freedom of religion: case digest

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LIST OF CASES Philippine Cases/Sources AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937 AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957 BASA vs. FOITAF G.R. No. L- 27113. November 19, 1974 CENTENO vs. VILLALON-PORNILLOS G.R. No. 113092. September 1, 1994 DOMINADOR ANUCENSION vs. NATIONAL LABOR UNION G.R. No. L-26097 November 29, 1977 EBRALINAG vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU G.R. No. 95770. December 29, 1995 ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02- 1651 June 22, 2006 GARCES vs. ESTENZO G.R. No. L- 53487. May 25, 1981 GERMAN vs. GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN G.R. No. 68828 March 27, 1985 GERONA, ET AL. vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL. G.R. No. L-13954 August 12, 1959 GONZALEZ vs. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA G.R. No. 27619 February 4, 1928 GONZALES vs. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION G.R. No. L-38178 October 3, 1985 IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.) vs. CA G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996 JAMIAS vs. RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. L-2133 July 22, 1948 LONG vs. BASA G.R. Nos. 134963-64 September 27, 2001

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Page 1: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

LIST OF CASES

Philippine Cases/Sources

AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957

BASA vs. FOITAF G.R. No. L-27113. November 19, 1974

CENTENO vs. VILLALON-PORNILLOS G.R. No. 113092. September 1, 1994

DOMINADOR ANUCENSION vs. NATIONAL LABOR UNION

G.R. No. L-26097 November 29, 1977

EBRALINAG vs. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

G.R. No. 95770. December 29, 1995

ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006

GARCES vs. ESTENZO G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981

GERMAN vs. GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN G.R. No. 68828 March 27, 1985

GERONA, ET AL. vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-13954 August 12, 1959

GONZALEZ vs. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA

G.R. No. 27619 February 4, 1928

GONZALES vs. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION

G.R. No. L-38178 October 3, 1985

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.) vs. CA G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996

JAMIAS vs. RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. L-2133 July 22, 1948

LONG vs. BASA G.R. Nos. 134963-64 September 27, 2001

MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 155282 January 17, 2005

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

G.R. No. 135306 January 28, 2003

Page 2: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982

RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE HOURS)

A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005

SORIANO vs. LAGUARDIA G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC.

G.R. No. 171905 June 20, 2012

VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION

G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

Foreign Cases/Sources

COX et. Al, v. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC

ARCH R. EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EWING TOWNSHIP

330 US 1

WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BARNETTE

319 U.S. 624

Page 3: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent

G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts

from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic

Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating

that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of

religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for

the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a

weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in

accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the

production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

HELD:

The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize

violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor

a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman

Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally

planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat

XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic

Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the

Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event

Page 4: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably

linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from

it was not the aim or purpose of the Government.

Page 5: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-9637. April 30, 1957.

FACTS:

In the course of its ministry, American Bible Society’s Philippine agency has been

distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (since 1898, but except during the

Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several

Philippine dialects. On 29 May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed the

Society that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November1945,

without providing itself with the necessary Mayor’s permit and municipal license, in violation of

Ordinance 3000, as amended, and Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the Society

to secure, within 3 days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise

covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2ndquarter of 1953, in the total sum of

P5,821.45. On 24 October 1953, the Society paid to the City Treasurer under protest the said

permit and license fees, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer that suit would be

taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which the said fees were being

collected, which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action.

After hearing, the lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not said Ordinances are constitutional and valid.

HELD:

Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sales of bibles and religious articles. The City

Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general

merchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in

Page 6: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, and

required plaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license. Plaintiff protested against this

requirement and claimed that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. Held: It is true

the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual

cost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation

of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No.

2529, as amended, which requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of

general merchandise, cannot be applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its

free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of

dissemination of religious beliefs. Upon the other hand, City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended,

which requires the obtention of the Mayor’s permit before any person can engage in any of the

businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, does not impose any charge upon the

enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices?

Hence, it cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as

Ordinance No. 2529 is not applicable to plaintiff and the City of Manila is powerless to license or

tax the business of plaintiff society involved herein, for the reasons above stated, Ordinance No.

3000 is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

Page 7: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

SABINA BASA, BONIFACIO BASA, BONIFACIO CABALHIN and PRIMlTIVO GALLARDO,

plaintiffs-appellees, vs. FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA INDUSTRIA TABAQUERA Y OTROS

TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS (FOITAF) and LA DICHA LA PAZ Y BUEN VIAJE CIGAR

AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, defendants. FEDERACION OBRERA DE LA INDUSTRIA

TABAQUERA Y OTROS TRABAJADORES DE FILIPINAS (FOITAF),

defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-27113. November 19, 1974.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs-appellees Sabina Basa, Bonifacio Basa, Bonifacio Cabalhin and Primitivo

Gallardo, who are members of "Iglesia ni Cristo", have been employed with the defendant

company, La Dicha La Paz y Buen Viaje Cigar and Cigarette Factory, since 1949, 1952, 1960

and 1957, respectively, and were therefore employees of that company on April 21, 1961, when

the collective bargaining contract between the company and the defendant union, Federacion

Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas (FOITAF) was executed.

The plaintiffs-appellees were members in good standing of the labor union until August

28, 1964, when they formally resigned from the Union invoking their constitutional right to

freedom of religion, the free exercise of which exempts them from being compelled to join any

labor organization, when such is contrary to their religious beliefs and convictions, as provided

by Republic Act No. 3350, which became a law on June 18, 1961.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 is violative of the fundamental charter, as it

infringes on the constitutional bar against a law respecting an establishment of religion or a

religious test for the exercise of civil and political rights.

Page 8: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

Republic Act No. 3350 classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage

of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and

convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit

membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary

or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of

employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in

their dogmas and canons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are

found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond

imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among

the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their

possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion than

before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important and should not be

ignored. Republic Act No. 3350 exempts them from joining any labor organization, when such is

contrary to their religious beliefs and convictions.

Page 9: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 113092. September 1, 1994.

FACTS:

Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay composed of elerly men of a civic

organization launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in

Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner, Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge

Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00.

The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and

Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD

No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the

ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564

only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for

a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.

ISSUE:

Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to

include a religious purpose?

HELD:

No and that legislative enactments usually and specifically indicates "charitable" and "religious"

in an enumeration, whereas in Presidential Decree No. 1564. it merely stated "charitable or

public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never

intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no

Page 10: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

reason why it would not have so stated expressly. Solicitation for religious purposes may be

subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at

bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of

Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally

liable therefore.

Page 11: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

DOMINADOR ANUCENSION AND 114 OTHER IGLESIA NI CRISTO AGRICULTURAL

WORKERS OF HACIENDA LUISITA, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR UNION, TARLAC

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-26097. November 29, 1977.

FACTS:

Petitioner union and the Hacienda entered into a collective bargaining agreement on

August 2, 1962, which, among others, embodies union security provisions. Prior to the

execution of the collective contract of August 2, 1962, the same union security provisions

appeared verbatim in the collective bargaining contract that was in force from 1959 to 1962. In a

letter to the union president, Rufino D. Lagman, dated May 8, 1964, a group of more than one

hundred and fifty persons representing themselves to be members of the United Luisita

Workers' Union (NLU), and followers of a religious sect known as the Iglesia ni Cristo, made

manifest their 'irrevocable resignation' from the United Luisita Workers' Union (NLU), herein

called the UNION for short. The letter ended with the statement that 'We believe our resignation

is legal and it is within the purview of the freedom of religion guaranteed by our Constitution.

Hence, it cannot be made a ground for the termination of our employment nor a cause for

discrimination against us.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners may be dismissed on the ground of resignation from the

union.

HELD:

No. The Court come to the inescapable conclusion that the petitioners cannot be

summarily dismissed from their employment in the Hacienda as a result of their resignation from

Page 12: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

the respondent Union, notwithstanding the existence of a union shop security clause in the

Collective Bargaining Agreement of August 2, 1962, since Republic Act 3350, which is

constitutional, exempts them from joining any labor organization, when such is contrary to their

religious beliefs and convictions.

Page 13: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ROEL EBRALINAG, EMILY EBRALINAG, et. al., petitioners, vs. THE DIVISION

SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU, and MR. MANUEL F. BIONGCOG, Cebu

District Supervisor, respondents

G.R. NO. 95770 March 1, 1993

FACTS:

The petitioners who are minor students and a member of the Jehova’s Witness sect

were expelled from their classes by the respondent public school authorities in Cebu for refusing

to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. Jehovah's Witnesses

admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the

patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which

they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God”. They feel bound by the

Bible's command to "guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag as an image or idol

representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute

and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of

the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control.

ISSUE:

Whether school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's

Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of

their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or

singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic

pledge

Page 14: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to

religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought.

2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation

to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals,

health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the

school is not justified. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony

but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the

Students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies

quietly, it doesn’t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the

petitioner’s request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools.

The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s

right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute

ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national

heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore,

expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified. Expulsion is ANNULLED.

Page 15: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.

A.M. No. P-02-1651. June 22, 2006

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.

Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch

253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been

living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son.

Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the

judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not

related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.

According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the

judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Escritor is a member of the religious

sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where

her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten

years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”

which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments

render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the

Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and

explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely

executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses

and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Escritor’s contention of freedom of religion as defense to her action be

sustained.

Page 16: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

Freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any

degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. The

Free Exercise Clause principally guarantees voluntarism, although the Establishment Clause

also assures voluntarism by placing the burden of the advancement of religious groups on their

intrinsic merits and not on the support of the state. In interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, the

realm of belief poses no difficulty. A sinilar jurisprudence is cited by the court wherein in the

case of Gerona v. Secretary of Education viz: The realm of belief and creed is infinite and

limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including

religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however

strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when

weighed in the. scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief

and .the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. The difficulty in

interpretation sets in when belief is externalized into speech and action. religious freedom will

not be upheld if it clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law such that

when a law of general applicability (in this case the Department Order) incidentally burdens the

exercise of one's religion, one's right to religious freedom cannot justify exemption from

compliance with the law.

Page 17: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and

JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of

the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of

Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO

LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary

CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents

G.R. L-53487. May 25, 1981

FACTS:

Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed. These

resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and projects were implemented. The image was

temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass,

Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was

the church’s property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was

passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the

recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to

the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The

priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1

and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation in the freedom of religion stated in the Constitution

HELD:

No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The

image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the

Page 18: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio

residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the

acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could

easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers

and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their

property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to

the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution , since private funds were used. Not every

government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some

religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,

freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

Page 19: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

RELI GERMAN, et. al., petitioners, vs. GEN. SANTIAGO BARANGAN and MAJOR ISABELO

LARIOSA, respondents.

G.R. No. 68828. March 27, 1985.

FACTS:

At about 5:00 p.m. of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of businessmen, students

and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila,to hear mass at the St. Jude

Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds locate in the same street. Wearing the yellow T-

shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists 1 and shouts of anti-

government invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred by respondent Major Isabelo

Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from

proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang

security area. When petitioners' protestations and pleas to allow them to get inside the church

proved unavailing, they decided to leave. However, because of the alleged warning given them

by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the

future would likewise be prevented, petitioners now invokes their right of freedom of religion.

Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at

St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court

that they have never restricted any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said

church They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of

religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very

residence and offices of the President of the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to freedom of religion of the petitioners was violated.

Page 20: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to

religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be

done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must in the

exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties . . . observe honesty and good faith."

Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still

respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as violative

of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through

the Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J P. Laurel Street

and the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected

thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to

courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readily

perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the

President and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests

transacting business with Malacañang. In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or

restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which

they had attempted to translate the same into action.

Page 21: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

GENARO GERONA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF

EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees

G.R. No. L-13954. August 12, 1959.

FACTS:

RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The

implementing rule Department Order 8 says that the anthem must be played while the flag is

raised and everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is

being held. Afterwhich, everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge. Gerona’s children attending the

Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and

recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses.

They consider the flag to be an image in the context of what is prohibited in their religion and

because of this they were expelled from the school. Gerona wrote to Sec of Ed that their

children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. Sec

of Ed denied the petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the children of Gerona can violate Department Order 8 as it is against

the exercise of their freedom of religion

HELD:

Flag salute ceremony is secular and the Department Order is non-discriminatory therefore it is

constitutional. The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but its exercise is not. If the belief

clashes with law then the former must yield. Petitioners salute the flag during boy scout

activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. The

pledge is judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or to

Page 22: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting

to force, military service, or duty to defend the country. There was no compulsion involved in the

enforcement of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If

they chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education.

Page 23: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

RAUL ROGERIO GONZALEZ, by his guardian ad item Adelaida Gonzalez, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, defendant-appellant

G.R. No. 27619. February 4, 1928

FACTS:

The fifth and last chaplain or beneficiary of the chaplaincy in question was Angel

Gonzalez, father of the present plaintiff. This individual resigned the office of chaplain, effective

December 6, 1910, since which date the chaplaincy has remained vacant. Plaintiff-appellee

Raul Gonzalez, through his guardian, filed an action to obtain writ of mandamus before the CFI

of Manila to force respondent to appoint plaintiff to the vacant chaplaincy, to compute for the

income obtained during the vacancy, and to secure other relief. The trial court then ruled in

favor of the plaintiff. It ordered respondent Roman Catholic Church of Manila to appoint plaintiff

as chaplain to the said chaplaincy, to pay plaintiff of the income obtained during the vacancy,

and to reserve to him any legal rights that he may have in connection to the cancellation of

certificate of registration of property under the name of the archbishop. From all the foregoing,

the defendant then appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiff can be appointed chaplain to the said vacant chaplaincy

HELD:

No. It is in fact a mistake in the part of the trial court to order defendant to appoint

plaintiff chaplain in the chaplaincy in question. The plaintiff does not possess the qualifications

necessary for appointment to the office of chaplain and consequently that the Archbishop was

justified in refusing to appoint the plaintiff to that office.

Page 24: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

Under the law of the Church as it stood when this chaplaincy was created, no ecclesiastical

qualifications were required in a candidate for appointment to the office of chaplain. However, a

new canon became effective in the Church in 1918 to the effect that, in order to be appointed

chaplain, the candidate must be a clerical, and that in order to be a clerical, one must have

taken the first tonsure, as a prerequisite to which he must also be a bachelor who has begun the

study of theology. It is admitted that the plaintiff in this case does not possess these

qualifications. This new canon is valid and applicable to candidates for chaplaincies since it is

general in terms and evidently intended to be applicable to all chaplains appointed in the future.

Page 25: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ERNESTO G. GONZALES, AGUEDO GUILLERMO, JOSE MERCADO, RODOLFO C.

TOLENTINO, FRISCO IBARRA, MELCHOR DIZON, GAVINO LOPEZ, MAXIMO FELICIANO,

CATALINO MUÑOZ, DOMINGO CAPILI, MAGNO MANALANG, HONORIO DOMINGO,

DONATO ESPIRITU, JUAN SANTOS, VICTORINO MERCADO and E. DE GUZMAN,

plaintiffs-appellees, vs. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION, represented

by PACIFICO P. MILLO, President, and CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC, INC.,

defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-38178. October 3, 1985.

FACTS:

The plaintiffs are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, a religious sect that prohibits its

members from joining a labor organization. All, except Jose Mercado and Victoriano Mercado,

have been seasonal employees or laborers of the defendant Tarlac Development Corporation

since prior to October 19, 1962. The defendant Tarlac Development Corporation is a

corporation that operates the Central Azucarera de Tarlac. The Tarlac Development

Corporation and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union entered into an exclusive

collective bargaining agreement.

The plaintiffs, through members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, being ignorant of the provisions

of Republic Act No. 3350, and believing that it was the only way by which they could continue

working for the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, by reason of Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective

Bargaining Agreement, joined the defendant Labor Union on the date mentioned. Upon being

informed of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3350, which exempts them from the effects of

Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective Bargaining Agreement due to their religion, the plaintiffs

resigned from the defendant Labor Union, who in turn demanded from its co-defendant, the

Tarlac Development Corporation, the dismissal of the plaintiffs from their work under the above-

quoted provision of Section 4 of the bargaining agreement.

Page 26: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the plaintiffs, as member of the Iglesia ni Kristo, may be dismissed

from their employment by reason of their resignation from the defendant Labor

Union.

2. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 is constitutional which exempts members of

any religious sect — prohibiting the affiliation of their members in any labor

organization — from the operation of a union security provision

HELD:

Court finds that plaintiffs-appellees, as members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, may not be

dismissed from their employment by reason of their resignation from the defendant-appellant

Labor Union. Republic Act No. 3350, which exempts plaintiffs-appellees from the operation of

the union security clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement of October 19, 1962, remains

constitutional.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or

religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the

constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused

work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded

to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its

citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and

their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935

Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor and capital

and industry. More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that 'the State shall

afford protection to labor, promote full employment and security in employment, ensure equal

work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers

and employers.

Page 27: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

In enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the

constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of

a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that

burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly Congress, if

it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience

can be accommodated by all laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of

conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some 'compelling state interest' intervenes.

In the instant case, there is no compelling state interest to withhold the exemption.

Page 28: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE

HENRIETTA S. MENDEZ, respondent.

G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2

every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates

petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with

other religions. When the petitioner submitted to the Board of Review for Moving Pictures and

Television, respondent, the VTR tapes of its several TV program series, the Board classified the

series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack

against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it

appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed

it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for

Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the

episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no

indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case

alleging that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in

requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. In their

Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of

the Revised Penal Code. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this

petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a

form of religious exercise.

Page 29: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its

right to free exercise of religion. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms

of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. “Attack” is different from

“offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other

religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean

they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion

by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at

war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment

clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. The basis of

freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace

of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave

danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may

be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing

whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence

of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified

by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil.

Page 30: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

MONS. JUAN JAMIAS, petitioner, vs. EULOGIO B. RODRIGUEZ, Director of Public

Libraries, and MANUEL V. GALLEGO, Secretary of Education, respondents

GR. No. L-2133. July 22, 1948.

FACTS:

In this case, petitioner Juan Jamias, as the Bishop Maximus of the Philippine Independent

Church, seeks a peremptory order to compel respondents, the Director of the Bureau of Public

Libraries and the Secretary of Education, to immediately issue to Bishops Leopoldo A. Ruiz and

Juan T. Kijano, of said church, authorizations to solemnize marriages.

Respondent Director of Public Libraries denied to renew the previous authority vested to

Bishop Leopoldo Ruiz to solemnize marriages. Likewise, respondent also cancelled the same

authority given to Bishop Juan Kijano. These decisions are anchored on the ground that the two

bishops refused to recognize Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., as the supreme head of the Iglesia

Filipina Independiente. This matter is in accordance with the administrative decision of

respondent Secretary of Education dated June 23, 1947, recognizing Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr.

as the sole head of the said religious organization. The said decision specifies that applications

of priests of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente for permits to solemnize marriages may be

granted provided that it is shown thereon that they recognize Reyes as the Obispo Maximo of

the Church they represent. Petitioner complains that recognizing Reyes as the Supreme head of

the said church pending the decision of the CFI of Manila is a grave abuse of power. Petitioner

emphasizes that these decisions clearly favored the faction headed by Reyes and against the

faction headed by the petitioner. Authority to solemnize marriages is granted to Reyes while the

same is denied to him and his faction. Consequently, respondents violate the constitutional

provision of freedom of religion.

Page 31: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents, pending final decision of the suit in the Court of First

Instance of Manila, can refuse to issue in favor of the bishops and priest headed by the

petitioner Juan Jamias the authorization provided by law to solemnize marriages

HELD:

No. There is nothing on record to show that the Philippine Independent Church or its

faction headed by Bishop Juan Jamias does not fulfill the “good repute” condition obligating

respondent Director, under section 34 of Act No. 3613, to issue the authorization to solemnize

marriages, or that said church or faction has lost said qualification as a result which, according

to section 35 of the same law, the authorization may be cancelled. The second ground provided

by same section 35 cannot be considered in this case because the question as to who are the

lawful authorities of said church is yet to be settled in the pending litigation before the Court of

First Instance of Manila. The conflict between the two factions, until finally decided by the

competent court, cannot have the effect of automatically divesting the members of one group or

the other of their legal rights as bishops and priests of the Philippine Independence Church.

Until the litigation is finally decided, both groups are entitled to represent themselves as

members of the same church to which they belonged before the conflict has arisen.

Page 32: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ALFREDO LONG and FELIX ALMERIA, petitioners, vs. LYDIA BASA, ANTHONY

SAYHEELIAM and YAO CHEK, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 134963-64. September 27, 2001

FACTS:

Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo Long and Felix Almeria, petitioners, were members of

a religious group known as "The Church In Quezon City (Church Assembly Hall), Incorporated"

which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1973. The members of

the said Church vested upon their Board of Directors the absolute power to admit and expel a

member of the Church. As early as 1988, the Board of Directors observed that certain members

of the church including petitioners herein exhibited conduct which was dishonorable, improper

and injurious to the character and interest of the Church. They warned petitioners that if they

persist in their highly improper conduct, they will be dropped from the membership of the

Church. However, petitioners ignored their repeated admonitions. Alarmed that petitioners'

conduct will continue to undermine the integrity of the principles of faith of the Church, the Board

of Directors, during its August 30, 1993 regular meeting, removed from the membership list

certain names of members, including the names of herein petitioners. On September 29, 1993,

petitioners and others questioned their expulsion by filing with the SEC Securities Investigation

and Clearing Department a petition seeking mainly the annulment of the August 30, 1993

membership list and the reinstatement of the original list, on the ground that it was made without

prior notice and hearing. Subsequently, SEC Hearing Officer Manuel Perea ruled, among

others, that the expulsion was in accordance with the Church By-laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the expulsion is valid

Page 33: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

No. The provision on expulsion under the Church By-Laws, as phrased, may sound

unusual and objectionable to petitioners as there is no requirement of prior notice to be given to

an erring member before he can be expelled. It must be stressed that the basis of the

relationship between a religious corporation and its members is the latter's absolute adherence

to a common religious or spiritual belief. Once this basis ceases, membership in the religious

corporation must also cease. Thus, generally, there is no room for dissension in a religious

corporation. And where, as here, any member of a religious corporation is expelled from the

membership for espousing doctrines and teachings contrary to that of his church, the

established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that such action from the church authorities is

conclusive upon the civil courts.

The courts will likewise exercise jurisdiction to grant relief in case property or civil rights

are invaded, although it has also been held that involvement of property rights does not

necessarily authorize judicial intervention, in the absence of arbitrariness, fraud, and collusion.

Another specific instance when intervention by the courts becomes warranted is when the

proceedings in question are violative of either the by-laws of the society itself or the basic law of

the land, such as when there is a violation of the fundamental right to due process of law.

Page 34: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner, vs.

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents.

G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent ABS CBN aired the program "Prosti-tuition" hosted by respondent Loren

Legarda on November 18, 1997. It featured female students servicing as prostitutes to pay for

their tuition fees. Philippine Women's university (PWU) was one of those mentioned as the

school of the said students. In fact, the PWU campus was even used as backdrop for the show.

Parents and teachers then complained before the MTRCB, contending that the program

besmirched the name of the school. ABS CBN said that the program is a public affairs one and

hence, protected by the freedom of expression and the press. MTRCB then ordered respondent

to pay fines for non-submission of the said program for review. Respondent then filed civil action

for certiorari before the RTC which then ruled in their favor. Petitioner MTRCB appealed,

claiming that all television programs, including public affairs programs are subject to and

pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the power to review the television program "The Inside

Story" featuring “Prosti-tuition”

HELD:

Yes. It is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review.

Respondent’s basis is not freedom of religion, as in Iglesia ni Cristo, but freedom of expression

and of the press. It is to be noted that despite the fact that freedom of religion has been

accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious

Page 35: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

program from petitioner’s review power. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious

programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there

is no justification to exempt therefrom “The Inside Story” which, according to respondents, is

protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom

bearing no preferred status.

Page 36: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G.

BINEGAS, JR., petitioners, vs. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,

ABDUL-RAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN,

AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, respondents

G.R. No. 135306. January 28, 2003

FACTS:

Respondents, a local federation of 70 Muslim religious organizations together with some

individual Muslims filed a complaint for damages against petitioner MVRS Publications, Inc

together with some others. This is consistent with the petitioner's alleged libellous statement

that insulted Muslims. The said statement presented a trivial fact that the pig is considered as a

god and therefore sacred to Muslims. Respondents claimed that on account of these libellous

words, Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world,

especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. In their answer, petitioner explained

that since the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article, therefore they

cannot be entitled to damages. Petitioner added that the article was merely an expression of

belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or

injury to Muslims. RTC dismissed the complaint while CA reversed the decision. Hence, this

appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can be held liable for damages in view of its alleged libellous

statement against respondents

Page 37: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

No moral and exemplary damages can be rewarded. Moral damages can only be given

when the factual basis and causal connection for the damages were clearly proven while

exemplary damages are only present if claimant can prove his right to moral or compensatory

damages. In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where misinformation about another

individual's religion is as commonplace as self-appointed critics of government, it would be more

appropriate to respect the fair criticism of religious principles, including those which may be

outrageously appalling, immensely erroneous, or those couched as fairly informative comments.

It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is proper

religious conduct or belief; neither does it have the authority to rule on the merits of one religion

over another, nor declare which belief to uphold or cast asunder, for the validity of religious

beliefs or values are outside the sphere of the judiciary. Such matters are better left for the

religious authorities to address what is rightfully within their doctrine and realm of influence.

Courts must be viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious matters.

Page 38: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner-

appellant, vs. JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the Court of First Instance of

Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented

by ERAÑO G. MANALO, as Executive Minister, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-55289. June 29, 1982

FACTS:

In 1933, Iglesia ni Cristo, private respondent, a corporation sole duly existing under

Philippine laws, acquired two lots with a total area of 313 square meters from Andres Perez,

who had possessed the property since 1933 and had declared the same for tax purposes. On

September 13, 1977, private respondent filed an application for registration of the two lots

pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law alleging that it and its predecessor-in-interest

had possessed the land for more than 30 years. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the

application on the ground that the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, is disqualified under

the Constitution to hold alienable lands of the public domain and that the land applied for is a

public land. After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the two lots in the name of

private respondent. Hence, this appeal by the Republic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Iglesia ni Cristo may acquire or hold lands of public domain.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits a corporation sole or a juridical

person like the Iglesia Ni Cristo from acquiring or holding lands of the public domain; that said

church is not entitled to avail of the benefits of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Law which

applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons; and that the subject lots are not private lands

Page 39: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

because possession by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest has not been since time

immemorial and because land registration proceeding under Section 48(b) of the Public Land

Law presupposes that the land is public.

The provision in the Constitution that "No private corporation or association may hold

alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in

area; Art. XIV, Sec. II of the Constitution is not the decisive consideration for the denial of the

registration in favor of appellee. It is the view that the Bill of Rights provision on religious

freedom which bans the enactment of any law prohibiting its free exercise, the "enjoyment of

religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference. (being) forever . . .

allowed." Here the Iglesia Ni Cristo, as a corporation sole, seeks the registration. The area

involved in the two parcels of land in question is 313 square meters. As admitted in the opinion

of the Court, a chapel is therein located. It is that basic consideration that leads to the

conclusion that the balancing process, which finds application in constitutional law adjudication,

equally requires that when two provisions in the Constitution maybe relevant to a certain factual

situation, it calls for the affirmance of the decision of respondent Judge allowing the registration.

Page 40: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY

(RE: OFFICE HOURS)

A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC. December 14, 2005.

FACTS:

Muslim employees sent a letter to Judge Salazar of the RTC of Iligan City requesting him

to grant them said privileges: 1) to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch

break or coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan; 2) to be excused from work from 10:00

a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year. Judge

Salazar favored the first request but not the second. He then forwarded the letter to the Office of

the Court Administrator (COA). Muslim employees invoke sec. 2 of P.D. 322 which excuses

them from reporting to office during recognized Muslim holidays. Section 3 of the same decree

substantially provides that during Ramadan, Muslim employees shall observe office hours from

7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without breaks. Civil Service Commmission (CSC) then promulgated a

resolution granting the two privileges mentioned above and even clarified that Fridays referred

herein pertain to the calendar year. However, CSC prescribed a flexible working schedule to

accommodate Muslims' Friday prayer day and so as not to violate E.O. 292 requiring civil

servants to work not less then 40 hours a week. The Court Administrator favored the said

resolutions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Muslim employees be granted of their two requests above mentioned

HELD:

No. Only the first request can be granted and not the second one. Said requests are

grounded on Section 5, Article 3 of the Constitution, particularly the free exercise clause to

Page 41: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

one's religion. The court said that this clause is of two-fold, freedom to believe which is absolute

and freedom to act on one's beliefs as subject to regulation since it involves matters affecting

public welfare.

The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is

integral to the Islamic faith.  However, only the first request finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D.

No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no basis for the second request. In fact, allowing

the second request would mean diminution of 12 hours from the prescribed government working

hours. The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those

belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. 

Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with

reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.

Page 42: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as

Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND

TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M.

DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO,

BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO,

respondents.

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009.

FACTS:

While on air on UNTV 37 on August 10, 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano uttered the

following remarks against members of Iglesia ni Cristo:

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang

gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,

masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang

kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

Complaint was then filed before the MTRCB. For one, the then minister of INC and regular

host of the TV Program “Ang Tamang Daan” felt directly alluded by the said remarks. MTRCB

then found Soriano liable for his utterances and imposed on him a penalty of three (3) months

suspension from his program, "Ang Dating Daan". Petitioner filed petition for certiorari and

raised several issues, praying to set aside the said aforementioned decision of MTRCB. One of

the issues he raised is that his statement was a religious speech and that he only exercised his

religious freedom.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner's remarks can be considered as an exercise of religious freedom

Page 43: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

No. This argument has no merit. Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious

freedom states that: "No law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession

and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test

shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

There is nothing in petitioner's statements subject of the complaints expressing any

particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he

came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically

accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another

person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner's attempts to place

his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by

any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his

statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul

language used in retaliation as religious speech.

Page 44: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. BRADFORD

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., PATRIZIO EZRA, GERONIMO V. NAZARETH,

RUPERTO MAYUGA, SR., ROBERT SCHAARE, HENRY CARIAT, REYNALDO FERRENAL

AND JOHN DOES, respondents.

G.R. No. 171905. June 20, 2012

FACTS:

In 1989, Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI) built a fence that said to

encroached the right of way allocated by United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) to

the Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI). UCCP favored CCI and the series of events then followed led

to the breakup of BUCCI from UCCP. BUCCI then disaffiliated itself from UCCP and filed its

Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws which provided for and effected its disaffiliation

from UCCP. SEC approved it on 2 July 1993. UCCP filed a complaint for rejection of decision,

alleging that separate incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP

Constitution and By-laws. SEC dismissed UCCP's petition and defended the right of BUCCI to

disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its constitutional freedom to associate and

disassociate. On appeal, CA affirmed previous decision of SEC. Before this court, UCCP

maintains that it has the sole power to decide whether BUCCI could disaffiliate from it as this

involves a purely ecclesiastical affair.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the determination of the validity of disaffiliation of respondents is purely an

ecclesiastical affair

Page 45: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

HELD:

No. The issue is not a purely ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one that

concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement

within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the

membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of

membership.

UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises, are

subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A provides that

SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations. Even with

their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and

corporate.

BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the freedom to

determine its steps.

Page 46: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and

ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION,

defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974.

FACTS:

Benjamin Victoriano, appellee, a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni

Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. As

such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (Union) which had with

the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision. Under

Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No.

3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to

require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the

representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was

enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act

No. 875, as follows: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which

prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

ISSUE:

Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the establishment of religion

clause or separation of Church and State.

HELD:

The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious

tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the

acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free

Page 47: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that

the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of

conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and

to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common

good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all

religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden

may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting,

within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's

secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the

state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden.

In Aglipay v. Ruiz, this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be

precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular ID character even if the incidental result would

be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand

the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary

effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No.

3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion)

clause of the Constitution.

Page 48: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

COX et. Al, v. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC

FACTS:

On July 8, 1939, sixty-eight defendants and twenty others engaged in an information

march. The group was divided into four or five subgroups. The groups dispersed into different

parts of the city, carrying signs reading 'Religion is a Snare and a Racket' and on the reverse

'Serve God and Christ the King'. They also distributed leaflets. Since the activity was one

without permit, sixty-eight members of Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted for violation of a

statute prohibiting public parade/procession without special license in Manchester, New

Hampshire. Five appellants appealed but their conviction was just affirmed by the Supreme

Court of the State. Appellants raised the questions that the statute was invalid under the

Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in that it deprived appellants of

their rights including the freedom of worship. Appellants added that each of them was a minister

ordained to preach the gospel and that their purpose for the march is to disseminate information

in public interest and was one of their ways of worship.

ISSUE:

Whether nor not imposing restrictions for holding public parades without a special

license to said appellants violate their freedom of worship.

HELD:

No. The argument as to freedom of worship is beside the point. No interference with

religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is shown, but only the exercise

of local control over the use of streets for parades and processions.

Page 49: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

ARCH R. EVERSON, appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF EWING TOWNSHIP, appellee

330 US 1

February 10, 1947

FACTS:

New Jersey enacted a law that gave School Dist authority to make rules and cases

pertaining to the transportation of children to and from schools. Board of Ed authorized

reimbursement of money paid by parents for bus transportation of their kids who rode public

transit to school. Some of this money was paid for the transportation of some kids to parochial

schools–Catholic.

ISSUE:

Whether the New Jersey statute or the Board resolution, authorizing the reimbursement

of tax funds to parents with students of parochial schools, unconstitutionally regulates the

establishment of religion.

HELD:

No, under the facts the 1st Amend does not bar New Jersey from spending tax funds to

pay the bus fares of parochial students under a general program that reimburses the fares of

students who attend other schools.

The New Jersey statute is challenged as a "law respecting an establishment of religion."

The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, Murdock v.

Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, commands that a state "shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." These words of the First

Amendment reflected in the minds of early Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and

practices which they fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves

Page 50: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

and for their posterity. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at

least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass

laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can

force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him

to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining [p16]

or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in

any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,

whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.

Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of

any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause

against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between

church and State."

Page 51: Freedom of Religion: CASE DIGEST

WEST VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION v. BARNETTE

319 U.S. 624

FACTS:

West Virginia required both students and teachers to participate in saluting the flag

during exercises at the beginning of each school day as part of a standard school curriculum. If

the student fails to comply he would be found insubordinate and expelled from school and will

not be permitted to be admitted unless he conforms. Respondent asked for an exception for all

Jehovah’s Witnesses because this pledge goes against their religious belief. But he was denied

an exception. A group of Jehovah's Witness families refused to salute the flag because it

represented a graven image they could not acknowledge in their religion and so they filed suit to

challenge the curriculum as a violation of their religious liberties.

ISSUE:

Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the First Amendment of the Constitution?

HELD:

Yes. Compelling a salute to the flag infringes upon an individual’s intellect and right to

choose their own beliefs. The majority focuses on the right of persons to choose beliefs and act

accordingly. As long as the actions do not present a clear and present danger of the kind the

state is allowed to prevent, then the Constitution encourages diversity of thought and belief. The

state has not power to mandatee allegiance in hopes that it will encourage patriotism. This is

something the citizens will choose or not.