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SOCIAL SCIENCES

POLITICAL SCIENCE

GULF OF GUINEA AND SECURITY CHALLENGES:

THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

FRANK, NORNUBARI JOHNSON

PG/MSc/ 13/ 65464

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GULF OF GUINEA AND SECURITY CHALLENGES:

THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

BY

FRANK, NORNUBARI JOHNSON

PG/MSc/ 13/ 65464

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

UNIVESITY OF NIGERIA

NSUKKA

SEPTEMBER, 2014

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GULF OF GUINEA AND SECURITY CHALLENGES:

THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

BY

FRANK, NORNUBARI JOHNSON

PG/MSc/ 13/ 65464

A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

SUPERVISOR: DR H.C. EDEH

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

UNIVESITY OF NIGERIA

NSUKKA

SEPTEMBER, 2014

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APPROVAL PAGE

This project report has been supervised, examined and approved in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the award of Master of Science (MSc) in Political Science (International

Relations) University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

By

________________________________ _____________________________ DR. H.C. EDEH PROF. JONAH ONUOHA PhD PROJECT SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT Date: …………………………… Date: ……………………….. ________________________________ _____________________________ PROF. A. I. MADU DEAN OF FACULTY EXTERNAL EXAMINER Date: ………………………….. Date: ………………………

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DEDICATION

To Our Most Supreme Abba Father, the Ancient of Days, the Only True and Living God

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In total humility, I’m most indebted to the Creator Divine, Prince of Heaven, and the Custodian

of Supreme Assembly of Eternity for His unquantifiable Love, Grace, and Protection as well

keeping the entire programmed in Shipshape. Accordingly, I express my immeasurable bliss and

gratitude to my supervisor to Dr. H.C. Edeh for his scholarly encouragement and inspiring

academic comments. Thank you for painstakingly, supervising this work, despite your busy

schedule.

I extend my greeting to the PG Coordinator, Department of Political Science, and a Scholar of

international repute (Full Bright) Distinguished Professor A. M. N. Okolie. Being privileged to

study under your tutelage has added to my academic acumen. Similarly, my appreciation to the

Head of Department Prof. Jonah Onuoha ; I equally thank Prof. Ken Ifesinachi for given us

quality lectures during our course work especially in research methodology, also to Prof. Obasi

Igwe for sharing his wealth of experienced with us. I must not forget an erudite scholar Dr.

Gerald Ezirim who had also being a facilitator of student’s academic excellence.

Again, I appreciate the contributions and encouragement of my family members, Senior Apostle

(Chief) Frank Karikpo; T. C. W. Cecilia Karikpo; Mr. Karikpo Beabu F. Engr. Frank,

Soraniabari; Engr. Frank Legborsi and Saro Wibe. I sincerely, appreciate my Mother Deaconess

Frank E. N. for financing my Programmed from a hard earned source of income.

Lastly, I seized this opportunity to express my gratitude to Chief. Emeka Akalabu; Prince

Nnachi, Enwo J. Good Luck Ndolo; Confidence Ogbonna; Monsi Gianee; Gbara Sunny; S.

Koobee and everyone who supported me throughout the course of this MSc project. I am

thankful for their aspiring guidance, invaluably constructive criticism and friendly advice during

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the project work. I am sincerely grateful to them for sharing their truthful and illuminating views

on a number of issues related to the project.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page - - - - - - - - - - i Approval Page - - - - - - - - - - ii Dedication - - - - - - - - - - iii Acknowledgement - - - - - - - - - iv Table of Content - - - - - - - - - v List of Table - - - - - - - - - - vi List of Figures - - - - - - - - - - vii Abbreviations - - - - - - - - - - viii Abstract - - - - - - - - - - ix

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study - - - - - - - - 1 1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - - - 2 1.3 Objectives of Study - - - - - - - - 4 1.4 Significance of the Study - - - - - - - - 5

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Literature Review - - - - - - - - - 6

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 3.1 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - - - 37 3.2 Hypotheses - - - - - - - - - 40 3.3 Research Design - - - - - - - - - 40 3.4 Method of Data Collection - - - - - - - 42 3.5 Method of Data Analysis - - - - - - - - 43 3.6 Logical Data Framework - - - - - - - - 44

CHAPTER FOUR: PIRACY IN GULF OF GUINEA AND MARITIME

SECURITY IN NIGERIA

4.1 Piracy and Hijacking of Ships in the Gulf of Guinea - - - - 47 4.2 Sea Robbery and Drug Trafficking in Nigerian Maritime Environment - - 53 4.3 Hostility and Kidnapping within Nigeria Territory Waters - - - 62

CHAPTER FIVE: SMALL ARM RUNNING IN GULF OF GUINEA AND

SECURITY IN NIGERIA

5.1 Influx of Small Arms in the Gulf of Guinea - - - - - 67 5.2 Wide Spread use of Small Arms in Piratical Activities in the Region - - 72 5.3 Circulation of Small Arms into various part of Nigeria - - - - 77

CHAPTER SIX: INSECURITY IN GULF OF GUINEA AND INVESTMENT IN

NIGERIA

6.1 Poor Security and Inadequate Surveillance Facilities in the Region - - 84 6.2 Weak trans-border Cooperation amongst States in Gulf of Guinea - - 86 6.3 Intensified Crime Level around Exclusive Zone in the Region - - - 90

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7.1 Summary - - - - - - - - - - 100 7.2 Conclusion - - - - - - - - - 102 7.3 Recommendations - - - - - - - - - 103

Bibliography - - - - - - - - - 106 Appendixes - - - - - - - - - 115

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LISTS OF TABLES Table 4.1: Showing Numbers of Pirate Attacks and Hijacks 2013 – 2014 Nigeria

Territorial Waters

Table 4.2: Showing Number of Selected Kidnapped in Nigeria Territorial Waters 2013- 2014

Table 5.1: Showing number of Illegal Arms Intercepted by Nigerian Custom Service

Table 6.1: Showing Ministry of Defence Budgets 2008-2014

Table: 6.2: Showing Onshore Oil and Gas Reserves Globally

Table 6.3: Showing Deep Sea Reserve Offshore Oil and Gas

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LISTS OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: Showing the Highest ranking narcotic Geo-political Zone in Nigeria

Figure 5.1: The Geo-political zone with highest number of violence incidents reported

In the press, 2008- 2014 September

Figure 6.4: Showing the Highest Region with Oil and Reserve in Deep Sea

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFRICOM- US African Command

AU- African Union

CPLC- Community of Portuguese Language Countries

DSS- Department of State Security

ECCAS- Economic Community of Central African States

EEZ- Exclusive Economic Zone

FOC- Flag Office Commanding

GG- Gulf of Guinea

GGC- Gulf of Guinea Commission

ICG- International Crisis Group

JDZ- Joint Development Zone

JTF- Joint Task Force

IMB- International Maritime Organization

IMB- International Maritime Bureau

IMF- International Monetary Fund

IANSA- International Action Network on Small Arms

LDF- Logical Data Framework

MEND- Movement For Emancipation of the Niger Delta

NDLEA- National Drug Law Enforcement Agency

NIMASA- Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency

NCS- Nigerian Custom Service

NITOA- Nigerian Trawlers Owners Association

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NN- Nigerian Navy

NOAC- Nigerian Agip Oil Company

OBP- Ocean Beyond Piracy

OPEC- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

SAA- Secure Anchorage Area

SALW- Small Arms and Light Weapons

SSB- Single Sideband Radio

UNCLOS- United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea

UNODC United Nation Office of and Crime

UNCTAD- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

VHF- Very High Frequency

WAANSA- West African Action Network on Small Arms

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ABSTRACT

Piracy and insecurity in Gulf of Guinea maritime environment has been of serious concern to member states as well foreign investors. The abundant mineral resources most especially hydrocarbon, has attracted major multi-national oil firms as well other investors to the oil rich region. However, the region is battered by sophisticated pirate groups among other sea criminals. Generally, the study was focused on Nigerian experience amidst security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, the study is poised to ascertain whether piracy, small arms running as well maritime insecurity in Gulf of Guinea undermine Nigeria’s economic and security development. The study examined extant literature bothering on the subject of discoursed. Similarly, Marxist Political Economy approach was adopted to explain the relative variables. Hence, the study employed qualitative method of data collection and invariably qualitative descriptive method of data analysis. A single case ex-post facto research design was used to demonstrate the causality in the relationship between the variables under study. Furthermore, the study noted that piracy; maritime insecurity among others related crimes have adversely undermines the nation security and economic development. Therefore, the study recommended holistic approach that will proffered solution to the maritime insurgency; among which is the need to address the underlying socio-economic issues that fuel piracy, these include: the large scale unemployment, lack of social services and political frustrations that prompt more people to join these criminal organization; however, more attention should be given to maritime policing and surveillance by government.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Gulf of Guinea (GG) region is located at the South Atlantic Ocean, it encompasses a

dozen African nations about 23 countries including: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,

Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of

Congo (RDC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia,

Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The 8,200 km of

region is wide plane level with high ground culminating in Mount Cameroon (4,095 m). As a

high ground, it constitutes a line of separation between the coastal and interior plane. Gulf of

Guinea stretches some fifty-three hundred miles along Africa’s West Coast; eighteen coastal and

eight landlocked states constitute the region. The two hundred nautical miles Exclusive

Economic Zones (EEZ) combine to make up a maritime domain containing numerous boundaries

and over one million square nautical miles of open sea. Numerous tributaries flow into the Gulf,

and some, like the River Niger, are navigable for commercial shipping inland. There are over

200 ports serving deep draft vessels, the Gulf of Guinea has no maritime chokepoint. The

northern section of the GG is composed of semi-arid terrain (Sahel), a transitional zone between

the Sahara desert and the savannahs. Equatorial forest forms a third belt between the savannah

and the coast (Shambhavi, 2005).

Gulf of Guinea sub-region has large deposits of hydrocarbons and other natural

resources, the immense potential of the Gulf of Guinea (both in terms of its resource endowment

and strategic importance as a shipping route/hub) linking Europe, Asia and Latin America for

over five hundred years (500); however, it has drawn domestic and international investors in

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exploration and exploitation of mineral resources in the maritime environment. Currently,

Nigeria is a leading oil bearing state in the region; shares oil and gas resources with Sao-Tome

and Principe in the EEZ known as the Joint Development Zone JDZ between the both countries

(Forest & Sousa, 2006).

In many ways, Nigeria is a microcosm of the rest of the GG and even the African

continent itself Paterson, (2007) cited in Onuoha (2009:8) it is not only Africa’s most populous

nation, but also its largest oil producer. Nigeria’s economy is highly dependent on the oil and gas

industry, which is based principally in the Niger Delta region. The oil sector accounts for some

80 percent of government revenue, 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings, 40 percent of GDP

and four percent of employment (Udo, 2008). Nigeria is not only an economic giant compared to

her neighbours (its economy is second only to South Africa in all of sub-Saharan Africa), but

also a regional security stabilizer given her enormous military might and contributions to

regional and global peacekeeping. Therefore, this study is focus on Gulf of Guinea and Security

Challenges: The Nigerian experience.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The major issue that affects Nigeria is maritime insecurity in the gulf of guinea; indeed

this problem is consequent on the geo-strategy significant and importance of the exclusive

economic zone (gulf of Guinea). There is now a stiff international competition among

industrialized nations including the United States, some European countries, China, Japan, and

India that are looking for new, safer, and more reliable sources of energy as a result of the

Middle East crisis. As the United States tries to wean itself from its Middle East oil dependency,

areas such as the Gulf of Guinea off the West African coast are emerging as potentially the most

important regions on the globe for access to this diminishing resource. However, the gulf guinea

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region faces several destabilizing factors and challenging Security environment (Tunde &

Benjamin, 2013). With over 90 percent of global trade passing through this hub, the Gulf of

Guinea has now become the new global route for the oil trade. Seafarers and general maritime

activities are now witnessing a very tough time in the Gulf of Guinea and the West African

coastline over the years has increasingly become a haven for criminality, meanwhile, West

African nations on the coastline that have been witnessing turbulent times in sea traffic. These

countries' territorial waters have come under sudden transnational crime attacks such as hijack of

oil vessels, oil bunkering, hostage taking and kidnapping, sea robbery, human and narcotic

trafficking, and smuggling of arms; all perpetrated by sea pirates (Klare & Volman, 2005). In

similar view Ezirim & Onuoha, (2010:2) noted that Africa’s maritime domain has been caught

in-between affluence and afflictions. Its maritime domain is surfeit with rich aquatic and mineral

resources critical to the survival of its people and states, both for subsistence and for economic

mainstay. These resources are also vitally important in the security development nexus for both

the continent and the international community. Regrettably, in the wake of the 21st century

African waters have now overtaken the traditionally dangerous area such as the Strait of Malacca

in the Southeast Asia in terms of visibility in the global map of piracy.

International Maritime Bureau, (IMB, 2005) report revealed that between 2003 and 2008,

there had been 293 incidents of pirates attacks in the West African coastline. In 2010, there were

45 cases, 2011 it rose to 65 while 37 vessels were attacked in 2012 where pirates carted away

goods, money and other valuables. The consequences of all this is that the region loses over

$3billion revenue to illegal bunkering annually with Nigeria being the worst hit. While Nigeria is

said to lose over 100,000 barrels of oil daily, Benin Republic on its part loses a colossal sums in

revenue as ship owners now wary of its seaport due to pirates’ activities. Apart from smuggling

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and small arms dealing, the coastline is notorious for human and hard drugs trafficking. And if

the pirate activities are left unchecked, they could surpass those of the Gulf of Eden, which had

been known as the most dangerous waterways due to activities of Somali pirates. According to

statistics (2003), data raised by the UN Office on Drugs and Organized Crime also shows a trend

away from robbery cases to kidnappings and hijackings. Indeed, security threats in the maritime

arena are of a multidimensional nature. In addition to piracy, boundary disputes, disagreements

over fishing rights, problems relating to pollution, migration, illegal trafficking; hence, virtually

every sphere of national and regional security has a maritime dimension. A cross-cutting issue

may well be the socio-economic situation of coastal communities. Accordingly, Peter (2007)

there is growing awareness in the world and Nigeria that the vast resources and potential in the

Gulf of Guinea are being undermined by multifaceted domestic, regional and international

threats and vulnerabilities. To this end, the study intends to rigorously investigate these

problems; of which the researcher has formulated the following research questions:

1. Does piracy in the Gulf of Guinea undermine maritime security in Nigeria?

2. Do small arms running in the region pose a threat to the Nigerian state?

3. Has insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea adversely affected investment in Nigeria?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

Several measures have been advanced by various writers on how to achieve a safe;

secure Gulf of Guinea, especially in the Nigeria territorial waters. The foregoing conditions

which is occasioned by insecurity in region vis-a- vis the Nigeria maritime environment, thus

has attracted domestic, regional and international attention, perhaps studies have been conducted

by researchers on the subject yet the problem persist, since much attention is needed to address

this issue accordingly; this study has both broad and specific objectives, the broad objective of

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the study is to investigate Gulf of Guinea and Security Challenges: The Nigerian Experience

while the specific objective is to:

� Ascertain whether piracy in the Gulf of Guinea undermine security of Nigeria

� Examine whether small arms running posed a threat to the Nigerian state

� Determine whether insecurity in Gulf of Guinea has adversely affected investment in

Nigeria

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study has both theoretical and practical significance. That is to say its significance

lies in its capacity to meet scholarly theoretical as well policymaker’s, practical needs. At the

theoretical level, the justification for the study lies in its ability to substantially fill a gap in the

extant literature by contributing to the production and reproduction of knowledge in this

relatively unexplored area. Furthermore, the theoretical significance hinges on exposing the

intricacies of impediments to regional peace and stability as could discerned from the nexus of

sea pirates and contemporary international terrorism in the maritime domain and beyond.

On the other hand, the practical significances of this study lies in its ability to constitute a

policy guide for those agencies that are saddle with task of formulation and implementation of

appropriate policies for maritime security defense as well protection of economic resources

within the Gulf of Guinea maritime environment. Similarly, the study will enables states,

regional, and international stakeholders to collectively address issues of insecurity in the GG

domain, utilizing both military and non-military approach in taming the problem.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The central thrust of this study is to analyse the Nigerian experience in the Gulf of

Guinea maritime environment. However, the crux of this review is to identify gap within the

extant literature with respect to the following research questions:

Does Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea undermine Maritime Security in Nigeria?

The following definition of piracy is contained in article 101 of the 1982 United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): “Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a)

any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by

the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high

seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or

aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any

State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with

knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act inciting or of intentionally

facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).” Initiatives to counter piracy and armed

robbery at sea IMO is implementing an anti-piracy project, a long-term project which began in

1998. As observe by Daniel, (2008) previous study clearly demonstrated that piracy and

maritime insecurity cannot be understood in isolation from political and socio-economic

developments on land, in this regard Allen (2011:18) affirm that:

In Nigeria the weakness of the state and its infiltration by organized crime creates fertile ground for piracy. Moreover, motives of personal enrichment coalesce with the political objectives of the Niger Delta rebels seeking to end the economic exploitation and marginalization of their region; for example utter collapse of the Somali state preceded the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Aden here a culture of violence, a pervasive war economy and lack of alternative sources of income turned piracy into a plausible survival strategy.

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Also, Stefan (2011:07) observes that effective counter-piracy requires more or less functioning

statehood; Nigeria is far from stabilizing its state apparatus, therefore may seek international

cooperation to improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, effective counter-piracy is

hampered not only by weak statehood, but also by certain aspects of national and international

law, under the law of the sea the international community is permitted to intervene against piracy

only on the high seas outside territorial waters. This rule applies even in cases where state’s

ability or willingness to take action in its own territorial waters is restricted or non-existent, for

example in the case of Somalia the UN Security Council made sure it asked the Transitional

Federal Government which hardly possesses any power in the country for its approval of anti-

piracy measures, despite this being unnecessary under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Furthermore, Daniel, (2008) identified cost as an obstacle to counter-piracy; however, if

it is true that maritime security is inseparable from security on land and political, economic and

social developments then effective counter-piracy demands nothing less than a comprehensive

programme to strengthen weak states, promote good governance and support social and

economic development. Nonetheless, purely military operations will not be enough to dispel the

spectre of piracy form the Gulf of Guinea, rather multilateral, cross-border initiatives for

resolving political conflict and establishing effective statehood remains the fulcrum.

Consequently, in recent years, the Gulf of Guinea region is now second most exposed to pirate

attacks, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 2013 report, the number of

attacks increased by nearly 50% between 2011 and 2013; it is anticipated that it may be higher in

2014. Similarly, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea is a threat (Alexander, 2014), over the last

decade, about 551 attacks and attempted attacks have been reported, most took placed in

national jurisdictions, while fewer than 20% occurred in international waters, with the largest

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number occurring off the coasts of Nigeria. In 2013, according to the International Maritime

Bureau (IMB) reporting Centre, of 234 reported incidents worldwide, 30 took placed off the

coast of Nigeria, including 2 hijacks; these attacks occurred mainly when ships are moored

bound for, or leaving offshore oil platforms, storage at sea, vessels and ports. However, latest

assessments are that the risk of attacks shift further from the coast, unpredictable use of violence

against crews, including use of guns, and hijacking of tankers for fuel theft or "petro-piracy" are

worrying trends Michael (2012:65) asserts that:

Nigeria has one of the highest numbers of piracy incidents. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for 427 out of 1434 attacks in African waters between 2003 and 2013.The frequency of attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, was not as high as those of the Somalia coast, and is however on the rise. The traditional modus operandi of pirates activity in the region had largely involved the use of speedboats to attack and steal cargo, valuables and cash from crews, when vessels is at anchor or in harbour, but mostly close to shore. Pirates are, however, increasingly modifying their tactics by hijacking fishing vessels, particularly within Nigerian waters, and using them to attack other vessels operating off the coasts of neighbouring countries like Benin and Cameroun; recent attacks have extended further at sea and have focused largely on oil-transport vessels aimed at stealing the petroleum products, as noted Gulf of Guinea piracy is an organized crime, sometimes highly sophisticated, and illicit siphon of oil. They engaged in black market circles of the stuff, and then deposit it back into the global supply.

As cited in David (2013) governance issues and widespread corruption have led to an unfair

distribution of energy Income (as well as other negative externalities such as pollution), and have

hampered development and fuelled piracy.

Their operations in the Gulf of Guinea are primarily based out in the Niger Delta; an area

that constitutes ideal grounds for development of pirate groups, those issues have encouraged

the formation of insurgent groups, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger

Delta (MEND). The Delta’s geographical terrain encourages clandestine activities of pirates; its

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proximity to the congested Port Harcourt harbour and the Oil and Gas Free Zone Onne, where

large mangrove-hidden waterways makes it an ideal location from which to launch attacks on

anchored and passing ships, while pirates are mostly based in Nigeria, they conduct attacks

throughout the Gulf Guinea70% of it, reported between 2006 and 2013 took placed off the coast

of Nigeria. This has serious implications for global security, as growing insecurity in the region

would make it difficult for Nigeria to export oil as well other foreign trade which may in turn

reduce its ability to effectively fight against international terrorist organizations such as Boko

Haram (Barrios, 2013). Also, Rider (2013:45) argues that:

For decades, piracy and armed robbery at sea have been common off the coast of Nigeria; amidst extreme poverty, high oil revenue, and poor regulation of maritime activity, corrupt government and a long history of political violence in the Niger Delta. Maritime crime spread from Nigerian waters to the whole region, criminal gangs continue to exploit Nigeria’s poor governance of the maritime domain and use violence to enrich-themselves and show little sign of stopping.

In a separate view Wingrin (2013) observes that, the rationale behind maritime piracy is oil theft;

pirate’s main motivation is to steal crude oil and refined petroleum products from tankers for sale

on the black market. The major oil-producing countries in the sub-region produce millions of

barrels of oil a day but only a limited amount of this is processed in the country, which means

they export crude oil and re-import refined fuel. The sub-region’s biggest oil producer, Nigeria,

produces more than two million barrels of oil a day but far less than a quarter is actually

processed in Nigeria. To this end, oil is therefore a potential target for pirates when being

exported and when the refined product is re-imported. Guinea Gulf pirates will continue to steal

crude oil or refined petroleum products as longs as there are well-developed black markets for oil

trade available and as long as the governance and law enforcement capacity remains weak, this is

something that the international community won’t be able to contain.

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Majority of the Gulf of Guinea piracy comes out of Nigerian water ways, recorded

incidents indicate that the world’s most dangerous shipping routes are along the coast of Nigeria,

with a small extension into the territorial waters of Benin and Togo, there is no doubt that pirates

will continue to threaten the region’s oil and shipping industries for years to come due to the oil

producers ‘doubled risk exposure’. Therefore, global shipping trade is bleeding due to piracy

Ukeje, (2003) noted that recent piracy attacks targets vessels carrying petroleum products, these

vessels are attacked because there is a booming black market for fuel in West Africa. The

weakness and general inadequacy of the maritime policies of Gulf of Guinea states and hitherto,

the low level of cooperation between them allowed criminal networks to diversify their activities

and gradually extend them away from the Nigerian coast, out on to the high seas, pirates focus

on stealing cargoes and siphoning fuel, mostly in territorial waters, close to shore. It is extremely

important that Gulf of Guinea countries and their allies collaborate to police the sea lanes of the

area, as disruptions in crude oil supply not only affect countries such as Nigeria, but ultimately

have an impact on the global economy (Florian, 2013).

Similarly, Nkosazana, (2010) has argued that the piracy is an international problem even

if it was happening off the African coast. The problem, however, is that Gulf of Guinea piracy is

above all an organised crime problem and most of these pirate attacks do occur in international

waters, more often than they occur within the sovereign borders of states, which are set at 12

nautical miles offshore, and are thus subject to countries’ own laws and legal systems, rather

than being subject to international law. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS 1982) as cited in Wagilda, (2007: 10) stated that:

Each country’s sovereign territorial water extend to a maximum of 12 nautical miles (22km) beyond its coast, but

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foreign vessels are granted the right of innocent passage through this zone; Passage is innocent as long as a ship refrains from engaging in certain prohibited activities, including weapon testing, spying, smuggling, serious pollution, fishing or scientific research.

There is thus a great need for co-operation and information sharing between pirates-infested

states in West Africa but so far that cooperation appears to be patchy. However, an agreement

between 22 West and Central African states was signed in June 2013 aiming at coping with the

growing threat of piracy and to strengthen the region’s maritime security. There is a consensus to

the Yaoundé Declaration, formally known as the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of

Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa,

the ambition with this agreement is to increase regional cooperation and capacity building in

combating piracy, while the world discusses whose responsibility it is and weather there is

enough regional competence for a successful counter-piracy campaign, the piracy in the Gulf of

Guinea is expanding and there are no indications that this expansion will end any time soon,

unless proper counter-piracy efforts are implemented. It is on this note; Brooks (2012:34) stated

that:

Whilst the public only hear about piracy and maritime terrorism when there is a serious incident, the problem is continuous and the costs to the industry, and hence to the end consumers of maritime trade, are growing. As in other armed conflicts, technology could provide more reliable, effective deterrents and safer counters. Meeting that challenge is what Institution of Engineering Technology can do. Through Insights like this, and by enabling debate, the IET’s Marine Transport Group encourages innovation in the search for effective solutions. “Piracy can only be addressed by means of a comprehensive multi-layered approach that involves political, technology and societal measures, to strengthen security capabilities improve intelligence gathering, sharing, and help bring about more effective law enforcement. It also requires multinational cooperation on land and at sea.

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Ejiofor, (2010) shared similar argument with some scholars (David, 2013, & Rider, 2013) that

Piracy has its roots in poverty; criminality feeds on lack of opportunities, unemployment, and

frail political environment; eradicate poverty and piracy will be eradicated, unfortunately poverty

eradication is exceptionally challenging and something that will take generations to accomplish,

but it is important to remember this as policing and military counter-piracy operations only have

short-term effects but comprehensive counter-piracy strategies must comprise both long-term

and short-term objectives to ensure a lasting effect. The current status of the Gulf of Guinea

region provides pirates with the best possible operational environment for their activities; the

recruitment pool of potential pirates is almost unlimited as poverty is present throughout all the

Gulf of Guinea nations and the main shipping route for sub-region oil producers traverses areas

with weak governance, inadequate law enforcement capacity, and massive socio-political

tensions. These factors foster an ideal piracy environment as the possibility for huge rewards

exceeds the probability for getting caught or punished. The weak governments of the Gulf of

Guinea nations have for years failed to defeat the expanding piracy and have repeatedly

requested assistance from the international community.

As observes by Nicole & Marie (2009) it is reasonable to acknowledge that most Gulf of

Guinea nations actually do not have the capabilities to launch comprehensive counter-piracy

operations. The piracy problem is nothing new but the Gulf of Guinea nations’ authorities failed

to address the problem in a timely manner. There is really no excuse for the fact that they have

not been able to deal with it and ships will not be safe until authorities strengthen police capacity

to investigate and prosecute criminal networks, as well as enforce a zero tolerance policy for

corruption in security services. Also, the rise of Somali piracy is mainly the consequence of state

collapse. The main driver of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is however, the regional oil black

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market. So if it is to be successful, it should not be narrowly focused on military solutions.

Indeed, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be viewed in isolation from the oil production in the

Niger Delta region and the socio-economic and environmental circumstances surrounding it. The

lack of meaningful economic opportunities and a prolonged pattern of environmental

degradation could be attributed to this crime which progressed from small opportunistic attacks

to more coordinated and organized attacks, with this in mind, the real solution to this menace

must be found in addressing its root causes (Alexandria, 2009).

Allen (2012) has identified some factors responsible for maritime insecurity in the

region, the Nigerian state contains vast oil wealth yet proceeds from the trade is not circulated

but concentrate in few hands which have consequent impact on her economy resulting to oil theft

/ bunkering, piracy, smuggling, trafficking and rising inequality these has necessitated onshore

and offshore security challenges. One of the shortcomings underlying underdevelopment is

government’s failure to build and maintain domestic oil refineries, despite being the region’s

largest oil producer, Nigeria is unable to refine most of its crude oil itself, resulting in the

continuous need to import large quantities of refined oil at much higher cost. Furthermore each

transaction provides ample opportunities for corruption; the lack of domestic refineries also

means that the coast of Nigeria is packed with oil tankers on a daily basis, which make for easy

targets amongst looters and pirates. As long as Nigeria’s fraudulent and corrupt oil policies are

not addressed, the collective effort by West African states in combating piracy in the GG cannot

amount to the kind of meaningful change necessary, without structural reforms that would

empower the populace, by providing alternative means of livelihoods especially for youths and

bringing at least part of the nation’s wealth back to people, any effort at stopping piracy can only

be cosmetic (Allen, 2012: 09).

14

As cited in Araud, (2011) most of the pirates in the West African region are believed to

be part of its countries’ thriving black market for crude oil and refined products. Gulf of Guinea

piracy is above all an organized crime, there will be no overnight transformation; piracy has deep

roots in the Gulf States, weak governance as well as limited law enforcement capabilities. The

regional oil black market is a product of structural problems within West African states, poverty,

socio-political tensions and conflicts between communities for control over resources all

contribute to regional vulnerability, ships will never be safe until the relevant authorities

strengthen the policing capacity to investigate and prosecute criminal networks. The citizens of

the affected countries should press for improvement of the oil sector governance and

development in the coastal states at the same time as it focuses resources on regional safety and

security (Ukeje, 2009). United Nations Office for West Africa (2013) “the growing threats of

terrorism, violent extremism and cross-border organized crime, compounded by weak State

institutions and the inadequate ability of Governments to provide basic social services, remains

major challenge to peace and stability in the region, According to UN estimates as cited in

masson (2013) stated that:

Maritime-related crime off the coast of Western Africa becomes increasingly violent and the area is in danger of becoming “the next piracy hotspot”. Piracy is interdependent to the political and social situation on the mainland. If one examines the history of piracy, it would be noticed that throughout the centuries, whenever there was instability and war or regimes collapsed, piracy and smuggling flourished. This means that the frequent coups and civil conflicts that plague the states of the Sahel region render the coastguards of the region less able to react. In addition, the extreme social issues of poverty and unemployment convince young Africans that Unlawful activities are the only way to make a living. Masson (2013:04).

Therefore, piracy may be seen as maritime threat and violent action against Persons, Sea trade,

Cargoes, Oil facilities, Ships, vessels and among other legal investment on high sea. These

15

actions are considered as acts of maritime terrorism which posed operational challenge to

Nigeria security and her national economic growth as most domestics and foreign investment as

well potential investors are not willing to continue their operations in State (Aminu, 2010).

Having identified issues raised by scholars (Allen, 2012; David, 2013; Ejiofor, 2010;

Masson, 2013; Rider, 2013 & Stefan, 2011) they identified institutional failure as basis for piracy

in Nigeria and Gulf of Guinea; while Daniel (2008) Nicole & Marie (2009), Wingrin (2010),

Nkosazana, (2010), and Ukeje (2003) are of different perspective, that piracy is resultant effect

of internal and external nexus which is consequent on energy interest in black Market.

Considering their arguments it is crystal clear that much attention were given to the root causes

of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea; however much has not been done on how piracy undermines

Nigeria security within the maritime environment and beyond, thus, this study intend to fill this

identified gap.

Do Small Arms Running in the Region Pose a Threat to Nigeria?

The spate and intensity of violent conflicts in Nigeria have been linked to the

proliferation and weak control mechanisms on small arms and light weapons smuggling via are

porous land and sea borders; while $ billions of dollars is being spent on conflicts in Africa, 60

to 90 per cent of deaths associated with conflicts in the region are linked to the illegal sale and

proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the country accounts for about 8 million out of

the 100 million small arms currently in circulation (Ahmad, 2012). Decades of violence and

instability in some part of Nigeria which includes the activities of militancy in the Delta area;

and insurgent groups in northeast Nigeria are major drivers of proliferation and illicit circulation

of small arms and light weapon (SALW) these characterized other forms of arm violence. Over

the years this has reinforced the sceptre of insecurity, which in turn compromises the prospects

16

for growth and development. Consequently the people are often worst victims due to conflicts

that continue to exacerbate organized crime, poverty and underdevelopment, which in turn has

led to a high sense of insecurity among the rural and urban poor in the country. According to

Kwaja, (2012) large caches of combat weapons transferred from Libya after the fall of Maummar

Gaddafi are suspected to have fallen into the hands of terrorist groups. This prompted the

adoption of Resolution 2017, which drew attention to the risk of destabilization posed by the

dissemination of illicit SALW. After the over-throw of the Gaddafi regime, an assessment report

(2012) revealed that influx of about 420,000 returnees to Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania as

well as the inflow of un-quantified and unspecified number of ammunitions from Libya to the

Sahel states within the West Africa region include Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,

Nigeria and Senegal. The insecurity associated with the activities of Boko Haram is evident in

the spate of bomb attacks and killing of thousands of Nigerians, with serial attacks on police

stations and armouries where stockpiles of weapons are acquired by the dreaded Islamic sect in

Northeast Nigeria, Chris (2012:03) argues that:

This is a major consequence of the privatization of violence to the extent that non-state actors are challenging the authority of the state in the acquisition and control of the instruments of coercion. In the long run, the region is poised to confront the challenges posed by the increased privatization of violence by informal groups such that the state will be forced to bargain with competing forces and authorities in order to maintain its hold.

Tambuwal, (2013:07) attributed the insecurity that has engulfed the country and other parts of

Africa largely to the protests across the Arab world, and sought the assistance of development

partners in tackling them. He argues further that as a region, we have been negatively impacted

by the Arab spring, and particularly the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. The proliferation of

light and heavy weapons which fell into the hands of Non State Actors is causing havoc and

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instability, the Nigerian government is trying to come to grips with the situation and some drastic

measures, including the declaration of a state of emergency in the most-affected states, have been

taken. Therefore security situation in the region should obviously take centre-stage.

Similarly, Usman, (2010) asserts that more than half of these millions small arms and light

weapons in West African sub-region are in the hands of non-state actors and criminal groups.

The non-state actors are made up of militants or ex-militants, vigilante, hired political thugs,

ethnic religious-militia groups, like Boko Haram, ombate cult, among other groups scattered all

over the country. They are mostly sponsored by anti-government or wealthy politicians. It is an

open secret that politicians control a number of armed Youths. In same vein United Nations

Security Council Report (2012) on Sahel region attributed that:

Spate of attacks and hijack by pirates is largely due to their ability to access SALWs. In fact piracy in the economies of the region has resulted in an annual loss of revenue of $2 billion, while the numbers of ships that en-route to various sea ports via busy hub are at risks and have declined in their numbers as a result of serial attacks. On the whole, transnational organized crimes associated with oil bunkering, trafficking in cocaine and counterfeit medicines holds sway (UN, 2012:07).

The activities of armed pirates in the Gulf of Guinea have placed the region on the front burner,

which sees the region overtaking Somalia as the world’s piracy hotspot, within the last 14 years,

attempts have been made to manage the menace posed by the proliferation of SALWs in terms of

putting in place control mechanisms. This include Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and

Manufacture of Light Weapons in ECOWAS Member States, signed in October 1998; the

ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related

Materials, signed in 2006; as well as the West African Action Network on Small Arms

(WAANSA), which was adopted at the WAANSA General Assembly in January, 2007. The

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ECOWAS Conference of Heads of State and Government also provided a basis for the

establishment of National Commissions on Small Arms by Member States.

Arms running are facilitated by certain intermediaries based on legal or illegal demands

coming from particular lawless or restricted environments. The Geneva-based organization,

Small Arms Survey, (2001) maintains, that “SALW do not proliferate themselves… rather, they

are sold, resold perhaps stolen, diverted and maybe legally or illegally transferred several time.

At each juncture in this complex chain of legal and illicit transfer, people-brokers, insurgents,

criminals, government officials and or organized groups are active participants in the

transmission (Okoro. 2007). Africa is the second largest continent in the world and the second

most populated as well due to the sheer size of some of its countries, there is the chronic problem

of border security, Nigeria is an example. Kelvin (2005:20) argues that:

It will be very hard to find any country in the world capable of effectively controlling such extensive borders. Arms traffickers exploit this situation to smuggle SALW into the country. It is also interesting to observe that some part of northern Nigeria are experiencing instability and armed conflict for quite some time, the porous border in the northeast makes it easy for weapons to be smuggle in to inflamed and protract violence.

He continue by stating that arms are accessible largely to the following factors such as simplicity

and durability, low cost and wide availability, portability and easiness to conceal, lethality,

usability by military, police and civilians, border porosity, ineffectiveness to guarantee internal

security, corruption, unemployment and low income as well other armed battles.

One of the important impediments to managing small arms proliferation and armed

violence is the tendency of politicians to utilize this violence to their own ends, coupled with the

financial capacity of politicians to foment violence or buy political victory (Amaize, 2003) There

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have been numerous allegations since the 2003 elections of political leaders creating and arming

groups of young men as tools for electoral intimidation. Similar allegations arose in the build-up

to the 2007 elections Politicians have used violence to ensure political victory and through that

victory get access to government resources and state power. Political violence is not, however,

limited to election, high-level political officials have been accused of involvement in oil

bunkering, community clashes, ethnic, religious clashes and for personal gains or accused of

complicity by lacking the political will to arrest and detain officials known to be involved in

these activities ( Amaize, 2003). The strength, level of equipment, and skills demonstrated by

armed groups has increased speculation that these groups must have some form of high-level

support and that they could not have established themselves without help from ‘high-ranking’

politicians who use them for self-interested gains. Abia, (2003:27) observes that:

Those who should be instrumental in pushing for action to limit the use of armed groups by politicians are therefore the same politicians who benefit from their use. One important source of funding for standing politicians to pay for armed groups is the so called ‘security vote’. This is a nebulous allocation in each state and local government budget. The allocation is allegedly intended for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in the local government area. Even though this allocation is often one of the largest single allocations in a state’s budget, there is no clear definition of what qualifies as an activity that maintains peace and security.

Furthermore, the use of the allocation remains opaque, and the state government is under no

obligation to justify the amount allocated or explain how that money is spent. Observers allege

that the security vote is used by many politicians to hire political thugs to carry out political

violence on their behalf, while publicly justifying the expense as youth empowerment. The

security vote could also be used to siphon state funds, given the lack of accountability attached

to the sums involved (Abia, 2003). Many factors have contributed to the development of gun

culture in Nigeria polity where more individuals and groups as well as politicians are appealing

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to the instrumentality of SALW in order to achieve their socio-political and economic goals

(John, 2007). The proliferation of SALW in Nigeria has many causes; these include trafficking,

local manufacture and theft of weapons belonging to individuals or the authorities. Nigerian

society no doubt has become militarized as socio-cultural relationships among the various groups

in the country have broken down over decades.

To address this problem, is a bit cumbersome but very important, especially when

considering any programme of prevention. The closeness of Nigeria to conflict zones of West

African states, its porous borders with Benin Republic in the West, Niger and Chad in the North,

Cameroon in the East, makes Nigeria a major destination for SALW of much importance is the

increase in the number of ethnic based militant group often in wider scope and often receive

support from their kinsmen who either import or manufactured them illegally. This is coupled

with those brought from peace keeping operations and the police either selling or leasing their

weapons, and those stolen from legal owners sometimes end up in black markets where civilians

buy them for personal use. The above implies that SALW flows to the country and its eventual

usage in insurgencies are largely determined by the structures on ground for example porous

border both in the North, West and the Niger Delta regions where there is access to international

water ways are tell-tale signs of the permissive Nigerian system that condones non-state actors

dealing and trafficking in arms (Ogundare and Elijah, 2010), hence the free flow of SALW in

Nigeria. Adetiba (2012:12) observes that:

The availability and accumulations of SALW by a group or individual are easily translated to accessibility through Border States in conflicts, more so access to SALW is determined by the resources of the recipient actors to act as patron. In contrast to the above, the growing bodies of evidence of availability of SALW and its usage in civil unrests and conflicts across the country shows that the way in which both state and non-state actors acquire SALW are different. But what explains the contradiction between underdevelopment and

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the proliferation of SALW particularly in the context of 1999 till date vis-à-vis political corruption and socio-political and economic injustices against one another? An understanding of this show that people arm themselves not only because of their unwarrantable situation but also because of exploitation, injustices and politics of exclusion.

Therefore the proliferation of SALW and the upsurge of insurgencies in Nigeria would not be

appreciated without identifying some of the reasons behind the proliferation of SALW in

Nigeria; these factor that reinforce proliferation are: Long military rule, profitability and its

socio-economic utility, domestic agitation for resource control, unemployment, poverty, growth

of ethnic militias, politicization of ethno- religious difference and political (electoral) violence.

The resurgence of armed insurrection in the Niger Delta, after militants had surrendered

their weapons under a comprehensive amnesty programme packaged by the Federal

Government, underscores the need for international collaborative efforts to combat proliferation

of arms in the entire Gulf of Guinea, to protect oil and gas facilities, Ejiofor (2010) reports that

after years of explosive and armed attacks on oil workers and installations in the Niger Delta,

which almost crippled Nigeria’s crude oil production, late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua took

a bold step in June 2009 to proclaim an amnesty for militants in the oil-rich region. The

proclamation was part of the recommendation of the Presidential Panel on Amnesty and

Disarmament for Militants of the Niger-Delta FGN, (2009:08) his statement affirmed that:

Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria acknowledged that challenges of the Niger Delta arose mainly from the inadequacies of previous attempts at meeting the yearnings and aspiration of the people. This neglect, made some elements of the Niger Delta populace to resort to “unlawful means of agitation for the development of the region including militancy thereby threatening peace, security, order and good governance and jeopardising the economy of the nation. The government realised that many of the militants were able-bodied youths

22

whose energies could be harnessed for the development of the Niger Delta and the nation at large. Whereas many persons who had so engaged in militancy now desire to apply for and obtain amnesty and pardon; Now therefore, I, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, after due consultation with the council of States and in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by the provisions of Section 175 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, make the following proclamation: “I hereby grant amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta; The pardon shall take effect upon the surrender and handing over of all equipment, weapons, arms and ammunition and execution of the renunciation of Militancy Forms specified in the schedule hereto, by the affected persons at the nearest collection centre established for the purpose of Government in each of the Niger Delta States; The unconditional pardon granted pursuant to this proclamation shall extend to all persons presently being prosecuted for offences associated with militant activities; and this proclamation shall cease to have effect from Sunday, October 4, 2009.

Sequel to the above Ejiofor, (2010) maintained that proactive measure of control was sin qua non

to crack down small arm running at the Gulf of Guinea by ensuring that arms do not enter the

wrong hands by blocking all routes through which weapons are imported and transported in the

region. The fight against internal militancy should not be left in the hands of individual countries

alone. Security agencies in the various countries should be proactive and collaborative by

monitoring movement of arms and sharing information. The maritime boundaries should also be

effectively policed to ensure that arms shipment is detected and effectively intercepted.

The current practice of using government forces such as the Joint Task Force to fight

armed militants is out dated, and wasteful as security forces ought to have prevented the influx of

arms thereby effectively and systematically preventing the conflict. As cited in Ebo (2007) who

argued that the largest exporters of small arms include the five permanent members of the United

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Nations Security Council, they are responsible for supplying arms, directly or indirectly, to

conflict zones. A lack of transparency by weapons exporters such as the Russian Federation,

China, Pakistan, Belarus, Iran and South Africa make it difficult to assess the extent to which

terrorist organizations and other non-state actors are receiving state support. Once small arms fall

into the hands of non-state actors that are unaccountable to international or domestic laws,

regulating their distribution is an even larger challenge. Though the uncontrolled cross-border

proliferation of small arms is largely facilitated by illegal activities, particularly the Gulf of

Guinea hotspot which link major sea port in Asia, Europe, Latin America is vulnerable largely to

the porosity as a safe haven for Sea pirates and Smugglers; virtually all illicit small arms were

originally legally produced or acquired but later fell into the hands of unintended recipients.

Regulation would thus require the separation of illicit from licit arms transfers to develop

protocols for exchanges between state or non-state actors that control the distribution of small

arms without constraining the legitimate market. Consequently, Ebo (2012:15) maintained that:

The effects of the proliferation of SALW are multiple and interrelated that bring devastation to lives, property and the physical environment, exacerbate conflict, spark mass displacement and refugee flows, undermine the rule of law, and promote and sustain a culture of violence. Small arms have become the choice instruments of terror and gross human rights abuses in Nigeria. Small arms proliferation mostly affects the vulnerable segments of society (children, women, and the aged). A major issue is in particular their impact on children. More than 50,000 children under the age of 18 are reported to be engaged in Boko Haram and wielding small arms. This is made easier by the fact that small arms are light, portable, and can be operated with minimal instructions and training. However, many children are also often victims of SALW, through slavery and rape for example.

Therefore, prospects for good governance and political stability are hampered and minimised by

SALW proliferation, consequence of SALW proliferation is the emergence of functional illicit

proliferation networks and routes in 2001 UN Small Arms Conference; the Nigerian Minister of

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Defence confirmed that Nigeria is home to a million of the SALW estimated to be circulating in

the West African sub-region. Indeed, contradictions emanating from Nigeria’s internal

governance – manifested as ethno-religious violence, armed robbery, electoral violence,

ritualistic secret cults in universities often involving small arms, and a general atmosphere of

insecurity – have made the country a ready market for illicit small arms and a major conduit to

other parts of West Africa. Nigeria is also the bridge to Central Africa, a zone of conflict from

where many weapons have been smuggled into West Africa, using the Congo River as a vital

waterway. Another striking feature of the small arms proliferation in West Africa is its trans-

national character, involving the citizens of various member states in a collaborative criminal

network.

According to Ibeanu, (2005) the situation in West Africa is frightening because the region

is the most backward in term of development and most vulnerable as far as peace, security and

stability are concerned. One of the world’s highest concentrations of SALW is in Africa. This is

a paradox. Why does a poor continent have such a magnitude of stockpiled small arms? What is

the bone of contention that leads to conflicts in Africa? Perhaps, what explains this contradictory

situation between economic underdevelopment (poverty) on the one hand and gun proliferation

and armed conflicts on the other is the “strongest expression of the injustice in the paradox of

wealth that characterizes situations of conflicts in Africa the fact that those who produce wealth

are the poorest and those who are wealthy take the wealth by force” (Ibeanu, 2005: 37). This

implies that the main reason for people to arm themselves is not only located in their appalling

socio-economic conditions but also exclusion, injustice and exploitation that they are subjected

to and clearly, SALW (guns in particular) perform two functions, viz, they abet in sustaining

injustices and also offer hopes for redressing injustices, thereby confirming Naylor’s assertion

25

that the demand for SALW is a “surrogate for demand for social justice, and the firearm is the

capital good intended to bring that objective” (cited in Dominick and Olonisakin, 2001; &

Badmus, 2009a & b). Nigeria is one of the Third World countries where the proliferation of this

arsenal is manifested in crisis proportions and its society has become fully militarized and

enmeshed in the culture of the gun. Perhaps, more than any other areas of the country, the Niger

Delta region exhibits this tendency with a high degree of intensity where different oil-bearing

ethnic minority groups, through their various social movements, are constantly contesting

exploitation and as a result, oiling their guns as well as gunning for oil in the region, and fighting

for the soul of the country’s treasury of natural resources.

Consequently, the Nigerian state has now institutionalized a regime of social repression

and corporate violence to silence dissenting voices in order to protect oil exploration and its

revenues. Today, the Niger Delta is confronted with social inequality, arms proliferation and

pervaded by protracted violence championed by state security forces, ethnic militia movements,

disgruntled youth, armed gangs, pirates, cultists, and robbers (Isiaka, 2010). From the foregoing

scholars like (Abia, 2003, Amaize, 2003, Ebo 2007, Ibeanu, 2005, John,2007 Okoro, 2007 Isiaka

2010) among other have identified the implications and consequences of SALW on the Nigerian

State but have not given adequately attention on how small arms running in the Gulf of Guinea,

whether it pose a threat to Nigeria’s national security. Thus, the study will address this lacuna as

well fill the gap in literature.

Has insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea adversely affected Investment in Nigeria?

No doubt economic interest in Nigeria maritime environment are namely; natural

resources, oil and gas, installations, shipping, are strategic national assets Dick (2010) identified

these material resources as most vulnerable investment in the maritime environment. The

26

expansion of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea poses a dire threat to local economies, potentially

undermining little stability that currently exists in the region. Oil revenue, which many countries

in the region rely upon, is seriously threatened by pirate activity; 7 per cent of Nigeria’s oil

wealth is believed lost due to such criminality, also instability in the Gulf has sharply decreased

revenue collected from trade; Benin, whose economy depends on taxing ships entering the port

of Cotonou, has experienced a 70 per cent decline in shipping activity due to piracy.

Furthermore, as piracy drives up insurance premiums for international shipping companies, the

price of imported goods in the region could spike, further imperilling local economies. If these

local economies falter, development and stability in the region could quickly deteriorate (Nelson,

2012). However, Dick, (2013:21) argues that:

The effects of piracy in the Gulf could well extend far beyond Africa, with potential ramifications for the larger global economy and the United States in particular. The estimated 3 million barrels of oil produced daily by the nations around the Gulf ultimately feed the North American and European markets. Nigeria alone is the fifth-largest supplier of oil to the United States and by 2015 could account for a quarter of U.S. oil consumption. However, given the rate at which attacks on oil tankers are increasing, the ability of these nations to reliably provide oil to the international market could be in question. Early 2012 saw a doubling in the number of attacks on oil tankers, with as many as eight hijacks in a month. If this dramatic trend continues, the flow of oil from the Gulf of Guinea to the United States and the West could slow considerably.

Since shipping industries are responsible for about 90 per cent of world trade, according to

Ihenacho, (2010) shipping is an indispensable logistic service upon which, the smooth

functioning of the Nigerian economy is clearly and firmly anchored. The ship traffic in major

ports in Nigeria excluding tankers is estimated at an average of 3500 vessels per annum. The oil

and gas activities had greatly contributed to increase in the activity of shipping in the nation's

water in terms of coastal tankers, crew boats, house boats and supply boats Usoro, (2003) stated

27

that about 2 billion US dollars was realized from shipping activity within the companies

operating in the oil industry in 2002". With the new Cabotage Act; more Nigerian flagged ships

would be expected to take advantage of the business opportunities in shipping.

The seaports are not only gate way to the nation's economy they also serve as transit

nodes for some neighbouring land locked countries like Niger and Chad. The Nigerian economic

survival depends to a great extent on the revenue derivable from the numerous resources and

assets available in the maritime environment. Therefore, the effect of insecurity within Gulf of

Guinea would negatively impact on the development of the nation if drastic measures are not

executed. Hence it would be necessary to safe guard the resources and assets in this area against

all forms of threats. Threat represents anything that can undermine the security of the nation or

anything that constitute danger to its survival, threats to Nigeria's economic interest can be

broadly classified into external and internal threat; External threats to Nigeria could manifest in

form of political and economic nature. They may arise from unresolved geo-political issues and

her porous borders. Other sources of external threats could be spill over from local conflicts,

civil strife and unrests in neighbouring countries.

The ever increasing interest in the Gulf of Guinea especially with regards to oil could be

a possible source of threat should Nigeria initiate a foreign policy that negatively affects the

economic interest of some powerful / developed countries Peter (2009), he also identified

internal threat to Nigeria's economic interest in the maritime environment these includes political

and communal conflicts, smuggling, piracy and sea robbery, poaching and marine pollution

others are maritime terrorism, crude oil theft/illegal bunkering, and pipeline vandalism and

sabotage, for example; according to Nigerian Trawlers Owners Association (NITOA) (2013)

there was more than 100 pirates attack on trawlers in 2007. The effect of piracy attacks was so

28

grievous on the fishing industries as over 50 per cent of about 250 trawlers registered in Nigeria

in 2003/2004 with over 40 fishing companies are no longer in business. The act of piracy has

impacted on the job opportunities and thus negatively affecting the economic growth and

development of the nation. Peter (2009: 14) asserts that:

Crude oil theft/Illegal Bunkering refers to the transfer of fuels and other petroleum products between vessels, from vessels to storage facilities and vice versa without following prescribed procedure or guidelines of the government. In the case of crude oil theft, perpetrators steal crude oil from crude oil pipelines and facilities that transverse the various rivers and creeks. At the peak of the Niger Delta crisis, Nigeria lost an estimated 70,000 – 300000 barrels per day of oil to theft amounting to $4.69 - $20.10 million US dollars at $67 US per barrel. The efforts to reduce these vices to the barest minimum through patrols, and aerial surveillance is challenging, activities of the restive youth was beginning to have effect on the revenue of governments in the oil producing states and hence stifling development in those states before the amnesty.

The threats from internal sources are not only numerous but have immediate and readily visible

effect on the investment, economy growth and development. Consequently, owing to its

enormous potential in serving the strategic economic and energy interest of national leaders,

multilateral institutions and multinational oil companies, Gulf of Guinea is of prominence to

scholars fortunately, it appears that scholars like Peter, (2009) &, Mane, (2005) in the discourse

on the Gulf of Guinea have either promoted the interest of external investors and equated it with

development for countries in the region as. (Mane, 2005:85) argues that:

In fact, the Gulf of Guinea is geographically and economically well positioned to the advantage of European and North American countries in quest, not only for energy security but also for markets, as the region is somewhat free of some of the risks of piracy, attacks and marine accidents associated with alternate sea routes in global commerce between the developed and developing countries of Africa.

29

According to (Adedayo, 2014) Sea piracy and armed robbery undermine investment in offshore

oil sector of the economy, arguing that Nigeria government heavily dependent on crude oil, this

growing interest in the Gulf of Guinea is now deceptively rationalized by the development

vacuum in major oil producing areas of the region.

As a result, mutual security interest of the importing and exporting countries is advanced

by western scholars and politicians as the region is expected to play more roles in meeting the

energy needs of oil importing nations in the years ahead. Nigeria as key oil producing country in

the region are by extension expected to play more role in addressing the problem of global

energy security. For example, Nigeria’s proven oil reserves are estimated at 40 billion barrels,

making the country, the eleventh largest world producer of oil (Abayomi, 2006) in fact, Nigeria

has 60 percent of total oil deposit in the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, Nigeria’s estimated natural

gas reserve of 176 trillion cubic feet is the largest in Africa against this background; Nigeria is at

the heart of this gradual shift in favour of the Gulf of Guinea strategy for security supplies of oil.

Incidentally, this rising dependence on the Gulf of Guinea for energy security has large-scale

implications for security of the oil importing and producing nations in the region.

The Niger Delta of Nigeria represents a central area of focus in the global attention on the

Gulf of Guinea for energy security and investment on the part of oil importing nations and the

Nigerian government. Trouble, and more trouble, seems clearly associated with this quest for

energy security. This has been well summed up by “resource curse” theorists in a work title:

Fuelling the World but Failing the Region, De Soya (2011) & Roll, (2011). External and

domestic linkages in the relationship between oil and security may be discussed on different

levels and perspectives, depending on how the issues of security are contextualized in terms of

what it means to each of the parties in the oil business between importing and exporting

30

countries in the Gulf of Guinea (De Soya, 2011 & Roll, 2011) understanding the meaning of

security within in that context; nature and interests of the importing and exporting countries for

example, Nigeria and United State; how global quest for energy security might also breed

insecurity and contribute to the nature of national governance of the oil, and if at all, the mode of

governance of the oil further leads to socio-economic and political conditions that fuel conflict

and insecurity to the export Nations.

The essence is the nature of impact of oil and gas business in oil producing states of the

Gulf of Guinea while meeting the needs of the importer. This classic example of the "Resource

Curse" was also documented by (Auty, 2001 & Gylfason, 2001). The term "resource curse

thesis" is used to describe how countries rich in natural resources are not able to utilize that

wealth to boost their economies and counter-intuitively, these countries had lower economic

growth than countries without an abundance of natural resources numerous studies by (World

Bank, 2000, IMF, 2000 & OPEC 2007) have shown a link between natural resource abundance

and poor economic growth. These disconnect between natural resources are stagnant of negative

economic growth can be seen clearly by looking at an example from the oil-producing countries.

The post-cold war era has come with a conviction that the concept of security is elastic,

beyond mere guard of sovereignty of states. It encompasses safeguard of the human environment

from destructive economic activities to comprehensive improvement in the well-being of citizens

(Owolabi & Okwechime, 2007). What this means is that security focuses on the root or source of

human pain and not on mere military threats against the state and its citizens. This, again, speaks

volumes about the significance of human security over other forms of security within the security

discourse. Beyond notions of posing security threat to the Nigerian state violent crisis in the

Niger Delta, which is in part, result of negative socio-economic, political and environmental

31

impact of oil industry in the region is a threat to human security and survival Owolabi &

Okwechime (2007: 29).

This goes along with a need for strong investment portfolios and profit in and from

production, externally driven to ensure sustained cost-friendliness and steady supplies. Security,

in this sense means opportunities for and safety of externally driven investments in the oil sector

in any case; oil multinational corporations are agents of capitalist globalization, an important

characteristic of capitalist globalization it’s a relationships of domination and exploitation in

alliance with the national economic and political class. As Kiely, (2005: 09) argues that:

Market societies do not arise naturally; they are products of political and social processes. Relationships of domination orchestrated by global capital breeds insecurity at one end of the spectrum –Gulf of Guinea – manifesting through the removal of citizens from basic benefits from the land and its oil resource. Access to equal benefits from the capitalist production of the oil is the result of external and domestic political and social processes that are basically determined by the agents of capitalist globalization in alliance with their home governments and host political and economic leaders.

The rising global quest for oil in the Gulf of Guinea is not merely to satisfy energy security needs

of key oil importing countries, and also to protect their investments in the oil sector in the region

and seek new investment opportunities; all of which are fundamental to the economic security of

home governments of the oil multinational corporations. External pressure for energy and

economic security on the part of major importing countries like US and China has no

corresponding pressure to address social, economic, environmental and political conditions that

have resulted from oil exploration and production activities. In fact, it appears that governance

32

becomes difficult in addressing internal issues (Collier, 2002, & Hoeffler, 2005). Perhaps, it is

for this reason, Stoker (2004:76) argues that:

Governance refers to ‘all sorts of new arrangements for creating order and structuring collective action.’ The ability to get things done without necessarily depending on state actors alone, nature of state and non-state actors, their involvement in addressing social problems, as well as the level of autonomy they enjoy in the social and political processes clearly signal important indices or properties of good governance.

Certainly, governance oil in Gulf of Guinea has had devastating impact from pressures of global

capitalism at the various stages of exploration, production and marketing. Generally, policy

choices of politicians in determining the nature of contract for exploration, production and

marketing, and how rents are to be utilized do not promote accountability.

Instead, it has contributed to corruption, bad governance, poverty and decadence in social

infrastructure insecurity associated with governance of oil in the Gulf of Guinea, as exemplified

in the case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta, manifests in different forms these institutional failure has

clearly reinforced the link between environmental insecurity and crime in Gulf of Guinea (Allen,

2012). Theo, (2010) analysed that security of global waterways cannot be overemphasised, the

ocean is a medium of transportation for important mineral resources, especially crude oil, and a

source of food in the form of fishing. Africa straddles important sea lanes and the waterways off

the west and east coasts of the continent have in recent years emerged as one of the world’s most

dangerous routes as vessels and crew members have been the targets of maritime pirate attacks;

of particular concern is the prevalence and increase in maritime piracy activities – horizontally

and vertically – around the Horn of Africa particularly the Gulf of Guinea where the safe

transportation of commercial goods, cargo and human lives is under constant threat.

33

From the above analysis, it is clear that the required good order at sea is directly

dependent on good governance after all, most security challenges confronting Africa have their

origin in the lack or failure of governance as states are the primary actors and agents of good

order at sea (Theo 2010:62) Thus the required good order at sea should be viewed as a function

of how states, such as Somalia and Nigeria, exercise their jurisdiction at sea to secure busy sea

lanes and also to protect the safe harvesting and extraction of resources, whether oil exploration

or fishing, to contribute to the desired good order. George (2012) estimated that global cost of

piracy within the current economic environment, have reached the following conclusions. Firstly,

the most spectacular increase in the cost of piracy in recent years have been brought about by the

increased ransom economic costs of piracy demanded by pirates in order to free the ship.

Secondly, insurance costs are difficult to quantify as many ships avoid purchasing the increased

insurance premiums.

In addition, the cost of deploying deterrent security equipment varies considerably as ship

owners choose to protect their property and crew from pirate attacks by different ways which

may vary greatly as far as the cost incurred is concerned. Lastly, the cost of Re-Routing, is also

difficult to estimate, since it depends on the type of ship, the speed and the miles covered. These

costs encumber most shipping companies in their attempt to avoid the impending danger of

maritime piracy, especially since 16.3% of world tonnage is owned by European shipping

companies. Piracy affects the cost of trade not merely because particular ships are intercepted

when delivering goods. A number of nations have, also indicated that their fishing sector has

declined in response to the threat of piracy. Another cost is the cost to Food Price Inflation

approximately 40% of piracy attacks have been on bulk carriers and general cargo vessels

together, these vessels carry the majority of the world’s food staples (such as rice and grain).

34

Pirate attacks on these vessels have direct consequences on the price of food, as deliveries of

food cargo are delayed, or in the case of perishable goods, lost.

Finally, there is the cost of reduced foreign revenue, as the instability and volatility of

regions affected by piracy, forces foreign investors to look for alternative regions to spend or

invest their money. It is clear that piracy attacks constitute an imminent danger to the lives and

welfare of mariners as well as cargoes and ships. Piracy in addition, has a direct economic

impact in terms of fraud, theft of cargo and travel delays, and definitely undermines the interests

of countries active in seaborne trade. It is obvious that piracy has increased in the seas

neighbouring states of gulf of guinea as recent figures indicates a significant upsurge in piracy

attacks off the Nigerian coast, especially 2012 / 2013. This rise of piracy incidents is due largely

to the movement of goods by sea inevitably increases piracy incidents, especially when cargoes,

ships and human life are valuable commodities, more so, that pirates acquired enough capital

from ransoms; it is obvious that piracy is a complex issue and no simplistic explanations and

analysis will give the maritime community a clear indication and forecast as to how this

international problem will be crackdown.

The maritime community is eagerly waiting for reduced number of piracy incidents in

2014 and years ahead (Nicolas, 2012). By and large the extant literature of writers namely

(Allen, 2012; Abayomi, 2003; Adedayo, 2014; Dick, 2010 Ihenacho, 2010; Nelson, 2012;

Peter, 2009; Theo, 2010 & Usoro, 2013) have identified internal and external beneficiaries that

patronize the Gulf of Guinea black markets, thus impede investments in Nigeria; but do not

adequately analyse in-depth effects of insecurity on investment in Nigeria. Therefore, this study

appreciates the lacuna and seeks to fill that gap as contribution to knowledge.

Gap in the Literature

35

Deriving from the extant literature, this study is able to adduce that the aforementioned

variables have been treated by scholars, although not satisfactory. However, this study identified

three gaps in the literature, as earlier mentioned the thesis statement of this study is to ascertain

whether piracy, small arms trafficking and insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea have undermine

security and investment in Nigeria. Firstly, having identified issues raised by scholars (Allen,

2012; David, 2013; Ejiofor, 2010; Masson, 2013; Rider, 2013 & Stefan, 2011) they identified

institutional failure as basis for piracy in Nigeria and Gulf of Guinea; while Daniel (2008) Nicole

& Marie (2009), Wingrin (2010), Nkosazana, (2010), and Ukeje (2003) share similar

perspective, that piracy is resultant effect of internal and external nexus which is consequent on

energy interest in black Market. Considering their polemics it is crystal clear that much

attention were given to the root causes of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea; however much has not

been done on how piracy undermines Nigeria security within the maritime environment and

beyond, thus, this study intend to fill this identified gap.

Furthermore, scholars like (Abia, 2003, Amaize, 2003, Ebo 2007, Ibeanu, 2005,

John,2007 Okoro, 2007 Isiaka 2010) among other have identified the implications and

consequences of SALW on the Nigerian State but has not given adequately attention on small

arms running in the Gulf of Guinea, whether it pose a threat to Nigeria’s national security. Thus,

the study will address this lacuna as well fill the gap in literature. Lastly, writers like( Allen,

2012; Abayomi, 2003; Adedayo, 2014; Dick, 2010 Ihenacho, 2010; Nelson, 2012; Peter, 2009;

Theo, 2010 & Usoro, 2013) have identified internal and external beneficiary that patronize the

Gulf of Guinea black markets thus impede investments in Nigeria; but do not adequately

analyse in-depth effects of insecurity on investment in Nigeria. Therefore, the study is aimed at

addressing this lacuna as well fill gap in literature.

36

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Theoretical Framework

There is hardly any valid research that has no theoretical construct. However, the essence

of theorizing is to explain in order to reach generalization, predict and control. It is on this note

that the study adopted the Marxian Political Economy Approach. This theory was propounded by

Karl Marx. Therefore, this theory as a tool of analysis, give some measure of analytical

coherence to the variable and phenomena in the study. Marx outlined the essence of materialist

understanding of history. He evolved a theory based on the dialectical materialism; essentially

the theory of dialectical materialism emphasizes the primacy condition, the dynamic character of

social reality and the relatedness of different elements of society, the theory is premised on the

notion that man is principally motivated by economic or material needs (Ake,1981:2). Labour is

the essence of material existence, hence economic activity is man’s primary concerned. The

thrust of this perspective is that the understanding of societal politics and culture depends

principally on the understanding of its economic structure as defined by the relations between

employers of labour and the working class in the production process (Akpuru-Aja, 1998:16). To

Marx, every political system corresponds to and reflects its kind of economic structure. Thus, in

the preface to his work: “A Contribution to Critique of political Economy” Marx places premium

on the sub-structural component of the society (otherwise called the base or foundation) which

plays a determinant role on its super-structural counterparts like politics, ideology and culture of

society. Accordingly, he asserts that:

Neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary, they originate in the material conditions of life… in the social production

37

of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditioned the general process of social, political and intellectual life (Marx, 1984:20).

Thus, from the substructure, one easily understands the nature of internal relations, how a society

organizes, manages and reproduces itself, the causes of tension, conflicts or contradictions in any

given society as well the direction of social change. Marx holds that the primary cause of tension

and social dislocation in society is economic factor. He first employed the political economy

approach for analysing the root causes of conflicts and contradictions in English capitalist

economy. To substantiate this, Nnoli cited in (Ken, 2010) asserts that understanding the

economic structure particular attention is paid to the mode of production (the organic unity of

productive forces and relations of production in society), the class structure of society and the

inherent contradictions among classes and how these factors determines political, economic,

legal, cultural, ideological, and moral aspects of social life.

Application of the Theory

The intensity of piracy and other maritime crimes in the GG is economically motivated,

hence the economic sabotage within the Nigerian territorial waters alongside other states in the

region can best explained within the analytical orbit of Marxian Political Economy Paradigm.

The theory enables us to appreciate the dimensions and dynamics of the prevailing world order,

which moves under the fulcrum of western capitalism/imperialism. The prevailing capitalist

order favours those who control the means of production and capitalize on the control of the

prevailing economic doctrine to perpetuate asymmetry relationship among other social strata.

38

The enormous deposit of Hydrocarbon and other mineral resources have attracted foreign and

domestic in investors to the region, there are presence of multinational corporations from

America, Asia, Europe and including indigenous firms from Nigeria, they pursue their respective

economic and energy interest. Also, considering the geo-strategic nature of the GG as a trans-

Atlantic trade and shipping route/ hub; illicit activities of pirates, smugglers, and militant among

others are part of the competition to acquire wealth by perpetuating their illegal act at sea.

Consequently, these groups of pirates, sea bandits, smugglers, and poachers etc; organized it

actions as to benefit from the large resources in the region, their principal objective is to satisfy

their primacy material condition by disrupting the legal activities of external and internal players.

Although there activities are criminally inclined but deeply rooted in mismanagement of oil

revenue, institutional failure, corruption, weak maritime laws in territorial or international

waters, lax security strength and most prevalence is the complex issue of governance; this have

serious implications on the socio-economic well-being of Nigeria citizens most especially the oil

bearing states within the Gulf of Guinea. To this end, Ake (1981:2) proposition seem justify on

the basis that theft as a moral value was created and dependant on a particular material condition,

accordingly he asserts that:

The morality and values of society tends to support the preservation of the existing division of labour and distribution of wealth in that society. The autonomy of morality and social values is more apparent than the real. Contemporary western morality condemns theft. And we forget that theft as a moral value is something created and dependent on particular economic condition; where there is no scarcity and no private property, the idea of theft would not arise (Ake, 1981:2).

This proposition among others shows the importance of economic conditions in understanding

society. It is therefore, not surprising that counter piracy effort may prove abortive due largely to

the parochial interest of littoral states, foreign consumers and the black market players on the

39

booming hydrocarbon resources, in other words the congress of interest among beneficiaries in

the criminal enterprise will make it difficult to stem the tide.

3.2 Hypotheses

This study is guided by the following hypotheses:

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea undermines Maritime Security in Nigeria.

Small Arms running in the region pose a threat to Nigeria.

Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea has adversely affected Investment in Nigeria.

3.3 Research Design

Essentially, the research design creates the foundation of the entire research work. Hence,

research design is a comprehensive plan for data collection in an empirical research project; this

specifies how data should be collected and analysed. It is the structuring of investigation aimed

at identifying variables and their relationships to one another (Asika, 1991:27). In other words, it

is an outline or a scheme that serves as a useful to the research in his effort to generate data for

any study. It is used for obtaining data to enable a researcher test / prove hypotheses or answer

research questions. This study is based on a single-case ex-post-facto analysis of documentary

evidences because it is basically qualitative and non –experimental. Ex-post-facto (otherwise

known as after the-fact) research design is based on the examination of the independent and

dependent variables after the events have taken place and data already in existence. In this

design, the test of hypotheses involves observing the independent and dependent variables at the

same time because the effect of the former on the later has already taken place before the

investigation.

According to Kerlinger (1977) defines the ex-post-facto design as a form of descriptive

research in which an independent variable has already occurred and in which an investigators

40

start with the observation of a dependent variable, then studies the independent variable in

retrospect for its possible relationship to cause and effect on the dependent variable.

Furthermore, Cohen & Manion (1980) notes that the phrase ex-post-facto mean after the fact or

retrospectively, and refers to those studies which investigate possible cause and effect

relationship by observing an existing condition and searching back in time for plausible casual

factors. The single-case facto design assumes the form of an experimental design where an

existing case is observed for some time in order to study or evaluate it. The single-case design

can be symbolically represented thus:

Where:

O= Observation

R= Random assignment of subjects

X= Independent variable

Y= Dependent variable

B= Before Observation

A= After observation

The analytical routine involved in testing structural causality based on the single case ex-

post-facto analysis of the independent variable (X) and the dependent variable (Y) is based on

concomitant variation. This is to demonstrate that (X) is the factor that determines (Y). This

implies that whenever (X) occurs, there is likelihood that (Y) will follow at some point later. The

criteria for inferring causality have been summarized by Selltiz et al (1974) as follows:

Co-variation between the pressured and presumed effect;

Proper time order, with the cause preceding the effect; and

Elimination of plausible alternative explanations for the observed relationship.

In testing the hypotheses, independent variables (X) have concomitant effects on dependent

variables (Y). The empirical referents of (X) and (Y) are stated in the logical data framework.

41

3.4 Methods of Data Collection

Methods are techniques and approaches employed to gather data which are used as

criteria for inference, interpretation, explanation and prediction (Cohen & Manion, 1980:26). On

the other hand, data are the information, evidence or fact from which conclusion can be drawn.

This study relied on the qualitative method of data collection in gathering data for the purposes

of testing our hypotheses. Qualitative research is a set of non-statistical inquiry technique and

process used to gather data about social phenomena (MacNabb, 2005:341). The qualitative

technique is most desirable because this work relies essentially on non-statistically-based and

numerically immeasurable data which nevertheless can be empirically studied. In other words,

the aim of qualitative methods is not to establish numeric or statistical relationship between

variables. This is because qualitative data may cover a few number of cases, the target is to

establish relationship and validity within the social or concrete reality. The qualitative technique

also deals with the real world situations because it conducts its observations under natural

settings, often devoid of artificialities and related computational manipulations. The implication

of this is that it studies people’s behaviour and attitudes using ordinary or natural language rather

than mathematical, statistical or numerical forms. Although it does not test hypotheses in the

statistical sense of the term, the above hypotheses shall be proven using the deductive logical

method.

The research utility of this technique cannot be overemphasized. The technique is usually

applied to obtain in-depth information, concept/variable clarification to facilitate instrument

designs and in the conduct of pilot studies (Biereenu-Nnabugwa, 2006:373). This data gathering

technique enables access into the inner recesses of group life, organizational structure,

bureaucratic processes as well as motivations for the individual behaviour. In relation to the

42

study, this technique enables us to gather data from documentary sources such as official

documents from organizations likes the IMB, IMO, UNSC and the United Nations Division for

Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea. Besides institutional and official documents, the study was

based on other secondary sources of data such as books, journals articles, conference papers,

Magazines / Newspapers and internet materials.

3.5 Methods of Data Analysis

The mass of qualitative data generated in this study was analysed using the qualitative

descriptive method. According to Asika (2006:118), qualitative descriptive analysis essentially

borders on summarizing the information generated in the research work, so that appropriate

analytical methods could be used to further discover relationship among the variables. This

method of data analysis is essentially the application of qualitative research technique in the

thorough examination and interpretation of research data. Through the qualitative technique of

data analysis, descriptive explanation was given to the data gathered during the study. Thus, the

use of this method is informed by the simplicity with which it summarizes, exposes and

interprets relationship implicit in a given data by giving a qualitative description or explanation

to the variable under study. Figures, tables and cartographic diagrams were also used for further

illumination of the subject

44

3.6 Logical Data Framework

Research

Question

Hypothesis Major Variables of

the Hypothesis:

Independent (X)

Dependent (Y)

Empirical Indicators of

Variables

Sources of Data Method of

Data

Collection

Method of Data

Analysis

Does piracy in

the Gulf of

Guinea

undermines

maritime

security in

Nigeria?

Piracy in the Gulf

of Guinea

undermines

maritime security

in Nigeria.

(X) Piracy in the

Gulf of Guinea

• Hijacking of Ships:

Such as Oil tankers/

vessels, Cargo ship &

Fishing trawlers.

• Sea robbery/ Drug

trafficking

• Hostility & Kidnapping:

of Oil Companies

expatriates, captains &

crew/ seafarer on

board.

Books Journals

Organizational

materials

Magazine

Newspaper

Qualitative

Methods of

data

collections,

secondary

sources.

Qualitative

descriptive

method,

Marxist Political

Economy

paradigm and

ex-post facto

research design.

(Y) Undermines

maritime security

in Nigeria

• Increased oil black

market, and loss of

Business.

• Loss of goods & other

valuables; availabilities

illicit drug and its

consequences.

• Reduction of Personnel

onboard, threats &

death of security

officers.

45

Research

Question

Hypothesis Major variables of the

Hypothesis:

Independent (X)

Dependent (Y)

Empirical Indicators of variables Sources Data Method of

data

collection

Method of data

analysis

Do Small

Arms

running in

the region

pose a

threat to

Nigeria?

Small Arms

running in the

region posed a

threat to

Nigeria.

(X) Small Arms

running in the region

• Influx of Small Arms in the Gulf

of Guinea.

• Wide spread use of small arms

in pirates activities in the

region.

• Circulation of small arms in

various part of Nigeria

Books

Journals

Organizational

materials

Magazine

Newspaper

Qualitative

Methods of

data

collections,

secondary

sources.

Qualitative

descriptive method,

Marxist Political

Economy paradigm

was adopted and ex-

post facto research

design.

(Y) Posed a threat to

Nigeria

• Making Nigeria waters ways to

be unsafe.

• Create tension and panic in

maritime environment.

• It has intensified crises in

Communities; increased crime

rate & other nefarious

activities in many states in the

country, political tension and

Islamic terrorism.

46

Research

Question

Hypothesis Major variables of the

Hypothesis:

Independent (X)

Dependent (Y)

Empirical Indicators of variables Sources Data Method of

data

collection

Method of data

analysis

Does

Maritime

insecurity in

the Gulf of

Guinea

affect

Investment

in Nigeria?

Maritime

insecurity in

the Gulf of

Guinea has

affected

Investment in

Nigeria.

(X) Maritime

insecurity in the Gulf

of Guinea

• Poor security and

inadequate surveillance

facilities in the region.

• Poor boarder

cooperation among the

Gulf states

• Intensified crime level

around economic

exclusive zone in the

region.

Books

Journals

Organizational

materials

Magazine

Newspaper

Qualitative

Methods of

data

collections,

secondary

sources.

Qualitative

descriptive method,

Marxist Political

Economy paradigm

was adopted and ex-

post facto research

design.

(Y) Has affected

Investment in Nigeria?

• Created an unsafe

maritime domain for

seafarers, ships, oil

platform, oil companies

and personnel.

• Weak economic and

security capabilities of

coastal states.

• Oil theft/ Illegal

refineries and fishing

poaching.

• Reduction in direct for

investments.

• Fall in oil production &

revenue.

47

CHAPTER FOUR

PIRACY IN GULF OF GUINEA AND MARITIME SECURITY IN NIGERIA

This chapter places high premium on piracy, sea robbery/ drug trafficking and

kidnapping activities within the confines of GG and beyond. Therefore, this chapter will equally

test the hypothetical statement as to ascertain whether or not piracy undermines maritime

security in Nigeria.

4.1 Piracy and Hijacking of Ships in the Gulf of Guinea

The upsurge of pirates activities and attacks on African waters is now a subject of serious

concern to member states and indeed the international community at large. Piracy on African

water ways revolve round three main regions; thus, the Somali coast/the Gulf of Aden along the

East African Coast; Nigeria’s territorial waters in West Africa; and the Mozambique

Channel/Cape sea route in Southern Africa. However, emphasis is on the Nigeria territorial

waters. According to Brigder (2014) 75,000-ton tanker, Kerala vessel vanished off the coast of

Angola. A sophisticated pirate gang hijacked the Greek-owned vessel, disabling its

identifications system and communication equipment, and painting over its identifying markers.

More than a week later and 1,300 miles away, the hijackers released Kerala off the coast of

Nigeria, after offloading 12,270 tons of its diesel cargo to other ships. The Kerala hijacking

marks the southernmost expansion of Nigeria’s pirate gangs, but represents only one subset of

piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. These Nigeria-based criminal enterprise is highly organized and

intelligence driven, allegedly with the involvement of high-powered political, business, and

military syndicates. As Brigder (2014:22) noted that a suspected hijacker captured near Lagos

coast stated thus:

We do not work in isolation. We have a network of ministry workers. What they do is to give us information on the location and content of the

48

vessels to be hijacked. Once we complete the assignment, we would inform the point men who thereafter, contact the cabal that takes charge of the hijacked vessels. We usually meet at a designated point on the high sea, from where they would offload the contents from the hijacked vessels and thereafter, deposit them in various oil facilities for distribution by oil marketers.

The geographic scope and nature of this particular crime underscores the expansive multinational

network and the activities of informants in relations to other pirate syndicates. Nigeria produces

about 2 million barrels of oil per day, but has the capacity to refine less than 50% of her crude.

Hence, crude oil is exported to foreign refineries and then returns back into Nigeria and sold at

government subsidized rates, a process that provides ample opportunity for corruption, theft, and

piracy of all sorts. The pirate’s hunting ground are the dense backlog of tankers waiting at

anchorage across the region territorial waters; products are of a peculiar market, thus the

pervasive acceptance of black market petroleum from illegal refineries onshore/ offshore, or

illicit ship-to-ship transfers enables stolen cargos to be quickly flipped (Brigder, 2014).

Similarly, according to Ocean Beyond Piracy OBP reports (2013) a Singaporean-flagged

oil tanker, Abu Dhabi Star, was hijacked off the coast of Lagos, Nigeria September 13, 2012.

They broke glass windows to access a bridge into the 183m (600-ft) long vessel. The pirates fled

as soon as they realized a Nigerian naval ship was approaching. It is suspected that although the

pirates fled, they may have attempted to siphon off the gas from the ship. In October 15, 2012; A

Luxembourgish-flagged anchor handling vessel named Bourbon Liberty 249, was hijacked off

the coast of Nigeria. In December 23, 2012; an Italian-registered ship was hijacked by seven

Nigerian pirates, off the coast of the state of Bayelsa. A Panamanian-flagged vessel, owned by

the Ivory Coast Company, Koda Maritime was hijacked while transferring 5,000 tons of oil near

Abidjan. February 3, 2013: A Luxembourg-flagged oil tanker, Gascogne owned by France was

49

hijacked approximately 70 nautical miles south of the port city of Abidjan. February 4, 2013: A

Marshall Islands-flagged chemical tanker, Pyxis Delta owned by the United Arab Emirates

(UAE), was hijacked off the coast of Nigeria. A UK-flagged cargo ship, Ester C, owned by the

Isle of Wight-based Carisbrooke Shipping was hijacked by pirates between the Cameroonian

port of Douala and the port of Malabo in Equatorial Guinea. April 16, 2013: A Greek-flagged

crude oil carrier, Cap Theodora, was attacked by pirates, 36 nautical miles off the coast of

Principe Island, Gulf of Guinea.

The ship thwarted the attack by increasing its speed and performing evasive manoeuvres.

April 25, 2013 A Liberian-flagged container ship, Hansa Marburg, owned by Hamburg-based

shipping firm Leonhard and Blumberg was hijacked 130 nautical miles off the coast of

Equatorial Guinea; May, 13 2013. The Nigerian-flagged oil products tanker, Matrix, was

hijacked approximately nautical mile off the coast of Bayelsa,these attacks had been aimed at oil

tankers, cargo vessels, fishing trawlers, and speed boats conveying passengers from one

destination to another. On July 24, an Italian-owned tanker with 108,958 weight, and 23 crew

members on board was hijacked by sea pirates off the coast of Benin, just outside the Nigerian

waters. In the first week of November 2013, gunmen boarded MT Halifax, an oil tanker, which

anchored off the coast of Port Harcourt. The pirates hijacked the ship and sailed off into the

waters of the Gulf of Guinea with the crew until the crude oil in the ship was offloaded. Thus,

sea pirates are responsible for drug/human trafficking, arms smuggling, dumping of toxic waste,

illegal bunkering, illegal fishing and terrorism ( Fisher, 2014:18) he further asserted that:

Unless it is tackled quickly and effectively, piracy could do serious damage to Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, slowing development for years to come. Mr Westland said At about 1am, I was awoken by banging, crashing and shouting. I was very scared. I locked my door and hid in the en suite toilet. Moments later, I heard loud crashing on

50

my cabin door and then I saw sledgehammers coming through the toilet door. I wanted to avoid injury so I opened the door and was confronted by six pirates with masks, machine-guns and shotguns. Mr Westland was forced to lie flat in one of the motorboats as the pirates ransacked the vessel, stealing televisions, phones, laptops, music players, food and drinks. The attackers failed to scramble aboard the second vessel so instead headed towards the Lady Swathin, where again they seized money, mobile phones and laptops. Shots were fired during the raids, but no one was injured.

In order buttress the above assertion, the table below provides a glimpse picture of selected

pirates attacks and hijack of ships in Gulf of Guinea, 200 nautical miles off Nigerian territorial

waters.

Table 4.1: Showing Numbers of Pirate Attacks and Hijacks 2013 – 2014 Nigeria Territorial

Waters

Country Name Cargo Date of Attack Date of

Release

Remark

Malaysia Armada Tugas Crude Oil Tanker 07-02-2013 08-02-2013 Ransom demanded Unknown

Nigeria Orange 7 Fishing Vessel 02-03-2013 02-03-2013 Unknown

Turkey MT Cotton Crude Oil Tanker 16-07-2013 22-07-2013 Unknown

United States C-Retriever Oil Tanker 04-10-2013 04-10-2013 Released after Ransom

Singapore MT Super League

Crude Oil Tanker 02-01-2014 10-01-2014 Unknown

Germany/Brussels

Marshall Island SP

Oil Tanker 11-04-2014 12-05-2014 Rescued

Singapore MT Hai Soon Oil Tanker 26-07-2014 04-08-2014 None

Source: Adapted from West African Secure Anchorage Area (2014) Quarterly Report.

From the table above, it is observed that the rate of pirates activities, attacks and hijacks of ship

in Nigeria’s territorial waters is a source of concern, it further demonstrate that sea piracy

hamper the activities of both domestic and foreign trade relations in the maritime industry

especially the oil and gas sector. Lastly, it shows that in every 10 attacks/hijacks; only a total of

two percent may be rescued.

51

Consequently, the implications of Piracy on maritime domain cannot be far-fetched;

accordingly, Edward (2014) observes that fishing merchants lean patiently against a tin wall in

Lagos’s Kirikiri harbour, waiting for sea-battered boats to bring in their haul. For years, women

here have bought fish to sell on to local markets, but now their livelihood is under threat, pirates

are driving Nigerian trawlers out of business creating artificial scarcity in the local market This

problem lies offshore. Nigeria’s sea-robbers are increasingly confident and sophisticated; attacks

on oil rigs, cargo ships and fishing boats have soared in the past decade. A local trawling

company, ORC Fishing & Food Processing, recorded about 20 incidents involving its fleet in

2013, including two deaths. Having being battered by sea pirates fishing trawler owners in the

country have raised alarm over the recurring hijack of fishing vessels within Nigerian waters by

sea pirates. In most cases, fishing trawlers hijacked from fishermen are used to attack other

vessels operating off the coast of other neighbouring West African countries (Lowe, 2013).

According to Overo (2014) the President of Nigeria Trawler Owners Association,

(NTOA) sea pirates have forced fishermen on the Nigerian waterways to scale down their

activities. He cited two recent cases of attacks on fishermen off the Nigerian coast on April 19th

and August 12th 2014, he explained that the sea pirates struck off the Bonny Oil Terminal,

assaulting seven vessels and subsequently taking them to an unknown destination, the seized

fishing trawlers were later vandalised after removing its necessary parts. He said the main

interests of the sea pirates when they attack fishermen are the electronic gadgets in the fishing

trawlers, after hijacking a fishing trawler, the sea pirates will remove all the electronic gadgets

on board, including the Single Sideband Transmission SSB Radio, Very High Frequency

Communication VHF Radio, Radar and Echo Sounder. The pathetic thing is that the sea pirates

will thereafter; direct us to a section of the sea where they can attack oil tankers and other vessels

52

using our fishing trawlers as platforms. Before, we had about 250 trawlers fishing in Nigerian

waters between 2000 and 2008 but now we only have 125 trawlers from the fisheries record

which concomitantly reduces the fishing pace as a result of piracy attacks so we do not have the

whole of the coast to fish. Nigeria is restricted from particular areas of the coastline by pirates,

thus the local production is also dropping because of the reduction in fishing areas. This may

affect supply as well increase market price; creating difficultly for common man (Overo, 2014).

Similarly, Okoro, (2013) explained that the activities of pirates could affect the Nigerian

economy negatively if not properly checked, lives and property are being lost on daily basis, just

as businesses are being truncated with delayed navigation of vessels as a result of the menace.

Other effects of the piracy on the economy could be inflation on imported goods as a result of

high insurance premium and freight on Nigeria bound cargoes because of the risk of navigation

into Nigeria. Accordingly the incidence of sea pirates has negatively affect inflow of foreign

direct investment to the country.

As examined by Obi (2014) Piracy is capable of crippling the nation’s economy, since

shipping largely contributes to the growth of any economy; the economy cannot thrive where

pirates activities are terrifying, thus the regulatory agency, Nigerian Maritime Administration

and Safety Agency (NIMASA) owe the international community the obligation to assure the

safety of their vessels, crew and cargo in order to foster shipping trade between Nigeria and the

rest of the world. Furthermore, piracy has created a continue booming oil black market with

availability of crude oil/ refined petroleum products. Black markets are illegal free markets

which flourish in economies where consumer goods are scarce or are heavily taxed. In the first

kind, black market prices are higher than the 'official' or controlled prices. On the other hand,

prices are lower than the 'legitimate' or taxed prices, due to tax evasion. Black market and black

53

money go hand in hand. Hence, not only does Nigeria lose potential tax revenue for the

percentage of its oil sold on the black market; it also loses its credibility through the illegal

exploitation of oil through the black markets. The theft of oil from pipelines and refineries is

estimate at ($7 billion every year) which is a major drag on Nigeria’s economic growth. Bunkers

and others who participate in the plundering of Nigeria’s oil have pushed the boundaries of the

market for their stolen oil into the international field, a step which has had global effects.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) which counts Nigeria among its

members, controls much of the global oil market, hence when Nigeria loses oil to the black

market, the effects can be felt throughout OPEC as the quantity of cheaper black market

substitutes for their goods increases, driving prices down.

4.2 Sea Robbery and Drug Trafficking in Nigerian Maritime Environment

As explained by Asu (2014) that a passenger craft was attacked by sea robbers in the region.

The incident took placed on March 22nd 2014 at approximately 0700 local time in position

approximately nautical miles off Nigerian coast; armed men in a speedboat attacked the

passenger craft stole cash and personal belongings from the victims; the robbers took and

disabled the passenger vessel leaving its occupants stranded. Also, On October 30 2013,

suspected sea pirates were reported by Ezeoba, (2013) to have attacked a speed boat conveying

passengers along Nembe waterways in Bayelsa State. The sea robbers attacked four passenger

speed boats which were conveying traders to Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State, some of the

passengers were ordered by the hoodlums to jump into the water after being dispossessed of their

cash and other valuables. 50% of Nigeria’s territorial waters are under threat (Folashade, 2013)

noted that vessel navigating within Calabar Rivers are operating in fear, sea robbery activities

hits a new peak, attacks on vessels and boats operating around 40 Nautical Miles from the

54

Fairway Buoy up to Calabar Port have increased. Accordingly, there are several islands around

the passage leading to the port which serve as hideout for pirates cum militants to carry out their

illegal operations around the territorial water ways. Adding that the constant robbery attacks

within the axis has also led to hike in fares by boat operators due to high level of risk. The

problem with the passage is that there are several islands around the Calabar waters, like Parrot

Island, Snake Island; these are safe havens for pirates. Thus, passenger’s boat crossing to these

island have increased their fare because of pirate activities, ships have been getting attacks very

often. He noted that the Nigerian territorial waters are yet to attain a satisfactory level in terms of

security (Folashade, 2013).

In view of drug trafficking, Nigeria water ways is a major sea route for smugglers across

the Atlantic to Asia, Europe and Latin America. According to United Nations Office on Drugs

and Crime (UNODC) 2008 the term drug varies in usage for medicine, it refers to any substance

with the potential to prevent or cure disease or enhance physical or mental welfare. In

pharmacology, it means any chemical agent that alters the biochemical or physiological

processes of tissues or organisms. In the context of international drug control, "drug" means any

of the substances listed in Schedule I and II of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,

whether natural or synthetic. Licit/Illicit drugs, the United Nations drug control conventions do

not recognize a distinction between licit and illicit drug, they describe it use as licit or illicit.

Hence, the term illicit drugs is used to describe drugs which are under international control (and

which may or may not have licit medical purposes) but which are produced, trafficked and

consumed illicitly (Taylor, 2005).

Nigeria has many busy Sea ports which remain vulnerable to illicit drug shipments;

Nigeria is a major transit point to destined continents like Asia, Europe, Latin America and the

55

United States. Nigerian trafficking groups are among the largest trafficking organizations

involved in heroin, cannabis, cocaine among others in West Africa, Nigeria is also becoming an

increasingly important transit country for smuggling; reports indicate that 10% of the annual

total harvest of cannabis is consumed in the area of cultivation or wild growth; 50% is introduced

to the illicit traffic within the country; and 40% is exported either as raw material or after

conversion. Nigerian drug peddlers are loosely structured, based on cartel, there network

operations are multidimensional. These made their organizations difficult for law enforcement

officials to penetrate. In recent years, the organizational structure appears to be changing,

Nigerian drug trafficking groups are increasingly employing non- Nigerian couriers, including

other African nationals (particularly South Africans), Europeans, Asians, and U.S. citizens.

Nigerian trafficking organizations often bypass Airport and land boarders making use of sea

routes via the South Atlantic in the Gulf of Guinea where piracy and trafficking seem to have a

safe transit to their destinations (Shehu, 2009).

Similarly, Ibemere (2014) stated that some die-hard drug syndicates originating from

West Africa have devised new method in making sure that their ‘wares’ reached their

counterparts in Nigeria and other foreign countries, in distributing the deadly ‘goods’; recent

attempt by syndicate got burst before its being hatched when their illicit business deal was

deflated by the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, NDLEA. The foiled plan succeeded

when five foreigners- two Ghanaian, two Beninese and another Niger national, attempted to ferry

illicit drugs using Nigeria water ways as perfect route for their illicit deals were apprehended;

and were stopped from ferrying drugs into Nigeria on the 18th June,2014 through the Apapa Sea

Port. These are West African drug syndicate, who are trying to invade Nigeria with illicit drugs

having considered the country as a transit country for drugs to Europe and America. The Marine

56

Unit of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), foiled attempt by a West

African drug syndicate to employ the services of fishermen in smuggling 1,020.5kg of

compressed dried weeds suspected to be Ghanaian cannabis with value worth of 10 Million

Naira. Accordingly, Ibemere (2014:7) affirmed that:

The Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) Eastern Naval Command Aikhomu raised alarm over the numerous security threats plaguing the Gulf of Guinea. According to him, these have a bad impact on the development of the region. At a media chat in Calabar, Cross River State capital, disclosed that some of the pressure included sea robbery and piracy, crude oil theft and illegal bunkering, unreported and unregulated fishing, drug and human trafficking and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. At the event, Aikhomu revealed that the Nigerian Navy was in partnership with the United States of America’s Office of the Security Cooperation to organise a Regional Maritime Awareness Capability Conference for countries in the Gulf of Guinea. According to the FOC, the conference was as a result of the necessity to have a comprehensive maritime understanding of Nigeria’s maritime environment, including the Gulf of Guinea. “This is with the view to improving maritime domain awareness of the Gulf of Guinea and the need for member states to collaborate in terms of intelligence gathering and information sharing.” He further said the expanded economic activities in the gulf were what gave rise to renewed interest within the region. FOC also stated that the Nigerian Navy was determined to ensure that the Nigeria maritime sphere of influence was safe against unwholesome practices.

From the above, it is adduce that sea robbery and drug trafficking are crime against the state.

Hence, maritime industry as well other trading firms have suffered from this heinous crime.

Bolokor, (2013) observes that Maritime experts estimate that Nigeria’s losses N480 billion due

to the activities of pirates in its territorial waters every year. They also blame the rising wave of

piracy in Nigerian waters to the non-domestication of some of the international treaties of the

International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which Nigeria has ratified.

However, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA, 2013)

say that it is determined to redress the trend, the country’s economic losses as a result of the

57

activities of pirates and sea robbers would no longer be tolerated stressing that NIMASA is now

ready to tackle the issue of robbery, illegal bunkering of petroleum products and piracy in the

nation’s waters. According to Taylor (2008) significant trend is the increasing prominence of

Africa, notably west and Central Africa, as transit points for cocaine shipments from South

America destined for the European markets. The proportion of individual cocaine seizures made

in Europe that were found to have transited Africa rose from 5% in 2004 to 12% in 2006 and

42% in 2013. Countries along the Gulf of Guinea and off the coast of Cape Verde have been

particularly affected, while cocaine use has also increased in West Africa. Cocaine is frequently

shipped into the countries along the Gulf of Guinea, from where it is usually trafficked by

individual couriers to various destinations in Europe, the main African re-distribution centres

being Ghana and Nigeria. The increase in seizures has been particularly evident in the West and

Central Africa sub region. The largest seizures were reported by Nigeria. Guinea-Bissau was

frequently mentioned as the main transit location by UNODC report (2013) individual drug

seizure database. In April 2007 the police of Guinea-Bissau made a major seizure of 635 kg of

cocaine that had been flown into a military airstrip. In June 2007, Senegalese authorities made

their highest ever seizure of cocaine. Nigeria, with its own growing drug problem and high levels

of corruption, is a convenient transit and storage point for international drug cartels.

To this end, it evident that the implications of sea robbery and drug trafficking affects the

country economic growth as well threaten sustainable national security. In the past years, West

African piracy has focused on “theft of goods” in which pirates board vessels in order to steal the

cargos and personal property of the seafarers. Given the large oil industry in West Africa and the

number of vessels in the region exporting oil and importing refined petroleum, one of the major

targets of pirates has been the oil industry. The Joint War Committee, which comprises

58

underwriting representatives from both the Lloyd’s and the International Underwriting

Association’s company markets in London, estimates that between $2 million and $6 million

worth of oil is stolen per pirate attack in the Gulf of Guinea. Ocean Beyond Piracy’ OBP (2013)

data identified thirteen reports of tankers being attacked in 2013, of which only three included

sufficient information to be counted as documented reports of oil theft, one of which was

thwarted by the navy’s successful rescue of the MT Norte. In addition to these three documented

cases of oil siphoning; OBP’s analysis identified up to an additional three that may have

involved oil siphoning. Based on the IMB (2013) Piracy and Armed Robbery reports, 18

vessels in our area of interest for West Africa reported personal property thefts. This brings the

estimated total value lost to between$180,000 and $270,000 for 2013. However, it is possible

that due to incomplete reporting the actual amount of losses was much higher.

The various forms of organized crime, particularly drug trafficking, pose threat to the

security and stability of states, undermining the rule of law and damaging their societies and

communities. As explained by McConnell (2011) developing and transition countries and those

in conflict zones are particularly vulnerable to the impact of organized crime. The consequences

of drugs being trafficked through the Islamic states have been severe especially the Boko Haram

terrorists group. The impact that drug trafficking has on the West African region most especially

as it concern Nigeria and it would certainly be erroneous to generalise the circumstances of drug

trafficking in various part of the country. Nevertheless, drug trafficking extends into every

sphere of the society in which it is prevalent. Firstly, the impact of narcotics consumption on

consumer economies is adverse; Nigerians experienced damaging effect of narcotics trading and

consumption on its domestic economy. Narcotics trading and the abuse thereof, ultimately leads

to the disintegration and disruption of family and society relations and a country dependent on

59

narcotic-trafficking causes the unravelling of its own population and the attached value system

required for its survival and cohesion. When the population of a state is weakened or

compromised by drug abuse, it has the potential of rendering the population insecure as

“dependency, distress, poverty and crime sets in. Evidently, the National Drug Law Enforcement

Agency NDLEA (2008) authenticated in statistical terms the Geo-political zone with the highest

number of drug peddlers as well consumers; accordingly North-West has the highest case of drug

addict; South-East with the highest number of traffickers; S west hub of hard drugs; while South-

South is mostly transit route to Europe Asia and Latin America. See chart below.

Figure 4.1: Showing the Highest ranking narcotic Geo-political Zone in Nigeria

236 11.70%

478

755 34.47%

263 13.50%

195

347 17.32%

North Cenral

North East

North West

South East

South South

South West

Source: Collated from NDLEA Official Document, 2014 October

The above bar chart demonstrates clearly that North-West Geo- political zone top the chart of

consumption of narcotic, while the South-South zone is the least among other zones.

Insecurity is worsened by the impact drug trafficking and drug abuse has on the education

of a population. The belief in the benefit of education is undermined by the ‘get-rich-quick-

mentality’ that establishes itself among the youth. The lucrative prospects, power and high profit

rates attached to drug trafficking becomes attractive to marginalised young males. However, it

60

also produces unskilled, unemployed and unproductive citizens who are at risk of abusing the

substance themselves, thereby amplifying the drug culture within the region. Consequently, the

economy is burdened with a declining and weakened labour force and a civil society divided and

rendered powerless. Graham (2009) noted that drug trafficking may be lucrative business but

creates an illusion of short-term route to economic prosperity. Accordingly, narcotic-economies

necessitate the building of better and efficient infrastructure and communication technologies to

facilitate streamlined and cost-effective trafficking. The supplementary construction boom

provides the necessary jobs and accommodation, while the payment received from these

opportunities increase the injection of monies into the domestic economy. The economy

therefore looks healthier, but the reality is that only a few individuals who control the cash

benefit from this economic boom. It should be stressed that the economic boom does not last

long and does not necessarily trickle down to the poorer masses. It only worsens the economic

credibility of the state and renders the economy and the prosperity of the population dependent

on drug trafficking. Aside from this, wealthy drug traffickers prefer to export their cash to safer

financial and economic climates, while some choose to decrease their spending in the local

economy to avoid detection (Shehu, 2009).

Drug trafficking and the money-laundering that comes with illicit trading, places the

banking system under considerable pressure to accept dirty money. Although it builds the

banking system’s net worth, it subsequently puts it at risk of prosecution or the risk of sudden

and large cash withdrawals. Increased violence and crime that persists in these countries and the

decline of a productive and reliable work force undermines the region’s business and tourism

sectors. This discourages investment within the region, leading to a further dependency on drug

trafficking and declining prospects of escaping that dependency. “The economic weight of this

61

flow could create a Dutch disease effect, in which other forms of commercial activity become

less attractive than drug trafficking and this inevitably has a negative effect on state revenue,

rendering the Government unable to provide public goods and services facilitative of domestic

development and economic growth. Furthermore, as cited in McConnell (2008) emergence of the

narcotic on any state weakening economic credibility and increase transnational criminal

networks operating within land and sea borders. This becomes difficult for Gulf of Guinea states

to build and sustain the capacity and political will necessary to prevent these criminal agents

from taking over state institutions and the domestic economy. Often, the net worth of individuals

or criminal networks who engage in these activities is higher than the country’s national income.

This provides the opportunity for these criminal networks and drug lords to infiltrate the

Government and usurp control of state institutions to aid their activities or avoid prosecution.

These cartels work with local syndicates and corrupt officials where some consignments are

handled by corrupt armies, customs and police forces. is quoted as saying that drug cartels buy

more than real estate, banks and businesses; they buy elections, candidates and parties. In a word

they buy power (Elis, 2009). The drug trade affect and corrupts Government official as well as

state institutions, capturing weak states in exchange for protection and money. The state and the

Government become compliant to the drugs trade and its allegiance to the drug lords renders it

negligent to the rights of her citizens.

4.3 Hostility and Kidnapping within Nigerian Territorial Waters

In Nigeria, Kidnapping and Hostage taking started in the Niger Delta region in

1999,while kidnap for ransom became prevalent since 2005. Today it is spreading like wild fire

into the neighbouring South East, South West and Abuja. Kidnapping for any reason is a crime

against humanity, it reduces man into the semblance of an animal (Otuya, 2010). Kidnapping, is

62

the taking away of a person against the person's will, usually to hold the person in false

imprisonment, confinement without legal authority. This may be done for ransom or in

furtherance of another crime (Adibe, 2008). Economic kidnapping or the kidnapping business is

where a financial demand is made, which could be either hard cash, or some other financial

resource. Political kidnapping on the other hand, is where political concessions such as the

release of prisoner, changes to the law and policy retreats, are demanded (Briggs, 2009).

However, economic kidnapping, is one of the fastest growing industries in the world. It is

estimated that kidnapping globally take home in the regions earned about $500 million each year

in ransom payment; the hostage is a commodity with a price on his head. It is estimated that

there are approximately 10,000 kidnappings each year worldwide. The undisputed kidnap capital

of the world is Colombia, where the activity has been described as a cottage industry. Down here

in the Gulf of Guinea; Nigeria experienced the highest number of kidnap-pings across Africa in

since 2005. The kidnap upsurge of wealthy Nigerians and Foreigners, especially those working

in the oil and gas sector remains principal targets. Kidnappings in the Niger Delta have reached

high proportions with more than 65 per cent of abduction cases “between” 2005 – 2013. The on-

going wave of kidnappings in the Niger Delta has driven thousands of foreign oil workers away

in the past years. The IMB report (2014) highlights the threat faced by expatriate and local

workers alike within the Niger Delta region. Security in the Niger Delta, the heart of Nigeria’s

oil production industry, is notoriously violent, with crime and kidnappings in commonplace.

According to Ake (2010) the maritime environment remains extremely volatile as kidnap

for ransom continues to pose a considerable threat to foreigners, especially those working in the

oil and gas sector. For example, 14 October 2013 an Indian national who worked as principal of

a school affiliated to oil company Exxon Mobil Corp was abducted in Eket, AkawaIbom State;

63

leaving two persons dead in the process. Also, kidnapped crew members are usually held on till

ransom is paid. The kidnapping of two American officers from the supply vessel C-Retriever, for

example, may have been a pre-informed attack on Oct. 17, 2013, the ship owners received a

letter threatening kidnappings if more local workers were not hired for labour; six days later,

pirates attacked the vessel just after it left the security perimeter of the Agbami oil field in Niger

Delta (OBP,2014). The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which had

been the arrow head of the agitation and violence in the Niger Delta, announced that they

masterminded an attack on the tugboat belonging to Agip Nigerian Oil Company (NOAC) and

the abduction of two personnel on the waterways of Nembe in Nembe Local Government Area

of Bayelsa State. Similar claims by the group in the past have always been dismissed as hoax by

the Joint Task Force (JTF), Operation Polo Shield. Therefore, in a bid to drive home our points,

the available data provides cases kidnapping as states below:

Table 4.2: Showing Number of Selected Kidnapped in Nigeria Territorial Waters 2013-

2014

Country of

Origin

Name Cargo Crew No of

kidnapped

Date of

Kidnapped

Date of

Released

Remark

Panama Koda Maritime

Crude Oil Tanker

23 5 09-01-2013 16-01-2013 Ransom Unknown

Italy St. Vincent & G

Oil Tanker 7 2 07-02-2013 10-022013 Unknown

Pakistan Unknown Crude Oil Tanker

I0 3 26-02-2013 07-03-2013 US$1.3 Million

Nigeria MT Matrix Oil Tanker 17

4

14-05-2013

06-062013 Unknown

Turkey MT Cotton Crude Oil Tanker

24 3 16-07-2013 22-07-2013 Unknown

Greece MT ALTHE Oil Tanker 18 4 17-12-2013 07-01-2014 Unknown

Germany/Brussels

Marshall Island SP

Oil Tanker 19 2 11-04-2014 12-05-2014 Unknown

Source: Adapted from West African Secure Anchorage Area (2014) Quarterly Report

64

The table above, represents a vivid picture of selected kidnapped activities recorded in the Gulf

of Guinea off Nigerian coast. It shows that most of the victims are foreigners in oil and gas

industry and other shipping firms, note that ransom for victims are mostly not reported, abut

there are exceptional cases like the Pakistan crew as indicated.

Kidnapping, has created insecurity, threat to National Security and adverse effect on the

economy, and dent the country’s image. The increasing case of insecurity of personnel and oil

installations, decelerating productive forces and economic growth of the country becomes a

threat to national security and a challenge to the security system. The Nigeria territorial waters

within the Niger Delta Region are experiencing an upsurge of criminal activities like kidnapping

that is threatening the Peace, Security and Economy of Nigeria. This planned crime of

kidnapping creates insecurity among Nigerians and corporate personnel, contractors abandon

their projects due to insecurity; this trend retards growth and development. Oil workers abandon

their job for their safety, at the detriment of oil production which is the mainstay of the economy.

Nigeria earns over 90% percent of her foreign exchange from oil production and gas. Therefore,

when there is a threat to oil and gas production, as a result of youth violence and militancy, this

translates to social instability and economic sabotage.

Insecurity has led to migration of foreign investors to neighbouring states. This could

create capital flight from the state thereby affecting the economy of the state. It could close

companies and render a lot of workers redundant. According to Teddy (2008) the crime situation

in Gulf of Guinea is a growing threat to western Business interests as serious threat to the local

economies due to joblessness, decrease in revenue and taxes. Also, it has affected Nigeria

National security, greater chunk of the budget is allocated to security services at the National

state and local government levels. This is likely to prevent the improvement of the economic and

65

the welfare services of the population. Military spending can under develop the economies of

developing countries, by diverting scarce financial resources to trained personnel from projects

that could create wealth and benefit the citizens. The wide spread of kidnapping incidents in

Nigeria is a thorny issue for security operatives in combating kidnappers, this is because; their

operation perimeter is within the water ways which is safe haven for their activities.

Consequently the weakness of the Nigeria Navy is being revealed, due to their inability to have

complete control the security of our water ways (Otuya, 2010).

Similarly, Ezeobi (2009) posited that the growing rate of insecurity in Nigeria especially

since 2007 has significantly affected the country's economy. Before the federal government's

Amnesty Programme designed for militants in the Niger Delta region, the oil production and the

number of barrels produced per day, drastically declined. This was largely due to kidnapping and

hostage of oil workers in the region. This singular problem adversely reduced government's

revenue from oil as well as implementation of government’s policies and programmes during

this period. Thus, most capital projects captured in the 2007 and 2008 annual budgets were

not effectively implemented largely due to shortage of financial resources occasioned by

militancy/security in the Niger Delta. This include the construction and rehabilitation of federal

roads in the six geo-political zones, construction of dams in the North West and North Central

zones, the immediate take-off of dredging of River Niger, and construction of additional power

plants in the six geo-political zones (Ezeobi, 2009:47). This ugly trend denied Nigerians the

dividend of democracy as government was incapacitated to provide social services to the people.

In the light of the seeming foregoing, it is an indisputable fact that piracy, sea robbery,

drug trafficking, and kidnapping / hostility are driven by economic motive, recasting the

theoretical framework as cited in Ake, (1981) man primacy is his economic benefit from the

66

social production process. The regular crime in the Hydrocarbon zone of Gulf Guinea has

generated legal and illicit means of livelihood for both domestic and foreign partners. The data

analyses above evidently validate the hypothesis, that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea undermines

maritime security activities in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SMALL ARMS RUNNING IN THE GULF OF GUINEA AND SECURITY IN NIGERIA

This chapter encompasses small arms running in the Gulf of Guinea and its propensity

with the Nigerian state. It further accessed the influx of small arms into Nigeria via the Gulf of

Guinea territorial waters. Similarly, mention is also made on the wide spread use of small arms

by pirates vis –a- vis its proliferation into various parts of country. Lastly, the hypothesis will be

put to test in a bid to ascertain its acceptability or reject ability.

5.1 Influx of Small Arms in the Gulf of Guinea

The Gulf of Guinea is now a key route for arms smuggling to Northern and Western Africa.

There have been reports that terrorist groups like Boko Haram of Nigeria, al Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM), al Shabaab of Somalia, and elements of the Iranian regime have used this area

for arms trafficking. It should therefore come as little surprise that one of the primary projects of

the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is troop training in the Gulf of Guinea. Currently,

AFRICOM has no regular troops, and so can do little to curb the problems that have been

festering in the region. The nation’s porous borders on both land and sea allow gun smuggling

from neighbouring countries. It has also been revealed that illegal arms dealers from both Africa

and Europe supply Small Arms Light Weapon (SALW) to the Niger Delta region and are paid

with proceeds of stolen crude oil (Dawit, 2013).

Influx of illegal weapons has since manifested in Nigeria, Ogar, (2014) posited that

recently in Rivers State, officers of the State Security Service SSS now known as Department of

State Security DSS intercepted a vessel, MV Iron Trader, off Nigerian coast sailing towards

Onne sea port carrying 2,700 anti-aircraft and anti-tank bombs carefully concealed in a 20-foot

container in the ship. The cargo, which was said to have originated from Turkey, was sailed to

68

Nigeria on the pretext that it contained building rods from Panama in Central America, and was

heading for Uruguay. However, the latest discovery was said to be the outcome of the diligence

of the SSS, who placed consignments from Turkey, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other

countries that are perceived to have links with terrorists, on the watch-list (Ogar, 2014).Several,

arms and have been illegally brought into the country through the ports in past years For

example, on October 26, 2010, officials of the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) and the (DSS)

discovered 13 containers laden with arms and ammunition at the Apapa Wharf Ports Complex.

Rocket launchers, grenades, mortar bombs and other light weapons were stacked with ceramic

tiles in crates and shipped from Iran into the country by unknown persons. As Mbu (2014:11)

noted that:

Officers of the Nigerian Police Force Rivers state command recovered 243 firearms, 6,944 ammunition, 88 magazine, 523 cartridges, 58 vehicles and 94 bags of cannabis sativa from criminals in the state. About 209 suspected kidnappers, 402 armed robbers, 69 cult suspects and three sea pirates are currently in police custody. Figures from Anambra State show that over 8,496 arms, 90,835 cartridges and 164 loaded magazines for AK47 rifles were recovered by the police after raiding several robbers’ hideouts in various parts of the state recently. The state’s police boss, Mr. Usman Gwary also explained that over 182 notorious kidnappers were arrested while over 45 kidnap victims regained freedom. But 18 kidnappers were not as lucky as they paid the supreme price in the process. Arms recovered include 25 AK-47 rifles, two types of K-2 rifle, one air rifle, 57 locally made pistols, 120 pump action guns, three toy guns, 15 DGSGS, nine English pistols, three cut-to-size shotguns and 25 machine guns, among others. While these dangerous weapons were recovered from robbers and kidnappers, it has been observed that they can come handy during election period (Mbu, 2014:11).

Accordingly, it is cumbersome to accessed numbers of illicit arms that have been smuggled into

Nigeria. However, from the available records; large numbers of small arms and light weapon are

in custody of non-state actors. The table below indicates selected number of intercepted arms in

Nigeria between period 2008-2014.

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Table 5.1: Showing number of Illegal Arms Intercepted by Nigerian Custom Service

Year Date No of Arms Seized No of around of

Ammunition/Cartridges

Seized

Location of

Interception

2014 15 March,

234 firearms 6, 944 ammunition

Rivers State

2013 9 Sept, 18 Sept,

26 AK 47 200 assort rifles

26 Cartridges 15 Cartridges

Tincan Port

2012 8 Aug, 634 AK 47 800 line of bullets Bakassi/Cameroon Coast

2011 21 Sept, Explosive Rocket propeller launcher & grenade

Apapa wharf

2010 14 Oct, 26 Oct,

15 container of arms 2 Bushnell, Sniper rifle

0 0

Tincan

2009 15 March 14 assorted rifles 0 Apapa Wharf

2008 10 April 2 March

21 weapon 2 pistol

17 Several rounds Onne Wharf

Sources: Collated from This day newspaper, Vanguard newspaper & All African.com

Articles

From the above table, Lagos sea port is mostly used as their belt point, also 2012 and 2014 had

highest number of seized firearm/ cartridges; thus the study inferred that sizeable number of

illicit arms are been smuggled into the country without interception by security operatives,

account of the non-intercepted arms remain undisclosed.

Consequent upon this, the water ways/seaports provide havens for arms trafficking

through ships and speed boats on high seas and the use of canoes in the creeks. The exchange of

stolen crude oil for arms/ ammunition is a well-known “trading activity” nurtured and

ferociously protected by militants or sea pirates and their financiers as well their collaborators

with the possible connivance of unscrupulous law enforcement agents in the Niger Delta. This is

one major source of arms and ammunition that strengthens militants; arms and ammunition

holding not only in the Niger Delta but also in the South East and South Western parts of the

country. Security agencies at the borders and seaports have severally complained of the porosity

of the nation’s borders and waterways. The problem of porous borders is compounded by

70

inadequate personnel, patrol vehicles, surveillance helicopters and equipment. Nevertheless,

most of the borders are leaky and this makes effective control of intruders, smugglers and

“merchants of death” a mirage. The vastness of the nation’s borders in the face of these

challenges bring to the fore the need for a rethink on the management and security of the

Nigeria’s borders and seaports without which effective fight against insurgency, arms trafficking

and proliferation will remain an optical illusion.

Luka (2010) noted that the proliferation of small and light arms constituted a major factor

in the intractable security equation. Certainly, there can be no denying the elementary truth that

the sustained violence and the criminality that the Niger Delta agitation has bred can be partly

explained by the relative ease of access to arms and ammunition by warlords operating in the

region. Thus, we are not talking of numbers and range of hardware but also of deadly

sophisticated weapons available through the vastly porous and under-policed Gulf of Guinea

region, of which the Niger Delta is part, with its expansive criminal network of oil bunkerers and

arms dealers. We have seen the region move from when militants overran oil platforms to seized

hostages; we have also witnessed ugly incidents where sections of joint detachment of the

Nigerian military deployed to keep maintain peace in the region were overran by the superior

fire-power of the militants. The point is that the uncontrollable influx of sophisticated small arms

has become the substratum upon on which militancy and associated criminality thrives. In view

of the Marxian political economy approach as earlier stated in the previous chapter, this places

emphasis on the primacy condition, the dynamic character of social reality and the relatedness of

different elements of society. The theory is premised on the notion that man is principally

motivated by economic or material needs (Ake,1981:2).

71

In the Niger Delta today, it is said that the price of the latest brand of AK47 is probably

worth a few barrels of illegal crude, with pipelines ever so available to be busted by any daring

gang. That is why the matter goes beyond the current whining by the military high command.

The situation has become undeniably, volatile. What is required in the circumstance is the will to

dismantle the entire infrastructure on which the militancy thrives. The architecture which gives it

sustenance, which is its source of arms; it is about ensuring that the corridors through which

illegal weapons find their ways into the creeks are blocked. This is as much a challenge for the

defence establishment, particularly defence intelligence agencies, working in concert with other

international bodies to exchange information. Nigeria sea pirates all dependent on an

international criminal network trading in illegal arms and crude oil stolen from pipelines in the

swamps and creeks of the region, accordingly Ojudu (2013) asserts that the small-arms trade in

the country, the Niger Delta has long had easy access to small weapons, but growing violence

and militarisation in the region has been a boost to the trade in recent years.

He stated further that smugglers operating out of Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon

and Nigeria have always coordinated the trade. Using fast boats, these smugglers cruise to ships

in the high seas and obtain guns, the origins of which may be as far a field of Eastern Europe and

Asia, and that Nigeria’s Atlantic waters were indeed the main channel through which his militia

obtained weapons. We are very close to international waters, and it's very easy to get weapons

from ships, he said in the interview “We have AK-47s, general-purpose machine guns and

rocket-propelled grenades.”(Ejiofor, 2013:7). Government and oil-industry which have popped

up in the region in recent years, fund their weapons purchases by tapping crude oil from

pipelines into barges for illegal sale to tankers waiting offshore. The aforementioned activities of

sea criminally, their target is monetary driven by taking advantage the maritime business, this

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imply that crime in the oil rich zone is basically dependent on economic activities in the Gulf of

Guinea hub, hence it nexus with the theoretical framework is workable as posited by Ake

(1981:2) proposition seem justify on the basis that theft as a moral value was created and

dependant on a particular material condition, accordingly he asserts that morality and values of

society tends to support the preservation of the existing division of labour and distribution of

wealth in that society. The autonomy of morality and social values is more apparent than the real.

Contemporary western morality condemns theft. And we forget that theft as a moral value is

something created and dependent on particular economic condition; where there is no scarcity

and no private property, the idea of theft would not arise.

5.2 Wide spread use of Small Arms in piratical Activities in the Region

The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons has helped stoke a decade of

unrest in the region that produces nearly all of Nigeria’s oil, which is rife with hostage-taking,

attacks on oil installations and fighting among rival militias. Attacks on oil installations and

hostage-takings staged in the Niger Delta for over a decade by a previously unknown Movement

for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have halved the Nigerian output of oil from

the Multinationals and cut 20 percent of the country’s daily exports of 2.5 million barrels. It has

helped sustain the pressure on world oil prices, now at new historical highs of US$70 a barrel.

The activities of MEND are dependent on an international criminal network trading in illegal

arms and crude oil stolen from pipelines in the swamps and creeks of the region (Antiga, 2012).

Bridger (2013) observes that West African pirates are also better armed and trained than

other maritime criminals, reportedly wielding heavy machines guns, such as M60s, and RPGs.

Many of these weapons are ‘legacy firearms’ circulating from previous African conflicts, while

others are sold or rented from stolen crude oil. This heavy armament is a product of the pirate’s

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proximity to alien arms dealers along the Atlantic in the Gulf of Guinea territorial waters.

Nigerian pirates also display military-grade tactics, this explains they know how to skilfully

maintain and fire their weapons, they ambush security forces, and they board vessels with

tactical precision. The weapons and tactics displayed by the pirates are often superior to those of

the security personnel hired to protect vessels, notes a report from the counter-piracy think tank

Oceans Beyond Piracy OBP (2012). As a result, local soldiers contracted to guard ships have

reportedly hidden during pirate attacks. “They hide, just like that, exclaimed a regional seafarer,

when we ask them why they hide, their answer is simple, ‘The weapons of rebels and pirates are

stronger (Rayman, 2013:58) An alternative, often anecdotally reported explanation is that naval

guards have colluded with pirates in exchange for a share of profits. Nigerian pirates are often

undeterred by on-board security forces and willing to use deadly force to achieve their

objectives. While shootouts between pirates and embarked security are exceedingly rare in the

Indian Ocean, they are becoming increasingly common in the Gulf of Guinea, resulting in

multiple casualties.

In the early hours of Saturday 9th August, (2014) a product tanker transiting 200 nautical

miles south of the Nigerian shoreline encountered a radar contact of a drifting vessel along its

track. After taking normal navigational measures to open the closest point of approach (CPA)

from the drifting vessel and passing abeam at 6.5 nautical miles, the tanker’s crew heard a burst

of gunfire; first from their starboard quarter when 6 or 7 shots were fired and later from forward

of the ship’s accommodation structure, but this time a burst of automatic fire. Although visibility

was poor in the darkness and hazy, one crew member reported seeing the outboard engine wakes

of up to three small craft that engaged in a chase of the tanker, during the period of gunfire. The

well-prepared and well-drilled ship’s crew had taken measures to harden the vessel prior to

74

leaving their last anchorage along the Gulf of Guinea coast. Initiation of anti-piracy drills and the

retreat of the crew to the shelter of the vessel’s interior ensured that no one was injured.

The pirates made an unsuccessful attempt at boarding the vessel from the stern, but

eventually fell behind as the ship’s master opened the range. It would be easy to characterise this

event as just another statistic in the story of Gulf of Guinea maritime crime, but to do so would

be missing one very significant point the open ocean nature of what looks like an intelligence-led

operation. It is true that this is not the first time that we have seen ships targeted for their cargo

or their crew and it is also true that some of these armed attempts have taken place at

considerable range from shore, particularly in the case of kidnapping of crew for ransom at

ranges up to 160 nautical miles off the Niger Delta. In the case of cargo theft, which looks like

the most likely scenario, the preferred criminal modus operandi (MO) has been to stealthily

embark an anchored vessel under cover of darkness and take control of the ship, sailing it under

duress, to an area off the Niger Delta for illegal offload of the highly valuable cargo. This is not

an exclusive MO as vessels have previously been taken offshore, notably south of Lome (Togo)

and most recently south of the Ghana/Togo border with the hijack of Hai Soon 6, but the range at

which this latest attack took place may signal a new and worrisome development.

The deployment of a mother vessel some 200 nautical miles offshore, in Open Ocean,

lying in wait for a passing vessel is something more akin to Somali piracy methods than those

normally seen in the Gulf of Guinea. In such a situation, there can be no guarantee of landing a

criminal catch, especially of a specific ship or cargo. Kidnap of crew for ransom can be achieved

from much easier, and less logistically challenging, areas off the Niger Delta, as can simple

armed robbery which is better achieved in the target rich environment of the Gulf of Guinea’s

many anchorages and port approaches. The victim vessel was in transit between Gulf of Guinea

75

port and destination further south (details withheld to protect identity at this stage). It is feasible

that an intelligence-led operation was mounted against this vessel. If the departure and

destination ports were known, and the mother ship had suitable equipment, it is possible that the

pirates could sit along the likely route and intercept the vessel whilst underway. With the amount

of data shared on maritime movements, it is even conceivable that the ship’s passage plan could

have fallen into the wrong hands, making this an even simpler criminal mission. In terms of

pirate capability, this incident may represent a step change in tactics that could, if repeated, be a

game changer in Gulf of Guinea piracy. Unlike a stealthy climb on to a vessel at anchor,

boarding a vessel underway is a very different proposition, especially at night in open seas. This

is something that even highly motivated Somali pirates have only attempted on a small number

of occasions during the hours of darkness. In such a situation, the most likely chance of success

lies in encouraging the master to heave to by attacking the vessel with gunfire, as getting into an

undetected stern chase with the prospect of boarding a vessel underway at 14 knots is something

that only the best of special forces would entertain in darkness. On this occasion, the vessel was

both prepared and alert. The actions of the master and crew made it too difficult for the pirates to

achieve their nefarious objective and the ship and crew are reported as safe. That means, a group

of criminals are still at sea with a mother ship and the means to attack another vessel. We may

never know the extent of this particular incident. It is highly unlikely that any naval interdiction

will be mounted to locate and apprehend the criminals; regional capability does not stretch to this

and there is little to go on when it comes to identifying the pirate vessel (Ukeje, 2011)

Nigeria was estimated at one time to be losing as much as 10 percent of its daily oil

exports through such thefts, which are locally known as bunkering. Nationwide, the illegal

circulation of small arms, sent in by smugglers across the land borders of the neighbouring

76

countries of Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon, has had an impact not only on widespread armed

banditry but also on ethnic and religious violence that have claimed more than 10,000 lives since

1999 Ibeano cited in Ebo (2006). Another key arms-smuggling route into Nigeria is the Lagos-

Benin coastal axis extending across West Africa as far as Liberia and Sierra Leone. In November

2003, customs officials intercepted a lorry carrying 170,000 rounds of ammunition concealed in

a cargo of charcoal that had crossed the border from Benin into Nigeria (Nte, 2011). It was

pronounced one of the biggest hauls ever in Nigeria. An equally worrisome source of weapons is

Nigeria’s northern borders with Chad and Niger. Nigerian security agencies say remnants of

rebel wars in both countries have drifted southwards with their weapons into Nigeria over the

past decade. Operating in large bands of 30 to 50 armed men, they engage in banditry on

highways in northeast and central Nigeria. They are even hired as mercenaries to fight in land

disputes or in communal or religious conflicts in the area,” said a Nigerian army intelligence

official (Luka, 2012: 9)

The violence associated with pirate attacks in West Africa is severe. Rates of attack with

deadly weapons are high: the IMB’s report for 2013 found that of 52 attacks or attempted attacks

reported by the IMB in the West African region, 67% of all events involved guns. Of those

events that specifically included the presence of weapons, 88% involved events in which guns

were used. The level of violence directed against seafarers during and after boarding is

significant. In one report, hijackers gained control of the MT Adour, fired guns in the air, and

beat the crew. A representative of the Lagos Seafarer Welfare Centre, speaking to the BBC,

reported forms of abuse hostages that included cigarette burns and amputated fingers.

Considering this increase in these forms of abuse, the rates of injury and death in West African

piracy were higher than the rates relating to Somali piracy.

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5.3 Circulation of Small Arms into Various Parts of Nigeria

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is often one of the major security

challenges currently confronting Nigeria, Africa and indeed the world in general. The trafficking

and wide availability of these weapons fuel communal conflict, political instability and pose a

threat, not only to security, but also to sustainable development. The widespread proliferation of

small arms is contributing to alarming levels of armed crime, and militancy (Nte, 2011). With an

estimated one to three million small arms in circulation in Nigeria (Small Arms Survey,2003)

these weapons pose a significant challenge to law and order and a high risk to personal security.

The majority of these small arms are illegally possessed, due to highly restrictive national laws

on possession. While this does not necessarily indicate intent to use these weapons in an illegal

fashion, as self-defence is a primary motive for possession in some cases, it does mean that there

are few records of the number of weapons in the country and ineffective means of controlling the

importation and distribution of small arms in Nigeria. The military and police are increasing

their stocks of weapons in an effort to modernize their forces and to combat rising armed

violence in the country, while illegal civilian importation is also continuing. The security forces

are importing weapons in order to meet the demands of their role in securing the country.

Individuals and groups are importing and purchasing small arms as a result of the failure of the

security forces to provide security and, in some cases, due to the draw of rich profits from the use

of small arms in illegal activities.

There are an estimated seven to ten million illicit small arms and light weapons in West

Africa (Small Arms Survey, 2008:80). These figures are based on rough estimations, given

population size and levels of conflict in countries and in the region as a whole. There are an

estimated one million (Ebo, 2006; Mensah, 2002) to three million (Obasi, 2002) small arms and

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light weapons in circulation in Nigeria alone. Civilians possess the majority of weapons in the

country. An estimate (2001) claimed that 80 per cent of the weapons in civilian possession had

been obtained illegally (Obasi, 2002) because of strict laws on civilian possession. There is

little quantitative or qualitative data available on small arms and light weapons in Nigeria (Ebo,

2006 2) making it difficult to conduct adequate analysis. This is true for both the legal and illegal

flows of small arms. This lack of data also makes it difficult to determine a baseline for

measuring rises or declines in the flows of arms into and out of the country. It is equally difficult

to assess the numerous claims that there has been an ‘alarming increase’ in the number of illegal

small arms in circulation resulting from the worsening security situation and fuelled by oil

bunkering (Peel, 2005, & Servant, 2006).

This raises questions about how widely available small arms are, how common

possession is by civilians, and whether there has been a dramatic spike in the level of imports of

illegal weapons over the past years. Given the difficulty in legally owning a gun, the majority of

small arms in Nigeria are believed to be held illegally. Their illegality makes it difficult to track

flows and possession. Weapons transit into the country across land borders and via sea ports.

Sources of small arms include arms dealers, serving and retired military and police officers,

returning peacekeepers, armed groups across borders, and other individuals. These weapons

transit into the country and into the hands of armed groups, national dealers, political and

community leaders, and individuals. Craft production provides a domestic source of small arms.

Demand is the key to understanding the trade: as long as insecurity persists, and economic and

political opportunities for gain exist through the use of force, demand for small arms will

continue, in this regard arms struggle is driven on economic position of the class structure of

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society and the inherent contradictions among classes and how these factors determines political,

economic, legal, cultural, ideological, and moral aspects of social life.

Effects of Proliferation of Small Arms Small arms have had and continue to have

devastating consequences not only in Nigeria, but Horn of Africa and many parts of the world

today. Illicit trafficking of arms is prevalent in the Sub-Saharan African where achievement of

stability and peace remain elusive and a farfetched reality to most African countries. Research

findings have affirmed that continuous communal conflict throughout Nigeria over the past two

decades have contributed to the ever increasing acquisition of small arms and light weapons as

primary tools of violence (Ibeanu, 2005, Isiaka, 2010,&Ebo, 2006) This is causing a lot of deaths

and injuries on thousands of innocent civilians. The glaring insecurity in all parts of the country

continues to threaten democracy and stability thereby impacting negatively on trade and

economic growth. This is explained largely by the illegal use of weapons in nearly every part of

the country (Bisong, 2013).

In spite of the available natural resources Nigeria is endowed with, the country is still

bedevilled with poor economy condition thereby positioning Nigeria as one of the poorest in the

world, Agbe (2014) noted that Poor governance and insecurity, coupled with corruption, has

contributed to the inability of the nation which has much interest in trading to control the spread

of weapons. According to the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) of (2007) a

thousand people die every day and at least 3,000 injured by small arms usage on a global scale.

Small arms are considered the one weapon to use in killing and to injure civilian; it maintained

that approximately one thousand, one hundred and thirty five companies in more than 98

countries are manufacturing SALW ammunition or components. This number has doubled in the

past 40 years. Small weapons play a big role in determining the winners and losers in communal

80

conflicts and in the commission of crimes. Other than legitimate use for security management,

misused or illicitly transferred small arms have only had negative effects on the communities

affected and largely affect innocent people. The impact of small arms proliferation on Nigeria in

Particular, affects the citizens in three main categories human rights, development, and

governance.

Several trips made into Nigeria by land, sea and air have become very frequent,

according to security sources in the country and have resulted in a dangerous influx of various

types of arms and ammunition with corresponding effect on crime and violence in the country.

The law enforcement agencies and other security agencies are equally worried at the

development which is turning Nigeria into a veritable market for small and light weapons. The

2013 report of seizures recently released by the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) which put

seizures of illegal weapons made in 2013 at seven times higher than the number recorded in

2012 paints a more grim and dangerous picture of the danger that the country faces from illegal

arms importation. What it suggests is that there is a good market for arms in Nigeria. It also

means illegal use of arms is on the increase. The figure which translates into a 700 percent rise in

the seizures thus gave credence to the fact that the problem of illegal arms and ammunition

currently circulating in the country has become a national problem that cannot simply be

ignored. The trend has coincided with the approach of the 2015 general elections. Politicians in

Nigeria are known to acquire arms as part of their preparations for elections. The arms are

usually given to political thugs who use it to protect them and help them secure victory by

terrorising opponents and their supporters.

Accordingly, politicians and communities are prone to attacks, Boko Haram terrorists and

Niger Delta militants are among those in the rush to acquire weapons. More worrisome is the

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declaration that 65 percent of illegal arms in the country were imported into the country through

the waterways before being routed into the system by road. But many still find their ways

through the trans- West African highway with the Accra-Lagos route becoming notorious for

arms trafficking. As observes by Bayo & Onani (2014) guns everywhere is a build up to the 2015

general elections, it appears that politicians are leaving the ballot boxes for bullets, with the

upsurge in the illegal importation, possession and utilisation of arms and ammunition by their

followers. The 2015 general elections a few months away, palpable fears are enveloping the

polity. This fear is informed by insecurity, occasioned by massive acquisition of arms and

ammunition by politicians, apparently with intent to cause violence and mayhem during the

elections. Over the years, this has characterised the build up to major elections in the country. In

what is reminiscent of scenarios in 2003 and 2007, which saw to the elimination of political big

wigs such as the then National Vice Chairman of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in the

South-South, Chief Aminasori Dikibo; Chief Marshall Harry of the then All Nigeria Peoples

Party and the post-election carnage of 2011, this unsavoury development may be signs of danger

in the next few months. Observers are worried that history might repeat itself, with the attendant

blood-letting that comes with it. Already, some states, such as Kaduna, Edo, Kogi, Delta, Rivers,

Ogun and parts of Ondo and Ekiti have become something akin to mini-theatres of war, where

party members and thugs brazenly brandish assorted weapons to either harm or eliminate

aspirants they consider dangerous to the realisation of their political ambitions. Since politics has

to do with struggle for power; who get what, when and how? and all activities that lead to seizure

of state power, use of state and consolidation of state power Nnoli cited in Nna( 1995) within this

context politician and their allies as well their foes are force to pursue the determinant element of

power economic substructure which is rooted in the Marxian political economic paradigmto

82

substantiate this, Nnoli cited in Ken (2010) asserts that understanding the economic structure

particular attention is paid to the mode of production (the organic unity of productive forces and

relations of production in society), the class structure of society and the inherent contradictions

among classes and how these factors determines political, economic, legal, cultural, ideological,

and moral aspects of social life. Furthermore, the chart below indicates the highest geo political

zone with reported cases of insecurity in the country with the period(s).

Figure 5.1: The Geo-political zone with Highest number of violence incidents reported in

the press, 2008- 2014 September

Source: Adapted from Thisday live newspaper, Vanguard newspaper and All article.com

website

From the table South-East Geo-political zone between the periods under study experienced the

least violence incidents as compare to rest five Geo-political zones; the North–East is at the

wrong end, having the highest surge of violence incident in Nigeria. The abominable act of

terrorism by the Islamic sect commonly known as Boko Haram has cripple the economic

development the Nigerian State most especially the North East geo-political zone, their activities

threaten the political stability and national integration of the Nigeria State to a large extend that

0 2 4 6 8 10

North Central

North East

North West

South East

South South

South West

C

83

have attracted international concern, thus the United Nations have label this sect as international

terrorist group that are posing threat to global peace and stability.

Similarly, Osita (2014) observes that the alarming rate of proliferation of arms in the

country has been brought to the fore particular the use of private jets by serving governors to

import arms ahead of the 2015 general elections. He alleged that the uncontrollable number of

private jets in the country was being used by governors to import arms. gave currency to the

apprehension that the increase in arms build-up in the country, particularly as the nation is

drawing close to the 2015 general elections, is very dangerous, indeed. He stated that politicians

bring in arms in order to prosecute their political projects, an indication that the governors could

not be exonerated from the arms proliferation. Some individuals among the political class and

some business men are believed to be neck-deep in the smuggling of arms through the seaports

in Lagos, Warri and Port Harcourt. They usually import the weapons under the guise of bringing

in needed motor parts or auxiliary engine spare parts. Some of the weapons also come through

the land borders while others are traced to ex-militants, who failed to turn in their entire weapons

as part of the amnesty programme for the former Niger Delta militants.

Sequel to the above discussion and analyses, it is evidently clear that Small arms running

in the Gulf of Guinea posed serious and continuous threat to the Nigerian state. In other words,

the availability and wide circulation of small arms and light weapons pose the greatest danger to

peace and security, especially in our region “These weapons have helped to prolong conflicts,

undermined stability, social peace and security and have wrought devastation on the economies

of affected states. Therefore, this hypothesis which is validated and accepted is owing to the facts

that small arms running in the region do not only posed a threat to Nigeria but equally causes

chaos and havoc as evident in the North-East region of the country.

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CHAPTER SIX

INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA AND INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA

85

This chapter focuses on maritime insecurity challenges in the region; it also examines the

adverse effect on investment in Nigeria. In same vein, primacy is placed on the following sub-

themes thus, security lax and inadequate surveillance facilities, poor border cooperation among

Gulf of Guinea states, and finally the position of exclusive economic zone.

6.1 Poor Security and Inadequate Surveillance Facilities in the Region

The security and protection of economic interests in the maritime environment worldwide is the

primary responsibility of navies or coastguards. Basically, interests of all coastal states navies

and other forces like coastguards is saddle with the responsibility of policing the territorials

waters of a nation; an attempt to further the basic interests of the coastal state, namely the

extension of sovereignty, resource enjoyment in contiguous areas and the maintenance of good

order at sea (Dick, 2010). Nigeria’s territorial waters are presently infested with criminal

activities ranging from piracy, armed robbery, kidnapping and oil theft among others, a

development that has prompted deep concern to the Nigerian government and the security

agencies especially those whose mandates are based on securing the maritime domain (Ray,

2014). Over a decade the Nigerian Navy (NN) had been beset with maritime insecurity

emanating from illicit activities of pirates in the Gulf of Guinea maritime environment. The

challenge is of topmost priority to all concern partners in the region most especially the Nigeria

Government, the problem of weak security and poor surveillance facilities in the region has

affected adequate policing of the water ways as Dick (2010) cited in Gingiya (2013) most of the

ships currently in the Nigerian Navy inventory were commissioned into the Service in the early

80s, with no regular refit or upgrades, they are in various states of disrepair, thus reducing their

availability for deployment; coupled with the insufficient number of vessels, as well as the ever

increasing requirement and challenges of securing the nation's maritime domain and assets.

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The development of oil fields in deep waters like Bonga, Agbami and the joint venture

fields in the Joint Development Zone (JDZ) between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe in the

Gulf of Guinea has further increased the demand for Nigeria Navy NN platform with the JDZ;

the NN is charged with more area to police. Another problem that is manifestly clear with

regards to inadequate vessel is the type of crafts, as a result of the changing threats in the region,

the NN need to acquire vessels that will operate conveniently within the nation's rivers and

creeks. Considering the budgetary allocation to the Nigerian Navy for the past six years; it was

expected that they acquired advanced technological facilities that could measure up with

sophisticated security threat in the Gulf Guinea. The table below provides a factual budget

allocation to the Ministry of Defence since 2008-2014:

Table: 6.1 Showing Ministry of Defence Budgets 2008-2014

Budget 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008

Total 340Bn 364Bn 326Bn 314Bn 292Bn 201Bn 152Bn

Recurrent(%) 89.92 82.43 89.38 91.97 74.50 82.53 86.80

Capital (%) 10.08 17.57 10.62 8.03 25.50 17.47 13.20

Nigerian Army 132,710,310,195 38.60%

Nigerian Navy 70,124,224,510 20.60%

Nigerian Air force 73,241,590,421 21.52%

Source: Federal Ministry of Finance, FCT Abuja, 2014

The above table provides a summary of total budgetary allocation to the Ministry of Defence

with the period under study. Considering 2014 budgetary figure for defence put at 340 billion

Naira 20% of the total budget while Nigerian Navy had (70,124,224,510) which is the focal point

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of analysis; thus the (NN) figures reflecting on the table covers capital and recurrent expenditure

costs; under capital expenditure; cost of facilities and operations to combat crude oil theft, illegal

bunkering, unregulated, fishing, piracy and sea robbery, among other maritime crimes are

inclusive, the budget proved that Nigerian Navy in 2014 received a higher figure than the Air

force ministry as compared to other Gulf of Guinea states; yet they lack advance facilities in

securing the region (Udo, 2014).

By virtue of its geographical endowments, large population, economic potential and

military capabilities, Nigeria is perceived as a hegemon in the Gulf of Guinea region. Huge

economic investments, including the vast natural resources in the region, require that Nigeria

provide a leadership role in defending and protecting the maritime domain. Furthermore, by

constitutional mandate, the NN must enforce the nation’s strategy to protect Nigeria's national

interests within its Economic Exclusive Zone and beyond. Consequently, the ineptitude of the

Nigeria Navy and other security operatives in the region have created an unsafe maritime

domain for seafarers, ships, oil rig platform, companies and personnel (Anene, 2006).

6.2 Weak Trans-Border Cooperation amongst States in Gulf of Guinea

The region has porous borders characterized with infiltrated criminals emanating from the

coastal states; they have structured and organize crime pattern in the Gulf of Guinea waters. Over

the years various multiple frameworks including the African Maritime Transport Charter & Plan

of Action (1994); the Durban Resolution on Maritime Safety, Maritime Security and Protection

of the Maritime Environment (2009); the African Union Draft Maritime Security Strategy (2010)

as well as the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (2013) have been in process on how

best to secure the Gulf of Guinea, however much is yet to be achieved as concern regional

cooperation from members state. Persistent threat of piracy prompts increased regional

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cooperation, raises potential for international involvement given the persistent threats of piracy

in the Gulf of Guinea; West African states have attempted to increase regional cooperation over

the past years. The Yaoundé Declaration (2013) was the first summit in Africa devoted

exclusively for maritime security. The aim was for Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS, Economic Community of Central African States ECCAS and Gulf of Guinea

Commission GGC adopted a comprehensive framework for trans-border cooperation and fight

against piracy in Gulf of Guinea. The intensification of what hitherto has been only rudimentary

regional and inter-regional cooperation is being driven decisively by external actors with

strategic interests in the region, primarily the United States and France. The resolutions made at

Yaoundé include a commitment to a joint strategy to combat piracy, to be developed within three

years. In the meantime, national policies and legislation to combat this cross-border phenomenon

are to be harmonised operational military plans are also to be developed (Ejiofor, 2013).

West African maritime environment most especially Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is

yet experience good order at sea. Since after establishment of Joint Development Zone (JDZ)

between Nigeria - Sao–Tome and Principe in 2004, Nigeria had signed several bilateral and

multilateral treaties with the Gulf of Guinea States on collaborative fronts in combating

criminality as well securing the Oil rich Region. Similarly, during the June 2013 summit, the

International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted a new Code of Conduct to combat maritime

piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, resembling the Djibouti Code of Conduct established in 2009 to

address piracy in the Horn of Africa. The objectives of the Code of Conduct were to improve

communication between states, strengthen the capacity of countries in the region so as to deter,

arrest and prosecute pirates, and enforce the operational dimensions of local coastguards in the

fight against piracy across borders. With this in mind, West African countries were intended to

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review their national legislation in order to ensure that the crime of piracy would be included in

their regulations. The meeting additionally highlighted the rising concerns of Western powers

that have particular economic interests in the region. Since 40% of the oil consumed in Europe

comes from the Gulf of Guinea, the persistent disruptions to the oil trade have led to a rise in

prices for European customers, significantly affecting business continuity for EU corporations.

Thus, following the conference, the EU announced its interest in launching a mission in 2015 to

combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (IMO, 2013).

More recently, in April 2014, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) has announced the

creation of a regional coordination centre, along with the establishment of training facilities in

order to address the increasing instability in the Gulf Of Guinea. In addition, Cameroon has

expressed its readiness and capabilities to establish an institution that can determine all

operations and strategic decisions to combat maritime insecurity. In May 2014, an additional

approach has been taken by the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). The

CPLP is comprised of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and

Principe, and several countries in Europe, South America, and Asia. These regional and

international actors are investigating the potential for counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of

Guinea. In spite of these regional cooperation as well international support initiatives, piracy in

the Gulf of Guinea remains a persistent trend, as indicated by the lack of noticeable decrease in

pirate attacks as such anti-piracy measures in the region have failed to crack down on this

increasing maritime criminality (Onuoha, 2010).

On the contrary, poor cooperation is a resultant effect of domestic governance issues

stemming across the sub-region. Although states of the sub-region differ in many ways, they

share several characteristics. All are post-colonial states with weak governments,

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underdeveloped economies and inadequate human capital. Citizens suffer from poverty, hunger,

illiteracy, unemployment and low life expectancy. Very few of the states achieve significant

growth, and none can boast an equitable income distribution. A related vulnerability stems from

most member states’ weak internal security forces—forces that are under-trained, poorly

equipped and incapable of effectively policing their internal waters and maritime boundaries.

These negative influence, lead to increase in maritime boundary disputes, piracy, illegal

bunkering, disruption of oil terminals and flow stations operations, destruction of oil pipelines,

poaching, terrorism, gun-running, and environmental degradation. Associated vulnerabilities

include limited maritime domain awareness, weak infrastructure, and poor legislative and

judicial arrangements. All these threats and vulnerabilities contribute to huge economic losses,

the inability of member states to achieve millennium development goals, and shipping and trade

losses.

The inability of member states to mount collective, sustained and effective security

control over the maritime domain makes it difficult for GG states to enjoy the full benefits of the

sub-regional EEZ's. Nigeria and Angola are leading oil producing nations among the Gulf of

Guinea states which is economically viable but possessed weak military capacity. Although

Angola is a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The

problem is that almost all the coastal states lack the capacity to handle the problem, and regional

organizations have proven ineffective (Obi, 2012). The International Crisis Group,(2012) for

example, noted that the weakness and sometimes general inadequacy of maritime polices in Gulf

of Guinea states, and the lack of cooperation between them have allowed criminal networks to

diversify their activities and gradually extend them away from the Nigerian coast and out on the

high seas.

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6.3 Intensified Crime Level around Exclusive Economic Zone in the Region

There is growing concern that the vast resources and potential in the GG sub-region are

undermined by multifaceted domestic, sub-regional and international threats and vulnerabilities.

It appears that rather than contributing to member states' stability and economic prosperity, the

resources are almost a curse. Resource abundant economies have not had appreciable growth

rate, but rather the reverse. None of the sub-region countries has experienced rapid economic

growth since oil and other resources were discovered. Analysts attribute this to political and

socioeconomic problems including bad governance, corruption, lack of economic diversity,

militants youth activities, piracy, poaching and terrorism. The pervasive insecurity tends to make

the sub-region look like an investor unfriendly environment, which in turn leads to huge

financial losses. Experts believe this contributes significantly to the sub-region’s constrained

investment and economic prospects. The sub-region is endowed with numerous living and non-

living resources including diamonds, gold, huge deposits of hydrocarbon, manganese nodules,

nickel and fish (Soya, 2011). Geologists’ estimate that the oil and gas deep water reserves within

the sub-region is about 77.4 million barrels, 11.8 trillion cubic meters and more than 14 billion

barrels, view tables below. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD) estimates the sub-regional total oil reserves to be in the neighbourhood of 80 billion

barrels, about eight percent of the world’s crude oil reserves. Additionally, within the sub-region

an estimated one million metric tons of fish are caught annually, of which more than one-third

for export.

Table: 6.2 Showing Onshore Oil and Gas Reserves Globally

S/N Country/Region Onshore Oil (Million) Gas (Trillion cubic meters)

1 Middle East 685.6 56.0

2 North America 37.3 7.1

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3 South & Central America 98.6 7.0

4 Asia Pacific 38.7 12.6

5 Africa 77.4 11.8

6 Europe 19.7 61.0

7 Republic of Russia 77. 8

Source: Adapted from UNCTAD Report, 2013

Table 6.3 Showing Deep Sea Reserve Offshore Oil and Gas

S/N Country/Region Deep Sea Oil

1 West Africa 14.495

2 Gulf of Mexico 12.393

3 North West Europe 3.126

4 Mediterranean Sea 1.868

5 Brazil 8.396

6 Asia-Pacific 2.139

Source: Adapted from UNCTAD Deep Sea Reserve 2013

From the above tables African onshore oil reserves is not much as compared to other regions like

Middle East, South Central America, and equally Republic of Russia, however considering table

6.3 West Africa top the table when it comes to Deep sea offshore reserves, this is to proves the

rich nature of Gulf of Guinea with it potential investment climate for oil industry. Also the

diagram below is a pie chart indicating the various portion of the oil content, in addition with key

properties.

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Figure 6.4 Showing the Highest Region with Oil and Reserve in Deep Sea

Source: Input by Researcher, October, 2014

The pie chart above is simply a picture of Deep Sea Reserve Globally with West Africa

producing the highest percentage, while Asia-Pacific and Mediterranean Sea produces equal

percentage.

Another, aspect of maritime investment that have suffered setback is the shipping sector,

according to Johnson (2014) Shipping is the heart of global economy and the maritime industry

which is a sub-sector of the transport sector, accounts for nearly 90 percent of transport

requirement of the world. In West Africa, seaborne trade accounts for over 60 percent of the total

GDP of the countries in the region. Over the years, Nigeria’s maritime industry has not attracted

considerably the required local and foreign investment inflow that is proportionate to its

contribution both to the Nigerian and West African economy despite its great potential and

enormous investment opportunities. As Imoh (2012) posited that poor security next work in a

pirate infested maritime domain was responsible for the drop in shipping investment in Nigeria

35%

29%

7%

4%

20%

5%

West Africa Gulf of MexicoNorth West Europe Mediterrean SeaBrazil Asia Pacific

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for example most ships now choses to belt at high sea off Benin Republic coastal water offload

their cargoes to smaller vessels that proceed onward into nearby sea port, through which goods

are taking to their destinations in hinterland; the implication is it deny the country of freight levy

as well as other maritime taxes.

Furthermore, the maritime industry in Nigeria is a very critical sector of the economy,

because Nigeria is a major oil and gas producer. Shipping is at the core of activities within

Nigeria’s maritime industry. It is also a major consuming nation with the implication of huge

seaborne trade. UNCTAD (2008) statistics indicate that average cargo traffic of 152 million

metric tons worth over $5 billion that is, (about N800 billion Naira) in freight earnings are

generated in the country annually. The Nigerian oil and gas sector which is the main stay of the

economy requires huge shipping and logistics services for its operations. However, this sub-

sector of the marine industry is also dominated by foreigners and the nation has been losing

about $4 billion dollars to foreign ship owners yearly due to lack of indigenous capacity in local

maritime transportation. The huge revenue loses annually to foreign ship owners; as well deny

the nation’s seafarers employment opportunities.

Nigeria's waters can boast of economic activities not limited to oil and gas exploration,

fisheries, free movement of cargo ships, passenger vessel among others. The Nigerian

continental shelf maintains a reasonable warm temperature that favours a high growth of

plankton which most species of fish feed on. This has made the area a fish haven thereby

attracting an industry which, if regulated in an organized manner, could become the second

largest income earner for the country. The high level of underwater activities and the fairly warm

and constant temperatures attracts amongst but not limited to whales that come to breed. It also

attracts researchers who make inquest into marine life and aqua culture. This is another source of

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income and education in the country is yet to explore to its full potentials. The relatively warm

and fairly constant temperature, coupled with a very long and low gradient continental shelf has

made the Nigerian EEZ a perfect environment for high growth of plankton. As this is the major

source of food for fish, fishing is the second largest marine activity in the region. For now, there

is lack of effective monitoring and this has attracted a whole lot of unregistered operators to

participate in illegal catches. Some of the illegal operators even have mother vessels known as

factory fishing vessels positioned deep inside the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to process

catches with fake stamps for labelling their boxes as imported fish, robbing the country of a

reasonable chunk of legitimate earnings. These vessels owing to their ability to deplete the ocean

of this natural resource are considered a problem worldwide and have become major issues of

contention in most monitored waters (Usoro, 2010).Other natural resources that increase the sub-

region's strategic importance include cobalt, copper, uranium, cocoa, coffee, oil palm fruits, and

columbites tantalite a key raw material used in cellular phones, satellites, and

telecommunications equipment.

Crude oil theft as peculiar to Nigeria is classified in three main categories; these include

small-scale pilfering and illegal local refining, large scale illegal bunkering in the field and theft

at the loading terminals. The process of crude oil theft include bursting of oil pipelines, tapping

into flow lines, tapping from abandoned well heads and theft at export terminals. The aim of the

oil thieves is to exert maximum destruction of pipelines well heads and other installations from

which crude is extracted illegally and transported through tankers, vessels of jerry cans to

locations where it is either refined into diesel or Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) or exported. The

nature and scope of these activities makes it difficult to secure crude oil from the production

centres to the terminals because Nigeria has a total pipeline grid of 5,001 kilometres, consisting

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of 4,315 kilometres of multi-product pipelines and 666 kilometres of crude oil pipelines. The

pipelines, which transverse the country, form a network that inter-connects the 22 petroleum

storage depots, the four refineries at Port Harcourt (I and II), Kaduna and Warri, the off-shore

terminals at Bonny and, Escravos and the jetties at Atlas Cove, Calabar, Okirika and Warri. The

most difficult axis to secure is the major 98 kilometre oil trunk pipeline between Trans Forcados

and Nembe Creek. For example this trunk pipelines was vandalised at over 100 illegal bunkering

points between Calabar and Lagos, there were eight identified choke points (Uzomaka, 2013).

Over the years, vandals and criminal cartels had subjected the pipeline infrastructure to

incessant attacks. Oil theft is the most complex of the piracy and requires a much more

sophisticated and coordinated effort. Vessels carrying refined oil product are targeted and

attacked specifically for the value of the oil cargo they are carrying. Once the vessel is hijacked

the crew is often forced to navigate the vessel to an unknown location where the cargo can be

lightered either to another vessel or to a storage facility on land. The refined oil product then

finds its way into the black market. Eventually, the oil product makes its way back into the clean,

mainstream supply and is sold domestically or in the global market. For example on February

3rd, 2013–Twelve heavily armed pirates with guns boarded and hijacked a flagged Luxembourg

oil tanker, Gascogne owned by France while it was underway. They sailed the tanker to Nigeria

and stole the oil cargo. In this instance, vessel and crew valuables were also stolen. The vessel

and her 17 crewmembers were released two days later, on February 5th during the incident, two

crewmembers were injured.

According to Gilpin, (2010) it's clear that sea pirates are looking for oil tankers that are

either anchored or moored in some form. The intent is to take over the vessel, direct it to a safe

location and offload its cargo." Armed robbery at sea is not new to the Gulf of Guinea, nor is the

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illegal sale of oil stolen from its waters in West African and European ports. In 2013, (OBP)

analysts say the attacks have become more systematic and the criminal, more organized (Gilpin,

2010) observes that their method of attack, particularly their use of violence, resembles that of

criminals in the Niger Delta. Ships that are taken over, he said, also are often diverted to waters

near the Nigerian border. There is nexus between oil theft and the black market; oil Barons in

Nigerian black market offer huge discount to international consumers country’s oil sectors, who

claim to have privileged access to crude oil, are offering the commodity at huge discounts to

interested traders, most foreign consumers prefer the crude oil black market rather the legal

market via Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation. They create under charge in the black

markets against the standard price by Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

This has a ripple effect within the oil community because it causes OPEC’s total output to

decrease, heightening competition between North American industries. Global economy lost

over $950m to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region in 2012, also the economic implication of the

insecurity in the region is a realisation of the gravity of the situation.

In a communiqué issued at the end of the conference to facilitate the establishment of an

effective legal regime for maritime enforcement within and among member-states in the Gulf of

Guinea. It is on records that Industry Alliance also estimated that total insurance cost for the

insecurity in the region was put at between $423m to N437m in 2012. It is estimated that piracy

in the Gulf of Guinea cost the world economy between $740m and $950m in 2013 and that

figure is expected to increase in 2014. Hence insecurity in the region is trace to the proliferation

of low-intensity resource-induced attacks, mostly led by criminal gangs, warlords and other non-

state actors (Gilpin, 2013). As noted by Adebayo (2014) he illegal refineries creates black

market which by and large sabotage the state economic that compound may hamper domestic

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consumption of petroleum products creating shortage and general impunity in the downstream

sector. Also, it deepens environmental degradation of the region affecting human, plant and aqua

crops.

No doubt that Nigerians especially the Niger Delta region people slammed the oil

companies for polluting their land and fishing waters. But on the contrary, those folks steal oil

from pipelines and refine it in barrels along the creeks. That, in turn, further pollutes the

environment. The government is caught in the middle, unable or unwilling to completely stop the

black market oil trade but burning down illegal refineries by the hundreds. When the fires

quenches, the refineries are re-built because of the vibrant black market. Arnold (2013)

clandestine oil refineries are proliferated in Nigeria, the centre wave of criminal activity that has

cost Nigeria $12 billion loss of revenues. West African piracy centred on the Niger Delta has in

recent years expanded from the coasts of Nigeria to the shorelines of many of the 11 West

African countries that border the Gulf where pirates seize large oil tankers, siphon the product

into smaller vessels, refine it in clandestine facilities and quickly sell it, fuelling a regional oil

black market. Oil consuming nations are concerned because more than 30 percent of U.S. oil and

40 percent of Europe’s oil passes through the Gulf and is vulnerable to West African piracy. The

largest foreign investor in Nigeria’s booming oil industry, Royal Dutch Shell, says that oil

pipeline theft on land, and piracy at sea means about 100,000 barrels of oil are stolen every day

in that country, costing the Nigerian government an estimated $12 billion yearly.

Also, (David, 2014) observe that poaching vessels from Asia, Europe and other parts of

Africa costs the sub-region some $370 million annually. In addition to the financial losses,

poaching has human security costs. Households and individuals are affected directly by the

reduced availability of seafood in local markets. Poaching also has a number of indirect effects,

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including drastic reduction of incomes and loss of livelihood in fishing communities. The rates

of piracy and sea robbery have been increasing since 1990s, occasioned by increasing shipping

activities. The sub-region is ranked by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) as one of the

most troubled global waterways. Similarly, Nigerian waters distinctly unfriendly for shipping

trade, thus casting an ominous shadow on the national economy. The resultant effect of this is the

ebbing confidence level of the Nigerian Sea trade among the shipping community. Aside from

the serious dent on the nation’s international image, ship-owners, shippers and ship operators

have been incurring huge financial losses including loss of human lives. Moreover, several

business operators particularly Fishing Trawler Owners have been relocating to other West

African States with safer navigable waters. This presents a serious challenge to the country

(Ihenacho, 2013). The Nigerian state is wholly dependent on budgetary allocation from the

federation account which is derived mostly from oil revenue. There is no doubt, that continued

violence and high levels of insecurity in the coastal areas and in the territorial waters of the

littoral states will badly hurt the Nigerian economy both in the short and in the long term. It is

easy, however, to focus always on the macro economic consequences from reduced revenue due

to dwindling oil exploitation activity and in the process forget that majority of Nigerians, living

in the rural areas away from the direct consequences of macro-economic indices. Considering,

this views (Oforomeh, 2013:7) asserts that:

It is informative to take a cursory, look at the direct consequences of the continued violence in the Niger Delta on the ordinary people of the area who live in the creeks and villages in the affected areas. When there is only one mode of travel in any given part of a developing country and that mode involves travel on waterways, piracy is a major issue. The case of Bonny in Rivers State is most worrisome. In recent times frequent attacks by pirates along the Bonny route has taken its toll on human lives and property. Indeed, travelling along the route has become a nightmare. During a recent attack, for instance, the pirates ordered passengers in five boats to

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disembark on the dangerous swamp, while the boats and property of the passengers were carted away. Most worrisome is that on occasions, the pirates even engaged security agents in shoot-outs thereby heightening the state of insecurity on the Port Harcourt - Bonny route.

From the above assertion, this study inferred that political economy of coastal communities are

significant in macro- economies. However, this is not peculiar to coastal communities only but

the entire rural areas in Nigeria.

It effect on the Nigerian economy and prospects is indeed far reaching on foreign

investors that made them sceptical about the region, thereby making some shipping firms

incurred high premium on insurance, freightage among other shipping cost. The investors in the

maritime industry are already pulling out of the region focusing their future investments on a

relative safe West African location; the oil multinationals are operating under tense atmosphere,

which have a concomitant effect on oil production and oil revenue as result of insecurity in the

maritime sector of the economy, cost of oil production is sky rocketing, this may affect the

domestic consumption, create artificial scarcity as well intensified unemployment rate. The

withdrawals of expatriate personnel of foreign oil firms from our cities for instance, adversely

affect the economy; most especially as it concerns tourism potentials. Therefore, it is crystal

clear that insecurity in maritime environment has a far reaching effect on Nigerian Economy.

Thus, the corollary of above data validates the hypothesis as constant.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary

The study x-rayed Nigeria’s experience in the wake of Security Challenges in Gulf of

Guinea Maritime Environment. Therefore, its sub-region has large deposits of hydrocarbons and

other natural resources, the immense potential of the Gulf of Guinea (both in terms of its

resource endowment and strategic importance as a shipping route/hub) linking Europe, Asia and

Latin America; it has drawn domestic and international attention for energy exploit as well as

other potential resources. Recently, the region is been deviled with challenges of insecurity and

forms of illicit activities on its territorial waters. Indeed, this study was carried out to provide

satisfactory answers to the following research questions:

1. Does piracy in the Gulf of Guinea undermines maritime security in Nigeria?

2. Do Small Arms running in the region pose a threat to Nigeria?

3. Does Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea adversely affect Investment in Nigeria?

Furthermore, the literature review was properly guided by the aforementioned research

questions, the study was able to adduce that the issue of insecurity in Gulf of Guinea have been

treated by extant literature, however much attention was focus on the causes and factors

responsible for piracy, sea robbery, oil theft among other crimes in the maritime environment. To

this end, the point of departure was to ascertain whether piracy, sea robbery, arms smuggling,

among others have really undermine the national economic and security development of

Nigerian state. Utilizing the Marxian Political Economy Approach, the study vigorously argued

that the aforementioned maritime crimes were driven by economic motive. The hypothetical

statements were stated thus;

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� Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea undermines Maritime Security in Nigeria.

� Small Arms running in the region pose a threat to Nigeria.

� Maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea has adversely affected Investment in Nigeria.

The single case ex-post-facto research design was used to demonstrate how data were

generated for the purpose of validating the hypotheses. In relation to the study, data was collated

from documentary sources such as official documents from organizations likes the Federal

Ministry of Finance, NDLEA, IMB, IMO, UNSC among others, besides institutional and

official documents, the study was based on other secondary sources of data such as books,

journal articles, conference papers, Magazines / Newspapers and internet materials. Thus data

was analyzed using the qualitative descriptive method; also logical data framework was inclusive

it shows the entire study at a glance.

Consequently, chapter four, the found that piracy, sea robbery/ drug trafficking ,

kidnapping and hostility in the Hydrocarbon zone of Gulf Guinea has generated legal and illicit

means of livelihood for both domestic and foreign partners. However, it has undermines

maritime security in Nigeria. In chapter five small arms running in the Gulf of Guinea posed

serious and continuous threat to the Nigerian state, in other words the availability and wide

circulation of small arms and light weapons posed the greatest danger to peace and security,

especially in our region. These weapons have helped to prolong conflicts, undermined stability,

social peace and security and have wrought devastation on the economies of affected states.

Chapter, six unravel the direct consequences of maritime insecurity such as weak policing, poor

border cooperation, oil theft/ Illegal refineries and fishing poach among others, are bane to

Nigerian economy and its prospect.

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7.2 Conclusion

From the foregoing, this study have evaluated piracy, small arms running and insecurity in

Nigerian territorial waters, and the aftermath on the Nigerian state; also the activities of this

group have being sophisticated in an organize pattern that have been difficult to dislodge. Since

the Gulf of Guinea is one of the fastest-growing maritime zones in energy production, policing

the maritime environment had over the years being an onerous task. The study assessed that there

are indications that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is in fact expanding and is poised to increase,

with the expansion of their illicit activities in the Nigerian territorial waters; equally the pirates

have a strong motivation to expand given the increasing oil exploration activities and shipments

of oil and other cargoes which monetary values are the motivating factor.

Similarly, the study found that regional initiatives, institutional and international supports

initiatives had failed due to lack of coordination among these partners largely to diverse national

interest as well their latten interest of littoral states. This has been further highlighted by the

absence of good governance, corruption, weak economic based, poverty, poor military capacity

among others (Onuorah, 2014). Also, the study found that small arms running in the Gulf of

Guinea are fueling social disintegration especially the insurgency of the Boko Haram Sect in

North East Nigeria based on political cum economic motive as the driven force for arms

trafficking in the region; this has increase insecurity and undermines development. Small arms

proliferations had caused more rapid spread of violence and intensify violence’s with devastating

effects including increasing crime that erodes prospects for development. The study also found

that maritime insecurity in the region have adversely affected investment in Nigeria; such as

shipping of cargo goods, fishing trawlers, crude oil tankers among other; this allows the

development of illegal offshore trade in crude oil and refined petroleum; consequently, it is

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evidently clear that there is a nexus between oil bunkering and the rise of violent attacks by

pirates in the region; Nigeria, is the epicentre of these activities. Therefore, on the basis of the

above analysis, the study states the findings as follows:

1. Piracy, sea robbery, kidnapping, among others pirate’s related crime in the Gulf of

Guinea is deeply rooted on economic conditioned; these undermine the Nigeria’ security.

2. Small arms trafficking in Gulf of Guinea are driven by economic cum political motive;

this is occasioned by the intensified communal, religious/ Ethnic conflicts and political

and violence electioneering in the Country.

3. Investment in Nigeria, especially in the maritime sector is operating at a snail pace

largely to the spate of attacks on oil vessels, other shipping cargoes as well crude oil

bunkering in Nigeria’s maritime domain.

7.3 Recommendations

Arising from the above findings, the study put forward the following recommendations

for policy implementation:

� The Gulf of Guinea states cannot overcome maritime security challenges without the

support of international partners; there for to render effective support partner should help

them address the root causes of violence at sea. Donors should therefore not restrict

themselves to a purely security-based approach but should broaden their cooperation

strategies with Gulf of Guinea states to include economic governance, development, law

enforcement and security, while involving all concerned ministries and agencies. States

and donors should collectively identify capacity building needs and distribute tasks

according to donors’ willingness and areas of expertise.

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� Government should demand greater transparency in the oil and gas industry and building

of more refineries. The passage of Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) will facilitate sector

wide reform and development.

� Higher and better awareness of the realities of the situation Improve cooperation amongst

role players both of State and non-State actors, enhances the capacities to limit maritime

piracy an enhanced integrated approach to maritime security in the region is necessary, in

other words Naval and civilian role players involved in the maritime sphere should

developed an integrated approach that connects all aspects, and they must think, plan and

work together.

� Government should demonstrate genuine commitment to stop the flow of small arms in

the region. For instance, while it is true that Nigeria has established a national committee

on the implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Small Arms, indications are

that the efforts made so far lack strategic coordination and consistent implementation;

thus, beyond the mere signing of the ECOWAS principle not to allow importation,

exportation and manufacturing of small arms, the government should strengthen its

control over arms in its armory and work out necessary measures that would guarantee

border security with its neighbours Improve the maritime security situation in the waters

of Africa, especially in piracy prone areas.

� Also need to address the underlying socio-economic issues that fuel piracy, these include:

the large scale unemployment, lack of social services and political frustrations that

prompt more people to join these criminal organization; more attention should be given

to maritime surveillance by government.

106

� Maritime security budget should be even more than that of land and air space security

budgets as well provision of ample surveillance facilities including platforms in policing

EEZ; furthermore, governments of these piracy prone areas should employ more hands to

police the vast areas of their territorial waters; the IMO should work out modalities,

principles or ways that may provide good order at sea.

� IMO, IMB and other international agencies alleviate the problems by providing

resources, funds and equipment to counter piracy via surveillance and monitoring. An

effective mechanism should be adopted for collection, analysis and dissemination of

intelligence throughout the piracy prone States in Africa.

107

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116

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GULF OF GUINEA

Source: Adapted from Ghana Defense web, 2013

117

APPENDIX B

GULF OF GUINEA AN OIL SHIPPING ROUTE

Source: Adapted from US Energy Information Administration, 2013

118

APPENDIX C

PIRACY AND OIL THEFT IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

Source: Adapted from www. imo.org/ 2013