REVIEW

France, Germany and the New Europe, by F. Roy Willis. Revised and Expanded Edition. Oxford University Press, 1968. pp. xiv and 431. ssl-

Professor Willis’s lucidly written book about the evolution of the French-German relationship since the end of World War II and its influence on the endeavours for European unification rovides a fascinating case study of national-international politica? linkages. At the same time, the book puts into stark relief the great aspirations for transforming the traditional nation-state system of Western Europe, that has repeatedly been the source of so much misery for mankind, into a more rational region-wide system and the failures in achieving this transformation. These failures have lefi today few realistic hopes and much scepticism in the minds and hearts of most Europeans about progress towards a United States of Euro e.

a crucial role in any effort to bring about political integration in Europe. In this context, it is interesting to read again in WiUis’s book some of de Gaulle’s highly significant statements made as early as the Gll of 1945. The Rhine was no more to be a barrier, but a ‘western bond’. The states bordering on the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees were to ‘ oh together on the political, economic, and strategic plane, and the evolving or anization was to be one of three ‘fanetary powers’ which, if n y should be ‘the arbiter etween Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps (p. 16). In pursuit of these aims France placed during the first few ’ears after World

the German people, ‘to make them worthy of a place in the moral and cultural community of Europe, notabl by cathartic acquain-

these French efforts have had a measure of lasting success; they re- awakened German admiration for French culture, a tradition of varying intensity dating back to Frederic the Great, and they led to the twinning of many French and German cities. While it would be impru- dent to overestimate the significance of the latter development, it provides at least a potential base for periodic border-crossing contacts.

On the other hand, such roblems as the severe French reparations

Undoubtedly, the French-German reationship f is bound to play

War II a high priority on the reeducation and d emocratization of

tance with the best of France’s own cultural l eritage’ (p. 32). Indeed,

17:

policy, the EDC fiasco, and tg e question of the Saarput a heavy strain on 0

172 JOURNAL OF COMMON JdARKET STUDES

the French-German relationship during the Igso's. Yet, the new-found ties between France and Germany did not collapse. Rather, aided by the early successes of the European Communities and the strong interest of Adenauer in this relationship, they culminated early in 1963 in the French-German Friendship Treaty.

This treaty is examined and evaluated by Professor Willis in the last chapter of his book, which has been added in the revised edition. One wonders whether the author does not underestimate the continuing significance and underlying strength of this Treaty. Perhaps it was the rather persistent scepticism of much of the German Press regarding this Treaty during the ups and downs of the French-German relationship &om 1963 to 1967 which influenced Professor Willis in his judgments. Or perhaps he identified himself too much with the views of Ehrhard and Schroeder who, following the American attempts to pull the Federal Republic away fiom France after the blows de Gaulle had dealt Euro- pean unification and NATO, were prepared to de-emphasize the French-German relationship and perhaps let the treaty succumb to a quiet death.

Willis does underscore the importance of the youth programme created by the treaty, but there is more to it. While the major foreign policy goals of the two artners have not been synchronized to any

issues between high-ranking officials below the top level of the French and German foreign ministries. There has also been a measure of mili- tary collaboration between the two countries which, though quite modest, may expand in the future. And as Willis points out 'f. 287), there has been an increasing amount of transnational business co abora- tion between German and French firms in the last few years, of which the planned joint construction of the Airbus is only the latest example. In fact, more German and French firms are engaged in mutual collabora- tions than those of any other EEC country.' While it is impossible to measure exactly the contribution of the Treaty to this development, it suggests the underlying strength of the French-German relationship.

In many respects the French-German Friendship Treaty is a copy of the Fouchet Plan writ small. It provides an instrument for political consultations within predetermined periodic intervals which, as far as the Common Market is concerned, supplement and often prepare the discussions in the EEC Council of Ministers. Such an instrument would have been available to all the Common Market partners if the Dutch and Belgians had accepted the Fouchet proposals in 1962. The Fouchet mechanism need not have been a substitute for the decision-making

1968). pp. z o h .

substantial degree, there K as been close co-operation on a number of

* CEPES, Crenturbnrrhreifmdc U~fmhmungsbopmufim it^ h E W G (Stuttgart, Forkcl Vulag,

REVIEWS I 73

apparatus of the Treaty of Rome as was feared, but a supplementary institution where some of the pertinent political questions could have been thrashed out. Since everybody had a veto, no country could have dominated the proceedings. The current efforts to use the WEU for a similar purpose points up a need that should have been recognized by the opponents of the Fouchet Plan seven or eight years ago. Although in view of de Gaulle’s ambitions and concepts, it would have been unrealistic to expect the consultations to result in quick resolutions of opposing viewpoints, a permanent forum for political bargaining would have existed and at a minimum the mechanism could have served as safety valve in the event of very severe disputes. This is precisely what the semi-annual consultations between de Gaulle and the German chancellors have accomplished: disagreements could be dis- cussed between the two partners and bases for understanding and agreement, no matter how small, could be defined. Chancellor Kie- singer’s efforts at continuing French-German co-operation under the Treaty in spite of sharp divergencies of view on major issues such as Britain’s entry into the Common Market and NATO reflect sound policy in the opinion of this observer, because no realistic plans can be laid for an eventual unification of Europe without such co-operation. Clearly, the Nixon administration’s new approach to Europe a pears

earlier United States policy of confronting Germany with the unwanted choice between Washington and Paris. There is no reason why Germany cannot have friendly relations with both the United States and France.

Great Britain’s entry into the Common Market may not so much depend on changes in the French government as on changes in the distribution of economic and political power among the West Euro- pean states. The continuing upsurge of German strength may well prompt the French government to look upon the entry of Britain and perhaps other European countries with new interest regardless of what the economic health of the United Kingdom may be. It is quite possible that the ‘Soames affair’ was an indication of such new interest on the part of the French and if the de Gaulle statements to Mr. Soames were indeed a fresh initiative, one may have mixed feelings about its handling by the British government. In any case, changing constellations of power in Western Europe may generate pressures for the enlargement of the Common Market and eventually for some kind of federation through which dis arate economic forces can be harnessed and political

Professor Willis‘s welldocumented book h i s h e s in concise form the necessary historical background which enables both the student of

to recognize this political reality and therefore is unlikely to f ollow

ambitions hope far y controlled.

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European affairs and the layman to obtain a greater insight into the com- plexities of European national and international politics. It should be recommended reading for both publics. An extensive bibliogra hy and a carefidy prepared index enhance the value of this excellent g ook.

Werner Feld Bmges