forwards listed doe/wep group closure statement/evaluation ... · weld size of 1.09t where t is the...

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

5N 157B Lookout Place

PJAN 16 1987

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttn: Document Control Deskoffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationWashington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Hr. B. J. Youngblood:

In the Hatter of the Application of )Docket Nos. 50-390Tennessee Valley Authority )50-391

In accordance with the commitment made by TVA in our December 5, 1986 letter,copies of the below listed DOE/WEP group closure statement/evaluation reportson welding at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant are enclosed for your review.

Please note that the enclosed reports are still in the closure review cycleand are not finally approved for closure by DOE/WEP.

GROUP I.D. ISSUE

029 NRC 5495 addressed substitution of S80pipe in lieu of S40. NRC did notaddress resultant required increase inweld size.

036 Arc strike unit 1 pressurizer relieftank WAT-RCATPR-Ol. Corrective actionmay be incomplete because inspectionmay not have been performed for minimumwall thickness.

211 Welders qualified only on flat platewere assigned to weld on the main steamsystem. f

213 The stainless steel surrounding theunit 1 reactor had some bad welds(porosity).

223 Uncertified inspector performed weldinspection on hangers April 1982through January 1983. The informationcontained in NCR 4374 was insufficientto provide assurance that thecorrective action required was complete.

8701290252 870116PDR ADOCK 05000390A PDR '

An Equal Opportunity Employer

09

-2-

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MAN 16 1987

If you have any questions regarding this letter, please get in touch withR. H. Shell at (615) 751-2474.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

. a. A"',

L. Gridley, DirectorNuclear Safety and Licensing

Enclosurecc (Enclosure):

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRegion IIAttention: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. Tom Kenyon,Watts Bar Project ManagerU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission7920 Norfolk AvenueBethesda, Maryland 20814

Mr. G. G. Zech, DirectorTVA ProjectsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRegion II101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Watts Bar Resident InspectorWatts Bar Nuclear PlantP.O. Box 2000Spring City, Tennessee 37381

S.

WEPClosure

Statement

EvaluationReport

S.

QUALITIY INUJICAIOR GROUP CLOSURE

UNDERSIZE SOCKET WELDS ON ASME

PIPING

WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SP-16

Page 0o

Date 11/21/86

Revision 0

WEP Group No 029

DateApproved

Address the following items In the space remaining on

additional pages as needed (see Standard Practice WEP

instructions).

Employee Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s)

Characterization of IssueSummaryEvaluation Methodology

this page and on3.1.10 for specific

5. Findings6. Conclusions7. References

1. Employee Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s) (Reference 7.1)

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Nonconforming Condition Report(NCR) 5495.

2. Characterization of Issue

The NCR 5495 was initiated to address the substitution of Schedule 80

pipe in lieu of the required Schedule 40. The disposition of the NCR

did not address the increase in weld size required for the Schedule 80

pipe. Weld size is determined in accordance with ASME Section III,

Paragraph NB-4427, which requires the size of fillet and socket welds

to be in accordance with Figure NB-4427-1 which is 1.09t where t is

the nominal pipe wall thickness (Reference 7.2).

3. Summary

Examination packages were prepared by the Department of Energy Weld

Evaluation Project (DOE/WEP) to perform inspections on the identified

welds. As a result of the inspections and engineering reviews, all

welds were determined to comply with applicable ASME Code requirements.

4. Evaluation Methodology

Quality Indicator Group 029 was formed to address the increase in size

of the socket weld required due to a substitution of Schedule 80 pipe

where Schedule 40 was originally required.

QUALITY INDICATOR GROUP CLOSURE Page __of 3

W EP UNDERSIZE SOCKET WELDS ON ASME Date 11/21/86

Closure PIPINGStatement

Revision 0

Evaluation WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SP-16 WEP Group No 029

Report

In accordance with Assessment Plan 029 (Reference 7.3), DOE/WEP

performed an examination of the eight welds identified on NCR 5495 to

determine if the correct weld size was present.

5. Findings

As a result of the DOE/WEP weld examination, three Deviation Reports

(DRs) were issued documenting three undersized welds. The welds

identified by DOE/WEP examination had previously been identified by

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) on NCR 5495. After concurring with

the corrective action provided by TVA for the closure of NCR 5495,

DOE/WEP provided justification for the closure of the DRs and

subsequently closed the examination package(Reference 7.4).

During the review for group closure, it was determined that while TVA

had previously identifiedthe welds, the evaluation and corrective

action performed addressed the substitution of Schedule 80 for

Schedule 40 pipe and not specifically the insufficient weld size

identified on the DRs. Further review indicated that the

justification for closure contained computation errors. Inspections

required by the examination package were performed to Revision 1 of

the package. Revision 1 specified the size of the socket welds to be

3/16 inch. The Assessment Plan 029 required inspections to verify

weld size of 1.09t where t is the nominal wall thickness of the pipe.

The resultant required weld size is 0.160 inch as opposed to 3/16 inch

or 0.188 inch.

The examinations revealed that the three welds were undersized by

"approximately 1/32 inch" from the "required size of 3/16 inch" as

specified in Revision 1 of the examination package. The difference

between the required weld size and the as-found condition was

0.004 inch (Required size--O.160 vs. the as-found condition of 5/32 or

0.156 inch). Due to the minimal differences observed, the results of

the examinations were forwarded to Suitability-for-Service Evaluation

Engineering Department (SSEE) for evaluation.

The SSEE evaluation determined that, based on the required weld size

of 0.160 inch, the gauges used in the measurement of welds do not

provide the necessary accuracy to determine a weld size within

0.004 inch; therefore, the use of the welds as-is, is an appropriate

disposition (Reference 7.5). These results were also submitted to the

DOE/WEP Inspection/Examination (I/E) department for review, and were

concurred with by the I/E Level III examiner (Reference 7.6).

QUA R I ag e __0

W E P UNDERSIZE SOCKET WELDS ON ASME Date 11/21/86

Closure PIPINGStaeen Revision 0

Statement

Evaluation WEP GROUP.IDENTIFIER QI-SP-16 WEP Group No 029

Report

6. Conclusions

Based on the results of the plant examination, evaluation by SSEE and

concurrence by I/E department, the DOE/WEP position is that the

identified welds meet the applicable acceptance criteria.

DOE/WEP considers this group closed.

7. References

7.1 Original Quality Indictor as listed in Section 1.

7.2 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Ill, 1971 Edition,

NB-4000.

7.3 DOE/WEP Assessment Plan 029, Revision 0.

7.4 DOE/WEP Examination Packages 029-00001 through 029-00008.

7.5 EG&G Interoffice correspondence to A. E. Bradford from

T. L. Bridges, October 7, 1986.

7.6 Interoffice Memo from R. Van Den Bosch to file, October 9, 1986.

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W E P QUALITY INDICATOR GROUP CLOSURE Page 1 of 3

ARC STRIKE REMOVAL AREA ON Date 12/02/86Closure PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK

Statement Revision 0

EvaluationReport ionWEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SP-1 WEP Group No 036

Approved Date

Reviewed Z14• 1•• / /9,6 Prepared,•

Address the following items In the space remaining on this page and onadditional pages as needed (see Standard Practice WEP 3.1.10 for specificinstructions).

Employee Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s)Characterization of IssueSummaryEvaluation Methodology

FindingsConclusionsReferences

1. Original Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s)

Nonconforming Condition Report (NCR) 717 (Reference 7.1).


NCR 717 refers to an arc strike on Unit 1 pressurizer relief tank(WAT-RCATPR-O1). Corrective action may be incomplete becauseinspection may not have been performed for minimum wall thickness.

3. Summary

Not applicable


The following are Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) GeneralConstruction Specification G-29M Process Specifications used forevaluating and examining an arc strike removal area:

4.M.5.1(b) "Elimination and Repair of Base Material Defects"

(notes requirements for minimum wall thickness and blendingrequirements), (Reference 7.2).

3.M.5.1(c) "Specification for Visual Examination of Weld joints."(Reference 7.3).

3.M.2.1(c) "Specification for Dry Magnetic Particle Examinationof Welds and Weld Edge Preparations" (Reference 7.4).

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QUALITY INDICATOR GROUP CLOSURE Page 2 of 3

W P ARC STRIKE REMOVAL AREA ON Date 12/02/86

Closure PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANKStatement Revision 0

Evaluation WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SP-l WEP Group No 036Report

5.M.l.l(d) "Specification for Thickness Measurement"(Reference 7.5).

The Department of Energy Weld Evaluation Project (DOE/WEP) reviewedNonconforming Condition Report (NCR) 717, Revision 0 and Revision 1,and initially found the corrective action incomplete. The initialreview had indicated that the minimum wall thickness was notverified. Specific Group 36 (QI-SP-l) was formed for evaluation andDOE/WEP Assessment Plan 036 .(Reference 7.6) written. Additionalinformation was also requested from TVA to aid in determining ifcorrective action had been completed as required by NCR 717. DOE/WEPreceived and reviewed the additional documentation supplied by TVA,which supplied the following:

4.1 NDE Surface Evaluation Data Sheet: Visual/MagneticParticle/Liquid Penetrant. One data sheet shows that a visualand a magnetic particle test had been performed (with acceptableresults) on the defect removal area.

4.2 Thickness Measurement Record: Ultrasonic Method. One data sheetshows that ultrasonic thickness measurements had been performed(with acceptable results) on the defect removal area.

4.3 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Field Deficiency Report NumberWAT-10029. The Westinghouse report shows acceptance of TVA testresults and also indicates that no internal visual examination ofthe tank would be required since no welding was performed.

4.4 Westinghouse Electric Corporation two page calculation sheetshows that minimum allowable wall thickness is 0.600 inches.Minimum tank thickness measured by ultrasonic testing was0.615 inches so no weld buildup in the arc strike area wasrequired.

5. Findings

NCR 717, Revision 0, did not provide thickness verification, and onlyapproximate size and depth were given for the defect. NCR 717,Revision 1, was written to give more exact dimensions regarding hedefect size and depth. All inspections required per NCR 717 andProcess Specification 4.M.5.1(b) for the arc strike removal area werefound acceptable, and minimum wall thickness was not violated. Thevendor (Westing house) also concurred with TVA's examination findings(Reference 7.7). The Assessment Plan originally required that anUltrasonic Thickness Examination be performed on the defect removal

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QUALITY INDICATOR GROUP CLOSURE Page 3 of 3

W- E r. ARC STRIKE REMOVAL AREA ON Date 12/02/86

Closure PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANKStatement Revision 0

Evaluation ..WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SP-l WEP Group No 036Report

area (Reference 7.6). Evaluation of the additional documentationsupplied by TVA for DOE/WEP review shows that this group could beclosed by document review only (Reference 7.8).

6. Conclusions

The arc strike on the pressurizer relief tank (WAT-RCATPR-lO) wasremoved and the proper tests were performed and documented withacceptable results as required. DOE/WEP considers this group closed.

7. References

7.1 Tennessee Valley Authority, Nonconforming Condition Report 717,Revision 0 and Revision 1.

7.2 Tennessee Valley Authority, General Construction SpecificationG-29M, Process Specification 4.M.5.1(b).

7.3 Tennessee Valley Authority, General Construction SpecificationG-29M, Process Specification 3.M.5.1(c).

7.4 Tennessee Valley Authority, General Construction SpecificationG-29M, Process Specification 3.M.2.1(c).

7.5 Tennessee Valley Authority, General Construction SpecificationG-29M, Process Specification 5.M.l.l(d).

7.6 DOE/WEP Assessment Plan 036, Revision 1, July 17, 1986.

7.7 Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Field Deficiency Report NumberWAT-0029.

7.8 EG&G Internal Memorandum, D. Cochran to A. E. Bradford datedApril 10, 1986.

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W EP EMPLOYEE CONCERN GROUP CLOSURE Page 1 of

Closure ALL UNIT 1 SAFETY-RELATED MAIN Date 12/10/86Statement STEAM PIPING WELDS

Revision 0Evaluation

Report WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER EC-SPL-14 WEP Group No 211

Approved _________ ____Date 1.I

Reviewed 6 _//__ __ Prepared

Address the following items in the space remaining on this page and onadditional pages as needed (see Standard Practice WEP 3.1.10 for specificinstructions).


5. Findings6. Conclusions7. References

Employee Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s) (Reference 7.1)

Employee Concern IN-86-190-002.


The Employee Concern states that in 1976-77 Tennessee Valley Authority(TVA) management claimed that, "they would complete Watts Bar NuclearPlant (WBNP) even if they had to use apprentices." An apprentice isone who is learning a trade or occupation under a skilled worker.According to the Concerned Individual (CI), TVA management thenallowed anyone to test for welding operations. Welders qualified atthat time were only qualified by a flat plate test. These samewelders were assigned to weld on the main steam system. TVA GeneralConstruction Specification G29M (Reference 7.2) states that, "eachwelder and welding operator shall be required to pass a performancequalification test prior to welding on components or assemblies whichare fabricated in accordance with any of the ASME codes." ASMESection IX, QW-461.9 states that, "Plate test is acceptable for pipingwith an outside diameter (OD) greater than 24-inches (Reference 7.3)."

3. Summary

The Department of Energy Weld Evaluation Project (DOE/WEP)investigated the employee concern and concluded after reviewing thequalification records of all steam fitters welding on the main steamsystem that no problem existed. None of the steam fitters whoqualified on the flat (IG Position) plate test welded on the mainsteam system. All of the steam fitters who welded on the main steam

00

W PEMPLOYEE CONCERN GROUP CLOSURE Page 2 of 3

IA!LFALL UNIT 1 SAFETY-RELATED MAIN Date 12/10/86Closure STEAM PIPING WELDS

Statement Revision 0Evaluation WEP GR~OUP-IDENTIFIER EC-SPL-l4 WEP Group No 211

Report

system were properly qualified using the pipe test applicable towelding on piping systems.


The DOE/WEP Assessment Plan 211 (Reference 7.4) required that existingdocumentation be reviewed to determine the identities of the steamfitters who welded on the main steam system. Also required was thereview of all steam fitter qualifications at the time the welds weremade.

The OQE/WEP determined that steam fitters qualified for the flat platetest would not meet the criteria for welding on the main steamsystem. Steam fitters qualified on the plate test (all positions 2G,3G and 4G) are by this process also qualified to weld on 24-inch (andlarger) diameter pipe. In order to qualify for welding on the mainsteam system, steam fitters must successfully complete a pipe test.

5. Findings

The DOE/WEP requested that Quality Technology Corporation (QTC) obtainfurther information from the CI. Specific information requested wasan identification of specific steam fitters (welders) involved and adetermination of whether the pipe was welded in place or rolled duringwelding.

The CI admitted that his/her concern was based solely on heresay andthat he/she had no first hand knowledge. The CI could not provide anyweld numbers or identify any specific steam fitters (Reference 7.5).The informant named by the CI also could not supply any additionalinformation to substantiate this employee concern. The DOE/WEPdetermined that only three steam fitters had been tested using theplate test in the flat (lG Position). Of the three steam fitters,none had ever welded on the main steam system. The remaining steamfitters who welded on the main steam system were properly qualifiedusing the pipe test.

6. Conclusions

The DOE/WEP concluded after a thorough review of all information'pertaining to this employee concern that no problem exists. Thisconclusion results from a review of the qualification records of alF'-steam fitters that welded on the main steam system and the results ofadditional questioning of the CI. Information obtained from the CIrevealed that the employee concern was based on heresay.

DOE/WEP considers this employee concern closed.

so 00

EMPLOYEE CONCERN GROUP CLOSURE Page 3 of 3WEP--ALL UNIT 1 SAFETY-RELATED MAIN Date 12/10/86

Closure STEAM PIPING WELDSStatement Revision 0EvaluationReport WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER EC-SPL-14 WEP Group No 211

7. References

7.1 Original Employee Concern as listed in Section 1.

7.2 TVA General Construction Specification G29M, ProcessSpecification 1.M.2.2(a), Paragraph 2.1, September 30, 1977.

7.3 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section IX, QW-461.9, 1971.

7.4 DOE/WEP Assessment Plan 211, August 19, 1986.

7.5 EG&G Idaho Notegram to A. E. Bradford from H. Richardson,April 8, 1986.

1508A

WEPClosure

Statement

EvaluationReport

EMPLOYEE CONCERN GROUP CLOSURE

UNIT 1 SAFETY-RELATED WELDSASSOCIATED WITH THE REFUELINGPIT LINER

WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER EC-SPL-16

Page 1 of 4

Date 12/05/86

Revision 0

WEP Group No 213

Approved , Date

Reviewed ( 4 494 I?/i &A Prepared ______

Address the following items in the space remaining on this page and onadditional pages as needed (see Standard Practice WEP 3.1.10 for specificinstructions).


FindingsConclusionsReferences

1. Employee Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s)

Employee Concern WI-85-081-004 (Reference 7.1).


The Concerned Individual (CI) stated, "the stainless steel surroundingthe Unit 1 reactor had some bad welds (porosity)."

Summary

Not applicable.

4. Evaluation Methodoloqy

The Department of Energy Weld Evaluation Project (DOE/WEP) AssessmentPlan 213 (Reference 7.2) requires a 100% visual and liquid penetrantexamination of the subject welds. These examinations are to beperformed on a representative sample of welds populated from welds onthe stainless steel liner plates.

5. Findings

At the request of DOE/WEP, the CI was contacted by Quality TechnologyCompany (References 7.3 and 7.4) and the following additionalinformation obtained:

a. The welds were located in the refueling pit.

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EMPLOYEE CONCERN GROUP CLOSURE Page 2 of 4

VW E P~ UNIT 1 SAFETY-RELATED WELDS Date 12/05/86Closure ASSOCIATED WITH THE REFUELING

Statement PIT LINER Revision 0

Evaluation *WEP GROUP IDEN TIFIER EC-SPL-16 WEP Group No 213Report

b. The welds were made by ironworkers.

C. The welds were performed before the reactor building dome wasplaced.

d. The welds were made while it was raining. Water trapped in themetal caused the porosity.

e. The affected area was Unit 1, in the vicinity of the refuelingtrough and pit.

The CI statement t-hat ironworkers made the welds prior to the domebeing placed indicates the concern is *related to welds on the embeddedplates and any structural shape attachments to anchor bolts which aresupports for the stainless steel pit liner. These supports wereinstalled prior to the stainless steel. liner plates being erected andfalls under the scope of work for ironworkers. The installation andwelding of the stainless steel liner plates were performed by theboilermaker craft. This work jurisdiction i~s per project agreementwith the union.

The DOE/WEP investigation of this concern has noted that the timeframe of the welding by the ironworkers was between 1974 and 1976.Welding of the liner plate by the boilermakers started in September of1976 and continued through 1978. Based on the above time frame, theindividual's concern is related to the structural welding theironworkers had done prior to the installation of the stainless steelliner plate. In order to inspect these welds, the stainless steelliner plate would have to be removed. Since the information providedshows that the welds of concern are in the embedded plates andstructural supports, which support the refueling pit liner, it isinappropriate to perform examinations of the refueling pit liner asdirected by the DOE/WEP Assessment Plan. Appropriate evaluation is todetermine the indicated weld quality of the items being questioned bydocumentation review.

The welding by the ironworkers is subject to TVA's "WeldingSurveillance and Weld Procedure Assignment" program (Reference 7.5).This procedure requires that a "Welding Surveillance Weekly CheckList" be used to document workmanship and compliance with theapplicable procedures, specifications and codes. A DOE/WEP review ofthis document from June 17, 1974 through December 29, 1979 disclosedno mention of unacceptable welding due to porosity.

00


VVEP UNIT 1 SAFETY-RELATED WELDS Date 12/05/86

Closure ASSOCIATED WITH THE REFUELINGStatement PIT LINER Revision 0

Evaluation WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER EC-SPL-16 WEP Group No 213Report

It should be noted that the structural welding done by the ironworkersis covered under TVA Construction Specification G29C (Reference 7.6)and Structural Welding Code AWS D1.1 (Reference 7.7). Both TVASpecification G29C and AWS D1.1 have established acceptance standardsfor porosity. The allowable amount of porosity varies depending onvisual or NDE inspection (Reference 7.8 and 7.9). A certain amount ofporosity in welds is considered acceptable.

6. Conclusions

6.1 The Employee Concern WI-85-081-004 apparently refers tostructural welds in the structural steel adjacent to andsupporting the refueling pit liners.

6.2 The structural welds identified by the C1 are inaccessible forreinspection unless the refueling pit liner is removed orpenetrated.

6.3 A DOE/WEP search of the available inspection documentation didnot produce indications that porosity was a problem in thestructural welds (Reference 7.10).

6.4 DOE/WEP considers this employee concern closed.

7. References

7.1 Employee Concern WI-85-081-004.

7.2 DOE/WEP Assessment Plan 213, Revision 0, May 1, 1986.

7.3 EG&G Memorandums to Quality Technology Company (QTC), KGT-43-86and KGT-50-86, dated February 7, 1986 and March 5, 1986respectively.

7.4 QTC Responses, File Numbers 843 and 1053, dated February 8, 1986and March 12, 1986 respectively.

7.5 TVA WBNP Quality Control Procedure QCP 4.3, Revision 0, WeldingSurveillance and Weld Procedure Assignment, Section 6.1.9.

7.6 TVA General Construction Specification G-29, Process

Specification 3.M.5.1, Revision C, Section 3.6.1.

7.7 ANSI/AWS Dl.1, Structural Welding Code, Subsection 8.15.1.6, 1974.


W E UNIT I SAFETY-RELATED WELDS Date 12/05/86Closure ASSOCIATED WITH THE REFUELING

Statement PIT LINER Revision 0

Evaluation WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER EC-SPL-16 WEP Group No 213Report

7.8 TVA WBNP Quality Control Procedure QCP-4.13, Revision 0, LiquidPenetrant Examination of ASME Weldments, NDE-PT-Ol, Section 6.7through 6.7.4.

7.9 TVA WBNP Quality Control Procedure QCP-4.13, Revision 0, VisualExamination of ASME Welds, NDE-VE-Ol, Section 6.0 throughParagraph 6.1.

7.10 EG&G Idaho Notegram to A. E. Bradford from A. D. Calija,June 20, 1986.

1501A

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W EP QUALITY INDICATOR GROUP CLOSURE Page 1 of 2

Closure INSPECTIONS PERFORMED BY UNCERTIFIED Date 12/03/86Statement INSPECTOR

Revision 0Evaluation

Report WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SP-7 WEP Group No 223

Approved Date

Reviewed f4 124 Prepared ___________

Address the following items in the space remaining on this page and onadditional pages as needed (see Standard Practice WEP 3.1.10 for specificInstructions).


5. Findings6. Conclusions

7. References

1. Employee Concern(s)/Quality Indicator(s) (Reference 7.1)

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Nonconforming Condition Report(NCR) 4374, Revision 0.


The NCR identified an inspector who transferred from Yellow CreekNuclear Plant to Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBNP). The inspector wasnot certified to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) WBNP Quality ControlProcedure 4.13 (Reference 7.2) for welding inspection and performedweld inspections on hangers while uncertified from April 18, 1982through January 9, 1983. The information contained in NCR 4374 wasinsufficient to provide assurance that the corrective action requiredwas completed.

3. Summary

Review of documentation for the hanger welds inspected by theinspector while uncertified has shown that the welds were allreinspected (by TVA certified inspectors) and found acceptable.


The Department of Energy Weld Evaluation Project (DOE/WEP) personnelreviewed NCR 4374 and found the results of the corrective actionindeterminate. DOE/WEP Assessment Plan 223 (Reference 7.3) requiredthat a document review be performed by extracting a representativesample of the group population in accordance with Standard PracticeWEP 3.1.6 (Referen6e 7.4). The document review was performed to

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Closure INSPECTIONS PERFORMED BY UNCERTIFIED Date 12/03/86

Statement INSPECTOR---- ---- Revision 0

EvaluationReport *WEP GROUP IDENTIFIER QI-SP-7 WEP Group No 222

determine if the hanger welds inspected by the uncertified inspectorwere reinspected and documented by TVA certified inspectors.

TVA personnel had found 122 hangers inspected by the uncertified

inspector during their review of the Support Welding InspectionVerification Cards (Reference 7.5) and attached a list of these to

NCR 4374. DOE/WEP personnel decided to perform a 100% review of the

support Welding Inspection Verification Cards for the 122 hangersinspected by the uncertified inspector instead of only using thesampling plan as required per Assessment Plan 223. Two of thehangers, numbers 0012-432-13-200-647 and 1033-W491-9-261, had been

removed after they were reinspected and no documentation could be

located for these assemblies. DOE/WEP personnel reviewed supportwelding verification cards for the remaining 120 hangers.

5. Findings

It was determined from document review of the 120 Support WeldingInpection Verification Cards that TVA personnel had reinspected the

welds originally inspected by the uncertified inspector. The welds

inspected by the uncertified inspector were found acceptable afterrei nspection.

6. Conclusions

Since all of the installed hangers were reinspected by TVA and foundacceptable, as verified by supporting documentation, DOE/WEP considersthis group closed.

7. References

7.1 Original Quality Indicator as listed in Section 1.

7.2 TVA WBNP Quality Control Procedure 4.13.

7.3 WEP Assessment Plan 223, Revision 0.

7.4 Standard Practice WEP 3.1.6, Identifying Random Samples FromHomogeneous Groups, August 6, 1986.

7.5 Support Welding Inspection Verification Cards (Quantity 120) aslisted on NCR 4374, Revision 0.

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forwards listed doe/wep group closure statement/evaluation ... · weld size of 1.09t where t is the...

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