freedom in the world 2017 · freedom in the world 2017 could not have been completed without the...

Freedom in the World2017

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The findings of Freedom in the World 2017 include eventsFrom January 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016

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Freedom in the World 2017The Annual Survey of

Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Arch PuddingtonGeneral Editor

Jennifer DunhamManaging Editor

Elen Aghekyan, Shannon O’Toole, Tyler Roylance, Sarah RepucciAssociate Editors

Freedom House • New York, NY and Washington, DC

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Oxford

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Published by Rowman & LittlefieldA wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706www.rowman.com

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Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global DemocracyArch Puddington and Tyler Roylance 1

Introduction 9

Country Reports 11

Related and Disputed Territory Reports 609

Survey Methodology 651

Tables and Ratings 665Table of Independent Countries 665Table of Territories 672Combined Average Ratings: Independent Countries 673Combined Average Ratings: Territories 674Electoral Democracies 675

Contributors 677

Selected Sources 695

Freedom House Board of Trustees 699

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Acknowledgments

Freedom in the World 2017 could not have been completed without the contributionsof numerous Freedom House staff members and consultants. The section titled “The SurveyTeam” contains a detailed list of the writers and advisers without whose efforts this projectwould not have been possible.

Sarah Repucci served as the project director for this year’s survey and Jennifer Dunhamserved as director of research. Elen Aghekyan, Bret Nelson, Shannon O’Toole, and TylerRoylance provided extensive research, analytical, editorial, and administrative assistance.Joshua Adamson, Valentina Duhanaj, Jacqueline Laks Gorman, Anne Kosseff-Jones, M.L.Liu, Janet Olson, Jake Palmer, Peter Schmidtke, Amy Slipowitz, and Matthew Thomasserved as additional country report editors. Rebeka Foley, Marian Jones, Sara Rosales, andAliyah Salim provided additional support. Overall guidance for the project was providedby Daniel Calingaert, acting president of Freedom House, Arch Puddington, distinguishedfellow for democracy studies, and Vanessa Tucker, vice president for analysis. A numberof Freedom House staff offered valuable additional input on the country reports and/orratings process.

Freedom House would like to acknowledge the generous financial support for Freedomin the World by the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Lilly Endowment, the Schloss FamilyFoundation, and Kim G. Davis. Freedom House also gratefully acknowledges the contribu-tions of the 21st Century ILGWU Heritage Fund, the Reed Foundation, and other privatecontributors. Freedom House is solely responsible for the report’s content.

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Populists and AutocratsThe Dual Threat to Global Democracy

Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance

In 2016, populist and nationalist political forces made astonishing gains in democraticstates, while authoritarian powers engaged in brazen acts of aggression, and grave atrocitieswent unanswered in war zones across two continents.

All of these developments point to a growing danger that the international order of thepast quarter-century—rooted in the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule oflaw—will give way to a world in which individual leaders and nations pursue their ownnarrow interests without meaningful constraints, and without regard for the shared benefitsof global peace, freedom, and prosperity.

The troubling impression created by the year’s headline events is supported by thelatest findings of Freedom in the World. A total of 67 countries suffered net declines inpolitical rights and civil liberties in 2016, compared with 36 that registered gains. Thismarked the 11th consecutive year in which declines outnumbered improvements.

While in past years the declines in freedom were generally concentrated among autocra-cies and dictatorships that simply went from bad to worse, in 2016 it was establisheddemocracies—countries rated Free in the report’s ranking system—that dominated the listof countries suffering setbacks. In fact, Free countries accounted for a larger share of thecountries with declines than at any time in the past decade, and nearly one-quarter of thecountries registering declines in 2016 were in Europe.

As the year drew to a conclusion, the major democracies were mired in anxiety andindecision after a series of destabilizing events. In the United States, the presidential victoryof Donald Trump, a mercurial figure with unconventional views on foreign policy and othermatters, raised questions about the country’s future role in the world. Britain’s vote to leavethe European Union, the collapse of the Italian government after a failed referendum onconstitutional reform, a series of antidemocratic moves by the new government in Poland,and gains by xenophobic nationalist parties elsewhere in Europe similarly cast doubt on thestrength of the alliances that shaped the institutions of global democracy.

At the same time, Russia, in stunning displays of hubris and hostility, interfered in thepolitical processes of the United States and other democracies, escalated its military supportfor the Assad dictatorship in Syria, and solidified its illegal occupation of Ukrainian terri-tory. China also flouted international law, ignoring a tribunal’s ruling against its expansiveclaims of sovereignty over the South China Sea and intensifying its repression of dissentwithin its borders. And unscrupulous leaders from South Sudan and Ethiopia to Thailandand the Philippines engaged in human rights violations of varying scale with impunity.

In the wake of last year’s developments, it is no longer possible to speak with confi-dence about the long-term durability of the EU; the incorporation of democracy and humanrights priorities into American foreign policy; the resilience of democratic institutions inCentral Europe, Brazil, or South Africa; or even the expectation that actions like the assault

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2 Freedom in the World 2017

on Myanmar’s Rohingya minority or indiscriminate bombing in Yemen will draw interna-tional criticism from democratic governments and UN human rights bodies. No suchassumption, it seems, is entirely safe.

SYRIA’S IMPACT ON DEMOCRACIES

While the democratic world stood aside throughout the year, a coalition of repressivedictatorships bombed and shelled Aleppo and other Syrian cities where opponents of Presi-dent Bashar al-Assad had gained footholds. Assad, with crucial assistance from Russia,Iran, and a multinational array of Iranian-backed Shiite militias, clearly regained the initia-tive in the five-year civil war, whose grinding violence has killed hundreds of thousands ofpeople and displaced millions more. A U.S.-led coalition pounded the Islamic State (IS)militant group in the east, but left the pro-Assad alliance undisturbed as it focused itsmilitary might on non-IS rebels and civilians.

Since the war began, each new horror has appeared to deter rather than motivate acoordinated international response. The conflict has only grown more complex and intracta-ble, however, and democratic governments continue to reap the consequences of theirhesitation.

The enormous refugee flows and IS-inspired terrorism generated by the Syrian conflicthave played an important role in the weakening of democratic standards in Europe and theUnited States. Arrivals of asylum seekers in Europe declined in 2016, largely due to thehardening of borders in the Balkans and an agreement between the EU and Turkey in whichAnkara pledged to block irregular departures. But the drop in numbers failed to stem anti-refugee rhetoric, as European political leaders routinely smeared those fleeing conflict zonesas criminals, rapists, and terrorists.

Moreover, the agreement with Turkey—an already dubious haven for refugees givenits raging Kurdish insurgency and regular terrorist attacks—became a deeper source ofembarrassment after Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan embraced an unvarnishedform of authoritarianism in response to a failed coup attempt in July. Having put down thecoup, the government imposed emergency rule that resulted in the arrest of nearly 40,000civilians, the imprisonment of dozens of journalists for their work, the shuttering of hun-dreds of media outlets and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the arrest of the leadersand hundreds of officials from the third-largest party in the parliament, and the firing ofmore than a hundred thousand civil servants.

Terrorism continued to fuel political upheaval in Europe and the United States despitemajor territorial losses suffered by IS and other extremist groups such as Boko Haram.France, Belgium, and Germany endured high-profile terrorist attacks, an IS-inspired massshooting struck the U.S. state of Florida, and smaller assaults elsewhere in Europe werefoiled or interrupted by the authorities.

Several European governments reacted by adopting laws that gave enhanced powers tosecurity forces and eased constraints on surveillance. More ominously, persistent fears overthe upsurge in terrorist attacks stoked public hostility toward Muslim minorities and immi-grants, deepening existing social rifts and threatening civil liberties. During the Americanpresidential campaign, Donald Trump at various times promised to prevent all Muslimsfrom entering the United States, deport Syrians already in the country, and carry out“extreme vetting” of the beliefs of refugees and immigrants.

RADICALIZING AUTHORITARIAN STATES

The conflicts in the Middle East and political upheavals in the democracies oftendeflected the world’s attention from worsening domestic repression in China, Russia, and

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Populists and Autocrats 3

other authoritarian countries, which stand to gain from a breakdown in democratic normsat the international level. In fact, both Beijing and Moscow stepped up efforts to reshapethe world in their own image.

In China, the Communist Party regime led by President Xi Jinping tightened its gripwith the adoption of new laws and regulations on cybersecurity, foreign nonprofits, andreligious affairs. Heavy sentences handed down to human rights lawyers, microbloggers,grassroots activists, and religious believers dealt an additional blow to those seeking toimprove conditions in the country.

As Xi consolidated his personal power, moving rapidly away from the existing pattern ofcollective leadership within the party elite, he sought to enforce greater ideological disciplinethrough a propaganda campaign that forbade intraparty dissent and relentlessly criticized“Western” democratic values. The regime also advanced plans to introduce a “social credit”system that would connect each citizen’s financial, social, political, and legal data to producea single numerical rating of his or her behavior and trustworthiness. A misstep in one areawould presumably have repercussions in every other aspect of an individual’s life.

Beijing’s growing intolerance for individual autonomy at home was mirrored by itsintrusions into the affairs of neighboring societies. The leadership issued an unprecedentedruling on Hong Kong’s Basic Law with the aim of preventing pro-independence and pro-democracy politicians from taking their seats in the self-governing territory’s legislature.The Chinese government similarly adopted a hostile attitude toward Taiwan after the localopposition party, which opposes unification with China, swept to victory in presidential andparliamentary elections. And Beijing has intensified its pressure on governments in theregion to return those who have fled China to escape persecution, especially members ofthe Uighur Muslim minority.

Russia followed a comparable pattern, combining domestic repression with an ambi-tious program of regional intimidation and long-distance political sabotage. The regimeof President Vladimir Putin stage-managed Russia’s parliamentary and regional elections,leading to record low turnout and the total extinction of liberal opposition in the legislature.The Kremlin also added to its blacklists of “extremist” websites and NGOs that it considers“foreign agents” or “undesirable.”

Outside its borders, Russia radically accelerated its indiscriminate bombing campaignagainst population centers held by anti-Assad rebels in Syria, contributing little to the fightagainst IS elsewhere in the country. Moscow also deepened its interference in elections inestablished democracies through a strategy that combined support for populist and national-ist parties, theft and publication of the internal documents of mainstream parties and candi-dates, and the aggressive dissemination of fake news and propaganda. Russia’s efforts toinfluence the Italian constitutional referendum and the presidential election in the UnitedStates represented a major leap forward in Putin’s bid to undermine the integrity and evenchange the outcome of democratic processes.

THE AMERICAN ELECTION

The success of Donald Trump, an outsider candidate who challenged the mainstreamforces of both major parties, demonstrated the continued openness and dynamism of theAmerican system. It also demonstrated that the United States is not immune to the kind ofpopulist appeals that have resonated across the Atlantic in recent years. The campaign fea-tured a series of disturbing events, stemming mainly from Trump’s own remarks and theactions of his supporters, and punctuated by Trump’s insistence, without evidence and evenafter he won, that the election results were marred by massive fraud.

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Trump’s statements and actions during the postelection transition period suggested thathe had abandoned or softened a number of his more contentious campaign promises, includingmass deportations of immigrants, lowering the legal bar for libel suits, and the prosecution ofhis Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton—something he had frequently vowed to pursueduring the campaign. At the same time, Trump did not immediately make clear the guidingprinciples of his foreign policy or his vision for America’s role in the world. Before theelection, he belittled the country’s treaty alliances and was critical of the EU. He repeatedlypraised Vladimir Putin, spoke dismissively of broadly accepted evidence that Russia had inter-fered in the campaign, and indicated a willingness to accept Russia’s occupation of Crimea.

After eight years as president, Barack Obama left office with America’s global presencereduced and its role as a beacon of world freedom less certain. Trump’s positions during2016 raised fears of a foreign policy divorced from America’s traditional strategic commit-ments to democracy, human rights, and the rules-based international order that it helped toconstruct beginning in 1945.

THE MENACE OF COUNTER-DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

Recent developments in Central Europe have raised the possibility that some of themost remarkable transitions from dictatorship to democracy in the 1980s and ’90s will besubstantially reversed by elected populist leaders.

After little more than a year in power, the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party hasalready delivered several serious blows to Poland’s democratic institutions. The governmentpassed legislation that has politicized public media, neutered the constitutional court,handed the security services sweeping powers of surveillance, and restricted the right ofpublic protest. It has also proposed worrisome regulations on NGOs.

Observers have described the PiS’s actions as an accelerated and condensed version ofwhat the ruling Fidesz party has accomplished in Hungary since 2010. Both governmentshave repudiated liberal values, attacked the institutions of pluralism, and sought to use theeconomic power of the state for partisan political ends. While the PiS has focused onproviding economic benefits to its core constituents, Fidesz has manipulated laws and statecontracts to enrich an affiliated business elite that can buttress its future political dominance.

The system pioneered by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán stands as an appeal-ing model for elected political leaders with authoritarian leanings. A further spread of such“illiberal democracy” in Central Europe and the Balkans seems likely given the orientationof major figures in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Serbia, among others.

While none of these leaders have moved their countries entirely outside the democraticsphere as of yet, the record in places like Venezuela and Turkey suggests that elected popu-lists who initially limit their authoritarian impulses can graduate to political purges andprosecutions, the militarization of government, sweeping controls on journalism, and politi-cized wrecking of the economy.

A POPULIST-AUTHORITARIAN NEXUS

Over the past decade or more, authoritarian powers have formed loose coalitions tocounter the influence of the United States and its democratic allies. Initially, they focusedon neutralizing efforts at the United Nations and other transnational bodies to enforce globalstandards on democracy and human rights. They also worked to mobilize support for fellowdictators facing domestic or international pressure, like Syria’s Assad.

More recently, however, the authoritarian regimes have reached out to sympatheticparties, movements, and political figures from democracies in Europe and elsewhere.Marine Le Pen, the leader of France’s National Front, frequently praises Vladimir Putin,

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has received financial assistance from Russian sources, and has called for France to alignwith Russia as a counterweight to the United States. Populist politicians in the Netherlands,Britain, Italy, and Austria meet regularly with Russian officials, criticize the sanctionsimposed by the EU after the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, and support Russia’s interestsin votes at the European Parliament.

This affection for authoritarians like Putin probably represents a minority view inEurope. Polls still show that Europeans regard Russia as repressive and dangerous. Butmany have come to have doubts about certain core values that underpin the European idea.They are increasingly inclined to question the economic and social benefits of Europeanintegration and democratic solidarity in general. They tend to regard sovereign states ratherthan supranational entities as best equipped to address problems like economic inequalityand displacement, surging rates of immigration, and humanitarian crises. And they are lesslikely to support a foreign policy that requires their nation to assist others for the greatergood.

For all of these reasons, citizens of democracies may look to Putin, Xi, and other author-itarian rulers as proof that nation-states can and should buck international commitments anddo what they must to protect their own interests. Partnering with such leaders is equatedwith an embrace of hard-nosed national opportunism.

History shows that this strategy leads to ruin. When universal values and internationallaw are cast aside, global affairs are governed by force. Small-state nationalists who admireforeign dictators today could find their countries subjugated by the same leaders tomorrow.Worse still, they could simply be trampled amid the lawless competition of great powers.

Orphaned Democrats

Citizens in many vulnerable democracies, such as Taiwan and the Baltic states, are alertto these threats. Others in places like Hong Kong, Tunisia, and Ukraine understand that thesurvival of their freedoms depends on international democratic solidarity. Protesters, activ-ists, refugees, and besieged civilians around the world rely on the promise of internationalaid and advocacy backed by democratic governments.

The question is whether the United States and Europe will ignore their own long-terminterests and retreat from their responsibilities as global leaders. If they do, Russia, China,Iran, and their ilk can be expected to fill the void.

REGIONAL TRENDS

Sub-Saharan Africa: Entrenched Autocrats, Fragile Institutions

Several major countries in sub-Saharan Africa faced critical tests in the form of elec-tions, popular protests, or surges in political violence during 2016.

Ethiopia experienced its worst political upheaval in many years, when protests by theOromo people over ethnic and land rights broadened into a general eruption of populardiscontent after decades of ethnicity-based political marginalization by the authoritarianruling party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Securityforces used disproportionate and lethal force against protesters in the Oromia and Amhararegions, killing hundreds of people over the course of the year. Tens of thousands weredetained, the internet and social media were periodically blocked, and a state of emergencyimposed in October further expanded the government’s already vast powers to crack downon the rights to expression, assembly, and movement.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, unpopular president Joseph Kabila successfullymaneuvered to delay constitutionally mandated elections, reaching a fragile “consensus”

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deal to extend his term beyond its scheduled December 2016 expiration; while the deal issupported by the main opposition coalition and much of civil society, skepticism remainsover implementation. Kabila’s regime violently suppressed protests against the electiondelay, and blocked social media in an effort to thwart protest organizers—taking a pagefrom the playbook of the EPRDF and other repressive regimes around the world.

Some of the stronger democracies in Southern and East Africa exhibited worrying signsof dysfunction during the year. In South Africa, revelations about the vast political influenceof the wealthy Gupta family placed even greater pressure on President Jacob Zuma, whowas also contending with protests over service delivery and university governance and theruling African National Congress’s unprecedented losses in subnational elections. Mean-while, Zuma’s administration moved to withdraw South Africa from the International Crim-inal Court, tarnishing the country’s commitment to the rule of law.

Political violence in Mozambique reached dangerous new levels, as supporters of theopposition Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and ruling Front for the Libera-tion of Mozambique (FRELIMO) engaged in assassinations. Clashes erupted between thearmy and RENAMO fighters, and security forces’ abuse of civilian populations in the coun-try’s central region forced thousands to flee to Malawi.

In Zimbabwe, citizens increasingly frustrated with an inept and corrupt governmentvented their dissatisfaction through social protest movements, prompting violence, arrests,and demonstration bans. The protests, combined with factional rivalries in the ruling Zimba-bwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and a self-inflicted economic cri-sis, have further weakened the regime of 92-year-old president Robert Mugabe.

In a bright spot at year’s end, Ghana consolidated its position as one of the most stabledemocracies on the continent when opposition candidate Nana Akufo-Addo defeatedincumbent John Mahama in the December presidential election.

Also that month, the Gambia seemed poised to deliver a major democratic breakthroughwhen authoritarian president Yahya Jammeh initially conceded defeat to opposition candi-date Adama Barrow in a shock election result. However, Jammeh later reneged, and atyear’s end he continued to dispute Barrow’s victory despite intense pressure from domestic,regional, and international officials to turn over power on schedule in January 2017.

Asia-Pacific: Silencing Critics of Arbitrary RuleA number of repressive rulers in Asia reined in free speech and assembly during 2016

to smother public criticism of their own crimes and abuses.Thailand’s military junta, which seized power in a 2014 coup, maintained its grip on

power by prosecuting even the slightest criticism under an array of restrictive laws. In thisconstrained atmosphere, voters approved a draft constitution that guaranteed the militaryoutsized influence over civilian politics even after general elections scheduled for 2017. InChina, an intrusive new cybersecurity law made it easier for authorities to monitor andprosecute online criticism of President Xi Jinping’s Communist Party regime, while author-ities in both Malaysia and the Maldives cracked down on demonstrators responding toallegations that top politicians had embezzled vast amounts of money from state coffers.

In the Philippines, newly elected president Rodrigo Duterte won widespread supportfor his policy of extrajudicial killings of suspected drug dealers and addicts, which by somecounts claimed as many as 6,000 lives. Duterte admitted to shooting suspected criminalshimself as mayor of Davao, and his aggressive public admonitions of his critics contributedto a climate of fear among activists in the country.

However, in a demonstration of democratic strength, enormous protests calling for theouster of President Park Geun-hye in response to corruption allegations went forward peace-fully in South Korea. The hundreds of thousands of citizens who took to the streets

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demanded an end to cronyism and opacity among political and business elites, and theprotest movement ultimately led to Park’s impeachment.

Americas: Political Turmoil and the Promise of Peace

Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro’s combination of strong-arm rule and dire eco-nomic mismanagement pushed his country to a status of Not Free for the first time in 2016.Venezuela had served as a model for populist regimes in the region, but today it epitomizesthe suffering that can ensue when citizens are unable to hold their leaders to account.

The like-minded regime of President Daniel Ortega brought Nicaragua to its lowestpoint in more than 20 years. Having stacked the judiciary in his favor and whittled awaythe independent media, Ortega was able to nearly eliminate the opposition in presidentialand legislative elections. With Venezuela, Nicaragua is one of the few countries in theAmericas on an extended downward trajectory.

In Brazil, the ouster of President Dilma Rousseff dominated the political scene in 2016.However history may judge the impeachment itself, the process impeded government func-tions by absorbing executive and legislative attention for months, and it did little to resolvea broader corruption crisis in which virtually the entire political class faced allegations ofbribery, influence peddling, and embezzlement. The year’s events only increased publicfrustration, as elected officials seemed more concerned with their own fates than with thecountry’s severe economic recession and soaring unemployment.

The peace deal in Colombia offered a welcome counterpoint to the economic and politi-cal breakdown in neighboring Venezuela. The agreement, which was rejected in a popularreferendum but then revised and passed into law, augurs well for a democracy that has longbeen crippled by violence. However, a political opening in Cuba, which helped broker thepeace, still seemed far off despite the death of Fidel Castro and two years of warmingrelations with the United States.

Middle East and North Africa: The Open Wounds of Civil Conflict

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has long been one of the world’s twoworst-performing regions. In 2016, it demonstrated the depths to which human freedom canfall after decades of authoritarian misrule, corruption, and erratic foreign interventions.

Libya was further plagued by political and security crises during the year. Despite aUN-brokered political agreement and the formation of a presidential council, the country’sgovernance remained crippled by the existence of multiple, competing state authorities,autonomous militias, and the presence of IS fighters opposed to all sides. The humanitariansituation and conditions for human rights have worsened as a result of insecurity and wide-spread impunity, and prospects for improvement are dim.

The war in Yemen continued to devastate what was already the poorest country in theregion. The Houthi rebels occupying the capital and most of the north sought to form theirown government given the failure of peace talks with the recognized government, whichholds territory in the south. In the process they have made no guarantee that they will restorethe country’s past political pluralism. Media independence has been all but eliminated asa result of the conflict, and civil liberties in general have effectively been suspended.

Syria remained the world’s least free country. Most of those living behind the frontlines were governed by a dictatorship, IS extremists, or Kurdish militants, and many otherswere trapped in the middle of appalling violence. The humanitarian crisis reached a nadirtoward the end of the year as regime forces bombarded and finally recaptured easternAleppo from rebel militias.

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Eurasia: Incumbents Armored against the Future

Eurasia was divided between a more European-oriented fringe and a core of rigid autoc-racies in 2016. While Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova struggled to build on fragile demo-cratic gains, several leaders to the east took steps to shore up their power in the face ofeconomic and political uncertainty.

Apparently unnerved by the repercussions of a lengthy slump in oil prices, the rulersof Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states used tightly controlled constitutional referen-dums to extend their rule into the future. In Azerbaijan, the authorities declared voterapproval for a longer presidential term, among dozens of other changes. As a result, Presi-dent Ilham Aliyev, who already enjoyed freedom from term limits, will not need to seekreelection again until 2020.

In Tajikistan, a referendum cleared the way for President Emomali Rahmon to run foran unlimited number of terms and lowered the age of eligibility for the presidency—a movelikely meant to allow Rahmon’s son to succeed him.

The Kyrgyz political elite also turned to a plebiscite to serve its own interests, rushingthrough a constitutional overhaul that will shift power from the presidency to the primeminister. The amendments drew allegations that President Almazbek Atambayev, whosesingle term is set to expire in 2017, aimed to retain power by moving to the premiership.

Europe: Cracks in a Pillar of Global Freedom

From the Brexit vote to antidemocratic reforms by Poland’s new government, the manyinternal strains within Europe exposed vulnerabilities that were previously hidden orignored. Combined with external pressures like Russian interference and the migrant crisis,these problems made it clear that the continent can no longer be taken for granted as abastion of democratic stability.

The rise of antiestablishment parties in Poland, France, Germany, and elsewhere ischanging Europe’s political landscape. It is also shifting the debate in ways that underminedthe fundamental values of democracy. Xenophobia, religious intolerance, and in some casesthe neutering of democratic institutions for partisan ends are gaining acceptance amongboth voters and government officials. Even German chancellor Angela Merkel seemed topander to anti-Muslim sentiment by calling for a ban on the full-face veil toward the end ofthe year.

The Czech Republic’s October 2017 elections could make it the next Central Europeandomino to fall to a populist leader, and France’s upcoming presidential race was alreadybeing closely watched in 2016 as a potential watershed for Europe as a whole. However,these trends are not inexorable. Austrian voters made it clear that a far-right head of statewas unacceptable to them, choosing the Green Party’s Alexander van der Bellen over Free-dom Party candidate Norbert Hofer by a solid margin.

In the Balkans, meanwhile, fair election processes and the rule of law further deterio-rated as the EU neglected its role in promoting democracy among aspiring member states.While there might have been deference to EU norms in the past, leaders in Bosnia andHerzegovina (BiH), Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia harassed civil society critics,obstructed investigations of government wrongdoing, and ignored constitutional procedureseven as EU accession talks went on, largely unfazed. Observers expressed concerns thatprogress toward democratic standards was being replaced by a toxic mix of nationalism,corruption, governmental dysfunction, and Russian interference.

The following people were instrumental in the writing of this essay: Elen Aghekyan, Jenni-fer Dunham, Shannon O’Toole, Sarah Repucci, and Vanessa Tucker.

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Introduction

The Freedom in the World 2017 survey contains reports on 195 countries and 14 relatedand disputed territories. Each country report begins with a section containing the followinginformation: population, capital, political rights rating (numerical rating), civil libertiesrating (numerical rating), freedom rating (the average of the political rights and civilliberties ratings), freedom status (Free, Partly Free, or Not Free), “electoral democracy”designation, and a 10-year ratings timeline. Each territory report begins with a sectioncontaining the same information, except for the capital and the electoral democracy desig-nation. The population figures are drawn primarily from the 2016 World Population DataSheet of the Population Reference Bureau.

The political rights and civil liberties ratings range from 1 to 7, with 1 representingthe most free and 7 the least free. The status designation of Free, Partly Free, or Not Free,which is determined by the average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings, indicatesthe general state of freedom in a country or territory. Any improvements or declines in theratings since the previous survey are noted next to the relevant number in each report.Positive or negative trends that were not sufficient to trigger a ratings change may be high-lighted by upward or downward trend arrows, which are located next to the name of thecountry or territory. A brief explanation of ratings changes or trend arrows is provided foreach country or territory as required. For a full description of the methods used to determinethe survey’s ratings, please see the chapter on the survey’s methodology.

The 10-year ratings time line lists the political rights and civil liberties ratings andstatus for each of the last 10 years. Each year that is included in the timeline refers to theyear under review, not the edition of the survey. Thus, the ratings and status from theFreedom in the World 2017 edition are listed under “2016” (the year that was under reviewfor the 2017 survey edition).

Following the section described above, each country and territory report is composedof four parts: an overview, bullets on key developments, an executive summary, and ananalysis of political rights and civil liberties. The overview provides a succinct, generaldescription that explains the country or territory’s place on the 0–7 rating scale; bullets onkey developments summarize key events that took place in 2017; the executive summaryanalyzes the year’s major developments and why they are significant for the country orterritory’s state of freedom; and the section on political rights and civil liberties analyzes thedegree of respect for the rights and liberties that Freedom House uses to evaluate freedom inthe world. This section is composed of seven parts that correspond to the seven main subcat-egories in the methodology and justify a country or territory’s score for each indicator. Thescores for each indicator, subcategory, and category, along with any changes from theprevious year, are noted next to the relevant subheading.

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AfghanistanPopulation: 33,400,000

Capital: KabulPolitical Rights Rating: 6Civil Liberties Rating: 6Freedom Rating: 6.0Freedom Status: Not FreeElectoral Democracy: No

Ten-Year Ratings Time-line For Year Under Review (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)

Year Under Review 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016Rating 5,5,PF 5,6,PF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF

Overview: Afghanistan has a progressive constitution marrying its Islamic identity with com-mitment to a wide range of internationally recognized rights, within the framework of anelectoral democracy. In practice, citizens have never enjoyed the full range of political andcivic rights promised to them. Successive disputed elections and a tendency toward bargainsbetween elites have weakened democratic accountability. High levels of violence, limitedstate authority, endemic corruption, and contested ideas of Muslim identity all limit politicalrights and civil liberties.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2016:

• In September, it was announced that the current National Unity Government(NUG), led by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah,intended to serve Ghani’s full, five-year presidential term, but without convening aloya jirga, or grand council, to discuss constitutional reform.

• Also in September, a new electoral law was passed by presidential decree, and inNovember, new members were appointed to the election commission. However, nodate was set for the overdue parliamentary elections.

• Members of the Hazara ethnic group led mass demonstrations in Kabul in thespring and summer, and authorities for the most part took a permissive stancetoward the protests. However, one such demonstration was attacked by suicidebombers, killing some 80 people.

• Around 700,000 refugees returned to Afghanistan, most of whom had been pushedout of Pakistan.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Unity Government, established to address a dispute over the result of the2014 presidential election, survived its second year. Some elements of an emergent opposi-tion had propagated the idea that the political agreement that had established the coalitiongovernment was to last only for two years, and that upon its expiration the NUG mustconvene a loya jirga to discuss constitutional reforms that would better define who was tohold executive power. Instead, it was announced that their NUG would operate for Ghani’sfull five-year presidential term.

In September, the president issued a decree containing provisions of long-awaited elec-toral reforms, and in November, new members were appointed to the election commission.However, no date was set for parliamentary elections, nor was it clear how elections would

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be possible in the prevailing insecurity. The parliament elected in 2010 continued to govern,well past its original term.

The Taliban increased their control over Afghan territory, while violence against civil-ians continued at levels comparable to the previous year.

A highly competent attorney general was appointed, but faced a major challenge interms of restoring the rule of law. The most prominent example of the entrenched impunityin Afghanistan came when the first vice president was accused of ordering assault andunlawful detention, and efforts to investigate the claims stalled.

A pattern of mass forced migration became even more complex in 2016. The Afghanexodus to Europe continued, though on a smaller scale than in 2015. Meanwhile, harass-ment of Afghans in Pakistan prompted some 700,000 people to return to Afghanistan, withthe needs of returnees severely straining public infrastructure.

POLITICAL RIGHTS: 10 / 40

A. Electoral Process: 2 / 12

Afghanistan’s president is directly elected for up to two five-year terms and has thepower to appoint ministers, subject to parliamentary approval. In the directly elected lowerhouse of the National Assembly, the 249-seat Wolesi Jirga (House of the People), membersstand for five-year terms. In the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), the upperhouse, the provincial councils elect two-thirds of members for three- or four-year terms,and the president appoints the remaining one-third for five-year terms. The constitutionenvisages the election of district councils, which would also send members to the MeshranoJirga, though these have not been established. Ten Wolesi Jirga seats are reserved for thenomadic Kuchi community, including at least three women, and 65 of the chamber’s gen-eral seats are reserved for women.

In the 2014 presidential election, the two first-round winners—Abdullah, a former for-eign minister, who received 45 percent of the vote, and Ghani, a former finance minister,who took 32 percent—faced off in a final round held that June, with a high reported turnout.After the Independent Election Commission (IEC) published preliminary results showingGhani leading by more than 10 percentage points, the Abdullah camp alleged voter fraud,claimed victory, and threatened to overthrow the government. The United States brokeredan agreement calling for an internationally supervised audit and the formation of theNational Unity Government. Ghani became president, and Abdullah became chief execu-tive, a new post resembling that of a prime minister. The final vote tallies for the twocandidates were not officially announced.

The April 2014 provincial council elections were also drawn out due to complaints overirregularities and a large quantity of fraudulent votes. It was not until October 2014 that theelection commission announced the winners of the 458 council seats.

The most recent parliamentary elections, held in September 2010, were characterizedby widespread fraud. The parliament’s term expired in 2015, with the NUG and currentlawmakers unable to agree on reforms that would pave the way for the next elections. Theparliament elected in 2010 was still seated throughout 2016, with a presidential decreeallowing members to serve until fresh elections were held. In September 2016, after twounsuccessful attempts, a new electoral law was passed by presidential decree, amid someconfusion about its content and the legality of its various provisions. In November, newIEC members were appointed. However, at year’s end no date had been set for the overdueelections; there is no clarity on how redrawing constituency boundaries would be achieved;and some leading politicians had expressed concern over the lack of progress toward issuing

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Country Reports 13

reliable digital identification for voters. Widespread insecurity also made it impossible toguarantee conditions for free and fair elections across the country.

B. Political Pluralism and Participation: 6 / 16

Afghanistan’s electoral system uses the single nontransferable vote, with most candi-dates for elected office running as independents and participating in fluid alliances linkedto local and regional patronage networks. Political parties, many of them operating withincoalitions, played an active role in backing candidates for the 2014 presidential election.However, parties lack a formal role within the legislature, weakening their ability to contrib-ute to stable policymaking and legislative processes. Despite their limited relevance inAfghanistan’s government, parties have been free to seek registration since 2005, and doz-ens have completed the process.

The Taliban have consistently opposed the holding of elections. Although their calls toboycott the 2014 election were widely ignored, the presence of various armed groups andlocal strongmen, including those enlisted by the government as anti-Taliban militias, posesa major obstacle to free public participation in the political process, especially outside majorurban centers. Government officials and politicians at all levels are regularly targeted forassassination.

The United States maintained about 8,400 military personnel in Afghanistan throughthe end of 2016. In July, U.S. president Barack Obama slowed the pace of troop withdrawalin response to the intensification of Taliban violence. The United States covers the bulk ofthe operating costs of the Afghan security forces. Although the NUG was formed on thebasis of an agreement brokered by a U.S. envoy, both the United States and the Kabulgovernment insist that the latter enjoys full sovereignty and control over political decisions.

The constitution recognizes multiple ethnic and linguistic minorities and provides moreguarantees of equal status to minorities than historically have been available in Afghanistan.Since 2001, the traditionally marginalized Shiite Muslim minority, which includes mostethnic Hazaras, have enjoyed increased levels of political representation and participationin national institutions. Nevertheless, participation is curtailed for all segments of the popu-lation by lack of security, flawed elections, and the dominance of local patronage networks.

C. Functioning of Government: 2 / 12

The NUG struggled to field a full cabinet in 2016. During the first half of the year, theparliament finally approved nominees for attorney general, defense and interior ministers,and intelligence chief. But later in the year, the cabinet started to unravel. In November, theparliament summoned various ministers to account for their failure to spend the develop-ment budgets allocated to their ministries, and promptly passed votes of no confidenceagainst several deemed to have managed their budgets poorly.

Corruption remains a key concern in national life. In addition to depressing state reve-nues, endemic corruption reduces military effectiveness and undermines government legiti-macy, and plays into Taliban claims that the Kabul government and ruling elite areinherently corrupt. In a December 2016 report, Integrity Watch Afghanistan estimated thatAfghans paid approximately $3 billion in bribes to public officials during the year; 71percent of Afghans believed that corruption was worse in 2016 than in 2014 and 2015.

The NUG has made efforts to address corruption in the public procurement program.Corrupt political appointments remain problematic, with some lucrative postings in theinterior ministry in effect being bought and sold. Major corruption prosecutions are uncom-mon, and during 2016 no further progress was reported on recovering assets of the failedKabul Bank.

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CIVIL LIBERTIES: 14 / 60

D. Freedom of Expression and Belief: 6 / 16

Afghanistan hosts a vibrant media sector, with multiple outlets in print, radio, andtelevision that collectively carry a wide range of views and are generally uncensored. Mediaproviders include independent and commercial firms, as well as a state broadcaster andoutlets tied to specific political interests. The rapid expansion in access to mobile phones,the internet, and social media has allowed many Afghans greater access to diverse views.Facebook alone is estimated to have a million users. The NUG has taken a public positionin support of media freedom and has cooperated with initiatives to counter security threatsto the media. However, amid the ongoing insurgency, media have faced both direct targetingand collateral damage. One local watchdog reported 415 violent attacks on the media in2016, with 14 journalists killed.

While religious freedom has improved since 2001, it is still hampered by violenceand discrimination aimed at religious minorities and reformist Muslims. The constitutionestablished Islam as the official religion and guaranteed freedom of worship to other reli-gions. Blasphemy and apostasy by Muslims are considered capital crimes, and non-Muslimproselytizing is strongly discouraged. Militant groups have targeted mosques and clerics aspart of the larger civil conflict. Hindus, Sikhs, and Shiite Muslims, particularly those fromthe Hazara ethnic group, face official obstacles and discrimination by the Sunni Muslimmajority. Moreover, conservative social attitudes, intolerance, and the inability or unwill-ingness of law enforcement officials to defend individual freedoms mean that those per-ceived as violating religious and social norms are highly vulnerable to abuse.

Academic freedom is largely tolerated in government-controlled areas. In addition topublic schooling, there has been a growth in private education, with new universities enjoy-ing full autonomy from the government. Government security forces and the Taliban haveboth taken over schools to use as military posts, which creates a sense of insecurity evenafter the forces withdraw. The expansion of Taliban control in rural areas has left an increas-ing number of public schools outside of government control. The Taliban operate an educa-tion commission in parallel to the official ministry of education. Although their practicesvary between areas, some schools under Taliban control reportedly allowed teachers tocontinue teaching, but banned certain subjects and replaced them with Islamic studies. InAugust 2016, the Taliban kidnapped two university professors at the American Universityof Afghanistan in Kabul, and a fortnight later sent gunmen into the campus, where theykilled 13 students and staff.

Although private discussion in government-held areas is largely free and unrestrained,discussion of a political nature is more dangerous for Afghans living in contested orTaliban-controlled areas. The government is not known to illegally restrict or monitor theinternet.

E. Associational and Organizational Rights: 4 / 12

The constitution guarantees the rights to assembly and association, subject to somerestrictions, but they are upheld erratically from region to region. The largest demonstra-tions to take place in 2016 focused on the routing of a major electricity transmission linethat would deliver energy from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan. A new activist group, theEnlightenment Movement, with a base in the Hazara community, staged major rallies inKabul in May and July in connection with concerns about the project. Although authoritiestook extensive security precautions to exclude demonstrators from the city center, overall

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Country Reports 15

the government response to the civic mobilization was permissive. However, the July dem-onstration ended in a massacre, when suicide bombers killed some 80 participants. TheIslamic State militant group claimed responsibility for the attack, which was widely under-stood as a sectarian act, as the demonstrators were largely Shia and the march presentedIslamic State with an opportunity to hit back at the assertiveness of this traditionallyoppressed minority sect.

The constitution guarantees the right to form associations and there is a relativelyenabling legal framework and supportive attitude from the national authorities. Nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs) play an important role in the country, particularly in urbanareas, where thousands of cultural, welfare, and sports associations operate with little inter-ference from authorities. During 2016, the Economy Ministry counted as active 1,971 localNGOs and 279 international NGOs, although periodically organizations are deregisteredwhen the ministry considers them noncompliant with reporting requirements. Threats andviolence by the Taliban and other actors, especially a pattern of kidnappings, have curbedthe activities of many NGOs and have hampered recruitment of foreign aid workers.

Despite broad constitutional protections for workers, labor rights are not well defined,and currently no effective enforcement or dispute-resolution mechanisms are in place.

F. Rule of Law: 2 / 16

The judicial system operates haphazardly, and justice in many places is administeredon the basis of a mixture of legal codes by inadequately trained judges. Corruption in thejudiciary is extensive, with judges and lawyers often subject to threats and bribes from localleaders or armed groups. Informal justice systems, employing variants of both customarylaw and Sharia (Islamic law), are widely used to arbitrate disputes, especially in rural areas.The Taliban have installed their own judiciary in areas they control, but also conduct sum-mary executions.

In April 2016, the parliament approved appointment of a new attorney general who hasa strong track record of commitment to legality and human rights. However, he faces mas-sive challenges in promoting the rule of law.

Prosecutions and trials suffer from a number of weaknesses, including lack of properrepresentation, excess reliance on uncorroborated witness testimony, lack of reliable foren-sics evidence, arbitrary decision-making, and failure to publish court decisions. Further-more, there is a well-ensconced culture of impunity for the country’s political and militarypower brokers. In December 2016, the former governor of Jowzjan Province accused FirstVice President Abdul Rashid Dostum of having him detained and assaulted, and at year’send it was unclear whether the attorney general could compel the vice president to cooperatewith an investigation.

The police force is heavily militarized and primarily focused on its role as a first lineof defense against insurgents in administrative centers. There are high levels of corruptionand complicity in organized crime among police, particularly near key smuggling routes.The torture of detainees by Afghan police, military, and intelligence services reportedlyremains common. Government-aligned strongmen and powerful figures within the securityforces operate illegal detention centers.

The conflict in Afghanistan continued at a high intensity in 2016, with a heavy toll oncivilians. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded11,418 conflict-related civilian casualties in 2016 (3,498 deaths and 7,920 injuries), almostthe same level as had occurred in 2015. UNAMA attributed 61 percent of the casualties tothe Taliban and other insurgents and 24 percent to Afghan security and other progovernmentforces. The figures reveal a trend toward the Afghan national security forces causing an

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increased proportion of civilian casualties, mainly from aerial and ground-based bombard-ment. During the year, the Taliban expanded their campaign of attacks on provincial centersand their control of rural areas. They sustained a campaign of high-profile suicide bombingsand complex attacks against civilian targets, such as restaurants and hotels, and targetswhere civilian casualties could be anticipated, such as military convoys moving throughpopulated urban areas. The local branch of the Islamic State faced pressure from both thegovernment and Taliban, but managed to hold onto an enclave in eastern Nangarhar Prov-ince. Although the Taliban were responsible for most insurgent violence, the Islamic Statefighters also took responsibility for a string of attacks, mostly targeting Shia civilians.

Historically, Afghanistan has been home to small communities of Hindus and Sikhs,though in 2016 there were thought to be fewer than 7,000 Hindus and Sikhs in the countrycompared to hundreds of thousands in the 1970s. Despite some legal protections, thesereligious minorities remain subject to harassment and discrimination, including in employ-ment and education. In December 2016, unknown gunmen shot and killed a Sikh commu-nity leader in Kunduz.

There is no legal protection for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) people,who face societal disapproval and abuse by police. Same-sex sexual activity is consideredillegal under the penal code and Sharia.

G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights: 2 / 16

The government does not restrict the right of travel within the country or abroad, thoughinsecurity and other obstacles hamper freedom of movement in practice. In 2016, Afghani-stan was embroiled in a multidimensional crisis of forced migration. First, the conflict athome continued to displace Afghans within the country, and more than 580,000 peoplenewly displaced during the year brought the cumulative total of internally displaced peopleto 1.6 million. Secondly, Afghans remained the second largest group of migrants or refu-gees arriving in southern Europe, with some 42,000 Afghans arriving by sea in the firsteleven months of the year. However, the biggest new development concerned Afghansreturning to the country. In the wake of Pakistan’s campaign of harassment against Afghansduring the summer of 2016 and Pakistani authorities’ foot-dragging over the extension ofrefugee documentation, there was a surge in Afghans returning to the country from Paki-stan. Many of the arrivals had not previously planned to leave Pakistan and were ill-preparedfor the move. European countries also started to deport Afghan asylum seekers whoseapplications were rejected, and the European Union countries effectively made theirrenewed aid commitments to Afghanistan conditional on the government cooperating withthe deportations. An estimated 700,000 returnees, most of them from Pakistan, crossed intoAfghanistan during 2016. The mass movements, happening in conditions of conflict, putsevere strain on public infrastructure.

Citizens are formally free to own property, buy and sell land, and establish businesses.There has also been a trend away from government monopolies. Economic freedoms, how-ever, are constrained by patronage, corruption, and the dominant economic role of a narrow,politically connected elite. Over the past decade the most profitable activities available toAfghans have been government and defense contracting, narcotics trafficking, and propertyand minerals development. Investors in all of these sectors have depended on connectionsto those in power. A combination of harassment, extortion, and arbitrary taxation make fora highly unfavorable business climate for any investor hoping to operate within the law.

Although women have formal rights to education and employment, and some partici-pate in public life, discrimination and domestic violence remain pervasive, with the latteroften going unreported because of social acceptance of the practice. Women’s choices

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Country Reports 17

regarding marriage and divorce remain circumscribed by custom and discriminatory laws.On some issues, customary practices withhold even rights that are guaranteed to women bySharia. The forced marriage of young girls to older men or widows to their husbands’ malerelations is a problem, and many girls continue to be married before the legal age of 16.The courts and the detention system have been used to enforce social control of women, forexample by jailing those who defy their families’ wishes regarding marriage.

Women in urban areas typically enjoy greater access to education and formal employ-ment, and are better able to participate in national politics. Women accounted for about 16percent of the candidates in the 2010 parliamentary elections, and roughly 41 percent ofregistered voters were women; 69 female candidates were elected. While no women candi-dates ran in the 2014 presidential election, 273 women ran for provincial council seats,securing 97 of them. Female electoral participation has been limited by threats, harassment,and social restrictions on traveling alone and appearing in public.

Most victims of human trafficking in Afghanistan are children trafficked internally towork in various industries, become domestic servants, settle debts, or be subjected to com-mercial sexual exploitation. Victims of trafficking are frequently prosecuted for moralcrimes.

AlbaniaPopulation: 2,900,000

Capital: TiranaPolitical Rights Rating: 3Civil Liberties Rating: 3Freedom Rating: 3.0Freedom Status: Partly FreeElectoral Democracy: Yes

Ten-Year Ratings Timeline For Year Under Review (Political Rights, Civil Liberties, Status)

Year Under Review 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016Rating 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,PF 3,3,PF

Overview: Albania has a built a record of competitive elections, though political parties arehighly polarized and often focused on leading personalities. Civil liberties such as religiousfreedom and freedom of assembly are respected. Corruption and organized crime remainserious problems despite recent government efforts to address them, and the interminglingof powerful business, political, and media interests inhibits the development of truly inde-pendent news outlets. The Romany minority continues to face discrimination in education,health care, employment, and housing.


• Beginning in July, the parliament passed a series of laws and constitutional amend-ments designed to reform the judicial system. The most controversial law, underwhich judges and prosecutors will be vetted for possible corruption and links toorganized crime, was upheld by the Constitutional Court in December after a chal-lenge by the opposition Democratic Party (PD).

• In November, the European Commission recommended that the European Union(EU) formally open accession negotiations with Albania once it has made tangible

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progress in implementing the judicial reforms, particularly the vetting process. TheEuropean Council accepted the recommendation in December.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In July, Albania’s parliament passed the first in a series of laws and constitutionalamendments aimed at overhauling the courts and justice system. The ruling Socialist Party(PD) pressed ahead with the reforms through the end of the year, as the effort was a keycondition set by the EU for the opening of membership talks with Albania. However, theopposition PD sought to block many of the changes, arguing that they were unconstitu-tional. The most controversial law called for the evaluation of current and prospectivejudges and prosecutors based on their professionalism, moral integrity, and independencefrom the influences of organized crime, corruption, and politics. The PD and the union ofjudges challenged the so-called vetting law before the Constitutional Court, but the courtupheld it in December, citing in part an endorsement from the Council of Europe’s VeniceCommission.

The current government has taken some steps to improve politicians’ accountability forcorruption and other abuses. A law passed in December 2015 banned individuals withcriminal records from holding office, and officials submitted self-declaration forms in 2016.The Central Electoral Commission voted in December to dismiss two members of parlia-ment and one mayor for hiding their past criminal convictions. Another lawmaker had beenremoved by the Constitutional Court in May due to a conflict of interest, and a whistle-blower protection law was adopted in June. According to a 2016 survey on corruption, whilethe general perception of corruption in state institutions remains high, the share of thosereporting an actual experience with corruption—being asked to pay a bribe—decreasedfrom 57 percent in 2010 to 44 percent in 2015.

POLITICAL RIGHTS: 28 / 40 (�1)



C. Functioning of Government: 7 / 12 (�1)






This country report has been abridged for Freedom in the World 2017. For backgroundinformation on political rights and civil liberties in Albania, see Freedom in the World2016.

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Country Reports 19

AlgeriaPopulation: 40,800,000

Capital: AlgiersPolitical Rights Rating: 6Civil Liberties Rating: 5Freedom Rating: 5.5Freedom Status: Not FreeElectoral Democracy: No


Year Under Review 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016Rating 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF

Overview: Political affairs in Algeria are dominated by a closed elite based in the militaryand the ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN). President Abdelaziz Bouteflikahas been in office since 1999, and while there are multiple opposition parties in the parlia-ment, elections are distorted by fraud and other forms of manipulation. Authorities userestrictive laws to curb criticism in the media and suppress street protests. Other concernsinclude rampant corruption, the threat of terrorist attacks, and occasional violence betweenArabs and Berbers as well as between Algerians and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.


• A presidential decree in January dissolved the military’s powerful Intelligence andSecurity Department (DRS) and replaced it with three directorates that wouldreport directly to the presidency and focus on internal security, external security,and technical intelligence, respectively.

• In February, the parliament passed constitutional revisions that reintroduced a two-term limit for the presidency and bolstered the legislature’s modest powers, amongother changes.

• In March, the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimedresponsibility for an attack in which rockets were fired at a gas facility near AinSalah. No casualties were reported.

• In June, the authorities arrested two journalists from the television channel KBCand an official with the Culture Ministry in connection with satirical programming.Two television programs were shut down, and the defendants received suspendedprison sentences in July.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The government in February 2016 pushed through a number of constitutional revisionsthat were apparently designed to improve its popular support and lay the foundation fora smooth presidential transition in light of growing concerns about President AbdelazizBouteflika’s health and possible successors. Amendments approved by the parliament re-introduced a two-term limit for the presidency, though Bouteflika would be able to seekreelection in 2019; enlarged the role and powers of the legislature relative to the executive,for example by requiring the president to consult the parliamentary majority on the appoint-ment of a prime minister; made Tamazight, the language of the Berber population, an offi-cial language, meaning it could be used on administrative documents; and set the goal ofgender equality in the labor market and public institutions.

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However, the authorities also worked to ensure control over the media and suppressdissent. In July, the government secured a court ruling that prevented businessman andBouteflika critic Issad Rebrab from purchasing El-Khabar media group, the parent companyof television station KBC. Also that month, two KBC journalists received suspended prisonsentences connected to satirical television programming, and the programs in question wereshut down; the government said the journalists had violated licensing rules. Journalist andblogger Mohamed Tamalt, who had been arrested in June and sentenced to two years inprison in July for insulting the president on Facebook, died in December after engaging ina hunger strike and reporting beatings by prison guards.

Security forces regularly restricted the freedom of assembly. Among other incidentsduring the year, January protests against the relocation of a power plant in the town of OuedEl Ma led to violent clashes between demonstrators and police after the latter used tear gas,and a demonstration by teachers seeking greater job security in Algiers in March was vio-lently dispersed by police. The authorities also used aggressive tactics to cope with migra-tion from sub-Saharan Africa. In December, following clashes between Algerians andmigrants in an Algiers neighborhood, police rounded up some 1,400 sub-Saharan Africansand moved them to a remote camp near Tamanrasset before arbitrarily expelling many ofthem from the country.










This country report has been abridged for Freedom in the World 2017. For backgroundinformation on political rights and civil liberties in Algeria, see Freedom in the World 2016.

AndorraPopulation: 80,000

Capital: Andorra la VellaPolitical Rights Rating: 1Civil Liberties Rating: 1Freedom Rating: 1.0Freedom Status: FreeElectoral Democracy: Yes


Year Under Review 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016Rating 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F 1,1,F

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Country Reports 21

The country or territory displayed here received scores but no narrative report for thisedition of Freedom in the World.

AngolaPopulation: 25,800,000

Capital: LuandaPolitical Rights Rating: 6Civil Liberties Rating: 6Freedom Rating: 6.0Freedom Status: Not FreeElectoral Democracy: No


Year Under Review 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2 015 2016Rating 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,5,NF 6,6,NF 6,6,NF

Overview: Angola has been ruled by the same party and just two presidents since indepen-dence, and authorities have repressed political dissent and maintained restrictions on free-dom of speech and assembly. Corruption, political imprisonment, and abuses by securityforces all remain common.


• The 17 activists known as the Luanda book club, who were imprisoned in 2015 fordiscussing a book on civil disobedience, were conditionally released in June. How-ever, their convictions on charges of sedition were not overturned.

• Police violently suppressed several protests during the year. In August, militarypolice killed a teenage boy during a demonstration against housing demolitions.

• The national assembly passed several new laws restricting freedom of the pressand free expression online, though dos Santos had yet to sign them at year’s end.

• Rebels associated with separatists in the exclave of Cabinda increased attacksagainst government forces, with deaths on both sides reported.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President José Eduardo dos Santos and his party, the Popular Movement for the Libera-tion of Angola (MPLA), retained tight control over the political system and significantlyrestricted civil liberties during 2016. Dos Santos, who has been in power for 37 years, inMarch announced that he would step down in 2018, though he has made and broken similarpledges before. In the meantime, he reportedly named the defense minister as his preferredsuccessor, and in June appointed his daughter to lead the national oil company.

The drop in global oil prices continued to damage Angola’s oil-dependent economyand state budget in 2016. Delays in workers’ pay have led to strikes. Amid popular frustra-tions with economic decline, corruption, and dos Santos’ continued rule, authorities haveharshly suppressed protests and worked to increase restrictions on freedom of speech andthe press. Meanwhile, separatists stepped up attacks on government forces in the restiveexclave of Cabinda.

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The 2010 constitution abolished direct presidential elections, stipulating instead that theleader of the largest party in the parliament would become president. The 220-seat unicam-eral National Assembly, whose members serve five-year terms, has little power, and 90percent of legislation originates in the executive branch. The constitution permits the presi-dent to serve a maximum of two five-year terms, and to directly appoint the vice president,cabinet, and provincial governors. President dos Santos has been in power for 37 years,making him one of the longest-serving heads of state in Africa. Dos Santos’ first full termunder the current constitution began in 2012, and he announced in March 2016 that hewould step down in 2018. Angola’s scheduled August 2017 parliamentary elections arethus key to determining the next president if dos Santos follows through on his pledge. DosSantos has reportedly named Defense Minister João Lourenço as his preferred successor.

The parliamentary elections held in 2012 were deeply flawed and followed a number ofdelays. The MPLA captured 72 percent of the vote, a notable decline from its 82 percentshowing in 2008. Still, the party maintained its overwhelming dominance in the NationalAssembly, garnering 175 of 220 seats. The opposition National Union for the Total Indepen-dence of Angola (UNITA) won 32 seats; the Broad Convergence for the Salvation ofAngola–Electoral Coalition (CASA–CE) won 8 seats, the Social Renewal Party (PRS) won3, and the National Front for Angolan Liberation (FNLA) won 2.

In October 2014, dos Santos confirmed that already-delayed municipal elections, calledfor in the constitution, would again be postponed until after the 2017 general elections. Thepresident justified this unilateral decision by citing the difficulties experienced in organizingthe 2012 elections and those anticipated in replacing existing local government institutionswith new municipal governments. The opposition vehemently protested the decision.


Although five political parties are represented in the National Assembly, the rulingMPLA dominates Angola’s party system. Mutual mistrust, the inability to agree on commonstrategy, and enticements from the more powerful and better-funded MPLA prevent opposi-tion parties from coordinating their efforts. In 2015 the four opposition parties representedin the National Assembly held their first joint parliamentary meetings to promote dialogueand discuss the state of the country with civil society leaders. Human rights and democracyactivists allege that opposition parties fail to challenge government efforts to suppress civilresistance.

Throughout 2014, opposition members had criticized the government’s delay in estab-lishing the Council of the Republic, a presidential advisory body that is constitutionallyrequired to include members of the opposition. President dos Santos finally swore councilmembers into office in February 2015, though their influence remains limited.

Political activism in the exclave of Cabinda, home to a long-standing movement forindependence or autonomy, is regarded with suspicion by the government and can drawcriminal charges. Rebels associated with the separatist Front for the Liberation of Cabinda(FLEC) increased attacks against government forces in 2016, with deaths on both sidesreported. The clashes led to a corresponding troop build-up in the territory.


Corruption and patronage are endemic in Angola’s entrenched political elite, which islargely unaccountable to the public. Allegations of corruption continued throughout 2016,

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Country Reports 23

with controversy continuing to swirl around the dos Santos family’s business interests. Thenaming of the president’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos, widely thought to be the wealthiestwoman in Africa, as head of national oil company Sonangol in June was a source of wide-spread anger in the country.

A freedom of information law ostensibly meant to allow citizens access to government-generated documents was approved in 2002. However, in practice accessing informationremains extremely difficult.



Despite constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, the state owns Angola’sonly daily newspaper, all national radio stations, and all but one national television station.These outlets, along with private media owned by senior officials and members of thedos Santos family, act as mouthpieces for the MPLA. Censorship and self-censorship arecommon.

In 2016, the legislature approved several restrictive new laws that would allow greatergovernment control over online and traditional media, and raise barriers to the creation ofnew media outlets. Dos Santos was expected to sign the legislation in 2017. Additionally, anew MPLA-controlled regulatory body, the Angolan Social Communications RegulatoryBody (ERCA), was established. Independent news outlets remain active online, but itremains to be seen how the government may use the new laws against them.

Angolan authorities have consistently prevented independent journalists from reportingthe news, denying them access to official information and events, preventing them frombroadcasting, and threatening them with detention and prosecution, frequently abusing libeland defamation laws. In January and June 2016, journalists Francisco Rasgado and JoséManuel Alberto were charged with defamation in two separate cases for covering corruptionand misuse of state funds; Rasgado had received death threats for his coverage of provincialgovernment corruption in Benguela. In May, police in Luanda detained Voice of Americajournalist Coque Mukuta for recording them beating a suspect, while Washington Post jour-nalists were detained for reporting on a hospital in Luanda in June. In December, journalistsRafael Marques de Morais of Maka Angola and Mariano Brás of O Crime, both longtimetargets of government persecution, faced defamation-related charges for publishing reportson alleged corruption by the attorney general.

The constitution guarantees religious freedom, but the government requires religiousgroups to meet rigorous criteria in order to receive legal recognition. Legal approval waslast granted to a new religious group in 2004. Roughly 1,200 religious groups operateillegally in Angola. All of those that have been officially recognized are Christian, despitethe presence of tens of thousands of Muslims in the country. The government maintainsthat it has no bias against the practice of Islam, though Muslims have complained ofdiscrimination.

In April 2016, José Kalupeteka, leader of the Light of the World religious sect, wassentenced to 28 years in prison in connection with an April 2015 clash between securityforces and sect members in Huambo province, in which the government reported that 13civilians and 9 policemen were killed. Nonstate sources reported a much higher death toll,accusing the government of a massacre, while the government blocked independent investi-gation of the incident, and President dos Santos declared the Light of the World to be athreat to peace and national unity. New deadly confrontations between police and groupmembers occurred in August 2016, with allegations that over 30 sect members weremassacred.

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There are no formal restrictions on academic freedom, though professors avoid politi-cally sensitive topics for fear of repercussions.

While internet access is increasing in Angola, the government actively monitors internetactivity and, in some instances, uses the data collected to crack down on dissidents, whilenewly approved social communication laws are designed to chill free speech on socialmedia. Offline communication is also subject to monitoring and punishment. In March2016, 17 young activists were convicted on charges of state security crimes, includingsedition, in connection with their participation in a 2015 book club discussion on civilresistance. The Supreme Court ordered the conditional release of the 17 activists in June,though their convictions have not yet been overturned.


The constitution guarantees limited freedoms of assembly and association. In recentyears, police and security forces have prohibited demonstrations, violently dispersed peace-ful political gatherings, and intimidated and arrested protesters in provinces includingLuanda, Malanje, and Benguela. In April 2016, police detained and assaulted protestors inLuanda demonstrating in support of the jailed Luanda book club members, while in August,police violently suppressed protests in the capital at which demonstrators called for Presi-dent dos Santos’s resignation; police beat protestors and attacked them with dogs. InNovember, authorities prohibited demonstrations against Isabel dos Santos taking controlof the national oil company.

Several hundred nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate in Angola, and manyadvocate for transparency, human rights protections, and political reform. Organizationsthat are critical of the government have frequently faced state interference and been threat-ened with closure. NGOs are required to register with the government and the Ministry ofForeign Affairs to operate and must obtain further authorizations to receive donations. Onceregistered, NGOs are required to submit to government supervision and audits.

The constitution includes the right to strike and to form unions, but the MPLA domi-nates the labor movement, and only a few weak independent unions exist. Still, strikes dooccur: transit workers in Luanda began 2016 on strike, while port workers in Lobito andteachers in Bengo went on strike in August and September, respectively, over grievancesincluding unpaid wages.


The courts are hampered by a lack of trained legal professionals, as well as insufficientinfrastructure, a large backlog of cases, corruption, and extensive political influence, partic-ularly from the executive. Many areas lack functional municipal courts, thus leaving crimesand conflicts to be adjudicated by informal tribunals, or by local police.

The president appoints Supreme Court judges to life terms without legislative input.Several examples of judicial abuse and lack of due process arose in 2016, including theconvictions of the 17 activists of the Luanda book club, and prosecution of human rightsdefenders and journalists covering corruption. However, courts in 2016 issued two promis-ing decisions regarding the activities of Cabindan human rights activists. In May, a courtoverturned a dubious conviction against José Marcos Mavungo for purportedly plottingrebellion. Similar charges against Arão Bula Tempo, another Cabindan rights activist, weredismissed in July.

There is no effective protection against unjustified imprisonment, lengthy pretrial deten-tion, extortion, or torture. Angolan jails are reported to be overcrowded, unhygienic, lackingbasic necessities, and plagued by sexual abuse. They also contain a number of political

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Country Reports 25

prisoners, advocates of the Cabindan autonomy movement, and members of peaceful activ-ist groups. In September 2016, police at the Rangel station in Luanda allegedly tortured andkilled suspect José Padrão Loureiro, an attack for which five officers were arrested.

In diamond mining regions, private security forces have taken the law into their ownhands, and frequently abuse it. In April 2016, reports emerged that such forces had beatenlocal miners in Lunda-Norte with machetes, while in August, private security forces in thesame region killed 17-year-old Gabriel Mufugueno, sparking protests.

Tensions in Cabinda remain high. The secessionist FLEC movement and its supporters—many of whom live in exile—continue to call for talks on independence amidst sporadicviolence. Activists have alleged that Cabinda residents are not permitted to voice their opin-ions and are under constant risk of persecution and discrimination.

Security forces allegedly harass and abuse African immigrant communities, against abackdrop of the government’s failure to adequately protect refugees and asylum seekers.Nevertheless, immigration from countries including Brazil, China, and Portugal remainshigh, and migrants from neighboring countries also continue to enter Angola in largenumbers.

National law criminalizes “acts against nature,” though there have been no recent casesof this provision being applied to same-sex sexual activity. LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual,and transgender) people sometimes suffer harassment, and few formal LGBT organizationsexist.


Several organizations have been working to remove land mines that were placed duringAngola’s decades-long civil war. Land mines inhibit agriculture, construction, and freedomof movement, particularly in rural areas.

The process for securing entry and exit visas remains difficult and mired in corruption.Individuals who are critical of the government have faced problems when attempting toleave or enter the country.

Access to quality education is limited to Angola’s elite and the expatriate community.Literacy rates remain low,

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