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Aristotle's Rhetoric

First published Thu M

ay 2, 2002; substantive revision M

on Feb 1, 2010

Aristotle's Rhetoric has had an enormou

s influ

ence on the developm

ent o

f the art o

f rhetoric. N

ot only authors writin

g in the

peripatetic tradition, b

ut also the famou

s Rom

an te

achers of rhetoric, such as Cicero and Quintilian, frequ

ently

used

elem

ents stemming from

the Aristotelian do

ctrine. N

evertheless, th

ese authors were interested neither in

an authentic

interpretatio

n of th

e Aristotelian works nor in

the philosophical sou

rces and

backgrounds of the vocabulary th

at Aristotle

had introd

uced to

rhetorical theory. Thu

s, for two millennia the interpretatio

n of Aristotelian rhetoric has becom

e a matter

of th

e history of rhetoric, not of philosophy. In the most influential m

anuscripts and

editio

ns, Aristotle's Rhetoric was

surrou

nded by rhetorical w

orks and even writte

n speeches of other Greek and

Latin authors, a

nd was seldom in

terpreted in

the context o

f the who

le Corpus Aristotelicum

. It w

as not until the last few

decades th

at th

e philosophically salient features

of th

e Aristotelian rhetoric were rediscovered: in construing a general th

eory of the persuasive, Aristotle app

lies numerous

concepts and

argum

ents th

at are also treated in his lo

gical, ethical, and psycho

logical w

ritin

gs. H

is th

eory of rhetorical

arguments, for example, is only on

e further application of his general doctrine of th

e sullogismos, which also form

s the

basis of dialectic, logic, a

nd his th

eory of demon

stratio

n. Ano

ther example is the concept of em

otions: tho

ugh em

otions are

one of the m

ost important top

ics in th

e Aristotelian ethics, h

e no

where offers such an illum

inating account o

f single

emotions as in the Rhetoric. F

inally, it is th

e Rhetoric, too, th

at in

form

s us about th

e cognitive features of language and

style.

1. W

orks on Rhetoric

2. The Agenda of th

e Rhetoric

3. Rhetoric as a Cou

nterpart to

Dialectic

4. The Purpose of Rhetoric

4.1 The Definition

of Rhetoric

4.2 The Neutrality

of Aristotelian Rhetoric

Aristotle's Rhetoric (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/

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4.3 Why W

e Need Rhetoric

4.4 Aristotelian Rhetoric as Proof-Centered and Pertin

ent

4.5 Is There an Inconsistency in Aristotle's Rhetorical T

heory?

5. The Three M

eans of Persuasion

6. The Enthy

mem

e6.1 The Concept of Enthy

mem

e6.2 Fo

rmal Requirements

6.3 Enthy

mem

es as Dialectical Argum

ents

6.4 The Brevity of the Enthy

mem

e– Su

pplement o

n the Brevity of the Enthy

mem

e6.5 Different T

ypes of Enthy

mem

es7. The Top

oi7.1 The Definition

of ‘Topos’

7.2 The W

ord ‘Topos’ and

the Techn

ique of Places

7.3 The Elements of a Topos

7.4 The Fun

ction of a Topos

– Su

pplement o

n the Topoi of th

e Rhetoric

8. Style: H

ow to

Say Things with

Words

8.1 The Virtue of Style

8.2 Aristotelian Metapho

rsGlossary of Selected Terms

Bibliography

Other Internet R

esou

rces

Related Entries

1. Works on Rhetoric

According to

ancient te

stim

onies, Aristotle wrote an early dialogue on rhetoric entitled ‘Grullos’, in which he pu

t forward

the argument that rhetoric cann

ot be an art (technê); and

since this is precisely th

e positio

n of Plato's Gorgias, th

e lost

dialogue Grullos has tradition

ally been regarded as a sign of Aristotle's (alleged) early Platonism

. But th

e evidence for th

epositio

n of th

is dialogue is too

tenu

ous to sup

port such strong con

clusions: it a

lso could have been a ‘dialectical’ dialogue,

which listed th

e pros and

con

s of th

e thesis th

at rhetoric is an art. We do

not kno

w m

uch more about the so-called ‘Technê



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Sunagogê’, a collection of previou

s theories of rhetoric th

at is also ascribed to

Aristotle. Cicero seem

s to use th

is collection

itself, or at least a

secondary source relying on

it, a

s his main historical sou

rce when he gives a sho

rt survey of th

e history of

pre-Aristotelian rhetoric in

his Brutus 46

–48. Finally, A

ristotle once mentio

ns a work called ‘Theodecteia’ which has also

been sup

posed to be Aristotelian; but m

ore prob

ably he meant th

e rhetorical handb

ook of his follower Theod

ectes, who was

a form

er pup

il of Isocrates.

What h

as com

e do

wn to us are just th

e three bo

oks on

rhetoric, which we kn

ow as The Rhetoric, though the ancient

catalogue of th

e Aristotelian works, reported by D

iogenes Laertius, m

entio

ns only tw

o bo

oks on rhetoric (perhaps our

Rhetoric I &

II), a

nd tw

o further book

s on

style (perhaps ou

r Rhetoric III?). W

hereas m

ost m

odern authors agree that at

least the core of Rhet. I &

II presents a coh

erent rhetorical th

eory, the tw

o them

es of Rhet. III are not m

entio

ned in th

eagenda of Rhet. I &

II. The con

ceptual link betw

een Rhet. I &

II and Rhet. III is not given until the very last sentence of th

esecond

boo

k. It is quite understandable that th

e authenticity

of this ad hoc com

positio

n has been questioned: we cannot

exclud

e the possibility th

at th

ese tw

o parts of th

e Rhetoric w

ere no

t put to

gether until the first editio

n of Aristotle's works

completed by And

ronicus in the first century. In the Poetics (145

6a33

) we fin

d a cross-reference to a work called

‘Rhetoric’ which obviously refers to Rhet. I &

II, but excludes Rhet. III. R

egardless of such do

ubts, the systematic id

ea that

links th

e tw

o heterogeneou

s parts of the Rhetoric does no

t at a

ll seem

to be un

reasonable: it is not enough to

have a supply

of th

ings to say (the so-called “tho

ught”), the th

eorist of rhetoric m

ust a

lso inform

us about the right way to

say th

ose things

(the so-called “style”).

The chron

ological fixing of the Rhetoric has tu

rned out to

be a delicate matter. At least the core of Rhet. I &

II seem

s to be

an early work, writte

n du

ring Aristotle's first stay in Athens (it is un

clear, how

ever, w

hich chapters belong to

that core;

regularly mentio

ned are the chapters I.4–15 and II.1–17). It is true th

at the Rhetoric refers to historical events that fall in the

time of Aristotle's exile and

his secon

d stay in

Athens, but m

ost o

f them

can be foun

d in th

e chapters II.23

–24, and

besides

this, e

xamples cou

ld have been updated, which is especially plausible if we assume that th

e Rhetoric formed th

e basis of a

lecture held several times. M

ost striking are the affin

ities to

the (also early) Topics; if, a

s it is widely agreed, the Topics

represents a pre-syllogistic state of Aristotelian logic, th

e same is true of the Rhetoric: w

e actually find no hints of syllogistic

inventory in it.

2. The Agenda of the Rhetoric

The structure of Rhet. I &

II is determined by tw

o tripartite division

s. The first division consists in

the distinction am

ong the

three means of persuasion

: The speech can prod

uce persuasion

eith

er throu

gh th

e character of th

e speaker, th

e em

otional

state of th

e listener, or the argument (logos) itself (see below

§5). The secon

d tripartite division

concerns the three species



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of pub

lic speech. The speech that ta

kes place in th

e assembly is defined as the deliberative species. In this rhetorical

species, th

e speaker either advises th

e audience to

do something or warns against doing som

ething. A

ccordingly, the

audience has to

judge things that a

re going to

happen in th

e future, and

they have to decide whether th

ese future events are

good

or bad for the polis, w

hether th

ey will cause advantage or harm

. The speech that ta

kes place before a cou

rt is defined

as th

e judicial species. T

he speaker eith

er accuses som

ebod

y or defends herself or som

eone else. Naturally, this kind of

speech treats th

ings th

at happened in th

e past. T

he aud

ience or rather jury has to

judge whether a past e

vent was ju

st or

unjust, i.e., whether it was according to

the law or contrary to the law. W

hile th

e deliberative and judicial species have their

context in a controversial situ

ation in which th

e listener has to decide in favor of on

e of tw

o op

posing parties, the th

ird

species do

es not aim

at such a decision: the epideictic speech praises or blames som

ebody, it tries to

describe things or

deeds of th

e respective person

as ho

norable or shameful.

The first boo

k of th

e Rhetoric treats th

e three species in succession. Rhet. I.4–8 deals with

the deliberative, I.9 with

the

epideictic, I.10–14

the judicial species. T

hese chapters are un

derstood

as contributin

g to the argum

entative mode of

persuasion

or—

more precisely—

to that p

art o

f argumentative persuasion

that is specific

to the respective species of

persuasion

. The secon

d part of the argumentative persuasion

that is com

mon

to all three species of rhetorical speech is

treated in th

e chapters II.19

–26. The secon

d means of persuasion

, which works by evok

ing the em

otions of the audience, is

described in the chapters II.2–11. Tho

ugh the following chapters II.12

–17 treat d

ifferent types of character these chapters

do not, as is often assum

ed, develop the third means of persuasion

, which depends on the character of th

e speaker. The

underlying th

eory of this m

eans of persuasion

is elaborated in a few

lines of chapter II.1. The aforementio

ned chapters

II.12–

17 give inform

ation abou

t different typ

es of character and their disposition

to em

otional response, which can be useful

for those speakers who

want to arouse the em

otions of the audience. W

hy the chapters on the argum

entative means of

persuasion

are separated by the treatm

ent o

f em

otions and

character (in II.2–

17) remains a riddle, especially since th

echapter II.18 tries to give a link between the specific and the common

aspects of argumentative persuasion. R

hetoric

III.1–

12 discusses several questions of style (see below

§8.1), R

hetoric III.13

–19 is on the several p

arts of a speech.

3. Rhetoric as a Counterpart to Dialectic

Aristotle stresses that rhetoric is closely related to

dialectic. H

e offers several formulas to

describe this affinity

between the

two disciplines: first of all, rhetoric is said to be a “cou

nterpart” (antistrophos) to

dialectic (Rhet. I.1, 1

354a1); (ii) it is also

called an “ou

tgrowth” (paraphues ti) of dialectic and

the stud

y of character (Rhet. I.2, 1356a25f.); finally, A

ristotle says

that rhetoric is part o

f dialectic and

resem

bles it (Rhet. I.2, 1

356a30

f.). In saying th

at rhetoric is a counterpart to

dialectic,

Aristotle obviously alludes to Plato's Gorgias (464

bff.), where rhetoric is iron

ically defined as a counterpart to cookery in

the soul. S

ince, in this passage, P

lato uses the word ‘antistrophos’ to designate an analogy, it is likely th

at Aristotle wants to



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express a kind

of analogy too: what d

ialectic is for th

e (private or academ

ic) practice of attacking and m

aintaining an

argument, rhetoric is for th

e (pub

lic) practice of defending oneself or accusing an opponent.

This analogy betw

een rhetoric and

dialectic can be substantiated by several com

mon features of both disciplines:

Rhetoric and dialectic are con

cerned with

things th

at do no

t belon

g to a definite genus or are not the object o

f a

specific science.

Rhetoric and dialectic rely on

accepted sentences (endoxa).

Rhetoric and dialectic are not dependent on the principles of specific sciences.

Rhetoric and dialectic are con

cerned with

both sides of an op

positio

n.Rhetoric and dialectic rely on

the same theory of dedu

ction and indu

ction.

Rhetoric and dialectic sim

ilarly apply the so-called topoi.

The analogy to

dialectic has im

portant implications for th

e status of rhetoric. P

lato argued in his Gorgias that rhetoric

cann

ot be an art (technê), since it is not related to

a definite sub

ject, while real arts are defin

ed by their specific subjects, a

se.g. m

edicine or sho

emaking are defin

ed by their prod

ucts, i.e., health and

sho

es. H

owever, though dialectic has no defin

itesubject, it is easy to see that it n

evertheless rests on

a m

etho

d, because dialectic has to grasp the reason

why som

earguments are valid and

others are no

t. Now

, if rhetoric is nothing but th

e coun

terpart to dialectic in

the do

main of public

speech, it m

ust be grounded in an investigation of what is persuasive and

what is no

t, and th

is, in turn, q

ualifies rhetoric as

an art.

Further, it is central to

both disciplines th

at th

ey deal w

ith argum

ents from accepted prem

ises. H

ence th

e rhetorician who

wants to

persuade by argum

ents or (rhetorical) proofs can adapt m

ost o

f the dialectical equipment. Nevertheless, persuasion

that ta

kes place before a public aud

ience is not only a m

atter of argum

ents and

proofs, but also of credibility and em

otional

attitud

es. T

his is why

there are also remarkable differences betw

een the two disciplines:

Dialectic can be applied to every object w

hatsoever, rhetoric is useful especially in

practical and public m

atters.

Dialectic proceeds by questioning and

answering, while rhetoric for the most p

art p

roceeds in contin

uous form.

Dialectic is con

cerned with

general questions, w

hile rhetoric is con

cerned for th

e most part with

particular to

pics (i.e.,

things about w

hich we cann

ot gain real kno

wledge).

Certain uses of dialectic apply qualified endoxa, i.e., endoxa th

at are approved by exp

erts, w

hile rhetoric aims at

endoxa th

at are pop

ular.

Rhetoric must take into accou

nt th

at its target group

has only restricted in

tellectual resou

rces, whereas such concerns

are totally absent from dialectic.



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While dialectic tries to te

st th

e consistency of a set of sentences, rhetoric tries to achieve th

e persuasion

of a given

audience.

Non

-argum

entative metho

ds are absent from

dialectic, w

hile rhetoric uses non

-argum

entative means of persuasion.

4. The Purpose of Rhetoric

4.1 The Definition of Rhetoric

Aristotle defines th

e rhetorician as som

eone who

is always able to

see what is persuasive (Topics VI.12, 1

49b25).

Correspon

dingly, rhetoric is defined as the ability to

see what is possibly persuasive in every given case (Rhet. I.2,

1355

b26f.). T

his is not to

say that the rhetorician w

ill be able to

con

vince un

der all circumstances. Rather he is in

a situ

ation

similar to th

at of the physician: th

e latte

r has a complete grasp of his art only if he neglects no

thing that m

ight heal h

ispatient, tho

ugh he is not able to heal every patient. S

imilarly, th

e rhetorician has a complete grasp of his m

etho

d, if he

discovers the available means of persuasion

, tho

ugh he is not able to con

vince everybody.

4.2 The eutrality of Aristotelian Rhetoric

Aristotelian rhetoric as such is a neutral to

ol th

at can be used by person

s of virtuou

s or depraved character. This capacity

can be used for good

or bad purposes; it can cause great benefits as well as great h

arms. There is no doubt that A

ristotle

himself regards his system

of rhetoric as something useful, but the good

purposes for which rhetoric is useful d

o not d

efine

the rhetorical capacity

as such. T

hus, Aristotle does no

t hesitate to concede on

the one hand th

at his art of rhetoric can be

misused. B

ut on the other hand

he tones do

wn the risk of misuse by stressing several factors: G

enerally, it is true of all

good

s, except virtue, that th

ey can be misused. S

econ

dly, using rhetoric of th

e Aristotelian style, it is easier to convince of

the just and

good than of their op

posites. Finally, the risk of m

isuse is com

pensated by the benefits that can be accomplished

by rhetoric of th

e Aristotelian style.

4.3 Why We eed Rhetoric

It cou

ld still b

e ob

jected th

at rhetoric is only useful for th

ose who

want to ou

twit their audience and conceal th

eir real aim

s,since someone who ju

st wants to

com

mun

icate the truth could be straightforward and wou

ld not need rhetorical to

ols. This,

however, is not Aristotle's point o

f view

: Even those who

just try to establish what is just and true need the help of rhetoric

when they are faced with

a pub

lic aud

ience. Aristotle te

lls us that it is im

possible to

teach such an audience, e

ven if the

speaker had the most e

xact kno

wledge of th

e subject. O

bviously he thinks th

at th

e audience of a public speech consists of



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ordinary people who are not able to follow an exact proo

f based on

the principles of a science. Further, such an audience

can easily be distracted by factors that do no

t pertain to

the subject a

t all; som

etim

es th

ey are receptive to flatte

ry or just try

to in

crease their own advantage. And

this situ

ation becomes even worse if th

e constitution, th

e laws, and

the rhetorical

habits in

a city

are bad. F

inally, m

ost of th

e topics th

at are usually discussed in

pub

lic speeches do not allow of exact

know

ledge, but leave room

for dou

bt; e

specially in

such cases it is im

portant that the speaker seem

s to be a credible person

and that th

e audience is in

a sym

pathetic m

ood. For all those reason

s, affectin

g the decisions of ju

ries and

assem

blies is a

matter of persuasiveness, not of kn

owledge. It is true th

at som

e peop

le m

anage to be persuasive eith

er at rando

m or by

habit, bu

t it is rhetoric th

at gives us a metho

d to discover all m

eans of persuasion

on any to

pic whatsoever.

4.4 Aristotelian Rhetoric as Proof-Centered and Pertinent

Aristotle jo

ins Plato in

criticizing contem

porary m

anuals of rhetoric. B

ut how

does he m

anage to distin

guish his ow

n project

from

the criticized manuals? The general id

ea seems to be this: P

reviou

s theorists of rhetoric gave m

ost o

f their attention to

metho

ds outside th

e subject; th

ey ta

ught how

to sland

er, h

ow to

arouse em

otions in

the audience, o

r ho

w to

distract the

attention of th

e hearers from

the subject. This style of rhetoric prom

otes a situ

ation in which ju

ries and assem

blies no

longer

form

rational judgm

ents about th

e given issues, b

ut surrend

er to

the litigants. A

ristotelian rhetoric is different in this respect:

it is centered on th

e rhetorical kind of proof, the enthy

mem

e (see below

§6), w

hich is called the most important m

eans of

persuasion

. Since people are most stron

gly convinced when they sup

pose th

at som

ething has been proven (Rhet. I.1,

1355

a5f.), th

ere is no need for the orator to con

fuse or distract the aud

ience by th

e use of emotional appeals, e

tc. In

Aristotle's view

an orator will be even m

ore successful when he ju

st picks up the convincing aspects of a given issue, th

ereby

using common

ly-held opinions as prem

ises. S

ince people have a natural dispositio

n for the true (Rhet. I.1, 1

355a15f.) and

every man has som

e contributio

n to m

ake to th

e truth (Eudemian Ethics I.6, 121

6b31,) th

ere is no un

bridgeable gap

betw

een the common

ly-held op

inions and

what is true. T

his alleged affin

ity between the true and th

e persuasive ju

stifies

Aristotle's project of a rhetoric that essentially relies on

the persuasiveness of pertinent a

rgum

entatio

n; and it is ju

st th

isargumentative character of Aristotelian rhetoric th

at exp

lains the close affin

ity between rhetoric and dialectic (see above

§3).

4.5 Is There an Inconsistency in Aristotle's Rhetorical Theory?

Of course, A

ristotle's rhetoric covers no

n-argumentative tools of persuasion as well. He tells th

e orator how

to stim

ulate

emotions and

how

to m

ake himself credible (see below §5); h

is art of rhetoric in

clud

es consideratio

ns about delivery and

style (see below

§8.1) and

the parts of a speech. It is un

derstand

able th

at several in

terpreters found an insoluble tension

betw

een the argumentative means of pertinent rhetoric and

non

-argum

entative tools that aim

at w

hat is outside the subject.



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It does no

t seem, h

owever, that A

ristotle him

self saw a m

ajor con

flict between these diverse tools of persuasion

—presum

ably for th

e following reason

s: (i) H

e leaves no do

ubt that the sub

ject that is treated in a speech has the highest

priority (e.g. Rhet. III.1, 1

403b

18–27). T

hus, it is not surprising that th

ere are even passages that regard the

non-argumentative tools as a sort o

f accidental con

tribution to th

e process of persuasion, which essentially proceeds in th

emanner of dialectic (cp. R

het. I.1, 1

354a15

). (ii) There are, h

e says (III.1, 140

4a2f.), m

etho

ds th

at are not right, b

utnecessary because of certain deficiencies of th

e audience. H

is point seems to be that th

e argumentative metho

d becomes

less effective, th

e worse th

e condition

of the audience is. This again is to say that it is due to

the badn

ess of th

e audience

when his rhetoric in

cludes aspects th

at are not in

line with

the idea of argumentative and pertinent rhetoric. (iii) In dealing

with

metho

ds of traditional rhetoric, Aristotle obviously assum

es th

at even metho

ds th

at have traditionally been used in

stead

of argum

entatio

n can be refined so that th

ey sup

port the aim

of an argum

entative style of rhetoric. The prologue of a

speech, for example, was tradition

ally used for appeals to th

e listener, but it can also be used to set out th

e issue of th

espeech, thu

s contributin

g to its clearness. Sim

ilarly, the epilogue has tradition

ally been used to

arouse em

otions like pity

or

anger; but as soon

as the epilogue recalls the con

clusions reached, it w

ill m

ake the speech m

ore understandable.

5. The Three Means of Persuasion

The systematical core of Aristotle's Rhetoric is the doctrine that th

ere are three technical m

eans of persuasion

. The attribute

‘techn

ical’ im

plies tw

o characteristics: (i) Techn

ical persuasion must rest o

n a metho

d, and th

is, in turn, is to

say th

at w

emust k

now th

e reason

why

som

e things are persuasive and some are no

t. Fu

rther, m

ethodical p

ersuasion must rest o

n a

complete analysis of what it m

eans to

be persuasive. (ii) Techn

ical m

eans of persuasion m

ust b

e provided by the speaker

himself, whereas preexistin

g facts, such as oaths, w

itnesses, te

stim

onies, etc. a

re non

-technical, since th

ey cannot b

eprepared by the speaker.

A speech consists of three things: the speaker, the subject that is treated in the speech, and

the listener to who

m th

e speech

is add

ressed (Rhet. I.3, 13

58a37ff.). It seems that th

is is w

hy only three technical m

eans of persuasion are possible:

Techn

ical m

eans of persuasion

are eith

er (a) in

the character of th

e speaker, or (b) in th

e em

otional state of the hearer, o

r(c) in th

e argument (logos) itself.

(a) The persuasion is accom

plished by character whenever the speech is held in such a way as to render the speaker worthy

of credence. If the speaker appears to be credible, the aud

ience will form th

e second

-order ju

dgment that p

ropositio

ns put

forw

ard by

the credible speaker are true or acceptable. T

his is especially im

portant in cases where th

ere is no exact

know

ledge but roo

m for dou

bt. But how

does the speaker manage to app

ear a credible person? He must d

isplay (i) practical

intelligence (phronêsis), (ii) a virtuou

s character, and

(iii) good

will (Rhet. II.1, 137

8a6ff.); for, if he displayed none of them,



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the audience wou

ld dou

bt that h

e is able to give good

advice at all. Again, if he displayed (i) w

ithout (ii) and (iii), th

eaudience cou

ld dou

bt whether th

e aims of the speaker are goo

d. Finally, if he displayed (i) and

(ii) with

out (iii), th

eaudience cou

ld still d

oubt whether th

e speaker gives the best suggestion, th

ough he kn

ows what it is. But if he displays all of

them

, Aristotle con

clud

es, it c

anno

t rationally be do

ubted that his suggestions are credible. It m

ust b

e stressed th

at th

espeaker must a

ccom

plish these effects by what h

e says; it is no

t necessary th

at he is actually virtuou

s: on the contrary, a

preexisting good character cannot b

e part of the technical m

eans of persuasion

.

(b) The success of the persuasive efforts depends on the em

otional d

ispositio

ns of the audience; for we do not ju

dge in th

esame way when we grieve and

rejoice or when we are friend

ly and

hostile. Thu

s, th

e orator has to

arouse em

otions exactly

because em

otions have the power to

mod

ify our ju

dgments: to a judge who

is in

a friendly moo

d, th

e person about whom he

is going to

judge seem

s no

t to do wrong or on

ly in

a small w

ay; b

ut to

the ju

dge who

is in

an angry mood, th

e same person

will seem to

do the op

posite (cp. R

het. II.1, 137

8a1ff.). M

any interpreters writin

g on

the rhetorical emotions were misled by

the role of the em

otions in

Aristotle's ethics: they suggested that th

e orator has to

arouse the em

otions in

order (i) to

motivate the audience or (ii) to make them

better person

s (since Aristotle requires that virtuou

s person

s do th

e right things

together with

the right emotions). Thesis (i) is false for th

e simple reason

that th

e aim of rhetorical persuasion is a certain

judgment (krisis), n

ot an actio

n or practical decision (prohairesis). Thesis (ii) is false, b

ecause m

oral educatio

n is not th

epurpose of rhetoric (see above §4), n

or cou

ld it be effected by a pu

blic speech: “Now

if speeches were in th

emselves

enou

gh to

make men goo

d, th

ey wou

ld ju

stly, a

s Theognis says, h

ave won

very great rew

ards, a

nd such rewards should

have been provided; b

ut as things are …

they are not able to encou

rage th

e many to nob

ility and

goodness.” (EN X.9.

1179

b4–1

0)

How

is it possible for the orator to bring the audience to

a certain emotion? Aristotle's techniqu

e essentially rests on the

know

ledge of th

e defin

ition

of every significant emotion. Let, for example, anger be defin

ed as “desire, accom

panied with

pain, for conspicuo

us revenge for a con

spicuo

us slight th

at was directed against o

neself or those near to

one, w

hen such a

slight is und

eserved.” (Rhet. II.2 137

8a31

–33). A

ccording to

such a defin

ition

, som

eone who

believes that he has suffered a

slight from a person who

is not entitled to

do so, e

tc., will becom

e angry. If we take such a definitio

n for granted, it is

possible to

deduce circum

stances in which a person will m

ost p

robably be angry; for example, we can dedu

ce (i) in

what

state of m

ind peop

le are angry and

(ii) against who

m th

ey are angry and

(iii) for what sorts of reason

. Aristotle deduces

these three factors for several emotions in

the chapters II.2–11

. With

this equ

ipment, the orator w

ill be able, for example, to

highlight such characteristics of a case as are likely to

provoke anger in

the audience. In comparison with

the tricks of

form

er rhetoricians, th

is m

etho

d of arousing em

otions has a striking advantage: The orator who

wants to

arouse em

otions

must n

ot even speak outside the subject; it is suffic

ient to

detect aspects of a given sub

ject th

at are causally con

nected with

the intend

ed emotion.



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(c) We persuade by the argument itself when we demon

strate or seem

to dem

onstrate th

at som

ething is th

e case. Fo

rAristotle, there are tw

o species of argum

ents: ind

uctio

ns and

deductio

ns (Posterior Analytics I.1, 71a5ff.). Ind

uctio

n(epagôgê) is defined as the proceeding from particulars up

to a universal (Topics I.12, 1

05a13ff.). A deductio

n(sullogismos) is an argument in which, c

ertain th

ings having been sup

posed, som

ething different from th

e suppositions

results of necessity

throu

gh th

em (Topics I.1, 100

a25ff.) or because of their being true (Prior Analytics I.2, 24b18

–20). T

heindu

ctive argument in rhetoric is th

e exam

ple (paradeigma); unlike other indu

ctive arguments, it d

oes not p

roceed from

many particular cases to

one universal case, but from one particular to

a sim

ilar particular if both particulars fall un

der the

same genu

s (Rhet. I.2, 1

357b

25ff.). T

he deductive argument in rhetoric is th

e enthym

eme (see below

§6):

but w

hen, certain th

ings being th

e case, som

ething different results beside them

because of their being true,

either universally or for the m

ost part, it is called dedu

ction here (in dialectic) and enthym

eme there (in

rhetoric).

It is rem

arkable that Aristotle uses the qu

alificatio

n “either universally or for the most p

art”: o

bviously, h

e wants to

say th

atin som

e cases the conclusion follows un

iversally, i.e., by necessity, while in

other cases it follows only fo

r the most part. A

tfirst glance, th

is seems to be inconsistent, since a non

-necessary in

ference is no longer a deductio

n. How

ever, it h

as been

disputed whether in

argum

ents from probable prem

ises th

e form

ula “for the m

ost p

art” qualifies the inference itself (“If for

the most p

art such and such is th

e case it follows for the most part th

at som

ething different is the case”), o

r on

ly th

econclusion

(“If for the most part such and such is th

e case it follows by necessity th

at fo

r the m

ost part som

ething different

is th

e case”). If the form

er in

terpretatio

n is true, then Aristotle con

cedes in th

e very definition

of the enthym

eme that som

eenthym

emes are not deductive. But if the latte

r interpretatio

n (w

hich has a parallel in An. post. 87

b23–25) is correct, a

nenthym

eme whose premises and con

clusion are for the most p

art true wou

ld still b

e a valid deductio

n.

6. The Enthymeme

6.1 The Concept of Enthymeme

For Aristotle, a

n enthym

eme is what h

as th

e functio

n of a proof or demon

stratio

n in th

e domain of public speech, since a

demon

stratio

n is a kind of sullogismos and the enthym

eme is said to be a sullogismos too. The word ‘enthymeme’ (from

‘enthumeisthai—

to con

sider’) had already been coined by Aristotle's predecessors and

originally designated clever sayings,

bon mots, and

sho

rt argum

ents in

volving a parado

x or con

tradictio

n. The con

cepts ‘proof’ (apodeixis) and ‘sullogismos’

play a crucial role in Aristotle's logical-dialectical theory. In applying them to

a te

rm of conventio

nal rhetoric, Aristotle

appeals to a well-know

n rhetorical te

chniqu

e, but, a

t the sam

e tim

e, restricts and

cod

ifies th

e original m

eaning of



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‘enthy

mem

e’: p

roperly un

derstood

, what p

eople call ‘enthy

mem

e’ should have the form

of a sullogismos, i.e., a

deductive

argument.

6.2 Formal Requirements

In general, A

ristotle regards deductive arguments as a set o

f sentences in which som

e sentences are prem

ises and one is th

econclusion

, and

the inference from

the prem

ises to

the conclusion

is guaranteed by th

e prem

ises alone. S

ince enthymem

esin th

e proper sense are exp

ected to be dedu

ctive arguments, the m

inim

al requirement for the form

ulation of enthy

mem

es is

that th

ey have to display th

e prem

ise-conclusion

structure of dedu

ctive arguments. T

his is why

enthymem

es have to in

clude

a statem

ent a

s well as a kind of reason

for th

e given statem

ent. Typ

ically th

is reason is given in

a conditio

nal ‘if’-clause or a

causal ‘since’- or ‘for’-clause. Examples of the form

er, c

onditio

nal typ

e are: “If not even the gods know everything, hum

anbeings can hardly do so.” “If the war is th

e cause of present evils, things sho

uld be set right by making peace.” Examples of

the latte

r, causal typ

e are: “One should no

t be educated, for one ought not be envied (and educated people are usually

envied).” “S

he has given birth, for she has m

ilk.” Aristotle stresses that the sentence “T

here is no man among us who is

free” taken for itself is a m

axim

, but b

ecom

es an enthym

eme as soo

n as it is used together w

ith a reason such as “for all are

slaves of mon

ey or of chance (and

no slave of m

oney or chance is free).” Som

etim

es th

e requ

ired reason may even be

implicit, as e.g. in

the sentence “As a mortal, do

not cherish im

mortal anger” the reason why

one should not c

herish m

ortal

anger is im

plicitly given in the phrase “immortal,” which alludes to th

e rule th

at is not app

ropriate for m

ortal b

eings to have

such an attitud

e.

6.3 Enthymemes as Dialectical Arguments

Aristotle calls th

e enthym

eme the “bod

y of persuasion”, implying th

at everything else is only an add

ition or accident to

the

core of the persuasive process. T

he reason why

the enthy

mem

e, as the rhetorical kind of proof or demonstratio

n, should be

regarded as central to the rhetorical process of persuasion

is th

at we are most e

asily persuaded when we think that

something has been demon

strated. Hence, the basic id

ea of a rhetorical dem

onstratio

n seem

s to be this: In order to m

ake a

target group believe th

at q, the orator must first select a

sentence p or some sentences p1 …

pn that a

re already

accepted by

the target group; secon

dly he has to

sho

w th

at q can be derived from

p or p1 …

pn, u

sing p or p1 …

pn as prem

ises. G

iven

that th

e target persons form th

eir beliefs in

accordance with rational stand

ards, they will accept q

as soon as they

understand

that q can be demonstrated on

the basis of their ow

n op

inions.

Con

sequ

ently

, the con

struction of enthy

mem

es is primarily a m

atter of deducing from

accepted opinions (endoxa). Of

course, it is also po

ssible to use prem

ises that a

re not com

mon

ly accepted by th

emselves, b

ut can be derived from



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common

ly accepted op

inions; o

ther premises are only accepted since th

e speaker is held to be credible; still other

enthym

emes are built from

signs: see §6.5. That a

deductio

n is m

ade from

accepted opinions—as opposed to deductions

from

first and

true sentences or principles—is th

e defin

ing feature of dialectical argum

entatio

n in th

e Aristotelian sense.

Thu

s, th

e form

ulation of enthy

mem

es is a m

atter of dialectic, and the dialectician has the competence that is needed for the

constructio

n of enthy

mem

es. If enthym

emes are a sub

class of dialectical argum

ents, then it is natural to

exp

ect a

specific

difference by which one can te

ll enthym

emes apart from all other kind

s of dialectical argum

ents (traditionally,

commentators regarded logical incom

pleteness as such a difference; for some ob

jections against th

e traditional view, see

§6.4). Nevertheless, this expectation is som

ehow

misled: The enthy

mem

e is different from other kinds of dialectical

arguments, insofar as it is used in th

e rhetorical con

text of pu

blic speech (and

rhetorical argum

ents are called

‘enthy

mem

es’); thus, no further form

al or qu

alitative differences are needed.

How

ever, in the rhetorical con

text th

ere are two factors that th

e dialectician has to keep in m

ind if she wants to

becom

e a

rhetorician too, and if th

e dialectical argum

ent is to

becom

e a successful enthy

mem

e. First, the ty

pical sub

jects of public

speech do no

t—as th

e subject of dialectic and

theoretical philosophy—

belong to the things th

at are necessarily th

e case, b

utare am

ong those things th

at are th

e goal of practical deliberation and can also be otherw

ise. Second, as op

posed to

well-trained dialecticians the audience of pub

lic speech is characterized by an in

tellectual insuffic

iency; above all, the

mem

bers of a jury or assembly are no

t accustomed to following a longer chain of inferences. T

herefore enthy

mem

es m

ust

not b

e as precise as a scientific demon

stratio

n and shou

ld be shorter than ordinary dialectical argum

ents. T

his, how

ever, is

not to say that th

e enthym

eme is defined by incompleteness and brevity

. Rather, it is a sign of a well-executed enthymem

ethat th

e content a

nd th

e nu

mber of its prem

ises are adjusted to th

e intellectual capacities of the public aud

ience; but even an

enthym

eme that failed to in

corporate these qu

alities wou

ld still be enthym

eme.

6.4 The Brevity of the Enthymeme

In a well k

nown passage (Rhet. I.2, 1

357a7–

18; sim

ilar: Rhet. II.22

, 139

5b24

–26), A

ristotle says that th

e enthym

eme often

has few or even few

er premises th

an som

e other dedu

ctions, (sullogismoi). S

ince m

ost interpreters refer the word

‘sullogismos’ to

the syllogistic theory (see th

e entry on

Aristotle's logic), a

ccording to

which a proper deduction has exactly

two prem

ises, those lines have led to th

e widespread un

derstand

ing that Aristotle defines th

e enthym

eme as a sullogismos in

which one of two prem

ises has been suppressed, i.e., as an abbreviated, in

complete syllogism

. But certainly the m

entio

ned

passages do no

t atte

mpt to

give a defin

ition

of the enthym

eme, nor does the word ‘sullogismos’ necessarily refer to

dedu

ctions with

exactly two prem

ises. P

roperly un

derstood

, both passages are abou

t the selectio

n of appropriate premises,

not a

bout lo

gical incom

pleteness. The rem

ark that enthy

mem

es often have few or less premises con

cludes th

e discussion of

two possible m

istakes the orator cou

ld m

ake (Rhet. I.2, 13

57a7–10): O

ne can draw conclusions from th

ings th

at have



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previously been dedu

ced or from th

ings th

at have no

t been deduced yet. T

he latte

r metho

d is unpersuasive, for th

e prem

ises

are no

t accepted, nor have th

ey been introd

uced. T

he former m

etho

d is problem

atic, too: if the orator has to

introd

uce the

needed premises by another dedu

ction, and

the prem

ises of this pre-deductio

n too, etc., one will end up with

a lo

ng chain of

dedu

ctions. A

rgum

ents with

several deductive steps are common

in dialectical practice, but one canno

t expect the audience

of a pub

lic speech to follow such long argum

ents. This is why

Aristotle says that th

e enthym

eme is and should be from

fewer premises.

Supplement o

n The Brevity of the Enthy

mem

e

6.5 Different Types of Enthymemes

Just as there is a difference between real and

apparent o

r fallaciou

s dedu

ctions in

dialectic, w

e have to

distin

guish betw

een

real and

apparent o

r fallaciou

s enthym

emes in

rhetoric. The to

poi for real enthy

mem

es are given in

chapter II.23, for

fallaciou

s enthym

emes in

chapter II.24

. The fallaciou

s enthym

eme pretends to

includ

e a valid deductio

n, while it actually

rests on

a fallaciou

s inference.

Further, Aristotle distin

guishes between enthym

emes ta

ken from

probable (eikos) premises and enthymem

es taken from

signs (sêmeia). (Rhet. I.2, 135

7a32

–33). In a different context, he says th

at enthy

mem

es are based on probabilities,

exam

ples, tekmêria (i.e., proofs, evidences), and

signs (Rhet. II.25, 140

2b12

–14). S

ince th

e so-called tekmêria are a

subclass of signs and the exam

ples are used to establish general p

remises, this is only an extension of the form

erclassific

ation. (Note that neither classification interferes with

the id

ea th

at premises have to be accepted opinion

s: with

respect to the signs, th

e audience m

ust believe that they exist a

nd accept that they in

dicate th

e existence of som

ething else,

and with

respect to

the probabilities, people must a

ccept that som

ething is likely to

happen.) How

ever, it is no

t clear

whether th

is is m

eant to be an exhaustive typology. T

hat most o

f the rhetorical argum

ents are ta

ken from

probable prem

ises

(“Fo

r the most p

art it is true th

at …

” “It is likely that …

”) is due to

the typical sub

jects of pub

lic speech, which are rarely

necessary. W

hen using a sign-argum

ent o

r sign-enthy

mem

e we do

not try to exp

lain a given fact; we just in

dicate th

at

something exists or is th

e case: “…

any

thing such th

at when it is ano

ther th

ing is, o

r when it has come into being, the other

has come into being before or after, is a sign of th

e other's being or having com

e into being.” (Prior Analytics II.27,

70a7ff.). B

ut th

ere are several typ

es of sign-argum

ents to

o; Aristotle offers the following exam

ples:

Rhetoric I.2

Prior Analytics II.27

(i)Wise men are ju

st, since Socrates is ju

st.

Wise men are goo

d, since Pittacus is



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good

.

(ii)

He is ill, since he has fever./ Sh

e has given birth, since she has

milk.

This wom

an has a child, since she has

milk.

(iii)

This man has fever, since he breathes rapidly.

She is pregnant, since she is pale.

Sign-argum

ents of type (i) and

(iii) can always be refuted, even if th

e prem

ises are true; th

at is to

say th

at they do not

includ

e a valid deductio

n (sullogismos); A

ristotle calls th

em asullogistos (non

-deductive). S

ign-arguments of type (ii) can

never be refuted if th

e prem

ise is true, since, for example, it is not possible that som

eone has fever with

out b

eing ill, or th

atsomeone has m

ilk with

out h

aving given birth, etc. T

his latte

r type of sign-enthy

mem

es is necessary and is also called

tekmêrion (proof, evidence). N

ow, if some sign-enthy

mem

es are valid deductio

ns and

som

e are not, it is te

mpting to ask

whether Aristotle regarded the no

n-necessary sign-enthy

mem

es as apparent or fallacious arguments. H

owever, there seems

to be a more attractive reading: W

e accept a fallaciou

s argument o

nly if we are deceived about its logical form. But we

could regard, for example, th

e inference “She is pregnant, since she is pale” as a good and

inform

ative argument, even if we

know

that it does no

t include a lo

gically necessary in

ference. So it seem

s as if Aristotle didn't regard all n

on-necessary

sign-argum

ents as fallaciou

s or deceptive; but even if this is true, it is difficult for Aristotle to

determine the sense in which

non-necessary sign-enthy

mem

es are valid argum

ents, since he is bou

nd to

the alternative of deductio

n and indu

ction, and

neith

er class seems approp

riate for no

n-necessary sign-argum

ents.

7. The Topoi

Generally speaking, an Aristotelian topos (‘place’, ‘locatio

n’) is an argumentative scheme that enables a dialectician or

rhetorician to con

strue an argum

ent for a given conclusion

. The use of so-called topoi or ‘loci communes’ can be traced

back to

early rhetoricians such as Protagoras, Gorgias (cp. C

icero, Brutus, 46–

48) and Isocrates. But while in

earlier

rhetoric a to

pos was understoo

d as a com

plete patte

rn or form

ula that can be mentioned at a certain stage of the speech to

prod

uce a certain effect, m

ost of th

e Aristotelian topoi are general instructio

ns saying that a conclusion of a certain form

can be derived from premises of a certain form

; and

because of this ‘form

al’ or ‘semi-form

al’ character of Aristotelian

topoi, one to

pos can be used to con

strue several d

ifferent argum

ents. A

ristotle's book

Topics lists som

e hundred topoi for

the constructio

n of dialectical argum

ents. T

hese lists of to

poi form

the core of the m

ethod by

which the dialectician shou

ldbe able to formulate dedu

ctions on any prob

lem th

at cou

ld be prop

osed. M

ost o

f the instructions th

at the Rhetoric gives for

the compositio

n of enthymem

es are also organized as lists of to

poi; especially the first book of th

e Rhetoric essentially

consists of topoi concerning th

e subjects of the three species of pub

lic speech.



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7.1 The Definition of ‘Topos’

It is striking that th

e work that is alm

ost e

xclusively dedicated to

the collection of to

poi, th

e bo

ok Topics, does not e

ven

make an atte

mpt to define th

e concept o

f topos. At a

ny rate the Rhetoric gives a sort o

f defining characterization: “I call the

same thing elem

ent a

nd topos; for an elem

ent o

r a topos is a heading und

er which m

any enthym

emes fall.” (Rhet.

1403

a18–

19) By ‘element’ Aristotle does no

t mean a prop

er part o

f the enthym

eme, but a general form under which m

any

concrete enthy

mem

es of the same type can be subsum

ed. A

ccording to

this definition, the to

pos is a general argum

entative

form

or patte

rn, a

nd th

e concrete argum

ents are in

stantiatio

ns of the general topos. That the to

pos is a general in

struction

from

which several argum

ents can be derived, is crucial for Aristotle's un

derstand

ing of an artful m

ethod of argum

entatio

n;for a teacher of rhetoric who m

akes his pup

ils learn ready samples of arguments wou

ld not im

part th

e art itself to th

em, b

uton

ly th

e prod

ucts of this art, just as if som

eone pretend

ing to teach the art of sho

e-making on

ly gave samples of already

made shoes to his pup

ils (see Sophistical Refutations 18

3b36

ff.).

7.2 The Word ‘Topos’ and the Technique of Places

The w

ord ‘topos’ (place, lo

catio

n) m

ost p

robably is derived from an ancient metho

d of m

emorizing a great n

umber of item

son

a list by associating them

with

successive places, say the hou

ses alon

g a street, o

ne is acquainted with

. By recalling the

houses along th

e street we can also rem

ember the associated item

s. Full d

escriptio

ns of this te

chnique can be found in

Cicero, De O

ratore II 86

–88, 351

–360

, Auctor ad Herennium III 16–

24, 2

9–40

and

in Quintilian, Institutio XI 2, 11–33). In

Topics 16

3b28

–32, Aristotle seems to allude to

this techn

ique: “For ju

st as in th

e art o

f remem

bering, the m

ere mentio

n of

the places in

stantly

makes us recall the things, so these will m

ake us m

ore apt a

t deductio

ns throu

gh lo

oking to th

ese defin

edprem

ises in

order of enum

eration.” Aristotle also alludes to th

is te

chniqu

e in On the soul 427b

18–20, On M

emory

452a12

–16, and On Dreams 45

8b20

–22.

But th

ough th

e name ‘topos’ m

ay be derived from

this m

nemotechn

ical con

text, A

ristotle's use of topoi does not rely on th

etechniqu

e of places. At least w

ithin the system of the bo

ok Topics, every given problem

must b

e analyzed in

term

s of som

eform

al criteria: Does the predicate of th

e sentence in

question ascribe a genu

s or a definition or peculiar or accidental

prop

erties to th

e subject? Does the sentence exp

ress a sort o

f op

positio

n, eith

er con

tradictio

n or contrariety, e

tc.? Does the

sentence exp

ress th

at som

ething is m

ore or less th

e case? Does it maintain identity or diversity? Are the words used

linguistically derived from words th

at are part o

f an accepted prem

ise? Depending on such formal criteria of th

e analyzed

sentence one has to

refer to

a fitting topos. For th

is reason, th

e succession

of topoi in th

e book

Topics is organized in

accordance with

their salient formal criteria; and

this, a

gain, makes a further m

nemotechnique superflu

ous. M

ore or less the

same is true of th

e Rhetoric—except th

at m

ost o

f its topoi are structured by material and not by form

al criteria, as we shall



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see in sectio

n 7.4. Besides all this, there is at least one passage in

which th

e use of th

e word ‘topos’ can be explained

with

out referring to

the previously m

entio

ned mnemotechn

ique: In Topics VIII.1, 155

b4–5 Aristotle says: “we must find the

locatio

n (topos) from which to

atta

ck”, where th

e word ‘topos’ is obviously used to m

ean a startin

g point for atta

cking the

theses of the op

ponents.

7.3 The Elements of a Topos

A typ

ical Aristotelian topos runs as follows: “Again, if the accident of a thing has a contrary, see whether it belongs to

the

subject to which th

e accident in

question has been declared to belon

g: for if the latte

r belongs, the former cou

ld not belong;

for it is im

possible th

at con

trary predicates sho

uld belong at the sam

e tim

e to th

e same thing.” (Topics 113a20

–24). Like

most topoi, it in

cludes (i) a sort o

f general instructio

n (“see, whether …

”); further it m

entio

ns (ii) an argumentative

scheme—

in th

e given exam

ple, th

e scheme ‘if the accidental predicate p belon

gs to

the subject s, then the op

posed P*

cann

ot belon

g to s to

o’. F

inally, the to

pos refers to

(iii) a general rule or principle (“for it is im

possible, …

”) w

hich ju

stifies

the given scheme. O

ther to

poi often includ

e the discussion

of (iv) examples; still o

ther topoi suggest (v) how

to apply th

egiven schemes.—

Tho

ugh these are elem

ents th

at regularly occur in

Aristotelian topoi, there is nothing like a standard form

with

which all topoi comply. Often Aristotle is very brief and leaves it to

the reader to

add th

e missing elements.

7.4 The Function of a Topos

In a nutshell, the functio

n of a to

pos can be exp

lained as follows. First of all, on

e has to select an apt topos for a given

conclusion

. The con

clusion is eith

er a th

esis of ou

r op

ponent th

at w

e want to refute, o

r our ow

n assertion we want to

establish or defend. Accordingly, there are tw

o uses of topoi: they can eith

er prove or disprove a given sentence; som

e can

be used for both purposes, others for on

ly one of them

. Most topoi are selected by certain form

al features of th

e given

conclusion

; if, for example, th

e conclusion

maintains a definition

, we have to

select our topos from

a list of topoi pertaining

to definition

s, etc. W

hen it comes to

the so-called ‘m

aterial’ to

poi of the Rhetoric, the appropriate to

pos must b

e selected

not b

y form

al criteria, but in

accordance with

the con

tent of the conclusion

—whether, for example, som

ething is said to be

useful or ho

norable or ju

st, e

tc. O

nce we have selected a topos that is appropriate for a given conclusion, th

e topos can be

used to

con

strue a prem

ise from

which th

e given conclusion

can be derived. If for exam

ple the argumentative scheme is ‘If

a predicate is generally true of a genu

s, th

en the predicate is also true of any species of that g

enus’, we can derive th

econclusion

‘the capacity of nu

trition belon

gs to plants’ using the prem

ise ‘the capacity

of nutrition belongs to

all living

things’, since ‘living thing’ is th

e genu

s of th

e species ‘plants’. If the construed prem

ise is accepted, eith

er by the oppo

nent

in a dialectical debate or by the audience in

pub

lic speech, we can draw

the in

tend

ed conclusion.



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It has been disputed whether th

e topos (or, m

ore precisely, th

e ‘if …, then …’ scheme that is in

cluded in

a to

pos) th

at we

use to con

strue an argum

ent m

ust itself be regarded as a further premise of th

e argument. It could be either, a

s some say,

the prem

ise of a propo

sitio

nal schem

e such as the mod

us pon

ens, or, as others assum

e, as the conditional premise of a

hypothetical syllogism

. Aristotle him

self do

es not favor one of these interpretatio

ns explicitly. But even if he regarded the

topoi as add

itional premises in

a dialectical or rhetorical argum

ent, it is beyon

d any doubt that h

e did not u

se th

em as

prem

ises th

at m

ust b

e explicitly mentio

ned or even approved by the op

ponent or audience.

Supplement o

n the Topoi of th

e Rhetoric

8. Style: How to Say Things with Words

Rhet. III.1–12 introduces th

e topic of lexis, u

sually translated as ‘style’. This topic was not ann

ounced until the fin

al passage

of Rhet. II, so that m

ost scholars have com

e to th

ink of th

is sectio

n as a m

ore or less self-contained treatise. The in

sertion of

this treatise into th

e Rhetoric is m

otivated by the claim th

at, w

hile Rhet. I &

II dealt w

ith th

ought (dianoia), i.e., about w

hat

the orator sho

uld say, it rem

ains to

inqu

ire into th

e variou

s ways of saying or formulating one and the same thing. In the

course of Rhet. III.1–1

2 it turns ou

t that A

ristotle tackles th

is ta

sk by using some qu

ite heterogeneous approaches. After an

initial exp

loratio

n of th

e fie

ld of delivery and style (III.1) Aristotle tries to determine what g

ood prose style consists in; for

this purpo

se he has to go into the differentiatio

n and the selection of various kinds of nouns, one of which is defined as

metapho

r (III.2). The following chapters III.3–6 feature to

pics th

at are at b

est loo

sely con

nected w

ith th

e them

e of good

prose style; amon

g these topics is th

e op

posite of good

style, n

amely frigid or deterring style (psuchron) (III.3), th

e simile,

which tu

rns ou

t to be con

nected with

the metapho

r (III.4), th

e issue of correct Greek (III.5), the appropriateness (III.7) and

the means by which one's style becomes lo

ng-w

inded and dignified (III.6). Chapters III.8–9 introduce tw

o new approaches

to th

e issue of style, w

hich seem to

be un

related to everything that has been said so far: These are th

e topics of the

rhythm

ical shaping of prose style and of periodic and no

n-period

ic flow of speech. C

hapters III.10

–11 are dedicated to how

the orator can ‘bring things before on

e's eyes’, w

hich amou

nts to som

ething like m

aking the style more vivid. Again

metapho

rs are sho

wn to play a crucial role for that purpo

se, so th

at the to

pic of m

etaphor is ta

ken up

again and

deepened

by extended lists of exam

ples. C

hapter III.12 seem

s to m

ake a new start by distinguishing between oral and writte

n style

and assessing their suitability for the three genres of speech (see above §2

). The philosophical core of Aristotle's treatise on

style in Rhet. III.1–12 seems to be includ

ed in

the discussion

of the good

prose style (see below §8.1), h

owever it is th

etopic of m

etapho

r (see below

§8.2) th

at has attracted th

e most attention in th

e later reception up to the present d

ay.

8.1 The Virtue of Style



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Originally the discussion of style belon

gs to

the art of poetry rather than to

rhetoric; the poets were the first, a

s Aristotle

observes, to give an im

pulse for the stud

y of style. N

evertheless he adm

its th

at questions of style or, m

ore precisely, of

different w

ays to formulate the same subject, may have an im

pact on the degree of clarity

: “What c

oncerns the topic of

lexis, how

ever, has some sm

all n

ecessary place in

all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another m

akes som

edifference in

regard to clarity; a

lthou

gh not a great difference…

” (Rhet. III.1, 14

04a8–10). C

larity again m

atters for

comprehension

and com

prehensibility contribu

tes to persuasiveness. Ind

eed Aristotle even claims that th

e virtue or

excellence (aretê) of prose style ultimately depend

s on

clarity, b

ecause it is th

e genu

ine pu

rpose of a speech is to

make

something clear. In prose speeches, the goo

d form

ulation of a state of affairs must therefore be a clear one. How

ever,

saying this is not yet enough to accou

nt for th

e best or excellent prose style, since clear linguistic exp

ressions tend to be

banal o

r fla

t, while goo

d style shou

ld avoid such banality. If the language becom

es to

o banal it w

ill not be able to attract the

attention of th

e audience. The orator can avoid this te

ndency of banality by th

e use of dignifie

d or elevated expressions and

in general by all formulations th

at deviate from com

mon

usage. O

n the on

e hand

, uncom

mon

vocabulary has the advantage

of evoking th

e curiosity

of an aud

ience. On the other hand

the use of such elevated vocabulary bears a seriou

s risk:

Whenever the orator m

akes excessive use of it, th

e speech m

ight becom

e un

clear, th

us failing to m

eet the default

requ

irem

ent o

f prose speech, n

amely clarity

. Moreover, if th

e vocabulary becom

es to

o sublim

e or dignifie

d in relation to

prose's subject m

atter (A

ristotle assum

es it is m

ostly

everyday affairs), the audience will notice that th

e orator uses his

words with

a certain in

tention and will becom

e suspicious about the orator and his intentions. H

itting upon th

e right w

ording

is th

erefore a matter of being clear, b

ut not to

o banal; In trying not to

be too banal, one must u

se uncom

mon, d

ignified

words and

phrases, b

ut one m

ust b

e careful n

ot to

use th

em excessively or inapprop

riately in relation to prose style and the

typical sub

ject m

atter of prose speeches.

Bringing all these con

sideratio

ns to

gether Aristotle defines th

e good

prose style, i.e. the virtue of prose style, a

s follows: “Let

the virtue of linguistic form be defin

ed as being clear, for since th

e logos is a (linguistic, sc.) sign, it w

ould fail to bring about

its proper functio

n, w

henever it do

es not m

ake clear (w

hatever it is th

e sign of, sc.)—

and neith

er banal/m

ean/fla

t (tapeinên)

nor above the deserved dignity, but a

ppropriate (prepon).” (Rhet. III.2, 1

404b

1–4; sim

ilar at III.12, 141

4a22

–26) According

to th

is definition, the virtue of prose style has to

avoid tw

o op

posed tend

encies, b

oth of which are excessive and

therefore

fallaciou

s: The goo

d style is clear in

a way th

at is neither to

o banal n

or to

o dignified, b

ut appropriate (in propo

rtion to th

esubject matter of prose speech). In this respect th

e definition of stylistic virtue follows the same scheme as th

e defin

ition of

ethical virtues in

Aristotle's ethical w

ritin

gs, insofar as both th

e stylistic virtue and the virtue of character are defin

ed in

terms

of a m

ean that lies between tw

o op

posed excesses. If the virtue of style is defined as a mean betw

een the banality involving

form

of clarity

and

overly dignified (and

hence in

approp

riate) speech, it is with

goo

d reason that A

ristotle speaks of only

one virtue of prose style, and not of clarity

, ornam

ent (by dignified exp

ressions) and approp

riateness as th

ree distinct virtues

of style. H

owever, from

the tim

es of Cicero and Quintilianus on, th

ese three, along with

the correctness of Greek or Latin,



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became the cano

nical fou

r virtues of speech (virtutes dicendi). R

eading Aristotle th

rough the spectacles of the Rom

an art of

rhetoric, scholars often try to id

entify tw

o, th

ree or fou

r virtues of style in

his Rhetoric.

Finally, if the virtue of style is about finding a balance between banal clarity, w

hich is dull, and attractive dignity

, which is

inapprop

riate in public speeches, how

can the orator manage to con

trol th

e different degrees of clarity and dignity? Fo

r this

purpose Aristotle equ

ips the orator with

a classificatio

n of words (more or less th

e same classificatio

n can also be found in

Poetics chapter 21

): First of all A

ristotle distin

guishes between the kuria onamata, the standard expressions, and

the glôtta,

the borrow

ed words, idiom

s or vernacular expression

s. M

ost e

xamples that A

ristotle gives of this latte

r class are taken from

the different G

reek dialects, and m

ost e

xamples of this ty

pe are in

turn ta

ken from

the language of the Hom

eric epos.

Further classes are defin

ed by metapho

rs and

by several exp

ressions that a

re som

ehow

altered or m

odified, e

.g., new

lycoined expressions (pepoiêmena), com

posite exp

ressions (especially new

or un

usual com

positio

ns (ta dipla)), a

ndlengthened, shortened or otherwise altered expression

s. Som

etim

es Aristotle also uses th

e term

kosm

os under which he

collects all epithets and otherw

ise ornamental exp

ressions. T

hese different typ

es of words differ in accordance with

their

familiarity

. Most fam

iliar are th

e usual o

r current w

ords, the least fam

iliar words are th

e glôtta or words th

at are new

lycoined. T

he m

etapho

rs are also un

know

n and un

usual, because a usual, well-kn

own word is used to designate som

ething

other than its usual d

esignatio

n (see below

§8.2). T

he best e

stablished words, the kuria, m

ake their subject c

lear, b

ut do not

excite th

e audience's curiosity

, whereas all other types of w

ords are not established, and hence have the sort of attractio

nthat alien or foreign th

ings used to have. Since rem

ote things are adm

irable (thaumaston) and the admirable is pleasant,

Aristotle says, one sho

uld make the speech adm

irable and

pleasant by th

e use of such unfamiliar words. H

owever one has

to be careful n

ot to

use in

appropriately dignified or poetic words in

prose speech. Thu

s the virtue of style is accom

plished

by th

e selection and balanced use of these variou

s types of words: F

undamental for prose speech is th

e use of usual and

therefore clear words. In order to m

ake the speech pleasant a

nd dignified and

in order to

avoid banality

the orator m

ust

make mod

erate use of non

-fam

iliar elements. M

etapho

r plays an im

portant role for prose style, since m

etapho

rs contribute,

as Aristotle says, clarity as well as the un

familiar, surprising effect th

at avoids banality and tediousness.

8.2 Aristotelian Metaphors

According to

Aristotle Poetics 21

, 145

7b9–

16 and

20–

22, a

metapho

r is “the application of an alien name by transference

either from genus to

species, o

r from

species to

genus, o

r from

species to

species, or by analogy, th

at is, p

roportion”. T

hese

four ty

pes are exem

plified as follows:

Type

Example

Explanation



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(i)From

genus to

species

There lies m

y ship

Lying at a

ncho

r is a species of the genus “lying”

(ii)

From

species to

genu

sVerily te

n thou

sand

nob

le deeds

hath Odysseus wrought

Ten th

ousand

is a species of the genu

s “large num

ber”

(iii)

From

species to

species

(a) With

blade of bron

ze drew

away th

e life

(a) “T

o draw

away” is used for “to cleave”

(b) Cleft th

e water w

ith th

e vessel

of uny

ielding bron

ze(b) “T

o cleave” is used for “to draw

away.” Both, to

draw

away and

to cleave, are species of “taking aw

ay”

(iv)

From

analogy

(a) To call the cup “the shield of

Dionysus”

(a) The cup

is to

Diony

sus as th

e shield to Ares

(b) To call the shield “the cup of

Ares”

(b) The shield is to

Ares as th

e cup to Dionysus

Most o

f the exam

ples Aristotle offers for types (i) to (iii) wou

ld not be regarded as metapho

rs in

the modern sense; rather

they wou

ld fall u

nder the headings of m

eton

omy or syn

ecdo

che. The examples offered for ty

pe (iv) are more like modern

metapho

rs. A

ristotle him

self regards the metapho

rs of grou

p (iv), w

hich are built from

analogy, a

s the most important type

of enthy

mem

es. A

n analogy is given if th

e second

term

is to

the first as the fourth to the third. Correspondingly, a

nanalogou

s metapho

r uses th

e fourth te

rm for th

e second

or the second

for th

e fourth. T

his principle can be illustrated by th

efollowing Aristotelian exam

ples:

Analogy

Metaphor

(a)The cup

to Diony

sus as shield to Ares.

To call the cup “the shield of D

ionysus” or

the shield “the cup of Ares” is a m

etaphor.

(b)Old age to

life as the evening to day

To call old age “the evening of the life” or

the evening “old age of the day” is a

metaphor

(c)So

wing to seed as X to

sun

rays, w

hile th

e actio

n of th

e sun in scattering

his rays is nam

eless; still this process bears to th

e sun the same relatio

n as

sowing to th

e seed.

To call (a nam

eless) X “sowing of sun

rays” is a m

etapho

r by analogy



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(d)= (a)

To call the shield “a cup with

out w

ine” is

also a m

etaphor by analogy.

Examples (a) and

(b) obey the op

tional instructio

n that m

etapho

rs can be qu

alified by adding th

e term

to which th

e proper

word is relative (cp. “the shield of Ares,” “the evening of life”). In example (c), th

ere is no proper nam

e for the thing that

the metaphor refers to

. In exam

ple (d) the relatio

n of analogy is not, a

s in th

e other cases, in

dicated by th

e do

main to which

an item

is referred to, b

ut by a certain negatio

n (for example “w

ithou

t nam

e”); th

e negatio

ns m

ake clear that th

e term

is not

used in

its usual sense.

Metapho

rs are closely related to

sim

iles; but as op

posed to th

e later tradition

, Aristotle does no

t define the metaphor as an

abbreviated simile, b

ut, the other way aroun

d, th

e simile as a metapho

r. The sim

ile differs from th

e metaphor in th

e form

of

expression

: while in

the metaphor something is id

entified or sub

stitu

ted, th

e simile com

pares tw

o things with

each other,

using words as “like,” “as”, etc. For example, “He rushed as a lion” is, a

ccording to

Aristotle, a

sim

ile, b

ut “The lion

rushed” is a m

etapho

r.

While in

the later tradition

the use of m

etapho

rs has been seen as a matter of m

ere decoratio

n, which has to

delight th

ehearer, A

ristotle stresses the cognitive fun

ction of m

etapho

rs. Metapho

rs, h

e says, b

ring about learning (Rhet. III.10,

1410

b14f.). In order to und

erstand a metapho

r, th

e hearer has to

find something com

mon between the metaphor and the

thing the metapho

r refers to

. For example, if som

eone calls th

e old age “stubb

le”, we have to fin

d a common genus to

which old age and

stubble belong; w

e do

not grasp th

e very sense of the metapho

r until we find th

at both, old age and

stub

ble, have lost th

eir bloo

m. Thu

s, a m

etapho

r no

t only refers to

a th

ing, but sim

ultaneously describes the thing in a

certain respect. This is why

Aristotle says that th

e metapho

r brings abo

ut learning: as soon as we understand why som

eone

uses th

e metapho

r “stubble” to refer to

old age, w

e have learned at least o

ne characteristic of old age.

Glossary of Selected Terms

Accepted op

inions: endoxa

Argum

ent: logos

Art: technê

Character: êthos

Cou

nterpart: a

ntistrophos

Credible: axiopistos

Decision (practical): prohairesis



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Deductio

n: sullogismos

Emotions: pathê

Enthy

mem

e: enthumêma

Example: paradeigma

For the most part: hôs epi to polu

Indu

ction (epagôgê)

Judgem

ent: krisis

Location: to

pos (an argumentative scheme)

Maxim

: gnômê

Means of persuasion

: pistis (in pre-Aristotelian use this word also designates a certain part of the speech)

Metapho

r: metaphora

Persuasive: pithanon

Place: topos (an argumentative scheme)

Practical in

telligence: phronêsis

Premise: protasis (can also mean ‘sentence’, statem

ent’)

Probable: eikos

Proof: a

podeixis (in th

e sense of ‘demon

strative argument, demon

stratio

n’)

Proof: tekmêrion (i.e. a

necessary sign or sign argument)

Sign: sêmeion (can also m

ean ‘sign argument’)

Style: lexis

Specific topoi: idioi topoi (A

ristotle refers to th

em also by ‘idiai protaseis’ or ‘eidê’)

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