From cruelty to welfare: the emergence of farmanimal welfare in Britain, 1964–71

Abigail Woods*

Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine, Level 2, Central Library, Imperial College London, South Kensington

Campus, London SW7 2AZ, United Kingdom

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2 The prevention of cruelty to experimental animals was managed by the Home

There is a long history of concern in Britain for howanimals are treated. Until the 1960s, these concernswere expressed largely in terms of cruelty or suffering,which was prevented through various acts of Parlia-ment. Over the period 1964–71, amidst public debatesabout intensive farming, a new discourse of animalwelfare emerged. To understand what welfare meantand how it became established as a term, a concept anda target of government regulation, it is necessary toexamine farming politics and practices, the existingtradition of animal protection and attempts to rethinkthe nature of animal suffering.

IntroductionAnimal welfare in Britain today is a contentious topic witha high political profile. Now usually defined as ‘the state ofthe individual as regards its attempts to cope with itsenvironment’,1 it lies at the heart of debates on howanimals should be bred, kept, used, moved and slaugh-tered. Minimum standards of welfare are laid down by theEU and British governments, and substantial resourcesallocated to its scientific investigation. Just 50 years ago,however, the term animal welfare rarely featured in publicor political discourse. Concerns about the treatment ofanimals were then articulated in terms of cruelty or un-necessary suffering, which was prevented through Acts ofParliament dating back to 1822 [1]. So how and why didanimal welfare emerge as a term and a target of stateregulation? What was its relationship to earlier concernsand initiatives for the prevention of animal cruelty, andwhat did animal welfare mean to government officials,farmers and lay campaigners?

Despite their extensive writings on the history of animalcruelty, historians have shown little interest in thesequestions [2–6]. Few of their accounts extend into the latertwentieth century, and those which do fail to problematisewelfare or examine its relationship to cruelty. The keyexception is Kirk’s analysis of how, in the 1950s, scientistsused the language of stress to redefine animal sufferingand to rethink its management in laboratories and onfarms [7]. He argues that this move facilitated the emer-gence of concern for animal welfare. However, he does notask when animal welfare became an actor’s category, orexamine the state’s role in defining and managing it.

*Tel.: +44 20 759 41824.Woods, A. (a.woods@imperial.ac.uk)1 Broom D. Indicators of poor welfare. British Veterinary Journal 1986;142:524–6.Available online 20 December 2011

www.sciencedirect.com 0160-9327/$ – see front matter � 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserve

These issues have been addressed, in part, by animalwelfare scientists [8,9]. They claim that animal welfareemerged, as a fundamentally new language and concept, inthe context of 1960s debates about intensive farming. Akey event was the 1964 publication of Ruth Harrison’sbook, Animal Machines [10]. This claimed that livestockwithin intensive systems were suffering in ways that couldnot be captured by the traditional vocabulary of cruelty ormanaged by existing legislation. The governmentresponded by appointing an expert committee on livestockwelfare (the Brambell committee), whose report [11] guid-ed the first animal welfare legislation (1968), and the issueof voluntary welfare codes of practice for livestock keepers(1969).

Drawing on this basic outline of events, but querying theinterpretation of them, this article will reconsider theemergence of animal welfare as a term, a concept and atarget of state regulation. Policy makers’ perspectives onfarm animal welfare will take centre stage. The article doesnot dwell on how scientists defined welfare, nor on itsmanagement in experimental animals, although it willexplore the role of scientific evidence in the developmentof welfare policy.2 It opens by examining the history oflegislation for the prevention of cruelty to animals. It thenscrutinises the relationship between the rise of intensivefarming and the emergence of concerns about welfare. Itasks whether these concerns were really new, and suggestsreasons why officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fish-eries and Food (MAFF) chose to adopt the language of‘welfare’ in preference to ‘cruelty’. Moving on to ask whatanimal welfare meant to them and other interested par-ties, divergent scientific and ethical perspectives are iden-tified. These prevented the reaching of consensus on howwelfare could be achieved in practice, and established it asthe highly contentious and politically complex problemthat it is today.

Introducing animal crueltyBy 1960, the British government had accumulated consid-erable responsibility for preventing cruelty to animals. Thekey piece of legislation was the 1911 Protection of AnimalsAct, which consolidated various earlier laws dating back tothe 1822 Martin’s Act. The 1911 Act defined cruelty as both

Office. It involved a quite different set of actors to farm animals, whose welfare becamethe responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. While, as Kirk [7]has shown, scientific attempts to redefine the suffering of experimental animalsinfluenced thinking on farm animals, it was in relation to the latter that welfareemerged as a term, a political construct and a target of state regulation.

d. doi:10.1016/j.endeavour.2011.10.003

Figure 2. Cattle being unloaded from an Irish ferry, 1909. NRM.

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active and passive, a product of the so-called ‘sins ofomission and commission’. It made it an offence to ‘beat,kick, ill treat, over-ride, over-drive, torture, infuriate orterrify an animal’ and to cause unnecessary suffering bydoing or omitting to do any act. Like the earlier Cruelty toAnimals Act (1876), which controlled the use of animals inexperiments, it was overseen by the Home Office (HO),with enforcement provided by Local Authorities and thepolice [1,8]. The act applied only to public spaces, and nofarmer had ever been prosecuted under it [10].

Another body of legislation – often overlooked by histor-ical accounts – aimed to protect animals in transit. Datingfrom 1870, it derived from the mixed motives of humani-tarianism and disease control. Following the 1846 aboli-tion of the Corn Laws and the development of railways andsteamships, there was substantial growth in the domesticand international livestock trade. Disease followed in itswake, most significantly the highly contagious and fatalcattle plague. The devastating effect of the 1865–7 cattleplague epidemic forced the state to assume responsibilityfor this, and subsequently other contagious animal dis-eases. Prior to the germ theory, the appearance of thesediseases was often blamed on conditions in transit, whichwere thought to generate disease poisons and make animalbodies susceptible to them. Other concerns about condi-tions in transit were voiced by humanitarians, who be-lieved they caused suffering to animals. Consequently, itwas a relatively straightforward affair to pass laws toimprove these conditions [12,13] (Figures 1 and 2).

The transit regulations stated that livestock pens had tobe clean. Their minimum dimensions, fittings, stockingrates and flooring materials were laid down. Animalshad to be provided with ventilation and shelter, inspectedregularly and rested, fed and watered on long journeys.Those injured during the journey had to be slaughteredunless they could be kept alive without cruelty. Regula-tions were updated as modes of transport changed. Owingto the connection with disease control, they were overseennot by the HO, but by the State Veterinary Department[14], which was later incorporated into MAFF.

Figure 1. Cattle vans, 1909. Held by National Railway Museum.

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The operation of these laws, and another set of regula-tions (1954, 1958) on the handling of animals at slaughter[14], was monitored by the Royal Society for the Preventionof Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA, established 1824) andother, similar bodies. Collectively, these were referred toas the animal welfare or animal protection societies. Theirinspectors followed up public reports of animal suffering.They mounted most of the prosecutions for cruelty, pub-licised its occurrence in the press and agitated for morestringent methods of prevention [1,11]. Because the 1911Act referred only to public places, scrutiny of cruelty tolivestock focussed on their arrival, departure and treat-ment in markets and fairs. Societies reported their obser-vations not to the HO, but the Minister of Agriculture.3

MAFF officials had no co-ordinated method of dealingwith this correspondence. Allegations of cruelty in marketsended up at the Fatstock division, and those of cruelhusbandry at the Meat and Livestock or the Eggs andPoultry divisions. Concerns about livestock on commonland went to the Land Use division, while cruelty relatedto animal health was dealt with by Animal Health division,which incorporated the State Veterinary Service (SVS).Officials considered, in 1962, whether to rationalise proce-dure, and make one division the focal point for enquiries,but none was prepared on take on the job.4

Cruelty and intensive farmingA brief survey of MAFF documents, Hansard Parliamen-tary Debates and the veterinary and farming press revealsthat prior to 1950, the term ‘welfare’ was rarely used inrelation to animals, except in reference to the ‘animalwelfare societies’ (also referred to as ‘animal protectionsocieties’). ‘Welfare’ featured much more prominently inother, human contexts, such as ‘welfare clinics’ (which wereestablished inter-war as a public health measure), ‘welfarefoods’ (such as milk) and the post-war ‘welfare state’.

3 Sample correspondence is included in the National Archives (NA) files MAF 35/751, MAF 112/1179, MAF 294/82, MAF 294/83.

4 Livestock improvement branch memo, 1962. NA MAF 294/83; Pitchforth. H. 28August 1963, NA MAF 224/374.

Figure 3. Cafeteria battery system, 1953. MERL, Reading University.

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During the 1950s, references to animal welfare began toappear, intermittently, in public debates on the marketingand movement of livestock. Usually adopted in place of thewords cruelty or suffering, it does not appear to have hadany distinctive meaning.5

Meanwhile, MAFF’s usual post bag of complaints aboutcruelty to livestock was expanded by a growing body ofcorrespondence on the manner in which they were kept onfarms. Formerly regarded as a private farming matter,livestock husbandry was also the topic of several Parlia-mentary questions. In 1960, John Dugdale, second cousinof former Minister of Agriculture, Thomas Dugdale, intro-duced The Animals (control of intensified methods of foodproduction) Bill. The aim of this private members bill –

which did not pass Parliament – was to secure humanepractices on farms by regulating the construction andlayout of buildings. It followed a similar measure in Hol-land, which stated that calves should be able to lie on theirsides, stand freely, move their heads and be kept in litrooms.6

The source of this growing concern about livestockhusbandry was the expansion of intensive farming meth-ods. Particularly in pig, poultry and calf production, farm-ers were attempting to keep larger numbers of animals inever-smaller spaces, and to exert tighter control over theirhealth and productivity [15]. By the early 1960s, 35% of thenation’s laying stock was located in densely stocked batterycages, with another 50% in indoor deep litter houses. Two-thirds of broiler chickens were kept indoors in units of morethan 20,000 birds. Antibiotics were routinely used to pre-vent disease, and de-beaking often performed to preventpoultry from cannibalising each other. In indoor pig units,tail docking was performed for similar reasons. Sow cubi-cles, which did not provide sufficient space to turn round,were increasingly popular, and some producers fattenedpigs in ‘sweat houses’ where humidity approached 100%.Those who supplied the ‘white veal’ market reared calvesindividually in small crates, and fed them purely on milksubstitutes which led to anaemia [11] (Figures 3 and 4).

While scientific and technical innovations made thesepractices possible [16], their adoption was encouraged bythe government’s subsidy regime [15,17]. During the Sec-ond World War and the subsequent global food shortage,the state had sought to encourage domestic food productionby offering generous subsidies. While this policy was suc-cessful, it was also extremely costly. In order to reduceexpenditure, the state announced that under the 1957Agriculture Act, subsidies would no longer fully compen-sate farmers for their rising costs. To maintain theirincomes, farmers had to increase productive efficiency byspecialising and intensifying their systems. The statesponsored research to assist this move, and offered capitalgrants to encourage farm mechanisation, expansion andthe erection of new buildings. Many farmers felt they hadlittle choice in the matter. The ‘housewife’ demanded cheapfood, and intensification allowed them to supply it.

5 MAFF files are listed on the National Archives catalogue, http://www.nationa-larchives.gov.uk/catalogue/. There are 53 files relating to livestock welfare in theperiod 1950–70. Just five pre-date 1964, and the earliest reference to welfare is 1958.Parliamentary debates are archived at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/.

6 Details of the bill are included in NA MAF 293/169.

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However, for one housewife, Ruth Harrison, the rise ofintensive farming was deeply problematic. Inspired by acampaigning leaflet put through her door, she produced abook-length critique of its practices. Animal Machines,published in 1964, documented the take-over of automat-ed, industrial-style ‘factory farms’ and the conditions towhich they subjected livestock. It contained a foreword by

Figure 4. Cows on slatted floors, 1961. MERL, Reading University.

Figure 6. Piggery, 1934. Northern Ireland. J Min Ag 41 (1934–5).

Figure 5. Nineteenth century cow keeper, Golden Lane. Wellcome images.

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American biologist, Rachel Carson, whose recent, highlyinfluential book, Silent Spring [18] had mounted a similarcritique of intensive farming by revealing the environmen-tal impacts of its pesticide use. Thoroughly researched,closely argued and dispassionate in tone, Animal Machinesused the writings of veterinary, farming and scientificexperts to highlight the detrimental effects of intensivehusbandry on animal wellbeing. She argued that livestockwere suffering in insidious ways not anticipated or control-lable by the 1911 Act. While they might continue to thrive,they experienced ‘discomfort, boredom and actual denial ofhealth . . . the animal is not allowed to live before it dies’.This raised a moral question: ‘How far do we have the rightto take our domination of the animal world . . . At whatpoint do we acknowledge cruelty?’ [10, p. 3]

MAFF’s standard defence against claims of cruelty tolivestock on farms was to argue that it was in farmers’economic interests to treat their stock well, because suffer-ing animals would fail to grow and produce. The rareoccasions on which cruelty occurred could be dealt withunder the 1911 Protection of Animals Act. Harrison en-gaged with this argument head-on. She repeatedly claimedthat animals could suffer distress and discomfort whileoutwardly appearing to thrive, therefore the 1911 Act wasinsufficient. She called for a rethinking of attitudes to-wards animals and the banning of certain practices such asbattery cages, veal production, permanent tethering, slat-ted floors and dim lighting. Although she is often retro-spectively credited with being the first to articulate theconcept of welfare, it should be noted that she was not theonly critic of intensive farming, and that her book did notactually use the term ‘welfare’. Rather, she expressed herconcerns in the existing vocabulary of cruelty and suffer-ing, while attempting simultaneously to redefine them[10].

Animal Machines achieved a huge amount of publicity.It was serialised in the Observer newspaper and widelycommented upon in other sections of the press. It generat-ed multiple Parliamentary questions and inspired theanimal welfare societies to lobby fiercely for action.7 Un-surprisingly, farmers were outraged at the suggestion thatthey were cruel to their animals and that their methodsrequired external regulation. They claimed that they had amuch deeper understanding of livestock wellbeing than ill-informed, emotional lay people. Rejecting Harrison’sclaims about the nature of animal suffering, they insistedon using productivity as an indicator: ‘Cruelty on the farmdoes not pay. Animals will not thrive if they are unhappy.That is the best defence that we have’.8

In emphasising that productivity was an effective wel-fare indicator, farmers were not simply defending theirinterests, but also expressing a view of nature which wasfundamentally at odds with that held by Harrison. Indeedit was this issue, not the mere existence of intensivefarming methods that lay at the heart of the debate overanimal wellbeing. Intensive farming was not unique to thepost-WWII years; nor were concerns surrounding itseffects. From at least the late nineteenth century, produc-

7 See discussions and material on Animal Machines, 1964. NA MAF 293/169.8 Sir Harold Sanders, quoted in the Daily Express 7 March 1964. NA MAF 293/169.

Also see NFU press release 1964, NA MAF 293/169.

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tivity-oriented livestock producers had turned to indoorhusbandry in an attempt to make farming more profitable,modern and efficient. Methods ranged from nineteenthcentury urban dairies, to inter-war suburban cattle keep-ing, to 1930s ‘factory style’ pig production. AnticipatingHarrison, a range of vets and farmers had highlighted thedetrimental effects of these ‘artificial’ practices on animals.They warned producers not to ‘force’ livestock or treat themlike ‘machines’, for ‘nature exacts a penalty for any viola-tion of her laws’.9 However, unlike Harrison, they did notfeel that state intervention was necessary. This was partlybecause, as a self-regulating, moral entity, they believedthat nature would impose its own controls on transgressivefarming systems, for example by causing disease [13,19,20](Figures 5 and 6).

In the post-WWII years, this view of a self-regulatingnature shaped the ways in which farmers approachedintensification. Keen to abide by nature’s laws, they soughtto define the natural needs of livestock and to ensure thatthey were provided by the new, ‘artificial’ systems [20].

9 Anthony DJ. Diseases of the Pig and its Husbandry. London: Bailliere Tindall andCox; 1940, v.

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Although subsequently, they pushed the bounds of whatwas naturally possible by using technology to substitute fornature or to control its undesirable aspects [21], they stillfelt subject to nature’s constraints. If intensification wentso far as to cause suffering, levels of productive efficiencywould fall. In other words, producers believed that theystill had what animal behaviourist Temple Grandin laterdescribed as an ‘ancient contract’ with animals. This was asymbiotic relationship, founded on shared interests. Farm-ers offered good husbandry, and in return, animals thrivedand fulfilled the human demand for food [22].

Critics like Harrison, on the other hand, believed thatthis ‘contract’ had ceased to exist. Intensive systems hadsubverted nature to such an extent that its self-regulatingtendencies could no longer operate. Animals would contin-ue producing even while they were suffering, which en-abled their exploitation by producers. Since nature couldno longer be relied upon to ensure animal wellbeing, stateintervention was required [10]. This belief – and the im-portance that Harrison and her supporters awarded tomental suffering – distinguished them from the pre-warcritics of intensive practices, and laid the ground for theemergence of ‘animal welfare’.

From cruelty to welfareMAFF officials quickly realised the severity of Harrison’schallenge to the status quo. She had effectively demolishedtheir standard defence that the 1911 Act was sufficient toprevent cruelty, and that it was not in farmers’ interests toharm their animals.10 Consequently, ‘the stock draft weuse to cover four or five Minister’s cases a week will not begood enough to answer letters based on this book’.11 More-over, ‘it would take another book to reply to every pointmade by Harrison’.12 In considering how the governmentshould respond, officials disregarded the moral questionsposed by Harrison, to focus on the technical details of howanimals were kept. Deputy Secretary, WC Tame, mused:

I wonder whether the time has come when we oughtto consider seriously, in spite of the obvious difficul-ties, the possibility of making regulations applying toanimals kept under intensive conditions similar, forexample, to those applicable to animals in transit. Inother words, a sort of Factories Act for animals.13

Tame’s analogy was not surprising. Harrison hadclaimed that farms now looked like factories, and shewas not alone in seeing lack of space as the defining featureof intensive farming. Animals confined within factoryfarms were now experiencing conditions similar to thosein a railway cattle truck or ship’s hold. Since MAFF alreadyset standards for pen size and construction, light andventilation, inspection, hygiene and feeding within thesespaces, it was only a small step to consider their extensionto intensive husbandry systems.14

10 See correspondence in NA MAF 293/169 and MAF 121/267.11 Jupe, GP. Intensive production – the cruelty question. 3 March 1964, NA MAF

293/169.12 Virgo, ES, 12 March 1964, NA MAF 293/169.13 Tame, WC. 28 February 1964, NA MAF 293/169.14 Tame, WC. 19 March 1964, NA MAF 121/267.

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This analogy between animals confined on farms andthose confined to vehicles not only suggested how thegovernment should respond; it also justified MAFF’s own-ership of a cruelty issue that should, by rights, have been aHO responsibility. Its officials quickly turned their atten-tion to the setting of mandatory standards for livestockwithin intensive systems. Following RSPCA lobbying, theydecided to turn this issue over to an independent commit-tee of enquiry. To reduce the likelihood of it producingawkward recommendations, they awarded it a narrow,technical remit: ‘to examine the conditions in which live-stock are kept under systems of intensive husbandry and toadvise whether standards ought to be set in the interests oftheir welfare, and if so what they should be’. A group ofindependent scientific experts chaired by Bangor professorof zoology, F.W. Rogers Brambell FRS was appointed toinvestigate this problem. Its formal title was the ‘technicalcommittee to enquire into the welfare of animals keptunder intensive livestock husbandry systems’ [11].

Although officials did not comment explicitly on the useof the term ‘welfare’ in the title and terms of reference ofthe Brambell committee, its adoption was highly signifi-cant. While, as noted above, welfare had already begun tofeature in discourse on the treatment of animals, it wasused interchangeably with cruelty and suffering, and hadno distinctive meaning. Here, however, it was used inpreference to these terms, and to convey a quite differentset of meanings. There are various possible explanationsfor its adoption. It may have been used for political reasons,to appease the farming community and reduce publiccriticisms of it. A reference to ‘cruelty’ or ‘suffering’ inthe title of the Brambell committee would have impliedthat these existed within intensive systems and that farm-ers were responsible for them. By contrast, welfare –

derived from an Old English term meaning to ‘fare well’– had more positive connotations relating to the capacity tothrive, grow and produce.

‘Welfare’ may also have been used for its literal mean-ings [9]. One of its 1968 dictionary definitions–‘good for-tune, health, happiness, prosperity’ – approximates toHarrison’s description of animal wellbeing, although asshown below, MAFF officials preferred a narrower defini-tion of welfare. Another dictionary definition – ‘aid provid-ed, especially by the government, to people in need’ –

suggests that the government now recognised that animalswere ‘in need’ and accepted a role in supporting them.15

Finally, officials may have had in mind the welfare state,and particularly two of its key elements: health and hous-ing. Certainly Harrison and the Brambell committee sawthese elements as fundamental to animal wellbeing, andthe analogy drawn with the protection of animals in transitsuggests that MAFF officials did as well.

The attachment of the term ‘welfare’ to the work of theBrambell committee precipitated its entry into main-stream discourse. Its 1965 report offered one of the firstdefinitions of welfare: ‘a wide term that embraces both thephysical and mental wellbeing of the animal’ [11, p. 9].Discussions of its findings and the government’s response

15 Random House Dictionary of the English Language, College Edition. New York:Random House; 1968.

22 Ministers had the following standards in mind: minimum levels of iron in milksubstitutes fed to veal calves; the provision of adequate lighting in pig and poultry

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to them were all couched in the language of welfare. At thesame time, MAFF officials began to rebrand – as ‘welfare’ –

activities they had previously defined as the prevention ofcruelty or suffering. For example, MAFF’s 1965 volume onthe history of the State Veterinary Service recounted thedevelopment of cruelty to animals legislation in a sectionheaded ‘animal welfare’ [14]. The following year, the gov-ernment Chief Veterinary Officer’s annual report adoptedthe same heading for the section formerly entitled ‘theprotection of animals in transit’ [23]. Internal discussionsreferred to laws for the protection of animals as ‘welfarelegislation’.16

While the adoption of the term welfare in place of crueltycan be attributed partly to linguistic ‘creep’, it may alsohave had a strategic purpose. The 1911 Act had aimed toprevent suffering through ‘the prevention of physical painand mental cruelty’. Taking its lead from the recent reportof the HO Departmental Committee on Experiments onAnimals [24] (the Littlewood committee), the Brambellcommittee thought this inadequate.17 Echoing the lan-guage used by Harrison, it defined suffering as discomfort,stress and pain, and recommended new legislation toprevent animals experiencing it [7,11]. MAFF was keento act, in the hope of quelling the constant lobbying of theanimal welfare societies. However, officials were worriedabout the implications for existing legislation for the pre-vention of cruelty to animals, which was overseen by theHO. The HO had recently rejected the Littlewood commit-tee’s extended definition of suffering, and MAFF officialsthought it ‘unlikely to agree to a definition of cruelty beingincluded in another department’s remit’.18 This situationmay have inspired their proposal to call the new legislationthe ‘Farm Animals Welfare Act’. Used in preference to the‘protection of animals’ or ‘prevention of cruelty’, ‘welfare’ inthis context referred to Brambell’s expanded definition ofsuffering, whose governance was to be MAFF’s responsi-bility, not that of the HO.19

In the event, HO objections led to the gradual wateringdown of the new definition of suffering, to the extent thatMAFF officials began to doubt whether it added anythingto the existing law.20 In the final version of the bill – whichwas presented to Parliament as part I (Welfare of Live-stock) of the 1968 Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions)Bill – the 1911 Act’s reference to ‘unnecessary suffering’was simply replaced by ‘unnecessary pain or unnecessarydistress’. Referring to physical and mental suffering re-spectively, with the nuances left to the courts to decide,MAFF regarded this as the legal definition of welfare.21

Welfare in practiceThe 1968 Act was relatively uncontentious. Its new defini-tion of suffering pleased the animal welfare societies, while

16 For example, see Lace, GO. Correspondence to HO, 19 August 1966. NA HO 285/46.17 The Littlewood committee was appointed in 1963 ‘to consider the present control

over experiments on living animals, and to consider whether, and if so what, changesare desirable in the law or its administration’.18 See internal MAFF correspondence and communications to the HO, 1965. NA

MAF 369/32 and HO 285/46.19 Instructions to parliamentary counsel 25 January 1967, NA MAF 369/89.20 MAFF correspondence and communications to the HO, 1967. NA MAF 369/89,

MAF 369/90, HO 285/46.21 Pinkerton, correspondence to legal department, 1978. NA MAF 369/214.

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its other measures were merely enabling. They awardedthe government power to act on some of the Brambellcommittee’s general recommendations [11], including:the setting of (undefined) mandatory standards for live-stock husbandry systems22; the appointment of a FarmAnimal Welfare Advisory Council (FAWAC) to adviseMinisters; and using the State Veterinary Service to in-spect welfare on farms, enforce legislation and offer adviceto farmers. This last step, which was implemented fairlyquickly, imposed order on MAFF’s formerly chaotic systemof handling cruelty complaints, and awarded vets thestatus of experts in welfare, thereby cementing its connec-tion with health [25].

The 1968 Act also enabled MAFF to issue, in line withBrambell’s recommendations, voluntary welfare codes ofpractice.23 Developed in consultation with relevant inter-ests, these promised to translate into practice the commit-tee’s general recommendations that all animals should havereadily accessible fresh water and nutritionally adequatefood; adequate ventilation and a suitable environmentaltemperature; adequate freedom of movement and abilityto stretch limbs; sufficient light for satisfactory inspection;rapid diagnosis and treatment of injury and disease; emer-gency provision in the event of a breakdown of essentialmechanical equipment; flooring which neither harms norcauses undue strain; and the avoidance of unnecessarymutilation [11].24 They amounted to the laying down ofminimum standards, akin to those defined under the transitregulations, for the keeping of animals on farms.

The hopes and fears of all parties were pinned on thewelfare codes, but there was no consensus on what theyshould contain. The divergent perspectives on this issuereflected fundamental differences of opinion on what wel-fare meant, and how it should be defined, evaluated andprevented. For Harrison and the animal welfare societies,welfare was a moral and ethical problem, rooted in humanattitudes to animals and nature. While rejecting the an-thropomorphic view that animals’ needs and feelings couldbe extrapolated directly from those of humans, they nev-ertheless emphasised that emotions and ability to expressnatural instincts should be taken into account. Scientificknowledge and practical experience did not provide anadequate basis for decisions on key welfare issues: theformer was often lacking, while experienced individualsusually had an economic interest in farming, which ledthem to equate welfare with productivity and ignore men-tal suffering. Ethical considerations had to be taken intoaccount, and on this basis, practices such as battery cagesand veal crates should be banned [10].25

houses; regulations to prevent the bleeding of live calves in order to produce abnor-mally pale flesh; and to ban the docking of cows’ tails. The codes would cover matterssuch as space allowances, feeding regimes, the restraint of livestock by yoking,tethering and confinement in individual stalls; the provision of bedding; and thenature and construction of the flooring. MAFF. Farm animal welfare – proposals forlegislation, 2nd circulation. 1966. NA HO 285/46.23 Brambell Committee (Report). House of Commons Debates. 5 August

1966;v733:c200–03.24 These were later incorporated into the ‘five freedoms’, which continue to define

animal welfare today. See http://www.fawc.org.uk/freedoms.htm.25 See responses to MAFF proposals for legislation, 1966. NA MAF 369/75; FAWAC

minority report, 1970, NA MAF 369/163/1.

27 Virgo, ES. 11 and 12 March 1964, NA MAF 293/169; Note for Minister, 1965. NAMAF 369/32; Winnifrith, J. 14 July 1966. NA MAF 369/73.28 Brambell Committee (Report). House of Commons Debates. 5 August

1966;v733:c202.

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Harrison’s farming, veterinary and scientific opponentsbranded these views ‘subjective’, ‘emotional’, ‘anthropomor-phic’ and ‘irrational’. They argued that welfare was a scien-tific and a practical problem, and that changes to husbandrysystems could only be justified on the basis of evidence, not‘subjective opinion’. For farmers, welfare equated to produc-tivity. The lack of evidence to support any other indicatorcaused vets to agree with them. Many scientific expertsadopted a similar perspective. Couching their views ofwelfare in the language of stress, they argued that ‘effecton protein metabolism’ – in other words, the ability to growand produce – was the best available indicator of a stressfulsituation. All claimed there was insufficient evidence tosupport costly changes to existing systems, especially asviews of what was acceptable would change as scientificevidence accumulated. They also argued that welfare wasaffected more by management and stockmanship than thesystems in which livestock were kept.26

The Brambell committee’s findings straddled these twoperspectives. As a ‘technical’ committee, most of its mem-bers had been selected for their scientific expertise inanimal behaviour, health, husbandry and zoology. Theyaccepted farmers’ claims that intensification was an eco-nomic necessity, that it could benefit livestock by protect-ing them from external environmental hazards, and thatstockmanship was a key determinant of welfare. Conse-quently, their report declined to condemn intensive farm-ing outright, and aimed for recommendations that wouldpermit its future development while ensuring livestockwelfare [11].

However, in considering the nature of welfare and howto evaluate it, the committee moved closer to Harrison’sposition. Its report claimed that it was important to takeinto account the feelings of animals, as revealed throughscientific evidence and analogies drawn with the humanexperience. ‘The cries, expression, reactions, behaviour,health and productivity of the animal’ should all be con-sidered [11, p. 9]. Animals probably suffered in similarways to humans, but their suffering was not identical. Toargue that ‘in the absence of any scientific method ofevaluating whether an animal is suffering, its continuedproductivity should be taken as decisive evidence that it isnot. . . [is] an over-simplified and incomplete view and wereject it’ [11, p. 10].

While acknowledging the paucity of scientific evidenceon welfare, which meant their recommendations werenecessarily provisional, the Brambell committee insisted‘it is morally incumbent upon us to give the animal thebenefit of the doubt and to protect it so far as is possiblefrom conditions that may be reasonably supposed to causeit suffering, though this cannot be proved’ [10, p. 11]. Onthis basis, it set down several recommended standards forintensive systems, for example that battery cages shouldcontain no more than three birds and have a minimum sizeof 20 in. � 17 in. � 18 in.

It fell to MAFF to navigate between these variouspositions and draft the first version of the welfare codes.It was not an impartial observer of events. Criticisms of

26 See responses to MAFF proposals for legislation, 1966. NA MAF 369/75; FAWACmajority report, 1970, NA MAF 369/163/1; British Veterinary Association evidence toBrambell Committee, Veterinary Record 1965;77:179–89.

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farming practice were indirect criticisms of MAFF, since itspolicies had encouraged agriculture to intensify. As thedefender of farmers’ interests within government, it hadtraditionally shown little sympathy with the ‘lunatic fringe’of animal lovers and the ‘hot air’ they spouted. However forpolitical reasons, it could not reject the Brambell reportoutright. Some officials also voiced personal qualms aboutveal crates, battery chickens and pig sweat houses – whichone described as ‘nauseating Belsens’. However, they setthese aside in order to pursue their chief policy goal ofrestricting the damage to farming interests.27

Although the Minister of Agriculture assured Parlia-ment that the standards laid down in the codes would be‘based on the best judgements we can make at this stage ofwhat is desirable practice’,28 his officials referred to stan-dard industry practice when making these judgements,rather than the advice laid down by Brambell.29 Drawingon the language of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘emotion’, they tried tosideline moral and ethical perspectives on welfare. Insist-ing on science as a basis for action, they used Brambell’sadmission that scientific evidence was lacking to reject hisrecommendations for specific standards of husbandry, andto insist on productivity as a measure of welfare.

After receiving comments on the draft codes from inter-ested parties, whose views diverged along the lines outlinedabove, MAFF passed them for approval to the new FarmAnimal Welfare Advisory Council (FAWAC). Appointedunder the 1968 Act, it consisted of four scientists, fourmembers with a special interest in welfare (including Har-rison), four farmers, a veterinary surgeon and two otherrural workers. MAFF officials tried to convert the committeeto its way of thinking by impressing upon the chair, Hum-phrey Hewer, professor of zoology at Imperial College, theincompleteness and lack of scientific evidence for Brambell,and the need to work towards balanced, collective decisions.Hewer, in turn, impressed this view upon the members.Nevertheless they failed to agree on certain issues such asbattery cage size.30

The codes still went forward to Parliament for approvalin October 1969. In opening the debate, the minister re-emphasised the lack of scientific evidence for Brambell andthe subjective nature of its judgements. Parliament wasnot impressed. It debated the codes for over 6 h. Whilelargely accepting the necessity of intensive farming, mem-ber after member urged the government to go ‘back toBrambell’ on the codes. F. Burden, chair of the Parliamen-tary all-party welfare group claimed that the insistence onscientific evidence was a red herring, for ‘we will neverhave legislation to protect animals if we must know firsthow much pain they have in all circumstances’. He alsowarned against the ‘play . . . made on the words ‘‘subjective’’and ‘‘objective’’. It is usually said that a person is subjectiveif we do not agree with him and objective if we do agreewith him’. The government narrowly avoided a division on

29 Winnifrith, J. 14 July 1966. NA MAF 369/73.30 Notes of meeting with Professor Hewer, 5 October 1967, Minutes of 1st FAWAC

meeting, 13 October 1967, NA MAF 369/91; Welfare of livestock (Brambell commit-tee’s report). House of Commons Debates. 20 October 1969;v788:c825–909.

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the codes by promising to commission a State VeterinaryService report on their working in the field, and to refercontentious points back to FAWAC for reconsideration.31

This outcome signalled the failure of MAFF’s attempt tocreate a consensus on science as a basis for welfare policy.32

FAWAC remained divided on whether science or ethicsshould be the key determinant of policy, and issued major-ity and minority reports to this effect.33 The SVS reportfound no problems on scientific grounds, but did not answerthe ethical challenge.34 While for political reasons theMinister wanted to make concessions to the welfare lobby,his own insistence on scientific evidence as a basis foraction prevented him from doing so.35 In 1971, the virtuallyunchanged codes were presented again to Parliament by anew government. This time, while insisting that it was‘better to move forward on sound scientific grounds ratherthan to leap in the dark on things on which there are noobjective views’36, ministers acknowledged the ethical andmoral dimensions to welfare. Although still unhappy withthe codes, Parliament accepted them on the basis thatsome welfare safeguards were better than none. This stepconfirmed the establishment of a new mode of governancefor the newly created and still highly contentious concept ofwelfare.37

ConclusionIn the 7 years from 1964 to 71, the traditional discourse ofanimal cruelty was gradually marginalised and ‘animalwelfare’ established as a term, a concept and a target ofgovernment regulation. Referring to a new set of laws,codes and concerns relating to farm animals, as well as tomany existing activities that had previously fallen underthe heading ‘prevention of cruelty’, welfare became animportant focus of political, scientific and ethical attention.

While existing accounts emphasise the novelty of wel-fare and attribute its emergence to the post-WWII rise ofintensive farming, this paper has located it within longertraditions of intensive farming, critiques of its practicesand legislation to protect animals in transit. Efforts toincrease farming efficiency by confining animals and ‘forc-ing’ them to produce were not unique to the post-WWII era,and Ruth Harrison was just the latest in a long line ofindividuals to highlight the detrimental effects of thesepractices on animals. Her novelty lay in emphasising thescope of suffering, its mental aspects and in denying thatnature alone would effect a cure. The state’s subsequentinterventions drew on MAFF’s long history of regulating

31 Welfare of livestock (Brambell committee’s report). House of Commons Debates, 20October 1969;v788:c825–909.32 Nevertheless MAFF and its successor, the Department for the Environment, Food

and Rural Affairs (Defra) continued adopt this approach in relation to other difficultpolicy problems such as BSE and bovine tuberculosis, and with a similar lack ofsuccess. See van Zwanenberg, P, Millstone, E. BSE: risk, science and governance.Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2005; Wilkinson, K. Too much evidence, too littlepolicy. Competing knowledge claims and bovine TB control. Paper presented toWarwick University workshop, Bovine Tuberculosis: People, Politics and Culture,2010.33 FAWAC reports, 1970. NA MAF 369/163/1.34 Tame, WC. 15 July 1970. NA MAF 369/173.35 MAFF correspondence and submission to Minister, 1970. NA MAF 369/177.36 James Prior, Agriculture (welfare of livestock). House of Commons Debates 30 July

1971;v822:c1011.37 Agriculture (welfare of livestock). House of Commons Debates. 30 July

1971;v822:c970–1022.

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the environments of animals confined during transit. Thefact that welfare was a new term and target of governanceshould not blind us to these historical continuities.

The publication of Animal Machines and the report ofthe Brambell committee are already recognised as seminalevents in the 1960s emergence of animal welfare. Thispaper has revealed the additional, key role played byMAFF officials in adopting the term ‘welfare’, decidingwhat it meant and setting the agenda for its management.While Harrison described a new form of animal suffering,which the Brambell committee defined and recommendedfor incorporation into law, its articulation as ‘welfare’derived from MAFF’s decision to apply this term to thecommittee’s work. This decision, like its subsequentattempts to regulate and define welfare, was influencedby its political desire to defend farmers’ interests andestablish its right to welfare governance.

In other words, ‘welfare’ was not simply a new term fordescribing particular forms of animal suffering, but also apolitical construct that reflected the outlooks and agendasof MAFF officials. Consequently it is not surprising thatthis construct – which was based on a scientific, productiv-ity-oriented understanding of animal wellbeing – met withopposition. The strong resistance expressed by Harrisonand her supporters to the government’s welfare codesforced agriculture ministers to acknowledge, however re-luctantly, an ethical dimension to the problem.

As a scientific and ethical issue, governed partly bystatute and partly by voluntary codes, with measuresinformed by independent expert advice and monitored,in practice, by state veterinary services, welfare had as-sumed, by 1971, the form that it still holds today. However,the tension between scientific and ethical perspectivesremains unresolved. Consequently, the question of howanimals should be kept on farms continues to be a highlycontentious and a highly political problem.

AcknowledgementsResearch for this article was undertaken while working on a fellowshipfunded under the UK Research Councils’ Rural Economy and Land Use(Relu) Programme (RES-229-27-0001). Relu is funded jointly by theEconomic and Social Research Council, the Biotechnology and BiologicalSciences Research Council and the Natural Environment ResearchCouncil, with additional funding from the Department forEnvironment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Scottish Government.Versions were presented to the Animal Welfare Policy workshop atWarwick University, 2009 and to the annual conference of the Society forthe Social History of Medicine, 2010. I would like to thank the audiencesand the referees of this paper for their comments and advice.

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