foreknowledge

Intelligence analystrecruitment woes

Essential Resources for Intelligence Analystswww.foreknowledge.info

ISSN 2225-5613December 2012Issue Six

2013 intelligenceconferences

Intelligenceanalysisresearch

A cool tool for yourXmas stocking

Necesidades informativasen la planeficación:

KIT’s and PIR’s

Intelligence planning:finding your waythrough a sea of

puzzle pieces

2 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Contents Editor:Dalene Duvenage

Publisher:4Knowledge Analysis Solutions

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From the editor 3

Intelligence planning: finding your way 4through a sea of puzzles

Know your client

Getting started checklist

Customer checklist

Concept maps

Problem restatement and redefinition

Necesidades informativas en la planeficación: KIT’s and PIR’s

Terms of reference

Role of analysis in criminal investigations: 10the preliminary information assessment

A cool tool for your Xmas stocking! 11

Teaching intelligence analysts critical 12thinking skills with learning agents

Meet Irene Bashabe from Uganda 13

Intelligence analyst recruitment woes 14

Psychology of intelligence analysis # 6 16

Recent published research in intelligence 18analysis

News 20

Upcoming events 22

What does 2013 hold for Foreknowledge? 23

Advertise in Foreknowledge 24

Association of LawEnforcement

Intelligence Units

Cover: Shutterstock

All photo’s from Shutterstock

3December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Mario Eybers is a mortgage fraud

analyst at First Na-tional Bank, Johan-nesburg, South Africa.He has extensive ex-

perience as a crime intelligence analystboth in the private and public sector.

Don McDowell (SCCA)received awards for hisbook Strategic Intelli-gence: a handbook forpractitioners, managersand users, teaches intel-ligence analysis through-

out the world, has a private intelligencedistance learning college and is a found-ing member and fellow of AIPIO. He isfrom Pambula, NSW, Australia.

Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa

A wonderful and blessed Festive Season to all our readers! I hope that 2013 will be a prosperous andhealthy year for you and your family and that you will achieve many good and worthy things. In our lastedition of this year, we share some tools and best practice on how to frame our understanding of an intel-ligence problem as part of the planning or direction phase of the intelligence process. We also have con-

tributions on the recruitment of intelligence analysts, some IT tools, recent research in intelligence analysis and asection on news and upcoming events.

We have published 6 editions of Foreknowledge this year and are grateful for the many well wishes and positivefeedback we receive. We would like to continue providing you with an excellent magazine and other resources thatserve the needs of intelligence professionals worldwide. We have many more ideas to make this project the go-tofor practitioners and scholars alike. Although we would have liked to keep distributing the e-magazine for free,this business model is just not sustainable anymore. We are investigating various possibilities of future funding in-cluding subscriptions, donations and crowd funding. If you like what we are doing for the intelligence profes-sion, and have an opinion about funding, please fill in this anonymous, 3 minute survey before 31 January2013. You can access the survey at https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/foreknowledge. You are also welcometo email me to make suggestions on how we can take Foreknowledge to new heights.

Our contributors in this edition include intelligence professionals writing under pseudonyms as well these experts:

Richards Heuer is aveteran intelligencescholar and analyst.He has written nu-merous books andresides in Monterey,

California, USA. He gave us permissionto summarise his book, Psychology ofIntelligence Analysis.

from the editor

Juan Pablo Somiedo isfrom Madrid, Spainwhere he is a strategicand competitiveintelligence  specialist.He runs a Spanish blog,

on intelligence related issues, Intel Timeshere.

Dalene

4 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

planning

IntelligencePlanning:Finding

Your Waythrough a

Sea ofPuzzlePieces

Many intelligence professionalswill agree that we do not spendenough time on the starting phaseof our intelligence task. Thereasons for this are manifold:time pressures, an impatientclient, intellectual laziness orarrogance or too many conflictingpriorities and pressures on ourlimited resources etc.The essentials of the first phase ofthe intelligence “cycle” orprocess, whether we call it“direction”, “planning” or“tasking”, remain the same:determining who the client/s areand their expectations,understanding the intelligenceproblem, knowing what we knowand don’t know, and frame allthese in time, cost and outputterms.One step in the planning phase isto understand the nature andextent of the intelligence problem.The puzzle metaphor1 is useful toreflect on what intelligenceanalysts experience every day.I’ve tweaked and use itextensively in training andconsulting to illustrate thecognitive and organisational

processes involved in identifyingand solving an intelligenceproblem.A simple problem: findingthe missing puzzle piece

You’re working on an intelligenceproblem of when and how manycalls your suspects made to eachother prior and after the crime.It’s like building a puzzle, either asmall and easy or a large anddifficult one.You’re working with knowables:planning and collectinginformation that have discernibleclues - you only need to knowwhere to find the missing piecesand then fit them into each otheruntil the image is complete. Evenif you don’t cheat with a sampler

of the final picture, you can stillget most the pieces and get apretty good idea of whathappened and what the imagemight mean.When planning with “puzzle”intelligence problems, one shouldbe cautious not to fall in the“more information is better” trap.Due to time constraints, theintelligence analyst should set astrict timeframe to make ajudgement call, even if all thepuzzle pieces are not yet collectedand fitted.Mysteries: a sea of puzzlepieces

You’ve been tasked to analyse theimpact of youth unemploymenton a fragile country’s political,military, economic and socialstability in the next 20 years.It’s like rowing in a sea of millionsof puzzle pieces in different sizes,colours and shapes, much like thelarge ocean plastic pollutionpatches. You have no idea whereland is, how far the puzzles piecesstretch, what lies beneath the

Dalene Duvenage

Foreknowledge EditorPretoria, South Africa

5December 2012 • Foreknowledge

obvious or whether anyone else isalso in the same boat as you.Even worse, some of the “debris”are not puzzle pieces at all, butsome other form that you havenever seen before.The easy way out is to say thatthis is too difficult and capitulateby not planning at all, hoping thatyour client forgets this instructionor that other more urgent oroperational needs overtake itsimportance. Another way ofdealing with this type of problemis to become fascinated with thewaves of data, often playingaround with fantastic big datasoftware tools. You can becomeoverwhelmed with theinformation overload, and nevermove beyond your paralysis toproper analysis. Mysteries haveno easy answers - if at all. Thereare just too many unknowablevariables and contingent“unintended consequences”.Sometimes what is missing is noteven in the form of a puzzle piecebut something totally different!The intelligence analyst needs tosense and project into the futureto frame the possibilities and

uncertainties. Our work is to tryand identify those criticalvariables, explain the dynamicinteractions and define futurepossibilities.In planning for mysteries, wehave to remember that we areworking with ambiguity anduncertainty. Collecting moreinformation is not going to solvethis problem but confound it!Planning for puzzle mysteries iscomplex. It requires a balancebetween structured planningand intuitive prodding to sensepatterns. It also requires

planning

collaboration between expertsand other role players and stakeholders. We need to tap otherpeople’s lenses and approaches towork through the visible pieces,and looking for those that arebeneath the surface.In the following few pages, weoffer a few tools and approachesthat might assist you in planningmore effectively. •

1 Gregory Treverton coined the puzzle andmystery metaphors in 2001 in RethinkingNtaional Intelligence for an Age of Information inour bookstore here. Other articles on the topicare here and here.

Planning for puzzle mysteries is complex -it requires a balance between structured planning,

intuitive prodding to sense patterns andcollaboration across boundaries

6 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Engaging your client in

the intelligence

process makes sense.

Know yourclient

1

2

3

4

5

Be aware of his contextWhat are the political and businesspressures he has to manageeveryday? Which stakeholders androle players demand his energy andattention? Who are waiting in thewings in case he fails to deliver onhis mandate?

What keeps your clientawake at night?What are those issues and prioritiesthat worry him? Make that yourfocus! Speak to those fears andput it into forewarning context.

Everyone wants to lookgoodThis does not mean that you shouldpamper your client and keep badnews away from him. Provideexplanations and options orsolutions. He would like to presentthese to his client and look good.

Know his preferencesProvide your products in thepackaging and format that heprefers. Regard every clientdifferently and market your productsaccordingly. Yes, some of themhate reading!

Educate your clientYour client needs to know what thelimitations of intelligence is andwhat to expect. Don’t under oroverestimate his understanding ofthe problem.

Planning is an ongoingprocess because weadapt our frames as

we learn andunderstand new

information.Intelligence productsare snapshots of ourunderstanding of theproblem at a specifictime. It is never the

whole truth.

planning

● What has prompted the need for the analysis? For example: wasit a news report, new intelligence report, or a customer re-quest?

● What is the key intelligence question that needs to be an-swered?

● Why is this issue important and how can analysis make a differ-ence?

● Has your organization ever answered this question or a similarquestion before, and what was said? To whom was this analysisdelivered, and what has changed since that time?

● Who is the principal customer? Are this customer’s needs wellunderstood? If not, try to gain a better understanding of thecustomer’s needs and the style of reporting the customer likes.

● Are there other stakeholders who would have an interest in theanswer to this question? Who might see the issue from a differ-ent perspective and prefer that a different question be an-swered? Consider meeting with others who see the questionfrom a different perspective.

● Based on first impressions, what are all the possible answers tothis question? For example, what alternative explanations oroutcomes should be considered before making an analytic judg-ment on the issue?

● Based on responses to the previous questions, consider re-wording the key intelligence question. Consider adding subordi-nate or supplemental questions.

● Generate a list of potential sources or streams of reporting tobe explored

● Reach out and tap the experience and expertise of analysts inother offices or organizations – both within and outside thegovernment – who are knowledgeable on this topic. For exam-ple, call a meeting or conduct a virtual meeting to brainstormrelevant evidence and to develop a list of alternative hypothe-ses, driving forces, key indicators, or important players.

Getting started checklistRichards Heuer and Randolph Pherson

From Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (2011)

Available here

7December 2012 • Foreknowledge

CUSTOMER CHECKLIST

● Who is the key person for whom the paper is being written?

● Will this paper answer the question the customer asked or thequestion the customer should be asking? If necessary, clarifythis before proceeding.

● What is the most important message to give this customer?

● How is the customer expected to use this information?

● How much time does the customer have to read this product?How long should the paper be?

● Is it possible to capture the essence of this paper in a few keygraphics?

● What format would convey the information most effectively?

● What classification is most appropriate for this paper? Is itnecessary to consider publishing the paper at more than oneclassification level?

● What is the customer’s level of tolerance for technicallanguage? How much detail would the customer expect? Canthe details be provided in appendices or backup papers?

● Has any structured analytic technique been used? If so, howhas it been flagged in the paper? In a footnote? In anappendix?

● Would the customer expect the analyst to reach out to otherexperts within or outside the Intelligence Community to taptheir expertise in drafting this paper? If this has been done,how has their contribution been flagged in the paper? In afootnote? In an appendix?

● To whom or to what source might the customer turn for alter-native views on this topic? What data or analysis might othersprovide that could influence how the customer reacts to what

is being prepared in this paper?

This checklist helps an analyst tailor the analytic product to the needs of the principalcustomer. When used appropriately, it ensures that the product is of maximum possiblevalue to this customer.

planning

Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson

From Structured Analytical Techniques forIntelligence Analysis (2011)

Available here

Katherine Hibbs Pherson | Randolph H. Pherson

This user-friendly handbook outlines 20 keyquestions that all analysts must ask themselvesas they prepare to conduct research, generatehypotheses, evaluate information, draft papers,

and present analysis.

More info at:www.pherson.org

Available now on:

New! CONCEPT MAPSConcept map of the question: “What is the nature and threat of the use of YouTube by jihad-

ists? and assess counter measures.” Mercyhurst University project here, here and here

Conceptual modelling, mindmaps, brainstorming, starbursting etc are all relatedand share one goal: to externalise our thinking on all aspects, issues, factors thatrelate to the intelligence problem. Once the concept map is drawn, it is easier to

identify assumptions, connecting issues ,information gaps and to prioritise.BUY NOW!

8 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

planning

Problem restatement & redefinitionI don’t know whatintelligence I want,but I’ll know when

I see it!HENRY KISSINGER

From Richards Heuer and RandolphPherson Structured Analytical Tech-niques for Intelligence Analysis (2011)and Morgan D Jones The Thinker’s

Toolkit (1998)

Available here and here

Initial question Is China selling ballistic missiles to Iran?Paraphrase without losing the origi-nal meaning. It might provide abetter foundation for research andanalysis to get the best answers tothe question.

Is Iran buying ballistic missiles from China?

Ask “Why”? Or “How?” Until thereal issue has surfaced.

Why would China sell ballistic missiles to Iran? BecauseChina seeks influence with Iran.Why does China want influence with Iran? Because Chi-na wants to reduce US influence in the Persian Gulf re-gion.Why does China want to reduce US influence in thePersian Gulf region? Because China wants to reduce theUS influence throughout the world?Final Question: Is China’s sale of military equipment to theMiddle East as part of a worldwide strategy to reduce USinfluence?

Broaden the focus: what other is-sues might be at play here? Towhat is this connected?

Is there a partnership between China and Iran?

Narrow the focus: break down theissue further into component parts.

What kinds of ballistic missiles are being sold by China toIran?

Redirect the focus: Shouldn’t werather focus on something else ?

Why would Iran want Chinese missiles? How is Iran goingto pay for any purchased missiles?

Turn 180 degrees: Turn the issueon its head and ask the opposite.

Is China buying ballistic missiles from Iran?

Defining the problem is the 1st phase in theplanning process. Throughout the conduct ofthe overall project, the original problem maybe further refined and delineated. Problem

definition involves 2 major functions: definingthe problem and determining the feasibilityof the proposed approach for attackint the

problem.

Jerome Clauser : An Introduction to Intelligence Researchand Analysis (2008)

Assess needs of theInte lligence Community

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Are sufficientfunds

available ?

Are theresufficient

resourcesavailable ?

Is theresufficient

manpoweravailable ?

Can theproposed effo rtbe completed in

the timeavailable ?

De lineate scope-state:Te rms of reference,

operational definitions,assumptions, coord ination

required, etc.

Select tenta tive top ics

Identify prob lem areas

YesYes Schedulesubsequent events

Is the proposede ffort within thecapabilit ies o fthe researcher?

No

No

No

No

Download PDF here

Steps in the problemdefinition phase

Misconception: The key part of the intelligence process is the analysis of a specific set of data.Reality: The process of “constructing a frame” is more important.

VAST2011 STUDY

Al l o f us have exper ience o fa c l ien t who heard

someth ing , somewhere andis no t sure exac t ly whatin te l l igence he wants . A

vague requ i rement i s g iven ,and typ ica l l y , you do no t

have access to c la r i f y thein te l l igence need.

Prob lem res ta tement i s ause fu l too l to focus the

in te l l igence opera t ion andnar row down a l l i ssues to

the c rux o f the mat te r -what the c l ien t need to

know now.

BUY NOW!

9December 2012 • Foreknowledge

La fase de dirección y pla-neamiento es la más im-portante del ciclo deinteligencia, pues configu-

ra todas las demás fases. Las áreasestratégicas se fijan de modo con-junto por los responsables del servi-cio de inteligencia y de los órganospolíticos. Se asesora así a los deci-sores políticos a la hora de establec-er las áreas estratégicasayudándoles en las lagunas y lasincertidumbres que puedan tener.El secretario de defensa de los Es-tados Unidos durante la adminis-tración de George W. Bush,Donald Rumsfeld, reflejó bien estaincertidumbre cuando dijo en unaentrevista: “We don´t know whatwe don´t know”. Por eso la inter-acción entre el usuario y el direc-tor de inteligencia es sumamenteimportante pero igualmente difícilpor razones de tiempo, distancia,dificultades burocráticas y dispari-dad de rango y funciones.

La definición de las necesidades deinformación es la parte más impor-tante del proceso y, a menudo, noes tan simple como pudiera parec-er. Las KIT,s o necesidades críticasde información suelen formularseen forma de pregunta y podránvariar conforme el decidor va perfi-lando su plan. A partir de estasnecesidades críticas, el personal deinteligencia desarrolla las necesi-

Juan Pablo Somiedo

dades prioritarias de información oPIR,s. Una vez seleccionadas lasPIR,s se procede a asignar personaly recursos a cada una y a establecerun calendario y un orden de priori-dad con los plazos de entrega.Se elabora el ICP o Intelligence Col-lection Plan, que es un plan pararecopilar información de todas lasfuentes disponibles para dar re-spuesta a las necesidades mediantela transformación de dichas necesi-dades en peticiones a los órganos ymedios de obtención de informa-ción adecuados.Finalmente, el documento que con-tiene todos los aspectos menciona-dos relativos al planeamiento deinteligencia es el Plan de Inteligen-cia o PLINT. En él vienen referidosla evaluación de la situación, la lis-ta de las PIR,s, su delimitación es-pacial o temática y la estructura yarquitectura de inteligencia.Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain.He is strategic  and competitive intelligencespecialist. He runs a Spanish blog, Intel Times here

Necesidades Informativas en la Planificación:KIT’s and PIR’s

When embarking on a comprehensive intelligence operation, itis always useful to compile a Terms of Reference (ToR). It de-fines the boundaries of the scope. Include the following:

Terms of Reference

● State the problem and aim● State the assumptions/background relating to the subject matter● State the hypotheses● Formulate operational definitions where necessary● Propose a title● Describe briefly the methodology to be used in collection and analysis● Describe sources of information● Indicate time frames● Indicate resource allocation● Indicate stake holders and clients of the study

Mercyhurst University Wiki projects ToR samples here

planning

10 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

In the previous two articles’ wefocused on the role of analysis

in criminal investigations. Welooked at some characteristics ofcriminal investigations andprojects that are not truly intelli-gence driven and also discussedthose factors that contribute to asuccessful intelligence or analyti-cal driven investigation. Therewas also some discussion aroundscore card measuring to evaluatethe effectiveness of the informa-tion analysis approach during aninvestigation.In this article we will be focusingon Preliminary Information As-sessments and the importance ofconducting an initial assessmentof information before project kick-off.Prior to any formal investigationor project meetings, the analystshould be given the opportunityto assess all available information.Potential participants in the inves-tigation should also be affordedthe opportunity to supply availa-ble information to the analyst.Such an assessment would:• assist with the scope and de-

marcation of the problem;• identify potential information

gaps;

• afford everybody an opportuni-ty to review available informa-tion;

• serve as a departure point fordiscussion and investigationplanning; and

• assist in structuring subsequentintelligence and investigationactivities.

This initial assessment should fo-cus on one or more of the follow-ing items: 1) Availableinformation, 2) overview of thethreat, 3) any information gapsthat might exist, 4) criminal casesregistered 5) applicable legislationthat can be considered by the in-vestigative team and 6) availableresources.

need2share

Focus Areas for the Information Assessment

Available information Overview of the threat Information gaps

● A description of available infor-mation

● Sources and suppliers of informa-tion

● Types of information such as inci-dent type information, confes-sions, as well as the format inwhich this information was sup-plied

● Information that is available butnot yet collected for assessment

● Extent of the problem or threatat hand

● Probable risk and exposure to thepublic and private sector

● Reported and perceived modusoperandi

● Geographical location of threat● List of potential targets and

groups where applicable

● List of information gapsidentified

● Potential sources ofinformation

Criminal cases Legislation Resources

● Overview of criminal cases al-ready opened

● Investigation and prosecutionstatus of the criminal cases

● Potential targets identified● Lists of individuals arrested

● Applicable legislation available toprosecution

● Criminal charges which may beconsidered at a later stage

● Potential jurisdictional issues.

● List of units or investigating of-ficers currently dealing withthe threat

● List of prosecutors currentlyprosecuting on the threat

● List of private sector organisa-tions and individuals

The role ofanalysis in

criminalinvestigations

Mario Eybers

The table below provides moredetail that can be considered foreach of these focus areas.The initial assessment of informa-tion needs to be documented,preferably in the form of a presen-tation by the analyst utilising sup-porting material such as thecriminal value chains and scenari-os.Note that this initial assessment ofinformation generally does notinclude any form of analysis andprovides only for a general over-view of the status quo. Specific an-alytical products for the project orinvestigation will be developedonce the analytical and investiga-tion plans are approved by the in-vestigating officer or project team.

Part 3: the PreliminaryInformation Assessment

11December 2012 • Foreknowledge

I was staring out of my officewindow yesterday in wonder

of the slopes of Table Mountain,silently contemplating anotherhot and sunny not-so-whiteChristmas… Dean Martin melodi-ously blaring ”Rudolph the RedNosed Reindeer” out of myiPod…..wondering what old San-ta has in store for my old stockingthis year. My daydreaming wasrudely interrupted by some of theanalyst staff debating…or shall Isay partaking in heated analyticaldiscourse regarding the benefitsof tools for mapping out one’sthoughts or externalizing com-plex questions. The discussionreminded me of an eggnog pro-cession deliberating the benefitsof free range organic eggs togeth-er with bourbon, cognac or bran-dy.In the spirit of the approachingfestive season, the editor, fullyaware of my propensity for day-dreaming to the tunes of MessrsDavis Jnr, Martin and Sinatra(“The Lady is a Tramp” hummingin the background), sent me aURL to an interestingwebsite….check it out here! Visu-al Understanding Environment orVUE for short. It is available forWindows, Linux and Mac operat-ing systems……and…in the spirit

of the festive season…decidedlyopen source! At first I was expect-ing a piece of software similar tomost mind or concept mappingsoftware. As luck would have it,I was pleasantly surprised – nogarden gnomes or trolls here! Itwas pure witchcraft and a goodsprinkle of good old black mag-ic!!

IT tools

A cool tool foryour Xmasstocking!

Apart from obvious mappingfunctionality the following addi-tional tools are available withinthe software:● VUE allows for the con-

struction of interactive pres-entations with the ability tozoom any node to fullscreen mode

● Dynamic Content Mappingwhich facilitates addingcontent to maps that aiddiscovery and understand-ing via annotation of infor-mation

● RSS feeds may be importedand visualized

● CVS files can be importedand joined allowing forsemi-automatic linking andclustering of data

● Seasr content analysis with-in VUE

● Search functionality allowsfor querying nodes andlinks and results can behighlighted, hidden or fil-tered.

● VUE allows dynamic addi-tion and searching of reposi-tories such as Fedora, Flickr,JStor, Museum of Fine ArtsBoston, PubMed (NCBI),Sakai, and Wikipedia toname a few

So…When You're smiling….VUEin addition is OKI (Open Knowl-edge Initiative) compliant allow-ing for the above mentionedsearching of digital repositories. Italso utilizes the open Calais webservice for entity extraction of in-formation in nodes….now Ain’tThat A Kick In The Head!Well what do you know…beforethe moon hits your eye like a bigpizza pie it’ll be 2013. Peace andjoy to you all over the festive sea-son. Volare! •

Visual Understanding Environment

RJG

12 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

El método LTA es un métodocreado a propósito para el

análisis de inteligencia. Recoge ysintetiza aportaciones de la in-teligencia artificial, del juristaJohn Wigmore, el filosofo de laciencia Stephen Toulmin y el pro-fesor David Schum. Se aproximaa la resolución de problemas me-diante la doble díada Problema-Reducción/ Solución-Síntesis, quees un aterrizaje de las representa-ciones de Inteligencia Artificial.Hasta ahora reemplazar la experi-encia analítica acumulada por losanalistas senior una vez que éstosdejaban su puesto o se retirabanera dificultoso, largo y muy cos-toso. El método LTA intenta seruna ayuda para que los analistasJunior se adapten más deprisa. Elmétodo se utilizó con éxito en laEscuela Superior de Guerra de losEE.UU y en varios experimentoscon analistas.

El mismo nombre del método(Disciple se traduce por Discípu-lo) sugiere que el analista junioraprende sobre análisis a través desu interacción con la experienciade otro analista. Y esto es, en efec-to, lo que hace LTA. Trata de pon-er a disposición del analista juniorla experiencia directa de losanalistas expertos. Disciple-LTAes la base de un agente de soft-ware innovador para la enseñan-za de los analistas de inteligencia.Este agente, llamado TIACRITIS(Teaching Intelligence AnalystsCritical Thinking Skills) contieneestudios de casos y una enormecantidad de conocimiento sobreevidencias, argumentos y suspropiedades. Es un agente queayuda a los analistas junior a ad-quirir los conocimientos, dest-rezas y habilidades propias de suprofesión. Los analistas practicany aprenden a vincular las eviden-

cias con las hipótesis a través delrazonamiento abductivo, deduc-tivo e inductivo y a establecer lascredenciales básicas de la eviden-cia como son credibilidad y rele-vancia.El uso de TIACRITIS en los cursosde análisis de inteligencia se hacecon el apoyo de un libro de textoque incluye una amplia gama deejemplos de la utilización del soft-ware y ejercicios prácticos deanálisis. En la actualidad el profe-sor Mihai Boicu de la George Ma-son University es consideradouna autoridad en este método eimparte clases de Disciple LTAdentro del Curso de "AplicacionesMilitares de Inteligencia Artifi-cial". También lo es el profesorDavid Schum, que de igual formaimparte clases en la misma uni-versidad y es un experto en lógicay probabilidad aplicadas al análi-sis en inteligencia. •

George Mason University developed theTIACRITIS web agent and textbook forteaching intelligence analysts the criticalthinking skills needed to perform evi-dence-based reasoning. They are basedon a computational theory which viewsIntelligence Analysis as ceaseless dis-covery of evidence, hypotheses, and ar-guments, in a complex world that ischanging all the time. TIACRITIS helpsstudents learn about the properties, us-es, and marshalling of evidence uponwhich all analyses rest, through regularpractice involving analyses of evidence inboth hypothetical and real situations.

Read more here, here and here

Teaching Intelligence Analysts Critical Thinking Skillswith learning agents

IT tools

Juan Pablo Somiedo

13December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Meet Irene BashabeManager: Intelligence, Tax Investigations Department, Uganda Revenue Authority

What is the role and function ofintelligence analysts in the Ugan-da Revenue Authority (URA)?The Intelligence division aims atproactively deterring tax crimewhilst supporting the internal aswell as external stakeholders, fo-cusing on an intelligence led Taxcompliance approach.The role and function of the intel-ligence analyst in URA is;● Develop an understanding of

a problem or threat at hand;● Select appropriate analytic

techniques such as link analy-sis, flow analysis, financialrecord analysis, telephone tollanalysis among others;

● Analyse (process; correlate,select, evaluate and restruc-ture) information gatheredfrom multiple sources, includ-ing tax criminal related infor-mation;

● Derive insights and provideestimates;

● Identify intelligence gaps &threats;

● Maintain analysis systemsnecessary to review, store, col-late, retrieve and disseminaterevenue intelligence;

● Prepare reports detailing intel-ligence findings and dissemi-nate to clients appropriately.

Who are your clients and whattype of products do you provideto them?Our intelligence products are dis-seminated to either the customerswho initiated the intelligence re-quirement or any other stakehold-er for whom intelligence has beenproactively generated. The clientsare both Internal (within the or-ganisation) and external (Outsidethe organization) including Ugan-da Revenue Authority Manage-ment and staff, other governmentagencies as well as other tax andrevenue agencies.Our products are:● Target Profiles;● Strategic Briefs;● Current Intelligence;● Management Executive Com-

mittee Briefs;● Commissioner’s Briefs;● Manager’s briefs● Threat Analysis;● Problem Profiles

What is your specialist area andwhat do you do to stay informedand abreast of new develop-ments?● Collection and analysis of tax

related information with acriminal bias

● Training and subscribing toprofessional bodies in the in-telligence field.

people

Ivory confiscated by URA in June 2012

Cigarette smuggling is the URA’s main taxevasion problem.

● Holding stakeholderengagements/partnershipswith organisations, bodiesand persons related to intelli-gence.

What are the greatest challengesyou face as an intelligence analystand how do you overcome them?We face several challenges as lawenforcement Intelligence analystsand among these are;● Putting into place a proactive

based intelligence collectionand analysis functionality;

● Integrity of the informationcollected from both internaland external sources;

● The application of intelligenceanalysis techniques in thecourse of our work

● Effectively managing requiredIntelligence tasks given limit-ed human resources at hand.

What can intelligence analysts doto promote our profession?● Development of an Intelli-

gence Analyst Curriculumwhich we have commenced.

● Keeping abreast of the bestpractices and developmentsin the intelligence field. •

14 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Managers should take ownership ofthe recruitment process

Don McDowell has nearly 50 yearsexperience in military, nationalsecurity and law enforcement

intelligence. He is the author of theaward-winning Strategic Intelligence:

a handbook for practitioners,managers and users, a Fellow of

AIPIO, former Presdient of AIPIOand former International Directorof IAFIE. He runs a private intelli-

gence distance learning college andtraining consultancy from Pambula,

NSW, Australia.See more here and here

There was a time when, as thesenior manager of a large in-

telligence unit, I really looked for-ward to the recruitment exerciseswe ran regularly, both for analystsand intelligence officers/collectors.I say this in the past tense simplybecause I don’t have much enthu-siasm or even optimism for intelli-gence staff recruitment activitythese days.Now, I am not a senior managerany more; I have become a globalconsultant who advises agencieson several continents on every-thing and anything to do with in-telligence and risk analysispractice. And to watch them –sometimes – bumble around witha lack of clarity and purpose de-

Intelligence analystrecruitment woes

Don McDowell

opinion

spite the plethora of new-age re-cruitment guidelines, is a sight notto enjoy.Recruitment is a serious businesswith laudable goals. We can usu-ally agree on why we need newpeople: for replacement or furtherdevelopment of our resource poolof analysts and collectors. But ithas become increasingly more dif-ficult to engage managers and su-pervisors globally in meaningfuldialogue about exactly whatthey’re looking for.Much is written in intelligence lit-erature on the criteria, traits andqualities, education and knowl-edge, that might or should be ap-plicable. No shortage there.However, getting those in power-ful positions to be able to articu-late the nexus between one ormore such criteria and how theyimpact on expected job perform-ance, is far more difficult.The exercise should in fact be easyand, in essence, it is: use the samesuite of approaches applied in any“needs survey” activity.

Identify what you expect of youranalysts – not in vague, generic,comfort-zone terms, but in finitedetail – based on an expert under-standing of precisely what it isthat analysts and collectors actual-ly do.Then, and only then, determinewhat qualities the new recruitneeds to bring to the job or, con-versely, what skills and tech-niques could actually be taught tothem once in the job.The added cost of this latter ap-proach is twofold: firstly, developselection criteria that imply an

Shutterstock

Shutterstock

15December 2012 • Foreknowledge

opinion

ability to learn new competencies;secondly, accept your organisa-tion’s responsibility to provide thelearning environment and oppor-tunities for the new recruits.Where we seem to start to gowrong or, at least “under-achieve”in the recruitment activity cycle, isto increasingly rely on Human Re-source specialists within or outsideof the organisation to cull appli-cants, pre-select those for furtherconsideration, and even conductthe short-list interview.Having spent much of my life be-coming and then applying skills ininterviewing and interrogationtechniques, one lesson remainsdominant in my recollection. Theinterviewer (whoever it is) cannotrely solely on skills as an inter-viewer … these must, without anydoubt, be back up by solid knowl-edge of the field for which one isinterviewing. Frankly, I have onlyoccasionally met HR specialists

who know much, if anything,about the life and routines thatface analysts and collectors.It is increasingly commonplace ina difficult world economic envi-ronment for jobs in intelligenceand risk analysis to attract hun-dreds or even thousands of appli-cants.This phenomenon is in part fed bythe plethora of developing aca-demic courses and technical pro-grams available for career pathdevelopment in several continents,though not all. Good though thismay be, it does regularly providean increasing pool of people“trained” (though not necessarilytested or experienced) in intelli-gence-related functions, all even-tually hoping to gain a paidposition.Recognising this reality, many HRand similar recruitment specialistagencies find it easy to identifypossession of an academic qualifi-cation in analysis, criminology,criminal justice or the like, as aconvenient threshold for weedingout a large proportion of would-berecruits. It is clearly shown by as-sessing vacancy notices that manyagencies prefer to set the bar high,perhaps at a Master’s Degree levelShutterstock

A post graduate degree does notequate intelligence analysisproficiency.

or even higher, with the expecta-tion that the short-list numberswill drop to a manageable level,and that all applicants will quitepossibly be of a high quality inview of their qualifications.All this, without any demonstra-bly rigorous examination of thevarious curricula, the quality ofthe applicants’ awards, the real-ism of their assignment challeng-es, nor of their individual resultswhen seen against the expecta-tions of a future job.My advice? Return back to basicsand conduct for yourself a properNeeds Survey. Who do you need?To do what? Which skills, tech-niques and competencies rank asessential, should-haves and could-haves? What can be taught in-house as opposed to hoping tobuy in everything you need?Get this right first and, only then,consider how to match your needsin finite detail against what theemployment market can offer.Short-listing for the sake of havinga limited number to finally con-sider for selection is understanda-ble. But doing so using the artificeof pre-qualification – unless it is inand of itself absolutely essential –is delusional.You may well have cut out of themix people who have lots to offer.Conversely, you may well includein the short-list mix those who aregood students, perhaps excellent,but who have not yet demonstrat-ed any ability to take their place inyour workforce.Think it over carefully ! •

Very few HR recruitment personnelreally understand the requirements of

intelligence analysis

16 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Richards Heuer

There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of In-telligence Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge.

This is an excerpt of chapter 4 on Strategies for Analytical Judgment - comparing with historic situations. You can alsodownload the entire book here.

Psychologyof

intelligenceanalysis

thinking

Comparison with HistoricalSituations

A third approach for going be-yond the available information iscomparison. An analyst seeks un-derstanding of current events bycomparing them with historicalprecedents in the same country,or with similar events in othercountries.Analogy is one form of compari-son. When an historical situationis deemed comparable to currentcircumstances, analysts use theirunderstanding of the historicalprecedent to fill gaps in their un-derstanding of the current situa-tion.Unknown elements of the presentare assumed to be the same asknown elements of the historicalprecedent. Thus, analysts reasonthat the same forces are at work,that the outcome of the present

situation is likely to be similar tothe outcome of the historical situ-ation, or that a certain policy isrequired in order to avoid thesame outcome as in the past.Comparison differs from situa-tional logic in that the present sit-uation is interpreted in the lightof a more or less explicit concep-tual model that is created bylooking at similar situations inother times or places.It differs from theoretical analysisin that this conceptual model isbased on a single case or only afew cases, rather than on manysimilar cases. Comparison mayalso be used to generate theory,but this is a more narrow kind oftheorizing that cannot be validat-ed nearly as well as generaliza-tions inferred from manycomparable cases.

Reasoning by comparison is aconvenient shortcut, one chosenwhen neither data nor theory areavailable for the other analyticalstrategies, or simply because it iseasier and less time-consumingthan a more detailed analysis.A careful comparative analy-sis starts by specifying keyelements of the present situa-tion.

The analyst then seeks out one ormore historical precedents thatmay shed light on the present.Frequently, however, a historicalprecedent may be so vivid andpowerful that it imposes itselfupon a person's thinking fromthe outset, conditioning them toperceive the present primarily interms of its similarity to the past.This is reasoning by analogy. AsRobert Jervis noted, "historicalanalogies often precede, rather

17December 2012 • Foreknowledge

thinking

than follow, a careful analysis of asituation."The tendency to relate contempo-rary events to earlier events as aguide to understanding is a pow-erful one. Comparison helpsachieve understanding by reduc-ing the unfamiliar to the familiar.In the absence of data required fora full understanding of the cur-rent situation, reasoning by com-parison may be the onlyalternative.Anyone taking this approach,however, should be aware of thesignificant potential for error. Thiscourse is an implicit admission ofthe lack of sufficient informationto understand the present situa-tion in its own right, and lack ofrelevant theory to relate the

present situation to many othercomparable situationsThe difficulty, of course, is in be-ing certain that two situations aretruly comparable. Because theyare equivalent in some respects,there is a tendency to reason asthough they were equivalent in allrespects, and to assume that thecurrent situation will have thesame or similar outcome as thehistorical situation.This is a valid assumption onlywhen based on in-depth analysisof both the current situation andthe historical precedent to ensurethat they are actually comparablein all relevant respects.Ernest May found that because ofreasoning by analogy, US policy-makers tend to be one generation

behind, determined to avoid themistakes of the previous genera-tion. They pursue the policies thatwould have been most appropri-ate in the historical situation butare not necessarily well adaptedto the current one.Policymakers in the 1930s, for in-stance, viewed the internationalsituation as analogous to that be-fore World War I. Consequently,they followed a policy of isolationthat would have been appropriatefor preventing American involve-ment in the first World War butfailed to prevent the second.Communist aggression afterWorld War II was seen as analo-gous to Nazi aggression, leadingto a policy of containment thatcould have prevented World WarII.More recently, the Vietnam analo-gy has been used repeatedly overmany years to argue against anactivist US foreign policy. For ex-ample, some used the Vietnamanalogy to argue against US par-ticipation in the Gulf War - aflawed analogy because the oper-ating terrain over which battleswere fought was completely dif-ferent in Kuwait/Iraq and muchmore in our favor there as com-pared with Vietnam.May argues that policymakers of-ten perceive problems in terms ofanalogies with the past, but thatthey ordinarily use history badly:“When resorting to an analogy,they tend to seize upon the firstthat comes to mind. They do notresearch more widely. Nor dothey pause to analyze the case,test its fitness, or even ask in whatways it might be misleading.”1

As compared with policymakers,intelligence analysts have moretime available to "analyze ratherthan analogize."

Comparisonhelps achieve un-

derstanding byreducing the un-familiar to the

familiar

Intelligence analysts tend to begood historians, with a largenumber of historical precedentsavailable for recall. The greaterthe number of potential analoguesan analyst has at his or her dis-posal, the greater the likelihood ofselecting an appropriate one.The greater the depth of an ana-lyst's knowledge, the greater thechances the analyst will perceivethe differences as well as the simi-larities between two situations.Even under the best of circum-stances, however, inferencesbased on comparison with a sin-gle analogous situation probablyare more prone to error than mostother forms of inference.The most productive uses of com-parative analysis are to suggest

The most productiveuses of comparative

analysis are tosuggest hypotheses

and to highlight dif-ferences, not to draw

conclusions.

hypotheses and to highlight dif-ferences, not to draw conclusions.Comparison can suggest the pres-ence or the influence of variablesthat are not readily apparent inthe current situation, or stimulatethe imagination to conceive expla-nations or possible outcomes thatmight not otherwise occur to theanalyst.In short, comparison can generatehypotheses that then guide thesearch for additional informationto confirm or refute these hypoth-eses. It should not, however, formthe basis for conclusions unlessthorough analysis of both situa-tions has confirmed they are in-deed comparable.1 Ernest May, `Lessons' of the Past: The Useand Misuse of History in American Foreign Poli-cy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

18 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Research

Kira Vrist Rønn (2012), DemocratizingStrategic Intelligence? On the feasibili-ty of an objective, decision-makingframework when assessing threats andharms of organized crime in Policing23 November 2012 $ here

In this article, I focus on methodologiesused for threat and harm assessmentsof organized crime. I present three gen-eral and interrelated objections con-cerning this endeavour: (1) conceptualvagueness, (2) inherent subjectivity,and (3) incommensurability. I introducetwo types of suggestions for how toovercome these objections: categoricaland conditional suggestions. I arguethat a participatory approach to themethodology of threat and harm as-sessments, via inclusion of interests andvalues from an extended peer-commu-nity, e.g. when designing methodolo-gies, may render strategic intelligencemore reliable. •

Andrew D. Brunatti, (2012), The archi-tecture of community: Intelligencecommunity management in Australia,Canada and New Zealand in PublicPolicy and Administration 26 Novem-ber 31, 2012 $ here

The study of the interdepartmental ar-chitecture that is meant to coordinateintelligence communities has been pe-ripheral at best. This is especially truein the case of smaller states, such asAustralia, Canada and New Zealand.Examination of the development of in-telligence community management ar-chitecture in these countries reveals thatactors in all three communities recog-nise networks of interdependency be-tween them. However the extent towhich they are able to exploit these in-terdependencies is dependent on largerdynamics in government, supportingthe idea that intelligence communitiescan only be as cohesive as the govern-ments they serve allow them to be. •

Nicolas Paul Hare and Paul Collinson,(2012), Organisational culture and in-telligence analysis: A perspective fromsenior managers in the Defence Intelli-gence Assessments Staff in Public Poli-cy and Administration 31 October,2012 $ here

We highlight some key elements of theorganisational culture of structures en-gaged in all-source intelligence analysisand draw on a preliminary survey of asmall cadre of senior managers in theDefence Intelligence Assessments Staff(DIAS). This suggests that DIAS has astrong identity and value system, andthat it is introspective and somewhataverse to change. Physical and demo-graphic isolation, and intrinsic factorssuch as the nature of the job and thepersonalities attracted to it also play apart. The continued impetus towards amore customer-facing culture appearsto carry both costs and benefits in termsof the kinds of tasks at which the or-ganisation is likely to excel. •

RECENT PUBLISHED RESEARCHIN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Structuring intelligenceorganisations

Extended participation inintelligence production

Organisational cultureand intelligence analysis

19December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Jean Perois, CPP, PSP writes:I am currently enrolled in aPhD programme with the Uni-versity of Leicester (UK) in Po-litical Science/ InternationalRelations. The title of my thesisis: What realism from whichfuture? A search for an interna-tional security forecasting mod-el.I test the capacity of Realism –the oldest and most prominenttheoretical paradigm in interna-tional relations – to provide thebest framework for internation-al affairs forecasting.I would like Foreknowledgereaders to contribute to my the-sis by completing the anony-mous 20 minute survey here toanswer the following questions:● How forecasting practition-

ers perceive the con-straints surrounding thesearch for an internationalsecurity forecasting model,

● The nature of the forcesand variables acting on themodel and how to weighthem,

● The importance of person-al biases and assumptionsin simulated interactions,and

● Whether analysts/ fore-casters think that such amodel is achievable or sim-ply too complex to envi-sion.

The survey can be accessedonhttps://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Forecasters.All participants will be entitledto a copy of the results, so youmight also benefit from it!Thank you in advance for yourparticipation.

Please assistwith myresearch!

Research

Miron Varouhakis (2013), What is BeingPublished in Intelligence? A Study ofTwo Scholarly Journals in InternationalJournal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Volume 26, Issue 1, 2013here

A total of 924 articles that were pub-lished since 1992 in the CIA’s unclassi-fied Studies in Intelligence and theInternational Journal of Intelligence andCounter Intelligence were reviewed tomap out a geography of knowledgegaps and identify underdeveloped re-search areas that are fertile for growth.The study shows how slow and diffi-cult it has been to bring scholastic studyof intelligence into the public domain.One finding was that the two journalsonly published 59 articles (6.4%) withan intelligence analysis focus. •

Phong H. Nguyen, Supporting Analyti-cal Reasoning and Presentation withAnalytic Provenance. Middlesex Uni-versity. Paper here

Analytic provenance research tries tounderstand a user’s reasoning processby examining their interactions with avisual analytic system. Visual analyticsis the science of analytical reasoningfacilitated by interactive visual interfac-es. Besides understanding the user’sreasoning process, many benefits canalso be gained from analytic prove-nance such as recalling the analysisprocess, reusing performed analyses,supporting evidence in constructing thereasoning process, and facilitating

collaboration between colleagues in-cluding dissemination, discussion andpresentation. •

Jeffrey A. Friedman and Richard Zeck-hauser (2012), Assessing Uncertainty inIntelligence, HKS Faculty ResearchWorking Paper Series RWP12-027,John F. Kennedy School of Govern-ment, Harvard University here

This article addresses the challenge ofmanaging uncertainty when producingestimative intelligence. Much of thetheory and practice of estimative intelli-gence aims to eliminate or reduce un-certainty, but this is often impossible orinfeasible. This article instead arguesthat the goal of estimative intelligenceshould be to assess uncertainty.

By drawing on a body of nearly 400 de-classified National Intelligence Esti-mates as well as prominent texts onanalytic tradecraft, this article arguesthat current tradecraft methods attemptto eliminate uncertainty in ways thatcan impede the accuracy, clarity, andutility of estimative intelligence. Bycontrast, a focus on assessing uncertain-ty suggests solutions to these problemsand provides a promising analyticframework for thinking about estima-tive intelligence in general. •

What is published inintelligence?

Supporting AnalyticalReasoning

Assessing Uncertainty inIntelligence

20 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

The US Defense Department’sDomestic Mobile Integrated Geospatial-Intelligence System (DMIGS), is a 44-foot long vehicle shaped a bit like a firetruck. It carries generators and a 2.4-meter wide satellite dish antenna and

has room for up to six analysts to work.They can update the Homeland

Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP),a common operational baseline of

geospatial data, with the data coming infor people on-site. This information isthen sent out to the mobile devices ofemergency response teams so theycan have a clearer picture of whatchallenges lie ahead of them. It wasused during the recent Hurricane

Sandy.

Pentagon’s mobileintel centre

nice2know

Amy Parsons, anintelligence analyst

with the MajorInvestigation

Department ofStaffordshire

Police, UK, received an award from theInternational Association of Women

Police (IAWP) this year for herexcellent work in contributing tosecuring guilty convictions. Her

comprehensive storybook that broughttogether all the strands of evidence into

a shooting case was lauded by HighCourt Judge, Sir Timothy Holroyd as“the best that I have ever seen in mymany years as a judge”. See more

here and here.

International award toUK intelligence analyst

Kristan Wheaton, associate professor ofintelligence studies at Mercyhurst

University designed a tabletop gamewhich identifies and mitigates the sixbiases that he considers the “worst” for

intelligence analysts. In “The Mind’s Lie,”players examine a scenario and thenparticipate in one or more rounds of

voting in order to determine the bias mostclearly present in the scenario. We will

keep you updated on the marketing of thegame. More here.

Mercyhurst’s KrisWheaton designs game tomitigate cognitive biases

Read the US NationalIntelligence Council’s2030 Global Trends

Report here that providesa conceptual frameworkto look at the future andwhat this might mean for

the intelligencecommunity. They identify

4 megatrends, 6 gamechangers and 4 future

worlds or possiblescenarios. Might assistyou with your strategic

analysis!

The National GeospatialIntelligence Agency’s intelligence

analysts and their technicalspecialists provided most of the

support to civil authorities duringthe recent Hurricane Sandydisaster. They took photos,infrared and other data from

satellites and air planes and builtthem into remarkably detailedand accurate maps. The maps

also mean that police and firemenknow what they are likely toencounter when they arrive onthe scene, whether it's simple

flooding, damaged buildings andruined or blocked roads.

Read more here

21December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Despite “climate change” being identifiedas one of the main future intelligence

threats in the next decade (here), the CIAclosed its Center on Climate Change and

National Security in November 2012.The CIA stated that “work continues to beperformed by a dedicated team in a newoffice that looks at economic and energy

matters affecting America’s nationalsecurity.” The CIA relies mainly on

scientists such as the Board onEnvironmental Change and Society toassist in this task. See their report here

1234567

The 7 Habits of HighlySuccessful IntelligenceAnalysts

Be Organized and Disciplined

Communicate with Confidence,Clarity and Credibility

Find Meaningful Patterns inMeaningless Noise

Adopt a Patient, MethodicalApproach

See the Bigger PictureThey are not afraid to stick by theirconvictions when the odd outlying data pointseems to throw the pattern off. Theyrecognize it for what it is and factor it into theoverall picture.

Be Flexible and Responsive toChange

Learn from Mistakes

They can recognize when they are headeddown the wrong path and have the foresightto change direction when the pattern deviatesfrom what is expected due to unforeseenforces or events.

They recognize when they have erred and arefree to admit they got it wrong. They learnfrom experience and experience is what youget when you don’t get it right the first time.

Have the vision to see patterns develop earlyin the process and wait until the patternbecomes clear before announcing it.

Project the patterns that emerge forward andpredict, within a reasonable accuracy, whatwill happen next or at some time in the future.

Present thoughts or ideas in a clear andconcise manner so that the untrained canunderstand what is being presented.

Great analysts must have the discipline toapproach each task in an orderly andscientific manner so they can reproduce theresults and show what led them to theirconclusions.

From Digimind.com

Today, we still live largely inthe world where intelligence

is defined as “secrets;” tomorrow,we will either embrace a new

understanding of intelligence andknowledge, or risk marginalizing

analysts from this century’sknowledge revolution and hence

fail to serve policy makers aseffectively as possible.

Intelligence and National Security AllianceRebalance Taskforce Report October 2012

here

The Gambian National Intelligence Agen-cy’s Analysis Director Ousman Bojang

has been detained for several months andis accused of agreeing to provide a sketchplan of pres Jammeh’s residences to Gam-bian dissidents. Jammeh is accused of fab-ricating coup stories against members ofthe security forces to sow seeds of dis-cord amongst service chiefs for his own

political survival. See more here

Intel analysis chiefaccused of subversion

Climate change as anintelligence priority

nice2know

22 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

collaboratesharediscuss

Australian Institutefor Professional

Intelligence Officers(AIPIO)

24-26 July 2013

Canberra, AustraliaInformation here

July 2013

January 2013

Brunel UniversitySeminar:

Intelligence andthe cyber

environment

25-26 January 2013

Uxbridge, EnglandInformation here

InternationalAssociation for

IntelligenceEducation

Conference

20-23 May 2013

El Paso, Texas, USInformation here

May 2013 AberystwythUniversity CIISS

ConferencePast, present and

future ofIntelligence

23-25 May 2013

Gregynog Hall,Wales, UK

Information hereDeadline for submissions

15 February 2013

IALEIA/LEIUAnnual Training

Conference

8-12 April 2013

Chicago, USInformation here

April 2013

InternationalStudies

Association AnnualConvention

2-6 April 2013

San Francisco, USInformation here

events

23December 2012 • Foreknowledge

WHAT DOES 2013HOLD FORFOREKNOWLEDGE?WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THE E-MAGAZINE AND EVEN EXTEND OUR OFFERINGS ON THEWEBSITE..

Foreknowledge e-magazine has established itself the last year as the essential resource for intelligence analystsover the world. However, we need an annual operating budget of at least US$30,000 to continue and embarkon new initiatives to make this truly the hub of all things related to intelligence analysis. Please take the time todo our anonymous online survey by 31 January 2013. The results will assist us to strategise the way forward.

Any suggestions?Contact editor here!

Do our survey!

Do oursurveyhere!

24 December 2012 • Foreknowledge

Reach your target market of 1000’s intelligenceprofessionals throughout the world!

Advertise in Foreknowledge!

CirculationOur 4 editions already had thousands of readersreached through the following marketing streams:● As a PDF to our existing database of 1500

intelligence professionals, managers, scholars,students etc all over the world who distributeit further in their agencies and companies,running the readership into tens of thousands.

● Our website: 11,500 visits from 106 countriessince 1 February 2012

● 23,000 readers of the Flash version of the e-magazine.

● Our endorsing professional organizations’members-only list serves and communicationchannels.

● The Pass-On Rate from these contact personswithin agencies to their colleagues runs intothe tens of thousands. Due to our profession’ssecrecy protocols, it is impossible to gauge theexact number of readers.

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