foreign affairs review spring issue, 2014. russia special

The Foreign Affairs Reviewwww.foreignaffairsreview.co.uk

Issue 2Spring / Summer 2014FAR

THE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW

RussiaBACK IN THE USSR? p18

over 11 pages

Putin’s Russia Reasserts Itself FOREIGN POLICY, SOCHI AND THE OLYMPICS, PUSSY RIOT AND HUMAN RIGHTS

A Congolese WArlord is Brought to JustiCe

Why the West CAn’t ignore ChinA’s nAvy

hoW russiA’s history Fuels its Foreign PoliCy

Pussy riot And the groWth oF AnArCho-PoPulism

venezuelA’s demoCrACy on the Brink

FEATURING:

INSIDE THIS ISSUE:

This magazine will be my last as a St Andrews student. Throughout my time as Chief Editor of the Regulus and later as Publishing Editor at this publication I have always sought to give students here a voice, and I have been continually surprised and delighted at the level of in-

sight and originality put forth by my peers. St Andrews may seem politically isolated at times, but we make up for it in writing and consuming a frankly astonishing amount of opinion on

international affairs. I owe a tremendous debt to the scores of interested students who willingly give up their time to write, edit, and design this non-profit magazine. In particular I must thank Martin Lyle, who sacrificed holiday time to finish this edition. Thanks to my team of editors—Liliane,

Tamar, Michael and Hannah. Thank you to J. P. Caroll, for running the excellent DC Bureau. More broadly, I am grateful for my Chief Editor Radim Dragomaca’s advice and constant vig-ilance. Radim, I don’t know how you do it all. I also owe my friend Ben Shaps for bringing me in to the magazine business in the first place and getting me started at The Regulus. This issue of The Review wouldn’t be here today without the contributions of Ben Shaps, Kurt Jose and

Deborah Marber to St Andrews’ first political magazine. Finally, thanks to all of the writers, especially the ones who have been with me for several

years. It’s a strange parasitic relationship that the editor shares with his writers, and I’m grate-ful that you all have put up with me as I have pestered you for articles month after month. This issue belongs to you. I will leave this university with a piece of paper declaring me fit

for work but the most rewarding aspect of my time here has undoubtedly been in creating a forum for the expression of political opinion. It is my firm conviction that a healthy democ-

racy requires an informed and active public, and my dear hope is that, in some small way, the Foreign Affairs Review has succeeded in this respect.

Editor’s noteBY: Nic Carter, Publishing Editor

WITH SPECIAL THANKS TORadim Dragomaca, Editor-In-Chief of the Review, Tarleton Watkins, Director of Sponsorship, Qi Tian, the

Foreign Affairs Society President.

And a special Thanks to all our writers.

Publishing EditorNic Carter

Associate EditorsLiliane Stadler, Michael Cotterill, Hannah-Mei Andrews, Tamar Ziff

DC Bureau EditorJ. P. Carroll

Design and CoverMartin Lyle

Editorial BoardTHE FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW - ST ANDREWS

www.foreignaffairsreview.co.uk - www.standrewsfas.co.uk

The views expressed herein represent only their respective authors. All images remain the full property of their owners, fully credited on our website. The Foreign Affairs Review is a part of the Foreign Affairs Society, a non-profit entity affiliated to the

St Andrews Students’ Association, a registered charity

ContentsIssue n.2 - Spring 2014

The publication of the second issue of the For-eign Affairs Review marks a milestone. Not just

a milestone for the magazine, coming now to the end of its second year, and the end of its first year publishing in print, but also for its staff. This edi-

torial is more than just an introduction. It is also a conclusion and a farewell. I founded this magazine two years ago with Michael Telfer. Since that time, editors and writers have come and gone, Michael left the magazine to lead the History Society Jour-nal, and when the FAR starts its third year in Sep-tember 2014, only one of the original editors will

be left – Tarleton Watkins.

It is the end of an era, and the beginning of a new one. In the last two years, we took a student society webpage with a few dozen articles and a few thousand views and turned it into the largest

publication at St Andrews. We’ve been fortunate to have a dedicated and talented staff of over a 100 people in the past two years, have published over 500 articles and have reached an audience of over 30,000 people around the world. We’ve expanded into audio and

interviews, opened a DC Bureau, and with the help of the Regulus Magazine, which was absorbed by the Foreign Affairs Review in

September 2013, we began publishing this print edition, now on its second issue.

The FAR is no longer a fledgling publication looking to find its identity, build its team, and establish itself in the media landscape of St Andrews. It is a project of worth, which reaches a wide audi-ence and contributes to the student experience of hundreds in St

Andrews. This is my last editorial as Editor-in-Chief, and I want to thank the incredible team that has made all this possible in the last two years, and it is with great pride and great hope for the future of

the Foreign Affairs Review that I pass the torch.

BY : Radim Dragomaca, Editor-in-ChiEf of thE rEviEw

CONTENTS

4 The foreign affairs review

PRINT ISSUE NUMBER 2

The foreign affairs review 5

Contents p18

EU

RO

PEA

ME

RIC

AS

WO

RLD

DC

BU

RE

AU

FEA

TUR

ES

Switzerland’s Immigration Laws: What Does the Future Hold?

#LaSalida - Crisis in Venezuela

Habeas Corpus From Lincoln to Bush

Why we Cannot Just Ignore Chinese Sea-Power

Interview with Charles Bird: The “Longest-Surviving Resident”

The Great War, its Aftermath, and its Relevance Today

Journalism and Justice: Hai-ti’s Jean Dominique

American Empire: Decline and Fall?

Crisis and Crossroads: Cam-bodia in Transition

Freedom House and Neglected Instruments of Democratisation

Releasing US Immigration Reform from the Immigrant Detention Quota

The ICC Prosecutes a War-lord in the DRC

Terrorism and International Law

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p 34

p 38

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RUSSIA

In an interview conducted by the Foreign Affairs Review, Charles Bird, a Teaching Fellow at the St Andrews Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), shares some of his insights into the study and practice of international relations over the course of his career.

Who were some of the high-profile decision-makers you have met in your time as a diplomat?

In the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, Jack Straw; then government ministers, politicians, and senior business people such as Richard Branson I also saw represent-atives from the oil and gas industries, many Members of Parliament (some on a more or less daily basis). I’ve also met a number of Foreign Secretaries, including David Miliband.I have strong views concerning pol-iticians. I do not have a particularly high opinion of some of the decisions they have made in the past or of the way they were seduced by vanity, by misinterpretations or misunderstand-ings of events.

The legacy of Iraq is one example. It is an issue that the Iraqi people, most of all, have to deal with on a daily basis owing to the numbers of women, children and innocent civilians killed. I myself still think about my respon-sibility for the part that I played. I wonder how those in positions of government can rest easy at night.

What should prospective deci-sion-makers be prepared to do over the course of their career?

Students who are considering a career in diplomacy should bear the follow-ing in mind: have realistic expecta-

tions and don’t see it as a career for life.That being said, do not be afraid to speak your mind. One of the dangers of an organization such as the For-eign Office is that it breeds tradition. However much an organization encourages its people to speak out and approach problems with a critical mind, it does demand conformity if you want to rise through the ranks, Intentionally or not, this process can stifle people’s ability to think critical-ly. What it can boil down to is com-petition for promotion on the basis of conformity.

Another thing is that senior officials can be seduced by their proximity to power, or what they perceive as pow-er. They tend to make decisions based not on the national interest of the UK, but on what could increase their chances of preferment. We often take decisions on the safe side, when we should be prepared to stick our necks out and disagree with the consensus.Make moral decisions. I always hoped that my involvement in difficult situations could make a difference for the better.

What is the purpose of diplo-macy today?

It is the same as it has always been: to sort out intractable problems, to avoid confrontation, violence and the loss of face.

How do academia and di-plomacy differ? How do they enhance each other?

Both have much to learn from each other, but academia works within a longer timeframe. In diplomacy, you often have to distil a huge amount of information very compactly and synthesize it in order to make a quick decision. For instance, in the Syrian crisis, a diplomat needs to know the situation on the ground. Who are the individuals and groups in a position to change the course of events and understand the methods and means to bring about change? They don’t necessarily need to know the specific affiliation of different tribal members -hose interests are more academic.

That being said, academics get things right pretty often, because they can test their analysis and their conclu-sions.

However, they often do not have a realistic understanding of how their recommendations can be implement-ed. Take the situation in Afghanistan. It is easy for academics to say that the UK should do this, the USA that and the Pakistanis something else. It is far

INTERVIEW

BY : Liliane Stadler

Charles Bird : The Longest-Surviving Resident

FEATURES




harder for diplomats to turn that into a reality.

How well do academics pre-pare future diplomats?

Diplomacy is not necessarily about knowledge, but about a skill set. For example, some doctors are only suit-ed for pathology, because they should never be let near a living patient. There are some people who may be brilliantly clever, but who are totally unsuited to diplomacy. In academ-ia, it is less important to have good inter-personal skills.

What was your most memora-ble experience as a diplomat?

I’ll describe three particularly memo-rable occasions.

The first was during my time in Iraq, which lasted about six months – both during the war-fighting phase and later - I was involved with setting up a civilian administration in the area under UK control. It’s an ex-traordinary experience, being faced with trying to find people to run a city like Basra within twenty-four hours of capture, knowing that every civil servant, every doctor, teacher, engineer, oil worker, gas worker, electrician, has disappeared because Saddam told them that we were going to execute them. I remember walking into a building where we asked Iraqis interested in working for us to meet after the capture of Basra. We were the first of the occupying forces to come into close contact with the local population, trying to find engineers or medics who were prepared to run a city on an interim basis. I found out I was the only Arabic-speaker, which

made things interesting.

The second occurred when I met Slo-bodan Milošević, who was extremely manipulative and clever. During the Yugoslav wars, a number of EU diplomats were charged with voicing objections to his practices. Milosevic knew this, so what he would do is, he would stand diagonally across from you at the other end of the room when you came in. He would then greet you with his hand outstretched. It is a natural reaction for most people to stretch out their hand in response and perhaps even to smile. At the same time, in the other corner of the room, Milosevic had arranged for the press to film and photograph the entire scene, so that all EU con-stituents would see would be smiling, hand-shaking diplomats, who had initially promised to scold Milošević for his actions.I spent nearly a year at the Hyatt Ho-tel in Belgrade. It was cheaper than renting a house – the hotel had to charge at the official rate of exchange, while private landlords demanded US Dollars or Deutsche Mark. Anyway, a well-known sanctions-breaker moved into the suite next to mine. For his own protection, his guards were permanently stationed in the lobby of the hotel. One night, as I was asleep, the sanctions-breaker opened the door and was shot three times with a silencer. I slept through the whole thing. The next morn-ing, as I was leaving, the desk clerk greeted me, saying, “Congratulations Mr. Bird, you are now officially our longest-surviving resident!” People in these situations often have an amaz-ing sense of humor.

Actually, I’ll give you one more story.

One of the things we struggle to find as humans is a sense of normalcy in the midst of chaos. During the Kosovo crisis, I used to go to no-man’s land at night to bring refugees to the border region of Macedonia. One night, I was standing with a whole load of refugees: women whose husbands had been shot, women who had been raped, the old and infirm,

and the injured – a scene of chaos and of utter human misery. Sudden-ly, my mobile phone rang. It was my son, who had no idea where I was or what I was doing. He had called to ask about whether I had heard the news about the test (cricket) match, and gave me a one-on-one account of the day’s play! It was a wonderful moment of calm and connection with another world, away from what I was seeing around me – I cried.

Who are the people who have im-pressed you the most over the course of your career?

The people who have impressed me most over the course of my career are not politicians or high-profile people. Instead, I have huge admiration for the people who are often regarded as unimportant. I respect colleagues, who put their lives at risk and their personal lives under immense strain because they are committed to what they are doing. I admire the individ-uals who have to suffer the conse-quences of political decisions. I have huge respect for soldiers, who are asked to do difficult and dangerous jobs without necessarily understand-ing or agreeing with the policies that guide their assignments.

I am most impressed by the ordinary people who can see through national and international disagreements and discover basic humanity in all of us. I have witnessed kindness and under-standing from ordinary people in countries with whom we were at war or in a state of diplomatic deep-freeze (meaning we were not talking).It’s easy to be dumbstruck by meeting the “heroes and villains” you reg-ularly see on the news. But equally

‘Ethical’ foreign policy has been in vogue for some time. A ‘foreign policy based on values’, as our man in Whitehall puts it, has made considerable in-roads into the popular political consciousness and vocabulary. Yet to con-sider some of the major challenges to international relations today is to trace a fault line between hard-headed realism and the kind of global moralism which raises the suspicions of even the most trusting spectators. It is some-thing of a non-choice: do we prefer a ruthlessly ambitious power unafraid to be the cudgel-player in the china shop (to twist Hume’s famous phrase), or do we carry on pretending that the soft-speaker doesn’t have a big stick? Ei-ther way, the suspicion lingers that value-laden language forms a superficial gloss to the substantive reality of international transactions.

It would hardly be an original argu-ment to suggest that international ethics seem to be stuck in a rut. That, in any case, sounds alarmingly close to a concession that those realists whose critique of liberal internation-

alism is invariably accompanied by a condescending reproach for even beginning to think that systems of personal obligation could be tran-scribed to the global sphere, should have the last word. The challenges we

face in several avenues of global af-fairs, however, beg a fresh approach. For example, where might we be-gin to shift the discourse on our re-sponse to transnational terrorism?In 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed

memorable are the people who suffer the consequences of the actions and decisions of politicians. I have spent a lot of time in conflict zones, meeting people who have suffered physical, emotional and psychological damage and loss beyond imagination. Their courage never ceases to amaze me. Here we are in Britain, upset about flood damage. We would fall apart if we had to experience what people in conflict and post-conflict situations have to endure.

I will never forget the words of a sol-dier outside of Basra. As we stopped for a cup of tea, there was a skirmish outside the city. He was about to go and put his life on the line and he asked me, with a cheerful grin, “Excuse me, sir. Can you tell me what we’re doing here?”

Charles Bird, OBE, is a Teaching Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St Andrews. Between 1986 and 2010 he was a member of HM Diplomatic Service specializing in the Middle East, conflict, post-conflict, terrorism and counter-terrorism issues. Post-ings included to the UAE (1988–92) with involvement in Desert Storm, Belgrade (1992–93) during the war

in former Yugoslavia, Macedonia (1999) for the Kosovo crisis, Greece and Nigeria. During tours in the UK his jobs included Deputy Head of Middle East Department, Head of South Asia Department, and leading a project that resulted in the forma-tion of the interdepartmental (FCO, MoD, DfID) Stabilization Unit, which co-ordinates the UK Government’s post conflict reconstruction work in, amongst other places, Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2003 he was second-ed to the military and was on the staff of the General Officer Commanding First (UK) Armored Division in Iraq, both during and for several months after the invasion. Between 2004 and 2008 he was on secondment to the MoD working on issues related to counter-terrorism.

FEATURES


TERRORISM

BY : Taylor Carey

Terrorism and International Law: Building a Trustworthy Programme



by US soldiers inside Pakistan. The raid was secret, and expedient, com-pleted in 38 minutes. Osama’s assassi-nation meant, according to President Obama, that ‘justice has been done’. Yet, for those avowedly clinging to an ethical framework for global politics, such a move presents certain tensions. Bin Laden was guilty – by his own gloating admission – of grotesque acts of mass-murder, beyond even of the casualties of 9/11. However, “jus-tice” has an essentially communica-tive component. We are convinced of it when we see it and thus our con-cern for a just foreign policy ought to be rooted in the extent to which it lends itself to public scrutiny. In the domestic sphere, this is all fairly uncontentious. Accountability is the sine qua non of a democratic polit-ical order. The values of democracy maintain self-criticism as the foun-dation for an equitable political set-tlement. Moral programmes are fre-quently diverse, but converge to the extent that, through proximity, they must argue for their permissibility and perspective. The role of the state is to act as a guarantor of freedom of argument, discourse and debate. More specifically, the state provides a guarantee that, in those areas of public life where the good of any one community threatens to impinge on the good of another, might need not equal right. What the state ensures

is scrutiny, the possibility of genu-ine public debate, and accountability. These are the values that we claim to bring to our foreign policies. Yet, the guarantee of fair argument, which states provide their constituent com-munities, does not exist in a glob-al context, where states constitute those interested parties themselves.

At this stage, returning to a focus on transnational terrorism will prevent a panegyric on the desirability of com-prehensive global governance; but perhaps the natural fluidity of such an argument suggests something of the difficulty of detaching a supposedly ethical programme for global engage-ment from the foundational principles with which we shape our own commu-nities. The killing of Osama bin Laden is problematic, because it suggests an arbitrary suspension of ethical norms and international law. The argument from the Obama administration was that the operation constituted wartime self-defence. That sounds convinc-ing only if self-defence is understood liberally, to say the least. What haunts this episode is its isolation from pro-

cedural politics – triggers were pulled before arguments settled. Granted, a host of practicalities would have made the detainment and trial of bin Laden a gargantuan struggle. Granted, too, that al-Qaeda kingpins don’t regular-ly hand themselves over to due pro-cess. Still, the biting question remains: can we ever trust a foreign policy that treats law as so easily dispensable? Trust is at the heart of the West’s dif-ficulties in the ‘War on Terror’. The inescapable reality is that a large pro-portion of the world’s Muslim com-munities feel that Western powers besieges their identity and threatens their cultural inheritance. What be-gan as unanimous solidarity behind a wounded icon of liberty and freedom – the World Trade Center – rapidly decayed into begrudging support, at most, for an American project. Here, we feel the true consequences of treat-ing international law as no more than an occasionally convenient tool. If the arguments advanced about the nature of the state as a guarantor of

freedom of speech are correct, then we ought to be able to extend them to critically evaluate the failings of in-ternational cooperation with regard to issues of collective responsibility. Transnational terrorism poses a challenge to the basic security of the political order, demanding a collec-tive response. These threats to the underpinnings of democratic lib-erty demand consensus and con-versation over unilateral zeal. Di-plomacy is today often seen as little more than a veil for vested nation-al interest – not least when the ‘big stick’ of which Theodore Roosevelt spoke is hidden behind one’s back. What would an ethical foreign pol-icy look like? The theologian and philosopher Herbert McCabe once quipped that ethics is ‘just about do-ing what you want’. International law and governance does not mean rigid imperative imposed from on high; rather, it exists to provide the space for argument, accountabili-ty, debate and demonstration which any notion of justice presupposes. Our prospects for meeting the de-mands of the most pressing global challenges, from terrorism to climate

change, are fatally damaged by the absence of trust in the global sphere. Yet for all the lack of a reliable and trustworthy discursive framework, for all the presumption of vested interest around every corner, our language about ethical engagement in the in-ternational sphere points us towards a solution. A foreign policy based on democratic values is exactly what we ought to be engaging in. Until we do, contrary to Mr Obama’s asser-tion, justice will not have been done.

EUROPE




�e referendum, which passed by a margin of only 0.36% �e referendum, which passed by a margin of only 0.36% above the required 50%, is in direct violation of the agreeabove the required 50%, is in direct violation of the agree-ment made between Switzerland and the EU to allow free ment made between Switzerland and the EU to allow free movement of people between borders.

Implications for SwitzerlandImplications for Switzerland

�e Swiss People’s Party has been instrumental in creating �e Swiss People’s Party has been instrumental in creating fear and hysteria over the prospect of ‘mass immigration’. fear and hysteria over the prospect of ‘mass immigration’. �e party has spearheaded other campaigns along similar �e party has spearheaded other campaigns along similar right-wing ideals in the past, for example a 2009 ban on right-wing ideals in the past, for example a 2009 ban on the construction of minarets, which prompted concerns the construction of minarets, which prompted concerns of Islamophobia in the country. �is referendum has been of Islamophobia in the country. �is referendum has been a great victory for the party, which seeks to create a more a great victory for the party, which seeks to create a more inward-looking Switzerland.

Proponents of the new cap on immigration believe that Proponents of the new cap on immigration believe that free movement has created pressure on housing, health, free movement has created pressure on housing, health, education and public transport. �ey also lament that education and public transport. �ey also lament that foreign workers drive salaries down for Swiss nationals. foreign workers drive salaries down for Swiss nationals. Further, they fear the discrepancy between the Swiss Further, they fear the discrepancy between the Swiss unemployment rate of 3 per cent, and the EU average of 7 unemployment rate of 3 per cent, and the EU average of 7 percent, distressed that continued free movement might percent, distressed that continued free movement might raise the number of unemployed people in Switzerland raise the number of unemployed people in Switzerland and a�ect economic prosperity. As a result of the referenand a�ect economic prosperity. As a result of the referen-dum, especially in areas of high unemployment, employdum, especially in areas of high unemployment, employ-ers will have to prove that they are looking for Swiss sta� ers will have to prove that they are looking for Swiss sta� before opening the pool out to foreign applicants. before opening the pool out to foreign applicants.

Immigrants make up around 60 per cent of workers in the Immigrants make up around 60 per cent of workers in the pharmaceutical, construction and farming industry. At pharmaceutical, construction and farming industry. At the Basel university hospital, over 50 percent of doctors the Basel university hospital, over 50 percent of doctors do not hold a Swiss passport. �ese industries would be do not hold a Swiss passport. �ese industries would be negatively impacted by the results of the referendum, as negatively impacted by the results of the referendum, as

many would lose their competitive edge with highly qualimany would lose their competitive edge with highly qualimany would lose their competitive edge with highly quali-�ed foreign employees. �ed foreign employees. �ed foreign employees.

�ere are many signi�cant backlashes resulting from the �ere are many signi�cant backlashes resulting from the �ere are many signi�cant backlashes resulting from the referendum, for example on study and research programs. referendum, for example on study and research programs. referendum, for example on study and research programs. Erasmus+, a European education exchange program that Erasmus+, a European education exchange program that Erasmus+, a European education exchange program that was recently allocated more funding and opened up to was recently allocated more funding and opened up to was recently allocated more funding and opened up to allow the participation of Swiss students, is one of many allow the participation of Swiss students, is one of many allow the participation of Swiss students, is one of many programs that is in jeopardy if the EU chooses to close o� programs that is in jeopardy if the EU chooses to close o� programs that is in jeopardy if the EU chooses to close o� Swiss membership. Between 2011 and 2012, over 2,600 Swiss membership. Between 2011 and 2012, over 2,600 Swiss membership. Between 2011 and 2012, over 2,600 Swiss students took part in the Erasmus program. Swiss Swiss students took part in the Erasmus program. Swiss Swiss students took part in the Erasmus program. Swiss universities that participate in the program stand to lose universities that participate in the program stand to lose universities that participate in the program stand to lose funding from research grants. �e Federal Institute of funding from research grants. �e Federal Institute of funding from research grants. �e Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, for example, could lose almost 100 Technology in Zurich, for example, could lose almost 100 Technology in Zurich, for example, could lose almost 100 million francs in funding. On top of this, the referendum million francs in funding. On top of this, the referendum million francs in funding. On top of this, the referendum sends a clear message to foreign students who are already sends a clear message to foreign students who are already sends a clear message to foreign students who are already in Switzerland, that they are not welcome. Naturally, this in Switzerland, that they are not welcome. Naturally, this in Switzerland, that they are not welcome. Naturally, this also greatly a�ects the plans of many students who would also greatly a�ects the plans of many students who would also greatly a�ects the plans of many students who would like to stay in the country a�er graduation. like to stay in the country a�er graduation. like to stay in the country a�er graduation.

As a shock tactic to demonstrate the concrete results of As a shock tactic to demonstrate the concrete results of As a shock tactic to demonstrate the concrete results of the referendum, a German TV program released a phothe referendum, a German TV program released a phothe referendum, a German TV program released a pho-to-shopped image of the Swiss football team, removing to-shopped image of the Swiss football team, removing to-shopped image of the Swiss football team, removing players with multicultural backgrounds from the photo, players with multicultural backgrounds from the photo, players with multicultural backgrounds from the photo, leaving only three players. Metaphorically, what this leaving only three players. Metaphorically, what this leaving only three players. Metaphorically, what this demonstrates is that the booming Swiss economy is greatdemonstrates is that the booming Swiss economy is greatdemonstrates is that the booming Swiss economy is great-ly supported by immigrants, many of whom are extremely ly supported by immigrants, many of whom are extremely ly supported by immigrants, many of whom are extremely well quali�ed.well quali�ed.well quali�ed.

Relationship with the EURelationship with the EURelationship with the EU

Switzerland is famously not a member of the now Switzerland is famously not a member of the now Switzerland is famously not a member of the now 28-member European Union, choosing instead to bene�t 28-member European Union, choosing instead to bene�t 28-member European Union, choosing instead to bene�t from the EU’s single market through a series of over one from the EU’s single market through a series of over one from the EU’s single market through a series of over one

In the early hours of the 17th of February, an In the early hours of the 17th of February, an In the early hours of the 17th of February, an In the early hours of the 17th of February, an Ethiopian Airlines �ight un-expectedly landed at Geneva airportGeneva airport. �e hijacker on board only had one . �e hijacker on board only had one . �e hijacker on board only had one

demand: asylum in Switzerlandasylum in Switzerland. When the news broke, it seemed that . When the news broke, it seemed that . When the news broke, it seemed that the most puzzling element of the hijacker’s decision was his destination of the most puzzling element of the hijacker’s decision was his destination of the most puzzling element of the hijacker’s decision was his destination of the most puzzling element of the hijacker’s decision was his destination of

choice. Why, of all European countries, would he choose Switzerland at this choice. Why, of all European countries, would he choose Switzerland at this choice. Why, of all European countries, would he choose Switzerland at this choice. Why, of all European countries, would he choose Switzerland at this time? Less than two weeks earlier, the small Alpine country narrowly passed time? Less than two weeks earlier, the small Alpine country narrowly passed time? Less than two weeks earlier, the small Alpine country narrowly passed time? Less than two weeks earlier, the small Alpine country narrowly passed a referendum vote to create stricter a referendum vote to create stricter quotas for immigrationquotas for immigrationquotas for immigration from European Union (EU) countries, a decision that is bound to have far-reaching implicaUnion (EU) countries, a decision that is bound to have far-reaching implicaUnion (EU) countries, a decision that is bound to have far-reaching implicaUnion (EU) countries, a decision that is bound to have far-reaching implica-

tions on the country’s tions on the country’s relationship with the EUrelationship with the EUrelationship with the EU.

BY :BY : Alexis McGivernAlexis McGivernAlexis McGivern

Switzerland’s Immigration laws:Switzerland’s Immigration laws:Switzerland’s Immigration laws:Switzerland’s Immigration laws:

What Does the Future Hold?What Does the Future Hold?What Does the Future Hold?What Does the Future Hold?

hundred bilateral treaties that link goods, services, people and capital between the two markets. In 2013, trade with the EU amounted to over 110 billion Swiss francs, making it the country’s biggest trading partner. Over 1.2 million EU citizens currently live in Switzerland, and 450,000 Swiss citizens live and work in the EU.

The relationship between the two has been afflicted in the past by conflicting ideas about tax evasion, particular with regards to multi-national corporations and citizens of neighboring countries with secret Swiss bank accounts.

The decision to place quotas on the number of immi-grants arriving in Switzerland is a far cry from the Swit-zerland that seemed to be opening up its borders only six years ago, when it first signed the Schengen Agreement in order to eliminate internal borders within the region and make travel hassle-free for EU and Swiss citizens. At the same time, Switzerland accepted the related Dublin Convention, designed to simplify the application process for asylum seekers. However, at the time of ratification of the Schengen Agreement, many citizens already expressed fears over the potential influx of cheap labour from sur-rounding EU countries.

How Should the EU React?

The EU’s reaction to the referendum not only has implica-tions for the future of their relationship with Switzerland, their fourth largest trading partner, but also affects how similar right-wing movements across Europe choose to move forward with their agendas. Nigel Farage, the leader of the UK’s Independence Party, stated that the result of the referendum was “wonderful news”, and he praised Switzerland for “[standing] up to the bullying and threats of the unelected bureaucrats of Brussels.”

Many other European right-wing parties, like the Progress Party of Norway or the Party for Freedom in the Nether-lands, are promoting the idea that the European Union ideals present a threat to national freedom and prosperity. Most concerning is the direct impact this may have on the 2017 referendum regarding David Cameron’s policy to renegotiate Britain’s membership of the EU. British Eurosceptics could look to Switzerland as an example of a successful move away from the European Union. The EU has struggled to make immigration policy uniform across the EU, with many countries viewing it as a nation-al foreign policy decision, rather than subject to common agreements across the union.

Now it is up to the EU to decide how to treat the results of this referendum. Some EU commissioners have favoured making it clear that “cherry-picking with the EU is not a sustainable strategy”, as Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Ger-many’s foreign minister, made clear in his warnings to the Swiss government. However, if they choose to come down too hard on the country, they may push others into

distancing themselves from the union.

Referendums are the first stage of any policy change within the Swiss government. As of now, the Swiss federal government has three years to create the matching legis-lation to set quotas for immigrants depending on annual economic needs. The bilateral agreements with the EU that allow the Swiss access onto the single market come with a ‘guillotine clause’, meaning that the compromise of one part of the agreement will put all others in jeopardy.

Swiss Political System

The vote was largely divided along the ‘Rösti curtain’, a po-litical split between French-speaking and German-speak-ing cantons in Switzerland. The French-speaking cantons overwhelmingly voted ‘no’ to imposing quotas on im-migrants, the German-speaking cantons were divided, and the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino voted ‘yes’ to curbing the amount of immigrants allowed in Switzer-land. The voting was also disproportionate across a rural and urban divide, with fewer city-dwellers voting for the initiative than those in rural regions. The Swiss political system operates through referenda, which are at the core of its unique democratic function-ing. All Swiss citizens are eligible to vote on policies at the cantonal and national levels several times a year. This form of direct democracy is essential to the Swiss political system, as it stimulates discussion on important issues that affect citizens. There are many long-term implications of this vote; therefore, though the result of this referen-dum is fearful and upsetting, it represents the will of the Swiss people, which is ultimately the most important part of any functioning democracy.

Alexis McGivern is a third year International Relations student who has a keen interest in environmental issues’ impact on the political sphere. Alexis has Canadian and Irish citizenships and grew up in Geneva, Switzerland. She cites this multiculturalism as the cause of her interest in the work of international and non-governmental organizations in coor-dinating political action. She also has an interest in interna-tional trade, development and aid, energy studies, corporate responsibility and marine conservation.

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D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover opens with a stark and powerful truth: “Ours is an essentially tragic age… the cataclysm has happened, we are amongst the ruins.” It perfectly captures the despair and incredulity that em-bodied the views of so many people who continued to suffer from the scars of World War One. The war was to cast a shadow over global proceeding for decades to come. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary in 1914, was more accurate than he had anticipated when he remarked that “the lights are going out all over Europe and I doubt we will see them go on again in our lifetime.”

Indeed, the disastrous aftermath of the Great War induced a paralysis in international relations and inadvert-ently planted the seeds of destruction that would lead to the unfolding of a Second World War. This year’s centenary commemoration provides a poignant opportunity to gaze back at the war and its aftermath, and try to educe a nugget of wisdom from the lessons of history.

The First World War remains so significant because it fundamentally altered the way that war was waged and perceived. After 1918, war could no longer be conceived of as a chiv-alrous pursuit, fought on distant bat-tlefields, for the glory of the Empire. Yet in 1914, without the benefit of hindsight, the cream of English youth followed their blind patriotism to fight for ‘King and Country’. Patriotic verses, such as the St Crispin’s Day Speech from Shakespeare’s Henry V, were successfully invoked to invigor-ate ‘heroism in the abstract’. In Vera Brittain’s immortalising classic, ‘A Testament of Youth’, even the schol-arly and progressive Roland Leighton declared in conversation that he saw war as “ennobling and very beautiful,

something whose elemental reality raises it above the reach of all cold theorising.” This is a fine example of the nauseating jingoism that captured the imagination of an entire gener-ation. Those who failed to volunteer immediately were met with posters designed to intimidate men into ‘doing their bit’ for their country. One particularly effective poster, with a charming homely scene in the back-ground, depicted a young girl sat on her father’s knee asking, ‘Daddy, what did you do in the great war?’

Yet this eruption of nationalistic fervour was soon dampened by the bitterness of reality. The slow decay of time ushered in a deadly realism tinged with grievous loss, profound suffering and abject misery. For the first time, the home front was ines-capably drawn into the abyss of war, with rationing and conscription im-posed on all citizens. Another mod-ern first was the threat of death by bombing. It seemed that even civil-ians were no longer safe. In total, the war claimed 9 million British souls, an astronomical figure, with the bulk of a generation being decimated and left to rot in the fields of Flanders. For

anyone in search of an illuminating glimpse of the squalor these soldiers endured, priority status must be given to the majestic war memoirs and poetry of literary titans such as Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sas-soon. Through gazing at these deeply personal and heartfelt accounts, the natural questions crops up: why on earth did such horrors have to be endured in the first place?

One substantive answer to this lies in the psyche of contemporaneous military leaders, whose visions were blinkered by a domineering strategy, known as the ‘cult of the offensive’. This strategy held that victory could only be won by launching all-out strategies of conquest. Germany’s Schlieffen Plan is the best embod-iment of the prevailing idea that “attack is the best form of defence.” Yet, this seemingly unanimous endorsement of an outdated set of political and military ideals meant that military leaders failed to recog-nise the many advantages of pursuing defensive strategies, and failed to rec-ognise the obstacles that aggressive tactics would be forced to confront. Indeed, British and French leaders

WORLD WAR ONE

BY : Michael Cotterill

Look Back in Anger! The Great War, its After-math, and its Relevance Today

were so convinced that superior morale would overcome the superior defensive firepower hurtling from the German trenches, that troops were ordered to climb out into ‘No Man’s Land’ for what they knew would be almost certain death. Failure to follow this gruesome command would result in execution for cowardice. After four years of fighting, Germany sued for peace after suffering near defeat. The long-lasting legacy of the war is an-nually recalled in a collective manner through the wearing of poppies as an enduring symbol of remembrance for the fallen.

In terms of the war’s repercussions, it is not an embellishment to say that the Treaty of Versailles was one of the most heinous political flops in histo-ry. It humiliated Germany through the parching of national pride, the stripping of territorial assets, the infliction of torturously high repa-rations, and the expurgation of her military forces. Regrettably, leaders in Britain and France heeded the opinions of their newly enfranchised

democratic populaces, who espoused retributive rhetoric such as ‘Hang the Kaiser’ and ‘Make Germany Pay’, and imposed punitive treaties upon the now subjugated and defeated nations. Winston Churchill once declared, “In War: Resolution, In Defeat: Defiance, In Victory: Magnanimity, In Peace: Goodwill.” Contrary to the noble ideals of Churchill’s statesmanlike remark, there was a fatal absence of goodwill and magnanimity in the peace negotiations of Versailles and elsewhere. Indeed, the extreme vindictiveness of Versailles ushered in an age of uncertainty; thus providing extraordinarily amenable condi-tions which facilitated the growth of totalitarian ideologies and dictatorial regimes. Unequivocally, the actions of Britain and her allies in the aftermath of World War I are at least partially responsible for Hitler’s ascendancy.

From 1917 onwards and through-out the inter-war years, a blizzard of change swept through the European continent. Vast autocratic empires crumbled into dust, ancient mon-

archies were toppled, the air became tinged with revolution-ary fervour, and Europe became polarised by the ideological ex-tremes of fascism and communism. This was an epoch that required strong hegemonic leadership in order to cultivate the nascent democra-cies, guard them from undesirable political extremes, and lead them to fruition and prosperity. Un-fortunately, the initial optimism of Wilson’s idealism ended in colossal disappointment. Without military backing and the

threat of force, the League of Nation’s potential to be a force for good was curtailed.

In this period, the League desperately needed a liberal hegemon to carry forward the flame of Wilsonian liber-alism, and ensure that democracy was upheld in lands still unaccustomed to its practices. Yet, not a single nation had the stomach to grab the reins of leadership. Former hegemons sunk into a stupor of depression, and the Wall Street Crash led to the exacerba-tion of defence-spending parsimony. France and the United States retreat-ed into a shell of reclusive isolation-ism, and Britain followed tradition by refocusing its gaze on imperial matters.

The inability of the stronger League of Nations powers to uphold collective security and peaceable international norms stimulated apathetic attitudes towards the growth of totalitarian-ism. Britain, along with many other countries, was immersed in the grip of a pacifist dream. Forward-thinking and progressive intellectuals began to garner prestige as their cosmo-politan ideas gained currency. E. M. Forster captured the spirit of the age by remarking: “If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country.” The infamous 1933 Oxford Union Debate similarly epitomised this shift in values, when it declared that ‘This House will not fight for King and Country.’ This ambivalence towards constructively interacting with the international community, engaging in tough decision-making, and culti-vating long-term national strategies meant that the democratic powers were woefully unprepared to deal with the unprecedented threats posed by belligerent fascist regimes deter-mined to wage war at any cost.

The prevailing lesson that can be learned from the First World War and its dire aftermath is that complacen-cy can act as the enemy of common sense. When faced with the alarming and unprecedented challenges of the

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twenty-first century, it simply will not do to idly sweep these problems under the carpet of inertia. Nor-man Angell’s 1909 classic The Great Illusion sensibly propounded the idea that Europe’s increasingly globalised economies were integrated to such an extraordinary extent that war would be unthinkable. Even though this was a widely accepted truth, the world nevertheless found itself at war in 1914.One thread of similarity that unites

us with our forebears a century ago is the troubling resurgence of national-ism as a political force, especially in the BRIC nations. Nationalism is a scourge of humanity, and represents a malignant and mutated offshoot of the more benign patriotism. Throughout the world, nationalism is being whipped up at a truly alarm-ing rate. In China, the all-powerful state is energetically cultivating a growing Japanophobia. In India, Narendra Modi (a Hindu nationalist who resolutely refuses to apologise for a pogrom inflicted on Muslims in the regional state he controls, and who, if elected to power, would have his finger on the nuclear button in a potential conflict with neighbouring Pakistan) might get elected next year.

Moreover, Putin is pursuing a strate-gy of nationalistically flexing Russia’s military muscles, most recently over the political debacle in Ukraine.

Perhaps above all else, the First World War teaches us that nothing is so fragile as the illusion of civilisation. Merely assuming reason will prevail is not enough. The single biggest threat to global security is an isolationist America. Presently, and in contra-diction to his supposedly progressive

values, Barack Obama appears to be pulling back from regions of the world where an American presence is most required. Obama’s rather lethar-gic attitude towards foreign affairs has meant that he has not applied enough effort to building bridges of dialogue with the Middle East, and conse-quently a groundswell of suspicion lingers between the United States and the Arab countries. The US President has similarly adopted an unasham-edly laissez-faire attitude towards the tragic turmoil engulfing Syria.

Problematically, Obama has done lit-tle to warmly assimilate the emerging BRIC giants into playing a strong and constructive role in the development of a more equitable international

framework. The BRICs will be less likely to pursue quests for aggressive hegemony if they can engage in pro-ductive dialogue with the West, and more particularly the United States. Alas, after six years in office, Oba-ma’s lack of appetite for engaging in foreign affairs is unlikely to change. Let us ardently hope, that if Hillary Clinton becomes President in 2016, the United States will rise up to the challenge of playing a fruitful role as the world’s foremost hegemon.

The US thrives as a nation when it un-dertakes an internationalist view of global events. Winston Churchill once declared: “The era of procras-tination, of half-measures, of soothing, and baffling expedients, of delays is com-ing to its close. In its place we are entering a period of consequences.” America needs to be roused from its deep

sleep of complacency, and remember that the mantle of the free world still lies in the palm of its hand. Domestic pressures are no excuse for shunning the problems facing the internation-al community. The world needs a benign policeman, equipped with the harmonious qualities of democratic values, progressive liberalism, and a reservoir of goodwill. We look back to history to gain a greater sense of who we are, and where we are going. Looking back to World War One and its aftermath, we should appreciate that the rise of nationalism, bellig-erent moves towards hegemony, and indifference by the West, all raise cause for concern.

The world is less free than it was eight years ago. To be more specific, 2013 was the eighth consecutive year in which both civil liberties and political rights suffered a decline. At least, this is the provocative statement kick-start-ing the analysis of the data presented in the annual report of the Ameri-can-based think tank Freedom House, Freedom in the World.

In the 2014 Freedom in the World publication, the data collected sug-gests that several countries that used to be ‘Free’ are now ‘Partly Free’ or in-deed ‘Not Free’. Rhetoric aside, fewer countries now meet Freedom House’s criteria for pluralism, participation, greater transparency and openness in the electoral process and rights of association and organisation. It is also sceptical about improvement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, particularly as a result of the counterrevolution and extremism in states that experienced the effects of the Arab Spring, and singles out Eurasia for particular criticism. Eurasia is condemned for

having the lowest regional political rights scores. For example, Azerbai-jan’s score for political participation is just three, while Australia scores fifteen.

Not only does Freedom House sug-gest continued resistance to democ-ratisation (and the liberal values now bound up with democracy itself), it claims that democracies are expe-riencing a “crisis of confidence”. It claims that self-absorption, most like-ly brought on by domestic economic issues, has reduced the attention paid to the promotion of democracy and human rights. The annual report subsequently calls for democracies

to renew their efforts at promoting political rights and civil liberties in other countries. Specifically, it claims that the United States needs to step in and take the lead once more. This American-centric approach ignores the growing importance of the Eu-ropean Union as an actor in world politics.

It is hardly surprising that a Washing-ton, D.C.-based think tank depend-ent upon US funding focuses on US policy-makers, but America is not the only international actor capable of setting the agenda on civil and po-litical rights. While its support is still important, it is not the only force for democracy promotion in the world today. The world has changed since the 1970s, and the EU now plays a vital role in democracy promotion, and could play an even greater one.

While the term ‘democracy pro-motion’ may evoke uncomfortable memories of the George W. Bush administration and Operation Iraqi Freedom, regime change imposed from the outside is an exception to the norm. Democratically motivated aid has been the staple of efforts to increase civil liberties and political rights across the globe while encour-aging local ownership. The EU has played an increasing role in this form of democracy assistance, particularly through the funds allocated by the

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FREEDOM HOUSE

BY : Hugh Oberlander

A False Crisis of Confidence? Freedom House and Neglected Instruments of Democratisation



European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) founded in 2006. Initiatives like the EIDHR, under the auspices of EuropeAid, have had a significant impact, and cannot be considered a mere ‘ally’ of American efforts.

Among the key objectives of the EIDHR are “Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental free-doms in countries and regions where they are most at risk” and “Strength-ening the role of civil society in pro-moting human rights and democratic reform”. For example, the EU is the largest foreign donor in Azerbaijan and in February 2012 it announced that EIDHR funding would go towards sixteen new projects in the country, focusing on a more in-dependent media and civil rights activities (a key component of free societies). In stepping up its efforts to strengthen civil society in Azerbaijan as early as 2012, the EU is already one step ahead of Freedom House.

The EIDHR also takes part in elec-toral observation and the training of electoral observers in order to prevent violations of political rights. It has taken part in missions in Mali, Honduras, Nepal, and Kenya among others. These are all countries that Freedom House has registered as

becoming freer in its report. While the reasons for these gains are mani-fold, the involvement of groups such as EIDHR is likely beneficial to the consolidation of democratic rights and practices.

Between 2007 and 2013 the EIDHR had an assistance budget of €1.104 billion and while this funding period overlaps with the eight year decline in freedoms alleged to exist in Freedom in the World, the EIDHR itself may provide an answer to the perceived ‘crisis of confidence’. As the EIDHR notes in one of its strategy papers, budgets have increased but so too have expectations and demands on initiatives related to democracy and human rights. Indeed, the demand for improved results often ignores the complexities of democratisation.

Thomas Carothers, the current vice-president of the Carnegie En-dowment for International Peace, has noted that democracy takes a long time to become consolidated, and is a chaotic, non-linear process. Not only does this partly explain the fluctua-tion of civil and political liberties in several states reported by Freedom House, it also suggests that think tanks like Freedom House are being too hasty in pinning a large portion of responsibility for the ‘decline’ in

world freedom on a lessening interest in democratisa-tion and human rights promotion among democra-cies. The assertion that there has been a ‘crisis of confidence’ is only partly true. The EU has remained continually en-gaged in low-key democratisation efforts supporting civil society with EIDHR grants and projects.

American ef-forts to promote democracy may be

suffering a particular crisis, wheth-er it results from the damage to US legitimacy caused by the George W. Bush administration or a more general over-reliance on promoting civil society. Freedom House should not so readily discount the continued efforts of European democracies. Not only can it aid civil society. The EU has more power than ever before to supplement initiatives by EIDHR and other agencies by encouraging dem-ocratic reform through the economic and diplomatic channels.

While the rhetoric of Freedom House should be welcomed for drawing attention to the ongoing difficul-ties faced in fostering political and human rights, it is overly pessimistic in many areas. American leadership is no longer essential, and while increased American participation would be beneficial, the EU can hold its own. It will be interesting to see how the EU continues to tackle the challenges facing the promotion of democracy and human rights both near and far from its borders. With this in mind, the outlook for world freedom in the absence of strong American leadership may not be as bleak as Freedom in the World makes out.

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How Russia’s History Fuels its Foreign Policy of Tomorrow.

Putin’s Games and Fanfare: Sochi Symbolic

Pussy Riot and the Growth of Anarcho-Populism in the Inter-national Political System

Two Tiers of Judgment for Russian Human Rights Violations

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As the world’s eyes turn increasingly to an aggres-sive and resurgent Russian Federation, the FAR brings you 11 pages of analysis on di�erent aspects of Russian foreign and domestic policy. While the situation in Ukraine changes day by day, and any coverage of it here would be hopelessly out of date by the time the magazine reaches you, we’d be re-miss not to comment.

It is striking to see troop mobilisations, naval blockades and trenches being dug on European soil in the 21st century. Shattered is the illusion of a European farewell to arms. �ough in the West we can tell ourselves that this con�ict is only pos-sible on our periphery, the Eurasian heartland will

always be a part of Europe, and its fate looms large for the Euro-Atlantic alliance and the future of East-West relations. In December 1991, it was the Soviet Union that bade a farewell to its military might and forty year long Cold War against the West. Two months later, the leaders of Europe, gathered in Maastricht, signed into being the European Union. As one bloc fell and another rose, confrontation that was so dreaded for so long seemed consigned to history. But now, with Russian troops seizing ter-ritory in Europe-proper, Putin has resurrected the ghosts of 1956 and 1968. What is the price of peace in Europe, and what is the price we’re willing to pay to defend it?

Welcome to the FAR’s special issue on Russia. �e decision to cover this vast country, its dynamic foreign policy, controversial domestic policy, and o�en larger than life president was made before the seizure of Crimea. In the year and particularly months leading to this dramatic development, there was a

sense of momentum for Putin’s Russia: Putin’s diplomatic intervention on As-sad’s behalf in Syria which staved o� an American military intervention, the crackdown on gay rights and dissidents that garnered so much attention in the West, the spectacular but polarising Sochi Olympics, and then of course

Ukraine’s pivot to the East, with everything that followed.

Editor-in-Chief

- Russia special -A few words from the

RADIM DRAGOMACA

Empire in Eastern Europe

Vladimir Putin o�en proves a somewhat incongruous character to popular perceptions of him. While he �ts the pro�le of the perennial Russian strongman (or, in the case of Catherine the Great, woman) leader, Putin o�en proves a hypocrite, at least in terms of public rhetoric. Nowhere is this more clear than in his own perception of Russia and its surrounding neighbours. In 2005, he remarked, “First and foremost it is worth acknowledging that the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” Nevertheless, just a year later, President Putin addressed Western perceptions of his state’s foreign policy by remarking, “I see that not every-one in the West has understood that the Soviet Union has disappeared from the political map of the world and that a new country has emerged with new humanist and ideological principles at the foundation of its existence.” Since the days of the USSR, Russia has evidently democ-ratised and extensively embraced capitalism. Yet many, including this analyst, would argue that although Russia has transformed ideologically, many of its immediate and long-term foreign policy goals are aimed at preserving the power of old Russia; the mirage of a state and a leader that can muscle its way through relations in the international system.

Prior to 1991 Russia had never known itself as a singu-lar entity. Since the days of the 9th century Kievan Rus, Russia has known itself as the centre of a vast and consist-ent empire, albeit under a variety of monikers. �e fall of communism brought the largest loss of territory in mod-ern history for Russia, perhaps with the exception of the short-lived concessions under the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Li-tovsk. It is perhaps understandable then, although cer-tainly not excusable, that Russia continues to attempt to economically and militarily dominate the Eastern Euro-pean region. Many such as Kremlinologist Lilia Shevtso-va see Russia’s attempt at a Eurasian Union as a sign of economic imperialist expansion in order to create a “mi-rage of a post-Soviet archipelago in which authoritarian leaders use each other to preserve their power. While this view has some problems regarding anachronism and an unhelpful return to a Cold War mentality, it is not di�cult to believe that Putin’s Russia is eager to keep resource-rich states on side for its own bene�t. Should states such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus “go west,” Russia would su�er greatly in the economic sense.

At the time of writing, Russian troops have taken the parliament building in Crimea, as well as 12 border guard posts between Ukraine and Russia. Putin has taken e�ective control of the region and suggested a referendum that will likely go ahead mid-March. �e recent Ukrainian turmoil that was sparked in November 2013 has, arguably,

BY : Ellen Macpherson

Bearing the Weight of the Past:

How Russia’s History Fuels its Foreign Policy of Tomorrow

Despite its diminished status in the post-Cold War era, Russia still main-tains that it is a global force to be reckoned with. Militarily and econom-ically, perhaps Russia is no longer able to play a round of honest poker with the United States. Nonetheless, President Putin and long-standing Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have done an admirable job at blu�ng their way through diplomatic negotiations and coercing people into believing that Russia is as great a power as it has ever been. �is article looks at Putin’s Russia and where its interests lie.

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been one of the biggest tests to Putin’s future aspirations in the region.

Yet Putin must act carefully. His vehement global rhetoric on non-intervention has been well documented, particu-larly in terms of the frustration it has caused the United States and international humanitarian missions. If he were to intervene in the Crimea, it would risk jeopardising decades of proclamations that withhold a state’s right to sovereignty above all else. Presumably, Russia has learned hard lessons about international credibility a�er its war against, and subsequent occupation of, South Ossetia and Georgia during 2008. If there is one thing Russia cannot a�ord to give up, it is the credibility it has gained from critics of international intervention in recognised con�ict zones. From this rhetoric, Putin and his veteran Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have gained valuable respect in the Middle East and Africa - regions that are of critical strategic importance to Russia in its wider foreign policy objectives towards the United States.

The Middle East

Yet it’s clearly not just in the regional sphere that Russia is exerting its in�uence. 2013 was an extremely success-

ful year for Putin in the United Nations. His success in accidental diplomacy led to the brokering of a chemical weapons deal in Syria and Putin’s resistance to United States sanctions on Iran in P5 meetings has secured pos-itive Russian-Iranian relations. Many in the international system have seen Russia pick up where the United States has le� o� in the Middle East, securing spaces harbouring anti-United States sentiment and bolstering military and economic ties.

In December, Russia quietly secured a lucrative $2 billion weapons deal with Egypt (at that time under the leader-ship of General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, o�ering MiG-29 in-terceptor jets, helicopters and air defence systems. “Today Russia is coming back to many regions it lost in the 90s. I’m talking about the African continent and the Middle East,” declared Mikhail Margelov, the Russian Federa-tion Council Foreign A�airs Committee Chairman, in a speech in London. He went on to say, “Russia was quite explicit about its interests in those regions even before the Arab Spring.” �rough the Arab Spring, Russia has maintained its business relations with a swath of changing leaders in the region. Russia’s willingness to overlook any moral misdemeanours is undoubtedly a reason why the leaders of the Arab Spring states are much more agreeable in doing business with Moscow rather than Washington. And yet it is not just in economic terms that Russian and Middle Eastern diplomats are negotiating. Putin has been stamping Russia’s presence on all possible fronts. Mos-cow-run oil giant Lukoil has won a number of large oil contracts in the Middle East, most notably in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. More recently, Russia has signed a $4 billion arms deal with Iraq. Crucially, Putin has been increasingly involved in peace processes, holding talks with Hamas and travelling to Israel in 2012, well before United States President Barack Obama made the trip. Individually, these developments may be of little notice, but it is indisputable that Putin is the bearer of a power in the Middle East that the United States is unlikely to get its hands on ever again if it continues to sanction and punish Middle Eastern states on standards of democratisation.

�e Chechnyan terrorist threat in Russia has posed very few obstacles to Putin’s deals in the Middle East itself. While originally aligning himself with the United States on the ‘War on Terror,’ Putin has since realised that it is far more lucrative to stay quiet on terrorist and rebel movements in the Middle East itself, perhaps realising that one day Russia may have to, at least temporarily, cooperate on a business level with individuals Putin might view as a threat to security in his own state. �is mentality does, however, also link in with Putin’s wider anti-inter-ventionist ideology regarding the primacy of sovereignty. What works at home - the brutal military suppression of separatist movements - may not work abroad. In this, Putin has learned a valuable lesson from the United States failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Goals of Foreign Policy with the United States

“The Comrade Wolf knows whom to eat, as the saying goes,” noted Vladimir Putin in his May 2006 annual ad-dress to the Federal Assembly, “It knows whom to eat and is not about to listen to anyone, it seems.” Many western commentators have argued, and would still argue, that Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy objectives in both his own region and in the Middle East are simply a part of a bigger policy objective linked to a ‘new Cold War’ mentality. It’s not hard to see why this would be the case. Russia has been notorious in the past decade for using its United Nations veto power to oppose the United States on issues of intervention. Putin’s often anti-US rhetoric has been a feature of his presidency thus far, making him popular with those who would like to see the United States’ status of world hegemony crumble.

This analyst however, believes the situation slightly more complex. There is one simple guiding statement that can explain all of Russia’s foreign policy goals. As Putin remarked to a particularly critical journalist in Moscow in 2012, “Our country must not be humiliated.” Russia fears, above all, being forgotten and being laughed at, particularly by its oldest and most formidable opponent, the United States. One only has to look at Putin’s ener-gy policies in Eastern Europe. His constant dictatorial economic bullying of states such as Ukraine shows a great amount of fear - fear that the United States’ advances in shale gas production will demote Russian energy giants to the periphery of global energy commerce. Putin himself is so popular in Russia purely because he is so reviled elsewhere. Western media commentary of Sochi’s fail-ures was met with mockery and contempt in Sochi. “I’m very offended that the closer we get to the opening of the Olympics, the more hysteria around Russia becomes inflamed in the Western media,” wrote Vladimir Yakunin, President of Russian Railways, the builder of much vital

infrastructure for the Sochi Games.

Putin’s coldness, and often outright hostility, towards the United States is not because of some obsessive loy-alty to a Cold War mentality. It is a response to the fear of being sidelined and internationally humiliated. If the West were to show respect, or at the very least, under-standing towards Putin’s Russia, we would undoubtedly see a sweeping change in relations. As Putin remarked in a 2013 interview with Russia Today, “It’s not by chance that Russia and the United States forge an alliance in the most critical moments of modern history. That was the case in WWI and WWII even if there was fierce con-frontation, our countries united against a common threat which means there’s something that unites us. There must be some fundamental interest which bring us together. That’s something we need to focus on first. We need to be aware of out difference but focus on a positive agenda that can improve our cooperation.” Cooperation between the United States and Russia is indeed becoming vital in the international system. International institutions have suf-fered from extravagantly angry language from both sides. As abhorrent as Russia’s economic and military bullying in Eastern Europe has been, as draconian as Putin’s an-ti-homosexuality laws are, as corrupt as the Kremin might seem, the United States and Russia must find common ground. The United States should indeed be speaking out about human rights abuses in Russia, but for both sides to continue with opposing each other for little reason other than what is essentially a diplomatic gun show is helpful to no one. Unfortunately, unless the United States and the West in general is willing to concede at least understand-ing to Russia, little will change and Putin’s Russia will remain the stubborn wedge in the cog of the international system.

Ellen Macpherson is a second year student pursuing a joint de-gree in International Relations and Modern History. Her par-ticular interests lie in security and development studies, the role of nuclear weapons in the international system, and studies of social movements for change. Although definitely not limited to the one area, Russia is of particular interest to her studies. She has written much about its post- communist development, its role in the international system and its path towards democracy.

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For Putin, Sochi was far more than a friendly international sporting event. It was an unparalleled opportunity to reassert Russia at the forefront of the international community. De-termined to project the “new face of Russia” that had overcome the slump of Soviet decline and was now a promising land of growth and achievement, Putin championed Sochi as an exhibition of the very best of Russia. The Sochi Games would be first and foremost a publicity stunt on the grandest scale, all extravagances worth the enormous costs in ex-change for the prestige Russia would gain from playing host.

From the night of the Opening Cere-mony, the event was permeated with political tension dating back to Cold War; a technical malfunction left the fifth Olympic ring, historically the ring corresponding to the Americas, from blossoming into its snowflake configuration, sparking speculations as to whether the failure was perhaps intentional. Sochi was monumentally symbolic for the change that has led up to it.

The last time the Olympics were held in Russia was in Moscow in 1980, when more than 60 countries, led by the United States, boycotted the games in response to the Soviet Un-ion’s invasion of Afghanistan. Leading up to the Sochi Games, tensions over Russia’s anti-gay rights stance, the fear of Islamist terrorist threats and

the violent unrest in neighbouring Ukraine had Russia in the politi-cal spotlight and some, especially the LGBT community, voiced calls for another boycott. Although the resulting tensions never escalated to the point of a boycott, many heads of state announced ahead of time that they would not make an appearance at the Sochi Games. This included British Prime Minister David Cam-eron and American President Barack Obama. The absence of the latter was mostly a result of the disagreements between Russia and the United States over events in Syria and the affair of Edward Snowden.

With regards to the running of the games, to Putin’s credit, many of the fears voiced in international media coverage never manifested them-selves. The Russians certainly handled security well with its “Ring of Steel” successfully preventing any terrorist attempts to infiltrate the Games. Once the sporting events commenced, focus was on the athletes and many of Russia’s human rights issues faded to the background though embarrassing blips emerged over unfinished hotel rooms and bathroom facilities of two toilets side by side with no partition.

However, although he pulled off the Winter Games successfully, the question of whether Putin has truly opened the doors of Russia is still unclear. Sochi, formally a single road town is now home to massive venues

to be turned into exhibition centres; including the host of one of the 2018 World Cup games and the 2014 Rus-sian Grand Prix. However, once these events pass, will there be any need for a massive shopping centre, new rail-ways and an amusement park without an international audience flooding in? Sochi’s population will not be suf-ficiently large or affluent to maintain the facilities on its own – so was this $50 billion a frivolous waste if Putin failed to truly rejuvenate Russia in the eyes of the world?

Despite its superficial success, the Sochi Olympics are a microcosm of old-world Russian extravagance and plutocracy at the absurd neglect of the masses. One village, a mere 10 minutes from Sochi, Akhshtyr, re-mains cut off from both the new road leading to mountain resort Krasnaya Polyana, where the skiing and snow-boarding events were held, as well as the newly constructed $8.7 billion railway. A village covered in dust and grime since Olympic construction began, Akhshtyr has not had fresh water since 2008, since its wells were destroyed by new waste dump site to serve Sochi’s development. The village is now entirely dependent on water deliveries from the authorities. Hence, many promises of improved infrastructure for the region have gone unfulfilled, reminiscent of Sovi-et times.

Some estimate that insufficient over-

On February 23, the most expensive Olympics in history came to a close in Sochi. Russia emerged triumphant, with 13 gold medals and highest overall medal count of 33, an extra feather for Putin to place in his cap. Yet the So-chi games have been controversial from the start. The final cost of the games runs at $51 billion, eclipsing the $40 billion spent on Beijing and the $7 billion spent on the previous Winter Olympics in Vancouver.

SOCHI

BY : Elizabeth Mastoris

Putin’s Games and Fanfare: Sochi Symbolic

sight has led to excessive and avoid-able costs: a ski jump at the Rosa Khutor resort in Krasnaya Polyana was originally slotted a $40 million budget, yet when Putin visited the jump last year the cost had soared to $265 million. Furthermore, a mem-ber of the International Olympic Committee along with Russia’s oppo-sition party allege that about a third of Sochi’s funds were stolen.

Those reaping the benefits of these Olympics are almost exclusively from among Putin’s tight inner circle. The Rotenberg brothers, Putin’s child-hood friends who once joined him in his boyhood marital arts instruction, were awarded 21 Olympic contracts worth $7.4 billion – a staggering amount worth more than the pre-vious Vancouver Winter Games but only a fraction of the final enormous total. Though the Russian economy has certainly evolved from Soviet

times, the state remains the single largest employer and state owned industries dominate the economic landscape and as such received a bulk of the Olympic contracts. Private businesses still struggle to succeed as some speculate nearly half of Russia’s economy is made up of state controlled companies run by Putin’s inner circle.

Though Putin strove to present Russia as a modern great power at Sochi, the state clearly represses modernisation. Between 35% and 40% of Russians are dependent on the state with a quarter employed in the public sector. While the rest of the world began to ease out of the recession, economic growth stagnated to less than 1.5% and prompted Putin’s admission of internal institutional flaws in the Russian system.Despite how far it has come since the Soviet era, Putin failed to tru-

ly catapult a “new Russia” onto the international scene. Sochi showed that irresponsible excess, cronyism, underground crime, corruption, oppression, and vanity still persist. Russia remains uncomfortably stuck between its Soviet roots and modern-isation, as the state remains highly centralised and power and wealth are concentrated in the hands of a few. While Putin may not have built a bridge between Russia and the West with the Sochi Games, he may have improved his slipping image at home. Leading the medal count and having produced an impressive spectacle, Russian pride was at its peak – stories of corruption and scandal were trivial matters in juxtaposition to worrying about the glory of Russia’s athletes, yet Putin’s dream of a vindicated Rus-sia has seemed to fall short of its goals to those watching from afar.

RUSSIA




In the case of the latter, this was to lead to the prosecution and eventual imprisonment of two members of the group. More recently, Pussy Riot made an appearance at the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi where they were violently subdued by Cossacks.Since its inception, Pussy Riot’s methodology has been fairly con-stant, following the same formula. This has usually involved its members dressing up in distinctive, brightly coloured clothing and face masks and performing politically motivated songs with incendiary lyrics in public locations. These are then filmed and posted to YouTube where they have a cult following and attract worldwide attention. Songs have included ‘Putin Zassal’, or ‘Putin has pissed himself ’ and ‘Mother of God, Drive Putin Away’. As with all punk, central to these songs is a salient anti-authority, anarchic element. Their first song, ‘Release the Cobble Stones’ called upon the Russian public to protest against an illegitimate parliamentary election process by using cobble-

stones as missiles in street clashes. The video was filmed on the Moscow metro and was accompanied by a blog post that stated simply: “Your ballots will be used as toilet paper by the Presidential Administration”. However, this anarchic element goes beyond the simple anti-establishment drive seen in punk music. It repre-sents a concerted political message, a call to arms for a wider society to overthrow a fundamentally illegit-imate societal structure. This tran-scends the usual parochial and gener-ationally bounded audience. Through their use of social media Pussy Riot has attempted to mobilise a usually politically apathetic or apolitical so-cial strata through extra-institutional and non-conventional means – in keeping with what political scientist/sociologist Alvin So conceptualised as a ‘post-modern mode of political organisation’.This broadening and mainstreaming of previously small-scale anarchic principles and methodology ties into wider developments globally. The

post-2008 international political sys-tem, in which the austerity has been the predominant economic trend, has witnessed the growth of a wide vari-ety of grassroots organisations and movements with principles of active resistance and counter-hegemonic struggle at their heart. King’s College lecturer Dr Paolo Gerbaudo labels

Ever since Pussy Riot’s formation in 2011, it has been a proverbi-al thorn in Putin’s side, a source of protest in a country where open government criticism is relatively rare – a nod as much to the current administration’s authoritarian leanings as Russia’s Soviet autocratic heritage. Originally beginning with small-scale protests on the Mos-cow metro, the feminist punk political collective gradually rose in international prominence following performances in Moscow’s Red Square followed by the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour.

‘There’s going to be a revolution. It’s going to happen…’ Russell Brand

PUSSY RIOT

BY : Jonathan Bertulis-Fernandes

Pussy Riot and the Growth of Anarcho-pop-ulism in the International Political System

this development as ‘anarcho-pop-ulism’, representing the ‘uncanny marriage between anarchism and progressive populism’ in current pro-test movements globally.This incorporates movements such as the indignados in Spain and the student protests and the anti tax-avoidance movement in the UK such as UK Uncut. Interestingly, it also includes the global Occupy movement, an international protest movement against social and eco-nomic inequality. This movement led to the development of grassroots-led protests all over the world, which saw the forceful occupation of public spaces in major cities in an attempt to assert the collective power of an otherwise un-heard majority. In his now famous Newsnight in-terview with Jeremy Paxman since viewed some ten million times online, Russell Brand characterised the growth of this mode of political organisation as one bound up with a struggle against an inherently disar-ticulated political system separating the governing from the governed. Linked to this, Loïc Wacquant argues for the development of a ‘centaur

state’ within the recently emerged neoliberal Leviathan. That is, a state with a small liberal head, but an authoritarian body – a state struc-tured so as to systemically privilege a small powerful elite. This builds on the central Marxian dialectic exist-ing between the capitalists and the proletariat, the superstructure and the infrastructure. The processes of neoliberalism and market-expansion have led to the development of a state and societal structure, which has been fundamentally reengineered to systemically, and systematically ben-efit this small minority at the expense of the majority. In a contemporary reworking of this Marxist principle and the notion of the centaur state, anthropologist David Graeber has argued for the notion of the 99% and the 1%. This principle has been cen-tral to the Occupy Movement, with the movement pushing for a radical rebalancing of the state apparatus and societal structures to redress this perceived power imbalance. The rise of transnational anar-cho-populist movements also hints at the rise of a global capitalist structure and the creation of a truly

post-national global elite. Marxist Anthropologist Eric Wolf argued that revolutions and socio-politico unrest originate from a societal ‘incoher-ence’, which serves to exploit vari-ous social strata for the benefit of a hegemonic power. With the creation of an international capitalist system governed by the neoliberal doctrine of market expansion and de-regula-tion, this societal incoherence thus becomes transnational. And are we therefore seeing the development of an international anarchic revolu-tionary movement, a global common mode of political organisation predi-cated on transnational millenariasm?The ultimate efficacy of anarcho-pop-ulism as a mode of political organisa-tion remains to be seen. However, the mainstreaming of previously mar-ginalised and extreme methodology and concepts shows a clear evolution in political organisation amongst Generation Y. The creation of a truly transnational social movement shows the increased integration into a global capitalist structure and hints at a wid-er post-nationalist trajectory of the international political system.

RUSSIA




The bill passed unanimously in the lower house of the Duma, 436 votes in favor of an established neo-con-servatism that the American Right can only dream about. The move drew hefty and immediate criticism from commentators at home and abroad, with many angling for a boy-cott of the impending Sochi Olympics and decrying Putin for his blatant violation of human rights. Anti-gay sentiment is arguably mere-ly another attribute of the religious, semi-tsarist traditionalism that has surged in Russia throughout Vladimir Putin’s fourteen-year stronghold on the Russian government. Ranked the most powerful person in the world by Forbes in 2013, Putin’s ascent to head of state in 1999 (following Boris Yeltsin’s impromptu resignation) and subsequent electoral success ushered in a social regression to 19th-century values and an emphasis on pre-Rev-olutionary religious mores. These are keenly felt in Putin’s rhetoric and resulting domestic policy decisions, which serve both to consolidate the legitimacy of his ‘tandemocracy’ with Dmitri Medvedev – oft referred to as ‘Putin’s puppet’– and to engineer society in accordance with an arcane, preconceived notion of Russia. In his state of the Union in 2013, Putin un-

derscored the need to represent “the will of the majority of the people” by enforcing a staunch conservatism that protects against other countries’ “[odd] equivalence of good and evil.” He alluded to the controversial legislation passed against homosexual advocacy, claiming that Russia must oppose “so-called tolerance – gender-less and infertile.”These statements, as well as govern-ment promotion of homophobia implied by the law, caused a backlash from Western political leaders, public icons, corporations, and citizens. Massive rallies were held in cities around the globe, from Asuncion to Durban, Melbourne to Jerusalem: people called for Olympic sponsors and organisers to denounce the “discriminatory laws” and fight for the basic human and civil rights of all peoples. By itself, this response is laudable – a testament to modern society’s global consciousness and active moral compass. Russia has a very long track record of human rights violations, extending back to its Soviet days. The fall of the USSR ostensibly initiated a more tol-erant and democratic time – its very dissolution was tied to Mikhail Gor-bachev’s ‘glasnost’, or a new allowance for free speech and protests in the late

1980’s. Under Yeltsin, new civil free-doms were indeed introduced and maintained, though he engineered privilege of the executive above the legislative or judicial branches, maintaining the Russian tradition

of authoritative government. In an attempt to ameliorate Russia’s reputa-tion on human rights, in 1993 Yeltsin established a commission specifically designed to oversee Russia’s com-pliance with human rights norms, to be headed by Soviet-era dissident Sergei Kovalev. However, the com-mission was established by presiden-tial decree, which presented a legal conundrum: if Kovalev’s power was legitimated by Yeltsin, he would not

The global community has been kept well abreast of the struggle of Russian homosexuals to achieve recognition from a government that denies them basic civil rights. Media outlets have leapt to report on the manifold protests and demonstrations of indignation over the treatment of the LGBT commu-nity in Russia. Citizens of many western states, regardless of sexual orienta-tion, have banded together to denounce the Russian government, who last year passed a law banning so-called “gay propaganda,” (i.e. gay rights advo-cacy.)

HUMAN RIGHTS

BY : Tamar Ziff

Complex Sympathy: Two Tiers of Judgment for Russian Human Rights Violations

be able to criticise the latter’s actions, problematising the effectiveness of his role. During his tenure as head of the Presidential Commission for Human Rights, Kovalev witnessed the neglect or violation of a variety of human freedoms, especially in the conduct of Russian soldiers in Chechnya. In 1996, the United Nations Commis-sion on Human Rights issued a report expressing “concern for the lives and physical integrity of the civilian pop-ulation of Chechnya, as well as that of members of the [Russian] armed forces who had laid down their arms or had been placed hors de combat” resulting from “excessive and dispro-portionate use of force by Russian forces.” Two years of war ended in a tense but amenable peace, bringing about de facto independence for the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and auguring the hope that the 100,000 Chechen deaths – most of which were civilian – would be enough to buy peace. However, the power vacuum created in 1996 would catalyze the flourishing of various terrorist groups who engaged in illicit operations in order to survive within Chechnya’s unraveling social infrastructure and “rock-bottom” economy. In 1999, Russia staged another invasion into Chechnya, with the aim of establishing order and reining in terrorist activity. Russian forces administered heavy-handed violence to the region, beginning an intense campaign of airstrikes that demol-ished Chechen cities and forced tens of thousands to flee from their homes. Though initially viewed as a domestic policy issue by Western nations, increasing brutality on the part of the Russian military prompted reports from groups such as Human Rights Watch on the myriad abuses committed by Russian troops. HRW also mentioned the worrying “lack of strong Western response” to the dire human rights situation in Chechnya, highlighting the protracted apathy of Western leaders – and their constit-uents – toward crimes against the Chechen people. The absence of visible Western in-dignation over the past and present

abuses against Chechens – as well as human rights activists and reporters seeking to raise awareness of their plight – is unpalatable, if unsurpris-ing. Chechnya still sees the restriction of free media and the persecution of journalists and human right activ-ists seeking to raise awareness of the abuses perpetrated by the puppet regime headed by Ramzan Kadyrov, who was personally appointed to power by Vladimir Putin.

Besides the odd verbal castigation or stern statement, however, the West’s reaction has been tepid at best.

Why, then, is there such a disparity between the Western reaction to Russian abuses in Chechnya and its response to anti-gay legislation? The answer is multifaceted, grounded in the West’s limited moral space for sympathies abroad, the complex amalgam of factors inherent in the Chechen identity, and the current popularity of the global gay rights movement. First, the citizens of West-ern nations have a circumscribed amount of available empathy for for-eign crises: with the myriad human rights violations occurring in all parts of the globe, industrialised nations cannot feasibly address all, or even most, of them. When one region is witnessing a series of abuses on mul-tiple fronts, the West has to budget its sympathies and focus on the most relatable one, the clearly delineated conflict.

In effectively condoning homo-phobia, if not overtly prohibiting it – though some, including Russian Orthodox church leader, Vsevolod Chaplin, have suggested the re-crim-inalisation of homosexuality – Rus-sia is the clear antagonist. Russian discrimination against gay people is a black-and-white issue: the West can-not do anything but condemn it, lest it also be accused of tacitly support-ing bigotry. As a group, gay people in Russia are exclusively victims – they have done no wrong, and are being unjustly persecuted due to govern-ment emphasis on neo-conservatism. Meanwhile, the Chechen crisis is a

convoluted one, and does not present an equivalent pathos to the Western audience. Though they have also been victim to undue Russian force, Chechen extremist factions have committed egregious infractions of both domestic and human rights law, utilising torture and concertedly tar-geting civilians in their violent quest for recognition and independence. The Chechen situation – that of an entire region blighted and character-ised by a single, vicious group within it – raises parallels to a post-9/11 Afghanistan, when the actions of a terrorist group were seen as justifi-cation for invasion of a nation-state. Some in the West see the Chechens, like Afghanis, through the ‘Muslim terrorist’ trope, a narrative that, con-sidering manifold Western involve-ment in the Middle East, invokes a certain war-weariness and distaste that precludes extended sympathies.

Endorsement of the Chechens, even from a supposedly humanitarian angle, can furthermore be reasona-bly viewed as an affront to Russian sovereignty. Despite the tension brought about by the Snowden affair, the United States cannot be seen to support threats to Russian territorial integrity. Far easier, and less contro-versial, would be to target Russia’s attack on homosexuals, which in light of a global trend toward legal equality can justifiably be criticised as arcane and irrational.

The inability of Western nations to truly empathise with, and attempt to ameliorate, the situation of the Chechens is understandable, but not acceptable. The current lambasting of Russian domestic policy over its treatment of gay individuals only serves to underscore the need for more attention to Russia’s perhaps more horrific human rights viola-tions, against people that exist at a greater psychological distance from the West. Distance, however, provides a weak rationale for indifference.

RUSSIA // DC BUREAU

28 The foreign affairs revieW



The statement above is one of many. It survives, uneasily, past the barri-cades, the banging pots and bulleted echoes of that unceasing sound of protest, past the watchful eyes and wishful masses. It is posted on Twitter under #LaSalida – perhaps one of the only social media outlets for demon-stration left unobstructed by govern-ment authorities, aimed at demand-ing President Maduro’s salida, or immediate departure from office.

Since February 12, nation-wide marches by anti-government masses and student protestors have erupt-ed into violent confrontations with police and criminal gangs known as colectivos. Yet the only broadcaster that carried live feed from the streets of Caracas, NTN24, was an interna-tional channel highly censored by the Maduro administration.

“In a climate in which the media are discouraged by the Maduro adminis-tration from covering social protests, social media such as Twitter, Youtube and related platforms are one of the few ways in which protestors can communicate with each other,” says Harold Trinkunas, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Ini-tiative at the Brookings Institution. “They provide information to the broader global community about what is happening in Venezuela.”

In the absence of live coverage of protests, social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook are document-ing the discord in its full rawness, to

historicise an account of the unjust and the harmed.

Protestors are stripped of basic police protection, blocked on one end by the Guardia Nacional, and the other by the more dangerous colectivos and the intelligence service, Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional (SEBIN), who continue to employ firearms against civilians. Out of uni-form, in secrecy, and without formal command, these entities perform hideous human rights abuses.

The Maduro administration has intensified its present policies in light of the protestors it regards as “right-wing conspirators and participants in a coup d’etat.” Its heightened attempts to censor the media caused the dis-mantling of NTN24’s signal and the fining of local broadcasts that pre-sented scenes of violence. President Maduro himself has already revoked press credentials from numerous CNN reporters.

“I would place President Maduro’s decision to revoke the press creden-tials for certain CNN journalists in a larger context of growing official control of the Venezuelan media,” says Trinkunas.

President Maduro remains eager to block Twitter from supplying access to anti-government information, while newsprint suffers from the can-celations or shortening of their print editions due to administrative threats.

“Newspapers have continued to pro-vide some coverage, although these are slowly dwindling in both number and depth of coverage due to a short-age of newsprint,” says Trinkunas.

RCTV, a powerful private television station, was removed from cable television offerings in 2010 for its criticisms of Maduro. Then came the purchasing of the once protest-cover-ing Globovisión by a pro-government corporation in 2013.

“The government controls a large number of radio, television and newspaper media outlets, and others have been purchased by private sector allies of the government,” adds Trinkunas. “These generally follow a pro-Maduro editorial line.”

Their next target is the web.

Because internet providers grant public access to websites on the black market bolivar exchange rate, they are obliged to screen news reports in or-der to keep access to the very foreign exchange that sustains them. News, then, is concentrated in the hands of government businesses. And for that, it will only become harder to dig out the truth of its broadcasts, for Vene-zuelans and for the rest of the world.

“Remaining independent radio and TV broadcasters have engaged in self-censorship regarding the popular protests going on in Venezuela for fear of fines and loss of access to gov-

“No somos ni de Izquierda ni de Derecha, somos los de Abajo y Vamos a por los de Arriba”/We are neither Left nor Right, we are the Underdogs and We go for the Top.

VENEZUELA

BY : Arianna Talaie

#La Salida

ernment-controlled foreign exchange needed to buy the equipment they need to operate,” says Trinkunas.

Venezuelans are a courageous people, hungry for reformation and sustained by uniformity. They have succeeded in pushing back against the Maduro agenda with their own ways of releas-ing public information. They simply do not give up.

Using quick-sharing features of cell phone video cameras, Twitter and YouTube, Venezuelans are record-ing their own history, and their own truth. From this, journalists have been able to pinpoint SEBIN agents by name that have led to the arrest of political police on account of civilian murders.

As seen in the regimes of El Salvador and Argentina, oppressive figures have always faced their downfall as a result of greater masses dedicated to

documenting human abuse.

President Maduro can inflict repres-sion and arrests on his people, but

social media will inflict upon him a greater harm. #LaSalida is now trending worldwide, and he may not have even the slightest of clue.

On January 18, a report by Judge Yvikel Dabresil indicted nine peo-ple for the murder of Dominique. According to Reporters Without Borders, “The investigation was relaunched on 8 May 2013 when former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who is reportedly linked to the nine accused, was questioned as a witness.” Reporters Without Borders names the nine as, “Myrlande…A former senator for Aristide’s Fanmi

Lavalas party, she is named…as the person who ordered Dominique’s murder. The authorities in the United States, where she now resides, should authorize her extradition if required. The indictments…also named former Port-au-Prince deputy mayor Harold Sévère and former Lavalas organiz-er and Vaudou priestess Anne “Sò Ann” Augustin, as well as alleged henchmen Frantz ‘Franco’ Camille, Toussaint Mercidieu, Mérité Mil-

ien, Dimsley ‘Ti Lou’ Milien, Jeudi ‘Guimy’ Jean-Daniel and Markington Michel.”

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was Haiti’s first democratically elected president. A former Salesian Catholic priest, he was elected as an alternative to the lavish corruption and political in-justice that characterized the former leaders “Papa Doc” and “Baby Doc” Duvalier. Dominique was a supporter

“You cannot kill the truth, you cannot kill justice, [and] you cannot kill what we are fighting for.” The immortal words of Haitian Jean Leopold Dominiq-ue encapsulate his more than forty-year struggle as a journalist, human rights advocate, and pro-democracy revolutionary. Irony would have it that Dominique himself would be killed in 2000 because of his vision for his country. He was assassinated, along with his security guard, while walking into work at Radio Haiti Inter.

HAITI

BY : Mary Ellen Garrett, DC Bureau

Journalism and Justice: Haiti’s Jean Dominique

DC BUREAU




of Aristide and was active during his election in 1990. Dominique, like many Haitians, saw Aristide as the hope for a democratic future. Despite Dominique’s initial support for Aris-tide, he did not withhold scathing criticism in his radio commentary. Although unconfirmed, some believe that Aristide ordered the murder of Dominique. According to this nar-rative, Aristide saw Dominique as a political threat. Apart from Aristide’s degree of involvement, the mere inef-ficiency of the trial illuminates Haiti’s political climate.

Myriam J. A. Chancy, Ph. D., a Hai-tian/Canadian professor, author, and expert in Haitian culture, comment-ed on the 14 years in between the assassination and the indictments: “It is not clear if [those responsible] will be brought to justice. The time this

has taken speaks volumes, as does the lack of progress.” The immense public outcry for justice following the assassination created incentive for the Haitian courts. Nevertheless, the trails have been mired in accusa-tions of politically motivated judges, disorganization and perhaps foul play in the compiling of witnesses, and various other judicial ineptitudes. Dominique helped to found Radio Haiti-Inter in the early 1960s. Its content was neither government propaganda nor entertainment radio, the two primary forms of radio con-tent in Haiti at the time. Dominique, along with his wife Michele Montas, created a forum for investigative journalism and commentary. The social inequality in Haiti was so acute and the ruling elite was so wary of overthrow that, in the words of Dominique, “every [piece of] infor-

mation, even about the garbage in the street, was seen by the power as opposition.” Dominique was threat-ened with death, taken into custody by military officers, and even shot at from the outside of Radio Haiti-Inter during a live broadcast. Dominique and Montas went into exile twice, between 1980 and 1986 and between 1991 and 1994, for fear of violence. Fred Brown, former National President and Ethics Committee Chairman of the Society of Profes-sional Journalists, commented that Dominique and Montas’ story is a stark reminder that, “Journalists need to understand that theirs is not always a safe, boring, white-collar job. In many places in the world…it can be dangerous and even life-threaten-ing.”

The journalist serves a crucial pur-pose within any functioning democ-racy. When journalists can operate without fear of violent backlash, they serve to expose corruption and check the powers of the ruling class. An acquaintance of Jean Dominique, Doctor Bellegarde-Smith, Professor Emeritus at the University of Wis-consin-Milwaukee and author, points out that, “When intense social and economic inequalities exist, there will be social strife, and the status quo under siege will respond often by terror. Governments and the elites they serve often respond by terroriz-ing the population.” Jean Dominique was assassinated amid this paradigm; a paradigm that still exists in Haiti. Dominique and Montas’ immeas-urable impact on Haiti makes the assassination even more shocking. They were groundbreaking in their direct attention to and advocacy for the Haitian poor. They broadcast in Haitian Creole, the language of most Haitians, instead of French. Dominique saw this as a political statement, a rejection of the lasting effects of imperialism and the unbri-dled power of Haitian elite. Born into a wealthy family of mixed ancestry, Dominique defied the traditional social narrative by fiercely advocating for the rights of oppressed Haitians throughout the second half of the

20th century. Chancy elaborates, “Jean Dominique, an educated man from the upper-classes, could easily have turned his back on the people of Haiti; instead, he used his privi-lege, and his voice, to speak on behalf and with the people, in their own language of [Creole], a first in Haiti; he then battled continuously for the rights of the people, and rights of a free press.”

Dominique attacked the institution-alized corruption and negligence that had become the standard in Haiti, the world’s poorest country. Jacques Pierre, Visiting Lecturer in Haitian Creole and Creole Studies at Duke University, characterizes Haiti’s condition at the time of Dominique’s murder as one of, “Political turmoil, political instability, because of all that, the economic situation was not in good shape. There was no agenda by Haitian authorities to address the core issues that have been affecting the country for more than 200 hun-dred years.” It was these core issues

that Dominique attempted to bring to the forefront of the conversation amongst the common Haitian. His broadcasts included international coverage and gave Haitians context for understanding the systemic pat-terns of oppression and corruption. It is tempting to view Dominique’s struggle for Haitian democracy in a vacuum. This conception of Hai-tian politics, or the politics of most developing countries in Latin Amer-ica, ignores the involvement of the United States. Dominique would often comment on the effect that each US President had on the culture of oppression within Haiti. Carter’s emphasis on human rights, Reagan’s fierce anti-communism, and Clinton’s emphasis on installing democratically elected leaders all had enormous im-pacts on Haiti. Doc. Bellegarde-Smith remarked, “The United States is the paramount power in the region, and nothing goes unless the American government acquiesces. Often-times this is at the urging of private business interests, seldom about

US national security interest.” Doc. Chancy echoed these sentiments say-ing, “Outside countries (donor and investing countries) play a major role in the political climate and have for over a century; the US has especially dominated (and manipulated) the political climate, especially since Du-valier’s ousting in 1986.” The weight of US military might and the coercive power of foreign monetary aid have played transformative roles in Haiti’s development throughout Dominiq-ue’s entire career and in the present day. As in much of Latin America, Haiti’s history continues to be influ-enced by the hand of US interests.

Jean Dominique and Michele Montas were images of the sincerest form of patriotism during their work at Radio Haiti-Inter. They fought for the representation of poor and disenfran-chised Haitians. They exposed the corruption and abuse of Haiti’s most powerful figures. Dominique’s assas-sination is a chilling reminder of the danger that journalists face everyday.

Almost a year after this last attempt, President Barack Obama, the so-called “champion-in chief ” of com-prehensive immigration reform has begun a renewed effort to institute re-form by 2014. Although this revived effort to reform the US immigration system offers a potential resolution to a pressing economic, social, and

political challenge, the success for any bill rests on the repeal of a detrimen-tal federal immigration detention quota.

Since its introduction by conserva-tive lawmakers in 2006, an unsettling legal mandate requires a minimum of 34,000 immigrants to occupy beds

in US federal immigration detention facilities daily. Carl Takei, a staff attorney at the National Prison Pro-ject of the American Civil Liberties Union, explains, “ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] inter-prets this federal law as a quota.” As a result, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and ICE, its immi-

In 2013, US citizens waited anxiously for immigration reform when a bi-partisan group of 8 senators dubbed by mainstream media as the “Gang of Eight” introduced a comprehensive reform bill to Congress. Despite the bill’s sweeping passage through the US senate in June of 2013 by a vote of 68 to 32, the bill stalled out in the House of Representatives and ultimately joined the growing pile of failed legislation in a deadlocked Congress.

HUMAN RIGHTS

BY : Brian Comiskey, DC Bureau

Releasing US Immigration Reform from the Immigrant Detention Quota

DC BUREAU



gration enforcement agency conduct their current border enforcement and detention policies with this quota at the heart of their objectives. With fa-cility populations averaging 33,000 to 35,000 detainees daily, ICE is clearly meeting this federal bed mandate, but not without major costs.

Takei elaborates, “Congress did not believe as many people were being detained as there should be. In fact, Congress gave more money to Immi-gration and Customs Enforcement for detention than ICE requested.” In-deed, the Fiscal Year 2014 Homeland Security Appropriations bill approved by the House Appropriations Com-mittee provides for a budget of $5.4 billion for ICE operations with $2.04 billion allocated to Custody Opera-tions alone.

Still, despite obtaining more funding than they requested, this detention quota has driven ICE to turn to for-profit prison organizations to help maintain custody operations across their more than 250 facilities. As a re-sult, private prison companies led by two industry giants, the Corrections Corp. of America (CCA) and the Geo Group Inc., hold almost two-thirds of all immigrants detained daily. With the prison-bed mandate in full effect, federal contracts have risen by 20% over a period of 12 years to make up 43% or $752 million of CCA’s 2012 revenue. This contract-based revenue stream more than covers the roughly $13 million that the CCA has spent since 2005 on lobbying Congress for increased immigration detention. Ac-cording to the Center for Responsive Politics’s Open Secrets database, in the year leading up to the enactment of the 2006 immigrant detention quo-ta, the CCA put $3,380,000 towards lobbying expenditures, which still remains the highest sum the compa-ny has paid for lobbying in a single fiscal year.

Although turning to outside corpo-rations for immigration detention facilities may provide temporary relief from the burden of the federal detention quota on ICE, growing

privatization may produce dangerous costs to the social and legal integrity of the overall US immigration system. Communications Director of De-tention Watch Network, Silky Shah warns, “While ICE is increasing their own internal oversight of operations, there is no third party oversight. There is no codification of detention standards for these private contrac-tors.”

In an effort to increase facility oversight, ICE developed a series of national standards for their immi-gration detention centers in 2000 with policy revisions in 2008 and 2011. According to ICE’s Perfor-mance-Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS), these standards are crafted to “improve medial and mental health services, increase ac-cess to legal services and religious op-portunities, improve communication with detainees with limited English proficiency, improve the process of reporting and responding to com-plaints, and increase recreation and visitation.” While the 2011 PBNDS standards represent the civic deten-tion ideal for ICE facilities, Takei asserts, “These detention facilities, under the leadership of privately-run facilities, are refusing to implement the 2011 standards until their con-tracts are renegotiated.”

Consequently, this refusal by de-tention facilities to follow oversight regulations and ICE’s complicity for the sake of an artificial immigration enforcement quota place the basic human and legal rights of detainees in grave jeopardy. As Michelle Brané, the Director of the Migrants’ Rights & Justice Program at the Women’s Refugee Commission, aptly describes “As long as there is a bed mandate, there is no room for due process.” Amidst all of the compromises made by both Republicans and Democrats to produce the 2013 immigration reform bill, the legislation made no effort to repeal the federal prison bed mandate. Even the hodgepodge of bills, like Rep. Trey Gowdy’s SAFE Act, proposed in the House of

Representatives last year designed to target individual problems within the US immigration system as a part of House Speaker John Boehner’s piecemeal approach to reform failed to address this critical flaw in immi-gration detention policy.

On March 4th, 2014 President Obama again proposed reducing the prison bed mandate to 30,500 detain-ees daily as a means to help improve the US economy. Although this offers some potential alleviation of stress-es on the American immigration system, only full repeal of the deten-tion quota can provide a sustainable economic and social solution to the challenges of immigration reform.Jean-Bertrand Aristide was Haiti’s first democratically elected president. A former Salesian Catholic priest, he was elected as an alternative to the lavish corruption and political in-justice that characterized the former leaders “Papa Doc” and “Baby Doc” Duvalier. Dominique was a supporter of Aristide and was active during his


HABEAS CORPUS

BY : Raymond Ko

Habeas Corpus from Lincoln to Bush

‘Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?’ This is the question Lincoln asked in the heat of the American Civil War, when faced with a legal conundrum: though habeas corpus – Latin for ‘you shall have the body’ – demands the appear-ance of a person before the court, there were people who, if tried, would use their court appearance to sabotage the Unionist war effort.

Those who celebrate the writ of habe-as corpus like to trace its provenance back to the Magna Carta. However, like much of English common law, habeas corpus evolved gradually on a judgment-to-judgment basis, as opposed to being proclaimed in one grand gesture. Over the years, it has evolved from being a writ that can be used either to call for or protect alleged offenders, to being an instru-ment to challenge unlawful deten-tion. When a writ of habeas corpus is

served, a jailer must present his pris-oner at a time and place prescribed by the court, so that it may judge if the detention is lawful.

Habeas corpus, in the English legal tradition, observes no boundary in terms of geography or nationality. In its feudal formulation, everyone who is a subject of the English King could have his actions examined by the King, as represented by his courts. Thus, habeas corpus is less a right

conferred on prisoners, but an obliga-tion imposed on his jailers. One who claims habeas corpus need not be a subject of the King – it suffices if only his jailers are. As the British Empire expanded, the jurisdiction of the writ followed the King’s servants to the Empire’s far corners.

The Americanised variety of habeas corpus is a very different story. It is a constitutional right created by the Suspension Clause, and therefore it

AMERICA




potentially recognises a distinction between citizens and aliens, who generally enjoy fewer constitutional rights. Americanised habeas cor-pus serves to protect the individual liberty of citizens, and does not exist as a centralised power to restrain the actions of a sovereign’s subjects. At the time the Constitution was drafted, this distinction was only of academic concern. However, as American pow-er continues to expand, it creates a loophole that could enlarge executive authority at the expense of judicial oversight.

Since the September 11th attacks, the American government has argued that prisoners captured in the ‘war on terror’ and interned outside of American territories have no re-course to habeas corpus. The gov-ernment’s position is premised on the Supreme Court’s 1950 ruling on Johnson v. Eisentrager. In the Eisen-trager case, a group of Nazi German officers captured in China and held in Allied-occupied Germany petitioned for a habeas corpus review against their imprisonment by the American military. The Supreme Court ruled that the officers enjoyed no recourse to habeas corpus, as they were un-connected to the US by citizenship, residency, or place of capture. Fur-thermore, the court claimed that the US enjoys no complete sovereignty over the occupied territories, and that a favourable ruling would lead to international disputes. The court con-tended that monitoring of US behav-iour by her allies would be sufficient in ensuring appropriate treatment of the detainees.

At the beginning of the ‘war on ter-ror’, the US government transported captured persons to Guantanamo Bay, a US military base in Cuba over which the US enjoys no formal sover-eignty, but effective perpetual control. This move was calculated to conform to the Eisentrager case, as prisoners were denied their rights to habeas corpus. These prisoners, classified as ‘unlawful enemy combatants’, do not enjoy the constitutional protection afforded to ordinary criminals (right

to attorney, right to silence, inadmis-sibility of coerced evidence, etc.) nor do they enjoy the rights afforded to prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. The primary purpose of detention at Guantanamo Bay is not to try these persons, but instead to extract information and prevent terrorist attacks on the US.

Challenges to the legal basis of the prisoners’ detention began as early as 2002. That year, a coalition of profes-sors and clergy filed a habeas corpus petition in the District of Columbia on behalf of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. Their petition was thrown out because the court doubted that the petitioners had sufficient stand-ing. Moreover, the court stated that even if they had standing, the federal court system had no jurisdiction over the matter since Guantanamo Bay is not US sovereign territory. Two years later, the Supreme Court reversed that judgment in the Rasul vs. Bush case. The court found that it has jurisdiction wherever the US enjoys complete territorial jurisdiction. To an extent, it also reversed the consti-tutional analysis of Eisentrager, and asserted that habeas corpus acts on the jailer, not the jailed. As a result, the Supreme Court declared that it was open to receive habeas corpus petitions from persons designated as ‘unlawful combatants’ by the US government.

In response to the legal develop-ments, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act in 2006 to explicit-ly deprive Guantanamo Bay detainees of the right to habeas corpus. It also sought to placate concerns over due process by granting detainees limited rights to challenge their detention, such as access to a summary of the evidence held against them. However, the act fell far short of the constitu-tional protection afforded to ordinary criminal defendants, as hearsay evi-dence and evidence obtained through coercion were still admissible under the Act. The Supreme Court ruled the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to be unconstitutional in the 2009 Bou-medine vs. Bush case, finding that

the alien status of Guantanamo Bay prisoners had no material impact on their right to submit habeas corpus petitions.

The ruling was decried by many in the national security circles. The main argument against it was that the 9/11 attacks marked a dramatic change in the national security landscape. As America’s enemies become more amorphous, the executive requires new powers to prevent terrorist attacks. The post-9/11 world is much like the civil war era, in that, as Lincoln once said, the ‘dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present… As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew’.

However, the historical analogy only goes so far. First, the federal government in Lincoln’s time lacked the global reach it enjoys today. The government did not and could not capture its enemies thousands of miles away and hold them in offshore prisons. The greater powers the U.S. government enjoys today make a strong case for a consummate in-crease in judicial scrutiny. Second, those who were detained by Lincoln outside of habeas corpus protection were American citizens, an organic part to the American body politic. Lincoln insisted on holding the presidential election in the midst of the civil war, partly as a public check on his authority. Today, most of those imprisoned in the ‘war on terror’ are non-citizens from alien cultures. The popular will is thus a much less robust check on executive power over these persons than during the civil war. Furthermore, while the civil war had a clear beginning and end, the ‘war on terror’, like all other meta-phorical ‘wars’, is likely to be a per-petual struggle. To suspend right of ‘enemy combatants’ to habeas corpus for as long as terrorism exists is to grant an open-ended license for the executive to detain citizens and aliens alike away from judicial scrutiny. Any liberal democracy worth its name should be extremely doubtful of such sweeping power.

AMERICA




BY : Matthew Birchall

American Empire: Decline and Fall?

�e future trajectory of American empire is di�cult, if not impossible, to trace. At once powerful and vulnerable, the American empire, like all empires, operates on the cusp of disruption. Rather than scare o� pundits however, this inbuilt com-plexity has given rise to a vast literature on the subject. Paul Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987) remains the classic; all subsequent accounts either challenge or a�rm his historically informed depiction of US imperial overstretch. As the global �nancial recovery begins in earnest, it now seems appropriate to reconsider the issue. Indeed, now that the mists of 2008 have begun to clear, what does the future hold for American empire?

�e strongest pillar of American power remains its military might. Despite recent embarrassments in Afghanistan and Iraq, US military in�uence reigns supreme. �is dom-inance is unlikely to be challenged in the near future, given current US defence spending. With a total spend of $645.7 billion in 2012, a �gure six times greater than China and eleven times greater than Russia, America is clearly intent on maintaining a �rm upper hand, militarily speaking. Pres-ident Obama’s rhetoric may appeal to our cosmopolitan sympathies, but make no mistake, the essential story remains the same. Empire, a�er all, is business best conducted by force. Much is made of China’s potential to pose a credible threat to America in this respect; but with a military spend that outweighs all that Asia can mus-ter, America’s military foundations remain immune to challenge.

Critics will no doubt argue that US defence spending is misguided. In an age of ‘asymmetric warfare’ sophisticated weaponry no longer translates into military success. A brief reading of history, however, will point towards a remarkable ability for weapons technology to develop in line with military needs. �e wars of today are by no means ‘new wars’ and you’d be a brave man to put your bet

on the unmarked combatant rather than the ballistics expert in MIT.�at being said, the recent crop of declinist literature has stayed well clear of defence, preferring instead to focus on economic matters. �is has necessitated an increased focus on perceived systemic �aws within the American economy. In recent times, these �aws have been contrasted with China’s remarkable rise over the last two decades, setting up a direct comparison between the empire of the West and the potential empire of the East. �e question, then, has be-come, how do we understand China’s economic ascendency in relation to America’s empire? Or, in other words, how do we read China’s newfound economic clout into the story of American imperialism?

�ere has been obvious hype sur-rounding China’s rise. Increased innovation and a staggering eco-nomic output has rightfully made it the biggest story in town. With a share of over $1.3 trillion dollars of US Treasuries, many in Washington remain frightful. Yet a rise in China’s stocks doesn’t necessarily mean a decline in America’s. On the contrary, the relationship is largely symbi-otic: China plays a valuable role in facilitating American consumption, while America helps fuel Chinese

savings. American policymakers are undeniably attempting to better balance this �nancial relationship. Yet rather than fear a disintegration of American power, those at the pulse of Sino-American relations recognise the huge opportunity for US pro�t, if managed correctly.

Moreover, America’s fortunes seem to be on the mend. �e Fed’s ‘ta-pering’ of post-crash quantitative easing measures is re�ective of this improved economic outlook. In conjunction with IMF projections that point towards slow but steady growth over the medium term, and the potential of natural gas to reignite US industry, the future of America’s economy is far from con�ned to the doldrums. What is more, in com-parison to the structural problems plaguing China’s economy, the US has it easy. Champions of a Chinese rise o�en neglect to note this. With this in mind, a future of relative American decline seems more plausi-ble than a chaotic narrative of imperi-al collapse à la �e British Empire. To refer back to Paul Kennedy’s histori-cal treatment of empire, this process would signal a return to ‘normalcy’, with America assuming the status of a great power among many, China included.

�e Western attitude towards China’s military accomplishments has al-ways had a strange element of condescending respect. Even during its worst years of weakness, China’s sheer size as a power has always merited a degree of acknowledgement by Western powers. A�er all, China was put on the UN Security Council at a time when both its economy and military strength were highly limited. Likewise, throughout the Cold War to the present day, regardless of the Chinese military’s actual e�ectiveness, China has always been included in the category of great powers. But this respect for China’s size has always been tempered by condescension towards their capabilities.

We use curious phrases like the “million-man swim” to describe a Chinese invasion to Taiwan. Indeed, that phrase itself perfectly summarises much of our popular opinion of Chinese military power. China may be able to mobilise immense manpower on land, but when push comes to shove, the only useful thing it can do with those men at sea is have them freestyle their way to Taipei. �at sentiment towards Chinese sea power, in many ways a holdover from Mao’s era, has persisted into the present day. Now as China faces o� against the Japanese, many commentators have continued to point out the �aws in China’s actual strength. �ese views are not necessarily wrong, China’s navy and air forces still have enormous de-�ciencies that have yet to be recti�ed. What many of these commentaries miss however is that China is now in an incomparably stronger position than it was just ten years ago and has strengthened faster than even the most para-noid military enthusiast could have reasonably predicted. Ten years ago, China was still very much a second-rate power at sea. Its navy was dominated by Soviet era designs with Romeo diesel-electric submarines from the 1950s, nuclear submarines that had a reputation for killing their crews with startling frequency, a surface �eet whose capa-bilities were scarcely worth mentioning, and an air force whose only modern �ghter aircra� were bought from or co-developed with Russia. While there were some mod-ern designs and certainly an improvement in personnel training, the weights of the old Cold War establishment still seemed to weigh heavily on the force. To any casual observer, China’s sea presence seemed a classic example the old stereotype: large quantity but little quality.

What these observers missed at the time however was

the intense period of experimentation that China under-went during the 1990s. Between the Tiananmen Square incident, where the West embargoed the sale of arms to China, and the Gulf War in 1991; China had come to the inescapable conclusion that it had to develop its own high-tech domestic arms industry in order to be relevant in this new era. As a result, the Chinese navy embarked on a series of new experimental warships for the modern age. Most of these early ships were �ops, vessels whose de-signs were o�en awkward or su�ered from major defects, but nevertheless China’s military never seemed daunted by these failures. �ey instead showed an impressive willingness to experiment and innovate with their force structure, embracing the fact that as a force with a grow-ing budget, they had room to make mistakes and �gure out what worked best. �e result was that by the early 2000s, China was starting to produce warship and subma-rine designs that were actually approaching their Russian and Western counterparts in capability.

In retrospect, 2004 may have been a critical year, the fulcrum in which a decade of trial and error began to swing toward concrete results. It was at the beginning of that year that China’s �rst indigenously designed fourth generation �ghter, the J-10, began to come into active ser-vice. It was also the year that China introduced the 052C destroyer, the �rst destroyer design considered successful enough to justify producing more than two of its kind. It was also just before 2004 that the now ubiquitous 054 frig-ate and the 022 missile boat came into service. In essence, it was around 2004 that China began to mass-produce a wide variety of modern, domestically produced ships and aircra�, the year when Chinese military modernisation

BY : Matthew Valla

Why We Cannot Just Ignore Chinese Sea-Power

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took on a tangible, measurable quality. China has since built upon its initial successes. Its surface �eet, once its weakest link, has now seemed to become its most modern asset in the timeframe of a decade. �is year, it is anticipated that the Type 052D destroyers, the successor to the 052C’s, will come into service in large numbers and will ostensibly o�er China air defence capabilities that previously only the American Aegis system could provide. While this may be an exaggeration on the part of the government, the fact that China is even pursuing such an ambitious capability demonstrates that it is set on competing with the Aegis-equipped Americans and Japanese on a purely qualitative basis. Whether or not it succeeds, there is no question that China has completely abandoned its Cold War era reliance on quantity and is instead banking on being able to produce a force that can meet its opponents on a more equal qualitative footing. Barring the unlikely collapse of the current government, it is all but guaranteed that China’s build-up will only ramp up in the near-future. China has already acquired an old Soviet carrier hull from the Russians and brought it to operational status. While the signi�cance of the Liaoning itself has been highly exaggerated – the carrier lacks aircra� catapults and thus can only launch partial-ly fuelled aircra� – the ship nevertheless betrays a far grander ambition to build up China’s power projection. While the carrier is of limited utility against a competent opponent, it can and probably is already being used as a training ship to train Chinese naval personnel in carrier operations. Carriers are extremely complex to operate and having a training ship to build up expertise would make an enormous amount of sense, as it would mean that the Chinese navy would immediately be ready to use their actual carriers once those become operational. At present, China is believed to be constructing at least two full-sized aircra� carriers that, while not expected to be operational until at least 2020, would on their own be enough to give China the world’s second most powerful navy by a signif-icant margin. What China will do with these carriers and whether it will decide to build more still remains open to speculation, but the existing programs alone are enough to suggest that China is not content with remaining a regional maritime power.

Now, all of this being said, it is important to rein in the rhetoric somewhat. China’s naval power has grown expo-nentially in a very short amount of time and any military build-up on the scale we are seeing in this case should be at least a bit alarming. Further, China still has its share of challenges to overcome. While China has vastly improved its surface capabilities, others have remained relatively underdeveloped. Replenishment oilers, anti-submarine capability, airborne early warning, strategic airli�, and aerial refuelling, for example, have remained fairly modest and have not kept up with China’s substantial advances in combat capability. As such, while China’s maritime strength is enormous on paper, the support structure to enhance that strength remains somewhat lacking and

suggests that China will still have a di�cult time project-ing power in ways that even smaller powers like British and French take for granted. �en there is the question of personnel. China has taken a number of steps to profes-sionalize its armed forces over the past twenty years and it does seem to have made major progress in improving the quality of its military exercises. �at said, whether or not these reforms are as e�ective as they should be remains a nebulous a�air. �e higher echelons of the PLA are notoriously corrupt and while that in of itself is not necessarily crippling, it is worth questioning how e�ective a military that has not fought a major war since 1979 can really be, especially given the complete overhaul of its technological capabilities. Finally, there is a strong possi-bility that a rising India and a resurgent Japan could both pose fundamental regional challenges that, regardless of China’s modernization, could impose a major check on China’s power. While such an outcome would not likely be positive for the international community as a whole, it does suggest that China’s maritime rise may not be as unstoppable or even as challenging as it initially seems. Regardless, it is likely that China has both the means and the will to pursue its maritime aspirations as it sees �t. As such it is crucial that Chinese ambitions be addressed by the international community sooner rather than later. �is is not a call to move against China or even an ap-peal to contain its growth. Rather, instead of ignoring the issue or treating China with the usual mixture of awe and condescension, we should instead recognize the country for what it is, a rising maritime power with potentially global aspirations and the means to achieve them. If we do not start discussing how to address this issue now, we only allow what is already an intensifying security situa-tion in East Asia to grow even worse. �e year 2014 is not just important because of its signi�cance to the past and present Chinese naval build-up; it is also the 100th anni-versary of 1914: the year in which great power relations broke down spectacularly and globalisation ground to a halt. A rising power of the magnitude of China must be accounted for. Otherwise what we risk is no less than our own globalisation, as well as the post-war order that we have so painstakingly preserved up until this point.

In January of this year, Cambodians celebrated the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Khmer Rogue; an anni-versary that highlights the country’s growth and progress alongside its structurally embedded social and political issues. The Khmer Rogue took power as Cambodia struggled with spill over from the war in Viet-nam in 1975, beginning almost four years of brutal reforms and social restructuring programs that resulting in the deaths of up to three million Cambodians. With the aim of creat-ing a completely agrarian society, the communist Pol Pot regime systemati-cally executed all intellectuals, French speakers, religious communities, ethnic minorities, and educated peo-ple. Cities were evacuated, families divided, and infrastructure destroyed as the regime expanded their control. Hundreds of thousands were impris-oned, tortured and executed, while even more died of malaria, exhaus-tion, and starvation as inexperienced workers were forced to labour in the rice fields sixteen hours per day.

Pol Pot’s regime ultimately lost power in 1979 following the Vietnamese invasion, though members of the Khmer Rogue held Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations through 1993, as Western powers refused to acknowl-edge the legitimacy of Vietnamese intervention in the years after the war in Vietnam. Thirty-five years later, it is evident that older Cambodians are still weathering the trauma of surviv-

ing genocide, while younger genera-tions are looking towards the future.

In the last two decades, Cambodia has been able to capitalize on growing tourism in South East Asia and has become a centre for textile manu-facturing, though the country still ranks among the Asian states with the lowest Human Development Index values. It has ranked among the World Bank’s top fifteen states with the highest annual GDP growth, but this has not come without secondary costs. In 1999, just four years after the United States reopened diplomatic re-lations with the Kingdom of Cambo-dia, the Cambodia Textile Compact was enacted between the two states. The trade agreement increased U.S. import quotas for Cambodia textiles and required documentation for im-provements in labor conditions and factory practices. With rising produc-tions costs in China, Cambodia has become a hub for international cor-porations to source low-cost textiles. Zara, H&M, and Gap are just a few of the fashion giants who have increased sourcing clothing from textile facto-ries in Cambodia in recent years. A ‘prefect storm’ of escalation in tensions surrounding government administration and social policies regarding civil liberties and labour standards has coincided with the 35 year anniversary, as protestors from the Cambodian National Rescue Par-ty (CNRP) have taken to the streets in all parts of the country.

The movement is indicative of new social initiatives to reject the status-quo politics that have kept Cambodia relatively stable in the past decades. Since August, members of the CNRP have been attempting to bring attention to suspected fraud in the summer elections. The growing party, which gained several seats in the country’s parliament, insists that President Hun Sen’s party deliber-ately miscounted votes in order to maintain a majority. Hun Sen’s gov-ernment has refused to authorize a recount, or to allow for an independ-ent investigation.

President Hun Sen has effectively been in power for 28 years since Vietnam withdrew from the coun-try. Opponents censure him for his continuously close ties to Vietnam, claiming that he does not fully repre-sent Cambodian interests, including land conflicts on the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, which some Cambodians still refer to as South Cambodia.

Trade unions have also taken to the streets. Workers from Cambodia’s industrial sector are pushing for a living wage, demanding a 100% increase from 80 to 160 USD per month, in order to account for the rising cost of living and a decade of inflation. Strikes and protests have been organised across the country, but to little avail. On 3 January, Cambodian security forces opened

During the winter holidays, I spent two weeks traveling through the King-dom of Cambodia, and discovering a political history foreign to me in all as-pects. In my interactions with Cambodians of all ages across the country, my visits to political monuments and museums, and in my multiple encounters with large protests, it was evident that the small country has reached a social and political crossroads, without a clear path forward.

CAMBODIA

BY : Michelle Ryan

Crisis and Crossroads: Cambodia in Transition

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fire on protestors gathering in Phnom Penh to reject the government’s offer of a $15 increase in wages. At least four demonstrators were killed, and dozens more hospitalised. Represent-atives from western clothing chains have been quiet in their commentar-ies on the issue.

Officials claimed continuous protests were ‘disrupting traffic,’ and Hun Sen officially banned public demonstra-tion in the capitol Phnom Penh on 3 January.

Other protestors have mobilised alleging that the government has refused to grant broadcasting licens-es to critical independent media. On January 27th, about 300 people marched through the capitol to de-mand an independent radio licence, and were met with smoke grenades riot police wielding batons. Govern-ment officials defended the violence against the ‘illegal protestors,’ reaf-firming the government’s hard line stance against the opposition move-ment.

Human Rights Watch has issued several statements condemning the events of recent months as the protes-tors have become increasingly vocal. The scheduled UN Human Right’s Council’s Universal Periodic Re-view (UPR) of Cambodia began on the 28th of January, though no high-ranking Cambodian officials were in attendance; which perhaps illustrates the current administration’s level of engagement with human rights advocates. The UPR is a mech-anism of the Human Rights Council aimed at improving the human rights situation on the ground in each of the UN member states through critical evaluation every four and a half years.

Ultimately, the unrest in Cambodia is indicative of a change in societal values. While the onslaught of po-litical violence is not directly related to the anniversary of the fall of the Khmer Rogue, the rise of unsatisfied individuals can be directly traced to the passing of time since the years of genocide that encompassed the late

1970s. Now, with two thirds of the population under 25, generational divide is stronger than ever. Given the violence and brutality that permeated every sector of society under Pol Pot, the Vietnamese were welcomed as liberators, and the essential installa-tion of Hun Sen was accepted for the preservation of stability and fear of conflict. Refrains of ‘anything is better than the Khmer Rouge’ and ‘we start-ed with empty hands’ are common from older Cambodians. It seems, however, that younger generations are looking for more than just consisten-cy in life and political representation. Quality of life and political freedoms are more important to a generation unsatisfied with the status-quo stabil-ity that genocide-survivors embraced decades before.

Real change, unfortunately, may not come without escalation of a compli-cated crisis. Comparisons have been drawn to ‘Arab Spring’ circumstances

– given the incredibly young pop-ulation, rapid industrialisation and urbanization of the economy, social media penetration, and the general rise of discontent throughout the population. The leading opposition movement, however, lacks essential central organisation and is predicated upon extreme Nationalism including

anti-Vietnamese and anti-Chinese sentiments that appeal to less educat-ed demographics. Revolution, while possible, will likely lead to a messy and chaotic ordeal of unintended consequences, including withdraw of foreign direct investment and great economic regression.

International coverage of the demon-strations and state violence has been meagre at best, especially compared to the coverage in neighbouring Thailand. This is obviously not the first time that violence in the devel-oping world has been overlooked by Western media, nor is it the first time for Cambodia. But as the tension of public activism continues to change the political landscape of Cambodia, this could potentially change. Giv-en the motivations of young people equipped with the 21st century tools of globalisation, an escape Cold War era politics could potentially help to bring Cambodia and its dark history

out of the shadows and the periphery of media attention.

For better or for worse, given the spreading desire for reform and improvements and a young mobile population, greater media attention will surely be merited in Cambodia’s uncertain future.

HUMAN RIGHTS

BY : Jennifer Morton

Justice for Whom? The ICC Prosecutes a Warlord in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Bosco “The Terminator” Ntaganda was one of the world’s most wanted suspects. After years on the run, he has finally appeared before judges at The Hague. Addressing the Court in the Kinyarwanda language, he said, “When I arrived at the ICC, I was a soldier, but I’m no longer a soldier any more”. It is up to the judges at International Criminal Court (ICC) to determine whether the former Congolese warlord is just a soldier – or whether there is sufficient evidence to put him on trial for being a war criminal.

For seven years, Ntaganda remained untouchable. Despite the ICC issu-ing his arrest warrant in 2006, it was not until recently that the search for justice began. In March last year, the feared militia leader stunned observ-ers when he walked through the gates of the American Embassy in Rwanda and requested to be transferred to The Hague. This marked an end to Ntaganda’s colourful military history where he had served both as a soldier in the Congolese national army (FARDC) and in various armed rebel groups. Whilst serving as commander of the FARDC in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Con-go (DRC), Ntaganda led an opulent lifestyle. He used his military power to build a vast empire by plundering the DRC’s rich natural resources, operating lucrative smuggling net-works, and racking up profits from the hotels, bars and villas he owned in neighbouring countries. However, the crimes Ntaganda is accused of at The Hague are far more sinister than his corruption charges as a Congolese general. The crimes that matter for the ICC occurred long before these in the military wing of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) party – when Ntaganda reigned as Deputy Chief of the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (FPLC).

“The Terminator” obtained his nickname for the killing sprees he allegedly conducted in the Ituri Prov-ince of the DRC. The militia leader stands accused of thirteen counts of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity – including ethni-cally motivated murder, rape, and the forced conscription of child soldiers. However, Ntaganda’s lawyers told the Court that this portrayal of Ntaganda as a mindless killer is nothing more than a caricature. Instead, they de-picted the militia leader as a defender of local populations, with his lawyer proclaiming that “taking up weapons to defend people is not a crime, it is a fundamental right”. Indeed, in the midst of Africa’s deadliest conflict, taking up defensive weapons is not a rare story. However, the voices of vic-tims relayed by the prosecution speak of Ntaganda, not as a heroic defender, but as someone that people needed defending from. ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda reported to the court that victims were told by Ntaganda, “You are not human beings. In three days we will finish you all”, whilst other witnesses reported seeing victims “mutilated, decapitated, and their heads borne as a trophy”. If such allegations are true, this adds a chill-ing dimension to the deaths of some of the 5 million who have died in the

one of the most catastrophic wars the world has ever seen.

However, if Ntaganda is brought to trial and sentenced, there are two ways in which his case could mark a critical turning point in the history of international justice. The idea of cre-ating a court to prosecute the world’s most serious crimes became a reality with the ICC’s formation in 2002. However, since its beginnings, the court has been plagued by problems – the most serious of which being its lack of enforcement powers to bring those indicted to court. Yet, despite a long delay between his indictment and eventual resignation, this obsta-cle was overcome when Ntaganda was the first indictee ever to voluntarily surrender to The Hague. If a convic-tion does follow, it sets an important precedent to other war criminals. Most importantly, it allows the ICC to show the world that it has set the standard for international justice.

The second trial requires the ICC to learn from its previous mistakes – or, more accurately, mistake. The ICC had its watershed moment in 2012 with its first (and, thus far, its only) conviction of a war criminal: Thomas Lubanga. He was Ntanganda’s former boss. Lubanga was sentenced to 15

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years imprisonment for conscripting child soldiers into the ULP militia party to fight in the Ituri conflict. The evidence produced during his trial led to additional charges being lev-elled against Ntaganda – an element bolstering the likelihood that enough evidence will be found for Lubanga’s co-accused to be put to trial.

However, although the sentencing of Lubanga was a historic moment, there was a critical omission in his sentence that must be rectified if Nta-ganda is brought to trial. Although judges agreed that sexual violence and rape occurred during Luban-ga’s presence in Ituri, the chamber strongly criticised the conduct of ICC prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo during the proceedings. According to Judge Falford, Ocampo was “actively opposed” to the inclusion of counts of sexual violence and sexual slavery, arguing that this inclusion would cause “unfairness” to the accused. Director of the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice called the ab-sence of gender-based violence from Lubanga’s sentence a “devastating decision”. Fortunately, the charges

against Ntaganda mark an important step forward. They include charges of rape and sexual violence, as well as holding Ntaganda accountable for the sexual slavery of girl soldiers commit-ted by other commanders within his FPLC militia group. With Ntaganda going to trial, it is imperative that this commitment to pursuing gen-der-based violence is upheld through-out the proceedings, and plays an important part in the verdict. The sentencing of Ntaganda thus offers a unique opportunity for the ICC to prove that it stands by a conception of international justice and human rights that is truly all encompassing in all its forms.

There is clearly enormous symbolic potential for the Ntaganda case if he is convicted as a war criminal. However, it is important to consider the wider picture. In a country where conflict is part and parcel of every day life and whose economy has been brought to its knees by corruption; in a country which is one of the world’s richest in resources but where over 87% of the population live under $1.25 a day; in a country which has

watched 5 million of its citizens die and where those who are left can only expect to live until 56-years old, things must be put in perspective. Will the prosecution of a former Congolese warlord really make any difference? With UN peacekeeping forces struggling to stem the unre-lenting conflict, perhaps it is one of the only ways that the international community can ensure that some justice is being done – no matter how small.

Yet, no matter how much Ntaganda’s conviction would be a triumph for international justice, it is not going to resolve ethnic rivalries or stop the incessant conflict. Nor is it going to bring back the dead. In an Al Jazeera interview, Nyirnzinza Sunzoga, a Congolese woman who lost three of her sons in the same day in a massa-cre in her hometown, said it all. She told the reporter that she did not care about Ntaganda’s voluntary surren-der. Because, for Nyirinzinza, there is nothing that anyone can do that will bring back her boys.

foreign affairs review spring issue, 2014. russia special

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