From green technology development to green innovation:inducing regulatory adoption of pathogen detectiontechnology for sustainable forestry

Jeremy Hall & Stelvia Matos & Vernon Bachor

Accepted: 30 June 2017 /Published online: 3 October 2017

Abstract Technological entrepreneurship has beenwidely acknowledged as a key driver of modern indus-trial economies, and more recently, a panacea for envi-ronmental and social problems. However, our currentunderstanding of how green-technology venturesemerge and diffuse more sustainable innovations re-mains limited. We advance theory on green entrepre-neurship by drawing on institutional work to refine andextend our understanding of how entrepreneurs mayinfluence government policies and practices in theirattempts to diffuse green technology. We develop atheoretical framework that combines institutional workwith a search tool, the technological, commercial,

organizational, and societal (TCOS) framework of in-novative uncertainties, which identifies key opportuni-ties, hurdles, and potential unintended consequences atearly stages of technology development. We present adetailed case study of a potential university-basedgreen-tech venture developing pathogen detection tech-nology for forestry protection. Foreign pathogens spreadby international trade can have major detrimental im-pacts on forests and the industries that rely on them. Ouranalysis found that green technology demonstratingtechnological feasibility is necessary but not sufficient;green-tech ventures must also engage in institutionalwork, in this case, articulating the technology’s benefitsto regulators to establish legitimacy and avoid misusethat can hinder its adoption. We thus add to previousstudies by emphasizing that institutional work could bea main activity for a green-tech venture, a core entrepre-neurial strategy rather than an afterthought.

Keywords Green entrepreneurship . Green innovation .

Institutional work . Regulatory technology adoption .

Sustainable forestry . Technology development

1 Introduction

Since at least Schumpeter (1934), entrepreneurship hasbeen widely acknowledged as a key driver of economicgrowth, where new technologies can disrupt old eco-nomic systems through creative destruction, a difficult

Small Bus Econ (2019) 52:877–889DOI 10.1007/s11187-017-9940-0

Electronic supplementary material The online version of thisarticle (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-017-9940-0) containssupplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

J. Hall (*) : S. MatosNottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus,University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG8 1BB, UKe-mail: jeremy.hall@nottingham.ac.ukURL: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/ICCSR/people.php?p=273

S. Matose-mail: Stelvia.Matos@nottingham.ac.uk

V. BachorBusiness Administration Department, College of Business,Winona State University, Somsen Hall 324E, 175 West Mark St.,Winona, MN 55987, USAe-mail: VBachor@winona.eduURL: http://www.winona.edu/businessadmin/vernon-bachor.asp

# The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication

and expensive process of throwing out the old in favorof the new. Entrepreneurship scholars have since iden-tified creative destruction as a driver of more sustainablesocieties (Cohen and Winn 2007; Hockerts andWüstenhagen 2010; York and Venkataraman 2010).While such a Bgreen wave^ of creative destructionsounds conceptually appealing, until recently, few stud-ies from the entrepreneurship discourse have exploredhow this may emerge (Hörisch et al. 2017). Accordingto Hall et al. (2010, p. 441), green entrepreneurshipresearch has been primarily driven from outside entre-preneurship journals, noting BThe unstated assumptionis that green, clean, and low carbon entrepreneurs willsomehow cure most of what ails aging industrialeconomies^, what they call the panacea hypothesis.Hörisch et al. (2017, p. 48) note BThis slight attentionresearch has paid to the determinants of environmentalentrepreneurship is surprising, given the potential of theconcept to successfully address global environmentalproblems^. Meyskens and Carsrud (2013, p. 740) spe-cifically recommend further research on green-tech ven-tures, i.e., firms that Bemploy sustainable entrepreneur-ial practices to develop and commercialize technologythat alleviates environmental market failures, preservesnatural resources, and protects the environment.^

We respond to these calls for further research byexamining a detailed case of a potential green-techventure in the form of a university spin-off, a type offirm created to commercially exploit university knowl-edge (Pirnay and Surlemont 2003). The venture is de-veloping new genomics-based pathogen detection tech-nology for forestry protection. Invasive pathogens canhave catastrophic impacts on forests and the industriesthat rely on them. The technology offers significantimprovements over the visual inspections currently usedby regulators to detect foreign pathogens (Hall et al.2014b). Although many studies investigate how regula-tions shape technology diffusion, much less attentionexplores how regulators adopt new technologies fortheir own needs (Hall et al. 2014b). According to Car-penter (2004), government regulators often favor betterknown firms, which may place new university spin-offsat a disadvantage over established firms. The key chal-lenges are therefore less about Bgreen technologydevelopment^ but rather the broader Bgreen innovation^process of successful commercialization and diffusion.

Inducing institutional change has been exploredthrough Binstitutional work,^ Bthe purposive action ofindividuals and organizations aimed at creating,

maintaining and disrupting institutions^ (Lawrenceand Suddaby 2006, p. 215), in our case, regulatoryadoption of more effective pathogen detection technol-ogy. According to Lawrence and Dover (2015, p. 375),institutional work uses B…heterogeneous material andsymbolic resources, the availability and quality of whichcan significantly affect the strategies actors employ.^Here, we suggest purposive action is establishing legit-imacy for the proposed pathogen detection technology,which is based on its ability to protect forests moreeffectively than incumbent methods.

Our aim is to advance theory on green entrepreneur-ship by drawing on institutional work to refine andextend our understanding of how entrepreneurs engagein purposive action to diffuse more sustainable technol-ogy. Our research question is thus: How can entrepre-neurs engage in institutional work to facilitate the adop-tion of green technology, thus resulting in greeninnovation?

To answer this question, we develop a theoreticalframework that combines institutional work with theBtechnological, commercial, organizational, and societal(TCOS)^ framework of innovative uncertainties (Halland Martin 2005; Hall et al. 2011, 2014a). TCOS is anorganizing framework that explicitly searches for keytechnological, commercial, organizational, and societalissues to be overcome before an invention can result insuccessful innovation. It differs from other approachesby emphasizing that various stakeholders may use dif-ferent heuristics to form opinions and make decisions.Thus, this framework helps to understand how entrepre-neurs can induce changes to regulators’ risk assessmentpractices through more effective green technology.

The TCOS analysis found that, in addition todemonstrating technological efficacy, there are alsonontechnical challenges such as how informationfrom the tests should be interpreted and used byregulators, the potential impact on internationaltrade, and cost concerns from industry. Our analy-sis thus suggests that, while demonstrating techno-logical feasibility is necessary, it may be insuffi-cient; in order for successful green innovation tooccur, the proposed green-tech venture must alsoprovide advice regarding where the technology canbe used and be prepared to address stakeholderconcerns. It thus needs to engage in institutionalwork to articulate the technology’s benefits to reg-ulators to establish legitimacy and avoid misusethat can hinder its adoption.

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Next, we discuss the recent literature on entrepre-neurship for sustainable development and institutionalwork that shape new green-tech ventures. We then pres-ent our methodology, followed by our analysis, discus-sion, and conclusion with recommendations.

2 Theory development

Sustainability concerns have become amajor topic with-in the academic discourse. For example, the recentBGrand Challenges^ literature calls for managementscholars to find solutions for the UN Sustainable Devel-opment Goals (SDG), where Grand Challenges are de-fined as B…formulations of global problems that can beplausibly addressed through coordinated and collabora-tive effort^ (George et al. 2016, p. 1880). Althoughentrepreneurship and innovation are explicitly seen asmechanisms to achieve SDGs (e.g., Goal 8: DecentWork and Economic Growth and Goal 9: Industry,Innovation, and Infrastructure), sustainable develop-ment has drawn limited attention within the entrepre-neurship literature (Hall et al. 2010; Hörisch et al. 2017).

Seminal studies from the entrepreneurship literatureregard environmental problems as market imperfec-tions, where alert entrepreneurs can find profitable so-lutions to resolve these imperfections (Cohen and Winn2007; Dean and McMullen 2007). These earlier studiesthus emphasize opportunities for environmental entre-preneurs by creating new firms, markets, products, in-formation sources, and institutions (York andVenkataraman 2010) as a panacea for societal problems(Hall et al. 2010).

Two additional themes within the entrepreneurshipdiscourse discussed next are the role of policy (both as asupporting mechanism and hindrance to transformation)and the role of technological innovation. The role ofpolicy includes a theoretical overview of policies forgreen entrepreneurship and institutional work as ameans to induce regulatory change, and the role oftechnological innovation specifically focuses on mech-anisms that green-tech ventures can use to identify keyissues facilitating or hindering the technology’sdiffusion.

2.1 The role of policy and institutional work

Criscuolo and Menon (2015) and Kesidou and Demirel(2012) found that policy makers stimulate green

entrepreneurship in both upstream (e.g., grants, researchand development (R&D) support) and downstream ac-tivities (e.g., regulation and deployment policies, taxmechanisms). Consistent with the market imperfectionsliterature, others note that policy can also hinder greenentrepreneurship, where transitioning towards sustain-ability requires regulatory change (Musiolik et al. 2012;Penna and Geels 2012). Institutional work (Lawrenceand Suddaby 2006) is recognized as one strategy toinvoke institutional change, thus potentially facilitatingtransition towards sustainability (Farla et al. 2012;Markard et al. 2012).

A key challenge recognized within the entrepreneur-ship literature is how entrepreneurs navigate the institu-tional environment (Bruton et al. 2010). Within thegreen entrepreneurship literature, Pacheco et al. (2010,p. 465) argue that green-tech ventures should generatecommunal institutions to Bimprove the competitivenessof sustainable behaviors.^ Drawing on entrepreneurialcooperation cases, they argue green entrepreneurs mayrequire institutional structures that go beyond thestandard-setting coalitions customary in many emergingindustries. Meek et al. (2010) similarly argue that abroader institutional context influences sustainable en-trepreneurship, where social norms favorable to sustain-ability objectives partially predict higher levels of newbusiness formation.

Consistent with Lawrence and Suddaby’s (2006)concept of institutional work, Lumpkin et al. (2013, p.777-8) argue that entrepreneurs with social mandatesoften need to Bbreak free from institutional norms anddefy traditional approaches to problem-solving.^ Insti-tutional work has been used to explore how strategy,practice work (actors’ efforts to influence recognitionand acceptance of routines), and boundary work (at-tempts to create, shape, and disrupt boundaries) aremaintained or transformed within an organization(Lawrence et al. 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010).For example, Van Dijk et al. (2011) examine how actorsdeploy institutional work to legitimize innovation with-in established firms, noting that ambiguity of interests,norms, and beliefs provide actors opportunities tospread new interpretations, gain legitimacy, and thustransform institutional systems in favor of theinnovation.

According to Lawrence and Dover (2015), institu-tional work uses heterogeneous material and symbolicresources, which vary in availability and quality, affectthe strategies actors employ, and by implication the

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heuristics used in decision-making. Lawrence et al.(2009) also caution that purposive shaping of institu-tions may result in significant unintended consequences,an area poorly understood. Finally, according to Law-rence et al. (2013), most studies on institutional workfocus on intended outcomes based on retrospectiveanalyses. Thus, while institutional work provides pow-erful strategic and theoretical perspectives for under-standing and initiating institutional change, it currentlylacks specific search heuristics that can be employed atearly stages of development, issues we discuss next.

2.2 Mechanisms facilitating technological innovationfor sustainability

Another theme in the entrepreneurship literature focuseson the role of technological innovation by green-techventures (Meyskens and Carsrud 2013). For example,O’Neil and Ucbasaran (2016) explore how legitimiza-tion processes of green entrepreneurs evolve to bringnew technologies to new audiences. Technological in-novation has been recognized as a key solution foraddressing Grand Challenges (Hicks 2016; Reid et al.2010) and more generally, a mechanism fortransitioning towards more sustainable societies bycorrecting market failures (Markard et al. 2012;Wagner et al. 2014; York and Venkataraman 2010).Hockerts and Wüstenhagen (2010) argue that such tran-sitions are often initially stimulated by new entrants thattrigger responses from incumbents, moving the industryto the next level. The sustainability transitions literaturethus focuses on multidimensional transformation pro-cesses (technological, institutional, political, economic)to promote more sustainable production and consump-tion (Markard et al. 2012).

According to Hess (2014, p. 279), the sustainabilitytransitions literature does not explain the mechanismsthat enable coalitions to achieve their goals under resis-tance from politically powerful incumbents. A moreapplied perspective that deals with such mechanisms isfuture technology analysis (FTA) that can guide practi-tioners’ efforts to address Grand Challenges (Haegemanet al. 2013). FTA aligns with Clark and Wheelwright’s(1993) seminal research on new product development,which emphasizes the importance of bringing technicaland commercial knowledge about potential new prod-ucts or processes together at early phases of develop-ment, the most efficient time to shape its innovationpath. FTA does this by utilizing various technology

foresight approaches that Bvalues the multiplicity ofperspectives, interests and knowledge held across adisperse landscape of actors and seeks to bring thesetogether in processes of deliberation analysis andsynthesis^ (Cagnin and Keenan 2008, p. 4). Freemanand Soete (1997) and Martin (1994) have framed suchperspectives under four areas of uncertainty: technolog-ical, commercial, organizational, and societal (TCOS).

Hall and Martin (2005) and Hall et al. (2011) suggestthat managing these four areas of uncertainty requiresthe application of different heuristics. They argue thattechnological and commercial uncertainties can be un-derstood using Popper’s (1959) trial-and-error elimina-tion scientific methodology approach. For societal un-certainties, there are often more stakeholders with vary-ing opinions and goals that may not be appeasedthrough purely scientific arguments, and as a result,heuristics based on Popper’s (1945) piecemeal socialengineering approach are more appropriate. Accordingto York and Lenox (2014, p. 1930), sociocultural fac-tors, the B… unwritten, decentralized rules of the game^play a particularly important role in green entrepreneur-ship. In addition to calling for different heuristics, theTCOS approach acts as a search tool, bringing togetherdifferent technological, commercial, organizational, andsocietal perspectives at early phases of development, inan attempt to identify potential hurdles that must beovercome, or opportunities to exploit that may helplegitimize the technology (Hall et al. 2011; 2014b).

According to Hall et al. (2014b), technological un-certainty focuses on overcoming scientific and engineer-ing hurdles. As noted by Schumpeter (1934), invention(i.e., technological feasibility) requires a market trans-action before it can be considered an innovation. Thus,commercial uncertainty deals with whether the newtechnology can successfully compete in the marketplaceand can be improved with input from well-defined usersinvolved during early stages of technology development(Clark and Wheelwright, 1993).

Organizational uncertainty focuses on whether, andhow, organizations profit from the innovation, which,according to Teece (1986) and Martin (1994), is basedon intellectual property (IP) protection, internal capabil-ities, and access to complementary assets. New ventureslacking complementary assets should either collaboratewith or sell the technology to those that possess suchassets. For university spin-offs, IP is often co-owned andmanaged by their technology transfer offices (TTOs),which were es tab l ished to help academics

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commercialize inventions and transfer knowledge topractitioners (Siegel et al. 2004). TTOs typically firstdetermine if the knowledge is patentable and then assessmarket potential (Feldman et al. 2002). This approachoften negates technologies that are unsuitable forpatenting such as when the potential market is small, orfor applications that are suitable for Bpassive industries -those that have limited resources and capabilities to seekout university research^ (Hall et al. 2014b, p. 33).

Societal uncertainty deals with Bthe social impacts ofthe technology and how diverse social groups and sec-ondary stakeholders may affect, or be affected by, itsdevelopment^ (Hall et al. 2014a, p. 99). Whereas TCOuncertainties are primarily concerned with establishingcognitive legitimacy, i.e. the knowledge needed to suc-ceed in a new industry, socio-political legitimacy is theprocess by which key stakeholders accept a new venturegiven their existing norms (Aldrich and Fiol 1994), andis crucial for overcoming societal uncertainties. Asdiscussed below, while establishing cognitive legitima-cy is necessary, the core reason for a green-tech ven-ture’s existence resides with its socio-politicallegitimacy.

TCOS thus complements institutional work by pro-viding a search tool that seeks to bring together thedifferent perspectives and heuristics at early phases ofdevelopment, the most efficient time to shape the inno-vation path of a new technology (Clark andWheelwright 1993).

3 Methodology

We illustrate a detailed analysis of a University of Brit-ish Columbia (Canada) potential green-tech venture, aspin-off from the BTAIGA^ Project (Technological As-pects of Tree Aggressors Identification using GenomicApproaches) attempting to commercialize pathogen de-tection technology for forestry protection. Foreign path-ogens are increasingly spread through internationaltrade and exacerbated by climate change, resulting inmajor damage to forests and the industries that rely onthem but can be reduced through early detection(Pimentel et al. 2000). To combat pathogen infestation,the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)provides international standards that are implementedthrough national plant protection agencies such as theAnimal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the USDepartment of Agriculture and the Canadian Food

Inspection Agency (CFIA). Such agencies currently relymostly on visual inspection, a problematic approachgiven that pathogens can be present before diseasesymptoms are visible, and cannot identify previouslyunknown pathogens (Hall et al. 2014b). TAIGA canimprove regulatory risk assessments by testing genomicprofiles of imported forest product samples against da-tabases of known pathogens, thus eliminating costlyfalse negatives and reducing false positives. Future gen-erations of this technology may provide more immedi-ate results, thus improving inspection efficiencies andfacilitating proactive forest management.

We chose this case for several reasons. First, werespond to calls for further research on how entrepre-neurship can facilitate sustainability (Hall et al. 2010;Hörisch et al. 2017), more specifically how R&D can betranslated into commercial applications through green-tech ventures (Meyskens and Carsrud 2013) and howentrepreneurs bring new technologies to new audiences(O’Neil and Ucbasaran 2016). This case also providesinsights on how university spin-offs can stimulate greentechnology. According to Meoli and Vismara (2016),university spin-offs have the potential to stimulate eco-nomic growth, but literature reviews on university spin-offs by Fryges and Wright (2014) and Grimaldi et al.(2011) indicate that few research projects have studiedgreen technology, and none studied developing regula-tory tools, as is the case here.

Second, consistent with the Grand Challenges(George et al. 2016; Hicks 2016; Reid et al.2010) and sustainability transitions literature(Hess 2014; Markard et al. 2012; Musiolik et al.2012; Penna and Geels 2012), this technology canpotentially improve international standards for for-estry protection by offering faster and more accu-rate assessments but requires transformational pro-cesses in risk assessment practices. Finally, datafrom multiple sources on TAIGA’s challenges andopportunities allow us to explore the experimentaland green technology developmental process underBextreme circumstances^ (Eisenhardt and Graebner2007). All of these factors make TAIGA a relevantcase (Yin 1994).

Using a single case study was appropriate and instru-mental because qualitative case studies can support andfacilitate comprehension of phenomena that are not wellunderstood (Marshall and Rossman 1995) and furtherdevelop existing theory Bby pointing to gaps and begin-ning to fill them^ (Siggelkow 2007, p. 21). Case studies

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can also tease out specific mechanisms underlying en-trepreneurship processes (Maguire et al. 2004).

We identified key stakeholders as potential inter-viewees from desk research and suggestions providedby TAIGA scientists and other stakeholders identifiedthrough the snowball technique (Berg 1988). Weinterviewed 68 people between December 2011 andNovember 2013,1 with expertise on scientific, policy,and business-oriented issues. To ensure data triangula-tion (Yin 1994), we interviewed representatives fromdifferent areas and levels within organizations andstakeholders with varying perspectives from Canada,US, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Italy, and the UK.Such geographical variation helped us explore potentialinternational implications on standards and plant protec-tion protocols in trade agreements.

Our units of analysis are potential green-tech entre-preneurs developing the TAIGA technology. Our levelof analysis is the process by which (i.e., how) engagingin institutional work can change government risk assess-ment practice in favor of technology adoption. Datacollection and analysis interacted throughout the re-search process, allowing for deductive and inductivecoding using TCOS as an organizing framework andsearch tool. We searched for heterogeneous material andsymbolic resources (Lawrence and Dover 2015) at anearly stage of the technology’s development, thus pro-viding the potential green-tech venture with strategicoptions. For example, introductory questions related tostakeholders’ perceptions of key forestry industry issueswere followed by an open discussion on potential TCOSchallenges (i.e., hurdles that need to be overcome) andopportunities (i.e., levers that can be exploited) relatedto the adoption of the TAIGA technology (interviewprotocol guide provided in Appendix 2). We transcribedand coded interviews using the qualitative data analysissoftware Atlas.ti.

Following Miles and Huberman’s (1994) deductiveprocess, stakeholder quotes were first organized accord-ing to themes and subthemes from the TCOS search. Asthe analysis progressed, additional subthemes emergedinductively, such as Bstakeholder take up^ and Bcostsensitivity.^ Two researchers coded the transcripts toensure inter-rater reliability. The coding system tableand samples of quotes linked to code themes are

presented in Appendix 3. Finally, we went back to thetheory and used institutional work to synthetize theTCOS findings into an understanding of how green-tech entrepreneurs can have an active role in changingregulatory practices for the benefit of technologicaldiffusion.

4 Analysis

We next analyze our findings using TCOS as an orga-nizing framework, starting with the T, C, and S analysesderived from our search process outlined in the meth-odology. We conclude with the O analysis, which, com-bined with the other analyses, provides insights onsuitable business models for the proposed green-techventure.

4.1 Technological analysis

Proof of concept for the TAIGA technology has beenestablished, where Canadian regulators successfullyused similar genomics-based pathogen detection toolsduring the Sudden Oak Death pathogen outbreak. Ac-cording to a CFIA representative, B[Scientists] showedhow the Sudden Oak Death test gave less or no falsepositives compared to some of the other types of teststhat we’re doing. The DNA-based tests [have fewer]false positives.^ TAIGA thus provides an importantvalue proposition needed in forestry by improvingaccuracy.

A key lever of TAIGA is to simplify risk assessments(Fig. 1) and address biosecurity issues—Bit simplifiesthings enormously^ according to a New Zealand plantprotection organization representative. An industry rep-resentative stated, Bif there are known problems and thisis a simple tool for detecting known problems, it stream-lines the process rather than complicating it.^ Canadianprovincial forest managers were similarly interested infuture applications capable of on-site testing and verifi-cation, facilitating more proactive risk management: BIfwe could get the equipment and do the testing ourselves,I think that would be ideal.^

Key technological issues include false positives andnegatives B… an absolutely massive risk, especiallyaround the world of pathogens...^ commented a Provin-cial Policy representative. TAIGA is a significant im-provement over visual inspections reducing cases offalse negatives. However, given that it is much more

1 Interview subjects are listed in Appendix 1, and an update of whathappened to the TAIGA project as of May 2017 is available inAppendix 4 (both available as electronic supplementary material).

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sensitive, there were concerns that it may detect minutetraces of pathogens that may not warrant quarantine ordead (and therefore harmless) pathogens, resulting infalse positives. A CFIA scientist noted, Bwe do haveviability tests that we do to see if the organism is aliveand functional... DNA might not give us the answer ifwe’re looking to see if something’s alive.^

Interpreting the diagnostic test results is also crucial.According to a National Policy representative, Bdetectingit is one thing, proving that it’s making some harm to theforest is another thing^ and B…if it is a tool that tells youa positive or negative and thenmaybe spits out a name orsomething, there’s a huge wealth of information thatneeds to go before and after that to say, ‘What is thatreally in that situation?’^ Concerns are thus more about

how the information will be used rather than the tech-nology per se. Its utility will thus need to be closelyentwined with guidelines, operating procedures, andlimitations.

4.2 Commercial analysis

Following Clark and Wheelwright (1993), the TAIGAteam engaged with potential early users in order tounderstand their needs and concerns. Regulators wereidentified as the first users, and the CFIA collaboratedwith TAIGA throughout the project. Possible secondarymarkets included private forest industry users such asnurseries and lumber exporters seeking improved forestmanagement tools.

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Fig. 1 Risk assessment practice benchmark

Regulators actively encouraged improved pathogendetection technology due to the significant commercialbenefits from avoiding outbreaks. For example, theSudden Oak Death infestation inflicted an estimated$580 million in damages on British Columbia forestryindustries (Elliott et al. 2012). A New Zealand Govern-ment Policy representative stated B…anything that’sgoing to enhance our sensitivity around detecting path-ogens coming into New Zealand will get picked up byus very, very quickly.^

Potential increased trade through more reliable detec-tion practices was also identified as a key lever. A CFIArepresentative stated BThe more trade that we do, themore the other countries ask us to ensure that the prod-ucts that we are exporting from Canada are free fromspecific pathogens… that’s where these DNA-basedtests will be valuable….^ Industry representatives hadsimilar views: BI know that there definitely have beentrade barrier issues around potential pathogens…, sosomething like this could be of use.^ An industry asso-ciation representative noted the importance of non-tarifftrade barriers around phytosanitary testing, BIt’s a diffi-cult thing for us to be able to, with certainty, demonstrateto our customers in a foreign government that the lum-ber that we’re shipping… does not contain those kindsof pathogens. So would be extremely useful.^However,this interviewee also emphasized BIt’s got to be able…to test it in some cost effective way…. you can’t testevery stick, obviously. So how it gets commercializedwould be very important as well.^

While end users were clearly engaged, their willing-ness to pay was more ambiguous. For example, therewas little awareness about the full costs of incumbentdetection methods, with estimates ranging from $15 to$200 per sample per test. A CFIA representative statedB[I]n a government agency, there isn’t really a bottom…Well, there is a bottom line, but it’s not determined, it’snot based on business decisions really. So I can’t in-crease the cost of my something-or-other to help coveroff the cost of this other test.^ Thus, current pathogendetection costs are incorporated as part of other operat-ing expenses, Bthere’s layers of investment in terms ofinfrastructure, people, expertise and diagnostic proce-dures within CFIA… But if you’re looking at the for-estry pathogen, that’s a narrow slice of that overalltesting investment.^

While regulators were unable to estimate costs fortheir incumbent detection methods, they expected de-tailed estimates about TAIGA costs. According to all

interviewees, the commodity-driven forestry sector iscost-sensitive and often reactive to phytosanitary issues.For example, an industry representative lamented aboutthe pressures to be efficient under increasing gradingrules, regulations, building codes, etc., B… and then thephytosanitary is just on top of all that.^ According to anursery operator, BCost effective is huge... it has to havereasonableness in terms of howmuch sampling needs tobe done.^

Interviewees also acknowledged potential trade re-strictions. An International Policy representative stated,BThere are some who would use or misuse such [DNA-Based] evidence more or less for the purpose of erectingan artificial trade barrier.^ According to one Municipalrepresentative, BTrade is often politically minded... Idon’t think a better diagnostic tool would protect youfrom a political backlash of closing a commodity offsimply because of… the hint of pathogen….^ Accord-ing to a CFIA representative, BWe can promote a tech-nology to our trading partners and say, ‘We have a lot ofconfidence in our ability to certify your export using thistechnology…’ but if that country doesn’t accept thistechnology or our arguments and our evidence…, thenwe can’t use it.^ Establishing legitimacy is thus crucial.

4.3 Societal analysis

TAIGA is primarily intended to improve forest protec-tion and provide additional benefits such as improvedinformation on biodiversity and climate change man-agement. Awareness about advanced approaches variedamong stakeholders, but overall, most supported thetechnology. All interviewees from national plant protec-tion agencies and the IPPC valued DNA-based assess-ment tools, although there was some skepticism aboutaccuracy. Support from the IPPC and national plantprotection organizations can thus establish legitimacy.

Representatives from environmental and aboriginalgroups generally supported the technology, particularlysince it could provide better risk assessment informa-tion. However, some expressed concerns over transpar-ency and how information would be managed. TheUnited Nations Convention on Biodiversity recognizesclimate change adaptation and biodiversity protectionfrom pest outbreaks as critical (Termorshuizen andOpdam 2009). Climate change is expected to have animpact on tree infestations (IPCC 2014). More effectivemonitoring is thus needed (Boyd et al. 2013), which canbe facilitated by TAIGA. Secondary stakeholders

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strongly support climate change applications, BI coulddefinitely see, especially as climate change progresses,that this may be a good tool for diagnostics [to assess]…ecosystems.^

Some stakeholders suggested the Convention on Bi-ological Diversity (CBD) as a potential lever for im-proved pathogen detection technology: BIt’s possiblethat governments, as they… start to implement and usethe CBD more will see [TAIGA] as one of the tools thatwill allow them to better meet some of the CBD goals^noted an International Policy representative. Canadaratified the CBD and is obligated to fulfilling biodiver-sity management objectives by taking all necessarysteps to prevent the introduction of harmful alien organ-isms and mitigate or eliminate their adverse effectsthrough better monitoring (Lindgren 2012). Technolo-gies that help manage biodiversity will thus be useful forCanadian policymakers.

4.4 Organizational analysis

The TAIGA team has access to complementary assetssuch as technical knowledge and testing equipment, anextensive network, and a strong reputation with regula-tors through their Sudden Oak Death test used by theCFIA. However, the developers, as academics, havelimited experience operating for-profit businesses andIP management.

Consistent with Feldman et al. (2002), theuniversity’s TTO officer stated their limited resourcesdictate prioritizing projects that are applicable to poten-tially large markets and patentable, as this is a relativelystraightforward contractual process understood by bothusers and producers. While gene discovery is patentablein Canada, in the USA, the isolation of genes withoutany alteration of genetic information is not consideredan act of invention.2 Given the importance of the USmarket to Canadian forestry trade, patent protection forTAIGA seems unviable or at best would be mired inlegal uncertainties and as a result, would have difficul-ties meeting the TTO’s threshold.

An alternative to patenting possibly suitable for TAI-GA is to use trade secrets. However, TAIGA’s fundingagency rewards patents as a proxy for success, whileresearchers are also under pressure to publish, which

conflicts with secrecy, a common challenge of commer-cializing university research (Czarnitzki et al. 2014).

As discussed above, the initial market is estimated tobe small, although there are longer-term market oppor-tunities with greater international adoption and diversi-fication into other areas such as agriculture. One methodof appropriating these longer-term profits is by creatinga standard (Teece 1986), which creates a competitiveadvantage such that users of the standard would consid-er TAIGA technology first.

Being instrumental in creating a standard can createfirst-mover advantages and, given the limited globalmarket size, result in a Bwinner-takes-all^ scenario,where capturing the market majority leaves the remain-ing market too small to warrant a competitive response.However, the decision to adopt specific technology ismade nationally. An IPPC technical standards specialistnoted that it can cost millions to establish a standarddiagnostic tool for an international commodity, B… thiscan cause some uncomfortable situations regarding fa-cilities and really implementing and making this as astandard, as a minimal requirement for diagnostics.^Trading partners are also allowed to challenge the testfindings if they resulted in import rejections.

We speculate that if one regulator adopts TAIGA andit is proven to offer greater efficacy, other regulators willfollow. The TAIGA team therefore needs to develop abusiness model that includes institutional work that willspecifically engage with the CFIA, IPPO, and otherregulatory bodies, to work with, rather than rely on thestandard practices of the TTO.

5 Discussion and conclusions

We respond to calls for more in-depth research onentrepreneurship for sustainable development (Hörischet al. 2017), particularly the challenges of bringing greentechnologies to new audiences (O’Neil and Ucbasaran2016) and finding commercial applications throughgreen-tech ventures (Criscuolo and Menon 2015;Kesidou and Demirel 2012; Meyskens and Carsrud2013). Our analysis also provides insights for under-standing the panacea hypothesis of green entrepreneur-ship (Hall et al. 2010) by going beyond opportunityidentification of market imperfections (Cohen andWinn 2007; Dean and McMullen 2007; York andVenkataraman 2010) to explore the challenges and nu-ances of actually converting green technologies into

2 See Appendix 5 (electronic supplementary material) for a summaryof the gene discovery patents and trade secrets.

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green innovations. We do so by building on Meeket al.’s (2010) and Pacheco et al.’s (2010) recognitionof institutional environments influencing green-techventures but explicitly emphasizing that entrepreneursmay need to actively shape their institutional environ-ment (Lumpkin et al. 2013), especially for green-techventures (Farla et al. 2012). We thus draw on institu-tional work (Lawrence et al. 2013; Zietsma andLawrence 2010) to understand how entrepreneurs influ-ence institutional change, in this case, through the adop-tion of more effective regulatory risk assessmentpractices.

To answer our question how entrepreneurs engage ininstitutional work to transition green technology intogreen innovation, we presented a theoretical frameworkthat combines institutional work with the TCOS frame-work of innovative uncertainties that explicitly searchesfor key technological, commercial, organizational, andsocietal issues that may affect diffusion. Thus, whileinstitutional work recognizes that entrepreneurs mayhave to influence institutional change, TCOS identifiesthe specific issues and stakeholder concerns that need tobe considered, at which point strategies can be devel-oped to deal with them.

We contribute towards institutional work in numer-ous ways. First, we respond to Lawrence et al.’s (2013)observation that most studies on institutional work focuson retrospective analyses, by studying a green-tech ven-ture at an early stage of development. Similar to vanDijk et al. (2011), we found the TAIGA project has anopportunity to engage in institutional work aiming todiffuse innovation within organizations. We howeveradd to previous studies by emphasizing that institutionalwork could be a main activity for a green-tech venture.We thus differ from much of the literature by placinginstitutional work as a core entrepreneurial strategyrather than as an afterthought. We also responded toconcerns by Lawrence et al. (2009) regarding unintend-ed consequences when agents engage in purposive in-stitutional shaping, by utilizing TCOS as a search tool atearly stages of technology development. We were thusable to identify potential unintended consequences, suchas misuse of TAIGA technology for restricting trade,which could hinder the technology’s adoption.

A key issue in the literature is the need to establishlegitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Hall et al. 2014a;Van Dijk et al. 2011), especially for new firms engagingwith regulators (Carpenter 2004). While establishingcognitive legitimacy is clearly necessary, we suggest

the core purpose of a green-tech venture resides in itssocio-political legitimacy. The TCOS analysis found thekey challenges facing TAIGA are primarily non-techni-cal. We therefore address calls for more research oncoordinated and collaborative effort advocated in theGrand Challenges (George et al. 2016) and sustainabil-ity transitions literatures (Farla et al. 2012) by empha-sizing the need for search mechanisms to facilitate in-stitutional work and identify potential unanticipatedoutcomes that may hinder green innovation.

5.1 Recommendations

Greater awareness of the technology’s ability to addressmore stringent phytosanitary procedures and improvedclimate change and biodiversity management wouldlikely establish socio-political legitimacy. However,concerns over how information derived from the tech-nology would be used, particularly regarding interna-tional trade disputes, could hamper adoption. The com-mercial viability of the technology also presents chal-lenging circumstances, given the primary initial userswill be regulators that, according to our interviews, areconcerned about howmuch the technologymay cost butlack data on cost structures for incumbent procedures.Forestry industry representatives similarly raised con-cerns over added costs, noting the industry is usuallyfinancially constrained and reactive to phytosanitaryissues.

Given these circumstances, a main activity of theventure would be to engage in institutional work tocomplement the specific technologies being developedby TAIGA. This could include a comprehensive set oftechnical procedures, ongoing guidelines, and operatingboundaries explaining how to use the information de-rived from the technology. The venture must also en-gage in regulatory change, specifically convincing reg-ulators to adopt the more effective risk assessment pro-cedures offered by TAIGA, and provide insights derivedfrom the TCOS analysis on the implications it may haveon industry and international trade. The key issue forgreen-tech ventures is that moving from green technol-ogy development to green innovation involves consid-erable institutional work, and as such, should bereflected in the business model.

The organizational analysis found that patenting isinfeasible given the initial market will likely be insuffi-cient to cover extensive IP protection and governancecosts. While trade secrets may be a valid alternative,

886 J. Hall et al.

academic TAIGA team members have to reconcile con-flicting pressures for IP protection with pressures topublish (Czarnitzki et al. 2014). However, the smallmarket may allow for the establishment of an industrystandard. The venture could therefore commercialize thefirst generation of TAIGA at no/minimal cost to theCFIA in an attempt to establish legitimacy, with along-term objective of making it the international stan-dard. To do so, the venture must actively engage ininstitutional work to establish legitimacy and reconcileambiguity of interests, norms, and beliefs that mayotherwise hinder the innovation’s diffusion (van Dijket al. 2011), particularly the interface betweenphytosanitary regulations and international trade. Ulti-mately, we believe the real value of the proposed ven-ture will be derived from the Bsoftware^ (i.e., how theinformation is interpreted and the institutional work thatstimulates institutional change towards more effectiveforestry protection) rather than the Bhardware^ (i.e., thespecific DNA-based assessment tools).

5.2 Limitations and further research

As a single case study, our research is limited by whatcan be generalized. While our proposed green-tech ven-ture provided insights on issues recognized by the greenentrepreneurship and institutional work literature, com-parative studies could add additional insights. For ex-ample, considering different jurisdictions as firstadopters, and other industrial sectors such as agriculture,could account for how differences in economic andpolitical systems influence institutional work at nascentstages of green-tech ventures. While the majority ofgreen entrepreneurship literature recognizes the impor-tance of policy in green innovation, few focus on shap-ing institutions as a core function of green-tech ventures.It would therefore be useful to determine under whatcircumstances institutional work is required and when apassive role is sufficient.

Another area for further research is how ambiguity ofinterests, norms, and beliefs (van Dijk et al. 2011) mayresult in unintended detrimental outcomes (Lawrenceet al. 2013) and more specifically, how various stake-holders choose to interpret information that may preventsocietally beneficial technology from diffusing. Givenpotential controversial trade implications, we speculatethat some stakeholders may, for example, choose toresist the technology for one reason (e.g., trade

protection) but justify their actions with other reasons(e.g., potential for false positives).

Developing an international industry standard willlikely create further demand for informational servicesand may stimulate more proactive behavior by regula-tors and the forest industry. Further applied researchcould explore how to stimulate other applications, forexample, in private forest management and the muchlarger (and controversial) agricultural sector. Shiftingtowards a proactive orientation is difficult, especiallygiven the sector’s cost sensitivities. Experiences fromthe quality assurance movement and recent trends inenvironmental management could provide useful anal-ogies that can be communicated to industry. Anotherpotentially useful analogy is the insurance industry, forexample, where firms pay the cost (premiums) for test-ing as protection to reduce the likelihood of a costlyfuture discovery.

From green technology development to green innovation: inducing regulatory adoption of pathogen... 887

Acknowledgements Funding for this research was supplied byGenome Canada, Genome British Columbia, and the Social Sci-ence and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We would liketo acknowledge the contributions of our colleagues, Robin Dow-ney, Richard Hamelin, Hesther Lui, Adnan Uzunovic, DéborahFarias, and Stephan Brière, as well as those that participated in theresearch and the useful comments from the reviewers and specialissue editors.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of theCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestrict-ed use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, providedyou give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifchanges were made.

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