foreign diplomate surveillance affirmative - ddi 2015 sws

7/25/2019 Foreign Diplomate Surveillance Affirmative - DDI 2015 SWS

1/24

Foreign Diplomat Surveillance Aff


2/24

InherencyNSA spying on diplomats now tensions on the brink

Ball ! [James Ball, an award-winning data journalist working on the Guardian's investigations team. He was a core journaliston several of the newspaper's data-driven investigations, including the pulication of the !"# files received from $dward "nowden,the %eading the %iots project, its reporting on the &ikieaks' Guantanamo Ba( files, and the Guardian's e)tensive reporting relatingto the *+*J's ffshore eaks series, ctoer , /01, 2!"# monitored calls of 1 world leaders after 3" official handed overcontacts4, http566www.theguardian.com6world6/016oct676nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls8 66dickies

9he !ational "ecurit(#genc( monitored the phone conversations of 1 world leaders after einggiven the numers ( an official in another 3" government department , according to a classifieddocument provided ( whistlelower $dward "nowden. 9he confidential memo reveals that the !"# encourages senior officials inits :customer: departments, such as the &hite House, "tate and the ;entagon, to share their :%olode)es: so the agenc( can add the

phone numers of leading foreign politicians to their surveillance s(stems. 9he document notes that one unnamed 3"official handed over // numers, including those of the 1 world leaders, none of whom is named. 9hese wereimmediatel( :tasked: for monitoring ( the !"#. 9he revelation is set to add to mountingdiplomatic tensions etween the 3" and its allies, after the German chancellor #ngela


3/24

"lan #e$t"lan% #he &nited States Federal 'overnment should substantially curtail its

surveillance of foreign diplomats and of embassies inside the &nited States(


4/24

&S)India *elations Advantage9he 3" uses surveillance against foreign diplomats and foreign emassies inside the 3nited

"tatesBB+ ![British Broadcast +orporation, 23" !ational "ecurit( #genc( 'spied on French diplomats',http566www.c.com6news6world-europe-7@I7,ctoer nd, /0166%ahul8

9he 3" !ational "ecurit( #genc( has spied on French diplomats in &ashington and at the 3!,according to the latest claims in e il, sa(s the BB+'s+hristian Fraser in ;aris. *t comes on the da( the 3" "ecretar( of "tate, John Kerr(, is in ondon meeting foreign counterparts to

discuss "(ria. '"p( implants'9he e


5/24

a report said &ednesda(. 9he Hindu newspaper, which has een collaorating with the Guardian newspaper reporter Glenn Greenwald, said the*ndian offices were on a top-secret list of countries chosen for intensive sp(ing. 9he !"#:selected *ndia's 3! office and the emass( as aC 'location target' for infiltrating theircomputers and telephones with hi-tech ugs,: the paper said, citing a secret internal documentfrom the sp( agenc(. *t said *ndia's missions were marked for various snooping techni=ues including one codenamed :ifesaver: which:facilitates imaging of the hard drive of computers.: *ndia and the 3" have put past difficulties ehind them and ecome firm allies over the last decade,

with ;rime ier *ndia-3" relations, ut the hurdles in the civil nuclear cooperation deal and man( other foreign polic( related issues have onl(

increased skepticism. 9here has een an *ndia-3" strategic dialogue in place since /0/, and various3" presidents have declared *ndia as an :indispensale partner and a trusted friend.: However, thestrategic partnership has een overshadowed ( various issues such as the spat over diplomatic immunit( and privileges of *ndiandiplomat Aev(ani Khoragade or the recent


6/24

Impact ,odule Afghan."akistan

Strong &S)India relations key to Afghani stability spills over to "akistan andregional e$tremism(Shenai /[!eena "henai, adjunct scholar at the #merican $nterprise *nstitute, !ovemer 0, //I, 29he +ritical 3."-*ndia

%elationship,4 9he #merican,http566www.american.com6archive6//I6novemer6the-critical-u-s-india-relationshipg8

#fghanistan. *ndia shares the desire of the 3nited "tates for a stale, secure#fghanistan .#lthough *ndiahas no militar( involvement in #fghanistan due to ;akistani sensitivitiesC, *ndias current and future reconstruction

activities in #fghanistan are critical to successful 3.". efforts. *n fact, closer &(S( cooperation

with a democratic, 3.".-friendl( India Ta lossoming regional and rising gloal powerT is vital to stability

and the balance of power in the region( *ndia has alread( committed more than 3"N0.1

illion in development assistancefor infrastructure and civic projects in #fghanistan. 9he *ndian governmentalso has longstanding ties with #fghanistan pre-dating the 9alians rule and enjo(s closerelations with#fghan ;resident Hamid Kar>ai,which could assist in rooting out corruption andcontaining violent *slamic e)tremism. &hile ;akistan remains uneas( aout *ndias intentions in #fghanistan, *ndiahas no interest in a destaili>ed ;akistan and instead seeks to contain 9alian and other

terrorist elementsand prevent their incursions into Kashmir. B( supporting the Kar>ai governments effortsto compartmentali>e e)tremist elements in #fghanistan, *ndias investment activities in concert with 3.".co unter in surgenc( efforts could prevent the re-9aliani>ation of #fghanistan , reversion of

#fghanistan into a safe haven for terrorists, and a full-scale spillover of the conflict into;akistan sordering trial areasand Kashmir. #ccordingl(, the 3nited "tates should seek to alla( ;akistans fears and morepulicl( support *ndias reconstruction efforts in #fghanistan. #fter all, *ndia sees itself with, in the words of ;rime


7/24

3$tinction+haffin [Greg +haffin4%esearch #ssistant at Foreign ;olic( in Focus, Jul( , /00, 2%eorienting 3.". "ecurit( "trateg( in"outh #sia,4 online5 http566www.fpif.org6articles6reorientingWusWsecurit(Wstrateg(WinWsouthWasia8

9he greatest threatto regional securit( although curiousl( not at the top of most lists of 3.". regional concernsC isthe possiilit( thatincreased *ndia-;akistan tension will erupt into all-out warthat could =uickl( escalate into a nucleare)change .*ndeed, in just the past two decades, the twoneighors have come perilousl( close to war on several occasions. *ndia and

;akistan remain the most likel( elligerentsin the world to engage in nuclear war. Aue to an *ndianpreponderance of conventional forces, ;akistan would have a strong incentive to use its nucleararsenal ver( earl(on efore a routing of its militar( installations and weaker conventional forces. *n the event of conflict, ;akistans onl(chance of survival would e the earl( use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptale damage to *ndian militar( and much more likel(C civilian targets.

B( raising the stakes to unacceptale levels, ;akistan would hope that *ndia would step awa( from the rink. However, it is e=uall( likel( that *ndiawould respond in kind,with escalation ensuing. !either state possesses tactical nuclear weapons,utoth possess scores of cit(-si>ed oms like those used on Hiroshima and !agasaki. Furthermore, as more damage wasinflicted or as the result of a decapitating strikeC, c ommand and c ontrol elementswould e disaled, leavingindividual commanders to respondin an environment increasingl( clouded ( the fog of war anddecreasing the likelihoodthat either government what would e left of themCwoulde ale to guarantee that their forces

would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. #s a result an( suchconflictwouldlikel( continue to escalateuntil one sideincurred an unacceptale or wholl( deilitating level of injur( or e)haustedits nuclear arsenal.# nuclear conflict in the sucontinentwould havedisastrous effects on the

worldas a whole. *n a Januar( /0/ paper pulished in "cientific #merican, climatolog( professors#lan %oock andwen Brian9oon forecastthe gloal repercussionsof a regional nuclearwar. 9heir results are strikingl( similar tothose ofstudiesconducted in 0I/ that concludethat a nuclear war etween the 3nited "tates and the "oviet 3nion

wouldresult in acatastrophicand prolonged nuclear winter,which couldver( well place the survival of thehuman race in jeopard(. *n their stud(, %oock and 9oon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear e)change etween *ndiaand ;akistan in which each were to use roughl( half their e)isting arsenals / apieceC. "ince *ndian and ;akistani nuclear devices are strategic rather

than tactical, the likel( targets would e major population centers. wing to the population densities of uran centers in othnations, the numer of direct casualties could clim as high as / million. 9he fallout of such an e)change would not merel( e limited to the

immediate area. First, the detonationof a large numer of nuclear deviceswould propel as much as seven millionmetric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and deris as high as the lower stratosphere . wing to their small si>e lessthan a tenth of a micronC and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as adecade, during which time the world would remain perpetuall( overcast. Furthermore, these particles wouldsoak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severel( damage the earths o>one la(er .9he inailit( of sunlight to penetratethrough the smoke and dustwould lead togloal cooling( as much as .1degrees Fahrenheit. 9his shiftin gloal temperaturewould lead tomore drought, worldwide food shortages, and

widespread political upheaval.#lthough the likelihood of this doomsda( scenario remains relativel( low, the conse=uences are direenough to warrant greater 3.". and international attention. Furthermore, due tothe ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animusheld etween *ndia and ;akistan, it might not take much to set them off. *ndeed, following the successful 3.".raid on in adens compound, several memers of *ndias securit( apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that *ndia shouldemulate the "$# 9eam "i) raid and launch their own cross-order incursions to na or kill anti-*ndian terrorists, either preemptivel( or after the fact.

"uch provocative action could ver( well lead to all-out waretween the two that could=uickl( escalate.


8/24

Impact ,odule 5 "rolif

&S)India relations key to N"# legitimacy and the non)prolif effortsAyoob 56[e that *ndia, unlike some other nuclear aspirants such as !orth Korea, isa responsile memer of the international communit( with a large and relativel( self-reliant technological infrastructure capale of

producing sophisticated nuclear warheads and deliver( s(stems. 9his eing the case, it is in the 3.". interest that*ndia e co-opted into the nonproliferation regime rather than treated as a pariah, ecause the

latter would undermine the residual crediilit( of the !;9 regime. However, &ashington is also concernedthat this co-optation e accomplished without unraveling the entire !;9 structure. 9he principal ojective of the*ndian-3.". dialogue seems to e to s=uare this circle while protecting the integrit(, as far as possile,of the initial positions adopted ( oth sides. 9his task is difficult ut not altogether impossile. &ith patience, goodwill, anddiplomatic creativit(, the two sides are more than likel( to succeed in crafting a formula that oth !ew Aelhi and &ashington can

live with until the world ecomes used to *ndias nuclear status. 9he attempt to find such a formula is, however,( definition a joint venture and, therefore, likel( to strengthen rather than damage *ndian-3.".relations.

"rolif causes e$tinction6roenig 5s0II ook, 9heor( of*nternational ;olitics.0[I8 *n this, and suse=uent works, &alt> argued that the spread of nuclear weapons has eneficial effects oninternational politics. He maintained that states, fearing a catastrophic nuclear war, will e deterred from going to war with othernuclear-armed states. #s more and more states ac=uire nuclear weapons, therefore, there are fewer states against which other stateswill e willing to wage war. 9he spread of nuclear weapons, according to &alt>, leads to greater levels of international stailit(.

0


9/24

ooking to the empirical record, he argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons in 0I7 coincided with an unprecedented periodof peace among the great powers. &hile the 3nited "tates and the "oviet 3nion engaged in man( pro)( wars in peripheralgeographic regions during the +old &ar, the( never engaged in direct comat. #nd, despite regional scuffles involving nuclear-armed states in the ation over the past few decades.[18 &hile earl( optimists like Piner and Brodie can e e)cused for not

knowing etter, the writings of contemporar( proliferation optimists ignore the past fifty years ofacademic

research on nuclear deterrence theor(. *n the 0I7/s, Piner, Brodie, and others argued that the advent of


10/24

optimistic. 9homas "chelling was the first to devise a rational means ( which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.0/[18He argued that leaders cannot credil( threaten to intentionall( launch a suicidal nuclear war, ut the( can make a 2threat thatleaves something to chance.400[1I8 9he( can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an

attempt to force a less resolved adversar( to ack down.As states escalate anuclear crisis there is anincreasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result inan

inadvertent or accidental nuclear e$change . #s long as the enefit of winning the crisis is greater than theincremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherentl( credile. *n these games of nuclear

rinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war efore ack down will win the crisis as long as it doesnot end in catastrophe. *t is for this reason that 9homas "chelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a 2competition in risktaking.40[7/8 9his does not mean that states eagerl( id up the risk of nuclear war. %ather, the( face gut-wrenching decisions ateach stage of the crisis. 9he( can =uit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, ut onl( ( ceding an important geopolitical issue to anopponent. r the( can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, ut onl( at the risk of suffering a possile nuclear e)change."ince 0I7 there were have een man( high stakes nuclear crises ( m( count, there have een twent(C in which 2rational4 stateslike the 3nited "tates run a risk of nuclear war and inch ver( close to the rink of nuclear war.01[708 B( asking whether states can edeterred or not, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong =uestion. 9he right =uestion to ask is5 what risk of nuclearwar is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisisM ptimists are likel( correct when the( assert that*ran will not intentionall( commit national suicide ( launching a olt-from-the-lue nuclear attack on the 3nited "tates or *srael.9his does not mean that *ran will never use nuclear weapons, however. *ndeed, it is almost inconceivale to think that a nuclear-armed *ran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power and that it would not e willing to runan( risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its ojectives. *f a nuclear-armed *ran and the 3nited "tates or *srael have a geopoliticalconflict in the future, over sa( the internal politics of "(ria, an *sraeli conflict with *rans client He>ollah, the 3.". presence in the;ersian Gulf, passage through the "trait of Hormu>, or some other issue, do we elieve that *ran would immediatel( capitulateM r isit possile that *ran would push ack, possil( even randishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter its adversariesM *f the latter,

there is a real risk that proliferation to *ran could result in nuclear war.

#n optimist might counter that nuclearweapons will never e used, even in a crisis situation,ecause states havesuch a strong incentive, namel(national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used .But, this ojection ignores the fact thatleaders operate under competing pressures . eaders in nuclear-armed statesalso have ver(strong incentives to convincetheir adversaries that nuclear weapons could ver( welle used .Historicall( we have seen that in crises, leaderspurposel( do things like put nuclear weapons on high alert and delegatenuclear launch authority to low level commanders, purposel(increasing the risk of

accidental nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to ack down.


11/24

a small cit(, for e)ample, it was thought that a nuclear-armed state could signal its willingness to escalate the crisis, while leaving itsadversar( with enough left to lose to deter the adversar( from launching a full-scale nuclear response. *n a future crisis etween anuclear-armed +hina and the 3nited "tates over 9aiwan, for e)ample, +hina could choose to launch a nuclear attack on Honolulu todemonstrate its seriousness. *n that situation, with the continental 3nited "tates intact, would &ashington choose to launch a full-scale nuclear war on +hina that could result in the destruction of man( more #merican citiesM r would it ack downM +hina mightdecide to strike hoping that &ashington will choose a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war. *f launching a limited nuclearwar could e rational, it follows that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear use. #gain, ( ignoringcontemporar( developments in scholarl( discourse and rel(ing e)clusivel( on understandings of nuclear deterrence theor( that

ecame osolete decades ago, optimists reveal the shortcomings of their anal(sis and fail to make a compelling case. 9he optimistsalso error ( confusing stailit( for the national interest. $ven if the spread of nuclear weapons contriutes togreater levels ofinternational stailit(which discussions aove and elow suggest it might notC it does notnecessaril(follow that the spread of nuclear weapons is in the 3.". interest. 9here might e other national goals that trump stailit(, such as

reducing to >ero the risk of nuclear warin an important geopolitical region. ptimists might argue that "outh #sia is more stalewhen *ndia and ;akistan have nuclear weapons, ut certainl( the risk of nuclear war is higher than if there were no nuclear weapons on the sucontinent. *n addition, it is wrongto assume that stailit( is alwa(s in the national interest. "ometimes it is, ut sometimes it is not. *f stailit( is otained ecause &ashington is deterred from using force againsta nuclear-armed adversar( in a situation where using force could have advanced national goals, stailit( harms, rather than advances, 3.". national interests. 9he final gaping

weakness in the proliferation optimist argument, however, is that it rests on a logical contradiction. 9his is particularl( ironic, given that man( optimists like to portra(themselves as hard-headed thinkers, following their premises to their logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the heart of the optimist argument is glaring and simple tounderstand5 either the proailit( of nuclear war is >ero, or it is non>ero, ut it cannot e oth. *f the proailit( of nuclear war is >ero, then nuclear weapons should have nodeterrent effect. "tates will not e deterred ( a nuclear war that could never occur and states should e willing to intentionall( launch large-scale wars against nuclear-armedstates. *n this case, proliferati on optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is staili>ing. *f, on the other hand, the proailit( of nuclear war is non>ero,then there is a real danger that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the proailit( of a catastrophic nuclear war. *f this is true, then proliferation optimists cannot e certainthat nuclear weapons will never e used. *n sum, the spread of nuclear weapons can either raise the risk of nuclear war and in so doing, deter large-scale conventional conflict.r there is no danger that nuclear weapons will e used and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase international instailit(. But, despite the claims of the proliferationoptimists, it is nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons will never e used and to simultaneousl( claim that their spread contriutes to international staili t(. ;roliferat ion

#nti-osessionists5 ther scholars, who * lael 2anti-osessionists4 argue that the spread of nuclear weapons has neither een good nor ad for international politics, ut ratherirrelevant. 9he( argue that academics and polic(makers concerned aout nuclear proliferation spend too much time and energ( osessing over something, nuclear weapons,that, at the end of the da(, are not all that important. *n #tomic session, John


12/24

prevent #rmageddon on the sucontinent. 9he 3.". government also worries aout the safet( and securit( of ;akistans nuclear arsenal, fearing that ;akistans nukes could fallinto the hands of terrorists in the event of a state collapse or a reak down in nuclear securit(. #nd we still have not witnessed the full range of conse=uences arising from;akistani nuclear proliferation. *slamaad has onl( possessed the om for a little over a decade, ut the( are likel( to keep it for decades to come, meaning that we could stillhave a nuclear war involving ;akistan. *n short, ;akistans nuclear capailit( has alread( had deleterious effects on 3.". national securit( and these threats are onl( likel( togrow over time. *n addition, the anti-osessionists are incorrect to argue that the cure of 3.". nuclear nonproliferation polic( is worse than the disease of proliferation.


13/24

nuclear war in the elief that war is inevitale and that it would e etter to go first than to gosecond.*n a future *sraeli-*ranian crisis, for e)ample, *srael and *ran might oth prefer to avoid a nuclear war, ut decide tostrike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. $ven in a world of


14/24

Impact ,odule ! Democracy

&S)India relations key to democracy promotionAyoob 56[ing the idea of a gloal democratic communit( are oviousl( the world'slargest democrac( *ndiaC and the world's most powerful democrac( the 3nited "tatesC, andtheir partnership is essential for the idea to e taken serious l(. n1 *f democrac( and human rights are toinform 3.". foreign polic( making in an( sustantial fashion in the coming decade,&ashington's relations with !ewAelhi must inevital( move to a higher plane of understanding and cooperation.

Democracy key to solve great power war'at4 !ational "ecurit( ;rof-9el #viv 3niversit(, 29he +hanging +haracter of &ar,4 in 9he +hanging +haracter of &ar, ed."trachan Z "cheipers, ;. 1/-1C

"ince 0I7, the decline of major great power war has deepenedfurther. !uclear weapons have concentrated theminds of all concerned wonderfull(, ut no less important have een the institutionali>ation of free trade and the closel( relatedprocess of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist world. 9he communist loc did not participate in thes(stem of free trade, ut at least initiall( it too e)perienced sustantial growth, and, unlike German( and Japan, it was alwa(ssuf]cientl( large and rich in natural resources to maintain an autark( of sorts. &ith the "oviet collapse and with the integration ofthe former communist powers into the gloal capitalist econom(, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems tohave ecome ver( remote indeed. 9his is one of the main sources for the feeling that war has een transformed5 its geopolitical

centre of gravit( has shifted radicall(. 9he moderni>ed, economicall( developed parts of the world constitute a \>one of peace.&arnow seems to e con]ned to the less-developed parts of the gloe, the worlds \>one of war,

where countries that haveso far failed to emrace moderni>ation and its pacif(ing spin-off effectscontinue to e engaged in warsamong themselves, as well as with developed countries. &hile the trend is ver( real, one

wonders if thenear disappearance of armed conîct within the developed world is likel( toremain as starkas it has een since the collapse of communism. 9he post-+old &ar momentma( turn out toea 7eetingone. 9he proailit( of major wars within the developed world remainslowTecause of the factors alread( mentioned5 increasing wealth, economic openness and interdependence, and nucleardeterrence. But the deep sense of changeprevailing since 0II has een ased on the far more radicalnotion that the triumph of capitalismalso spelled the irresistile ultimate victor( of democrac(Land that in an afûent and democratic world, major conîct no longer needs to e feared or seriousl( prepared for. 9his notion,however, isfast erodingwith the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have eenasent from the international s(stem since 0I7. #ove all, there is the formerl( communist and fastindustriali>ing authoritarian-capitalist +hina, whose massive growth represents the greatest change in the gloal

alance of power. %ussia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist lieralism and assuming anincreasingl( authoritarian character.#uthoritarian capitalism ma( e more viable thanpeople tend to assume. 9he communist great powers failed even though the( were potentiall( larger than thedemocracies, ecause their economic s(stems failed them. B( contrast, the capitalist authoritarian6totalitarianpowers during the ]rst half of the twentieth centur(, German( and Japan , particularl( the former,were

as ef]cient economicall( as, andif an(thing more successful militaril( than,their democraticcounterparts. 9he( were defeated in war mainl( ecause the( were too small and ultimatel( succumed to the e)ceptionalcontinental si>e of the 3nited "tates in alliance with the communist "oviet 3nion during the "econd &orld &arC. However, the

new non-democratic powers are othlarge and capitalist.+hinain particular is the largest pla(er inthe international s(stem in terms of population and is showing spectacular economic growth thatwithin a generation or two is likel( to make it a true non-democratic superpower. #lthough the return of capitalist non-democratic great powersdoes not necessaril( impl( open conîct or war, it might indicate that the democratichegemon( since the "oviet 3nions collapse could eshort)livedand thata universal8democratic peace1 may stillbe far off. 9he new capitalist authoritarian powers are deepl( integrated into the


15/24

world econom(. 9he( partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, ut not of the lieral democratic cause. 9hus,it is cruciall( important that an( protectionist turn in the s(stem is avoided so as to prevent a gra for markets and raw materialssuch as that which followed the disastrous slide into imperial protectionism and conîct during the ]rst part of the twentiethcentur(. f course, the openness of the world econom( does not depend e)clusivel( on the democracies. *n time, +hina itself mightecome more protectionist, as it grows wealthier, its laour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes. &ith the possilee)ception of the sore 9aiwan prolem, +hina is likel( to e less restless and revisionist than the territoriall( con]ned German( and

Japan were. %ussia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, ma( e more prolematic. However, as +hina grows inpower, it is likel( to ecome more assertive, ê) its muscles, and ehave like a superpower , even ifit does not ecome particularl( aggressive. 9he democratic and non-democratic powers ma( coe)ist more orless peacefull(, aleit waril(, side ( side, armed ecause of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called \securit(dilemma, and against worst-case scenarios. But there isalso the prospect ofmore antagonistic relations,accentuated ideological rivalr(, potential and actual con7ict 4intensi]ed arms races, and evennew cold wars, with spheres of inûence and opposing coalitions. #lthough great power relations will proal( var( from those thatprevailed during an( of the great twentieth-centur( conîcts, as conditions are never =uite the same, the( ma( var( less than seemedlikel( onl( a short while ago.


16/24

&S)3& *elations Advantage3mpirical proof of surveillance of 3uropean embassies and diplomats in the &SA

*# ! %95 # %ussian state-funded television network which runs cale and satellite televisionchannels, as well as *nternet content directed to audiences outside the %ussian Federation,2!"# spied on $3 diplomats in &ashington !R and Brussels ? report,4 @6I601,http566rt.com6news6nsa-sp(-eu-diplomats-7I, %%%C!ot onl( $uropean citi>ens, ut also emplo(ees of the $3 diplomatic missions in &ashington and the 3!

were under electronic surveillance from the !"#, Aer "piegel maga>ine reports citing a document otained (whistlelower $dward "nowden.V9he German maga>ine claims to have taken a glance at parts of a 2top secret4 document, which

reveals that 3" !ational "ecurit( #genc(has placed ugs in $3 offices in &ashington and at the !ewRork\s 3nited !ations head=uarters in order to listen to conversations and phone calls. V9heinternal computer networks in the uildings were also under surveillance, which granted !"#access to documents and emails of the $uropean officials. V9he document, which categoricall( laels the$uropean 3nion as a 2target4, was dated "eptemer /0/, Aer "piegel sa(s. V9he maga>ine reports that the !"# also targetedcommunications at the $uropean +ouncil head=uarters at the Justus ipsius uilding in Brussels, Belgium ( calling a remotemaintenance unit.V#ccording to Aer "piegel, more than five (ears ago $3 securit( officers had noticed and traced several missed

calls to an area of the !#9 facilit( in Brussels, which was used ( !"# e)perts. V9he 3" previousl( acknowledgedthat the( were collecting data on $uropean citi>ens under the ;%*"< program, ut not on largescale, onl( in cases of strong suspicion of individual or group eing involved in terrorism,c(ercrime or nuclear proliferation. VFormer !"# contractor and +*# emplo(ee, "nowden, is elieved to e currentl(sta(ing in the transit >one of


17/24

3kraine. *t is necessar( for the 3.". and $3 to form a united front to meet these challengesecausefirst, there is a risk that dangerous materials related to &eneighoring countries and provide safe havens for terrorists and other international criminalorgani>ations.ikewise, in the +aucasus and +entral #sia oth sides share a stake in promotingpolitical and economic transformationand integrating these states into larger communities such as the "+$. 9his

would also minimi>e the risk of instailit( spreading and preventthose countries of ecominghavens for international terrorists and criminals."imilarl(, there is a common interest in integrating the Balkanspoliticall( and economicall(. Aealing with *ran, *ra=, eanon, and the *sraeli-;alestinian conflict as well as other political issues in

the


18/24

Solvency#he &S must show a commitment to the :ienna +onvention and the +onvention on

Internationally "rotected "ersons) *ecent &N meeting proves&N 'eneral Assembly - 3! General #sseml(5 9he main delierative, polic(making andrepresentative organ of the 3!, 2+ompliance with Pienna +onventions +ritical in ;rotection ofAiplomatic, +onsular


19/24

5A+


20/24

5A+ &S Surveys India

NSA continues surveillance of the Indian 3mbassy killing India1s sovereignty anddecision making processBurke !JasonL south #sia correspondent for the guardianL "eptemer th/01http566www.theguardian.com6world6/016sep66nsa-surveillance-indian-emass(-un-mission66%*ttC9he 3" !ational "ecurit( #genc( ma( have accessed computers within the *ndian emass( in

&ashington and mission at the 3nited !ations in !ew Rork as part of a huge clandestine effortto mine electronic data held ( its south #sian all(. Aocuments released ( the 3" whistlelower$dward "nowden also reveal the e)tent and aggressive nature of other !"# datamininge)ercises targeting *ndia as recentl( as


21/24

5A+ Surveillance 6ills India D,aking Scenario

"trong decision making process is ke( to effective foreign polic("ant /Harsh P. # %ising *ndia's "earch for a Foreign ;olic(L n *nternational %elations in the Aefence"tudies Aepartment, http566r(ue7ekd.scholar.serialssolutions.com6M

sidYgoogleZauinitYHPZaulastY;antZatitleY#_rising_*ndia`s_search_for_a_foreign_polic(ZidYdoi50/.0/[email protected].//I./0.//ZtitleYris_;hiladelphiaCZvolumeY1ZissueYZdateY//IZspageY/ZissnY//1/-7166%ittC

# state's destin( is not onl( shaped ( e)ternal circumstances such as its geograph(, nationalcharacter, and resource endowments ut also ( the goals and choices that statesmen set andmake. # successful statesman works to 2ridge the gap etween a people's e)perience and his

vision, etween a nation's tradition and its future.40#s *ndia reaches a turning point in itsrelations with the rest of the world, *ndian polic(makers will have to make some crucial foreignpolic( decisions, the most important of which includes how est to e)ploit the e)tant structureof the international s(stem to their nation's advantage. But a fundamental =uandar( has longdogged *ndia in the realm of foreign affairs and has ecome even more acute with *ndia's ascentin the international order. "unil Khilnani has identified this =uandar( as *ndia's lack of an

2instinct for power.4 ;ower lies at the heart of international politics. ;ower permits one state toe)ert influence over another, there( shaping political outcomes. 9he success or failure of astate's foreign polic( is largel( a function of how power is wielded. 9he e)ercise of power can eshocking and at times corrupting ut power is asolutel( necessar( to maintain one's place inthe international arena. Ret ecause *ndia continues to e amivalent aout power, it has failedto develop a strategic agenda commensurate with its growing economic and militar(capailities. #s


22/24

*ndias strong process and framework for reform are ke( to +hinas alliance"ant /Harsh P. # %ising *ndia's "earch for a Foreign ;olic(L n *nternational %elations in the Aefence"tudies Aepartment, http566r(ue7ekd.scholar.serialssolutions.com6MsidYgoogleZauinitYHPZaulastY;antZatitleY#_rising_*ndia`s_search_for_a_foreign_polic(ZidYdoi50/.0/[email protected].//I./0.//ZtitleYris_;hiladelphiaCZvolumeY1ZissueYZdateY//IZspageY/ZissnY//1/-7166%ittC

&hile the part( did set up the !"+ in the late 0II/s, defining its role in polic( formulation, itnonetheless failed to institutionali>e the !"+ or to provide it the capailities necessar( to pla(its assigned role. #s in the past, important national securit( decisions were addressed in an adhoc manner without utili>ing the +ainet +ommittee on "ecurit(, the "trategic ;olic( Groupcomprised of ke( secretaries, service chiefs, and heads of intelligence agenciesC, and officials ofthe !ational "ecurit( #dvisor( Board.


23/24

its demeanor. !ew Aelhi refrained from commenting on the dispute when the 3" flew asurveillance aircraft over +hinas artificial island s and the international communit( joined

&ashington in condemning +hinese actions in the region. *n the ackground, *ndia hase)perienced some fresh troules along its order with +hina and watched with concern as +hinahas ventured into the *ndian cean. *n fact, Beijing recentl( warned *ndia aout cooperating

with Pietnam on oil and gas e)ploration projects in the "+", all the while +hina defends its own

economic corridor with ;akistan. ne of the crucial developments that could affect the futuremaritime securit( architecture in the *ndian cean region was the docking of +hinesesumarines in ;akistan following the docking in "ri anka late last (ear. +hina has also warned*ndia aout its reference to the *ndian cean as its ack(ard . +hinese presence in the *ndiancean is no longer a possiilit(, it is a realit(. For *ndia the challenge is in managing thisdevelopment while securing its strategic interests in the region. 9he *ndian cean has alwa(s

een an area of primar( interest for !ew Aelhi and an increasing +hinese presence is ound tochallenge the e)isting securit( order in the *ndian cean region. *ndia and +hina have alwa(shad troules along their land oundaries ut their strategic interests are now converging intothe maritime domain as well. 9here will e serious ramifications for maritime securit( in the*ndian cean if relations etween the two rising #sian powers cant e managed. 9he messagefrom +hina is loud and clear. *t wants to e a great power and will therefore take to the seas to

estalish its presence in the #sia?;acific and e(ond. *ndias een relativel( =uiet as +hina hasdone so and made a strategic miscalculation ( not sending its defence minister to the "hangri-a Aialogue /0Tits crucial to show up and shape the discourse at an( opportunit(. 9hedialogue is a critical platform to voice concerns aout regional securit( challenges. 9he *ndianAefense


24/24

and +hina ,4 warns her colleague "heila #. "mith, 2 this could be all)out conflict between these two

Asian giants( And as a treaty ally of >apan4 it will automatically involve the &nited

States (? #s *ve written, maintaining gloal hegemon( does ordinar( #mericans little good. "uch ane)clusive hold on power in the sphere of international relations is greatl( eneficial to political elites and the wealth( entities to

which the( are closel( tied, ut not much for the general population. Given this, the =uestion of whether we prefermaintaining hegemon( to 2all-out conflict4 in the #sia-;acific is pertinent .&e can eithercontinue

to risk catastrophic conflict etween two of the world1s most powerful states ,or, as %o(

puts it, 2accede4 to +hinas regional amitionswhich, after all, mirror #mericas own regional amitions when it was arising power.

foreign diplomate surveillance affirmative - ddi 2015 sws

Documents