francisco vs hor

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Case Title: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,petitioner, vs. NAGMAMALASAKIT NAMGA MANANANGGOL NG MGAMANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.,ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,petitioner-in-intervention, WORLDWAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTEDBY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BYSENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.DRILON, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. ANDREPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIMEN. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention., SEDFREY M.CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA,JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD,petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO D.MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINOQUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTINGSPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVEFELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO,respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention., ARTUROM. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLDWAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc.

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.*

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, vs.NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGAMANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS ANDMEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD WAR IIVETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G.DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIXWILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO,respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003.*

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. ANDHENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO D.MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKEROR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKERJOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINM. DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003.*

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG,petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, ANDJOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF

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* EN BANC.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 415

SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITYAS SPEAKER OF, FRANCISCO I.CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR IIVETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE

VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY ASPRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THEREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIXWILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIOLEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIMBERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINOLIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS,SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUISBERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGARERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUELDANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR.,CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS,AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTOSEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN,SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DELDE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON,LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERICSINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSESOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINOTEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIOMACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADOESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR.,JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLOBONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN,PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAELDUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLILAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO,GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS

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VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 45


THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003.*

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OFTHE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA,JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN,MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS,DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN,JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE,ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON,JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO,FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSECARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN,SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDEBAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO,ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERICSINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO,HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS,ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADOESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUANPABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUOYLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS,CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCISESCUDERO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIOBADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA,JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETASUAREZ, RODOLFO PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUANMIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINAJOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN,RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLERBARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO

GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCISESCUDERO, RENE VELARDE, CELSOLOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES,DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAMMITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO,ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLFO PLAZA, JVBAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO,CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,BENASING MACARAMBON, JR.,JOSEFINA JOSON, MARKCOJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN,RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELOMONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA,JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS,RODOLFO, HERMINIO HARRY L.ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P.SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI,petitioners, WORLD WAR II

VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKERJOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. ANDROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HISCAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERALOF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention., SALACNIB F. BATERINAAND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAULM.GONZALES, petitioners, WORLDWAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THESPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSEG. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITSPRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT

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ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ,respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003.*

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR.AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO,

respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003.*

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAULM.GONZALES, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATORAQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003.*

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO,EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDONAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIOMENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS,NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TO

PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENTFRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention., LEONILO R. ALFONSO,PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMONMIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO,EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDOSARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE,LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARDSMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA,MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMOCASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TO,PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC.,CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DEVENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINESENATE, respondents., ATTY.FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HISCAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THEINTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES, MANILA III, ANDENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ, JR., INHIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER ANDMEMBER OF THE ENGINEERINGPROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESREPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLEMEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BYHON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA, respondents.,

INTEGRATED BAR OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTINGSPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,SPEAKER, CLARO B. FLORES,petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THESPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATEPRESIDENT, respondents., U.P. LAWALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC.,

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QUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICOPABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P.GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ,HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., ELDELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTOBUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNACLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIERQUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIOLIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U.SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAURESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR,petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKERJOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BYHON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIXFUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003.*

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES,petitioners, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALLMEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS,PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003.*

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AMEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ, JR., IN HISCAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THEENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLEMEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVEWILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003.*

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKEROR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER

ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC.,GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILOV. ORTIZ, GLORIA C.ESTENZORAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO,LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S.RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B.CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FORTHEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OFOTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLICOF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, TIIESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINDRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVESFELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTOTEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND ASREPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUPOF MORE THAN 80 HOUSEREPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNEDAND FILED THE IMPEACHMENTCOMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREMECOURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR., respondents., FR.RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO,petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLEPRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THEHONORABLE SPEAKER OF THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents., NILO A. MALANYAON,petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTTEODORO, IN REPRESENTA,VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L.HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THEHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DEVENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,respondents., IN THE MATTER OFTHE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINTAGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.,PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION,petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THESPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,

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JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINESTHROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINM. DRILON, respondents.

G.R. No. 160360. November 10, 2003.*

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATEPRESIDENT, respondents.

G.R. No. 160365. November 10, 2003.*

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZORAMOS,LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVAG. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND INBEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, TIIESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENTFRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIXFUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVESAND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORETHAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED ANDFILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREMECOURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 160370. November 10, 2003.*

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THEHONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THEHONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

G.R. No. 160376. November 10, 2003.*

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTA

SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,

HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVEFELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.,DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS,PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITYCHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE,VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIALBOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY,DEAN OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW,UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNGLAWYERS ASSOCIATION OF CEBU,INC. [YLAC], REPRESENTED BY ATTY.MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATIONOF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC.],REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R.POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERSASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],REPRESENTED BY FELIPEVELASQUEZ, FEDERACIONINTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS

Citation: 415 SCRA 44More...

Search Result1. G.R. No. 160261. November 10,

2003. [*EN BANC.] ERNESTO B.FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, vs.NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGAMANANANGGOL NG MGAMANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.,ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS,petitioner-in-intervention, WORLDWAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTEDBY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BYSENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.DRILON, REPRESENTATIVEGILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. ANDREPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIME

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VOL. 415, NOVEMBER 10, 2003 49


TION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OFIMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITSSPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

G.R. No. 160392. November 10, 2003.*

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGHSPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THEPHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLINDRILON, respondents.

G.R. No. 160397. November 10, 2003.*

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINTAGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY.DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.

G.R. No. 160403. November 10, 2003.*

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER ORPRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THESENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATEPRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003.*

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITYCHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBUPROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARDMEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEGE OFLAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERSASSOCIATION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRESENTED BYATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OFACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.[CAMP, INC.], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA,MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACIONINTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS

FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAIMEN. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. G.R. No. 160262.November 10, 2003. [*EN BANC

2. . [*EN BANC.] ARTURO M. DECASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLDWAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OFTHE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS

SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G.DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITYAS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. G.R. No. 160277.November 10, 2003.* FRANCISCOI. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WARII VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THEPHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DEVENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY ASSPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M.DRILON, IN HIS

3. .] SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA,CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. ANDHENEDINA RAZON-ABAD,petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO D.MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINOQUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANSLEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, THROUGHTHE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKEROR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKERJOSE G. DE VENECIA,REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVEFELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA,THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE

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[FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G.CO, PRESIDENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ANDINDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITOFLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OFCOMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DEVENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, ASSENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.

Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; Checks andBalances; The Supreme Courts power of judicial review is conferred on thejudicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of theConstitution; In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the onlyconstitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the properallocation of powers between the several departments and among theintegral or constituent units thereof.This Courts power of judicial reviewis conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, ArticleVIII of our present 1987 Constitution: SECTION 1. The judicial powershall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may beestablished by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justiceto settle actual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there hasbeen a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionon the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasissupplied) Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustivelyexpounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case ofAngara v. Electoral Commission after the effectivity of the 1935Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did notcontain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on whatjudicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed: x x x In times ofsocial disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of theConstitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organwhich can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powersbetween the several departments and among the integral or constituentunits thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The executive and legislative branches ofthe government effectively acknowledged the power of judicial review inArticle 7 of the Civil Code.In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902,decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power ofjudicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionallyinfirm acts. And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former

THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATEPRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO,respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,respondent-in-intervention. G.R. No.160263. November 10, 2003

4. CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OFTHE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES, GILBERTTEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAMFUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV,HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS,DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWINGATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR.,NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTONIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAELMATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA,ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIACARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITOAQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSECARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA,

ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO,CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DEGUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DYIII, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANORUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDOBANAAG, ERIC SINGSON

5. insidious scheme of theminority members of the House ofRepresentatives is successful, thisCourt found the requisites forintervention had been complied with.Alleging that the issues raised in thepetitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,160295, and 160310 were oftranscendental importance, WorldWar II Veterans Legionnaires of thePhilippines, Inc. filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave toIntervene to raise the additionalissue of whether or not the second

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Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the executive and legislativebranches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power ofjudicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit: Article 7. Laws arerepealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observanceshall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. Whenthe courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, theformer shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative orexecutive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are notcontrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial review is indeed an integralcomponent of the delicate system of checks and balances which, togetherwith the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock ofour republican form of government and insures that its vast powers areutilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.As indicatedin Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integralcomponent of the delicate system of checks and balances which, togetherwith the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock ofour republican form of government and insures that its vast powers areutilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. Theseparation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of

government.It obtains not through express provision but by actual divisionin our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusivecognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within itsown sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers areto be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to beabsolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitutionhas provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to securecoordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power todetermine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts voidif violative of the Constitution. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; Wherever possible,the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed.To determine the merits of theissues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn tothe Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles ofconstitutional construction. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible,the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, this Court, speaking through ChiefJustice Enrique Fernando, declared: We look to the language of thedocument itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stopthere, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words inwhich consti-

issue of whether or not the secondimpeachment complaint against theChief Justice is valid and based onany of the grounds prescribed by theConstitution. Finding thatNagmamalasakit na mgaManananggol ng mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al

6. . and World War II VeteransLegionnaires of the Philippines, Inc.possess a legal interest in the matterin litigation the respective motions tointervene were hereby granted.Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on theother hand, sought to intervene forthe limited purpose of making ofrecord and arguing a point of viewthat differs with Senate PresidentDrilons. He alleges that submittingto this Courts jurisdiction as theSenate President does willundermine the independence of theSenate which will sit as animpeachment court once the Articlesof Impeachment are transmitted toit from the House ofRepresentatives. Clearly, SenatorPimentel possesses a legal interest inthe matter in litigation, he

7. the 12th Congress, theconstitutionality of which isquestioned. The questioned actshaving been carried out, i.e., thesecond impeachment complaint hadbeen filed with the House ofRepresentatives and the 2001Rules have already been alreadypromulgated and enforced, theprerequisite that the allegedunconstitutional act should beaccomplished and performed beforesuit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, hasbeen complied with.

8. standing. With respect to themotions for intervention, Rule 19,Section 2 of the Rules of Court

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tutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical termsare employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essentialfor the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoplesconsciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood inthe sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of theprovision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of thecourts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the peoplemean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need forconstruction is reduced to a minimum. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Same; Same; Same; The words of the Constitution should beinterpreted in accordance with the intent of the framersratio legis estanimathe object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers ofthe Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought tobe accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make thewords consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of theConstitution should be interpreted in accordance with the Intent of itsframers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Unionv. Executive Secretary in this wise: A foolproof yardstick in constitutionalconstruction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution shouldbear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and theevils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision willbe examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition andcircumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is toascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enactthe particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby,in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to thatreason and calculated to effect that purpose. (Emphasis and italicssupplied)

Same; Same; Same; The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole

ut magis valeat quam pereat.Ut magis valeat quam pereat. TheConstitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. DeLeon, this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared: x x x[T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated aprovision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person withoutconsidering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2,they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the fullextent of its substance and its terms, not itself alone, but in con junctionwith all other provisions of that great document. (Emphasis and italicssupplied)

Section 2 of the Rules of Courtrequires an intervenor to possess alegal interest in the matter inlitigation, or in the success of eitherof the parties, or an interest againstboth, or is so situated as to beadversely affected by a distributionor other disposition of property inthe custody of the court or of anofficer thereof. While intervention isnot a matter of right, it may bepermitted by the courts when theapplicant shows facts which satisfythe requirements of the lawauthorizing intervention.[92Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Courtof Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531(1999) citing Gibson vs. Revilla, 92SCRA 219; Magsaysay

9. -Labrador v. Court of Appeals,180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989).] InIntervenors Attorneys RomuloMacalintal and Pete Quirino Quadrascase, they seek to join petitionersCandelaria, et al. in G.R. No.160262. Since, save for oneadditional issue, they raise the sameissues and the same standing, andno objection on the part ofpetitioners Candelaria, et al. hasbeen interposed, this Court as earlierstated, granted the Motion for Leaveof Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention. Nagmamalasakit namga Manananggol ng mgaManggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al.sought to join petitioner Franciscoin G.R. No, 160261. Invoking theirright as citizens to intervene,alleging that they will suffer if this

10. suffice to clothe him withstanding. Ripeness and PrematurityIn Tan v. Macapagal, [95Supra note81.] this Court, through Chief JusticeFernando, held that for a case to beconsidered ripe for adjudication, it isa prerequisite that something had bythen been accomplished orperformed by either branch before a

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Same; Same; Same; If the plain meaning of the word is not found to beclear, resort to other aids is available; The proper interpretation of aconstitutional provision depends more on how it was understood by thepeople adopting it than the framers understanding thereof.If, however,the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aidsis available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. ExecutiveSecretary, this Court expounded: While it is permissible in this jurisdictionto consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention inorder to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedingsare powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning isclear. Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing theviews of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for theirvotes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority whodid not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at thepolls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it saferto construe the constitution from what appears upon its face. The properinterpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by thepeople adopting it than in the framers understanding thereof. (Emphasisand italics supplied)

Same; Same; Impeachment; American jurisprudence and authoritieson impeachment, much less the American Constitution, are of dubiousapplication for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction andhave only limited persuasive merit as Philippine constitutional law isconcerned; Although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins tothat of the United States, their paths of development have long sincedivergedin the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut theumbilical cord.Respondents and intervenors reliance upon Americanjurisprudence, the Americana Constitution and American authoritiescannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senates sole powerto try and decide impeachment cases, as provided for under Art. XI, Sec.3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutionalcommitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, tothe total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain anygrave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably supportthe interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate theinherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident toimpeachment proceedings. Said American jurisprudence and authorities,much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for theseare no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limitedpersuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. Asheld in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, [i]n resolving constitutionaldisputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence someof which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated bydifferent constitutional settings and needs. Indeed, although thePhilippine Constitution can trace its

performed by either branch before acourt may come into the picture.[96Id., at p. 681.] Only then maythe courts pass on the validity ofwhat was done, if and when thelatter is challenged in an appropriatelegal proceeding. The instantpetitions raise in the main the issueof the validity of the filing of thesecond impeachment complaintagainst the Chief Justice inaccordance with the HouseImpeachment Rules adopted by

More...

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origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have longsince diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, [w]e have cut theumbilical cord.

Same; Same; Same; The major difference between the judicial power ofthe Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is thatwhile the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to thePhilippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for inthe Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given anexpanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality; Thereare also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and thePhilippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House ofRepresentatives over impeachment proceedings.The major differencebetween the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that ofthe U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is onlyimpliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary innature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, asexpressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also aduty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power tocorrect any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any governmentbranch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between theU.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to thepower of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings.While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to theHouse of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, thoughvesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiateimpeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of suchpower as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof.These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

Same; Same; Same; The Constitution did not intend to leave the matterof impeachment to the sole discretion of Congressit provided for certainwell-defined limits, or judicially discoverable standards for determiningthe validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicialreview.Respondents are also of the view that judicial review ofimpeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflictsbetween Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court toexercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that whenever possible,the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressedlegislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness andpride. But did not the people also express their will when they institutedthe above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that theConstitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the solediscre-

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tion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or inthe language of Baker v. Carr, judicially discoverable standards fordetermining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through thepower of judicial review.

Same; Same; Same; Checks and Balances; There exists noconstitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial reviewover impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and

balances.There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that theexercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset thesystem of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpretedas a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Bothare integral components of the calibrated system of independence andinterdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond thepowers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Same; Same; Requisites for Judicial Review.As clearly stated inAngara v. Electoral Commission, the courts power of judicial review, likealmost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to severallimitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for theexercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must havestanding to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interestin the case such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as aresult of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must beraised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue ofconstitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; The gist to thequestion of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in theoutcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends forillumination of difficult constitutional questions.Locus standi or legalstanding has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in thecase such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as aresult of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of thequestion of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in theoutcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends forillumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Real-Party-in-Interest; The rule onreal-party-in-interest is a concept of civil procedure while the rule onstanding has constitutional underpinningsthe question as to real partyin interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured bythe judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit while thequestion of standing is whether such party have alleged such a personal

56



stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concreteadverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the courtso largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutionalissues.There is, however, a difference between the rule on real party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civilprocedure while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. In view of thearguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiteratethe ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato to clarify what is meant by locusstandi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest. The differencebetween the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted byauthorities thus: It is important to note . . . that standing because of itsconstitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different fromquestions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party ininterest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements aredirected towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain anaction, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits,as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of thejudiciary in certain areas. Standing is a special concern in constitutionallaw because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have beenpersonally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, butby concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the publicinterest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties havealleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to

assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation ofissues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficultconstitutional questions. x x x On the other hand, the question as to realparty in interest is whether he is the party who would be benefited orinjured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. (Citations omitted)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizens Suits; When suing as a citizen, theinterest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must bedirect and personal.When suing as a citizen, the interest of thepetitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct andpersonal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or anygovernment act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminentdanger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, andnot merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appearthat the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some rightor privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to besubjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or actcomplained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of apublic right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement ofpersonal interest.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Taxpayers Suits; In the case of a taxpayer,he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegallydisbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper

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purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcementof an invalid or unconstitutional law; Courts are vested with discretion asto whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.In the case of ataxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds areillegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improperpurpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through theenforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke thepower of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he hassufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised bytaxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of theenforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient thathe has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Atall events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not ataxpayers suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing tomost of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impendingtransmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuingtrial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of publicfunds.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislators Suits; For a legislator, he isallowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claimsinfringes his prerogatives as a legislator.As for a legislator, he is allowedto sue to question the validity of any official action which he claimsinfringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House ofRepresentatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Associations Suits; While an associationhas legal personality to represent its members, especially when it iscomposed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vitalinterests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines orany member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of lawand nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe itwith standing.While an association has legal personality to represent itsmembers, especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and theoutcome will affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of

the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, althoughundoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest istoo general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However,a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issueswhich deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court torelax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Class Suits; When dealing with class suitsfiled in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently nu-

58



merous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court todeal properly with all interests involved in the suit, and where it clearlyappears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown bythe divergent issues raised, a class suit ought to fail.In the same vein,when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, personsintervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests ofall concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interestsinvolved in the suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable orunfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on allmembers of the class whether or not they were before the court. Where itclearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented asshown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before thisCourt, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitionersadditionally allege standing ascitizens and taxpayers, however, theirpetition will stand.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; TranscendentalImportance, Explained; There being no doctrinal definition oftranscendental importance, the following instructive determinants areinstructive(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in thecase, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional orstatutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality ofthe government, and, (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct andspecific interest in raising the questions being raised; In not a few cases, theSupreme Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on locus standi of apetitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendentalsignificance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramountimportance to the public.There being no doctrinal definition oftranscendental importance, the following instructive determinantsformulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano areinstructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in thecase; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional orstatutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentalityof the government; and, (3) the lack of any other party with a more directand specific interest in raising the questions being raised. Applying thesedeterminants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein areindeed of transcendental importance. In not a few cases, this Court has infact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where thepetitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to thepeople, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to thepublic. Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement thata party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A partymust, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it notbeing one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejoscase, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus havestanding.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention; An intervenor must possess alegal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of theparties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adverselyaffected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody ofthe court or of an officer thereof.With respect to the motions forintervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires anintervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in thesuccess of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situatedas to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of propertyin the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is nota matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicantshows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizingintervention.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A Senator possesses a legal interestin the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against whichthe petitions are directed.Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand,sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record andarguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilons. Healleges that submitting to this Courts jurisdiction as the Senate Presidentdoes will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as animpeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to itfrom the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses alegal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congressagainst which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and tofully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, hisMotion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed toargue.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; A motion to intervene as ataxpayer will be denied where such party fails to allege that there willresult an illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money beingdeflected to any improper purpose; A lawyers mere interest as a member ofthe Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.As to Jaime N.Sorianos motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while heasserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standingrequirement for bringing taxpayers suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, to wit: x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve theexpenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitionersallege that their tax money is being extracted and spent in violation ofspecific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power, orthat there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, orthat public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither dopetitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds throughthe enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Citations omitted)In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allegethat

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the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds orin public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, hismere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him withstanding.

Same; Same; Same; Ripeness and Prematurity; For a case to beconsidered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had bythen been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court maycome into the picture.In Tan v. Macapagal, this Court, through ChiefJustice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe foradjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had by then beenaccomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come intothe picture. Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what wasdone, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legalproceeding.

Same; Same; Same; Justiciability; Political Questions; Separation ofPowers; Words and Phrases; The term political question connotes, in legalparlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policyit refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to bedecided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which fulldiscretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executivebranch of the Government.In the leading case of Taada v. Cuenco,Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term political question,viz.: [T]he term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what itmeans in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words,in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to those questionswhich, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in theirsovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority hasbeen delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of aparticular measure. (Italics in the original)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prior to the 1973 Constitution,without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, theSupreme Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases whichinvolved political questions; The frequency with which the Court invokedthe political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certaincases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, whenhe became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify the Courts power ofjudicial review and its application on issues involving political questions.Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seeminglywithout any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of takingcognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, thisCourt hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused toexercise its power of judicial review. In other cases, however, despite theseeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed

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jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers orfunctions conferred upon political bodies. Even in the landmark 1988 caseof Javellana v. Executive Secretary which raised the issue of whether the1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted thepolitical question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by thepeople of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decidedby the people in their sovereign capacity. The frequency with which thisCourt invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdictionover certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief JusticeConcepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarifythis Courts power of judicial review and its application on issues involvingpolitical questions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; From the record of theproceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicialpower is not only a powerit is also a duty, a duty which cannot beabdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political questiondoctrine.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only apower; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the merespecter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief JusticeConcepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII wasnot intended to do away with truly political questions. From thisclarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions:

(1) truly political questions and (2) those which are not truly politicalquestions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Truly political questions arebeyond judicial review while courts can review questions which are nottruly political in nature.Truly political questions are thus beyond judicialreview, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to bemaintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of theConstitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political innature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Standards for DeterminingPolitical Questions; Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does notdefine what are justiciable political questions and non justiciable politicalquestions, and identification of these two species of political questions maybe problematic.Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution does not definewhat are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable politicalquestions, however. Identification of these two species of politicalquestions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. TheAmerican case of Baker v. Carrattempts to provide some: x x x Prominenton the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found atextually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to acoordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable andmanageable standards

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for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policydetermination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or theimpossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution withoutexpressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or anunusual, need for questioning adherence to a political decision alreadymade; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifariouspronouncements by various departments on one question. (Italics supplied)Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) atextually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to acoordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable andmanageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of decidingwithout an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicialdiscretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but areinterrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusionthat the others are also present.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The problem inapplying the standards provided in Baker v. Carr, 227 U.S. 100 (1993), isthat the American concept of judicial review is radically different from thecurrent Philippine concept, for the Constitution provides our courts with farless discretion in determining whether they should pass upon aconstitutional issue; In our jurisdiction, the determination of a trulypolitical question from a non-justiciable political question lies in theanswer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limitson powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.The problem inapplying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicialreview is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, ArticleVIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion indetermining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue. In ourjurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whetherthere are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferredupon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound toexamine whether the branch or instrumentality of the governmentproperly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply thisstandard to the present controversy.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Impeachment; Words and

Phrases; A determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense is apurely political question which the Constitution has left to the sounddiscretion of the legislatureit is beyond the scope of the Supreme Courtsjudicial power; Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitutionenumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of theseother high crimesand betrayal of public trustelude a precise definition.It is a well-settledmaxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of agovernmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case

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of Sotto v. Commission on Elections, this Court held: x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutionalquestion and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless suchquestion is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the recordalso presents some other ground upon which the court may rest itsjudgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question willbe left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon suchquestion will be unavoidable. [Emphasis and italics supplied] Succinctlyput, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is trulyunavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.

Same; Same; Same; Lis Mota; It is a well-settled maxim ofadjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmentalact should be avoided whenever possible.The first issue goes into themerits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has nojurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would requirethis Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachableoffense. Such a determination is a purely political question which theConstitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such anintent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates sixgrounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes andbetrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examinationof the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that theframers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries ofbetrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to bothpositive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cutdefinition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon thiscourt to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond thescope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is guided by the relatedcanon of adjudication that it should not form a rule of constitutional lawbroader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.Notedearlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidityof the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise severalconstitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy couldpossibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of theremaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guidedby the related canon of adjudication that the court should not form a ruleof constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to whichit is applied.

Same; Same; Legislative Inquiries; Standard of Conduct for theConduct of Legislative Inquiries.En passant, this Court notes that astandard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already beenenunciated

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by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, viz.: The1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses ofCongress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,Article VI thereof provides: The Senate or the House of Representatives orany of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislationin accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights ofpersons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Thepower of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislationis not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by theaforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, theinvestigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its dulypublished rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing inor affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that therights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including theright to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify againstones self.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political Questions; JudicialRestraint; The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not anoption before the Supreme Court, otherwise the Court would be shirkingfrom its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the ConstitutionTheexercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option beforethis Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is notlegally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no othertribunal to which the controversy may be referred. Otherwise, this Courtwould be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of theConstitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court isduty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the augustwords of amicus curiae Father Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; itis a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it isvexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even in cases where it is aninterested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibititself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has theauthority to do so.Even in cases where it is an interested party, theCourt under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must ruleupon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. Onthe occasion that this Court had been an interested party to thecontroversy before it, it has acted upon the matter not with officiousnessbut in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, withdetachment and fairness. After all, by [his] appointment to the office, thepublic has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] ismentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their variedcontentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his]pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interestor power and to be equipped

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with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his]office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Seven Pillars of Limitations of thePower of Judicial Review.In Demetria v. Alba, this Court, throughJustice Marcelo Fernan cited the seven pillars of limitations of the powerof judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis inAshwander v. TVA as follows: 1. The Court will not pass upon theconstitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,declining because to decide such questions is legitimate only in the last

resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vitalcontroversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by meansof a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to thecourts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act. 2. TheCourt will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of thenecessity of deciding it. . . . It is not the habit of the Court to decidequestions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to adecision of the case. 3. The Court will not formulate a rule ofconstitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which itis to be applied. 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional questionalthough properly presented by the record, if there is also present someother ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has foundmost varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of twogrounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question ofstatutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of aquestion under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed becausethe judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. 5. TheCourt will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of onewho fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the manyapplications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the rightof challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, thechallenge by a public official interested only in the performance of hisofficial duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Courtaffirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to havethe Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertainedalthough made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens. 6. TheCourt will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instanceof one who has availed himself of its benefits. 7. When the validity of anact of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt ofconstitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court willfirst ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible bywhich the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The possibility of the occurrence of aconstitutional crisis is not a reason for the Supreme Court to refrain fromupholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.RespondentsSpeaker de Venecia, et al. raise another argument for judicial restraint thepossibility that judicial review of impeachments might also lead toembarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary. Theystress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts ofinterest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusingand humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad ifthe judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove animpeachable official. Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by allegingthat failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress wouldresult in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode publicconfidence and faith in the judiciary. Such an argument, however, isspecious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, thepossibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason forthis Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachmentcases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just becausetheir action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Impeachment; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; Initiate ofcourse is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin,to commence, or set going.The resolution of this issue thus hinges on theinterpretation of the term initiate. Resort to statutory construction is,therefore, in order. That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of theConstitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became anAssociate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of initiate as tofile, as proffered and explained by Constitutional CommissionerMaambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he(Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oralarguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which headded that the act of initiating included the act of taking initial action onthe complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word initiate as ittwice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file thecomplaint and take initial action on it. Initiate of course is understood byordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or setgoing. As Websters Third New International Dictionary of the EnglishLanguage concisely puts it, it means to perform or facilitate the firstaction, which jibes with Justice Regalados position, and that of FatherBernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitionson November 5, 2003.

Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the framers intended initiation tostart with the filing of the complaint.It is thus clear that the framersintended initiation to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicuscuriae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that the obvious reason

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in deleting the phrase to initiate impeachment proceedings as containedin the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make itunderstood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedingsstarts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of theHouse in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachmentproceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verifiedcomplaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution.Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same viewas is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 ConstitutionalCommission, that the word initiate as used in Article XI, Section 3(5)means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompaniedby an action to set the complaint moving.

Same; Same; Same; Reddendo Singula Singulis; The term cases mustbe distinguished from the term proceedingsan impeachment case is thelegal controversy that must be decided by the Senate but before a decision ismade to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed toarrive at a conclusion, and such proceeding must be initiated in theHouse of Representatives.Father Bernas explains that in these twoprovisions, the common verb is to initiate. The object in the first sentenceis impeachment case. The object in the second sentence is impeachmentproceeding. Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the termcases must be distinguished from the term proceedings. Animpeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by theSenate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote ofone-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in thatsense that the House has exclusive power to initiate all cases ofimpeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is madeto initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed to arriveat a conclusion. A proceeding must be initiated. To initiate, which comesfrom the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end.It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of severalsteps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member ofthe House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Memberof the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of thiscomplaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaintor uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects orupholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House forfurther processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaintby the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable

resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote ofone-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Membersupholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared andtransmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House initiates animpeachment case. It is at this point that an impeachable public official issuccessfully impeached.

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That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment casebefore the Senate impeachment court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the Constitution understoodinitiation in its ordinary meaning.The framers of the Constitution alsounderstood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposalreached the floor proposing that A vote of at least one-third of all theMembers of the House shall be necessary . . . to initiate impeachmentproceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the groundthat the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding butrather the filing of a complaint does. Thus the line was deleted and is notfound in the present Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; From the records of the ConstitutionalCommission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former ConstitutionalCommissioners, it is without a doubt that the term to initiate refers to thefiling of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initialaction of said complaint; Once an impeachment complaint has beeninitiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against thesame official within a one year period.To the argument that only theHouse of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedingsbecause Section 3 (1) says The House of Representatives shall have theexclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment, This is a misreadingof said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singulasingulis by equating impeachment cases with impeachment proceeding.From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiaebriefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubtthat the term to initiate refers to the filing of the impeachmentcomplaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint.Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing andreferral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the HouseCommittee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the membersof the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once animpeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachmentcomplaint may not be filed against the same official within a one yearperiod.

Same; Separation of Powers; The power of Congress to promulgate itsrules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively carry out thepurpose of this section.the rules cannot contravene the very purpose ofthe Constitution; If Congress had absolute rule-making power, then itwould by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend themeaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.RespondentHouse of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, itis clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make andinterpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised onthe assump-

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Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.

tion that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. Thisassumption, however, is misplaced. Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides thatThe Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectivelycarry out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its power to promulgate itsrules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively carry out thepurpose of this section. Hence, these rules cannot contravene the verypurpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectivelycarry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for otherspecific limitations on its power to make rules, viz.: It is basic that all rulesmust not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If asalleged Congress had absolute rule-making power, then it would bynecessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of theConstitution without need of referendum.

Same; Same; Where the construction to be given to a rule affectspersons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomesjudicial in nature.In Osmea v. Pendatun, this Court held that it iswithin the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules andthat it was the best judge of what constituted disorderly behavior of itsmembers. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission onAppointments, Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speakingfor this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects personsother than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial innature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia, quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &Co., Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while theConstitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, itmay not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamentalrights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between themode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result whichis sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all mattersof method are open to the determination of the Legislature.

Same; Same; The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of theHouse Impeachment Rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI asthey give the term initiate a meaning different from filing.Theprovisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House ImpeachmentRules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1)if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verifiedcomplaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once theHouse itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justicethat the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substanceor (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of theHouse of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution ofimpeachment by at least 1/3 of the members

francisco vs hor

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