Personality And Political Behavior Chapter 7

The Loss Of Enemies, Fragmenting Identities And The Resurgence Of Ethnic/Nationalist Hatred

In Eastern Europe

The Loss Of Enemies, Fragmenting Identities And The Resurgence Of Ethnic/Nationalist

Hatred And Anti-Semitism In Eastern Europe1 Jerrold M. Post, MD

The Need For Enemies

How rapidly-and tragically-the celebration of freedom occasioned by throwing off the yoke

of Communist rule in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was succeeded by a wave of

ethnic nationalist conflicts, expressed at its violent genocidal extreme in the identity war in Bosnia,

in which ethnic cleansing became policy. Tragic, but predictable, for the loss of enemies is

destabilizing, and the chaos left in the wake of the departing Communist enemy provided fertile soil

for hate-mongering demagogues to exploit centuries-old hostilities.

The revival of hostility among existing groups with a history of conflict is not surprising.

Nor, given the long-standing history of anti-Semitism in these nations, would it be surprising to see

the revival of anti-Semitism in post-Communist eastern Europe, if there were Jews there. The fact

that anti-Semitism has revived so powerfully in the absence of Jews demonstrates the power of the

paranoid dynamic and the associated need for enemies. When the real enemy disappears, the need

for enemies becomes intensified, and in the absence of real enemies they will be created.

There is a readiness in the human psyche to fear strangers and seek comfort with the

familiar. Under duress, stranger anxiety and fear of the other mount, and the paranoid capacity to

project hatred is mobilized. Such anxiety is produced not only by unknown persons, but also by

unfamiliar places, foods, and sounds. Significant others-parents, teachers, peers-sponsor "suitable

targets of externalization" for the developing child, and "group-specific externalizations" tie the

children together (Volkan 32). The strangeness of some things (and the comforting familiarity of

others) take on political significance as the child grows into adulthood.

This fear of the stranger and projection of hatred upon the other are the psychological

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foundation of the concept of the enemy.2

The crystallization of the shared comfort of the familiar is

the psychological foundation of nationalism.

Vamik Volkan has drawn on both his psychoanalytic training and his own life history to

illustrate this process, constructing a bridge from the family to the nation and the development of

the sense of national identity:

In Cyprus [Volkan's birthplace], although Greeks and Turks lived side by side for centuries

until 1974, when the island was divided, they remained-and still remain-mutual antagonists. A

Greek child learns from what his mother says and does that the neighborhood church is a good

place; he unconsciously invests in it his unintegrated good aspects and feels comfortable there. The

same mechanism, fueled by his mother's influence, makes him shun the Turkish mosque and

minaret, in which he deposits the unintegrated bad aspects of himself and important others. He is

more himself when playing near his church and distancing himself from the mosque. . . . Although

the child would have his own unique individualized psychological makeup, he would be allied to

other children in his group through the common suitable target of externalization . . . that affirms

their ethnic, cultural, and national identity. (32-33)

As personal identity is consolidating, it incorporates elements of national identity. The sense

of comfort-and belonging-spreads to the national flag. Those who oppose the nation, or desecrate

the flag, may threaten one's sense of self This helps explain the rage engendered in the United

States, for example, by flag burning, and the emotional force behind the proposed constitutional

amendment making desecration of the flag a federal crime. So it is, especially under stress, that we

cling all the more tightly to those symbols of our national, racial, ethnic, or religious identity that

have become incorporated as part of our self-concept. They are in effect self-objects. This is

graphically illustrated by the talismans with ethnic symbols worn by Palestinians living in the Gaza

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Strip:

Like songs often repeated among the Arabs, they are shared only within the in-group,

providing a magical [psychological] network for maintaining group narcissism under adverse

conditions as well as contributing to the self-esteem of individual Arabs. It is not enough for

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip simply to be aware of their Arabic identity; they need to exhibit its

symbols in order to maintain their self-esteem. (Volkan 36)

We are comforted by familiarity and cling tightly to those like us. This contributes to a

sense of group and selfcohesion.

But this requires differentiating ourselves from strangers. They are necessary for our process

of self-definition. To say that "these things are specially good and are specially part of me" is to say

that "those other things are specially bad and not part of me, are part of others." The self, and

objects3

with which the self has identified (such as one's ethnic group or political party), are

idealized; other objects (such as historical adversaries of one's ethnic group or political party) are

viewed as dangerous persecutors and are demonized. The absorption ("introjection") of the good

cultural symbols is expressed thus: "I must be good because my people's history-which is part of

me-is good, our food is delicious, our religious buildings are impressive, our architecture is

beautiful," and so on. The converse also occurs: "All those others, especially those I see around me

and with whom my group has lived, are bad-their history is one of deception and violence, their

food is inferior, their architecture is ugly," and so on. All badness is outside, all goodness inside.

There is an idealization of the self and the familiar group; there is a demonization of the stranger.

Such racial or ethnic or religious identifications have helped produce great poetry and music, and

have stimulated self-sacrifice in the interest of fellow group members. But such group identification

has also formed the fertile field from which wars and massacres

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have grown. Pride in one's heritage often manifests itself as destructive narcissism and political

paranoia. It is a world of friends and enemies, where there is a splitting of good and evil, of self and

not-self

This tendency to idealize the in-group and demonize the out-group can never be eradicated.

The germs of that more primitive psychology remain within the personality, ready to be activated at

times of stress. Otherwise psychologically healthy individuals can be infected by paranoid thinking

when the friendly group with which they are identified is attacked or when economic reversals

occur.4

Thus enemies are necessary for self-definition, which makes it necessary to have enemies in

our midst. Creating bad others is a necessary part of a child's acquiring a distinct identity, but

insofar as a national identity becomes part of one's personal identity, deep-seated feelings that

transcend childhood become fixed within one's social personality. For some people, the bad objects

remain true enemies. A mature, integrated person learns that those enemy objects are at most

adversaries, or things which are distasteful, and not objects to be hated or destroyed, but under

overwhelming social stress, even mature individuals and groups can return to the paranoid position,

and experience these internalized bad objects as true enemies.

A "good enough enemy" (Stein 188-189) is an object that is available to serve as a reservoir

for all the negated aspects of the self In so doing, the enemy provides the valuable function of

stabilizing the internal group by storing group projections. The enemy thus provides cohesion for

the social group, especially the social group under stress. Since it is representations of the self

which are being projected, there must be a recognized kinship at an unconscious level. We are

bound to those we hate.

Yet at the same time there must be a recognizable difference, a distinct gap to facilitate the

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distinction between "us" and "them." An important aspect of the development of group identity is

shared symbols of difference, symbols on which to project hatred. The more "different" the stranger

in our midst, the more readily available he is as a target for externalization.5

The enemy whom we

are certain is a despicable "other" is littered with parts cast out from the self (Stein 193). We project

into "them" what we disown in ourselves. It becomes a part of their projected identity.

The requirement for an unconscious kinship is responsible for the phenomenon of the

Familiar Enemy. The Greeks and the Turks, as Volkan points out, have lived near each other for

centuries. So have India's Sikhs and Hindus; Bosnia's Serbs, Croats, and Muslims; Northern

Ireland's Catholics and Protestants; Israel's Arabs and Jews. They remain feared-but familiar-

strangers. Thus those groups from which we most passionately distinguish ourselves are those with

which we are most inseparably bound. We end where they begin (Stein 103).

This identity-creating process-a psychological necessity-results in the world being divided

among groups with varying degrees of animosity, excessive self-regard, and fear of others. We need

enemies to keep our treasured-and idealized-selves intact. Enemies, therefore, are to be cherished,

cultivated and preserved, for if we lose them, our self definition is endangered and our cherished

group is threatened.

The Psychopolitics Of Hatred In Central And Eastern Europe: Searching For New

Enemies, Reviving Old Hatreds

The events in Eastern Europe since the collapse of Communist rule bear tragic testimony to

this need for enemies. Even some hardened observers of Balkan politics believed that the

antagonisms among Croats, Serbs, and Muslims had been permanently blunted by the decades of

peaceful Communist rule. The revival of ferocious ethnic wars in the early 1 990s demonstrated

that deep-seated fears and anger had not died, but had merely been suppressed by the powerful

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leaders of the socialist state. When the outside enemy disappeared, the need for enemies produced a

bloody revival of ancient hatreds. The revival of age-old tensions in Eastern Europe in the wake of

the dissolution of the Soviet empire is a special case of the destabilizing consequences of losing

one's enemy.

Lenin saw the inculcation of loyalty to the Soviet Union as a crucial task in

institutionalizing the revolution. To develop an identity as new Soviet man required suppression-

indeed destruction~f other loyalties and identities, nationalistic and religious.

Even family loyalties were seen as reactionary vestiges, a view carried to its most dreadful extreme

with the celebration of Pavel Morozov as a hero of the Soviet Union for denouncing his family.

This ruthless stamping out of national identity was extended to the socialist nations of

Eastern Europe in the wake ofWorld War II. In the pursuit of the new socialist man, for forty years

expressions of nationalist identity were forbidden to the people of Central and Eastern Europe-the

intensely nationalistic Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, the Czechs and Slovaks of

Czechoslovakia, and the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims ofYugoslavia. In this exaggerated emphasis of

one identity, and attempted forcible elimination of other identities, the essential quality of identity-

difference-was attacked. Such destruction nearly always fails, and it did in Eastern Europe. In

totalitarian regimes this leads to a duality of identity-the publicly espoused identity (new socialist

man) and the private identity (see Eros). The regime's intense pressure on private life led to an

extensive erosion of private identity, which can occur in three ways:

1. through repression of identity elements that have been deemed undesirable;

2. through the transformation of undesirable identity elements into negative identity fragments

(the "self-criticism" in Communist China is an example of such enforced ransformations);

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and

3. through marginalization of private identity, "squeezing certain identity elements to the

margins of awareness, thereby rendering them seemingly insignificant" (Eros).

Thus the Communist regime's attack upon these private identity elements did not destroy

them. Rather, the social basis of private identity was forced underground. Allusion became "the

mother tongue of collective experience.

In the fall of 1989, that most remarkable season of freedom, with bewildering rapidity the

Communist empire collapsed, and in Eastern Europe, one socialist government after another was

displaced, as the long-suppressed peoples rose up in democratic protest. It was an exultant moment.

Free at last!

Within a few years, however, that spirit of exultation was replaced by the revival of age-old

hatreds in exaggerated form, as Serbs slaughtered Croats, Slovaks asserted their individual

autonomy and split from the Czech lands, and free expression was given to hatred of minorities,

often becoming a major theme in political campaigns.

This result is not surprising, for after forty years of enforced suppression of nationalist

identity, at last these intensely nationalistic people were free, free to express in intensified form the

core of their identity--difference--and with it expressions of hatred of the "other." As one mocking

poem put it,

Free at last

Free to choose

To eat at MacDonalds

And hate the Jews.

(Anonymous)

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More than difference was expressed, for the intensity with which hated groups were blamed

for the troubles of the in-group was remarkable. A particularly painful example is found in Poland.

Before World War II, Poland was the center of world Judaism, with a population of over three

million Jews. About 2.9 million perished in the Holocaust. Today less than 10,000 of the estimated

38 million population are Jewish, and their average age is seventy. This annihilation of Jewry was

particularly severe in Poland's capitol Warsaw. Approximately 30 percent of the population of

Warsaw was Jewish when the Nazis invaded. As a consequence of the Holocaust, there are now

only about 300-400 Jews in Warsaw.

Poland not only has fewer Jews than in 1939, it also has fewer other minorities. Hitler's

murder of the Jews, the expulsion of the Germans from East Prussia and Silesia, and the shift

westward of the Ukrainian border have resulted in Poland becoming perhaps the most ethnically

and religiously homogeneous country in eastern Europe. Although Poland retains its historical

memory of "enemy" minorities, it has almost none within its borders. Absent the Communist

leaders, absent traditional enemies, who could be blamed when things went wrong-and initially they

went very badly indeed? The answer was, of course, Jews! Reports of anti-Semitism surfaced

almost immediately after 1989. Monuments and cemeteries were desecrated, with swastikas painted

on gravestones (Harden Al, A19). On the monument to the ghetto fighters who fought against the

Nazis was inscribed, "The only good Jew is a dead Jew" (Brumberg 72). The largely non-existent

Jewish population was blamed for Poland's economic distress, with an invocation of the

international Zionist conspiracy. A Polish academic, Krystyna Kersten, characterized this as "the

anti-Semitic paranoia" in a country where practically no Jews are left but where "the public

imagination" is nonetheless "obsessed by the Jewish presence in the government, in parliament, in

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the press, in television, and God knows where else" (Shafir 9). A poll conducted in the early 1 990s

indicated that a quarter of the Polish population believed that although the respondents recognized

that Jews constituted only a small part of the population, they nevertheless maintained that Jews

exercised too much influence. Only three percent of those interviewed found it acceptable to have

Jewish neighbors.6

The pollster, Slawomir Nowotny, commented on the intensity of the anti-

Semitism in the face of the virtually absent Jewish population.7

He dubbed the phenomenon,

"Platonic Anti-Semitism," observing that if love without sex is platonic love, then anti-Semitism

without Jews is platonic anti-Semitism. Nowotny saw the power attributed to the Jews as a

reflection of the powerless-ness of the populace, and the need for someone to blame.

Having difficulty coping with massive socioeconomic dislocation and widespread

discontent, the Polish leadership played an active role in fanning the flames of anti-Semitism. In

August 1990, Walesa clarified that his earlier charge that a gang of Jews "had gotten hold of the

[country's] trough and is bent on destroying us" applied not to "the Jewish people as a whole" but

only to those "who are looking out for themselves while not giving a damn about anyone else"

(Gazeta Wyborcza, June 24, 1990, cited in Brumberg.) In the 1990 election campaign, Walesa

asserted he was "clean" because he had no Jews among his ancestors. He said he was "100 percent

Pole" (Brinkley A5). During the 1991 political campaign, Lech Walesa's main opponent was

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who was "accused" of being Jewish (Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

Eastern European Report, 18 March, 1991). Not recognizing the anti-Semitism in their response,

the Catholic Church defended Mazowiecki, asserting that they had gone back through 200 years of

church records of Mazowiecki's family and found "not a drop of Jewish blood."

In Romania too there is anti-Semitism without Jews. Before World War II, it is estimated

that there were upwards of one million Jews in Romania. Today there are 17,000, most of them

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elderly. More than 400,000 Rumanian Jews were killed during World War II by Germans and

Rumanian security forces, and the climate under President Nicolai Caeucescu fostered a large

emigration to Israel.

Rumanian politics were distinctly anti-communist in the interwar period. Most of the

Communist Party's support thus came from the disaffected minorities, including Jews, Hungarians,

and Bulgarians. Hostility toward the now departed Communist leaders has been accompanied by

blaming Jews and Hungarians as Communists. This "Communist equals Jew" as rationalization for

anti-Semitism was demonstrated in the manifesto of "the National Defense League," made public

during a violent demonstration in April, 1990 (Shafir 24). The leaflet began with a declaration that

the Communists had "sown only blood and woes" and that "blood calls for blood." It then went on

to attack the National Salvation Front as having been "bought by the Bolsheviks and the

international Jewish conspiracy." The manifesto declared that the Jews, under the direction of Chief

Rabbi Moses Rosen, have a "secret mission . . . in your new communist government. . . of setting

up a new form of communism and socialism for the benefit of the Jewry."

Anti-Semitic articles have appeared in national newspapers, reviving the anti-Semitic

organization, the Legion of the Archangel Saint Michael, later renamed the Iron Guard. In one

message, reported to be from the Anticommunist Iron Guard Army, the goals were declared to be

to save the country and to reconstruct it on the sound basis of the purity of the Rumanian soul,

which has been poisoned then just as it is being poisoned now. . . . The crucifixion of the Legion

was followed by the crucifixion of Romania itself Students! Today, when Romania's desperation

is almost as great as Christ's desperation on the Golgotha. . .. (Shafir 27)

The pamphlet ended with the words, "Our time has finally come. Heil Hitler. We shall be

victorious." There were swastikas in all four corners. An article by a former submarine commander,

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Captain Nicolac Radu, claimed that Israel planned to turn Romania into a Jewish colony, that Jews

were plotting with the International Monetary Fund to turn Rumanians into street sweepers," that

the Jews control the Rumanian government, and that they brought Communism to Romania

(Champion Al 4).

Elie Wiesel, the Nobel Prize winning chronicler of the Holocaust, was taunted at a talk in lasi,

Romania, commemorating the deaths of 8,000 Jews at the hands of the Rumanian Army and police

in 1941. Before the war, of the 90,000 population of lasi, 40,000 were Jews. Today only 900

remain. A woman disrupted the meeting, sh~uting "It's a lie. The Jews didn't die. We won't allow

Rumanians to be insulted by foreigners in their own country" (Kamm Al). In April, 1991, the

Romanian chamber of deputies rose in a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of Marshal Ion

Antonescu, the dictator executed as a war criminal who allied Romania with Germany and ordered

the deportation and killing of thousands of Jews.

Similar tribute to an architect of the Holocaust was paid to Father Tiso; a Catholic priest, and

President of Slovakia during the one period of its functioning as an autonomous nation, 1939-1945.

Under Tiso's leadership, Slovakia was allied with Germany, and paid the Germans 500 crowns for

each Jewish man, woman, and child deported to the death camps. Tiso was convicted of war crimes

and executed. A cross was consecrated and erected on his grave in March 1991 on the occasion of

the fifty-second anniversary of the independent and sovereign Slovak Republic by a new intensely

nationalist political force, the Slovak National Unity, which had declared as its central goal the

establishment of an independent Slovak state (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 19 March,

1991). "It was not the first time in history when power humiliated the law and justice and an

innocent man had to die," the eulogist said. During the rally, the eulogy was interrupted by cries of

"Glory to Tiso," "Long Live Slovakia," and "Enough of Havel." On a visit to Bratislava, Havel had

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been attacked by a crowd who called him "King of the Jews." On the occasion of the visit to

Czechoslovakia of Chaim Heizog, the President of Israel, the Slovak fascist party erected a plaque

on Tiso's birthplace. The resurgence of nationalism was coupled with an intense resurgence of the

feelings associated with the brief period of national independence-fascism and anti-Semitism.

In reflecting on the suppression of identity, Peter Huncik, a psychiatrist who served as Special

Assistant to President Havel of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, has observed that more

than identity was suppressed. He has written of the "deformation of personality" after forty years of

socialism. Huncik observes that the socialist masters systematically extinguished initiative and in

emphasizing the primacy of state authority created a climate which socialized a passive dependent

populace who expected the state to take care of them. The populace blamed the omnipresent

authority for society's shortcomings, with a marked atrophy of individual responsibility. With the

disappearance of that authority, the resentful dependent populace had to find a target to blame.

The readiness to externalize blame is another social psychological consequence of forty years

of Communist rule. For one of the legacies of Communism was societal paranoia (see Schifter).

The massive security organizations throughout the Communist bloc led to pervasive fear and

distrust and an erosion of communality. The inability to trust friends and even family had led to

deep scars and an atrophy of mutuality and sharing.

What happens when that all-powerful authority disappears, when the caretaking enemy is

gone? As Communist governments were overthrown, leaving social economic chaos in their wake,

it was at last safe to express the long pent-up anger at the Communist leaders. For many,

Communist equals Jew was an equation in the collective psychology.8

Anger and blame went to the departing enemy. But new enemies must be found as well, and

old enmities were revived. A Czech journalist asserted, "the politics of Slovakia is looking for an

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enemy-everybody who is different."

In the Czech lands-Bohemia and Moravia-there is some anti-Semitism, but the most intense

feelings are directed at Gypsies. Indeed it has been suggested that the intense resentment of the

large Gypsy population had defused feelings that otherwise might have targeted Jews. The Gypsies

have been the object of brutal attacks by young toughs, but the

attitudes of ethnocentric resentment are maintained by Czech intelligentsia as well. A Czech

diplomat, shaking his head in disgust, stated:

They, the Gypsies] are responsible for most of the crime. They are lazy, and shiftless, and don't

hold regular jobs. And they have all of these children. It makes me angry that there are these

special welfare programs for them, when the money should be going to the hard working

people of this country.9

Similar feelings were voiced in Hungary where there is also strong anti-Gypsy feeling. When the

main opposition party in Hungary called attention to the plight of the gypsies, they were

characterized in leading newspapers as "the party of the gypsies and the Jews," and they

demonstrably lost standing in the polls because of their principled stand.

The intensity of the nationalistic passions and associated violence has several roots. In the first

place, after decades of suppression under socialist rule, the intense expression of nationalism

represents an exaggerated search for identity, which, as we have seen, depends fundamentally upon

difference. At the same time, the forty years of socialist rule did indeed lead to "a deformation of

personality," characterized by societal paranoia, an atrophy of personal responsibility and initiative

and an expectation of being cared for, however badly, by the totalitarian leadership. With the

disappearance of that leadership, the populace is floundering. The long-sought freedom is

frightening, as it emphasizes individual identity and responsibility, long suppressed qualities.

When the powerful disappear, the powerless do not easily succeed them. There must be

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someone to blame for the chaos left behind. Who is behind the devastating economic dislocation?

Being for so long accustomed to (justly) blame their own government, it was an easy transition to

continue to externalize blame. If, as in Poland, there is no clear internal enemy, one will be created

from the country's social history. The political and economic instability in Eastern and Central

Europe in the wake of the loss of the Communist enemy is ripe territory for the demagogue

exploiting the paranoid dynamic and scapegoating. Throughout the region, demagogues have

provided meaning for the distressed population by identifying new enemies and reviving old

enmities.

NOTES

1. This paper is drawn from Chapter Four, "The Need for Enemies: Nationalism, Terrorism and

Paranoid Mass Movements, Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred (with Robert

Robins), New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.

2. A major contributor to political psychology is the psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan. In his study The

Need to Have Enemies and Allies, Volkan traces the roots of international conflict to the crib,

persuasively demonstrating that fear and hatred of the stranger is deeply rooted in the human

psyche. The theoretical formulations in this paper draw significance from Volkan's work.

3. Melanie Klein uses the term "objects" to refer not only to persons and physical objects, but also

to abstract concepts such as capitalism and racial homogeneity We all have these "objects" in our

minds (the idea of capitalism, the idea of the president), and to the extent that our behavior is

determined by psychological forces, it is determined by the nature and relation among these mental

objects. Kicinian theory~ for this reason, is called object relations theory Klein's major theoretical

and clinical contributions can be found in her Contributions to Psychoanalysis.

4. This is not to imply that the fear of enemies is always a psychological distortion. If the paranoid

dynamic is expressed in the mobilization of a mass movement, it can lead to war. And for the

nation at war, it is not paranoid to fear the enemy. Thus the paranoid appeal, a fantasy at first, can

come to be a reality Just as individual paranoids create genuine enemies, so will groups and even

nations create theirs in war. When the paranoid group finds itself at war with the larger society (as

do religious cults and terrorist organizations), or paranoid nations with other nations, the paranoid

fears are realized. They are out there, and, for the nation at war, it is true that it is us versus them

and that they will destroy us unless we attack them and are successful. If the incentive to join a

mass movement is collective feelings of fragmentation and isolation, going to war cements the

alienated into a cohesive united whole. For each party to the war, the aggression is defensive,

justified, indeed required, by the external enemy.

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5. The situation is at its most extreme when there is major Socio-economic incongruity between

adjoining groups. That is, hostility at the boundary is most intense when one group is rich and the

other is poor, and where languages differ, so that one ethnic group looks upon the other with

contempt or bitter envy.

6. Demoskop Research Agency "Democracy Economic Reform and Western Assistance in Poland."

7. Interview, November 1991, Warsaw.

8. Even though Jews rarely rose to senior levels, in fact Jews were represented in disproportionate

numbers in the Communist party. Both in the Soviet Union and the socialist nations of Eastern

Europe, the prospect of eradicating expressions of nationalism meant the prospect of eradicating

expressions of anti-Semitism. Thus it was that many Jews joined the Communist Party in the hope

of finding asylum from persecution. Of course, Jews also had impeccable anti-Nazi credentials.

9. Personal communication, November 1991, senior minister, government of Czechoslovakia.

1 This chapter is drawn from The Loss of Enemies, Fragmenting Identities, and

the Resurgence of Ethnic/Nationalist Hatred and Anti-Semitism in Eastern

Europe, Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, Vol. 1, # 2, Fall, 1996.