forces affecting success in negotiation groups

FORCES AFFECTING SUCCESS IN NEGOTIATION GROUPS’

by Neil Viclmar and Joseph E. McGrath

Departments of Psychology, University of Western Ontario and Universi ty of Illinois

McGrath’s Tri-forces model of the negotiation process emphasizes three major sets of role forces which act on the negotiation representatives. I t is proposed that by obtaining a number of measures of these role forces for each negotiator and combining them as a “battery of predictors” in a multiple regression equation, negotiation group outcomes can be predicted. Data from two experimental studies are presented. They support the Tri- forces model as a valid representation of the factors operating in the decision-making process of negotiation groups and confirm the usefulness of the multiple regression technique.

w

CGRATH and his associates (RIIcGrath, M 1966; McGrath and Julian, 1963; Vidmar and McGrath, 1965; 1967) have described a Tri-forces model of negotiation which conceives of the negotiation process as being carried out by representatives of the conflicting parties in the context of a small decision-making group. Essentially, the model centers on the role obligations of these representatives and suggests three major sets of role forces which affect negotiator behavior and consequently negotiation outcomes. The present paper proposes that by obtaining multiple measures of these role forces for each negotiation representative and combining them as a “battery of predictors” in a multiple regression equation, negotiation group outcomes can be predicted. Two experimental studies which show the usefulness of the conceptualization are presented.

THE TRI-FORCES MODEL

Although groups attempting to negotiate some issues of conflict may influence each other indirectly, through attempts to affect public opinion or other actions, the actual decision-making process in negotiation is usually carried out by explicitly legitimized representatives of the two sides. In the most direct sense it is these representatives who, using their respective parties for reference,

This research wassupported by AFOSR Grant #1161-67, Joseph E. McGrath, Principal Investi- gator. The authors are indebted to Duncan A. Ferguson for critical comments on an earlier ver- sion of the manuscript.

154

Behavioral Science, Volume 15. 1970

actually negotiate and formulate the final solution to the conflict.

Neither the representatives nor the reference groups exist in a vacuum, but rather are embedded in a social system, or community, which is likely to be affected by the conflict and which in turn may exert influence on the negotiation representatives and their reference groups.2 Negotiation, then, may be defined as a situation in which representatives from two (or more) reference groups within an involved social community, come together with the intent of setting forth a mutually acceptable solution to one or more issues about which the reference groups are in conflict.

The social psychological field Four major aspects may be identified in

the social psychological field in which the negotiation process is carried out:

1. Two (or more) parties or reference groups ( J and K ) which hold differing positions on one or more important issues;

2. Two (or more) negotiation representative(s) ( j and k ) who are explicitly legitimized representatives of each of the contending reference groups;

* Other writers (e.g., Phipps, 1961; Walton and McKersie, 1965; Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965) have also taken cognizance of the broader social system. Examples of its involvement are, on the domestic level, President Johnson’s intervention into the 1964 railroad dispute and, 011 the international level, the many attempts by the Secretary General of the United Nations to mediate negotiations between conflicting countries.

____

SUCCESS IN NEGOTIATION GROUPS 155

3. A direct face-to-face confrontation between these negotiators for the explicit purpose of obtaining a jointly acceptable solution to one or more of the contended issues;

4. The social system or community (C) within which the contending parties exist and are related to one another and within which the negotiation takes place.3

Negotiation outcomes

each of three standpoints: Negotiation outcomes can be assessed from

1. Acceptability of the negotiation solu-

2. Acceptability to reference group K ; 3. Acceptability to the values and in-

terests of C, the surrounding com- muni t y .

tion to reference group J ;

Ultimately, however, a negotiation outcome is successful only to the extent that it satisfies all three of the above criteria. One index which can serve as an overall criterion of the negotiation success, then, is the product of these three “acceptability” judgments (that is, J X K X C).

Forces operating on the negotiation representatives

Like members in other decision-making groups, the negotiation representatives have the task of agreeing and setting forth a good solution. Both their reference groups have some interest in resolving the conflict or they would not engage in negotiations in the first place. Similarly, the broader community, C, is also interested in a mutually agreeable and constructive solution. At the same time, however, the reference groups are each interested in obtaining a solution as favorable for themselves as possible, and the negotiation representatives are charged with this responsibility.

Consequently, it may be seen that the role of negotiation representative has built-in conflicting role demands. Each negotiator is simultaneously in a promotive as well as a

3 The Tri-forces model (McGrath, 1966) in- cludes the case where the “third party”, C, is also represented in the negotiation session by a medi- ator. The studies reported here, however, deal only with two-party, unmediated negotiation groups.

contrient relationship with his opponent negotiator. He is asked to (1) reach agreement with the other side and to ( 2 ) arrive a t a solution which is in accord with the interests of a broader community, but a t the same time to (3) represent the special and conflicting interests of his own reference group. These three sets of demands may be conceived of as three sets of role forces, called A forces, C forces and R forces, re~pectively.~ The role forces and some of the personality and situational factors which contribute to them are described below.

R Forces. These are forces acting on the individual negotiator toward obtaining a solution which is in accord with the position of the reference group which he represents. The strength of that “pull” depends on characteristics of the negotiator, and of his relationship to the reference group. Some of the characteristics which influence this force are (a) his perception of his reference group’s position; (b) the payoff contingencies (as he perceives them) for representing that group’s position effectively; and (c ) his personal belief in his own group’s position.

A Forces. These are forces acting on the negotiator toward agreement, on the negotiation issues, with the representative(s) of the contending reference group. Some of the characteristics which influence A forces are : (a) the negotiator’s perception of his reference group’s desire for, or investment in, reaching agreement; ( b ) the perceived inter- dependence of goals of own and other reference group; ( c ) personal sympathy with the contending group’s position or goals; and (d ) personal attraction to the other negotiator(s). C Forces. These are forces acting on the

negotiator toward obtaining creative, constructive solutions, in accord with values and interests of the surrounding community

Similar to the description of role forces de- lineated by Katz and Kahn (1966; also Kahn e t al., 1964), i t is the “received” role, or how the negotiator perceives and cognizes the demands, rather than what, actually is demanded (the “sent role”) by parties J , K or C. The degree of correspondence between received and sent role demands is prob- ably affected by personality and situational factors and is a separate (or separable) empirical question. It is the received role which will actually determine the negotiator’s behavior.

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156 NEIL VIDMAR AND JOSEPH E. XICGRATH

or social system ( C ) . Some of the negotiator characteristics which influence C forces are: (a) his perception of the community’s position; (b) the perceived payoff contingencies for his reference group for supporting the interests of the community; ( c ) the payoff contingencies for himself for supporting the interests of the community; and (tl) his personal attraction to the community’s values and goals.

It is not suggested that the above list of characteristics contributing to the role forces is complete; other characteristics might also be relevant, depending on the particular situation. Neither is it implied that the characteristics contributing to a role force are anything more than conceptually independent components. In fact they may be highly correlated with one another empiri- cally. Finally, the three sets of “forces” themselves are conceptually independent dimensions. For example, although R and A forces lead to opposite results on behavior, they could both be very strong in a particular situation: for example, as when a reference group might be strongly committed to a position conflicting strongly with that of the other group, but also have a strong need to reach agreement and resolve the conflict. In another instance the reference groups may need to maintain a very strong position and have virtually no need or desire to reach agreement with the other side, for instance, two nations that can break relations and pursue independent courses.

Role forces and negotiation outcomes

Negotiation group outcomes can be predicted by assessing the role forces acting on the negotiators. Specifically, negotiation outcomes are determined by the sum of the role forces acting on each of the negotiation representatives. The stronger the R forces, the greater will be the conflict within the negotiation group, because each negotiator will be attempting to maximize the benefit to his respective reference group. The stronger the A and C forces, the greater will be the tendency for the negotiators to reduce conflict, and to work toward mutual negotiation goals. R forces, therefore, should be negatively related to successful negotiation out-

comes, and A and C forces should be posi- tively related to them.

Prediction of outcomes: Use of a multiple

Given the above description of the negotiation situation, it may be seen that if we obtain multiple measures of R, A and C forces for each negotiation representative, negotiation group outcomes may be predicted by the following multiple regression equation:

regression formula

SNO = -l(bRji + bR,2 + * . . bRj,) + (bAji + bAj2 + * . . bAj,) + (bCji + bCjz + * - - bCj,) f -l(bRki + bRkz * . * bRk,) f (bAki + bAk2 + . . . bA,,) -!- (bckl + bck:! -k - * . bCk,) Where :

S N O = Successful negotiation outcomes R, A and C = the three sets of role

forces j = negotiation representative for refer-

ence group J k = negotiation representative for ref-

erence group K subscripts 1 through n = particular

measures (or components) contributing to the role forces

b = the weight given the particular measure in the prediction equation.

The R force measures for negotiators j and k are multiplied by -1 to indicate that they will always contribute negatively toward successful negotiation outcomes. If there is more than one representative per side, the equation would be expanded to include R, A and C forces for each negotiator.

Some comments about the equation may elucidate its usefulness. The investigator may obtain as many measures of R, A and C force components as he wishes, or is able to obtain. If the components contributing to a given role force are correlated with one another, as they are likely to be for both sub- stantive and methodological reasons, the multiple regression equation takes this into account when predicting to the outcome criteria. Examination of the beta weights (b) of the measures may indicate that some do not add appreciably to the controlled variance, and these might be dropped in future investigations.


SUCCESS IN NEGOTIATION GROUPS I57

The contributions of the various components of the role forces, the total forces themselves, or even the different negotiation representatives may be affected by particular situational variables. For example, Vidmar and McGrath (1965) suggested that a t least some negotiation situations are characterized by one party taking the offen- sive, while the other party is placed in a more or less defensive position. Under such circumstance, one representative may have more influence, or “weight”, in the final outcome. Or, one negotiator’s R forces might weigh more heavily and the other’s A and/or C forces might be more important. By examining the relative contributions of the beta weights the importance of the various negotiators, role forces, and/or measures of role forces can be assessed.

Let us now consider some results from two experiments which provide evidence in favour of the Tri-forces model and show the usefulness of the multiple regression approach to the prediction of negotiation outcomes.

STUDY I: NEGOTIATION ON HOUSING ISSUESK

This study examined the effects of R and A forces on the outcomes of negotiation groups composed of members from two conflicting housing organizations.

The Inter-Fraternity Council ( I F C ) and the Men’s Independent Association ( M I A ) are two often-conflicting men’s student housing organizations on the campus of the University of Illinois, Urbana. These two groups have different values and philosophies with respect to residence houses on campus and to varying degrees compete in recruiting members for their respective organizations. At the time the study was run, relationships between the two groups ranged from covert ideological conflict to overt political conflict. For example, a t that time the student newspaper was full of letters from members of both organizations accusing the other of underhanded tactics with respect to the election of representatives to the University Student Council.

5 This study is reported in more detail in Vid- mar and McGrath (1965).

Method and procedure Subjects and negotiation groups. Sub-

jects were twenty volunteers recruited from each of the housing organizations. Twenty negotiation groups were created by randomly assigning a member from the IFC to negotiate with a member from the M I A .

Negotiation task and instructions. The groups were given the task of developing a jointly acceptable statement of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different types of men’s campus housing; these statements were to be of such a nature that they could be distributed by the office of the Dean of Men as orientation information for incoming freshman men.

Before the study began strong “position papers’’ were prepared for each group and were edited and endorsed in writing by officers and faculty advisers of the respective housing groups. These position papers were given to the proper negotiation representative after a prenegotiation task and a series of pre-measures (described below). Each negotiator was instructed to use the position paper as a guide-line for representing his reference group. He was told to work for an outcome as favorable to his group as possible, but was informed (truthfully) that the negotiation solution would be judged by officers of the IFC and the M I A , and by the staff of the Dean of Men’s office (a “neutral” or C source), and that the product of these ratings would be the criterion of the overall quality of solution. Subjects were informed that the best IFC negotiator and the best M I A negotiator (in terms of the product of IFC, M I A and Dean of Men’s office ratings), would receive a ten-dollar prize.

The groups were given thirty minutes to discuss and write up the solution. Finally, the negotiators were required to jointly endorse their recommendations.

Instruments to measure R and A forces. The two main instruments used to assess the negotiator’s role forces were the Housing Issues Questionnaire (HI&) and the Other Esteem Questionnaire. No attempt was made to obtain a measure of C forces in this study. The Housing Issues Questionnaire, administered prior to the negotiation session,

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158 NEIL VIDMAR AND JOSEPH E. MCGRATH

Over- all

success

________

was composed of 13 controversial statements about fraternities and 13 identical statements about independent houses (for example, Fraternities, or Independent Houses, help members become self reliant; Fraternities, or Independent Houses, foster conformity to social pressure). Each item was accompanied by a seven-point Likert scale, with endpoints labelled “not a t all true” and “very true.” Responses to the thirteen items were summed to yield an “attitude” toward each housing group for each subject.

Each subject answered the HI& from three points of view: ( a ) how he himself felt; ( b ) how he felt the M I A as an organization would answer the items; and (c) how he thought the IFC as an organization would answer the items. Hence, the HI& allowed the determination of (a) the subject’s stti- tude toward his own reference group; ( b ) his perception of his own reference group’s attitudes about itself; and (c) his attitude toward the other reference group. The first two of these measures were used as measures of R forces: j’s or k’s attraction toward his own reference group, and his perception of its position on the issues being negotiated. The last measure was used as an A force measure: j’s or Ic’s attraction toward the other reference group.

The Other Esteem Questionnaire was composed of twenty-one eight-point rating items of the semantic differential type on which each subject was asked to describe his part- ner. Other Esteem was determined by summing over the scales; a high sum indicated high Other Esteem. This measure, also administered before the negotiation session (but after a warm-up task in which the negotiators got acquainted with one another) was used as a second component of the A forces: that is, attraction toward the other negotiator.

Judgments of negotiation outcomes. The group solutions were judged from three viewpoints: (a) acceptability to reference group J (the ZFC); (b) acceptability to reference group K (the M I A ) ; (c) acceptability to the neutral (or C) source, the Dean of Men’s office. Ratings were made on a zero to five scale with five being a very acceptable solution. An “overall success” score for each

For j (Fraternity) 0. Self re Fraternity b. Fraternity re Fraternity

a. Self re Independent For k (Independent)

b. Independents re Independents Multiple Correlation (4 Predictors) __

solution was obtained by multiplying J X K X C. Results

The two measures of R forces and the two measures of A forces for each of the two negotiators in the group were combined as an eight variable “battery” to predict each of the four criteria of negotiation outcome. lllultiple Rs of 30, .76, .60 and .88 were obtained for the J , K , C , and “overall success” criteria, respectively. Examination of the beta weights, however, indicated that neither of the A force measures for either of the negotiators were contributing substanti- ally to the prediction. Therefore, multiple correlations were computed for a four variable “battery” consisting of the two R forces measures for each negotiator. These results are presented in Table 1. The correlations with the J , C and ‘Loverall success” criteria reach acceptable levels of statistical significance. Examination of the individual predictors shows that three of them were consistently negatively correlated with negotiation outcomes as expected. The fourth predictor (attitudes of the fraternity members re: Fraternities) did not appear to be correlated with negotiation outcomes.

Discussion On the whole, R force measures were

negatively correlated with negotiation suc-

-.19 - . 3 4 - . 38 - . 4 0 .06 .04 .19 .23

-.19 -.14 -.26 - . I 8 --.65t - .23 --.62t - . 7 3 t

.67* .48 .76t .87$

TABLE 1 P R E D I C T I O N OF N E G O T I A T I O N CRITERI.1 FROM

MEASURES OF R FORCES -

Predictor Set 1 Criterion Measuresa


SUCCESS IN NEGOTIilTION GROUPS 159

cess, as predicted from the Tri-force model. It is noteworthy that the best prediction (accounting for 75 percent of the variance) is made to the complex multi-partisan “overall success” criterion, conceptually the most important of the criteria. It is also obvious that some of the predictors were better than others, suggesting that certain negotiation representatives (and perhaps some of the components which make up the role forces) may have more weight than others in determining negotiation outcomes.

In this study, A force measures were not useful in predicting outcomes. Perhaps this was due to poor measurement of the A force components; or perhaps A forces were not important for this particular negotiation setting. More likely, the measures were not as relevant as others which could have been taken. Other Esteem and attitude toward the other reference group may be of much less importance than measures of the perceived need or desire to reach agreement.

STUDY 11: NEGOTIATION ON EDUCATION ISSUESB

A second study offers the opportunity to replicate the findings of the Housing Issues study regarding R forces, and to extend the tests of measures of A and C force components. The study also offers the opportunity to clarify the nature of the role forces: specifically, are the measures of role force components meaningful in the absence of a representational role obligation? This latter issue requires discussion.

The Tri-force model assumes that the major characteristic which distinguishes negotiation groups from other types of task- oriented groups is the explicit and formalized conflicting role structures of the negotiation group members. From the definition stated in the beginning of this paper, i t is clear that at Ieast four conditions must be met before a group can be classified as a negotiation group: (1) a task which deals with issues involving conflicting values or goals; ( 2 ) a requirement for unanimity to achieve group task completion; (3) two or more members, who may differ in their attitudes toward the issues involved in the task; and (4) an

6 This study is reported in more detail in Vid- mar and McGrath (1967).

explicit representational role structure in which group members are representatives of reference groups who hold conflicting views on the issues involved in the task. The fourth condition, representational role obligation, is the crucial element which differ- entiates negotiation groups from all other types of task-oriented groups. The major negotiation conflict does not arise out of the task, or out of differing member attitudes per se, but rather from a conflict-producing role structure derived from the negotiators’ commitments to their own reference groups.

Were the measures of R forces in the Housing Study just measures of attitudes? Instead of making conclusions about representational role forces, could the result be better interpreted as merely due to group performance decrement caused by attitudinal conflict among the members? The second study allowed investigation of these ques- tions by comparing the efficacy of measures of R, A and C forces in predicting outcomes of groups having a representational role structure (Negotiation groups) with groups having the same task, task requirements and heterogeneity of member attitudes, but no representational role structure (Discus- sion groups). It was hypothesized that the measures of R, A and C forces would be better predictors of group performance for the Negotiation groups than for the Discus- sion groups.

Method and procedures

Task and reference positions. Unlike the Housing Study, where members from “real life” reference groups were used, the second study created artificial reference groups with conflicting positions on educational issues. Specifically, the task (for both negotiation and discussion groups) was concerned with whether the main purpose of the University should be to foster an orientation favoring broad, general education, or to foster an orientation favoring specialized, career oriented education.

The task consisted of two parts. Part I required a recommendation as to the per- centage of students having various orientations that should be admitted to the Univer- sity, and a justification of that recommendation. Part I1 asked what types of curriculum

Behavioral Science, Volume 15. 1970


changes should be instituted to deal with the conflicting views of advocates of broad education and of career oriented education.

The task was set in the context of pro- viding recommendation to the President’s Council on Planning a t the University of Illinois. Two reference positions based on the broad and career orientations, were created in the form of hypothetical organizations. No attempt was made to portray these partisan organizations, or the neutral organization, the President’s Council on Planning, as real. The organization advocating a broad, general education was called the Council for Broadening Educational Curricula (CBEC) and that advocating a career oriented education was called the Student-faculty Committee on Career-oriented Curricula (SCCC). A position paper, called a Facts and Information Paper, was prepared for each organization. It provided ideas and information supporting that organization’s position. The two papers were generally conflicting in their viewpoints.

Subjects. Subjects were 84 males enrolled in the Introductory Psychology course who participated to fulfill part of their course requirements. They were formed into forty- two two-man decision-making groups.7 To facilitate subject handling, the experiment was conducted on several occasions so that only a relatively small number of groups had to be handled at one time.

Assignment to positions and conditions. Prior to filling out some additional questionnaires and entering the negotiation session, subjects answered the Preference Education Questionnaire (PEQ). The PEQ consisted of a number of items intended to measure the degree to which subjects favored broad- or career-oriented education. On the basis of their answers subjects were categorized as favorable to the position of the Council for Broadening Educational Curricula or the position of the Student-faculty Committee for Career-oriented Curricula.

Within each of these categories one half of the subjects were randomly assigned to a group in a Negotiation condition and the

7 Two other conditions, with three-man groups, were also rui i in this study (see Vidrnar and Mc- Grath, 1967) but that data is not relevant, here.

other half to a group in a Discussion condition. In both types of groups, one member was attitudinally aligned with the CBEC organization and the other member was favorable to the XCCC organization’s position.

Instructions and negotiation-discussion manipulation. After subjects had completed additional questionnaries, the experimenter, on the pretext that better instructions could be given to a smaller group, moved the members who had been assigned to the Discussion condition to another room.

Since the experiment was conducted a number of times, two experimenters alter- nated giving instructions to the Negotiation and Discussion conditions to counterbalance any experimenter effect. In both the Negoti- ation and Discussion conditions the subjects who had been classified as favoring broad- oriented education were given a “Facts and Information Paper” which gave arguments favorable to the CBEC and purportedly taken from a report made by that organization. The subjects classified as favoring career-oriented education were given a similar paper, favorable to the SCCC organization.8 Each subject was also given written instructions explaining what was required of him. The experimenters orally repeated some of the instructions and answered any ques- tions. A resum6 of the procedure and instructions for each condition is presented below.

1. Negotiation Conditions: The subjects having CBEC roles were seated together; those having SCCC roles sat together. The experimenter stood in front of the room so that all instructions could be heard by all subjects. The Ss having the CBEC position papers were explicitly told by written and oral instructions that they were to represent that organization, They were informed that the other person with whom they would discuss the issue would be representing the opposed organization. The XCCC subjects

* No attempt was made to portray these “organizations” or the President’s Council on Plan- ning, as real. I t seems wise to assume the subjects knew they were contrived although no attempt was made to ascertain this information. Subjects’ lack of belief i n the “realness” of the organixa- tions, however, should have a conservative effect on the hypotheses to be tested


SUCCESS IN NEGOTIATION GROUPS 161

were given similar instructions. It was stressed that the negotiation group was to set forth a constructive solution to the task; but each representative was also to make sure his organization’s viewpoints were represented in the final written group solution. The E then gave each representative a symbolic “salary” of $1 for representing his position. Upon acceptance of the money the subject signed a note which the experimenter said constituted an agreement to represent that position to the best of his ability. In addition it was explained that a t the conclusion of the study the person who best represented the CBEC position would receive a $5 prize. A similar prize was offered to the best SCCC representative.

Thus, a multiple manipulation consisting of instructions to represent a particular position, a salary, and a prize for representing that position were used to create the representational role structures in the negotiation groups.

2. Discussion Condition: In both written and oral instructions subjects were told that they had each been given information from a conflicting position merely to make them an expert on this position; the group’s goal was to set forth a solution which was constructive and was acceptable to both organizations. The members were given a symbolic “salary” of $1 for trying to be good group members and setting forth a fair and constructive solution. Further, subjects were told that the best group would receive a $10 prize ($5 per member).

Decision-making session. Upon completion of instructions the groups in both conditions were guided to separate rooms to work on the task for thirty minutes. Subjects brought their ‘‘Facts and Information Papers” and instructions with them and were encouraged to use them if they needed them. At the end of thirty minutes the experimenters collected the solutions and escorted the subjects back to the original meeting room for de-briefing and filling out some additional questionnaires.

Group solution scores. The two parts of the group solutions were rated separately. Solutions from each part were judged by paid undergraduates trained by the experi-

menter. These raters evaluated each part of the group solutions on a 5-step scale from the point of view of each of the three reference positions; CBEC, SCCC, and neutral- constructiveness. Inter-rater reliabilities ranged from .76 through .93 for the various positions.

Measures of R, A , and C forces. The single R force measure was the original attitudinal agreement with the subject’s reference position, as measured by the Pref- erence Education Questionnaire.

The A force measures were derived by summing responses to two 5-point Iikert items from a questionnaire filled out just before entering into the negotiation session. The items were as follows: “It is important to me that my group reaches agreement” and “I expect that the other persons in my group will be agreeable”.

The measures of C forces were taken from the same questionnaire. Again responses to two items were summed. The items were: “It is important to me that my group sets forth workable, constructive recommendations to the President’s Council on Planning” and “I want my group to be the best group.”

Results and discussion

The measures of R, A and C forces for each group member were used to form a six variable “battery” of predictors of group performance. The correlations of the individual predictors with the criteria and the results of multiple correlations for the Negotiation groups are presented in Table 2 and those for the Discussion groups are presented in Table 3. The columns represent Parts I and I1 of the group solutions as judged from the viewpoint of the CBEC, the SCCC, and the President’s Council on Planning (reference group C), and the “overall success” criterion derived from the product of these three ratings. The correlations of the R, A and C forces for each negotiator with the criteria are contained in the rows of the table.

The Tri-force conceptualization predicts that in the negotiation groups R forces should be negatively correlated with the criteria and A and C forces should be posi- tively correlated. With minor exceptions the

Behavioral Science. Volume 15, 1970


TABLE 2 PREDICTION O F NEGOTIATION SECCESS CRITERI.1 FROM h f E A S U R E S O F h!, 8 , AND C FORCES:

NECOTI ZTION G R O U P S

Predictor Set Criterion Measuresa

I:J I:K I:C I:P I1:J I I :K 1I:C 1I:P

.03 -.50' -,34 - .42* -.56t -.20 -.35 - . lo -.39 -.12 - .43* -.39 . I7 - .38 - - .44' - .27

.36 .32 .28 .48* . 2 l .29 .27 .36

. 01 .22 .39 .27 -.20 - . I0 .38 .09

.28 .42* .60t .56t -.W .11 .59t .47* -.11 .24 .22 .11 -.22 - .29 .21 .09

Multiple Correlation ~

,520 .27 R forces (a, b ) .40 .51" .52' .53' .57* .40 A forces (c, dj .37 .39 .38 .52* . 2 l .35 .36 .36 C forces ( e , f) .46 .42 .63t .63t .23 .41 .62t .68t R, A, and C farces (a, b, c, d , e, f) .59 .68t .69t .771 .72t .63* .69t .70t

8 J = CBEC: K = SCCC; C = President's Council; P = Overall Success (J X K X C ) p < .05

t P < .01

conceptualization is supported. It is noteworthy from the standpoint of construct validity that the C force measures correlate higher with the C criterion than with the J or K criteria for both Parts I and I1 of the negotiation solutions. The bottom row of Table 2 gives the multiple correlations using the total battery of predictors with the criteria. All but one (that with criterion I: J) of the correlations are statistically significant.

Table 3 presents the results of parallel

analyses carried out for the Discussion groups. Unlike the Negotiation group condition, the variables in this predictor set yield essentially random correlations.

In sum, Negotiation group outcomes were predicted to a substantial degree for measures of R, A and C forces acting on the negotiators. Similar measures did not predict outcomes in Discussion groups whose members, though similar in attitudes and having the same task, did not have representational role obligations. These findings support the

TABLE 3 PREDICTION OF NEGOTIATION SUCCESS CIUTERIA FROM MEISURES OF R, 4 , A N D C FORCES:

UISCUSSION GROUPS -

Predictor Set Criterion Measuresa

I:J I:K I:C l:P 1I:J 1I:K

Multiple Correlation

.35 -.25 .42* .23 .31 --.43* -.w -.12 . l l -.17 .02 .14

.35 -.07 .15 .35 .20 -.21

.29 - .24 .27 .22 .56t -.50* - . I 7 .35 -.02 .I5 .03 -.16 -.18 .24 . 00 .01 -.17 .I9

R forces (a, b) .36 . 2 8 .44 .29 .31 .46 A forces (c, dj , .38 .25 .27 .36 .57* .50 C forces ( e . f ) .22 .39 .18 .15 .19 .28 R, A, and C forces (a, b, c, d, e , /) .50 .53 .49 .42 .61 .64'

1I:C 1I:P

.21 .22 -.31 -.11

.40 .27

.35 .46*

.22 . 14 - . lo -.08

.37 .21

.44 .46

.26 .IS

.52 .48

a J = CBEC; I( = SCCC; C = President's conncil; P = Overall Success ( J X K X C) ' p < .05 t p < .01


SUCCESS IN NEGOTIATION GROUPS 16.3

Tri-forces model and its contention that the negotiators’ representational role obligations are an important element in the negotiation process.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

A number of interrelated conclusions may be drawn from this research. First, prediction of negotiation outcomes may be best effected through approaches which center on, or a t least give substantial emphasis to, properties of the individuals who actually set forth the negotiation solution. This conclusion is in agreement with Douglas’ (1962) observations of industrial negotiation groups and Guetzkow and Gyr’s (1954) observations of business and governmental decision- making conferences: the interrelations among the negotiators, as well as the interrelations of the negotiating parties and the substance of the issues, are quite important in determining negotiation outcomes. A further implication is that it may be easier to modify negotiation outcomes by attend- ing to the negotiators themselves than by focussing on the negotiating parties.

A second conclusion is that the Tri-forces model appears to be a valid representation of the factors operating in the decision-making process of negotiation groups. It was at least useful in predicting outcomes of two experimental-simulation studies that differed sub- stantially in member composition and in the substance of the negotiation issues.

Finally, multiple regression was shown to be a useful technique to predict group outcomes and to test theoretical conceptualiza- tions. A number of correlated measures may be combined to control the maxima1 amount of group outcome variance. The technique

should prove to be especially useful in field studies of negotiations groups.

REFERENCES Dorlglas, A. Industrial peacemaking New York :

Columbia University Press, 1932. Guetzkow, H., & Gyr, J. An analysis of conflict in

decision-making groups. Human Relations,

Kahn, It. L., Wolfe, D., Quinn, R., Snoek, J. , & Rosenthal, R. Organizational stress; Studies in role conJlict and ambiguity. New York: John Wiley, 1964.

Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. The social psychology of organizatzons. New York: John Wiley, 1966.

McGrath, J. E. A social psychological approach to the study of negotiation. In R. Bowers (Ed.) Studies on behavior in organizations; A research symposium. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1966.

McGrath, J. E., & Julian, J. W. Interaction process and task outcomes in experimentally- created negotiation groups. J. psychol.

Phipps, T. Resolving hopeless conflicts. J. conflict Resol., 1961, 5, 274-278.

SAWYER, J., & Guetzkow, H. Bargaining and negotiation in international relations. In H. Kelman (Ed.), International behavior, a social psychological analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart &Winston, 1965.

Vidmar, N., & McGrath, J. E. Role assignment and attitudinal commitment as factors in negotiation. Tech. Report, No. 3, Urbana, Illinois: AFOSR Contract AF49 (638)-1291, Depart- ment of Psychology, University of Illinois, 1965.

Vidmar, N., & McGrath, J. E. Role structure, leadership and negotiation effectiveness. Tech. Report, No. 6, Urbana, Illinois: AFOSR Contract AF49 (638)-1291, Depart- ment of Psychology, University of Illinois, 1967.

Wdton, R. E., & McKersie, R. B. A behavioral theory of labor negotiations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.

1954, 7, 367-382.

Stud., 1963, 14, 117-138.

(Manuscript received July 7, 1969)

When a trout rising to a fly gets hooked on a line and finds himself unable to swim about freely, he begins with a fight which results in struggles and splashes and sometimes an escape. Often, of course, the situation is too tough for him.

In the same way the human being struggles with his environment and the hooks that catch him. Sometimes he masters his difficulties; sometimes they are too much for him. His struggles are all that the world sees and it naturally misunderstands them. It is hard for a free fish to understand what is happening to a hooked one.

KARL A. MENNINGER


forces affecting success in negotiation groups

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