miles) wide on theeastern side of the canal.

To the Egyptians, the first version of thisplan would only represent a return to the situa-tion- existing prior to their attack of 6 October1973. To the Israelis it would mean yielding ob-servation and direct fire positions over a waterbarrier and approximately 7,600 square kilometers(2,900 square miles) of maneuver area. The secondversion would enable the Egyptians to open andoperate the canal, but -might be regarded by themas merely a step toward the recovery of their lostterritory and by the Israelis as the surrender ofa tactically important physical barrier.

Plan B. Plan B uses the north-south elementof the Israeli line of Plan A, and extends it south-eastward as a line running approximately 32 kilo-meters (20 miles) inland and parallel to the west-ern coast of the Sinai to Ras Muhammad, at the verytip of the peninsula. This arrangement would giveEgypt control of the western coast of the Sinai,the Sinai oilfields, and the Suez Canal. It wouldpermit Israel to retain most of the Sinai, includingSharm ash Shaykh and control over the Strait ofTiran. Because of the extreme ruggedness of theterrain it would be infeasible, to post a UN ob-server force on the ground along the Plan B linesouth of 30 degrees north. Necessary policingcould probably be accomplished from the air.

This plan would not please either side. Is-rael would not like losing the oilfields, andEgypt would not like relinquishing claim to the

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major portion of the Sinai. Egypt, however, hasa strong claim that Israel is working the fieldsin violation of international law. The return ofthe oilfields might persuade Egypt to yield therest of the Sinai to Israel, and Israel might be-lieve that retaining the bulk of Sinai would offerreasonable protection.

Plan C. Plan C divides the Sinai by a linerunning south from a point just west of Al Arishto Ras Muhammad at the tip of the Peninsula. Itwould be desirable to demilitarize the mountainousterritory between this line and the edge of the hillcountry to the west, which would coincide with lineB. This line is the most arbitrary of those con-sidered and is more difficult to support on thebasis of terrain, economic, or military considera-tions, but it has some precedent. During the 1906British--Turkish Sinai boundary negotiations thisline was put forward as a Turkish alternate pro-posal. There were indications that Israel con-sidered bargaining for the line as a Sinai boundaryduring the 1956 conflict.

The advantage of this boundary is that it iseasily defined on a map and divides the Sinai neatly,giving Israel Al Arish (with the only sizable sweetwater resources in the Sinai) and putting the westernshore of the Gulf of Aqaba firmly under Israeli con-trol. It would be difficult to demarcate on theground, but for most of its length the boundary runsthrough such rugged, inhospitable terrain thatbarring the discovery of oil, its exact locationwould be of little concern to either side. Thedifference in the economic significance of thisline as compared to Plan B or Plan D is minute.Except in the extreme north and in the vicinityof St. Catherine's Monastery, there is nothing ofvalue for many miles on either side. It would pro-vide each nation with a broad buffer zone.

A dividing line for a variant of Plan C wouldbegin at the same point on the Mediterranean, andrun southeastward to the point at which it would

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meet Wadi al Arish. It would then follow the mainchannel of Wadi al Arish to the southwest, passingthrough the settlement An Nakhl and continuingalong Wadi al Arish to the mouth of Wadi Abu al Jayn.It would then follow th' bed of Abu al Jayn to itshead and continue southeast until joining the primaryPlan C line near Bir al Udayd.

- This variant would have the advantage of beingmore readily recognizable on the ground and of pro-viding some quid.pro quo for trading purposes. Thearea gained by Israel would be larger; that gainedby Egypt would be smaller but more accessible, morehabitable, and provided with a better.water supply.

Plan D. Plan D uses the Al Arish--Ras Muhammadline of Plan C as the Egyptian cease-fire line. TheEgyptians would be given all of the Sinai west ofthis line. The Israelis would be placed east of the1949 Armistice line but would be granted a 20 kilo-meter (12 mile) corridor along the Gulf of Aqabacoast from Elat to Ras Muhammad. This would givethem control over the Strait of Tiran. The areaenclosed by the Al Arish--Ras Muhammad line, the1949 Armistice line, and the Gulf of Aqaba corridorwould be demilitarized, giving the Israelis a sizablebuffer zone.

The most strenuous objection to this plan wouldprobably come from the Israelis. It would push theirarmy and their settlements completely out of the Sinaiexcept for the Aqaba corridor. They might not considerthe demilitarized zone sufficiently secure. But a pro-posal similar to this was included in the comprehensiveAllon Plan which indicates that at least some sectorsof the Israeli Government might be receptive to it.

Plan E. This plan would combine the north-southline of Plan B and the demilitarization of Plan Don. a significantly larger scale and would requirethe total Israeli evacuation of the Sinai. -Egyptwould reoccupy territory up to the Plan B line, andthe remainder of the entire peninsula, including

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Sharm ash Shaykh, would be demilitarized. Thisarea could be placed under the control of an inter-national force--withdrawable only by a bilateralEgyptian-Israeli decision sanctioned by the Secu-rity Council--that could, if effective, guaranteeIsraeli shipping through the Strait of Tiran.

The Israelis would object seriously to thisplan, not only for its requirement in general fora total withdrawal, but for the reason that itwould necessitate giving up the settlements. Is-rael would also not feel assured of the efficacyof international guarantees, no matter how stronglybacked up and theoretically enforceable. For Egypt,on the other hand, this is the only plan that wouldbe consic-':ed viable and the only one likely to en-sure agai: _t further Egyptian attempts to retaketerritory by force.

A variant of this plan would demilitarize thearea from the Plan B line to the 1949 armisticeline with the exception of the Israeli corridorprovided in Plan D. From the Israeli standpoint,

. this would be somewhat more satisfactory than thefirst version and, because of the larger demilitar-ized zone provided, far better than Plan D. The,same Israeli objections to a virtual total with-'drawal and to giving up the settlements wouldapply, however. The Egyptians would find the planunacceptable for the very reasons that the Israeliswould find it at all attractive.

The Golan Heights

The Golan Heights is a semi-arid tract ofrocky hills and brush-covered plains 65 kilometers(40 miles) long and 20 kilometers (12 miles) wide.From the former Israeli-Syrian border the terrainrises abruptly to rugged hills standing 600 meters(2,000 feet) above the upper Jordan Valley and LakeTiberias (the Sea of Galilee). East of these hills,a rolling plain rises toward the northeast; its high-est elevations are formed by a line of volcanic hillsextending from the steep lower slopes of Mount Hermonin the north to the Wadi ar Ruqqad, a deeply incisedstream valley in the south.

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Cease-Fire Line Between Israel and Syria: Possible Options

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Much of the region is agricultural land. Thearea around the city of Al Qunaytirah was once animportant producer of wheat. Land too steep or rockyfor farming is used for pasture. Before the 1967 warthe population in the Golan Heights was in excess of100,000, and the density of the rural population wasabout 80 persons per square kilometer (200 personsper square mile). Most of the inhabitants fled east-ward when the Israelis took over in 1967.

The Israelis consider possession of the highground overlooking the upper Jordan Valley and LakeTiberias to be vital to their national defense;prior to the 1967. war they were subject to inter-mittent sniping from the Golan Heights. The Syriansconsider themselves the rightful owners, and theirresentment at being ejected from their own territoryis compounded by the vulnerability of Damascus; thereare no effective terrain barriers between their capi-tal and the occupied Golan, less than 60 kilometers(37 miles) to the southwest.

In addition to military considerations, otherfactors influence Israeli reluctance to give up oc-cupied territory in the Golan Heights. They have(since 1967) established numerous new settlementsthroughout much of the area and have expended con-siderable efforts in road building, water develop-ment, land reclamation, and other projects. Ineffect, they have converted a sizable portion offormerly Syrian territory into an increasingly in-tegral part of Israel.

Four possible sets of cease-fire lines arepresented below.

Plan A. The Israelis would withdraw to the1967 Israeli cease-fire line. A UN observer linewould be fixed along key terrain features, varyingfrom about 4 to 8 kilometers (3 to 5 miles.) east ofthe 1967 cease-fire line. The Syrian forces wouldbe positioned an approxima,-ly equal distance eastof the observer line. Syria would lose no sizable

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villages or other populated places of significance,and the immediate threat to Damascus would be re-moved. Syrian forces would make a slight advanceto the west. Depending on how the demilitarizedzone was administered, some Syrians displaced in1967 might find it possible to return to theirformer lands. Most of the central and western partsof the Golan Heights would probably continue to bedenied to the Syrians. Damascus, dlthough savedfrom imminent danger of capture, might still feelvulnerable to attack. Most of the area would remainunder Israeli influence, and the Israelis would re-tain all of their new settlements; the process ofintegrating the Golan into Israel could probablycontinue. For the Israeli military the plan wouldinvolve a retreat to the 1967 Israeli cease-fireline. They would be particularly reluctant to sur-render hard-won high ground in the vicinity of MountHermon. Their forces would be pullpd back a con-siderable distance (e.g., on the road to Damascus,they would be pulled back more than 20 kilometers(12 miles) from the vicinity of Sasa to the vicinityof Al Qunaytirah).

Plan B. The Israelis would withdraw in thenorth to a position south and west of that portionof the Tapline oil pipeline that extends from theborder with Lebanon to the vicinity of Al Jukhadar.In the south their positic.n would be west of thesouthern portion of the 1967 Israeli cease-fire line.The UN observer line would (for most of its length)extend along the road that runs from Baniyas in thenorth through Al Qunaytirah to a point where it in-tercepts the UN observer line of Plan A; the southernsegment of the observer line would correspond to thesouthern segment of the Plan A observer line. TheSyrian force's in the north would be permitted as farwest as the former Israeli cease-fire line (1967);in the south their line would extend eastward alongthe 33 degree of latitude for a strt distance andthen south and east to Nawa and from Nawa to theJordan Border (corresponding in part to the samesegment as in Plan A). The roads would facilitatethe deployment and logistical support of the UN

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force. The Israelis would lose none of their newsettlements to the Syrians, although some would fallin the UN supervised "demilitarized zone." Syriawould regain some of its lost territory in the north.Neither side would be completely satisfied with thisplan. The Isarelis would be reluctant to withdrawtheir military forces from tactically advantageousterrain, and the Syrians would want to regain muchmore of their former territory.

Plan C. Igrueli military forces would be com-pletely withdrawn from the Golan Heights, and adenied area or "buffer zone" varying in width fromabout three to ten kilometers (2 to 6 miles) wouldbe established along its western side. The deniedarea would be sufficiently broad to eliminate thethreat of sniping from the Golan Heights into Israeli.territory to the west, Syria would regain a largepart of its lost territ:ry, and the Israelis wouldabandon all of their new settlements. It appears un-likely at this time that any Israeli government couldstand after making such a concession.

Plan D. The :sraelis would withdraw completelyfrom the Golan Heights and the entire area would beturned into a demilitarized zone. The UN forces wouldhave greater flexibility of movement and could exertbetter control in the area. If the UN proved capableof keeping the peace, Israel would be relieved of theburden of maintaining defense force's in the area.Syria would have the satisfaction of seeing an Is-raeli military withdrawal. The Israelis would prob-ably have to abandon their new settlements to return-ing Syrians. Again, it is unlikely that any Israeligovernment could survive such a concession.

Jerusalem

Jerusalem is a city sacred to Christians, Mus-lims, and Jews. Each has at some time been thedominant population, establishing its own religious

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structures and communities. Four residential quar-ters, Armenian, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish areenclosed by the Old City's walls, but sites sacredto all are so numerous and widely dispersed thatdelimitation of large areas by religious shrines isimpossible.

The Dome of the Rock where Solomon prayed,Jesus preached, and Muhammad ascended to Heaven liesin the southeast corner of the Old City bordered byJewish and Muslim quarters. This site and itsmosques, the third most important shrine in theMuslim world, is about 120 meters (400 feet) fromthe Western (Wailing) Wall, the most important sitein Judaism. Also within 180 meters (600 feet) ofthe Dome of the Rock begins the Via Dolorosa, thepath that Jesus walked in his last hours. Thisstreet extends for about 1 kilometer (half a mile)westward through the Muslim quarter to the Churchof the Holy Sepllchre in the Christian quarter.

Religious sites are not limited to the Old City,and as the city's growth has extendea beyond itswalls, conflicts have arisen over the development ofsurrounding areas such as the Mount of Olives and thesouth Jerusalem-Bethlehem area. At this time theJerusalem municipality has approximately 283,000 Jews,13,000 Christians, and 69,000 Muslims.

Any proposed international city plan F'r Jeru-salem would be rejected by the Israelis. King Husayn,despite a generally hard stance on the status ofthose portions of the city formerly under Jordaniancontrol, might be willing to settle for some arrange-ment that would permit a shared Israeli-Jordanianadministration; his United Arab Kingdom plan proposedJerusalem as the capital of Jordan's West Bank region,but did not specifically exclude the possibility ofcontinued Israeli administration. Husayn would findhiraself under heavy pressure from other Arabs, how-ever--particularly King Faysal--if he indicated awillingness to settle for anything less than fullArab control, allowing for Israeli access to Jewish

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holy placon?. Faynal rogardn himnolf an the defenderof Islamio holy placon and neon Jeruralom an theinue in the Arab ntruggle with Inrael . The Taentconflict han brought thin even more keenly to hisattention an an inue whono nottlemnt he can forceby the uno of his oil weapon.

Inraol declared Jorunalem its capital in 1950and bogan building national offices in the WontJorusalom sector. After the capturo of Arab EastJerusalem in the Juno 1967 war, the Inraulin mergedthat section of the city and its 70,000 inhabitantswith former Israeli Wont Jerusalem and proclaimedthe united city an the capital of Israel. (TheUnited Staten doon not recognize Jerusalem as thecapital; the US Embanny is in Tel Aviv.)

The Israelin consider the Jerusalem issue non-nogotiablo and the unification irreversible; theystate flatly that the city will remain under Israelisovereignty, and Israel's administrative actions areopenly designed to make it almost impossible to divideit again. Prime Miniater Golda Moir stated in April1973 that "Israel has announced her policy that Chrin-tian and Muslim holy places be administered by therespective heads of these religionn. To thin endIsrael wishan to enter into special agreements withthe heads of tho various denominations for the de-tailed implementation o: this policy."

The Israelis have steadily moved towards "In-raelization" of the city. A law pasned by the 1nnenteton 27 June 1967 trip)led the former municipal boun-darios from 36 square kilometers (14 square tailen)to 103 square kilometers (40 square milen), mergedthe city into one, and brought Israeli law and ad-ministration to the enlarged capital. In 1971, theIsraelis began to expropriate privately owned Arablands as building sites. In 1973, additional areasoutside the municipal boundaries were expropriated.

Within tho expanded municipal iron, the Israoliaaro well advancod on a program of houning conrtruc-tion designed to provide a resident Jewish majoritythroughout the city. Thu Jewish Quarter in the Old

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City from which Jewn were expelled in 19411, is nowlargely Arab, but it in being rebuilt and most ofthe Arabs will be replaced by Jews. fly late 1972

nome 12,000 Jewn had moved into Cant Jerusalem.

Other ste:pls toward uiificaf~ion taken by thelnraelis include the movement of Inraeli Governmentofficen into tant Jerunalem, and the connolidationof varioun municipal services, such as electricity,witer, and communicationn. The Jerusalem municipalcouncil operaten like other Israeli municipalitienexcept that it receiven more Cabinet guidance, Thenon-Israeli inhabitantA of tant Jerunalem are taxedan Israelin but are not eligible to vote in Ynennetelectiozn or to be appointed state employeen.

Muslims and Christians have complained thatthe extennion of Israeli law and administration overthem prejudices their rights. Prime Ministor Heir'sproposal which providen for separate control overspecial sacred sites, does not concern itself spe-cifically with the rightn of the membera of thedifferent faithn. It is conceivable that the areaeast of the 1949 UN Armintice line might be governedby a council of mixed faiths so that Christians,Muslimn, and othern would feel their cage was beingheard and their lives governad more by pem ratherthan nn imp',osd loraeli authority.

The Allon Plan

Mihister of Labor (nov Deputy Prime Mininter)Yigal Allon placed bin 'lan- for dealing with theoccupied territories before the Israeli Governrentin' July 1967, about a ronth after the end of the1147 war. It h4.s never been officially consideredby the Xnennet, but it has been around, and many ofits elerenta have been irplenented durinrg the pastsix yearn. At the tire it wan null itted the planprimarily called for the retention and nettler.ent ofthe Golan Heightn: a string of Israeli -nettlementsin a Security Zone nome 15-25 kilcvetern (9 to 16mile) wide on the "astern bank of the Jordan River:annexation of the Gaga Strip: retention of all ofJerusalem and retention of a strip of land along thecast coanw -f Sinai including Sharm ash Shaykh andthe tarraii 'c2omanding the Strait of Tiran.

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