freedom of expression and the liberalism of fear

volume20,no.34 november2020

Freedom of Expression and

the Liberalism of Fear:

A Defense of the Darker Mill

J. P. MessinaThe University of New Orleans

© 2020 J.P.MessinaThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/020034/>

I. Introduction

Much recentphilosophicalworkon free speechproceeds in the fol-lowing ostensibly plausible way. Rights, it is said, protect weightyinterests (Raz 1986).Therefore, if there isa right to freeexpression,then theremust be someweighty interest(s) that it protects.More-over, reasoning about the best means of protecting and advancingtheseinterestsdeterminesaright’snormativelimits.Forexample: ifwehavearighttofreeexpressionbecauseitaidsusinthesearchfortruth(asJ.S.Millsuggests),then,whenlimitingspeechhelpsusinoursearch,weoughttoimposetherelevantlimitations(Leiter2016).Ifwehavearighttofreedomofexpressionbecauseitfacilitatesdemocraticdeliberation,then,whensilencingspeechdoessobetter,silencingisjustified(Schauer1982).Ifwehavearighttofreeexpressionbecausesucharightpromotestheperfectionofourcapacities,then,whenpre-ventingsomespeechdoessobetter,weoughttopreventspeechjustthatfar(Brink2001:149−172).Ifarighttofreeexpressionprotectsusagainstoppression,thenourspeechcanberegulatedinsofarasitcon-stitutesoppression(McGowan2014).Andsoon.

AsStanleyFishputsthegeneralpoint,speech“isalwaysproducedwithintheprecinctsofsomeconceptionofthegoodtowhichitmustyieldintheeventofconflict”(1994).OrasErwinChemerinskywrites,courtsmustinevitablydecide“whatspeechisprotected,underwhatcircumstances, and when and how the government may regulate”(2017: 1237−1238). He continues, “such an analysis is possible onlywithreferencetothegoalsthatfreedomofspeechismeanttoachieve”(ibid.:1238).

Philosophers sometimes suggest that reasoning thiswaydemon-strates the central problemwith theUnited States legal context, inwhichtherighttofreespeechissecuredthroughlaissez-fairepolicieswhichprohibitstaterestrictionofspeechbroadly.Theyobserve, forexample,thatthefirstamendmentprotectsmuchspeechthatismis-leading andharmful in spite of the fact thatwhen the right to freespeech isprotected this far, itsprotection fails tooptimallyadvancethegoalsitismeanttoadvance.Othercountries,theysay,achievea

j.p.messina Freedom of Expression and the Liberalism of Fear

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.20,no.34(november2020)

isasimportanttoprotectpersons’suitablycurtailedlibertyasitistoempowergovernmentstolimitlibertywhenitunderminesthegoalsthatjustifyit.Onthesecondtradition,rightsexistnotbecausethey’reoptimalwaysofrealizinggood,flourishinglives,butbecausehistorydemonstrates their importance for avoiding tyrannical interferencewithliveslivedbythelightsofthoselivingthem.JudithShklarcalledthislatterschoolofthoughttheliberalismoffearandgroundeditinthethoughtofThomasHobbes.Butitmightalso,Ithink,begroundedinanappreciationofJ.S.Mill’spessimisticor“dark”conceptionofhu-mannature.3

Below,IarguethatrecoveringthisdarkerMilliscrucialforanswer-ingrecentMilliancriticismsofU.S.freespeechexceptionalism(here-afterFSE).4Thepaperbegins(§II)bybrieflyreconstructingthreear-gumentsagainstFSE.Next,IspendsometimewiththeIntroductiontoOn Liberty andthePrinciples of Political Economy, towardtheendofrecoveringMill’sdarkerside(§III).SectionIVrevisitstheargumentsagainstFSEandarguesthatattentiontothedarkerMillyieldsacom-pelling reply.SectionVconcludesbysuggestingvarious respects inwhichdefendersofFSEmightbetterrespondtoitsrealcosts.

3. IjoinZaibert(2011)inassociatingMillwiththisliberaltradition.

4. My argument thus embraces the sort of minimalism that Joshua Cohendismissesinhisfamousarticleonspeech.ForCohen,“thecommonthreadrunningthroughtheseveralvariantsofminimalismisthatthedefenseistoproceedwithoutrecoursetothethesisthatexpressionhassubstantialvalue”(Cohen1993:210).Ratherthanpursuingthisroute,minimalistsonCohen’sviewrestsubstantialweighton“the factualassumptionthat regulationsofexpression”commonly involve themere“legislative impositionofexternalpreferences”(ibid.).ButforCohen,minimalistscomeintwovarieties.First,thereare“no-cost”minimalists—theoristswhodenythatexpressiveactivitycanimposecosts(ibid.:218).Cohenreadilydispenseswithsuchviews,anditisnopartoftheargumentherethatexpressionmustbecost-free.Second,however,thereareminimalistswhoadmitthatspeechcanbecostly,butsim-plyrefusetodefendthefreedomofexpressiononthegroundsofitsbenefi-cialeffects.Althoughheseemstoacknowledgetheexistenceofsuchviews,Cohenhasnothingtosayagainstthem.Hissilenceonthispointis,Ithink,aconsiderabledefect.

betterfitbetweenfreedomofexpressionandthevaluesthatjustifyitbyrejectinglaissez-fairewhenitislikelytofrustratethesevalues.Forthesescholars,theUnitedStates’exceptionalisminthedomainoffreespeechjurisprudenceisnotjustregrettable;itispracticallyirrational.

Howeverpopular,Ithinkthisisthewrongwayoflookingatthings.Itiswrongbecauseittreatsrightsprimarilyastoolsforrealizinggoods.Butthereisalonghistoryofprotectingliberalrights,notbecausetheyprotect and advance our positive interests (although they do), butbecause recorded history repeatedly tells the story of persons gain-ingpowerprimarilytoimposetheirvisionofthegoodlifeuponnon-consentingothers.1Thoseempoweredtointerferehavegunsandthemorewearmthemwithjustificationsforturningthemonthosetheyaresupposedtoprotect,thesoonerwefindourselvesonthewrongendofthebarrel.Wesupportrightsagainstinterferencenottorealizecertaingoods,buttoprotectagainstcertainevils.2

Theseapproachesrepresent, in fact, twodistinct traditionsof lib-eralism.Thefirst treats thespecificationof liberalrightsascruciallyimportantbecause,bystrikingjusttherightbalance,wecanrealizeallsortsofgoodthings:creativity,community,self-expression,autonomy,mutual respect, accommodation for difference, etc.On this view, it

1. FredSchauerarguesthatfreedomofspeechisnotmerelyaninstantiationofthegeneralrighttoliberty(1982:ch.1;seealsoUPMS:11).Thisappearstobebecausewevaluespeechmore thanwemightpredictifitweremerelyanapplicationofamoregeneralright.ButIdon’tthinkthisiscorrect.Wecan,asIarguebelow,explainthespecialattentionwegivetospeechnotbyfocusingonthefactthatit’sparticularlyvaluable,butbyfocusingonthefactthatthereareparticularreasonsforotherstowanttointerferehere.Schauertooquicklydismissesthispossibility.

2. Myobjectionhereisthusnotthatdominantaccountsareteleological, butthattheyriskforsakingthereal(negative)teleologicaljustificationsforrightstofreespeech(e.g.,fearofunprincipledgovernmentrepression)for(positive)grounds that open up space precisely for such repression.Of course, oneneednotacceptateleologicalgroundingofrights.Indeed,myownfavoredapproachtorightsisultimatelyclosertothenon-teleologicalviewexpressedbyRipstein (2006).Still, thedominantviewswith respect to rights to freeexpressionareteleological,andIattemptheretoengagewiththemontheirownterms.Thankstoananonymousreaderforpressingmetoaddressthispoint.



thetruthaboutmattersofsocietalimportance”,etc.,andrestrictstherelevant sort of value such speechmight have to epistemic or demo-cratic value (ibid.). Even restrictingweighty, constitutionally guaran-teedspeechof thiskindrisks little lossofvalue,heargues,and thegains from restriction are potentially enormous. For protecting allspeechequallydoeslittlemorethanrealizeaworldinwhichreasonisdrownedoutbynonsense.

To illustrate, Leiter draws on the example of courtroom norms.Whilesuchnormsarespecificallydesignedtoconducetotruth,theycouldnotbe further fromembracing theexpressive laissez-faire thatFSEembraces. Tothedegreethatwefindthesemorerestrictivenormswell-adjusted to thegoalofensuring that the jury reaches the rightdecision,weoughttobeskepticalthatFSEpromotesdemocraticandepistemicvaluesinthepublicsphere(ibid.:410).Leiter’sargumentisasfollows:

(1)Weshouldacceptafreespeechregimeonlyifitpro-motesepistemicvalueordemocraticself-government.6

(2) FSEdoesnot plausibly promote these valuesbetterthanaregimeofregulation(Leiter2016:417).7

(3)Therefore,weoughtnotacceptFSE.

Itshouldbeclearthatthisargumentfollowsthemodellaidoutintheintroduction.Premise(1)articulatesaweightyinterestthattheright

6. Leiterisskepticalofothergroundsofspeechprotections.Heisskepticalofautonomy-based grounds because “neither speakers nor listeners are actu-ally ‘autonomous’… theyare, instead,mostlyartefactsof social,economic,andpsychologicalforcesbeyondtheircontrol,merevesselsthroughwhichthevariousprejudicesoftheircommunitiesortheirpersonalhistoriespass”(2016:423).Whileheembraceseudaemonicgroundsof speechprotection,these,liketheepistemicgrounds,areonlycontingentlyrelatedtoprotectionofspeech.Any“eudaemonicinterestsinexpressingourselveshavetobebal-ancedagainst thecostsofbadandworthlessandharmfulspeech,suchasthoseattendantuponour‘bravenew’cyber-worldof24-houroftenirrespon-sible,dishonestandtwistedinvective”(ibid:427).

7. ForLeiter, it’sat least truethat therelationshipbetweenprotectingspeechandpromotingthesevaluesiscontingent.

II. Against Free Speech Exceptionalism?

FSEreferstotheclusterofinstitutionalnormsthatmakestheUnitedStatesuniquewithregardtotheprotectionofspeech.Together,thesenorms imply that citizens’ expressive acts are not to be interferedwith—evenwhentheyarehatefulorobscene.True,someofwhatisintuitivelyspeech(theproductionofsoundsthroughthevocalcords)orexpressionconstitutesaction.Inemploymentcontexts,uttering(orwriting) thewords “you’re fired” constitutes an act—firing—that isgovernedbynormsofdistributivejusticethatdonotgoverntheutter-anceinothercontexts(e.g.,inanovel’sdialogue)(McGowan2009).Makingacrediblethreatonanotherperson’slifeispossibleonlybymeansoflanguage.SupportersofFSEneednotandshouldnotdenyasmuch.Theymustholdonlythatlegalinterferencewithexpressiveactsaimedmerelyatcommunicatingorrepresentingstatesofaffairs(realorimagined),ideas,feelings,judgments,ideals,orrecommenda-tionsisnottobetolerated. 5Below,Iintroducethreeofthemostprom-inentobjectionstoFSE.IarguethateachcallsfordeparturesfromFSE onthegroundsthatthelatterdoesnotoptimallyadvancethepositiveinterestsfreespeechrightsaresupposedtoadvance.Inotherwords,eachembracesthestrategyIsketchintheintroduction.Then,IshowhowabandoningthisstrategyreframestheobjectionswhileallowingFSEtostand.

A. The Objection from Cacophony Ina recent law reviewarticle,BrianLeiter argues that ifmuchnon-mundanespeechweresuppressed,“littleofactual valuewouldbelostto theworld” (2016: 408). Leiter’s focus is restricted to speech thatconcernsmattersof“politicalandmoralurgency,speechthatpurportstobeofaestheticvalue,speechthatpurports tohelpusunderstand

5. Inthis,FSEfollowsrecentU.S.firstamendmentjurisprudence.However,inrejecting as irrelevant any distinction between low-value and high-valuespeech,itismoreradicalstill.WhereasU.S.constitutionallawdoesnotpro-tect libel, obscenity, and other worthless speech (Brink 2013: 164), propo-nentsofFSEbelievethistobemistaken.



(1)Weshouldacceptafreespeechregimeonlyifdoingsorealizes the interest in communicative freedomequallyforall.

(2) FSE does not realize the interest in communicativefreedomequallyforall.

(3)Therefore,weshouldnotacceptFSE.9

Thefirstpremiseconditions theacceptanceofa freespeechregimeonitsequallyadvancingageneralinterestinfreecommunication,aninterestthatseemsattheheartoftherighttofreespeech.Thesecondpremisecanbeconstruedasaconceptualoranempiricalclaim—andoneitherconstrual,proponentshavesuccessfullymotivateditsplau-sibility.Modustollensyieldstheconclusion.Again,Iwilleventuallyshowthattheproblemliesinthefirstpremise.Fornow,itisenoughtoseethattheargumentisvalid,andthatit,too,employsthestandardstrategy,albeitinaparticularlyinnovativeway.Thereasonstoprotectfreespeechdeterminealsothelimitsofprotection.IftheintereststhefreespeechprincipleisdesignedtoprotectcanbebetteradvancedbydepartingfromFSE,thenmoreregulationis(atleastprotanto) calledfor.

9. Asomewhatdifferentversionofthisargumentobservesthatneutrallypro-tectingtherightstospeakoftheweakandthepowerfultogetherineffecten-suresthatpowerasymmetrieswillreproducethemselvesthroughthepoliti-calsystem(Marcuse1969,MacKinnon1987).Take,forexample,theproblemof climate change. It iswell-known that popular opinion radically departsfromexpertopinionconcerningthequestionofwhetherhumanactionshavecontributedto thewarmingof theearth.But,asCatrionaMcKinnonnotes,thisislikelydueinparttotheproliferationofmisinformationonthepartof“anestablishedinternationalnetworkofwell-fundedorganizationsdevotedtoorganizedclimatechangedenial” (McKinnon2016). Inworking to raisedoubtsaboutthesuretyofclimateresearch,thesepowerfulorganizationscanoftendrownoutmoreinformedscientificopinionandexertundueinfluenceonthemindsandvotesofcitizens.Thus,asMarcuseputsit,eveniftolera-tionforspeechisasensiblegoalofafreesociety,incircumstanceslikeours,wherepowerfulvoicesprevail,“therealizationoftheobjectiveoftolerance[calls]forintolerancetowardprevailingpolicies,attitudes,opinions”(1969:81).

tofreespeechissupposedtoprotectandadvance,andconditionstherationalityof a free speech regimeon its advancement.Premise (2)isaplausibleempiricalclaim,supportedbyLeiter’sobservationsthat“muchunmediatednon-mundanespeech”has“littleepistemicvalue”,oftenamountingtolittlemorethantheepistemicallycostly“endlessrepetitionofsillyopinions”(ibid.:428).HethusrejectsFSE.Aswillbecomeclearbytheend,theproblemliesinthefirstpremise.

B. The Objection from Silencing and Unequal PowerWhereasthefirstobjectiontoFSEpicksoutanindependentgoodthatfreespeechissupposedtoadvanceandnotesthatsometimesrestric-tionsadvance thegoalbetter than their absence, the secondgrantsthatwemayhaveaninterestinfreespeechitself.FollowingCatherineMacKinnon (1987),MaryKateMcGowan,AlexandraAdelman,SaraHelmers, and Jacqueline Stolzenberg argue that, minimally, a freespeechprincipleissupposedtoprotectcitizens’interestincommuni-catingfreely(McGowanetal.2011).8Theproblemisthatourinterestsinfreecommunicationcanconflict.Protectingtheintereststospeakofsome(e.g.,pornographers,racists)involveseffectivelydenyingothers(women, racialminorities) the effective ability to communicate. Forsomespeech,byitsverynature,silences. Astheyputthepoint:

Ifpornographysilenceswomen(andifsilencingviolatesthefreespeechright),thentheveryfreespeechreasonsforprotectingpornographyalsoappeartoaffordreasonsto regulate it. In thisway, the silencingargument turnsthefreespeechdiscussion…onitshead.(ibid.:133)

Sinceitwouldbehardtodenythatprotectingfreespeechistoprotecttheinterestinspeakingfreely,thisisanespeciallytroublingcharge.

Insteps,theargumentgoeslikethis:

8. SeealsoLangton1993;foracritique,seeJacobson1995.



twoarguments,theproblemIwillbepressingisthefalsityoftheargu-ment’sfirstpremise,whichcommitstothestandardstrategy.

***ProponentsoftheaboveargumentsoftenexplicitlyclaimMilliancre-dentials,arguingthatamoreconsistentMillwouldhaverejectedFSE forthereasonstheycite.ForMill’sdefenseofanegativerighttofree-domofexpressionappealstoourweightyinterestsinrepresentativegovernment, discovering the truth, and developing as autonomousindividuals. But one can accept the centrality of these values with-out acceptingFSE. Indeed, in spiteofhis enthusiastic rhetoric,Millhimselfadmitslimitstofreedomofexpression.“[E]venopinions”,hewrites,“losetheirimmunitywhenthecircumstancesinwhichtheyareexpressedaresuchastoconstitutetheirexpressionapositiveinstiga-tiontosomemischievousact”(OL:53).TheargumentsabovesimplypointoutthatMill’sownreasonsforpreferringaregimeoffreeexpres-sionalsosuggestreasonsforregulationthatgobeyondthoseaimedtoprevent“positiveinstigationtosomemischievousact”.

III. The Darker Mill

HavingstatedtheseobjectionstoFSE(andhavingshownthateachofthemappearscompatiblewithabasicallyMillianframework),IturnnowtowardthetaskofuncoveringadarkerMill.WhileMill’sdarkersideis,nodoubt,nothisonlyside,discussionsoffreespeechanditsvaluewoulddowelltocomplementtheirvisionofMillwithanappre-ciationforhispessimisticconceptionofhumannature.11

Tostart,recallthatMillbeginsOn Liberty withabriefhistoryofpo-liticalpower.Atfirst,politicalpowerwasaccededtobecauseitofferedthe vulnerable protection from the strong: “To prevent the weakermembersofthecommunityfrombeingpreyeduponbyinnumerable

11. Jacobson(2000)admitsthatMill’sargumentsforthedoctrineoflibertyrestuponhis“controversialclaimsabouthumannature”(296).Itisapartofmygoal in this essay to showwhat Jacobson conjectures, namely that “a per-spicuousassessmentoftheseclaims,almostacenturyandahalflater,wouldnotbeunflatteringtoMill”(ibid.).

C. The Objection from HarmAthirdMillianargumentappealsdirectlytotheinterestthatgroundsMill’sharmprinciple,namelyaninterest inbeingfreefromharm.Itgoesroughlythisway:

(1)Weshouldacceptafreespeechregimeonlyifitreal-izesfreedomfromsignificantharms.

(2)FSEdoesnotrealizefreedomfromsignificantharms.

(3)SoweshouldrejectFSE.

AsJeremyWaldron—aleadingproponentofthisview—putsit:

The publication of hate speech is calculated… to com-promisethedignityofthoseatwhomitistargeted,bothin theirowneyesand in theeyesofothermembersofsociety.And it sets out tomake the establishment andupholdingof theirdignity—in thesense that Ihavede-scribed—muchmoredifficult.(2012:5)

In undermining the dignity and social standing of minorities, hatespeech issues in a distinct kind of harm—dignitary harm.10 Tolera-tion for significant (dignitary) harms is, in turn, incompatible withtheMillianharm-preventionparadigmrecommendedbyMill’sharmprinciple.

Itiscommontoreacttoargumentsofthiskindbyrejectingthesec-ondpremise.Speechmightoffend,skepticssay,butitsimplycannotharminthesenserelevantforgroundinginterferenceinothers’affairs.This isnottherouteIpursuehere.Thesecondpremise isplausible.Speechisatypeofactand,likeotheracts,mayresultinharm.Indeed,theharmsofspeechcanbemoreseriousandworthyofourconcernthantheharmsassociatedwith“physicalacts”.Instead,aswiththefirst

10.WhileWaldronishimselfreluctanttoextendhisargumenttotheAmericancase(optinginsteadtomakegoodnormativesenseofnon-exceptionalism),othersemploysubstantivelysimilarargumentstogroundagendasofreform.Seee.g.,MaitraandMcGowan2012:passim;McGowan2019:ch.7.



preferencefeltbyotherpeople”injustifyingtheirintolerance(OL:6).Thoseinchargeconsiderquestionsof“whatthingssocietyoughttolikeordislike”withoutconsideringwhethersociety’s“likingsordislik-ingsshouldbealawtoindividuals”(OL:7).

Evenwhenrespectforindividualfreedomappearsprincipled(e.g.,respect for religious difference following the reformation), the ap-pearanceisoftenmisleading:“thosewhofirstbroketheyokeofwhatcalled itself theUniversalChurchwere ingeneralas littlewillingtopermitdifferenceofreligiousopinionasthatchurchitself”(ibid.).12In-stead,theymerelyrealizedthatprudencerecommendedlimitingtheir“hopestoretainingpossessionoftheground[they]alreadyoccupied”thanvyingforpowerovertherest(ibid.).Putdifferently,“minorities,seeingthat theyhadnochanceofbecomingmajorities,wereunderthenecessityofpleading to thosewhomtheycouldnotconvert forpermissiontodiffer”(ibid.).Evenapparentlyprincipledreligioustol-eration,then,comesaboutlessforreasonsofprinciple,andmoreduetoanincapacityforpursuingthemodesofintolerancetheylikebest.ForMill, the point is perfectly general: intolerance is “so natural tomankind” thatmostalleged tolerance ismerelydisguisedweakness(OL:8).Thehumandispositionto“impose[one’s]ownopinionsandinclinationsasaruleofconductonothers”,Millwrites,is“hardlyeverkeptunderrestraintbyanythingotherthanbutwantofpower”(OL:13).

Mill paints apicture according towhichhumanbeings aremed-dlesome,biasedintheirownfavor,andafraidofandoftenhostiletodifference.Theyviewthemeansof legalandsocialcontrolas toolsfor ensuring thatothers live according to theirmodel, andespouseprincipleonlywhentheypredictthatdoingsowillprotectthemfrom12. It is true, as an anonymous refereepoints out, that (inMill’s formulation)

harm is anecessary rather than a sufficient conditionof interference, andrightlyso.Buthis readershavenotalwaysrecognizedthis (seee.g.,Leiter2016:432).Moreover,Millholdsthatinterferencetopreventsignificantharmtoothersisprotantojustified,ashischapteronapplicationsdemonstrates(On Liberty:ch.5).Hereafter,citationstoOn Liberty areabbreviated“OL”;cita-tionstoPrinciples of Political Economy areabbreviated“PPE”.(Foreditions,see:Mill1978,1965.)

vultures,itwasneedfulthatthereshouldbeananimalofpreystrongerthantherest”(OL:2).The“animalofprey”towhichMillrefersis,ofcourse,nothingother than the state.Howevernecessary, the state’sfoundingbringsnewdangers.Justas“thekingofthevultureswouldbenolessbentuponpreyingontheflockthananyoftheminorhar-pies”,soitwasatfirst“indispensabletobeinaperpetualattitudeofde-fenseagainst”thepowerofthestate(ibid.).Thisperpetualattitudeofdefensebroughtwithitnotonlythenotionofpoliticalrightsandlib-ertiesheldagainstgoverningagents—“certain immunities…whichitwasregardedasabreachofdutyintherulertoinfringe”—butalso“constitutionalchecks”onthepowerofthestatetoensurethattheseimmunitieswereadequatelyrespected(ibid.).

Intime,thesechecksonstatepowerweresupplementedbyrepre-sentativegovernment,makingitappearthatthestateandthepeoplesubject to itwere one, and that the state, being constituted by thepeople,couldnotharmthem.Thenation,inMill’swords,nolongerappearedtoneedprotectionagainstwhatitsawas“itsownwill”(OL:3). Indeed,whatonceservedasprotectionsagainst tyrannynowap-pearedasshacklesontheself-legislativecapacityofthegeneralwill.Mill isperhapsbestknownforhistendencytothrowcoldwateronanynaïveidentificationbetweentheindividual’swillandthewillofthemajority.Ashefamouslyputsit,“the‘self-government’spokenofisnotthegovernmentofeachbyhimself,butofeachbyalltherest”(OL:4),andassuch,canverywellbetyrannical.

SomuchforMill’sreadingofthehistoryofpoliticalpower.Thisisreasonablywell-troddenterrain.What’s lessoftendiscussedisMill’saccountofhumannature, whichamplifieshisfamousconcernaboutthetyrannyofthemajority.Humanbeings,Millreports,aregiventobelievethatitisgenerallyunnecessarytoofferreasonsforinterferinginothers’lives,“thattheirfeelingsonsubjectsofthisnaturearebet-terthanreasonsandrenderreasonsunnecessary”(OL:5).Ingeneral,aperson’sgroundsforrestrictingsomebehaviorrunnodeeperthanthe“feeling…thateverybodyshouldberequiredtoactashe”(ibid.).In the best scenarios, persons are prepared to “appeal to a similar



bynotingthatdeparturefromthenormoflaissez-faireinthedomainofspeechisdemandedbytheneedtorealize“somegreatgood”.

ButMillcannothaveitbothways.13Itcannotbeboththathumansareseldomprincipledactors,thattheyfrequentlyusewhatevermeansintheirpowertoimposetheirvisionofthegoodandtherightonoth-erswhodisagree,and that it issoundpracticetocreate institutionalstructures thatgive thepowerful increasedauthority todo just that,merelyundertheguiseofpursuingsomegood.Forevenifwegrantthatsomeproposedregulationonspeechisgroundedinprincipleandisnotaboutimposingasectarianconceptionofthegoodonanyone,butinpreventingharmorrealizingagreatanduniversalgoodstill,lawsdonotdeterminetheirapplication.Peopledo.

It iswellandgoodtonotethatasaphilosophicalmatterofprin-ciple,therearereasonstorestrictcertainkindsofspeech.14Thestand-

13. Ananonymous referee suggests thatMill’s position inOn Liberty is consis-tent in constraining interference to the prevention of harm and thatMillmayhaveabandoned theview(expressed inPrinciples of Political Economy) thatinterferencenecessarytopursuepositivegoodsisjustified.Ifthisiscor-rect, itwouldrelaxthetensionIsee inMill’sposition(therebymakingmytaskeasier).But itwouldnot, I think,eliminate it.Formanyof the“goods”FSEskeptics identifyas important for justifying freespeechregimesadmitof formulationsasharms tobeprevented.Myaccountstressesnotmerelythatrightsaregroundedinpreventingharms,butthattheyaregroundedinpreventingacertainclassofharms,namelythosethatappeartoinevitablyeventuatewhenthestatehasthepowertointerferewithcitizenexpression.

14. Is thisallmyopponentswishtoargue?Perhaps.Towardtheconclusionofhisessay,Leiter,forexample,arguesthatintroducingconcernsoverenforce-mentchangesthetopicfromfreespeechtopoliticalinstitutions:

Ifthekeyquestioninfreespeechjurisprudenceishowtoinsurecompe-tent regulationofbad speech,given thatmuch,maybeevenmost,non-mundanespeechmayturnouttobebadspeech,thenthequestionisnotaboutfreespeechatall,butaboutpoliticalinstitutions.(2016:435)

Thisissomewhatodd,givenLeiter’sfocuson“thepolity”.Inanycase,IbelievethatthequestionsaboutfreedomofspeechandopinionMillmeanttointro-ducewere inherently questionsofpolitical institutionsand theirnormativegrounds,andthattheaboveconsiderationsaboveshowatleastthatmuch.Thus,itseemstomethatifanyoneisguiltyofchangingthetopic,it isnotthoseofusfocusedontheseinstitutionalquestions,butthosewhowouldin-sistonanabstractanalysisofthecontentofcertainpre-politicalmoralrights.

interferencebyotherswhoareinfactstronger.InhisPrinciples of Po-litical Economy, heexplicitlyconnectstheseaspectsofourpsychologywiththeissueoffreeexpression.Asheputsthepointthere,

[although]freedombothofopinionandofdiscussionisadmittedasanaxiominallfreecountries,thisapparentliberality and tolerance has acquired so little of the au-thorityofaprinciple,thatitisalwaysreadytogivewaytothedreadorhorrorinspiredbysomeparticularsortofopinions.(PPEV.x.6)

Whenitdoesgiveway,thegovernmentisaffordedgreaterpowerforintervention.Thisisconcerning,for“everyincreaseofthefunctionsdevolvingonthegovernmentisanincreaseofitspower,bothintheformofauthority,andstillmore,intheindirectformofinfluence”(PPE V.xi.2).Anddemocratic accountability offers thinprotection againstabuse.Electedrepresentativesare“quiteasreadyasanyorgansofoli-garchy,toassumearbitrarypower”whentheycancountonpopularsupport(ibid.).Onthebasisof theseandotherconsiderations,Millconcludesthat“[l]aissez-faire … shouldbethegeneralpractice”,hold-ingatthesametimethat“everydeparturefromit,unlessrequiredbysomegreatgood,isacertainevil”(PPEV.xi.7,emphasisadded).

Millexhortsustobeprincipled,attheverysametimethathisac-countofhumannature throwscoldwateronanyoptimismthatwewillcomply.Hispessimismonthisfront,whichconstituteswhatI’vebeencallinghisdarkerside,leadshimtoadopttheviewthatthestrongdefaultpositionoughttobeliberty,andthatthecaseforinterferencemustbebasedonagreatgoodthatcanbeobtainedonly bymeansoftheinterference.TheemergingMillis,tobesure,apartialMill.ForitisalsoMillthatclaimsthat“interferenceofgovernmentis,withaboutequal frequency, improperly invoked and improperly condemned”(OL:9).ItisalsoMillwhosemodeofargumentationstronglysuggeststhattheobjectionstoFSEcanvassedintheprevioussectionaresoundMillianobjections.For thoseobjectionsappear toproceedprecisely



interestsempowersstateandotherwisepowerfulactors to interfereinindividual’slives,andthesepowersareregularlyandtodisastrouseffectabused.

IV. FSE, Defended

IconcludedthelastsectionbypointingoutatensioninMill’sposition.Hecannot,Iclaimed,abandonFSEinjustanycaseinwhichagreatgoodmaybe efficiently achieved (or an evil averted) by regulatingspeech.Ratherhispessimismabouthumannatureimpliesthatexecu-tives, legislators, judges, andvoters alikewill abuse theirnewpow-erstoregulateinself-servingways.ThedarkerMill’sviewsonhumannaturearesufficientlydarkthatwhatallcanagreeisariskinordinarycontexts(namelythatlegislationmaybeabused)approachesthesta-tusofadecisivefactorinthedomainofspeechacts. AsRonaldCassputthepointsomedecadesago,theprotectionofspeechencodes“afear of certain ill-defined and disparate government actions”, ratherthanapromise to realizecertainpositivegoods (Cass 1987: 1422).15 Therefore,thestartingpoint“isnotwhatisgoodaboutspeech;insteadtheinitialquestioniswhatweretheworriesaboutgovernmentcon-trolofspeech”(ibid.:1443).16

SuchanoutlookcohereswellwithwhatJudithShklarcallsthelib-eralism of fear,whichwoulddirectourattentionnottowhatwemightachievebyrestrictingspeech,buttowhatweriskwhenweempowerpeopletocarryouttherestrictions.Suchaliberalism

worries about the excesses of official agents at everylevel of government, and it assumes that these are apt

15. Indeed,Cassnoteslater,theoriginal“constraintsonfederalpowerwerenottheproductofgeneralbeliefsinliberty,butofmorefocusedfearsaboutitsunjustifiedinfringement”(1987:1441).

16. AlthoughIsympathizewithmuchofCass’snegativeapproach,ourprojectsaremethodologicallydistinct.Heisprimarilyinterestedinofferingacorrecttheoreticalapproachtoissuesoffirstamendmentjurisprudence,whichhaspredictiveaspirations.Here,acorrecttheorycapturesjudges’actualreason-ingaboutcases,andistightlymooredtohistory.Myownaspirationsarenor-mative.WhatisthebestdefenseofFSE,evenifitisnowhererealized?

ing,powerfuldefeaterofthosereasonsissimplythatpoliticalpower-fulactorsarehuman(atbestaccountable tomajoritiesandcounter-majoritarianmechanisms)andthat,quahuman, theyuseprinciplesopportunistically.That is,although theymayclaimtobe interferinginthelivesofothersbyappealtotherelevantprinciple,thiswilloftensimplyservetoconcealthattheyreallyseektoimposetheirpreferreduniformityonothers.Others,sensingthis(orunabletoseethattherestrictionontheirlibertyreallyisprincipled)turnfrompursuingtheirpurposesprivately(sincetheyhavebeenbarredfromdoingso),andseekinsteadtogainpublicpowertoretaliate.Thepredictableresultismoreinterferenceovertimeoftheunprincipledkind,evenshouldtheinitialeffortbewell-meaningandwell-grounded.

InviewofthedarkerMill,theproblemwiththethreeobjectionstoFSEcanvassedin§II isnotthataregimeoffreespeechisanop-timalwayofpursuingtruth. It isnot thatsomepersons’speechcanneverdepriveothersofvoice. It isnot,finally, thata regimeof freespeechwill never result in speech-based harms. The primary prob-lemwitheachoftheseargumentsisnotthenintheirsecondpremises,but in their first premises. Eachfirst premisemakes out that a freespeechregimeistobeacceptedonlyinsofarasitoptimallyadvancessomegoaloravoidscertainkindsofharms.Instead,speechistobeprotected because regulation for the purpose of promoting certain

Inpartforthisreason,IbelieveHoward(2019)iswisetorecommendthatthecontendersinthedebateoverfreespeechmoreclearlyspecifywhichofthreeclaimstheymeantodefend.Theymight,e.g.,meantoarguethat(i)thereisamoralobligationtorefrainfromcertainkindsofspeech,(ii)thatthereisaco-ercibleobligationsotorefrain,or(iii)that,allthingsconsidered,weoughttoregulatetokeepspeechwithinitsproperbounds.Onlybybeingexplicitcanweavoidtalkingpastoneanother.Formypart,Ireadilyacknowledgemoralobligationstorefrainfromcertainkindsofspeech.Myviewislesssettledonwhetherthesedutiesarein-principlepermissiblyenforceable(muchhangsonwhatkindofenforcementisatissue).Mypointinthisessayisonlythat,allthingsconsidered,recognizingarighttofreespeechforthereasonsMilldidimplies that state-sponsoredcontent-basedspeechrestrictionsought tobeopposeduptothepointatwhichtherelevant“speech”constitutesconspiracytocommitacrime.



thenormativefacts,arestrictiononspeechforagoodreasonlookstoapersonwhodisagreesindistinguishablefromanarbitraryrestriction.Inturn,sinceweareimperfectprecedent-basedthinkers,thosewhothinkthattherestrictionwasunjustmayseektorestrictothers’speechinactuallyunjustwaysassoonastheycangainpowerasameansofretaliation.

Marcuse—thegreatintellectualoftheNewLeft—famouslycalledforrepressionofviewsthatwouldopposetheextensionofNewDealpolicies(1969:100).Supposethatsucharestrictionoramoresensi-bleone,saythatproposedbyMcKinnon(2016)againstclimatechangedenialismwere towin legislative favor.Thismayhaveepistemicbenefitsintheshortterm.Butisitsimplyobviousthattheseepistemicbenefitswouldcarryoverinthelongerterm?Orisitnotreasonabletoworrythatthosesilenced(andthosewhoagreewiththosewhohavebeensilenced)arelikelytorespondinkind—tovieforpoliticalpower,claimthatrestrictionsonspeecharenecessary(andadmittedbyop-ponentsanyway)andtoensurethattheygetjusttherestrictionstheywant?17Byhypothesis,theserestrictionswillnotbetherightones.Byhypothesis,theywillbeputinplacebythealreadymoreinfluential.

Skepticsarelikelytoreplythatwealreadyhaveampleproofofthepossibilityofovercomingthedarkersidesofhumannaturewhen itcomestotheregulationofspeech.EventheexceptionalUnitedStateshas triumphed in this respect. First amendment freedoms, theywillsay,haveneverincludedthefreedomtoincitetoillegalactivity,andrestrictions on fightingwords have been applied reasonably impar-tially.Second,othercountrieshaveenactedrestrictionsonspeechthatgowellbeyond these restrictionsandarewordedpreciselyenoughas tobe successfully implementedwithoutwidespreadabuse.Thus,proposed regulations (e.g., regulations on pornography and hatespeech)mightbesuccessfullyimplemented.Therearerisks,true.But,

17. WeseethisalreadyinTrump’sclaimthatmediaoutletscriticalofhisadmin-istrationoughttobesilencedbymeansofabroadeningoflibellaws.Howmuchbetterhiscaselookstothosesympatheticwithhimifwehaveadmittedrestrictionsinotherdomains.ForarecordofTrump’stroublingclaimsaboutfreeexpressioncompiledbytheACLU,seeTashman2017.

toburden thepoorandweakmostheavily.Thehistoryofthepoorcomparedtothatofthevariouselitesmakesthatobviousenough.Theassumption,amplyjustifiedbyeverypageofpoliticalhistory,isthatsomeagentsofgov-ernmentwillbehavelawlesslyandbrutallyinsmallorbigwaysmostofthetimeunlesstheyarepreventedfromdo-ingso.(Shklar1989:28)

Theliberalismoffeardoesnotdenythattherearepowerasymmetriesbetweenprivatecitizensorbetweenindividualsandcorporatebodies.Nordoesitdenythatmuchspeechisofitselfworthlessorcounterpro-ductiveorevenharmful,orthatthesefactsaresensibleobjectsofcon-cern.Itsimplynotesthatprovidingadditionalspaceforgovernmentstoexercisearbitrarypowerisanoddmedicine.AsShklarputsit,“whilethesourcesofsocialoppressionareindeednumerous,nonehasthedeadlyeffectofthosewho,asagentsofthemodernstate,haveuniqueresourcesofphysicalmight andpersuasionat theirdisposal” (ibid.:21). Inmyview—inspiredbyShklar,Cass,andthedarkerMill—weshouldembraceFSEandrejectcallsforspeech-restrictivelegislationinsofar as we fear providing government actors—themselves oftenrichandpowerfulprivateagents—withthepowertorestrictspeech,andthusrejectcallstoregulatespeech.

Onemightreply:allevilscanbereframedasprivationsofgoods,andsointermsofthem,andallgoodscanbereframedasabsencesofevils,andsointermsofthem.Whileaversionofthisissuretoberight,nevertheless,thedifferenceinframingmatters.Liberalsoffearfocusneitheronthewaysinwhichspeechisgoodnoronthewaysthatitin-vitesevil,butonthereasonswhyspeechisthekindofthingthatpow-erfulpeoplewanttointerferewith.Fearfulliberalsnoticethatrestrict-ing expression—more than restricting action—can aid to achieveconformityinthought,andthatitisthereforeimportanttokeeptoolsofrestrictionoutofthehandsofthepowerful.Theyunderstandthat,forbeingslikeus,diversityisdifficult,andthisdifficultyoftenleadsustowanttosnuffitout.Theyrecognizethat,becausewedisagreeabout



factwasknownandrelieduponbythosewhosent thepaperout.(ibid.)

Sincewedonotknowhowstrongthegovernment’sevidencewasinthisdirection,Holmesandtheotherjusticesunanimouslyagreed,theconvictionmustbeupheld.Therearemanyearlycaseslikethis.

Therearetwothingstonoticeabouttheseearlycases.First,theyupheld convictions that seem (independently of the constitutionalissuesatstake)unjust.Minoritysocialistopinionsinfactunlikelytoposeanyrealdangertoanyoneweresuppressedtopromoteanatmo-sphereofunitysurroundingthestate’sinterests.Thecourttrusted—inaway that it shouldnot have trusted—the government’s judgmentthat the relevant speech posed a clear and present danger that thestate’srepressionjustifiablysoughttoavert.Inotherwords,theclearandpresentdanger test—placed in thehandsof real-worldauthori-ties—ledtotherepressionofspeechthatoughtnottohavebeenre-pressedandthewrongfulimprisonmentofindividualswhoserightstospeakoughttohavebeenprotected.ForcriticsofFSEtociteHolmes’words with approval is, therefore, somewhat odd. For the contextinwhich thesewordsweredelivereddisplaysquite clearly the truegroundsofFSE—fearofabuseandinappropriaterestrictionofspeechresultinginthebrutalpunishmentoftheinnocent.

The second thing to notice is that this era of jurisprudencewasshort-lived.Standingbytheseearlierdecisionsatthesametimethatheseemedtocontradictthem,Holmeshimselfbegantoshiftthetideofjudicialopinioninamorespeech-protectivedirectionwhenhede-liveredthedissentingopinioninAbrams v. United States.18Inthiscase,fiveindividualsprintedanddistributedpamphletsadvocatingtheendofcapitalismandtheunityofworkers’interestsacrosstheglobe.Thepamphlet especially encouraged the end of American interventioninRussia.WhilethecourtmajorityupheldtheconvictionsundertheEspionageAct, citing theearlierdecisionsasprecedent,Holmesde-murred,claimingthattherewasnoclearandpresentdanger inthis

18. Foraniceaccountofthisimportantreversal,see(Healy2013).

asCatherineMacKinnonsays,risksthatregulationswillbe“misusedhavetobemeasuredagainst therisksof thestatusquo”(1987:195).Bycontrast,FSEseemsto implausibly implythatweshouldn’tevenundertakethecalculation.Let’staketheseobjectionsinturn.

First,note thatFSEskepticsarequick toremindreaders that theU.S.asamatterofdoctrineallowsforregulationofspeech,oftencitingwithzealJusticeOliverWendellHolmes’claimthatthereisnoprotect-edlibertytoshoutfireinatheaterandcauseapanic(Schenck v. United States,249U.S.471919).Speech,inshort,isnotanabsoluteright,hasnot been treated as suchby the courts, andneednot be treated assuchtoensurejustoutcomes.Itisironic,Ithink,thatthesewordsaredrawnfromacasepursuanttotheEspionageActof1917.Theplain-tiff,CharlesSchenck(thengeneralsecretaryoftheAmericanSocialistParty),distributedapamphlettodraftees,encouragingthemtoclaimtheir13thamendmentrightsagainstenslavementandevadethedraft.HewasconvictedforconspiracytoviolatetheEspionageActandap-pealed to the SupremeCourt, claiming violation of his first amend-mentrights.ThecourtheldthatSchenck’sdocument,circulatedasitwas inwartime and intended as itwas to obstruct the draft, consti-tutedanattempttoincitetoillegalactivity.Schenck’sspeech,Holmesjudged,wasjustlikeshoutingfireinacrowdedtheater.Initsdecision,thecourtconcurredwithHolmes’opinionunanimously.

Ina secondcaseaffirming thesameprinciple (Frohwerk v. United States, 249U.S.1919),JusticeHolmesdeliveredtheopinionofthecourt,againupholdingaconvictionforincitement.JacobFrohwerkhadpub-lishedaseriesofarticlescriticizingtheinvolvementoftheU.S.withWorldWar I.For this,Frohwerk, too,wasconvictedofviolating theEspionageAct.Again,thecourtruledunanimouslytoupholdtheim-posedpenalties.Giventhefactsastheywere,Holmesconcludedthatitwassimply

impossibletosaythatitmightnothavebeenfoundthatthecirculationofthepaperwasinquarterswherealittlebreathwouldbeenoughtokindleaflameandthat the



formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism”(395U.S.4441969).ThecourtruledthatOhio’sstatutemustbestruckdown.Forthefirsttime,thegovernmentwasnowclearlyheldtobeincapableofrestrictingspeechsofarasthisstopsshortof“preparingagroupforviolentactionandstillingittosuchaction”,i.e.,engaginginspeechthatcomesarbitrarilyclosetocriminalconspiracy(ibid.).

ThetestarticulatedinBrandenburgwassimilarlyappliedtoacaseintheearlyeighties,surroundingtheNAACP’sboycottofracistwhite-ownedbusinesses.Aconsortiumofwhite-ownedbusinessesclaimeddamagesinresponsetotheboycott,whichtheywereawardedbythelowercourts.TheNAACPclaimedthatassessingdamagesinthiswayviolatedtheirfirstamendmentrighttopeaceablyassembleforpoliti-cal change.At issue in the casewaswhether theNAACP’s boycottwasprotectedby thefirstamendment,given thatspeechassociatedwiththeboycottconstitutedincitementtounlawfulactivity(e.g.,anNAACPofficialstatedinameeting:“Ifwecatchanyofyougoinginanyofthemraciststores,we’regonnabreakyourdamnneck”).Thecourt (rightly) held (1) that the fact that some associated speechwasunprotecteddoesnotentailthattheentireboycottmustalsobedeemedunprotected, and (2) that, in any case, the relevant speechfailedtomeetthetest(incitementtoimminentlawlessaction)setoutinBrandenburg foridentifyingunprotectedspeech(458U.S.9271982). Thedecisionofthelowercourtswasthusreversed.

Ineachofthesecases,thecourt’sreasoningfollowsasimilarpat-tern.Thereisnoabsoluterighttospeak;thestatehasaninterestinregulatingspeechthatendangersthegeneralwelfare;thecrucialques-tioniswhetherthespeechcountsasincitement(andtheanswerisse-curedbyapplyingcertaintests,construedincreasinglynarrowlyovertime19).The issue is thatdependingonwho is sittingon thebench,thatsamebasicpatternofreasoningyieldsradicallydifferentresults.Somecourtsmanagetoprotectspeechagainstimproperstateregula-tion,andothersnot.Sinceourjusticesystemisprecedent-based,the

19. Infact, legalscholarspointtothreetests:clearandpresentdanger,reason-ablesuspicionofdanger,andincitementtoanimminentlawlessaction.

caseandthatthemarketplaceofideaswasworthprotecting,dangersaside.Later,inGitlow v. New York(268U.S.6521925),BenjaminGitlowwasindictedforthestatutorycrimeofcriminalanarchy.Gitlowpub-lishedamanifestoinThe Revolutionary Age advocatingforviolentrevo-lutionanddecryingmoderatesocialismthatworkedonthemargins.Deliveringtheopinionofthecourt,JusticeSanfordwrotethat

a State in the exercise of its police powermay punishthose who abuse this freedom [the freedom of expres-sion]byutterancesinimicaltothepublicwelfare,tendingto corruptpublicmorals, incite to crime,ordisturb thepublicpeace.(ibid.)

Sanfordarguedthatthestatewastojudgetheregulationsrequiredinthepursuitoftheseinterests,andthusthatevery“presumptionistobeindulgedinfavorofthevalidityofthestatute”(ibid.).JusticesHolmesandBrandeisdissented,holdinginthesecasesthattherewasnoclearandpresentdangerofrevolution.

Althoughjudicialsentimentbegantochange,then,changewouldultimatelybeslow.Continuingitspatternofupholdingwrongfulcon-victions,theMcCarthy-eracourtfamouslyupheldtheconstitutionalityoftheSmithAct,whichheldthatitwasacriminaloffensetobelongtoagroupthatadvocated(ortoadvocateoneself) fortheviolentover-throwofthegovernment.Theactresultedinseveralwrongfulconvic-tions,thevictimsofwhichwereoverwhelminglyvulnerablemembersofthepoliticalleft.Itwasn’tuntilBrandenburg thattheclearandpres-entdangertestwasconstruedinasufficientlynarrowwaybyamajor-ityofjusticestooverturnwrongfulconvictionsandstrikedownunjustregulationsonspeechofthekindcanvassedthusfar.

In Brandenburg, a KKK rally was deemed protected against theOhioCriminalSyndicalismstatute.Underthisstatute,aKKKmemberwasfoundguiltyof“advocat[ing]…theduty,necessity,orproprietyof crime, sabotage, violence, orunlawfulmethodsof terrorismas ameansofaccomplishingindustrialorpoliticalreform”andfor“volun-tarilyassembl[ing]withanysociety,group,orassemblageofpersons



legislationinquestionisoverlybroadorvague,orimpermissiblyre-strictsthecontentofspeech(ibid.).

Itisn’thardtoseewhyfightingwordsstatutesareoftendismissedby the courts as unconstitutionally broad or vague. Consider thecourt’sreasoninginGooding v. Wilson (405U.S.518).InFultonCounty,Georgia,code§26-6303providesthat“anypersonwhoshall,withoutprovocationusetoorofanother,andinhispresence…opprobriouswords or abusive language, tending to cause a breachof the peace…shallbeguiltyofamisdemeanor”.Goodingwas indictedforutter-ing, amongothers, thewords “White sonof abitch, I’ll kill you” toapoliceofficerattempting to restoreorder. JusticeBrennan,deliver-ing theopinionof the court, argued that “thedictionarydefinitionsof ‘opprobrious’and ‘abusive’give themgreater reach than ‘fightingwords’”.Withthesewords,inanycase,theentirejurisprudentialbasisforrefusingconstitutionalprotectionforfightingwordsisundone,thecourt’srefusaltoreverseChaplinsky notwithstanding.FortheoriginalChaplinsky rulingconcernedastatutethatprohibitedintendingto“an-noy”anotherpersoninapublicplace,andsurelyannoyancereachesnolessfarthan“opprobrium”.Gooding isoneofmanycasesinwhichthecourtveersstronglyinaspeech-protectivedirectionthatmakesitverydifficultforgovernmentstoregulatefightingwords.What’smoreisthat,pertainingtoboththefightingwordsdoctrineandtheincite-mentdoctrine,thecourtfailedtoprotectcitizens’speechuntilittiedits ownhandsbymaking it nearly impossible to characterize theseclassesofspeechasunprotected.20

20.Chemerinskyreportsthatthecourt’sdecisioninR.A.V. v. City of St. Paul Min-nesota wasthenailinthecoffinofthefightingwordsdoctrine.St.PaulMin-nesota’sBias-MotivatedCrimeOrdinanceprovidesexplicitlythat

whoeverplacesonpublicorprivatepropertyasymbol,object,appellation,characterizationorgraffiti,including,butnotlimitedto,aburningcrossorNaziswastika,whichoneknowsorhasreasonablegrounds toknowarousesanger,alarmorresentment inothersonthebasisof race,color,creed,religion,orgendercommitsdisorderlyconductandshallbeguiltyofamisdemeanor.

InR.A.V. (505U.S.3771992),JusticeScaliadeliveredtheopinionofthecourt,

resultoftheparticulardirectionofthecourthasbeentopressinthedirectionofgreaterprotectionofspeech—thisinlargepartiswhereourcurrentexceptionalismhascomefrom.It’sworthnotingwellhowdelicateafactthatis.Schenckhasneverbeenoverturned.Itremainsgoodlaw.

That FSE skeptics invoke the U.S. doctrine of failing to protectfightingwords is similarly strange.The landmarkcase inwhich theSupremeCourtdefendsabanonfightingwordsisChaplinsky v. New Hampshire(315U.S.5681942).Thestatutereads:

No person shall address any offensive, derisive or an-noyingwordtoanyotherpersonwhoislawfullyinanystreetorotherpublicplace,norcallhimbyanyoffensiveorderisivename,normakeanynoiseorexclamationinhispresenceandhearingwithintenttoderide,offendorannoyhim,or topreventhim frompursuinghis lawfulbusinessoroccupation.

Thecourtupheldthelaw.Itreported:

Therearecertainwell-definedandnarrowlylimitedclass-es of speech, the prevention andpunishment ofwhichhasneverbeenthoughttoraiseanyConstitutionalprob-lem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,thelibelous,andtheinsultingor‘fighting’words—thosethatbytheirveryutteranceinflictinjuryortendtoinciteanimmediatebreachofthepeace.(ibid.)

Theironyisthat,thoughChaplinsky remainsgoodlawandhasneverbeenreversed,thecourthasneveragainupheldafightingwordscon-viction.AsChemerinskyreports,“everytimetheCourthasrevieweda case involving fightingwords [after Chaplinsky], theCourt has re-versed the conviction, but without overrulingChaplinsky” (Chemer-inksy2017:1387).Todothis,thecourthasheldeitherthatthefight-ingwordsdoctrine“appliesonlytospeechdirectedatanotherpersonthatislikelytoproduceaviolentresponse”orthatthefightingwords



doesnotcauseharmissupportedbyappealtoexistingpractice,e.g.,inplaceslikeCanada,whichoutlawshatespeechthus:

319(2): Every one who, by communicating statements,otherthaninprivateconversation,willfullypromotesha-tredagainstanyidentifiablegroupisguiltyof

(a)anindictableoffenseandisliabletoimprisonmentforatermnotexceedingtwoyears;or

(b)anoffencepunishableonsummaryconviction.21

While this lawappearscapableofabuse, therehavebeen relativelyfew reports of actual abuse (Bleich 2011). Proponents of regulationwillsaythatthiscementstheircase.Torejectgoodregulations(likeCanada’s)becauseofthebarepossibilitythatthey’llbeabusedistomakeaslipperyslopeargumentoftheworstkind.

Perhaps.Butfirst:itisworthventuringbeyondCanadaandEurope,whereliberaldemocraticinstitutionshaveenjoyedremarkablestabil-ity.Forthatkindofstabilityiseasytotakeforgranted,andliberalsoffearowingtotheirfearwishtotakelittleforgranted.IncountriesintransitionlikeIndia(Eswaran1992)andSouthAfrica(Johannessen1992;Marcus1992),attemptstoregulatehatespeechandincitementtoracialviolencehavenotsuccessfullyavoidedbeingabused,despitethefactthattheregulationsarecastinlanguagesimilartothatfoundinCanada and variousEuropean countries.Rather, theyhavebeenusedbythepowerfultopursuetheirownpoliticalgainandtorepressthosewithwhomtheydisagree,especiallyvoicesonthepoliticalleft.

21. Canadahasbuiltinsomeimportantexceptions:319(3):Nopersonshallbeconvictedofanoffenceundersubsection(2)ifheestablishesthatthestatementscommunicatedweretrue;if,ingoodfaith,heexpressedorattemptedtoestablishanargumentona

religioussubject;ifthestatementswererelevanttoanysubjectofpublicinterest,thediscus-

sionofwhichwasforthepublicbenefit,andifonreasonablegroundshebelievedthemtobetrue;or

if,ingoodfaith,heintendedtopointout,forthepurposeofremoval,mat-tersproducingortendingtoproducefeelingsofhatredtowardaniden-tifiablegroupinCanada.

For the defender of FSE, these are promising developments.Speech—even that which might lead others to commit vio-lence—oughtnottoberestrictedbylaw. ThehistorythathasbroughtitaboutthatverylittleofsuchspeechiscapableofrestrictionintheUnitedStatesislongandwinding,andstronglysuggeststhatMillwascorrect toworry that anything shyof absoluteprotection in thedo-mainofspeechwasaskingfortrouble.Still,itisnotcrazytolookatthishistory,acknowledgetherisks,anddeterminethattheyaretoler-able.Moreover,thecriticofFSEcanjoinwithitsproponentsincele-bratingthesetrends.Holdingthatsometimesspeechcanberegulateddoesnotcommitonetoapplaudingtheearlycourt’scapaciousunder-standingofunprotectedspeech.What’smore is that therearesomelimitations on speech—restricting, e.g., pornography, hate speech,andfraudulentpoliticallymotivatedspeechthatdonotseemliabletoexcessiveabuse.

Thereare two linesof response to thismorespecificworry.First,proposed formulations of the relevant restrictions do indeed raiserealisticworriesofabuse.Second, incontextsofdeepdisagreement,wheretheimportanceofexpressivelibertyiswidelyrecognized,sup-pressionof controversial speechprovidesgroundsof reciprocity forthosewhoengageinsuchspeechtovieforpoliticalpowertosuppressspeechtheydon’tlike.Thefactthatsomepersonsarecorrectintheirconcernsandothersarenotmatterslittle.Forinpolitics,power,nottruthorrightness,isthe(empirical)rule.

Theideathatcertaincountrieshavealreadystruckabetterbalancebetweenrespectingthelibertyofexpressionandensuringthatspeech

strikingdownthelegislationnotonthegroundsthatitwasoverlybroad—thecourtheldthatitwasnarrowlytailoredtounprotectedspeech—butonthegrounds that it restrictedonly speech that causedangeror resentmentonspecifiedgroundsofrace,color,creed,religion,orgender,i.e.,amountedtoa content-based restriction. PostR.A.V., Chemerinsky explains, a narrowlyconstrued statutewould violateprohibitionson content-based restrictions.Bycontrast,ifastatutewerenotnarrowlyconstrued,itwouldrunupagainsttheprohibitiononover-breadth.Thishadtheeffectofbasicallyguaranteeingthatfightingwordslegislationwouldbestruckdownbythecourts(Chemer-insky2017:1396).



right,weshouldexpectfortheseindividualsandgroups,resentfulofzealtorestricttheirownspeech,toviefortheirownfavoredspeechre-strictions,sofarastheyhavethepowertodoso.Itgoeswithoutsayingthattheresultofthiswouldbeaninappropriatesuppressionofideas,likelyinvolvingtheunjustjailingofpersons.Ingeneral:thepostwarperiodwhichhasgrownbothAmericanfreespeechjurisprudenceandEuropean andCanadian restrictions remains relatively young—per-hapstooyoungforcriticsof the liberalismof fear todeclarevictory.Fortheliberalismoffearrecognizesthatweliveinadynamicworld,thatvictorieswonmightbereversedintime.Weoughtaccordinglytohaveinplacethemostgeneralsafeguardsforourfreedoms,thattheymaybewrestedfromusonlywithgreatdifficulty.

V. Conclusion

IhavearguedthattheprimaryproblemwithmostrecentattemptstodiscreditFSEliesintheirembraceoftheoptimisticJ.S.Millattheex-penseofhisdarkerside.Aspoliticalactorsandvoters,weshouldbehighlyskepticalofregulationsofspeech,evenwhenthoseregulationstakeaimat speechwhich ismisleading, foolish,hateful,orharmfulforthepurposeofrealizinggreatgoods,andevenwhentheproposedrestrictionsappearunassailable(noyelling“fire”inpublicplaces).Thereasonisnotthattheoutlawedspeechmight(inwaysdifficulttopre-dict)contributetothegood(althoughitmay25).Thereasonisthattheoutlawinginvolvescreatingnewpowersforstateagentstointerfereinindividuallives—powerswhichmightcontinuallyexpandinwaysthatwereasonablyfear.

Butallofthismightringseriouslyhollow.FornoneofitaddressestheobviouspointthatFSEimposesburdensoncitizensanddoesnotdo so equally.Women, racialminorities, and the poor are asked toacceptdutiesoftolerationforspeechthatdemeanstheminexchangeforthefreedomsofthealreadywell-offandbigoted.Insayingnothingaboutthis,thedefenderofFSEseemsinsensitivetoseriousinequities.

25. Schulzke2016.

Their abuse has meant punishment of innocent people—and thewidelyrecognizedBlackstoneruleholdsthatpunishingtheinnocentisworsebyordersofmagnitudethannotpunishingtheguilty.Andsecond,arecentreportbyGlenGreenwaldsuggeststhatthestoryincountrieslikeFranceandEnglandisnotasencouragingasFSEskep-ticsmighthaveyoubelieve.In2015France,forexample,12activistswerearrestedandsentencedforwearingT-shirtsthatread,“LongLivePalestine, Boycott Israel”. When challenged, the sentences held up.TheT-shirtswerealleged(andfoundbythecourts)tobeantisemitic(Greenwald2017).Ifthere’sanydoubtthattheU.S.isatriskforgoingthesameway, lookno further than the legislationon the table thatwouldmakeitillegalforcompaniestoboycottIsrael.22OrthefactthatRepublicanlegislatorsarealready tryingtogetBlackLivesMatterclas-sifiedasahategroup.23Aslipperyslopeargument—sofarasitisfal-lacious—providesnorealreasontobelieveintheslipperinessoftheslope.Bycontrast,thereisheresignificantreasonforcautionbeforeanicyhill.

Onemightarguethatabuseinsuchcases—realorimagined—isnotafailureofthelaws,butafailureofdemocraticaccountabilityinthesecountries.Butitisimportantthatwhataccountabilitytoademos securesdependsupon thecompositionof thedemos.Andallacrosstheworld,wearewitnessingaresurgenceofhategroupsandfar-rightpoliticalactivity.Weignorethesetrendsatourperilandshouldstrivetobetterunderstandtheirsources.Leadersofthesegroupsarealreadyleveraging the state’s laws against libel anddefamation to suppresstheircriticsandareexplicitlycriticalofdeviancefromFSE.24IfMillis

22. S.720−115thCongress: IsraelAnti-BoycottAct,<https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s720>. Or, more recently, consider Trump’s executiveordercondemningaparticularbrandofantisemitismoncollegecampuses(CBS2019).

23. Trumphasalsocalledtohaveantifaclassifiedasaterroristorganization(Al-eem2019).

24. For example,GavinMcInnes has already launched a libel suit against theSouthernPovertyLawCenterforclassifyinghimasawhitesupremacistandanextremist(Wilson2019).



speech,toreviewsourcesofinformation(weedingoutepistemicallyvicioussources),andtoprovideeducationalandoutreachservicesfortacklinghateandbigotryat itsveryroots.With thesecalls toricherimagination,Iconclude.

References

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