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Indonesian Soft Power in ASEAN and Beyond Susan Harris Rimmer

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Indonesian Soft Power in ASEAN and Beyond Dr. Susan Harris Rimmer, ANU

Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the Asia‐Pacific College of Diplomacy (APCD) at the Australian National University, Canberra

Indonesia is a ‘big nation’ in transition, making important choices about the projection of its foreign policy personality and identity in a time of domestic and regional seismic shifts. Indonesia has all the attributes of a rapidly ascending power; a GDP of some $2.554 trillion USD (PPP), an economic growth rate in 2014 of 6.46%, G20 membership, a population of just over a quarter of a billion people. These, together with Indonesia’s position as the largest Muslim majority democracy in the world, and by far the largest member of ASEAN, all suggest a country that should be taken seriously. Yet Indonesia’s status on the world stage is far less than would be expected (Davis 2014). Even in Amitav Acharya’s 2015 book called Indonesia Mattershe admits that Indonesia is not moving towards the position of a great power ‘in the traditional manner’ (Acharya, 2015: 1). Indonesia does not pursue hard power in traditional ways, but that is not the whole story. To see how Indonesia matters in today’s world requires looking beyond the world of ‘high diplomacy’. To understand Indonesia’s influence

requires embedding an analysis of what Indonesia does within an appreciation of what Indonesia is. A list of activities does little to capture Indonesia’s influence because it is not definitive of that most crucial component of influence – how Indonesia is perceived and how the ideas that characterise Indonesian politics and interests are received. If we use the frame of ‘soft power’ and use Joseph Nye’s theory of ‘attraction rather than coercion’ (Nye, 2004: 5) I argue that one key element of normative influence, that of modelling behaviour, is often overlooked as crucial to Indonesia’s role in ASEAN.This type of influence does have some notable limitations. Indonesian soft power has most influence when exerted through modelling behaviour, in other words, Indonesia’s positional and identity significance. Modelling behaviour in this sense includes: • Indonesia’s status as the world’s largest Muslim

majority state with a tradition of religious tolerance,


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• its democratic credentials, • its shift from authoritarian military to

democratic civilian government, • emerging economy status and projected

economic growth, • social media aptitudes, such as huge Twitter

community, and • its particular take on multiculturalism, or at

least pluralism. It should be conceded that some of these attributes are often contested, within and outside Indonesia, especially religious and ethnic tolerance, the difficulties in moving from procedural to more substantive democracy and dealing with corruption and money politics. The downside of modelling behaviour as a key component of soft power is that as Indonesia gains more power, it will receive more scrutiny on these identity issues. Some might also argue that this soft power has not occurred through design, but by the lack of a state’s fragmented capacity to mobilise hard power. Nevertheless, there is some opportunity to be more strategic about this source of power and take this influence beyond ASEAN, using the amplifying effects of its regional leadership. Indonesia often has an impact on ASEAN members by modelling behaviour rather than overt negotiation or displays of coercive hard power. When Indonesia expresses concern about productive cross-border infrastructure in South-East Asia, or foreign fighters in Syria, or the plight of migrant workers in the Middle East, this should have forceful impact beyond the region. Indonesia’s participation in the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) is a case in point. Indonesia has a legacy within ASEAN for championing the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC), which promotes peace and cooperation (Santikajaya 2014b). The AIPR was established through a joint statement by ASEAN Heads of State which was delivered during the 18th ASEAN Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia in May 2011. The AIPR Governing Council held its first meeting in December 2013. It was reportedly a Jakarta initiative, with even ASEAN members like The Philippines and Thailand being sceptical. Previous Foreign Minister MartyNatalegawa stated in a 2012 speech to the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club that the new body was neither a substitute for government-to-government talks nor for calling an emergency meeting of ministers. The AIPR was a‘menu option’, a ‘catalyst in trying to get ASEAN members to start to think that they could solve

their own disputes’ and eventually, ‘an ASEAN export’ (cited by ICG 2012). In 2015 an AIPR symposium was held in Myanmar with lessons learned from conflicts in the Philippines and Indonesia. The role of great powers US and China are more useful in explaining the current transition process in Myanmar. But the Myanmar government is more likely to consider as valuable lessons learned on how to manage and prevent religious conflict, pursue democratic transitions and reform the role of the military in a constitutional democracy from a country like Indonesia within the ASEAN context, than almost any other source. The AIPR deserves more investment and Indonesia should be generous, and honest, about offering up its lessons learned to the region in the spirit of creating a genuine ASEAN culture of conflict prevention and preventative diplomacy. So what is another example on how ASEAN could ‘learn’ from Indonesia's diplomacy under Jokowi? ASEAN members should be far more active in promoting the ability of civil society organisations and people-to-people dialogues to contribute to the aims of the ASEAN Charter. There could be greater effort to bring home to the region some of the global economic governance debates Indonesia is participating in via forums like the G20 and APEC. There could be a stronger propensity to bring more voices of ordinary people, not just business leaders, up to these forums. This is a source of influence that could be emphasised by the new style of ‘pro-people’s diplomacy’. President Widodo and his new Foreign Minister Retno LP Marsudi are emphasising economic diplomacy, the strengthening of people-to-people links, and south-south cooperation. SBY redefined Indonesia’s view of its place in the international system as a country with ‘a thousand friends and zero enemies’ and an ‘all directions foreign policy’ (2009). Jokowi has outlined three priorities for Indonesian foreign policy: maintaining Indonesia’s sovereignty (especially through positioning Indonesia as a ‘maritime axis’); enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens; and intensifying economic diplomacy (Saragih and Parlina, 2015). Many insiders say that Indonesian foreign policy may not look radically different in the short term (Santikajaya 2014a). However, diplomatic style may change. In contrast to SBY, Foreign Minister Retno announced a shift away from international forums and towards ‘pro-people’ diplomacy to source more economic opportunities for Indonesians abroad, which she


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Acharya, Amitav. 2015. Indonesia Matters: Asia's Emerging Democratic Power: World Scientific Publishing Company. Connelly, Aaron L., 2004. 'Indonesian foreign policy under President Jokowi',Analysis. Sydney: Lowy Institute, October. Davis, Ben, 2014. 'Indonesia losing the race in soft power campaign',The Jakarta Post, 5 November, available athttp://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/05/indonesia-losing-race-soft-power-campaign.html#sthash.ql4X4XIN.dpuf International Crisis Group, 2012. ‘All we are saying is give ASEAN a chance’,13 December. Nye, Joseph S. 2004. Soft power: The means to success in world politics: Public Affairs. Santikajaya, Awidya 2014a. ‘Steady as she goes for Indonesian foreign policy, even with a new president’, East Asia Forum, 27 March. Santikajaya, Awidya 2014b. ‘Indonesia: A Potential Leader in the Indian Ocean’ The Diplomat, December 12. Sukma, Rizal, 2009. 'A post-ASEAN foreign policy for a post-G8 world' Jakarta Post, 5 October. Yudhoyono, SusiloBambang 2009. 'Inaugural Address', Jakarta, 20 October. Saragih, Bagus BT and Ina Parlina, 2015. 'Jokowi lays out his ‘pro-people’ diplomacy'. The Jakarta Post, 3 February. Dhont, Frank, Kevin W. Fogg and Mason C. Hoadley (eds), 2009. Towards an inclusive democratic Indonesian society; Bridging the gap between state uniformity and multicultural identity patterns. Yale Indonesia Forum International Conference Book Series 1. Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University.

described as the ‘soul’ of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indonesia’s foreign policy must be down-to-earth; it should not be detached from the people’s interests. Therefore, the kind of diplomacy that the Foreign Ministry will do is a pro-people diplomacy, diplomacy for the people (Saragih and Parlina, 2015). The style of Indonesian diplomacy will also change to suit this goal. President Joko expects diplomats stationed overseas to perform ‘blusukan’. This means impromptu visits to the constituents by state officials. When asked about how he would deal with the difficult relationship with Australia, Jokowi favoured people-to-people links (Connelly 2014: 14). ASEAN could greatly benefit from a dose of blusukan, and from moving from an elite process to something that more citizens in ASEAN country know about and debate. President Widodo should consider how this new diplomatic focus can complement the power of Indonesia’s modelling behaviour, and perhaps make some of the soft power lessons more explicit beyond the region. There are positive signs in this direction. Indonesia now favours more nimble dialogue forums such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association and MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and Australia). Indonesia is also making more investments in public diplomacy, announcing that it would establish 10 cultural centres in the US, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Turkey, Japan, Timor Leste, Singapore, Myanmar and Australia. These investments should highlight the unique flavour of what Indonesia brings to the international community. Indonesia is rapidly becoming a country that has greatness thrust upon it, and without the usual appetite for such a role. But it would do well to cultivate its soft power potential in ASEAN and beyond. This is part of a larger piece by Susan Harris Rimmer and Mathew Davies entitled ‘Indonesia’s Normative Influence and the ASEAN Way’ for aspecial issue of Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies. Dr Davies’ contribution is gratefully acknowledged. I also acknowledge comments on a draft by Awidya Santikajaya from ANU. All errors remain my own.

Embedding Market Economies in ASEAN? Andrew W. Mantong & Muhammad Waffa Kharisma

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Embedding Market Economies in ASEAN? Andrew W. Mantong & Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma

ASEAN’s significance is often framed in terms of “market.”ASEAN countries are moving towards “single market and production base” in which they believe that economic integration through the launch of ASEAN Community will ensure, with some flexibility, free flow of goods, services, investments and labor. This will ensure ASEAN unity in the sort of “global community” as a vibrant and dynamic region that will facilitate global peace and assert its role to sustain global economics. However, with regards to the fact that cooperation under the Association’s framework is based on differences of Southeast Asian Nations’ path towards modernity that manifest in their variations in political system, coordinating market economy could be a potential problem in ASEAN. This skepticism might be responded by the notion that ASEAN has its own institutional character, norms and values embodied from the principle of non-interference from which ASEAN countries are able to “localize” globalization. However, market always needs support and the establishment which enables cooperation among ASEAN states and the absence of societal forces that will ensure “market legitimacy” might be insufficient. Embedding Market, Ensuring Support Globalization, or simply the interconnection of open economy, has sparked debate in academics about the role of state as institutions to arrange behavior and, thus, incentives for economic actors

to take risk and involve in productive activities. According to Weiss (2004), the debate is among them who see globalization as “enabling” process and as “constraining” process (p. 1-33). The later focuses on the economic logic by contending that openness fostered by increasing capital mobility – and intensified by many international agreements – will reduce state capability to autonomously shape its policy. The former, on the other hand, focuses on the political logic by emphasizing that openness creates a sense of insecurity and competition from which various stakeholders will seek to ensure social protections and innovation in order to maintain competitiveness. Specifically argued by “enabling” school, state will create various policies directed to sponsoring private sectors to thrive in global market and for lower class citizen through various policies of education, health, and social insurances. These policies are to ensure that the nation will have sufficient human capital in maintaining its beneficial link with global markets. Therefore, far from being singular, states’ responses against globalizing forces in the context of open economies are varied, following the way state structures its economics. Hall and Soskice (2001) found that by observing the way firms as economic actors “resolve the coordination problems,” there is a spectrum of market economies made up by two poles: liberal and coordinated. While liberal market relies totally on hierarchies and competitive arrangements usually


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found in market economics, coordinated market relies on “non-market” relationships created by network among firms to handle business among firms. Specifics with regards to policy adjustment envisaged from the “enabling school” line of thought, business groups can support the expansion of social policy to ensure that the state’s welfare provision will benefit industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and their employees. Therefore support for open economics can actually improve welfare spending, beyond classical believe that state spending will induce crowd-out effect against investment. In other words, firms can support, even demand, more robust social policy if it secures their markets and their embeddedness. Social Issues in ASEAN This reminds ASEAN Countries officials that market is not orthodox. There is a spectrum of market economics and the demand as well as support for market economics could actually be constructed. According to Rodrik (2007), institutions play important role for markets to function because markets are not “self-creating, self-regulating, self-stabilizing, or self-legitimizing” (p. 154). Moreover, the link between openness and social policy is not necessarily singular and deterministic. The way state configures institutions influences the way economies are structured to ensure comparative advantage. There are, to put it more simply by quoting Hall and Soskice, institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Regionalism, seen from this perspective, is not only about fostering shared visions and identity, but also about synchronizing different market economies and institutions in which various domestic institutions are structured to arrive at mutual benefits. It is thus logical for, at least proven by some OECD countries, labor organizations and business associations engage in coordinated efforts to catch the opportunities of the global economy. Unfortunately, market adjustment in the framework of ASEAN rarely touches the issues of ensuring support for market, given the inequality among people in ASEAN countries. Welfare issues are fragmented between economic pillar and socio-cultural pillar in the framework of ASEAN Community. There is a certain acknowledgement in ASEAN conduct that “human capital” plays important role to ensure “competitiveness.” But, it

does not emerge from preferences consolidated by organized officials, political forces, business groups as well as academics. Instead of making demands for social policy or integration of social issues more seriously into ASEAN framework, social policy is inversely “determined by regional initiatives” (Chavez, 2007, p. 363). Under The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) services that include commercially available social services like education and health are liberalized. There are now initiatives to discuss the standard of nurse, doctors, teachers, etc. as ASEAN countries move into standardization of education and training to meet a certain standard for labor flows among ASEAN Countries. The problem is that the standardization of those services is rarely accompanied by the standardization of welfare among services sector workers. There are no well-coordinated efforts to ensure that macroeconomic policies are directed to ensure support for open economies. Under the framework of ASEAN, the idea of “redistribution” is primarily associated with the idea of “narrowing development gap” between founding countries of ASEAN and the CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam). It corresponds to supporting infrastructure development, human resources, and information technology. Notably, Chavez (2007) found that this initiative of “narrowing development gap” shows that “external contributions far outpace the contributionsof ASEAN Members themselves” (p. 363). There is even a tendency that ASEAN countries compete with each other to invite funding from external countries to support their infrastructure developments. With regards to issues of human capital, ASEAN officials regularly meet every two years in the forum of the ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting (ALMM) to produce the so-called ALM Work Program which implementation is monitored by the Senior Labour Officials Meeting (SLOM). They regularly discuss issues of labor practices, migrant workers’ rights, safety and health, as well as HIV Prevention and Control in the Work Place. However, the work has yet to produce a rigid standard of labor that will ensure each member’s synchronization. Redistribution without Progress? The fragmentation of social issues in ASEAN could be said to be associated with the tendency of ASEAN countries not to interfere with each other’s domestic business. The difficulties to produce a robust standard or framework might correlates


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with the reluctance of member countries to adjust their policy. Following the norm of non-interference, there cannot be a certain principles, rules, or law that stipulates conducts in ASEAN countries if states choose to back away from shared understandings. Under this sticky interpretation of non-interference, the integration of social issues into ASEAN framework is consequential: there is a relative absence of coordinated labor discussions and policies among ASEAN members. However, a recent study of ASEAN’s non-interference norm shows that the norm is not as rigid as it is frequently invoked by scholars as well as officials of ASEAN. ASEAN countries did intervene as shown when ASEAN countries were concerned of the development of issues in Myanmar and East Timor. Jones (2012) found that once enacted through the shared aversion against subversive forces of communism during state-formation period in Southeast Asia, “non-interference” becomes a norm that is selective in character, becoming more of justifications towards cases of inaction (p. 5). This is, to say, that the selective use of norms corresponds to the effort of enabling or constraining certain political projects, used by state managers to define the scope of political struggle to determine which societal interests – and ideologies – are advanced (Jones, 2012, p. 16).

Bibliography Chavez, J. J. (2007). Social policy inASEAN: The prospects for integrating migrant labour rightsand protection.

Global Social Policy,7, 358–378. Hall, P., & Soskice, D. (Eds.) (2001). Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative

advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jones, L. (2012). ASEAN, sovereignty and intervention in Southeast Asia. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. Rodrik, D. (2007). One economics, many recipes: Globalization, institutions, and economic growth. Princeton:

Princeton University Press. Weiss, L. (Ed.). (2004). States in the global economy: Bringing domestic institutions back in. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

The absence of redistribution issues and the fragmentation of social issues normally found in efforts to coordinate market, seeing from this perspective, do not only reflect the “ASEAN Way,” but also reflect the absence of societal interests organized as “preferences” channeled towards ASEAN multilateralism. The reluctance of ASEAN countries to progressively deal with labor issues as well as to promote expansive social policy, albeit unimaginable, in the face of fear against crowding-out effect might reinforce non-interference norm by becoming an orthodoxy of managing and governing economies in ASEAN. Observing through Indonesian lenses, debates about readiness for

ASEAN Community revolve around some rubrics such as “competitiveness,” “development gap,” “ASEAN Connectivity,” or even the relevance of “decentralization” in ASEAN Community. Academics think and discuss issues about education and health as ones of “services sector” to be “liberalized” under the framework of ASEAN, instead of politics of redistribution that relates to questions of how tax and subsidy should be recalibrated to meet challenges posed by regional integration. They even rarely bring labor issues to the surface of “readiness.” Meanwhile, universities are busy to ensure the competitiveness of their educated workforce as well as their accredited ranks in regional competition of higher education. When in some developed countries supports for multilateralism come from systematic preferences and the design – and logically the negotiation behind – of multilateral cooperation that bring about synchronization of various market economies, it is the absence of alternatively organized perspective to see the relevance of progressive labor issues and to support states role in expanding social policy that might make, in turn, ASEAN countries fail to thoroughly anticipate the risk and the draw full benefits from cooperation as well as global market. It needs more than a vision or identity to ensure that ASEAN is not only becoming “market” for global products in global economy, i.e. to make ASEAN “workable” for people in Southeast Asian countries. ABOUT THE AUTHORS: Andrew W. Mantong teaches International Relations and serves as the Secretary of Undergraduate Program at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia; he obtained his degrees from Universitas Indonesia (B.Sc.) in 2008 & S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (M.Sc.) in 2012. Muhammad Waffaa Kharisma is a Teaching Assistant at the Undergraduate Program at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia; he obtained his degree from Universitas Indonesia (B.Sc.) in 2014.

Enhancing Maritime Cooperation in the Context of ASEAN Plus Three

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NEAT Indonesia and the Directorate of Dialogue Partners, Directorate for Dialogue Partners and Inter‐Regional Cooperation, Directorate General for ASEAN Cooperation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia

The extensive coastal areas of the East Asian Seas region are suitable locations for human settlements, agriculture, aquaculture, industrial estates, tourism, and other economic activities and livelihoods. The ecosystems in the region contribute to 40 million tons of fish/year and produce about 80% of the world’s aquaculture products. East Asia region has been a major global player in almost all coastal and ocean economic sectors. According to FAO (2012), China and Indonesia are the largest and the third largest producer of fish and fisheries products in the world with total production of 62 million metric tons and 12 million metric tons respectively. While Thailand, Japan and Viet Nam, are among the top ten producers of fish and fisheries products on earth. ROK, China and Japan are consecutively the largest, second, and third largest producers of ships in the world. If the estimated global value of goods and services sourced from different coastal ecosystem averages US$ 33 trillion/year, then a substantial part of this figure must belong to East Asia, considering that

one-third of the coral reefs and the mangroves in the world and a great part of the sea grasses are found in the region. Coral reef in Southeast Asia alone generate an estimated value of US$ 112.5 billion/year. The coasts of East Asia region are major social and economic development zones, contributing some 20% to 60% of the GDP of the countries in the region. Maritime Issues and Challenges In many parts of the region, dynamic economic development has been made mostly in coastal areas but at the expense of the environment, such as upstream pollution, domestic and industrial effluent, more areas of landfill, increased dredging, and the erosion of coastlines and coastal habitats. The rapid economic growth has also put enormous pressures on the marine environmental situation of the region. Over-fishing, excessive exploitation of the coral reef, sea grass and mangrove, and expansion of aquaculture farms have further damaged the marine environment and resources in the region. Moreover, oil spills have


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become serious along major shipping routes in recent years. Trans-boundary Issues such as maritime boundary disputes/conflicts; IUU fishing and other illegal economic activities; piracy, robbery, and safety at sea; harm not only biodiversity but also millions of people who rely their livelihoods on food security and nutrition from the oceans. The coral reefs of Southeast Asia are the most threatened of any region in the world. Poverty is still lingering on majority of coastal dwellers and many countries in the region are still lack of technological and financial capacities in implementing sustainable coastal development. Maritime Cooperation in the Context of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) There are already several maritime cooperation initiatives in the context of ASEAN Plus Three. Various APT processes such as the 15th APT Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (FMM), Myanmar, August 2014; the 16th APT Summit, Brunei Darussalam, 10 October 2013; and the 9th APT Summit, Malaysia, 12 December 2005, have concurred to strengthen political-security cooperation to deal with emerging challenges in both traditional and non-traditional security dimensions, inter alia the threat of terrorism, disaster management, pandemic diseases, transnational and cyber security including maritime security. The Final Report of the East Asia Study Group (EASG), which was submitted at the APT Summit, Cambodia, 4 November 2002, recommended nine concrete medium and long-term measures that require further studies with high priority. One of the measures is to promote closer regional marine environmental cooperation for the entire region. The APT Cooperation Work Plan 2013-2017, which was adopted by the 14th APT FMM, Brunei Darussalam, 30 June 2013, emphasized the importance of enhancing maritime cooperation including in the area of maritime security through cooperative activities, such as safety of navigation, and in accordance with relevant international and regional treaties and agreements including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and through, inter alia, the promotion of information sharing, and technology cooperation projects such as through exchanges of visits of authorities concerned, training of personnel in search and rescue and other areas.

The 17th APT Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 13 November 2014, has recognized the efforts of the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) II in stock-taking and evaluating APT cooperation to strengthen and deepen APT process. EAVG II proposes to enhance cooperation in addressing non-traditional security issues, particularly counter-terrorism, cybercrime, drug and human trafficking, and maritime security as one of recommended actions with high priority. This recommended action is in line with the measures under the APT Cooperation Work Plan 2013-2017. Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippine and Viet Nam are committed to be the lead countries for this recommended action and are responsible for making plan of actions (PoA). This (PoA) will be part of the final report to the Follow-up to the EAVG II Report to be submitted at the 18th APT Summit in November 2015. Furthermore, NEAT Memorandum No.2 (August 2005) recommended APT to step-up coordinating efforts on energy maritime security, while NEAT Memorandum No.3 (August 2006) encouraged cooperation to address non-traditional security and environment cooperation in East Asia, among other through maritime security. Maritime cooperation in the APT Cooperation Work Plan 2013-2017 and in various APT processes is focused more on security aspect. As one of important ASEAN-led mechanisms, APT is geographically, geopolitically and geo-economically strategic to develop and enhance maritime cooperation in various aspects. APT can synergize its work with the existing maritime cooperation platforms, such as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime Plus Three, Senior Official Meeting Plus on Transnational Crime Plus Three, East Asia Summit (EAS) Track Two Study Group on Fisheries Management, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF), and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). Recommendation In this regard, Indonesia proposes that the series of NEAT Meetings in 2015 including the Working Groups held by the NEAT Country Coordinators respectively, could conduct comprehensive approaches to strengthen the APT process through policy recommendation to address maritime challenges among others by: • Protecting and preserving maritime resources

and environment. • Preventing incidents at sea.


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• Addressing traditional and non-traditional security issues, among others drugs trafficking, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, as well as combating piracy.

• Developing maritime connectivity to promote economic growth, narrow development gaps, and contribute to regional integration and community building process.

• Promoting cooperation between research institutions to examine maritime issues.

NEAT as the strategic 1.5 track forum is highly expected to serve as a bridge between academic community and political decision-makers. It is hoped that NEAT can contribute to effective policy recommendation to strengthen APT process on various strategic issues of common concern, including maritime cooperation to promote welfare and wellbeing of its people in the region. Editor’s note: This article is prepared for the NEAT Meetings in 2015, in which ASEAN Study Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia, will be the host, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia. The publication of this article in ASEAN Insights is hoped to make the important issue of maritime cooperation be more accessible for wider audience.

ASEAN Updates

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ASEAN Updates

Malaysia Hosts the 26th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur Leaders of ASEAN member states will gather in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 26-27 April 2015 for the 26th ASEAN Summit. Carrying the theme “Our People, Our Vision, Our Community”, the Summit is expected to produce a number of key documents, including the “Kuala Lumpur Declaration on a People-Oriented, People-Centred ASEAN” which will specify the Leaders’ commitments to the political, economic and socio-cultural pillars, and the “Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of Moderates”. Throughout the Summit, the delegates are expected to meet with a number of stakeholders, including the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA), the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ABAC), and youth representatives. On the second day, they will also have a retreat in Langkawi to discuss key issues, including ASEAN’s response to financial crisis and economic slowdown, climate change, peace and security, and ASEAN centrality. Last but not least, the Summit is also expected to come up with a consensus on institutionalising the organisation and its peoples to natural disasters and climate change, which will be a follow up to the “ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change” produced in the previous Summit in Naypitaw in 2014. Overall, this Summit becomes a final preparation for ASEAN ahead of the implementation of ASEAN Community by the end of this year. (Source: ASEAN Secretariat News)

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Universities, Think‐Tanks, Convene in Track II channels University-based research centers and independent think-tanks across Southeast Asia convened in Bangkok, Thailand on 27 March 2015 in the first Annual Meeting of the Network of ASEAN Studies (NAS). The meeting, which was hosted by the Center for ASEAN Studies Thammasat University (CAS-TU), produced a number of important outcomes, including the draft for NAS Charter, proposals for joint activities between think-tanks and centers for ASEAN studies, and plans for collaboration with governments from ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat. The Network aspires to become a prominent Track II network working together with governments and the Secretariat to provide policy recommendations and help promoting ASEAN among the academic environment and the general public. NAS also seeks to work with existing Track II networks in the region such as the Network of East Asia Think-tanks (NEAT). In related news, NEAT members will also convene in the 22nd Country Coordinators’ Meeting (CCM) in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on 5 May 2015. NEAT was established in 2003, and consists of research centers and think tanks from ASEAN+3 countries. In accordance with NEAT’s tradition, the meeting will discuss proposals from NEAT members. NEAT members are also expected to provide policy recommendations to the governments in East and Southeast Asia and to increase NEAT’s role as one of the key Track II frameworks in the region. The recommendations from NEAT are expected to be submitted to the leaders of ASEAN prior to the 27th ASEAN Summit in November this year. (Source: ASEAN Secretariat News)

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