for the twelfth circuit docket nos. 14-000123 and 14 … · 2018. 1. 17. · team no. 2 in the...
TRANSCRIPT
Team No. 2
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
Docket Nos. 14-000123 and 14-000124
SYLVANERGY, L.L.C.,
Petitioner,
v.
SHANEY GRANGER, in her official capacity as
Regional Administrator for Region XIII of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondent,
AND
SAVE OUR CLIMATE, INC.,
Petitioner,
v.
SHANEY GRANGER, in her official capacity as
Regional Administrator for Region XIII of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondent
On Consolidated Petitions for Review of a
Final Order of the Regional Administrator
BRIEF OF SHANEY GRANGER, Petitioner
Oral Argument Requested
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES.....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................................1
I. FACTS .................................................................................................................................1
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................................................................................3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................4
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................5
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE NAD BECAUSE IT WAS
NEITHER FINAL ACTION NOR REVIEWABLE UNDER THE APA. ..........................5
A. The NAD was not a “final action,” and therefore falls outside this Court’s
jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act. ...............................................6
i. The NAD was not final because it neither marked the consummation of
the administrative process nor determined rights and obligations. ..............7
ii. Binding EPA regulations reinforce this result. ............................................8
B. The NAD denial was a decision committed to NUARB’s discretion, and
accordingly this Court’s jurisdiction over the PSD permit does not confer the
ability to review the NAD. .......................................................................................9
II. THE POWER PLANT IS A “MAJOR EMITTING FACILITY” BECAUSE IT HAS
THE “POTENTIAL TO EMIT” MORE THAN 250 TONS PER YEAR OF CARBON
MONOXIDE. .....................................................................................................................11
A. The Facility is not subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold under CAA § 169(1)
because it is not a “fossil-fuel fired” source. .........................................................12
i. The plain language of CAA § 169(1) only reaches source4s with a heat
input rate greater than 250 million Btu/hour..............................................13
ii. Under EPA interpretations, the Facility is not a fossil-fuel fired source
because the burning of fossil fuels is not its primary activity. ...................14
a. EPA’s primary-activity test warrants deference. ...........................15
ii
B. The Power Plant is a major emitting facility because it has the potential to emit
more than 250 tons per year of carbon monoxide, notwithstanding the Village of
Forestdale’s operational limitations. ......................................................................18
i. Under EPA’s Federal Enforceability Policy, the Forestdale site plan is not
a federally enforceable limitation, and therefore this Court must judge the
Facility’s “potential to emit” on its 96% capacity factor. ..........................18
a. This Court should defer to the Federal Enforceability Policy. ......19
III. BECAUSE THE POWER PLANT IS A “MAJOR EMITTING FACILITY” SUBJECT
TO PSD REVIEW, SYLVANERGY MUST INSTALL BACT FOR GREENHOUSE
GASES. ..............................................................................................................................20
A. Greenhouse gases are “subject to regulation” under the CAA, and therefore may
be subject to the BACT requirement. ....................................................................21
B. Sylvanergy’s use of biomass fuel does not exempt the Facility from the operation
of the Clean Air Act—including the requirement to install BACT. ......................23
IV. NUARB PERMISSIBLY REJECTED WOOD GASIFICATION AND PARTIAL
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE AS BACT BECAUSE THE CONCEPT
REDEFINES THE FACILITY. .........................................................................................25
A. WGPCCS redefines the Facility because it changes the Facility’s fundamental
scope. .....................................................................................................................25
i. Changing a facility’s “fundamental scope” redefines that facility. ...........25
ii. WGPCCS changes the fundamental scope of the Facility. ........................27
B. NUARB’s analysis was sufficiently rigorous because the agency considered
carbon capture and storage generally, among other alternatives, in line with EPA
guidance. ................................................................................................................29
V. NUARB PROPERLY IMPOSED THE SUSTAINABLE FOREST PLAN AS BACT
BECAUSE THE PLAN IS NOT A “BEYOND-THE-FENCE” MEASURE, AND
REGARDLESS, THE CAA DOES NOT OUTLAW SUCH MEASURES. ....................30
A. Biofuel combustion is not—of itself—BACT because the process can act as a net
source of carbon. ....................................................................................................30
B. The Sustainable Forest Plan is not a “beyond-the-fence” measure because it is
entirely within the control of Sylvanergy, and regardless, the CAA does not
outlaw such measures. ...........................................................................................31
i. The Plan is entirely within the control of Sylvanergy. ..............................31
iii
ii. The CAA does not outlaw beyond-the-fence measures. ............................32
C. NUARB had a cogent rationale for selecting the Sustainable Forest Plan. ...........33
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................34
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United States Supreme Court Cases
Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA
540 U.S. 461 (2004). ............................................................................12, 21, 25, 30, 33, 34
Barnhart v. Walton
535 U.S. 212 (2002. ...............................................................................................15, 16, 19
Bennett v. Spear
520 U.S. 154 (1997). ........................................................................................................6, 8
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.
467 U.S. 837 (1984). ..........................................................................................9, 13, 14, 15
Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., Inc.
482 U.S. 117 (1987). ..........................................................................................................24
Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki
552 U.S. 389 (2008). ..........................................................................................................32
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin
444 U.S. 555 (1980) .....................................................................................................17, 20
FTC v. Standard Oil of Cal.
449 U.S. 232 (1980). ........................................................................................................5, 7
Great W. Life & Ins. Co. v. Knudson
534 U.S. 204 (2002). ..........................................................................................................13
Heckler v. Chaney
470 U.S. 821 (1985). ..............................................................................................10, 11, 27
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.
511 U.S. 375 (1994). ........................................................................................................6, 7
Lincoln v. Vigil
508 U.S. 182 (1993). ..........................................................................................................10
Lorillard v. Pons
434 U.S. 575 (1978). ..........................................................................................................16
Marsh v. Ore. Nat. Res. Council
490 U.S. 360 (1989). ....................................................................................................16, 19
Massachusetts v. EPA
549 U.S. 497 (2007). ..........................................................................................................21
v
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.
496 U.S. 633 (199). ............................................................................................................33
United States v. Mead Corp.
533 U.S. 218 (2001). ......................................................................................................9, 16
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA
134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014). .....................................................................................20, 22, 24, 32
Sebelius v. Coler
133 S. Ct. 1886, 1898 (2013) .............................................................................................13
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
323 U.S. 134 (1944). ....................................................................................................17, 20
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns
531 U.S. 457 (2001). ............................................................................................................6
United States Courts of Appeals Cases
Ala. Power Co. v. Costle
636 F.2d 323 (1979). ..........................................................................................................22
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp.
202 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000). ............................................................................................33
AT&T Co. v. EEOC
270 F.3d 973 (D.C. Cir. 2001). ............................................................................................8
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA
70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) .............................................................................................18
City of Rochester v. Bond
603 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1979). ............................................................................................7
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA
684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). ..........................................................................................22
Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard
761 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................6
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA
722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013). ....................................................................................21, 23
Doe v. Leavitt
552 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2009). ...............................................................................................19
vi
Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA
53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995). ....................................................................................16, 19
Hale v. Norton
476 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2007). ..............................................................................................7
Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA
723 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1984) .............................................................................................7
Indus. Customers of Nw. Util. v. Bonneville Power Admin.
408 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2005). ..............................................................................................7
LaFleur v. Whitman
300 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002)...................................................................................14, 16, 17
Luminant Generation Co., LLC v. EPA
757 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2014) .........................................................................................8, 11
Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. FTC
864 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 2012). .................................................................................16
P.R. Cement Co. v. EPA
889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1989) ................................................................................................7
Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n
727 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1984). ........................................................................................33
Schooler v. United States
231 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1956). ............................................................................................29
Sierra Club v. EPA
499 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2007). ......................................................................................26, 27
Sierra Club v. Peterson
185 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 1999). ............................................................................................33
United States v. Gary
963 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1992). ............................................................................................11
Unity08 v. FEC
596 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2010) .....................................................................................7
Environmental Appeals Board Cases
In re Desert Rock Energy Co.
14 E.A.D. 484 (EAB 2009). .............................................................................25, 27, 28, 29
vii
In re Prairie State Generating Co.
13 E.A.D. 1 (EAB 2006). ...................................................................................................26
In re Sylvanergy
No. 15-0123 (EAB June 1, 2015). ............................................................................. passim
United States Code
5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). .....................................................................................................................6
5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012). ...................................................................................................................33
5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) ..................................................................................................................5, 9
5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) ..............................................................................................................5, 6, 9
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). .............................................................................................................12, 19
42 U.S.C. § 7470 (2012). .........................................................................................................12, 21
42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2012). ...........................................................................1, 7, 8, 11, 20, 21, 23, 33
42 U.S.C. § 7479 (2012). .................................................................................12, 13, 14, 17, 20, 24
42 U.S.C. § 7601 (2012). .................................................................................................1, 9, 15, 20
42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012). .............................................................................................................1, 5
Code of Federal Regulations
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (2015). ........................................................................................................18, 24
40 C.F.R. § 124.19 (2015). ......................................................................................................1, 8, 9
Federal Register
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electricity Generating
Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,829 (June 18, 2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). ......................31
Deferral for CO2 Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under the Prevention
of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 (July 20,
2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 52, 70, 71). ..............................................................23
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of
the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). ....21
viii
Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
124). .....................................................................................................................................9
Light–Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86,
600). ...................................................................................................................................21
Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 56 Fed. Reg.
27, 630 (June 14, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60). ........................................11
Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg.
52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52). ....................................14, 15, 17
Other Sources of Authority
Carla Santos & Alisha Falberg, Light My Fire: The Use & Policies of Woody Biomass as a Heat
Source, 15 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 41 (2015). ..............................................24, 30, 31
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. ................................16
33 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8397 (3d ed.
2004). ...................................................................................................................................6
Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA, Guidance for Determining Best Available Control
Technology for Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Bioenergy Production (2011).29, 30, 31, 32
Office of Air Quality Planning & Standards, U.S. EPA, Interim Policy on Federal Enforceability
of Limitations on Potential to Emit (Jan. 1996). ....................................................18, 19, 20
Office of Air Quality Planning & Standards, U.S. EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual
(draft Oct. 1990)...........................................................................................................14, 25
Roger A. Sedjo, Comparative Life Cycle Assessments: Carbon Neutrality & Wood Biomass
Energy (2013). ...................................................................................................................24
1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
EPA has delegated its permit-reviewing power to the EAB, thus granting the Board
subject-matter jurisdiction over Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) preconstruction
permits. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19 (2015); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7601 (2012). Both petitioners timely
filed for review of the Board’s order, In re Sylvanergy, No. 15-0123, slip op. at 1 (EAB June 1,
2015), so this Court has jurisdiction over all “final action[s]” taken under the CAA by the New
Union Air Resources Board (NUARB) through its EPA-delegated authority, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(b)(1). At its root, this petition centers on an interlocutory order and a final decision:
respectively, NUARB’s denial of the Non-Applicability Determination (NAD) and its
requirement of best available control technology (BACT) for Sylvanergy’s greenhouse
emissions. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over the BACT determination, but not over the
denial of the NAD.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review NUARB’s denial of the requested NAD?
II. Assuming jurisdiction over the denial of the NAD, is Sylvanergy’s proposed plant a
“major emitting facility” subject to PSD review?
III. Did NUARB properly determine that a biomass-fueled facility subject to PSD review for
its non-greenhouse emissions is also subject to review as an emitter of greenhouse gases?
IV. Did NUARB permissibly reject wood gasification and partial carbon capture and storage
as BACT?
V. Did NUARB properly impose the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Facts
Sylvanergy, L.L.C. resolved to construct a biomass-fired electricity generation and wood
pellet fuel production facility (the “Facility” or the “Power Plant”) in Forestdale, New Union.
2
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. The Facility will produce 500 million Btu’s each hour, and at capacity
would burn 150,000 tons of dry weight each year. Id. It will consist of an advanced stoker design
wood-fired boiler and two ultra-low sulfur diesel start-up burners, each with a maximum heat
input rate of 60 million Btu’s per hour. Id.
Based on a 96% capacity factor, the Facility has the potential to emit 255 tons per year of
carbon monoxide, in addition to a host of other pollutants. Id. Worried about the impact of log-
truck deliveries to the Facility, Forestdale limited its operation to no more than 6,500 hours per
year. Id. Only Forestdale’s building inspector has the authority to enforce the limitation, which in
effect restricts the Facility to 75% capacity. Id. At 75% capacity, the Facility will emit 190 tons
per year of carbon monoxide. Id. The Facility has the potential to emit 350,000 tons per year of
greenhouse gases in the form of carbon dioxide equivalents. Id.
EPA has delegated authority to NUARB to issue preconstruction permits under § 165 of
the Clean Air Act. Id. On January 15, 2013, Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for an NAD, a
determination that it needed no PSD preconstruction permit under § 165 of the Act. Id. In an
interlocutory order, NUARB denied Sylvanergy’s request on grounds that the Power Plant was a
major emitting facility in an attainment area under the Act—notwithstanding the locally-
enforced hours limitation—and thus subject to more rigorous PSD review. Id. at 6. This
preliminary finding ushered Sylvanergy into the heart of the PSD permitting process. Id.
In crafting Sylvanergy’s permit, NUARB thoroughly analyzed the available control
alternatives and determined the BACT for the pollutants emitted by the Facility, as required by
§ 165(a)(4). Id. at 6–7. Concerning greenhouse gases, NUARB employed a top-down approach
in analyzing the available control alternatives. Id. First, NUARB considered carbon capture and
storage as the technology capable of achieving the greatest reduction in emissions; the agency
3
rejected the technology as technically infeasible. Id. at 6. Next, the agency considered the use of
alternative fuels, like natural gas and oil; NUARB concluded that such fuels would
impermissibly redefine the Facility. Id. at 7. NUARB also concluded that wood gasification and
partial carbon capture and storage (WGPCCS) would impermissibly redefine the source. Id.
Finally, NUARB considered a sustainable forest plan, requiring a dedicated reforestation area.
Id. The agency concluded that acquisition of 25,000 hectares of forest land at a cost of
approximately ten million dollars was economically feasible, and that at an assumed production
rate of ten dry tons of wood per hectare per year, the area would offset approximately seventy
percent of the Facility’s emissions. Id.
On September 12, 2013, NUARB published its draft permit for the Facility, which
included the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for the Facility’s greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at
6. Save Our Climate, Inc. (SOC), a non-profit environmental protection group, commented
extensively; the New Union Loggers Association also commented. Id. On June 12, 2014—after
nine months during which the agency considered the permit’s characteristics—NUARB issued
its PSD permit for the Sylvanergy Facility. Id. It retained the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT
for greenhouse gas emissions at the Facility. Id. at 7.
II. Procedural History
After issuance of the permit, Sylvanergy and SOC both filed timely petitions for review
with the Environmental Appeals Board. Id. at 7. Sylvanergy challenged the denial of the NAD
and the permit’s imposition of the Sustainable Forest Plan; SOC challenged NUARB’s refusal to
require wood gasification and partial carbon capture and storage as BACT for the Facility. Id.
The EAB denied both petitions, pointing to a lack of jurisdiction over the NAD and an absence
of any clear factual or legal error that would justify overturning the BACT determination; it then
4
ordered the Administrator of Region XIII to publish notice of final action. Id. at 13–14. The
parties then petitioned this Court for judicial review. Id. at 1.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As a threshold matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the NAD denial. To protect the
administrative process, Congress subjects only “final action” to CAA § 307 jurisdiction. Because
the denial neither consummated NUARB’s decisionmaking nor determined Sylvanergy’s rights
and obligations, it was not jurisdictional final action. Moreover, Sylvanergy cannot twist § 704
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to dodge the plain rule of § 307, because the denial
was committed to NUARB’s discretion as a matter of resource management and agency inaction.
Accordingly, APA § 704 simply does not apply.
Even assuming jurisdiction, this Court should not disturb NUARB’s determination that
the Power Plant is a major emitting facility. Although not a fossil-fuel fired source—as shown by
the plain language of the CAA and EPA guidance—the Facility still has the potential to emit
more than 250 tons per year of carbon monoxide when operating at 96% capacity. NUARB
properly determined the Facility to be a major emitter because no federally enforceable
limitation brings it below the emissions threshold. NUARB acted in accordance with EPA
guidance, and the Agency’s expertise on the law and science of the Clean Air Act commands
deference. This Court should therefore affirm NUARB’s classification of the Power Plant as a
major emitting facility.
NUARB properly subjected the Power Plant to BACT for greenhouse gases. The
Supreme Court recognizes that regulation of greenhouse gases in other contexts triggered PSD
requirements for these emissions, and has ruled that permitting agencies may require BACT for
5
greenhouse gas emissions. Because neither the text nor the policy of the Act justify an exception
for biogenic greenhouse gases, application of BACT to the Facility was proper.
This Court should uphold NUARB’s determination that the Sustainable Forest Plan
constitutes BACT for the Facility’s greenhouse gas emissions. In making its determination, the
agency properly employed a top-down approach to analyze the universe of available control
alternatives. In line with EPA guidance, after deciding against WGPCCS, NUARB properly
embraced the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT. The agency permissibly rejected WGPCCS
because it redefines the source—requiring it to undergo significant modifications, thereby
changing its fundamental scope. Instead, the agency properly settled on the Plan as BACT; the
Plan is economically feasible, effective at offsetting the Facility’s emissions, and entirely within
the control of Sylvanergy.
ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE NAD BECAUSE IT
WAS NEITHER FINAL ACTION NOR REVIEWABLE UNDER THE APA.
Section 307 of the CAA grants this Court jurisdiction to review “final action[s]”
taken by EPA under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). By only opening the courthouse doors
to final actions, the CAA seeks to preserve the integrity of EPA’s robust administrative
procedures—reflecting faith in EPA adjudications and congressional judgment that the
Agency should not have to shoulder the burden of piecemeal judicial review. FTC v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. (SOCAL), 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980). Because the NAD was not a
“final action,” this Court lacks jurisdiction to review its denial. Similarly, APA § 704 does
not authorize this Court to review the NAD on review of the final permit, because the denial
was committed to NUARB’s discretion and hence unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2).
6
As a question of jurisdiction, this Court reviews this issue on a de novo standard.
Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard, 761 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). And as the
party that would invoke judicial review, Sylvanergy must carry the burden of proving
jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
A. The NAD was not a “final action,” and therefore falls outside this Court’s
jurisdiction under § 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act.
As explained by the Supreme Court, “final action” under § 307 carries the same
meaning as “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act. Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001); see 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). The APA does not
define “final agency action,” and the Supreme Court has wrestled with the term for decades.
33 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8397 (3d ed.
2004) (bemoaning the confused state of the case law). But the crux of the term is the word
final, owing to the broad APA definition of “agency action” as well as the strong judicial
policy in favor of protecting the administrative process. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
Under the Court’s latest interpretation, agency action is final only if it meets two
requirements. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).
First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s
decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or
interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which
rights and obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will flow.
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Only if both conditions are met is the action
final for purposes of judicial review. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178.
7
The finality of an NAD is an issue of first impression under the Bennett standard.1 Thus,
without persuasive case law, this Court should look to the NAD’s place within the statutory
scheme of the CAA to resolve the question. Because Sylvanergy cannot carry its burden of proof
that the denial of the NAD satisfies one—let alone both—of Bennett’s prongs, the NAD was not
final and this Court lacks jurisdiction under § 307. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
i. The NAD was not final because it neither marked the consummation of the
administrative process nor determined rights and obligations.
The NAD begins, rather than ends, the permitting process: it represents EPA’s opinion
that a stationary source qualifies as a “major emitting facility” subject to the PSD program, and
presages a lengthy permitting review. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475. Although the NAD is the last word
on the threshold question of PSD applicability, definitiveness on a preliminary issue does not
itself make for final action. Indus. Customers of Nw. Util. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 408 F.3d
638, 647 (9th Cir. 2005); SOCAL, 449 U.S. at 244 (recognizing that preliminary agency action is
not final, even if it commits the regulated party to a full permitting proceeding of “substantial
and unrecoupable cost”).2 Thus, because denying the NAD was merely the first step toward a
PSD permit, the denial was an “interlocutory” decision that did not “consummat[e]” NUARB’s
1 The two reported decisions on the finality of NAD-like determinations on PSD applicability
were both pre-Bennett decisions—they did not address whether the action was final in the
modern sense of the term. See P.R. Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 294 (1st Cir. 1989)
(relying on the concepts of ripeness and exhaustion to find that an NAD was final action);
Hawaiian Elec. Co. v. EPA, 723 F.2d 1440, 1442–43 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); cf. Unity08 v. FEC,
596 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that finality is distinct from ripeness and
exhaustion). Accordingly, these cases should not persuade this Court. 2 This Court should not warp the collateral-order doctrine to find that the NAD is reviewable as
an order “collateral” to the PSD-permitting process. Cf. Hale v. Norton, 476 F.3d 694 (9th Cir.
2007). The doctrine simply does not apply here: the PSD permit reflects the denial of the NAD,
which means that the NAD necessarily merged into the final permit. SOCAL, 449 U.S. at 246
(declining to apply the doctrine to an agency complaint of a violation where the complaint was
merely “a step toward” the final decision on the merits, and would merge into that decision).
More importantly, the doctrine does not apply where Congress enacts a “special statutory review
procedure” like § 307. See City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8
“decisionmaking process.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178. Accordingly, it cannot be a “final action”
reviewable under CAA § 307.
Even assuming the satisfaction of Bennett’s first prong, the NAD is not final action
because it is no more than NUARB’s opinion on the application of law to fact. Standing alone,
the denial of the NAD has no legal force; all of Sylvanergy’s legal obligations under the PSD
program stem from the CAA itself, not the NAD decision. Luminant Generation Co., LLC v.
EPA, 757 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that EPA notices of violation did not meet
Bennett’s second prong as the operator’s rights and obligations did not flow from the notices but
from the Clean Air Act). Both before and after the NAD’s denial, Sylvanergy was under an
obligation not to build a major emitting facility in Forestdale without a PSD permit—nothing
changed when NUARB rejected Sylvanergy’s petition. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). Rather, the denial
reflected NUARB’s opinion that, under § 169(1) of the CAA, the proposed plant would be a
major emitting facility. Insofar as the NAD is just NUARB’s adoption of one particular view of
the statute, it is a far cry from final action. AT&T Co. v. EEOC, 270 F.3d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (rejecting the argument that an agency “takes final action when it embraces one view of
the law and rejects another,” even when “that view is adverse to the [regulated] party”). Thus,
because the denial was neither the consummation of NUARB’s decisionmaking process nor a
determination of Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations—and certainly not both—it was not the sort
of final action that this Court can review. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
ii. Binding EPA regulations reinforce this result.
EPA regulations provide that “agency action on a . . . PSD permit” is only final upon the
exhaustion of “agency review procedures” and the issuance of “a final permit decision.” 40
C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2). Those words bind this Court. Section 301 of the CAA expressly grants
rulemaking authority to EPA as “necessary to carry out [its] function under the [Act],” and this
9
Court well knows that such an express delegation engages the gears of Chevron deference. 42
U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Because this regulation was promulgated by notice-and-comment rulemaking,3 Chevron limits
this Court’s inquiry to whether the rule is “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
A look at the PSD-review process shows that EPA’s estimation of finality is not arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to the statute. Not only does EPA reach the same conclusion as it would
by applying the Bennett standard, supra Part I.a.i, but postponing finality until the end of the
permitting process furthers the statutory goal of avoiding piecemeal judicial review. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (finding agency interpretation reasonable because it advanced statutory
purposes). Thus, any permitting actions taken before the final permit cannot be “final action[s]”
reviewable under § 307; the denial of the NAD therefore falls outside this Court’s jurisdiction.
B. The NAD denial was a decision committed to NUARB’s discretion, and
accordingly this Court’s jurisdiction over the PSD permit does not confer the
ability to review the NAD.
Although the NAD denial was non-final action outside this Court's § 307 jurisdiction,
Sylvanergy may twist the APA to attempt an end-run around the statutory scheme. NUARB has
undeniably taken final action by issuing the PSD permit, 40 C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2), and
Sylvanergy will argue that review of the preliminary NAD is proper on review of the final
permit. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. This argument fails because the denial of the NAD was committed to
NUARB's discretion, and hence unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2).
By their own terms, the judicial-review provisions of the APA do not apply where
“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The Supreme
3 See Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 124).
10
Court reads section (a)(2) as precluding review in two situations: first, where a statute is so
broadly drawn that a court would lack a “meaningful standard” on which to judge the agency
action; and second, where “the common law of judicial review of agency action” traditionally
commits the question to the discretion of the agency. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32
(1985); see also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (recognizing that section (a)(2) can
preclude judicial review by operation of either statutory law or the common law).
As illustrated by the presumptive unreviewability of an agency decision to enforce or not
enforce, see Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832, the common law traditionally grants agencies
unreviewable discretion in two relevant areas: (1) matters dealing with the allocation of agency
resources, and (2) matters of agency inaction. As for the first category, courts traditionally give
agencies especial leeway to manage their resources, as such questions require “a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.” Lincoln,
508 U.S. at 191 (citation omitted). A massive statutory scheme like the CAA requires EPA to
play an administrative game of Whack-a-Mole to identify and curtail violations of the Act. See
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. In deciding when and where to flex its enforcement muscles to most
effectively administer the Act, EPA’s “peculiar[] . . . expertise” demands a long judicial leash.
Id. And as for the second category, courts treat agency inaction as discretionary because it does
not involve the exertion of “coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights,” and
hence steers clear of the traditional realm of the judiciary. Id. at 832. Rather, only when the
agency “exercise[s] its power in some manner” is there sufficient “focus for judicial review.” Id.
Because the denial of the NAD implicates both rationales, section (a)(2) bars application of
§ 704 to shoehorn review of the NAD into review of the final permit.
11
At its root, the NAD is a decision tied up in questions of resource allocation. The NAD
serves as an informal method to streamline agency oversight of stationary sources that pose only
a minor threat to the environment, thus letting NUARB reserve its fullest permitting procedures
for those emitters that require them. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal
of Implementation Plans, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,630, 27,639 (June 14, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
51, 52, 60). Insofar as the NAD allows NUARB to triage the calls for its attention, it implicates
agency discretion. “The agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many
variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities,” and accordingly courts will not review
management decisions like the NAD denial. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831–32.
This Court should also view the NAD denial as an instance of agency inaction. The
denial had no independent legal effect and thus involved no exercise of NUARB or EPA’s
“coercive power.” See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832. Just as non-enforcement has no effect on the
rights of the regulated party, neither did the NAD denial affect Sylvanergy’s rights and
obligations. See Luminant Generation Co., 757 F.3d at 442; see also supra, Part I.a.i. This
distinction traditionally leads courts to decline review of agency decisions without legal effect.
E.g., United States v. Gary, 963 F.2d 180, 184 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding unreviewable an agency
opinion that dealt with resource management and did not determine the regulated party’s rights
and obligations). Accordingly, the denial of the NAD is an exercise of agency discretion
“general[ly] unsuitab[le] for judicial review.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.
II. THE POWER PLANT IS A “MAJOR EMITTING FACILITY” BECAUSE IT
HAS THE “POTENTIAL TO EMIT” MORE THAN 250 TONS PER YEAR OF
CARBON MONOXIDE.
The CAA requires PSD permits for facilities that both qualify as a "major emitting
facility" and are located within an attainment or unclassifiable areas. 42 U.S.C. § 7475. These
permits impose numerous requirements “to insure that economic growth will occur in a manner
12
consistent with the preservation of existing clean air resources.” Id. § 7470. This Court must
decide whether Sylvanergy’s Power Plant qualifies as a “major emitting facility” subject to PSD
review. A “major emitting facility” under the Act must either (A) be one of the 28 types of
facilities listed and “emit, or have the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any
air pollutant,” or (B) simply have “the potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or
more of any air pollutant.” Id. § 7479(1).
Because the CAA does not specify a standard for judicial review of this sort of agency
action, this Court applies the default standard of the APA and asks whether NUARB’s action
was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This Court may not upset NUARB’s decision “if the agency’s path may
reasonably be discerned.” Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496–97
(2004) (citation omitted). Assuming jurisdiction, the arbitrary and capricious standard compels
this Court to affirm NUARB’s determination of PSD applicability. Although the Facility does
not qualify as a “fossil-fuel fired” source subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold under the Act,
it does have the “potential to emit” 250 tons or more per year of any air pollutant—namely,
carbon monoxide. Thus, NUARB did not act arbitrarily in determining that the Power Plant was
a major emitting facility subject to the PSD program.
A. The Facility is not subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold under CAA § 169(1)
because it is not a “fossil-fuel fired” source.
Sylvanergy proposes a 500 million Btu/hour biomass-fired electricity generation unit in
Forestdale, New Union. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. The facility will contain two ultra-low sulfur
diesel (ULSD) start-up burners that each has a maximum heat input rate of 60 million Btu/hour.
Id. It contains no other component parts potentially subject to the 100 ton-per-year limitation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). As a result, this Court must determine if the two burners qualify the
13
Facility as a “fossil-fuel fired” source subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold under Section
169(1). The unequivocal answer: They do not.
As the Supreme Court stated in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43, courts take two steps to
determine if an agency’s construction of a statute warrants deference. First, this Court must
determine whether Congress spoke directly to the issue. Id. If so, its unambiguously expressed
intent controls. Id. If not, the second step of the analysis asks this Court to determine if the
agency has interpreted the statute permissibly. Id. Here, this Court should stop at step one
because the statutory language is clear. However, even if this Court finds some ambiguity in the
statutory language, EPA’s permissible construction of the statute should control.
i. The plain language of CAA § 169(1) only reaches sources with a heat
input rate greater than 250 million Btu/hour.
Where language is plain, this Court’s only function is to enforce a statute according to its
terms. Sebelius v. Coler, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1898 (2013). The Supreme Court has been adamant on
this point: rather than looking for the “reasons for what Congress has plainly done,” courts
simply give effect to the clear text. Great W. Life & Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217–18
(2002). Accordingly, the plain language of the CAA should end this Court’s inquiry.
Congress explicitly aimed to regulate only fossil-fuel fired sources that have a heat input
rate of 250 million Btu/hour or more. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). By contrast, the ULSD start-up
burners each only have a heat input rate of 60 million Btu/hour. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. Neither
burner meets the threshold. Even combined, the units would only have a heat input rate of 120
million Btu/hour—still below the regulatory threshold. As a result, Congress clearly and
unambiguously exempted such small fossil-fuel fired sources based on the statutory language. To
hold otherwise would “render what Congress has plainly done . . . devoid of . . . effect.” Great
W., 524 U.S. at 217–18.
14
Accordingly, any argument by SOC that EPA should regulate the ULSD burners as an
“embedded source” must fail. See LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2002). This
contention is rooted in EPA’s guidance that “[a] source which, when considered alone, would be
major (and hence subject to PSD) cannot ‘hide’ within a different and less restrictive source
category in order to escape applicability.” Office of Air Quality Planning & Standards, U.S.
EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual A.23 (draft Oct. 1990) (“NSR Manual”). Even
considered together, the burners are not “major”: they fail to reach even 50% of the threshold
heat input rate, and there is no indication in the record that the burners themselves would emit
100 tons per year of any pollutant. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5; 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). As a result, this
Court should find that Sylvanergy’s Facility is not a “fossil-fuel fired” source subject to the 100
ton-per-year threshold.
ii. Under EPA interpretations, the Facility is not a fossil-fuel fired source
because the burning of fossil fuels is not its primary activity.
SOC will argue that the statute is ambiguous because it does not address how EPA should
classify facilities that undertake more than one activity that may be regulated under the Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). EPA’s interpretation of the statute resolves this alleged ambiguity, and
should be afforded deference. Any ambiguity would shift this Court’s analysis to whether the
agency’s interpretation of the statute is permissible. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
In August 1980, EPA addressed the classification of multi-activity facilities by
promulgating rules pursuant to its authority under § 301 of the Act. See Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7,
1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52). Although the rules adopted the statutory definition of
“major emitting facility” without substantial change, the regulatory preamble stated that a multi-
activity facility will be classified by its primary activity. Id. at 52,695. EPA stated a source’s
15
primary activity “is determined by its principal product or group of products produced.” Id.
Thus, support facilities—defined as “those which convey, store, or otherwise assist in the
production of the principal product”—do not alter a plant’s classification under the Act. Id.
Under this “primary-activity test,” the Facility is not a “fossil-fuel fired” source. The
Facility will provide one product: electricity. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. This electricity comes
from the Facility’s wood-fired boiler, which harnesses the combustion of wood pellets. Id. The
ULSD burners start the fire, but have no further role in actually generating power. Id. Thus, these
start-up burners are archetypal support facilities: they play the limited role of “assist[ing] in the
production of the principal product”—electricity—but do not produce it themselves. See
Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. at
52,695. Accordingly, the primary activity of the Facility is biogenic electricity production, and
Sylvanergy’s Facility does not qualify as a “fossil-fuel fired” source.
a. EPA’s primary-activity test warrants deference.
Where an agency fills a gap in the statutory scheme, “a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for” the agency’s “reasonable interpretation.” Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844. This remains the case, even though EPA set out the primary-activity test in the
regulatory preamble rather than the regulation itself. An agency interpretation reached “through
means less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking” may still be entitled to Chevron
deference. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002). Courts determine if Chevron
applies by considering various deference-conferring factors, such as the agency’s expertise, “the
importance of the question to the administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the agency has given the question over a long
period of time.” Id. at 222. Here, several such factors militate in favor of Chevron deference.
16
To start, the CAA grants EPA extensive rulemaking authority, showing congressional
intent that EPA’s words on the matter should carry the weight of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601;
Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (identifying congressional expectation that “the agency . . . be able to
speak with the force of law” as an indicator that Chevron should apply). The scientific and
technical complexity of the issue strongly favors judicial deference. See Marsh v. Ore. Nat. Res.
Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) (requiring courts to be at their “most deferential” when
reviewing “this kind of scientific determination”). And so does the complexity of the Act itself.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (deferring to agency interpretation
in light of the “technically complex statutory scheme”). Still more importantly, Congress left the
“major emitting facility” definition alone when it enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399; Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (noting
that when a statute is amended, Congress is presumed to adopt administrative interpretations of
any sections left unchanged). Finally, the primary-activity test is a well-reasoned interpretation
of the statute, as it allows EPA to efficiently classify multi-activity sources, and has been
consistently applied for almost forty years. LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 261 (emphasizing EPA’s long-
standing adherence to the primary-activity test); Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 220 (“[T]his Court will
normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration.”).
These factors should weigh heavily in this Court’s analysis. Accordingly, the primary-
activity test should receive Chevron deference despite the preamble’s relative informality.
Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221–22; accord Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. FTC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77–
78 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that regulatory preambles are worthy recipients of Chevron
deference).
17
Even if this Court determines that Chevron deference does not apply, EPA’s policy
should receive substantial Skidmore deference. Mead, 533 U.S at 234–35 (explaining that agency
interpretations receive deference even outside of Chevron). Although not binding, agency
policies and interpretations “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment,” and should
be afforded deference based on “the thoroughness evident in [EPA’s] consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.” Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Skidmore deference carries persuasive rather than controlling
weight, but is often a deciding factor in a complex statutory scheme like the CAA. E.g., Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 570 (1980) (reversing appellate court for failure to
heed federal agency’s “expert judgment” contained in nonbinding guidance documents).
EPA’s thoroughness of consideration is evident in the language of the preamble itself.
See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed.
Reg. at 52,695. EPA considered and addressed various suggestions as to the breadth of the
definition and ultimately decided to adopt the primary-activity test. Id. Additionally, EPA
employed sound reasoning in its decision, citing a desire for predictability, objectivity, and
simplicity in determinations. Id. This, coupled with an understanding of the complexity of
allocating resources, led EPA to a primary-activity determination to classify a source based on
standard industrial classifications. Id. Not only did EPA thoroughly consider this well-reasoned
policy, it has consistently applied it over the years. See id.; LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 261
(emphasizing EPA’s long-standing adherence to the primary-activity test). At the very least,
EPA’s primary-activity test demands substantial Skidmore deference; this Court therefore should
follow EPA’s interpretation and find that the Facility is not a fossil-fuel fired source.
18
B. The Power Plant is a major emitting facility because it has the potential to emit
more than 250 tons per year of carbon monoxide, notwithstanding the Village of
Forestdale’s operational limitations.
Although the proposed Facility is not a “fossil-fuel fired” source, it is still a “major
emitting facility.” Relevant here is the second statutory definition: a “source with the potential to
emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant.” 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1).
Congress did not define the term “potential to emit” within the confines of the PSD statute. Id.
Accordingly, EPA promulgated regulations defining a plant’s potential to emit as including
“restrictions on hours of operation” so long as the restriction “is federally enforceable.” See 40
C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4). In an unpublished opinion, the D.C. Circuit vacated this definition because
it limited the term “potential to emit” to include only EPA-enforceable limitations on operation.
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In response, EPA issued guidance to
address the D.C. Circuit’s concerns by broadening its definition. Office of Air Quality Planning
& Standards, U.S. EPA, Interim Policy on Federal Enforceability of Limitations on Potential to
Emit (Jan. 1996) (“Federal Enforceability Policy”). This guidance warrants sufficient deference
to control this Court’s inquiry, and establishes that Forestdale’s site plan is not a federally
enforceable limitation for purposes of the “potential to emit” calculation.
i. Under EPA’s Federal Enforceability Policy, the Forestdale site plan is not
a federally enforceable limitation, and therefore this Court must judge the
Facility’s “potential to emit” on its 96% capacity factor.
EPA’s guidance states that the regulatory term “federal[] enforceab[ility]” means
“federally enforceable or legally and practicably enforceable by a state or local air pollution
control agency.” Id. at 3–4; see 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4). In other words, operational limitations
only come into play when calculating a facility’s “potential to emit” if they are enforceable by an
environmental agency, whether on the federal, state, or local level. Federal Enforceability Policy
at 3–4. Thus, the emissions decrease resulting from the Forestdale site plan’s limitation on hours
19
of operation, though environmentally laudable, only affects the Facility’s “potential to emit” if
the plan can be enforced by EPA or NUARB. See id.
But Forestdale has not empowered either agency to police the Facility’s hours of
operation; rather, responsibility for enforcement falls to the Village of Forestdale’s building
inspector. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. No matter how this Court feels about building inspectors,
surely it must agree that they are not “state or local air pollution control agenc[ies].” Federal
Enforceability Policy, at 4. Therefore, the hours limitation in the site plan does not enter into this
Court’s “potential-to-emit” calculus, and the Facility’s 96% capacity factor determines its
classification under the Act. Because the Facility will emit 255 tons per year of carbon monoxide
when operating at this level, NUARB did not act arbitrarily in labeling it a “major emitting
facility”; its decision should accordingly be affirmed. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
a. This Court should defer to the Federal Enforceability Policy.
This Court does not need to be reminded that Chevron deference reaches beyond the
confines of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Supra, Part II.A.ii.a; Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221–22.
The congressional expectation that “the agency . . . be able to speak with the force of law” may
apply independent of formal agency procedures, Mead, 533 U.S. at 229, on a showing of
deference-conferring factors, Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. Several such factors are present here.
First, the Policy’s interpretation has been applied for almost twenty years. Id. at 220
(granting “particular deference to an agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration”). Second,
the complexity of the Clean Air Act compels a degree of deference to EPA’s administrative
efforts, as the Agency has enough experience with the Act to navigate its dense provisions. Gen.
Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1327. Third, the scientific expertise necessary to administer the Act
commands still more deference to EPA’s interpretation. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377. Fourth, the
Policy reflects thorough consideration. Not only did two high-ranking EPA officials sign off on
20
it, but it also contains a thoughtful response to the D.C. Circuit’s objections to the original
regulation. Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that policies generally
demonstrate thoroughness of consideration when issued by upper-level officials); Federal
Enforceability Policy at 3–4. And fifth, EPA’s interpretation reaches a reasonable result. The
Federal Enforceability Policy prevents the absurd result of putting the administration of the CAA
in the inexperienced hands of entities without environmental know-how—reflecting
congressional intent that EPA preside over the administration of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601.
Therefore, this Court should grant Chevron deference to the Federal Enforceability Policy.
But even if this Court declines to apply Chevron, the Policy is still due substantial
Skidmore deference. 323 U.S. at 140; see supra, Part II.A.ii.a. It bears repeating that, although
merely persuasive, Skidmore can be a deciding factor in the interpretation of a complex statute
like the CAA. Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 570. And as demonstrated by the sheer number of factors
compelling deference in this case, EPA’s Policy should decide the issue under whichever
agency-deference rubric this Court chooses to apply. Accordingly, because the hours limitation is
not federally enforceable, it does not decrease the Facility’s potential to emit. Because the
Facility will emit 255 tons per year of carbon monoxide at 96% capacity, NUARB did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in determining it to be a “major emitting facility.”
III. BECAUSE THE POWER PLANT IS A MAJOR EMITTING FACILITY
SUBJECT TO PSD REVIEW, SYLVANERGY MUST INSTALL BACT FOR
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS.
The Clean Air Act requires PSD-permit applicants to install “the best available control
technology for each pollutant [that is] subject to regulation under [the Act]” and emitted by the
facility. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (emphasis added). In other words, BACT applies not only to the
pollutants that trigger the “major emitting facility” threshold, see id. § 7479(3), but to every
emitted pollutant regulated by the CAA. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 2448
21
(2014) (“[T]he BACT provision [cannot] bear a narrowing construction.”). The notable breadth
of this provision is no accident. Rather, it reflects congressional recognition that “preserv[ing],
protect[ing], and enhanc[ing] the air quality” in our nation’s pristine areas requires across-the-
board regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2).
This breadth ties the BACT requirement to the evolving CAA landscape—most
importantly for purposes of this appeal, the long-overdue move toward regulation of greenhouse
gases. Because of EPA’s promulgation of greenhouse gas emissions standards for motor
vehicles, greenhouse gases are now air pollutants regulated under the CAA. See Light–Duty
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards,
75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600) (“Tailpipe Rule”).
Accordingly, the PSD program requires installation of BACT for these gases. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7475(a)(4). And because neither the Act nor the case law carves out an exception for the use of
biomass fuel, Sylvanergy has no legal basis to claim its wood-burning plant is exempt from the
BACT requirement. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Once
again, this Court reviews NUARB’s decision on the markedly deferential arbitrary-and-
capricious standard. Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–97; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
A. Greenhouse gases are “subject to regulation” under the CAA, and therefore may
be subject to the BACT requirement.
After Massachusetts v. EPA read the CAA to authorize regulation of greenhouse gases
and required EPA to give a statutory justification for its failure to do so, see 549 U.S. 497, 532
(2007), the Agency revamped its air-pollution regulation. See Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed.
Reg. 66,496, 66,699 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) (“Endangerment Finding”)
(staking out EPA’s position that greenhouse gases endanger public health). The Endangerment
22
Finding led to the promulgation of the Tailpipe Rule, in turn “automatically trigger[ing]
regulation of stationary greenhouse gas emitters under” the PSD program. Coal. for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, Util. Air,
134 S.Ct. 2427.4
Sylvanergy cannot keep a straight face and contest the applicability of BACT to
greenhouse gas emissions. Not only is the CAA’s “each pollutant subject to regulation” language
so broad that the D.C. Circuit considered it beyond the realm of reasonable misinterpretation,
Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 404 (1979), but the Supreme Court has definitively
closed the door on this argument. Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2449. One year ago, the Court
emphatically rejected this same contention and held that “each pollutant subject to regulation”
does not “mean anything other than what it says.” Id. at 2448. Thus, where a source is a “major
emitting facility” by virtue of non-greenhouse pollutants, EPA may require “compliance with
greenhouse-gas BACT” so long as “the source emits more than a de minimis amount of
greenhouse gases.” Id. at 2449.
Sylvanergy has proposed such a source. Not only do its non-greenhouse emissions
qualify it as a major emitting facility, see supra Part II.B, but its full-capacity operation will
cause the emission of a hardly de minimis 350,000 tons per year of greenhouse gases, see
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. Accordingly, binding Supreme Court precedent authorizes NUARB’s
requirement of BACT for greenhouse emissions. Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2449.
4 EPA’s admittedly mistaken reading of the Act led it to draft further rules to help ease the
administrative burden of regulating greenhouse gases, which are emitted more commonly and in
greater amounts than other pollutants. See Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2442–43. The Supreme Court
struck these regulations down as exceeding the scope of the CAA, id., but expressly approved
EPA’s position that it may apply BACT to greenhouse gases emitted by a source that is a “major
emitting facility” by reason of its emission of other pollutants. Id. at 2449.
23
B. Sylvanergy’s use of biomass fuel does not exempt the Facility from the operation
of the Clean Air Act—including the requirement to install BACT.
Sylvanergy is left only with its argument that biomass-fueled polluters should be
categorically exempt from BACT for greenhouse gases. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. To support
this contention, it points to a temporary EPA regulation that has both expired and been vacated
by the D.C. Circuit, Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409–12, and to controversial (if not
outdated) science supporting a policy argument with no basis in the text of the Act. Neither
should persuade this Court. Rather, because there is no statutory or regulatory authority for this
biomass exemption, and the prevailing scientific views undermine Sylvanergy’s stance, this
Court should uphold NUARB’s requirement of BACT for Sylvanergy’s greenhouse gas
emissions.
First, the so-called “Deferral Rule.” Deferral for CO2 Emissions from Bioenergy and
Other Biogenic Sources Under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 (July 20, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 52, 70, 71)
(“Deferral Rule”). In the Deferral Rule, EPA sought to delay PSD review of biomass-fueled
sources so that it could better understand the interplay between the greenhouse gases emitted by
these sources and the carbon sequestration caused by regrowth of the biofuels. Id. at 43,496. But
no matter how helpful this rule would be to Sylvanergy’s present appeal, it is no longer valid. By
its own terms the rule was to expire more than a year ago. Id. at 43,490. But even before its July
2014 expiration date, the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule as unjustified by the doctrines of
administrative law that EPA invoked to justify the regulation. Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at
409–12. As a result, Sylvanergy must turn to the statutory text to support its claimed exemption.
But this, the petitioner cannot do.
24
The CAA plainly requires the installation of BACT in major emitting facilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7475(a). The Act defines a “major emitting facility” to include both “fossil-fuel fired” sources
with potential to emit 100 or more tons per year, and “any other source with the potential to emit
[250] tons per year or more of any air pollutant”; it gives no further qualification on which to
base this biofuel exception. Id. § 7479(1). Nor do EPA’s definitional regulations provide a basis
to claim this exception. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(1)(i) (no mention of bioenergy). Sylvanergy
would have this Court rewrite the CAA to add an exception for biomass-fueled sources—an
exception that simply is not there. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479; Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., Inc.,
482 U.S. 117, 121 (1987) (explaining that courts may not “disregard what Congress has plainly
and intentionally provided” in statutory text). Such a result is unwarranted by the text, and flouts
Supreme Court precedent. Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2445 (rejecting an attempt to “rewrite[e]
unambiguous statutory terms” in § 169(1) of the Clean Air Act).
Finally, hobbled by the lack of statutory and regulatory support for its position,
Sylvanergy limps into a policy appeal. The petitioner argued before the EAB that the greenhouse
gas emissions due to the burning of “biomass fuels such as wood . . . are fully offset” by forest
regrowth and the resulting “carbon sequestration.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. To be sure, this idea
once warranted serious scientific consideration and was even the basis of EPA’s now-vacated
Deferral Rule. See Deferral Rule at 43,492. But the intervening years of research have not been
kind to this hypothesis. E.g., Roger A. Sedjo, Comparative Life Cycle Assessments: Carbon
Neutrality & Wood Biomass Energy 9 (2013) (“GHG emissions targets would not be assisted by
the use of bioenergy.”); accord Carla Santos & Alisha Falberg, Light My Fire: The Use &
Policies of Woody Biomass as a Heat Source, 15 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 41, 43 (2015)
(reviewing the scholarship and concluding that “woody biomass for energy can no longer be
25
considered a ‘carbon neutral source’”). Thus, not only is Sylvanergy’s claimed exemption
completely detached from the text of the statute; it is bad policy. This Court therefore should
uphold NUARB’s application of BACT to Sylvanergy’s greenhouse gas emissions.
IV. NUARB PERMISSIBLY REJECTED WOOD GASIFICATION AND PARTIAL
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE AS BACT BECAUSE THE CONCEPT
REDEFINES THE FACILITY.
Here also, this Court asks whether NUARB’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S.at 496–97. It
bears repeating—this standard of review is notably deferential. See supra Part II.
A. WGPCCS redefines the Facility because it changes the Facility’s fundamental
scope.
Historically, EPA has not asked applicants to redefine their sources when considering
available control alternatives as part of the BACT requirement. NSR Manual at B.13. For
example, EPA has not required applicants proposing a coal-fired electric generator to consider
building a natural gas-fired electric turbine as part of their BACT analysis, despite the fact that
the turbine may be inherently less polluting than the generator. Id. Admittedly, state agencies
have the discretion to engage in a “broader analysis,” which might include “the consideration of
alternative production processes.” Id. But the decision to engage or not engage in an analysis
beyond standard control technologies is committed entirely to the permit authority’s judgment.
See id.; accord Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. Here, NUARB permissibly chose not to consider
alternative production processes as part of its BACT analysis. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 7.
i. Changing a facility’s “fundamental scope” redefines that facility.
In re Desert Rock Energy Co. outlines the test for whether an available control alternative
redefines the relevant source. 14 E.A.D. 484 (EAB 2009). In Desert Rock, the EAB stated,
“[T]he permit applicant initially ‘defines the proposed facility’s end, object, aim, or purpose—
26
that is the facility’s basic design . . . .’” Id. at 530 (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Prairie State
Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 22 (EAB 2006)). The permitting agency does more than simply
rubber stamp the applicant’s design, though: the permit issuer should take a “hard look” to
determine which design elements are inherent and which might be changed without disrupting
the design’s purpose. Id. (quoting Prairie State, 13 E.A.D at 26). But the permitting agency has
“broad discretion” to determine the mutability or immutability of design elements. Id.
Prairie State and Desert Rock outline the dichotomy between available control
alternatives that redefine their source—and that might be permissibly rejected—and those that
must be treated in the BACT analysis. In Prairie State, the EAB refused to require consideration
of an alternative fuel (low-sulfur coal) as possible BACT for a proposed coal-fired power plant
co-located with a high-sulfur coal mine. Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 28; see also Sylvanergy, slip
op. at 13. The power plant in Prairie State was designed to burn the locally available coal, so
requiring low-sulfur coal as BACT would have impermissibly “redefined” the source. Prairie
State, 13 E.A.D. at 28; see also Sylvanergy, slip op. at 13.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Prairie State decision in Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d
653 (7th Cir. 2007). The appellate court emphasized that “to convert the design from that of a
mine-mouth plant to one that burned coal obtained from a distance would require that the plant
undergo significant modifications.” Id. at 655 (emphasis added). In light of EPA precedent, the
court wrote against requiring proposed facilities to change their “fundamental scope” or an
“inherent aspect of the proposed project.” Id. at 655–56. The court noted that when it is not
obvious where to draw the line between control technology and redesign, “it makes sense to let
the [agency] . . . draw it, within reason.” Id. at 655.
27
Post-Prairie State and Sierra Club, the EAB handed down its decision in Desert Rock
and granted EPA’s motion for voluntary remand of a PSD permit it had issued for a proposed
coal-fired electric generating facility.5 Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 540. The Board also remanded
the permit on the independent ground that EPA had “abused its discretion” in declining to
consider IGCC as part of its BACT analysis. Id. The Board found two facts important: first, EPA
failed to provide a rational explanation why IGCC would redefine the source, particularly when
the applicant itself had indicated that IGCC was a technology capable of satisfying its business
purpose; second, EPA failed to adequately explain its conclusion when IGCC had been analyzed
at similar facilities. Id. at 538. The Board remanded the PSD permit for EPA to provide further
explanation for its determination that IGCC would redefine the source, or for the Agency to
include IGCC in its BACT analysis. Id. at 539.
ii. WGPCCS changes the fundamental scope of the Facility.
The present case mirrors Prairie State and differs significantly from Desert Rock. Similar
to Sierra Club (which upheld Prairie State), conversion of Sylvanergy’s proposed facility from
one that “generate[s] electricity by burning wood” to one that generates electricity by “gasifying
wood and burning gas” would require the Facility to undergo “significant modifications.”
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 13; Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655. It would change the Facility’s
“fundamental scope” by altering an “inherent aspect of the proposed project”—namely the
primary means of electricity generation at the facility, burning wood. Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at
655–56.
5 It bears emphasizing that the remand in Desert Rock was voluntary. The Board did nothing that
EPA did not want it to do. EPA itself approached the Board seeking remand of the permit, for a
variety of reasons. Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 488–89. Among them: so that it might reconsider
its failure to include integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) in its BACT analysis. Id.
at 488. Unsurprisingly, the case for remand is stronger when the agency itself pushes for remand.
Cf. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (noting the peculiar expertise of agencies).
28
Even if this Court believes that WGPCCS straddles the line between control technology
and redesign of the Facility, NUARB’s determination of redesign was hardly arbitrary. See id. at
656 (citing Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–97) (“We hesitate in a borderline case . . . to
pronounce the [agency’s] decision arbitrary . . . .”). There is a distinction in this case between the
tendency of WGPCCS to redesign the Facility and its availability as a potential control
technology. But that distinction is one of degree, and potentially minute; the treatment of such
differences in a technically complex field with limited statutory guidance "is entrusted to the
judgment of the agency.” Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43).
Different from Desert Rock, NUARB did not file a motion for voluntary remand of the
PSD permit issued to Sylvanergy. To be sure, the Board in Desert Rock also found an
independent ground for remand: EPA abused its discretion in declining to consider IGCC as part
of its BACT analysis, based on the scant administrative record. See Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at
540. But with EPA’s motion for voluntary remand firmly situated at the heart of the proceedings
in Desert Rock, the Board’s focus on remand rather than agency discretion was unremarkable.
This Court should accordingly place little emphasis on the Board’s independent ground for
remand in Desert Rock.
Even so, the two factors that led the EAB to independently remand in Desert Rock are not
present here. There is no evidence that Sylvanergy represented at any point that WGPCCS was a
technology that could be considered for its facility, i.e., that could satisfy its business purpose.
See generally Sylvanergy. Neither is there evidence of previously issued permits at facilities
similar to Sylvanergy’s in which WGPCCS was analyzed. See generally id. NUARB was under
no obligation to offer an enhanced explanation, like that required under the tenets of Desert
Rock, for its determination that WGPCCS redefines the Facility. The agency only had to give a
29
traditional “hard look” at the facility’s alleged purpose and had broad discretion to make its
redesign determination from there. See Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 530. NUARB did just that, and
permissibly rejected WGPCCS as BACT for the Facility.
B. NUARB’s analysis was sufficiently rigorous because the agency considered
carbon capture and storage generally, among other alternatives, in line with EPA
guidance.
Lending support to the rigor of its BACT analysis, NUARB considered carbon capture
and storage generally and rejected it as technically infeasible at the Facility. See Sylvanergy, slip
op. at 6. Where greenhouse gas emissions are the subject of BACT analysis, EPA guidance
classifies carbon capture and sequestration as an “available” add-on pollution control technology.
See Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA, Guidance for Determining Best Available Control
Technology for Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Bioenergy Production 13 (2011)
(“Guidance—Bioenergy Production”). Furthermore, EPA guidance states that carbon capture
and sequestration “should be listed” as part of BACT analysis for greenhouse gases, although
“[t]his does not necessarily mean [it] should be selected.” Id. at 14. NUARB adhered to EPA’s
guidance: “It first considered . . . carbon capture and storage,” but rejected that concept because
“there was no proven technology.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 6.
WGPCCS differs significantly from carbon capture and sequestration. The former
partially incorporates the latter, but it also adds the specific design element of wood gasification
to the generalized concept of carbon capture and storage. EPA directs that carbon capture and
sequestration should be included, at least initially, in BACT analysis for greenhouse gases. See
Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 14. But EPA leaves to the discretion of permitting agencies
whether to include more specialized, design-specific forms of carbon capture and sequestration,
such as WGPCCS, in BACT analysis. To understand otherwise—to require inclusion of
specialized forms of carbon capture and sequestration—is to read into EPA guidance words that
30
simply are not there. See Schooler v. United States, 231 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1956)
(“Confusion results when an attempt is made to read into the law words which are not there.”).
Regardless, NUARB’s consideration of carbon capture and storage as BACT for the Facility
demonstrates the agency’s commitment to EPA guidance and the overarching rigor with which it
conducted its BACT analysis.
V. NUARB PROPERLY IMPOSED THE SUSTAINABLE FOREST PLAN AS BACT
BECAUSE THE PLAN IS NOT A “BEYOND-THE-FENCE” MEASURE, AND
REGARDLESS, THE CAA DOES NOT OUTLAW SUCH MEASURES.
Again, this Court may only ask whether NUARB’s action was “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–97.
It bears emphasizing—this standard of review is quite deferential. See supra Part II.
A. Biofuel combustion is not—of itself—BACT because the process can act as a net
source of carbon.
Before the EAB, Sylvanergy took the position that NUARB impermissibly imposed the
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT because, “since all biofuels are renewable fuels, biofuel
combustion should be considered BACT per se without any additional controls.” Sylvanergy, slip
op. at 11. This position is untenable in light of EPA guidance and scientific authority. See
generally Guidance—Bioenergy Production; supra Part II (concerning the deference due agency
proclamations). In essence, Sylvanergy contends that “the combustion of biofuels, by its very
nature, is fully offset by the carbon sequestration effects of biofuel production.” Sylvanergy, slip
op. at 11. Sylvanergy glosses over a principle fatal to its position, though.
Carbon sequestration can indeed offset the combustion of biofuels, but it does not always
do so fully. See Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 6; accord Santos & Falberg, supra Part
III.B (concluding that biomass is not a “carbon neutral” source). EPA guidance states,
“[B]iogenic carbon stocks can act as a sink . . . .” Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 6
31
(emphasis added). But importantly, the guidance also notes that “if more carbon is released than
is sequestered, plant biomass acts as a net source of carbon.” Id. (emphasis added). When plant
biomass is a net source of carbon, “[g]reenhouse gases emitted by the facility are still pollutants,
and they may still be subject to controls.” See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11.
At the permitting stage, Sylvanergy did not provide evidence to NUARB that its facility
will be a net sink for carbon, rather than a net source of carbon. See generally id. Sylvanergy’s
proposed facility has the potential to emit 350,000 tons per year of carbon dioxide equivalents.6
Id. at 5. Yet Sylvanergy “made no commitment that its fuel sources [will] be sustainably
harvested,” and thus no commitment that its facility’s “net atmospheric impact [will be]
accounted for and . . . negative or zero.” Id. at 11 (emphasis added); Guidance—Bioenergy
Production at 8 (highlighting the importance of a net-negative or zero atmospheric impact); see
also Santos & Falberg, supra Part III.B.
B. The Sustainable Forest Plan is not a “beyond-the-fence” measure because it is
entirely within the control of Sylvanergy, and regardless, the CAA does not
outlaw such measures.
Sylvanergy also takes the position that NUARB impermissibly imposed the Sustainable
Forest Plan as BACT for its facility because “BACT cannot include ‘beyond-the-fence’
mitigation measures unrelated to the control of the actual emissions from the facility.” Id. at 11.
This argument fails for two reasons: first, because the Plan is not a beyond-the-fence measure;
second, and regardless of the first reason, because the CAA does not proscribe such measures.
i. The Plan is entirely within the control of Sylvanergy.
To the first point, the Sustainable Forest Plan is not a “beyond-the-fence” measure. The
decisive factor in whether a measure is beyond the fence is control. See Carbon Pollution
6 The Facility will in fact emit 262,500 tons per year in light of its operating limits. See
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. But those limits are not federally enforceable, and therefore do not
affect the potential-to-emit calculation. See supra Part II.B.
32
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed.
Reg. 34,829, 34,888 (June 18, 2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). For a measure to be beyond
the fence, it must be “implemented outside of the affected units and outside their control.” Id.
(emphasis added). The Sustainable Forest Plan is not outside the control of Sylvanergy, though.
See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11–12 (finding that the Plan is “entirely within the control of
Sylvanergy”). The Facility encompasses the dedicated reforestation area, such that one part of
the Facility tempers emissions from another part of the Facility. Id.
ii. The CAA does not outlaw beyond-the-fence measures.
Second, even if the Sustainable Forest Plan is a beyond-the-fence measure, the CAA does
not outlaw such measures: many provisions of the Act are open-ended and lend themselves—
often intentionally—to agency discretion. See Util. Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2439 (“[W]e presume that
when an agency-administered statute is ambiguous with respect to what it prescribes, Congress
has empowered the agency to resolve the ambiguity.”).
Given that statutory leeway, EPA guidance suggests that beyond-the-fence measures are
appropriate for BACT consideration in the context of greenhouse gas emissions: “[B]ecause
sequestration of CO2 emissions in living plant material outside the boundaries of the facility may
counteract the emissions from such facilities on a continuous basis, this unique dynamic merits
consideration in the BACT analysis.” Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 8. Greenhouse gases
are “well-mixed” in the atmosphere, so “the need to reduce them directly at the facility is of
lesser importance so long as their net atmospheric impact is accounted for and is negative or
zero.” Id.; cf. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,888–89 (“[W]e propose that the provisions of CAA
section 111 do not by their terms preclude the BSER [Best System of Emission Reduction] from
including [beyond-the-fence] measures.”). This Court should effectuate EPA’s reasonable
33
understanding of greenhouse gas science and the BACT requirement and allow consideration of
beyond-the-fence measures. See Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 403 (2008)
(holding that where ambiguity exists, “the agency may choose among reasonable alternatives”).
C. NUARB had a cogent rationale for selecting the Sustainable Forest Plan.
SOC argues that NUARB impermissibly imposed the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT
because the Plan “should have been rejected . . . as having unacceptable adverse environmental
impacts.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 12. Namely, SOC alleges that the Sustainable Forest Plan will
“destroy biodiversity and promote tree diseases and pest invasions.” Id. The EAB noted that
NUARB did not specifically address SOC’s concerns at permitting, but the Board also went on
to find “no clear error” in the agency’s failure to treat them. Id.
NUARB is under no obligation to respond directly to every comment it receives from all
interested parties. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 797 (5th Cir. 2000);
see also Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 497. The issuance of a PSD permit is an informal
adjudication, as the CAA does not require that the determination be made “on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C § 554(a) (emphasis added); see also Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(explaining that formal adjudications are only necessary where the statute requires a
determination “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”) (emphasis added);
compare 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (no such requirement). And “an agency can define its own
procedures for conducting an informal adjudication,” which do not have to include addressing
each comment it receives. Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 797 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990)); see also Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185 F.3d 349, 367
n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pension Benefit, 496 U.S. at 655) (“An ‘informal adjudication [like
the PSD-permit process] . . . contains only ‘minimal requirements[.]’”).
34
Moreover, in the context of a BACT determination, “[e]ven when an agency explains its
decision with ‘less than ideal clarity,’ a reviewing court will not upset the decision on that
account ‘if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 497
(citation omitted). NUARB had a cogent rationale for selecting the Sustainable Forest Plan as
BACT for the Facility. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 7. The agency grounded its decision in the
economic feasibility of the Plan, and its estimated 70% offset of the facility’s greenhouse gas
emissions. Id. Supreme Court precedent will not allow this Court to “upset” NUARB’s decision.
Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 497.
CONCLUSION
This Court lacks jurisdiction over the NAD denial. The denial was neither the end of
NUARB’s decisionmaking process nor a determination of Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations,
and accordingly was not the sort of “final action” this Court has the power to review. Sylvanergy
cannot avoid this result by twisting the words of the APA, because the denial was committed to
NUARB’s discretion and therefore outside the purview of the APA’s judicial-review provisions.
Even if this Court can review the “major emitting facility” determination, NUARB did
not act arbitrarily or capriciously in so classifying the Facility. Although the plain text of the
CAA and EPA’s primary-activity test show that the Facility’s ULSD start-up burners do not
make it a fossil-fuel fired source, the Facility is still a major emitter by reason of its potential to
emit more than 250 tons per year of carbon monoxide. The site plan imposed by the Village of
Forestdale is not a federally enforceable limitation under EPA guidance, and consequently does
not affect the Facility’s potential to emit. Accordingly, NUARB did not act arbitrarily in finding
the Power Plant to be a major emitting facility.
35
Similarly, NUARB’s requirement of BACT for the Facility’s greenhouse gas emissions
was neither arbitrary nor capricious. EPA regulation of greenhouse gases in the motor-vehicle
context triggered PSD requirements for greenhouse emissions, as recognized by the Supreme
Court. Because the Facility will emit a massive amount of greenhouse gases per year, and neither
the Act itself nor sound policy allow for a biofuel-plant exemption, NUARB properly required
Sylvanergy to install BACT for greenhouse emissions.
And finally, NUARB’s robust procedures and peculiar expertise were at their zenith
when the agency selected the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for the Facility. The agency
employed a rigorous top-down approach to analyze the available control alternatives—the same
diligent approach outlined by EPA guidance. The Plan represented the most effective, technically
feasible alternative that did not require Sylvanergy to change the fundamental scope of its
project. The Plan is a sensible alternative—economically manageable, technically effective, and
accessible to Sylvanergy. NUARB properly selected it as BACT for the Facility.