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fit made contact with a patrol from1st Battalion, 7th Marines, andlearned of the enemy breakout. Afew minutes later Company C raninto a large force of Japanese nearAsamama on the Metapona River.The Marines had been crossing awide grassy area. When the advanceguard entered a wooded area on theopposite side it surprised the enemyin their bivouac. In the initial action,the advance guard inflicted signifi-cant casualties on the Japanese, butlost five men killed and three wound-ed. In short order the enemy had theremainder of the company pinneddown in the open with rifle, machinegun, and mortar fire.

Carlson vectored two of his patrolsin that direction to assist, and dis-patched one platoon from the basecamp. As it crossed the Metapona toreach the main battle, Company Etangled with another enemy groupcoming in the opposite direction. Themore numerous Japanese initiallyforced the Marines to withdraw, butMajor Richard T. Washburn reor-ganized his company and counterat-tacked the enemy as they attemptedto cross the river. The raiders inflictedsignificant casualties on their oppo-nent, but could not push through tolink up with Charlie Company. In

mid-afternoon, Carlson himself ledCompany F toward Asamama.

By the time he arrived, CompanyC had extricated itself under cover-ing fire from its own 60mm mortars.Carlson called in two dive bomberson the enemy, ordered Company Bto break off its independent action,

and launched Company F in a flank-ing attack against the main Japaneseforce. Those raiders completed themaneuver by dusk, only to find theenemy position abandoned. The bat-talion assembled back at Binu thatnight. There Company D reportedthat it had run into yet another group

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 51728

Native scouts lead a combat/reconnaissance patrol of the 2d lasted for less than a month, during which the Marines co-Raider Battalion across the hills of Cuadalcanal. The patrol vered 150 miles and fought more than a dozen actions.

Maj James Roosevelt, the president's son, served as executive officer of the 2d Raidersduring the Makin raid and commanded the 4th Raiders after that unit was activated.


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of enemy and been pinned down formost of the afternoon. The under-stength unit had lost two killed andone wounded.

On 12 November Carlson ledCompanies B and E back to thewoods at Asamama. Throughout theday enemy messengers attempted toenter the bivouac site under the mis-taken notion that it still belonged totheir side; the raiders killed 25 ofthem. In the afternoon Carison or-dered Company C to join him there.The next day he observed enemyunits moving in the vicinity, and heplaced artillery and mortar fire onfive separate groups. After each suchmission the raiders dealt withJapanese survivors trying to maketheir way into the woods. On 14November Carison decided to pullback to Binu. That same day a Com-pany F patrol wiped out a 15-manenemy outpost that had been report-ed by native scouts.

After a brief period to rest andreplenish at Binu, the 2d Raidersmoved their base camp to Asamamaon 15 November. During two daysof patrolling from that site, Carlsondetermined that the main enemyforce had departed the area. At Van-degrift's request, the raider com-mander entered the perimeter on 17November. Vandegrift directed Carl-son to search for 'Pistol Pete;' an ene-my artillery piece that regularlyshelled the airfield. The battalionalso was to seek out trails circling theperimeter, and any Japanese unitsoperating to the south. The raidersmoved forward to the Tenaru Riverover the next few days.

On 25 November Company A ar-rived from Espiritu Santo and joinedthe battalion. For the next few daysthe 2d Raiders divided into threecombat teams of two companiesapiece, with each operating from itsown patrol base. Each day theymoved farther into the interior of theisland, in the area between the head-waters of the Tenaru and Lungarivers. Carlson remained with the

center team, from which point hecould quickly reinforce either of theflank detachments.

On 30 November the battalioncrossed over the steep ridgeline thatdivided the valleys of the Tenaru andLunga. Discovery of a telephone wireled the raiders to a large bivouac site,which held an unattended 75mmmountain gun and a 37mm antitankgun. Marines removed key parts ofthe weapons and scattered themdown the hillside. Farther on the ad-vance guard entered yet anotherbivouac site, this one occupied by100 Japanese. Both sides were equallysurprised, but Corporal John Yanceycharged into the group firing his au-tomatic weapon and calling for hissquad to follow. The more numerousenemy were at a disadvantage sincetheir arms were stacked out of reach.The handful of raiders routed theJapanese and killed 75. Carlsoncalled it "the most spectacular of anyof our engagements:' For this featYancey earned the first of his twoNavy Crosses (the second came yearslater in Korea).

The next day, 1 December, aDouglas R4D Skytrain transport air-dropped badly needed rations, aswell as orders for the battalion toenter the perimeter. Carlson askedfor a few more days in the field andgot it. On 3 December he held a"Gung Ho" meeting to motivate hisexhausted men for one more effort.Then he divided the 2d Raiders inhalf, sending the companies with themost field time down to Marine lines.The rest he led up to the top ofMount Austen, where a raider patrolhad discovered a strong but aban-doned Japanese position. The forcehad barely reached their objectivewhen they encountered an enemyplatoon approaching from a differ-ent direction. After a two-hour firefight and two attempts at a doubleenvelopment, the Marines finallywiped out their opponents. Theresult was 25 enemy dead at a costof four wounded Marines (one of

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whom died soon after). The raidersspent a tough night on the mountain,since there was no water availableand their canteens were empty. Thenext day Carlson led the force downinto the Marine perimeter, but notwithout one last skirmish. SevenJapanese ambushed the point andsucceeded in killing four men beforethe raiders wiped them out.

The long patrol of the 2d Raiderswas extremely successful from a tac-tical point of view. The battalion hadkilled 488 enemy soldiers at a cost of16 dead and 18 wounded. Carlson'ssubsequent report praised his guer-rilla tactics, which undoubtedlyplayed an important role in thefavorable exchange ratio. Far awayfrom the Marine perimeter, theJapanese became careless and allowedthemselves to be surprised on a regu-lar basis, a phenomenon other Ma-rine units had exploited earlier in thecampaign. Since the 2d Raiders oper-ated exclusively in the enemy rear,they reaped the benefit of their ownstealthiness and this Japaneseweakness.

The stated casualty figures,however, did not reflect the true costto the Marines. During the course ofthe operation, the 2d Raiders hadevacuated 225 men to the rear due tosevere illness, primarily malaria,dysentery, and ringworm. Althoughsickness was common on Guadal-canal, Carlson's men became disabledat an astonishing rate due to inade-quate rations and the rough condi-tions, factors that had diminishedsignificantly by that point in the cam-paign for other American units. Sinceonly two raider companies had spentthe entire month in combat, the ef-fect was actually worse than thosenumbers indicated. Companies C andF had landed at Aola Bay with 133officers and men each. They enteredthe perimeter on 4 December with acombined total of 57 Marines, bare-ly one-fifth their original strength.Things would have been worse, ex-cept for the efforts of native carriers

The Raider Training Center

T he Raider Training Center got its start in late 1942,when the Major General Commandant authorizeda slight increase in the table of organization of the

newly formed 4th Raider Battalion. These additional twoofficers and 26 enlisted men became the cadre for the center,which formally came into being at Camp Pendleton, Cali-fornia, on 5 February 1943. The purpose of the center wasto train new men up to raider standards and thus create apool of qualified replacements for the battalions overseas.Prior to this, each raider unit had solicited fresh volunteersfrom other organizations in rear areas and then incorpo-rated them directly into their ranks. Since most of theseyoung Marines had only rudimentary training in weaponsand tactics, the raiders had to expend considerable efforton individual instruction. Worse still, that old systemprovided no means to replace casualties during prolonged

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combat operations. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. GriffithII had been a prime proponent of the improved setup.

The course was eight weeks long. Carison's vision of theraiders initially influenced the training program, probablyvia Lieutenant Colonel James Roosevelt's part in setting upthe center. Their hands were obvious in the selection ofclasses on guerrilla warfare and "individual cookery" Thelatter was a fetish of Carison's — he thought regular infan-try relied too heavily on bulky field kitchens. There alsowas a week-long field problem in which the students divid-ed into a main body and two guerrilla bands acting as ag-gressors. Rubber boat operations occupied a significantblock of the schedule. Otherwise, the course focused heav-ily on traditional individual skills and small unit tactics:marksmanship, scouting, patrolling, physical conditioning,individual combat, and so forth.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 54683While other raiders watch, two instructors demonstratethe dexterity required for hand-to-hand knife fighting.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 55234Shown here is one aspect of raider training, crossing a riveron a two-rope bridge, not often encountered in combat.

Clad in camouflage utilities and fully combat equipped,a raider vaults a barbed-wire obstacle while in training.


Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 54686ANegotiating an obstacle course while TNT charges explodenearby, this raider carries a folding-stock Reising gun.Hiking was a major training component for raiders, con-sidering their primary mission as light infantry in combat.


ULL

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to keep the raiders supplied. Guerrillatactics inflicted heavy casualties onthe enemy, but at an equally highcost in friendly manpower.

Nevertheless, the 2d Raiders couldhold their heads high. Vandegrift cit-ed them for "the consumate skill dis-played in the conduct of operations,for the training, stamina and forti-tude displayed by all members of thebattalion, and for its commendableaggressive spirit and high morale:'

The 2d Raiders boarded a trans-port on 15 December and returnedto Camp Gung Ho on Espiritu San-to. There they recuperated in pyram-idal tents in a coconut grove alongthe banks of a river. The camp andthe chow were Spartan, and the onlyrelief came when a ship took the bat-talion to New Zealand in February1943 for two weeks of liberty. The1st Raiders had returned to CampBailey in New Caledonia in October1942. Their living conditions weresimilar, except for a slightly betterhillside site looking over a river. Theyspent a month in New Zealand overthe Christmas holidays.

These were no longer the onlyraider battalions in the MarineCorps. Admiral Turner had tried toforce each Marine regiment to con-vert one battalion to a raider organi-zation, but General Holcomb, withan assist from Nimitz, put a stop tothat interference in the Corps' inter-nal affairs. However, the Comman-dant did authorize the creation oftwo additional battalions of raiders.The 3d Raiders came into being onSamoa on 20 September 1942. Theircommander was Lieutenant ColonelHarry B. "Harry the Horse" Liver-sedge, a former enlisted Marine anda shotputter in the 1920 and 1924Olympics. The battalion drew onvolunteers from the many Marineunits in Samoa, and also receivedsmall contingents from the 1st and 2dRaiders.

The Corps activated the 4th Raid-er Battalion in Southern California

on 23 October 1942. Major Rooseveltcommanded this new unit. The 3dand 4th Raiders both arrived in Es-piritu Santo in February 1943.

There as yet existed no commonraider table of organization. Carlsonretained his six companies of two ri-fle platoons and a weapons platoon.Griffith adopted the fire team con-cept, but added a fourth man to eachteam and retained the four rifle com-panies and a weapons company es-tablished by Edson. Roosevelt'sbattalion had four rifle companiesplus a Demolition and EngineerCompany.

On the anniversary of the creationof the 2d Raiders, Carlson addressedhis men in a "Gung Ho" meeting. Heissued a press release later to publi-cize his words. In addition to an-

nouncing his decision to establishMarine Raider Organization Day, hereviewed the battalion's first year ofexistence. He noted that his moralehad been "low" at times, as theofficers and men struggled to learnand implement the philosophy of"Gung Ho:' In his mind, the tacticalsuccesses of the outfit were less sig-nificant than the way in which he hadmolded it. "Makin brought the sto-ry of our methods of living and train-ing to the world. Perhaps this factwas of even greater importance thanthe material gains of the raid:'However, the days of Carlson's in-fluence on the raiders werenumbered.

On 15 March 1943 the MarineCorps created the 1st Raider Regi-ment and gave it control of all four

Col Harry B. "I-larry the Horse" Liversedge brought the 3d Raider Battalion intoexistence in September 1942 and then became the first commander of the 1st Ma-rine Raider Regiment upon its activation in March 1943, Here he cuts a cake forhis raiders in honor of the Marine Corps birthday on 10 November 1943.

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) 67934

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Reshaping the Raiders

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battalions. Liversedge, now acolonel, took charge of the new or-ganization. A week later, LieutenantColonel Alan Shapley took overcommand of the 2d Raiders. He wasan orthodox line officer who hadearned a Navy Cross on board theArizona (BB 39) on 7 December1941. He thought the Makin Raidhad been a "fiasco," and he had no in-terest in "Gung Ho:' Shapley wastedno time in turning the unit into "aregular battalion:' Carlson temporar-ily became the regimental executiveofficer, but served there only brieflybefore entering the hospital weakfrom malaria and jaundice. Soonthereafter he was on his way state-side. A month later LieutenantColonel Michael S. Currin, anotherofficer with more orthodox views,took command of the 4th Raidersfrom Roosevelt.

The regiment enforced a commonorganization among the battalions.The result was a mixture of Edsonand Carlson's ideas. Carlson be-queathed his fire team and squad tothe raiders (and later to the Corps asa whole). But each battalion nowhad a weapons company, and four ri-fle companies composed of aweapons platoon and three rifle pla-

toons. Edson's other imprint was theconcept of a highly trained, lightlyequipped force using conventionaltactics to accomplish special missionsor to fill in for a line battalion. The1st Raider Regiment was no guerril-la outfit. Given the changing thrustof the Pacific war, the choice was awise one. In the future the Marineswould be attacking Japanese forcesholed up in tight perimeters or onsmall islands. Guerrilla tacticsprovided no answer to the problemof overcoming these strong defensivepositions.

As the fighting on Guadalcanaldrew to a close in early 1943, Ameri-can commanders intensified theirplanning for the eventual seizure ofRabaul, the primary Japanese strong-hold in the Southwest Pacific. Thismajor air and naval base on theeastern end of New Britain was cen-trally located between New Guineaand the northwestern terminus of theSolomons. That allowed the Jap-anese to shift their air and naval sup-port from one front to the other onshort notice. Conversely, simultane-ous American advances through NewGuinea and the Solomcins would

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threaten Rabaul from two directions.With that in mind, Admiral WilliamK Halsey's South Pacific commandprepared to drive farther up the Solo-mons chain, while MacArthur con-tinued his operations along the NewGuinea coast.

Halsey's planners initially focusedon New Georgia, a large island lo-cated on the southern flank of theSlot about halfway up the Solomonschain. By December 1942, theJapanese had managed to completean airstrip on New Georgia's Mun-da Point. Seizure of the island wouldthus remove that enemy threat andadvance Allied aircraft one-third ofthe way to Rabaul. However, theSouth Pacific command also wasworried about enemy activity in theRussell Islands, located 30 milesnorthwest of Guadalcanal's Cape Es-perance. The Russells had been astaging point for the enemy's rein-forcement and subsequent evacua-tion of Guadalcanal. Strong Japaneseforces there would be a thorn in theside of an operation against New Ge-orgia and possibly a threat toGuadalcanal itself. Halsey thusdecided to seize the Russells prior toaction elsewhere in the Solomons. Asan additional benefit, American

MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift (with riding crop) troopsthe line of the 2d Raider Battalion in New Caledonia in 1943.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 60133LtCoI Alan Shapley, the battalion commander, is on Van-degrift's left. Shapley ended Carlson's "Gung Ho" experiments.

fighter planes stationed in the Rus-sells would be able to provide moreeffective support to the eventual as-sault on New Georgia.

The landing force for OperationCleanslate (the codename for theRussells assault) consisted of the 43dInfantry Division and the 3d RaiderBattalion. The Army division wouldseize Banika Island while the Marinestook nearby Pavuvu. The APDs ofTransdiv 12 carried the raiders fromEspiritu Santo to Guadalcanal in mid-February. Four days prior to the 21February D-day, a lieutenant and a Department of Defense Photos (USMC) 54765

sergeant from the raiders scouted A BAR man in the bow of the rubber landing craft provides covering fire as the

both objectives — they found them 10-man boat crew reaches the undefended beach of Pavuvu in the Russell Island5.

empty of the enemy. The 3d Raidersthus made an unopposed landing intheir first offensive action. The 159thInfantry followed them ashore andassisted in the occupation of theisland.

The greatest challenges the Ma-rifles faced on Pavuvu were logisti-cal and medical. Due to the Navy'slegitimate concern about an enemyair and naval response, the landingplan relied on a rapid offload andquick withdrawal of the transports.The Higgins boats of the APDs were Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 54468

preloaded with raider supplies, while The 3d Raider Battalion squad pulls its boat into cover on Pavuvu and heads inland.

the men went ashore in their rubber As the raider skirmish line maneuvers cautiously through the coconut groves and

boats. A rash of outboard motor keeps an eye out for snipers in the treetops, it is also wary of enemy elsewhere.

failures played havoc with the land- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 54473

ing formations, and Liversedge's af-ter action report noted that this couldhave resulted in "serious conse-quences." Once ashore, the light raid-ers suffered from their lack of organictransport as they struggled to man-handle supplies from the beach to in-land dumps. During the battalion'ssubsequent four-week stay onPavuvu, the diet of field chow andthe tough tropic conditions combinedto debilitate the troops. Fully one-third developed skin problems, allmen lost weight, and several dozeneventually fell ill with malaria andother diseases. Although it was notentirely the fault of planners, thehard-hitting capabilities of the Ma-rine battalion were wasted on

26

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RUSSE ISLANDSSI-tOWING LANDING PLAN AND

SCHEME OF MANEUVER

03

Cleanslate. Only the two-man scout-ing team had performed a mission inaccordance with the original purposeof the raiders.

In the midst of the execution ofCleanslate Halsey continued prepa-rations for subsequent operations inthe Central Solomons. This includ-ed repeated use of the scouting capa-bility demonstrated in the Russells.At the end of February a Navy lieu-tenant and six raiders landed at NewGeorgia's Roviana Lagoon. With theaid of coastwatchers and natives,they spent the next three weeks col-lecting information on the terrain,hydrographic conditions, andJapanese defenses. On 21 MarchCondolidated Catalina PBYs landedfour raider patrols at New Georgia'sSegi Point. From there they fannedout with native guides and canoes toscout Kolombangara, Vangunu, andNew Georgia. Other groups visitedthese areas and Rendova over thecourse of the next three months. Thepatrols provided valuable informa-tion that helped shape landing plans,and the final groups emplaced smalldetachments near designated beachesto act as guides for the assault forces.

During May and June the Japanesereinforced their garrisons in the cen-tral Solomons to 11,000 men, but thisnumber was grossly insufficient tocover all potential landing sites on thenumerous large islands in the region.That gave Halsey's force great flexi-bility. The final plan called for severalassaults, all against lightly defendedor undefended targets. On D-day theEastern Landing Force, consisting ofthe 103d Infantry, an Army regi-ment, and the 4th Raider Battalion,would occupy Wickham Anchorage,Segi Point, and Viru Harbor. Navalconstruction units would immediate-ly build a fighter strip at Segi and abase for torpedo boats at Viru. TheNorthern Landing Group (the 1stRaider Regiment headquarters, the1st Raider Battalion, and two armybattalions) would simultaneously goashore at Rice Anchorage, then at-

tack overland to take Enogai Inletand Bairoko Harbor. This would cutoff the Japanese barge traffic thatsupplied reinforcements and logistics.The last D-day operation would bethe Southern Landing Group's seizureof the northern end of Rendova andits outlying islands. On D plus 4many of these same units from the43d Infantry Division would conducta shore-to-shore assault against theundefended beaches at Zanana andPiraka on New Georgia. Planes fromSegi Point and artillery from the Ren-dova beachhead would render sup-port as the Army regiments advancedoverland to capture Munda airfield.D-day was 30 June.

Things did not go entirely accord-ing to plan. During June the Japaneseused some of their reinforcements toextend their coverage of New Geor-gia. They ordered a battalion to Viruwith instructions to clean out nativeforces operating in the vicinity ofSegi. The Solomon Islanders, undercommand of Coastwatcher DonaldG. Kennedy, had repeatedly attackedenemy outposts and patrols in thearea. As the Japanese battalion ad-vanced units closer to Segi Point,Kennedy requested support. On 20June Admiral Turner ordered Lieu-tenant Colonel Currin and half of his4th Raiders to move immediately

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from Guadalcanal to Segi. Compa-nies 0 and P loaded on board APDsthat day and made an unopposedlanding the next morning. On 22June two Army infantry companiesand the advance party of the airfieldconstruction unit arrived to strength-en the position.

Viru presented a tougher problem.The narrow entrance to the harborwas flanked by high cliffs and cov-ered by a 3-inch coast defense gun.Numerous enemy machine guns, in-cluding .50-caliber models, occupiedsupporting positions. Most of thedefenses were oriented toward an at-tack from the sea, so American lead-ers quickly decided to conduct anoverland approach. But that was noteasy either, given the difficulty of thetrails. After reconnaisance and con-sultation with higher headquarters,Currin decided to take his raiders byrubber boat to Regi, where theywould begin their trek. The assaulton Viru would be a double envelop-ment. Lieutenant Devillo W. Brown's3d Platoon, designated Task Force B,would take the lightly defended vil-lage of Tombe on the eastern side ofthe harbor. The remainder of theforce would attack the main enemydefenses at Tetemara on the oppositeshore. The simultaneous assaultswere to take place on the originally

The Raider Patch

T he use of Marine Corps shoulder patches inWorld War II originated with the creation of the1st Marine Division insignia following the Guadal-

canal campaign. This was not a new practice for Marines,since members of the Fourth Marine Brigade wore the Starand Indian Head patch of the Army 2d Infantry Divisionin France during World War I.

The 1st Marine Division emblem consisted of the word"Guadalcanal" lettered in white on a red numeral "1" placedon a sky-blue diamond. The white stars of the SouthernCross surrounded the number. By July 1943, the I MarineAmphibious Corps had adopted a variation for its ownpatch — a white-bordered, red diamond, encircled by thewhite stars of the Southern Cross, on a five-sided blue back-ground. Non-divisional corps units each had a specific sym-bol inside the red diamond. The emblem of the I MACraider battalions was a skull. While the raider insignia maynot have been the most artistic of Marine Corps shoulderpatches in the war, it certainly was the most striking.

The skull device originated with the 2d Raider Battal-ion, which began using it not long after that unit came intoexistence. Carlson issued paper emblems, consisting of askull-like face superimposed on crossed scimitars, to hisraiders prior to the Makin raid. Each piece of paper wasbacked with glue and allegedly raiders were to use themto mark enemy dead for psychological effect, but they stucktogether in the humid tropics and proved impractical. Bythe time Carlson's battalion reached Guadalcanal, the em-

blem had evolved into a skull backed by a crossed "GungHo" knife and lightning bolt. It is not clear who selectedthe skull for the official raider patch, but that device read-ily conveyed the image the raiders effectively cultivated —

that of an elite force trained to close with and destroy theenemy in commando-style operations.

commander in charge was aware ofCurrin's message altering the date ofthe land attack, he chose to order hisAPDs to approach the harbor on 30June. The Japanese 3-inch gun quick-ly drove them off. Unable to contactCurrin, higher headquarters thendecided to land the Army force em-barked in the APDs near the samespot where the raiders had beguntheir trek. The new mission was tomove overland and support the Ma-rines, who were apparently ex-periencing difficulties. The Japanesecommander at Viru reported that hehad repulsed an American landing.

Both wings of the raider assaultforce moved out early on the morn-ing of 1 July. By 0845 Walker'sdetachment reached the outskirts ofTombe without being discovered.The men deployed, opened fire onthe tiny village, and then rushed for-

ward. Most of the defenders appar-ently died in the initial burst of fire.The two Marine platoons secured thevillage without a single casualty andcounted 13 enemy bodies. Just as thatengagement came to a close, sixAmerican aircraft appeared over theharbor. These were not part of theoriginal plan, but headquarters hadsent them to soften up the objectivewhen it realized that the raider attackwould be delayed. Although this un-coordinated air support could haveresulted in disaster, it wojked outwell in practice. The planes ignoredTombe and concentrated their effortson Tetemara. The Japanese aban-doned some of their fixed defensesand moved inland, directly into thepath of the oncoming raiders.

Currin's point made contact withthe enemy shortly after the bombingceased. Company 0, leading the bat-

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talion column, quickly deployed twoplatoons on line astride the trail. Theraiders continued forward and des-troyed Japanese outposts, but thenran into the enemy main body, whichwas bolstered by several machineguns. Progress then was painfullyslow as intermittent heavy rainsswept the battlefield. Company 0'sreserve platoon went into line to theleft as noise indicated that the ene-my might be gathering there for acounterattack. As the day wore onthe raiders pushed the Japanese back,until the Marine right flank rested onhigh ground overlooking the harbor.Currin fed some of Company P'smachine guns into the line, then puthis remaining platoon (also fromCompany P) on his right flank.Demolitions men moved forward todeal with the enemy machine guns.

In mid-afternoon a handful of

.' -1'6110

SOLOMON

JUNE 1943

Japanese launched a brief banzai at-tack against the Marine left. Notlong after this effort dissolved, Cur-rin launched Lieutenant Malcolm N.McCarthy's Company P platoonagainst the enemy's left flank, whileCompany 0 provided a base of fire.McCarthy's men quickly overran the3-inch gun and soon rolled up theenemy line, as the remainder of theJapanese defenders withdrew towardthe northwest. The raiders hadsuffered 8 dead and 15 wounded,while killing 48 of the enemy andcapturing 16 machine guns and ahandful of heavier weapons.

The 4th Raiders consolidated itshold on Viru and conducted numer-ous patrols over the next severaldays. The two Army companieslanded near Regi finally reachedTombe on 4 July. The Navy broughtin more Army units on 9 July and theMarines boarded the LCIs forGuadalcanal.

The other half of the 4th RaiderBattalion (Companies N and Q)received its baptism of fire during thissame period. This unit was undercommand of the battalion executiveofficer, Major James R. Clark. It wasassigned to assist the Army's 2d Bat-talion, 103d Infantry (LieutenantColonel Lester E. Brown) in seizingVangunu and the approaches toWickham Anchorage on 30 June. In-telligence from the coastwatchers in-

dicated that there were about 100Japanese occupying the island. Theplan called for the raiders to make apredawn landing at undefendedOloana Bay. The Army would followthem ashore after daylight, establisha beachhead, and then deal with theenemy, thought to be located in a vil-lage along the coast several miles tothe east.

The night landing under condi-tions of low visibility and heavy seasturned into a fiasco. The APDs be-gan debarkation in the wrong spot,their Higgins boats lost formationwhen they attempted to pass throughthe LCIs loaded with soldiers, and thetwo raider companies ended up be-ing scattered along seven miles ofcoastline. When the Army units be-gan to land after daylight, they foundjust 75 Marines holding the designat-ed beachhead. A two-man patrol(one lieutenant each from the raid-ers and the Army battalion) had beenashore since mid-June to reconnoiterwith the aid of native scouts. Theyprovided the exact location of theJapanese garrison, and the joint forcesoon headed to the northeast towardits objective. Native scouts and thehandful of Marines led the way, withtwo Army companies (F and C) intrace. The remaining raiders were tojoin up with their unit as soon asthey could. All but one platoon didcatch up by the time the Americans

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reached their line of departure a fewhundred yards north of the village.

The plan of attack was simple. TheArmy units passed through the raid-ers on the east-west trail to assumethe eastern-most position. The entirecolumn of files then merely faced tothe right, which placed the compo-site battalion on line and pointingtoward the enemy to the south. Com-pany Q held the right flank on thebank of the Kaeruka River. Compa-ny N in the center and Company Fon the left flank would guide on themovements of Q. Company C heldback and acted as the reserve. Withinminutes of beginning the advance,the attack ran into resistance.Japanese fire from the west bank ofthe river was particularly heavy andCompany Q crossed over to dealwith this threat. At the same timeCompany F moved to its left to skirtaround strong defenses. Company Csoon moved in to fill the gap. By lateafternoon the Americans were ableto clear the east bank of the river.Lieutenant Colonel Brown orderedCompany Q to disengage from thewest bank and join in the battalion'sperimeter defense at the mouth of theriver. The Marines had lost 10 deadand 21 wounded, while the Armyhad suffered similarly.

The enemy made no ground attackthat night, but periodically firedmortars and machine guns at Amen-

1-an.

e

Things were worse for the 3d Bat-talion, 148th Infantry. After break-ing off from the line of march of the1st Raiders on 6 July, the soldiers hadmoved over equally difficult terrainto assume their blocking position onthe Munda-Bairoko Trail on 8 July.After initial success against surprisedJapanese patrols, the Army battalionfought a bloody action against anenemy force of similar strength thatpushed the American soldiers offhigh ground and away from the im-portant trail. Heavy jungle and poormaps prevented aerial resupply oftheir position, while illness andcasualties sapped manpower. Liver-sedge led a reinforcing company fromthe 3d Battalion, 145th Infantry, tothe scene on 13 July. Disappointed atthe results of this portion of the oper-ation, and unable to reinforce orresupply this outpost adequately, theraider colonel decided to withdrawthe force to Triri. There the soldierswould recuperate for the upcomingmove on Bairoko and disrupt enemymovement on the Munda-BairokoTrail with occasional patrols.

Prior to dawn on 18 July fourAPDs brought the 4th Raider Battal-ion and fresh supplies to Enogai.

Most of the Rice Anchorage garrisonhad also moved up to join the mainforce. This gave Liversedge four bat-talions, but all of them were signifi-cantly understrength due to lossesalready suffered in the New Georgiacampaign. The 4th Raider Battalionwas short more than 200 men. The1st Raiders reorganized into two fullcompanies (B and D), with A and Cbecoming skeleton units. A detach-ment of the 3d Battalion, 145th In-fantry remained at Rice Anchorage.More important, the enemy atBairoko was now aware of the threat

to its position. Marine patrols in mid-July noted that the Japanese werebusily fortifying the landward ap-proaches to their last harbor on thenorth coast of the island.

Liversedge issued his order for theattack. It would commence themorning of 20 July with two compa-nies of the 1st Raider Battalion andall of the 4th advancing from Enogaiwhile the 3d Battalion, 148th Infan-try, moved out along the Triri-Bairoko Trail. The American forceswould converge on the Japanese fromtwo directions. The remaining Armybattalion guarded Triri; CompaniesA and C of the raiders defendedEnogai. These units also served as thereserve. Liversedge requested an air-strike on Bairoko timed to coincidewith the attack, but it never materi-

33

The movement toward Bairokokicked off at 0800 and the 1st Raid-er Battalion made contact with ene-my outposts two hours later.Companies B and D deployed intoline and pushed through a series ofJapanese outguards. By noonGriffith's men had reached the maindefenses, which consisted of four for-tified lines on parallel coral ridges justa few hundred yards from the har-bor. The bunkers were mutually sup-porting and well protected bycoconut logs and coral. Each held a

Department oi Defense Photo (USMC) 54650A raider 60mm mortar crew goes into action on New Georgia. Because the raidershad no heavier weapons, their initial efforts at Bairoko were mostly unsuccessful.

alized.

SEIZURE Of VIRU HARBOR4th MARINE RAIDER PAl IALION

en Co,npaflItS N -

B JEE JULY 943

At

AAflCJA'O tCTO

SCALE

9— ILNI

Bairo ko

THE ATTACK ON BAIROKONORTHERN LNDNG GROUP 20 JULY

posI.oNs EEv osE LEENEMY OUTPOST LINE U 'EUETEP NIGHT OFNLG FINAL ATTACK 2O-2I JULYLINES 20 JULY TRAILS

TQU_ 0

TAKES

FORM LINES AND SCALE 4UFROXIMkE

short supply and everyone had totake turns carrying litters. Thecolumn moved slowly and halted cv-cry few hundred yards. In the after-noon rubber boats picked up mostof the wounded and ferried them tothe rear. By that evening the entireforce was back in its enclaves atEnogai and Triri. PBYs made anothertrip to evacuate wounded, thoughthis time two Zero fighters damagedone of the amphibian planes aftertake-off and forced it to return toEnogai Inlet. Total American casual-ties were 49 killed, 200 wounded, andtwo missing — the vast majority ofthem suffered by the raider bat-talions.

machine gun or automatic weapon.Here the 1st Battalion's attack groundto a halt. Liversedge, accompanyingthe northern prong of his offensive,committed the 4th Battalion in an at-tempt to turn the enemy flank, butit met the same heavy resistance. Theraider companies slowly workedtheir way forward, and by late after-noon they had seized the first twoenemy lines. However, throughoutthis advance enemy 90mm mortarfire swept the Marine units and in-flicted numerous casualties.

The southern prong of the attackwas faring less well. The Army bat-talion made its first contact with theenemy just 1,000 yards from Bairoko,but the Japanese held a vital piece ofhigh ground that blocked the trail.With the lagoon on one side and adeep swamp on the other, there wasno room for the soldiers to maneu-ver to the flanks of the enemy posi-tion. With the approval of theexecutive officer of the raider regi-ment, the commander of the Armybattalion pulled back his lead unitsand used his two Simm mortars tosoften the defenses.

When news of the halt in thesouthern attack made it to Liversedgeat 1600, he asked the commanders of

the raider battalions for their input.Griffith and Currin checked theirlines. They were running out of waterand ammunition, casualties had beenheavy, and there was no friendly firesupport. Neither battalion had anyfresh reserves to commit to the fight.Moreover, a large number of menwould be needed to hand-carry themany wounded to the rear. The 4thRaiders alone had 90 litter cases.From their current positions on highground the Marine commanderscould see the harbor just a fewhundred yards away, but continuedattacks against a well-entrenchedenemy with fire superiority seemedwasteful. Not long after 1700 Liver-sedge issued orders for all battalionsto pull back into defensive positionsfor the night in preparation for awithdrawal to Enogai and Triri thenext day. He requested air strikes tocover the latter movement.

The move back across DragonsPeninsula on 21 July went smoothlyfrom a tactical point of view. Afterfailing to provide air support for theattack, higher echelons sent 250 sor-ties against Bairoko to cover thewithdrawal. The Japanese did notpursue, but even so it was tough go-ing on the ground. Water was in

34

The failure to seize the objectiveand the severe American losses wereplainly the result of poor logisticsand a lack of firepower. A JointChiefs of Staff post mortem on theoperation noted that "lightly armedtroops cannot be expected to attackfixed positions defended by heavyautomatic weapons, mortars, andheavy artillery1 Another factor ofsignificance, however, was the ab-sence of surprise. The raiders hadtaken Enogai against similar odds be-cause the enemy had not expected anattack from anywhere but the sea.Victory at Enogai provided amplewarning to the garrison at Bairoko,and the Japanese there made them-selves ready for an overland assault.The raiders might still have won witha suicidal effort, but Bairoko was notworth it.

The 1st Raider Regiment and itsassorted battalions settled into defen-sive positions for the rest of July. Thesole action consisted of patrolstoward Bairoko and nuisance raidsfrom Japanese aircraft. In early Au-gust elements of the force took upnew blocking positions on theMunda-Bairoko Trail. On 9 Augustthey made contact with Army troopsfrom the Southern Landing Group.(Munda Airfield had fallen four daysearlier.) Later in the month twoArmy battalions moved cautiously

-

•-lY, —

i'

perimeter. There were occasional en-gagements with small enemy patrols,but the greatest resistance during thisperiod came from the terrain, whichconsisted largely of swampland anddense jungle once one moved beyondthe beach. The thing most Marineswould remember about Bougainvillewould be the deep, sucking mud thatseemed to cover everything not al-ready underwater. On 4 Novemberanother unit relieved the 2d RaiderBattalion on the line, and both bat-talions of the raider regiment were at-tached to the 9th Marines. Theraiders maintained responsibility for

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63165 the roadblock, and companies rotat-Demolition men of the 3d Raider Battalion landed on Torokina Island on 3 Novem- ed out to the position every coupleber, but found that supporting arms had already killed or driven off all Japanese. of days.Raiders pose during a lull in the battle next to one of the Japanese dugouts they cleared on Cape Torokina on I November.


37

1.

a

•SSA1 til

1

Two small attacks hit Company Eat the roadblock the night of 5November, and a larger one struckCompany H there two days later.Company G came forward in sup-port and the enemy withdrew, butthe Japanese kept up a rain of mor-tar shells all that night. On the morn-ing of 8 November Companies H andM occupied the post and received yetanother assault, this one the heavi-est yet. In midafternoon CompaniesE and F conducted a passage of lines,counterattacked the enemy, andwithdrew after two hours.

The next morning Companies Iand M held the roadblock as L andF conducted another counterattackpreceded by a half-hour artillerypreparation. Japanese resistance wasstubborn and elements of CompaniesI and M, and the 9th Marines even-tually moved forward to assist.Shortly after noon the enemy retiredfrom the scene. Patrols soon disco-vered the abandoned bivouac site ofthe Japanese 23d Infantry Regimentjust a few hundred yards up the trail.In the midst of this action PFC Hen-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 70785A

ry Gurke of Company M covered anenemy grenade with his body to pro-tect another Marine. He received aposthumous Medal of Honor for hisheroic act of self-sacrifice.

The raider regiment celebrated theMarine Corps' birthday on 10November by moving off the frontlines and into division reserve. Otherthan occasional patrols and shortstints on the line, the next two weekswere relatively quiet for the raiders.The Army's 37th Division began ar-riving at this time to reinforce theperimeter. On 23 November the 1stParachute Battalion came ashore andtemporarily joined the raiders, nowacting as corps reserve. Two dayslater the 2d Raider Battalion partici-pated in an attack extending theperimeter several hundred yards tothe east, but it met little opposition.

On 29 November Company M ofthe 3d Raider Battalion reinforced theparachutists for a predawn amphibi-ous landing at Koiari several milessoutheast of the perimeter. This oper-ation could have been a repeat of thesuccessful Tasimboko Raid, since the

38

Marine force unexpectedly cameashore on the edge of a large Japanesesupply dump. However, the enemyreacted quickly and pinned the Ma-rines to the beach with heavy fire.Landing craft attempting to extractthe force were twice driven off. It wasnot until evening that artillery, air,and naval gunfire support sufficientlysilenced opposition that theparachutists and raiders could getback out to sea.

Army troops continued to pourinto the enlarging perimeter. On 15December control of the landingforce passed from the I Marine Am-phibious Corps to the Army's XIVCorps. The Americal Division gradu-ally replaced the 3d Marine Division,which had borne the brunt of thefighting. For much of the month the2d Raider Regiment served as corpsreserve, but these highly trained as-sault troops spent most of their timeon working parties at the airfield orcarrying supplies to the front lines.On 21 December the raiders, rein-forced by the 1st Parachute Battalionand a battalion of the 145th Infan-try, assumed the position formerlyoccupied by the 3d Marines. Theregiment remained there until 11January, when an Army outfitrelieved it. The raiders boarded trans-ports the next day and sailed toGuadalcanal.

While the 2d Raider Regiment hadbeen fighting on Bougainville, theraiders who had participated in theNew Georgia campaign had beenrecuperating and training in the rear.Both the 1st and 4th Battalions en-joyed a month of leave in NewZealand, after which they returnedto their base camps in New Caledo-nia. Just after Christmas 1943Colonel Liversedge detached andpassed command of the 1st RaiderRegiment to Lieutenant ColonelSamuel D. Puller (the youngerbrother of "Chesty" Puller). The regi-ment embarked on 21 January andarrived at Guadalcanal three days

Raiders move up the muddy Piva Trail to safeguard the flank of the beachhead.

'p1.

V

rT-

I.,

later. In short order the 2d RaiderRegiment disbanded and folded intothe 1st, with Shapley taking com-mand of the combined unit andPuller becoming the executive officer.

Bougainville, however, was thelast combat action for any raiderunit. Events had conspired to soundthe death knell of the raiders. Themain factor was the unprecedentedexpansion of the Corps. In late 1943there were four divisions, withanother two on the drawing boards.Even though there were now nearlyhalf a million Marines, there neverseemed to be enough men to createthe new battalions needed for the 5thand 6th Divisions. In addition to theusual drains like training and tran-sients, the Corps had committedlarge numbers to specialty units:

defense battalions, parachute battal-ions, raider battalions, barrage bal-loon detachments, and many others.Since there was no prospect of in-creasing the Corps beyond 500,000men, the only way to add combat di-visions was to delete other organi-zations.

Another factor was the changingnature of the Pacific war. In thedesperate early days of 1942 therewas a potential need for commando-type units that could strike deep inenemy territory and keep theJapanese off balance while the Unit-ed States caught its breath. However,there had been only one such oper-ation and it had not been a completesuccess, the development of the am-phibian tractor and improved firesupport also had removed the need

for the light assault units envisionedby Holland Smith at the beginningof the war. Since then the raidersgenerally had performed the samemissions as any infantry battalion.Sometimes this meant that theirtraining and talent were wasted, ashappened on Bougainville andPavuvu. In other cases, the quick butlightly armed raiders suffered be-cause they lacked the firepower of aline outfit. The failure at Bairokocould be partially traced to that fact,With many large-scale amphibiousassaults to come against well—

defended islands, there was no fore-seeable requirement for the particu-lar strengths of the raiders.

Finally, there was institutional op-position to the existence of an eliteforce within the already elite Corps.

Weary members of the 2d Raider Battalion catch a few mo-ments of rest in the miserable, unrelieved wetness that was

the hallmark that all troops experienced as soon as they ad-vanced inland from the beach in the Bougainville operation.


39

4 1! • --

IiDepartment of Defense Photo (USMC) 59036

Marine raider Pvt Roy Grier examinesthe Nambu pistol he liberated froman enemy officer of the Special LandingForce in an encounter on Bairoko.The personnel and equipment priori-ties given to the first two raider bat-talions at a time of general scarcityhad further fueled enmity towardthese units. Now that the war wasprogressing toward victoiy there wasless interest on the part of outsidersin meddling in the details of MarineCorps organization. Just as impor-tant, two senior officers who hadkeenly felt pain at the birth of theraiders —Vandegrift and Thomas —

were now coming into positionswhere they could do somethingabout it. On 1 January 1944 Van-degrift became Commandant of theMarine Corps and he made Thomasthe Director of Plans and Policies.

In mid-December 1943 Thomas'predecessor at HQMC had alreadyset the wheels in motion to disbandthe raiders and the parachutists.Among the reasons cited in his studywas that such "handpicked outfits

are detrimental to morale ofother troops:' A week later, a Marineofficer on the Chief of Naval Oper-ation's staff forwarded a memoran-dum through the Navy chain ofcommand noting that the Corps"feels that any operation so far car-

ned out by raiders could have beenperformed equally well by a standardorganization specially trained forthat specific mission:' The CNO con-curred in the suggestion to disbandthe special units, and Vandegriftgladly promulgated the change on 8January 1944. This gave Thomaseverything he wanted — fresh man-power from the deleted units andtheir stateside training establish-ments, as well as simplified supplyrequirements due to increaseduniformity.

The raiders did not entirely disap-pear. On 1 February the 1st RaiderRegiment was redesignated the 4thMarines, thus assuming the lineageof the regiment that had garrisonedShanghai in the interwar years andfought so gallantly on Bataan andCorrigedor. The 1st, 3d, and 4thRaider Battalions became respective-ly the 1st, 3d, and 2d Battalions ofthe 4th Marines. The 2d Raider Bat-talion filled out the regimental

weapons company. Personnel in theRaider Training Center transferred tothe newly formed 5th Marine Divi-sion. Leavened with new men, the4th Marines went on to earn addi-tional distinctions in the assaults onGuam and Okinawa. At the close ofthe war, the regiment joined the oc-cupation forces in Japan and partic-ipated in the release from POWcompounds of the remaining mem-bers of the old 4th Marines.

The commanders in the PacificTheater may not have properly usedthe raiders, but the few thousandmen of those elite units bequeatheda legacy of courage and competencenot surpassed by any other Marinebattalion. The spirit of the raiderslives on today in the Marine Corps'Special Operations Capable battal-ions. These infantry units, specifical-ly trained for many of the samemissions as the raiders, routinelydeploy with amphibious readygroups around the globe.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1995 386—768/20002 40

.Seabee Chief Earl I. Cobb and Marine raider Cpl Charles L. Marshall shake handsat the site of a sign erected near Bougainville's travelled "Marine Drive Hi-Way."


theSo when we reachIsle I Japarr'

With our caps at aJauntu tilt

Well enter the citullo[On the roads the Sraa:

Built.Third Marine

Ruder

—*!- -— . - I -- t—rsrfl 44C -.a - -

The best primary documents are therelevant operational and administrativerecords of the Marine Corps held by theWashington National Records Center inSuitland, Maryland. Of particular noteare the files of the Amphibious Force At-lantic Fleet, which detail the efforts ofEdson and Holland Smith to create theirversion of the raiders. Another impor-tant source is the Edson personal paperscollection at the Library of CongressManuscript Division. The various officesof the Marine Corps Historical Centerprovide additional useful information.The Reference Section holds biographi-cal data on most significant individuals.The Oral History Section has a numberof interviews with senior raiders andother Marines, particularly BrigadierGeneral Charles L. Banks, BrigadierGeneral Fred D. Beans, Colonel JusticeM. Chambers, Brigadier General SamuelB. Griffith II, Major General Oscar F.Peatross, Lieutenant General AlanShapley, and General Gerald C. Tho-mas. The Personal Papers Section holdsnumerous items pertaining to the raiders.

A number of secondary sources dealwith the history of the raiders in somedepth. The Marine Corps' own WorldWar II campaign monographs werebased on interviews and other sources ofinformation in addition to the service'sarchives. Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl'sThe U.S. Marines and Amphibious War,James Roosevelt's Affectionately, RD.R.,Michael Blankfort's Big Yankee, andSamuel Griffith's Battle for Guadalcanalare valuable books. The Marine CorpsGazette and Leatherneck contain a num-ber of articles describing the raiders andtheir campaigns. Of particular interest isMajor General Peatross' account of theMakin raid in the August and Septem-ber 1992 issues of Leatherneck. CharlesL. Updegraph, Jr.'s U.S. Marine CorpsSpecial Units of World War II and Lieu-tenant Colonel R. L. Mattingly's Her-ringbone Cloak— GI Dagger are twomonographs specifically addressing theformation of the raiders. The publica-tions of the two raider associations, TheRaider Patch and The Dope Sheet, con-tain a number of first-person accountswritten by former raiders.

M ajor Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR, has spentmore than 12 years on active duty as an

infantry officer, an instructor at the Naval Acade-my, and a historian at Headquarters MarineCorps. Presently he is serving as a reserve fieldhistorian for the Marine Corps History andMuseums Division. He has a master's degree inmilitary history from Ohio State University anda law degree from Duke University. In 1994 Presi-dio Press published his biography of Major

General Edson, Once A Legend, which won the Marine Corps Historical Founda-tion's Greene Award. He is the author of numerous articles in the Marine CorpsGazette, Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval History, Leatherneck, and VermontHistory. His works have earned several writing prizes, including the Marine CorpsHistorical Foundation's Heinl Awards for 1992, 1993, and 1994.

ERRATAIn the pamphlet. The Right to Fight: African-American Marines in World War II, in this series, among"Sources" listed on page 29 is Blacks and Whites Together Through Hell: US. Marines in World WarII. The bibliographic listing misspells the name of one author and assigns a wrong World War II unitto the second. The volume is by Perry F. Fischer, a veteran of the ath Marine Ammunition Company,and Brooks F. Gray, who was a member of the 51st Defense Battalion.

94 10WORLD WAR II

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observanceof the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMSBrigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR.WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Benis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor: W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1995

PCN 190 003130 00

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