from the 28 annual camden conference...c. patrick mundy thomas putnam frederick p. rector, iii louis...

Matthew Rojansky • Nina Tumarkin • Nikolay Petrov • Daniel Treisman • Steven PiferConstanze Stelzenmüller • Lanxin Xiang • Thomas Graham • Fyodor Lukyanov • Nicholas Burns

From the 28th Annual Camden Conference

BOARD OF DIRECTORSDavid BabskiKaren CadburyBruce ColeJohn W. Davidson, TreasurerG. Paul HolmanJeffrey HowlandPeter Imber, Vice PresidentBeryl Ann JohnsonRendle JonesEmily Lusher, SecretaryMargaret MalmbergBetsy MayberrySarah Miller, PresidentJane MonhartMaureen O’KeefeSandra RuchSeth SingletonKarolyn SnyderWard WickwireEileen Wilkinson

ADVISORY COUNCILJames AlgrantElizabeth AllenRichard AndersonBland BanwellJohn BirdDan BookhamFrederic Coulon Thomas M. DefordH. Allen FernaldBrewster GraceCharlie GrahamPeter GrossRobert HirschKathleen HirschDavid JacksonAdm. Gregory JohnsonMonique LaRocqueJean LenderkingJames MatlackRalph Moore C. Patrick MundyThomas PutnamFrederick P. Rector, IIILouis SellAmb. Anne SigmundJudy SteinRobert TracyMichael Wygant

STAFFKimberly Scott, Conference DirectorKathleen Brown, Administrative Assistant

About the Camden Conference

Every year since 1987 the Camden Conference has provided interested individualsfrom Midcoast Maine and beyond an opportunity to learn first-hand from, andengage directly with, renowned experts on issues of global importance. Each

year, a topic is selected and speakers from government, academia, internationalorganizations, the media and business are invited to participate in a three-dayconference in Camden in February, which is simultaneously streamed to audiences inBelfast and Rockland. Each speaker addresses a facet of the year’s topic, answersquestions from the audience in all three locations, and participates in an exchange ofideas throughout the weekend. All the talks are subsequently made available to all atour website, www.camdenconference.org. Previous Camden Conference programs have examined “Religion as a Force inWorld Affairs”; “Global Leadership”; and “The Global Politics of Food and Water.” TheConference has also focused on geopolitical areas including the Middle East, Asia,Europe, and Latin America. The February 2016 Camden Conference will consider thevast and diverse continent of Africa. Exciting as the weekend is, the Camden Conference has over the years become amuch bigger presence in the educational and intellectual life of our area and state.Dozens of events related to the annual Conference theme or promoting “informed dis-course on world issues” are held in communities across Maine. These “CommunityEvents” include lectures, symposia, and senior-college courses; group discussions ofselected articles and film clips; and longer films, art exhibits, and other cultural pro-grams. All are open to the public and most are free of charge. They are led by scholarsand other well-informed area residents.

The Camden Conference works to enhance teaching of global affairs in Maine universities, colleges and high schools by subsidizing and encouraging student atten-dance at the February Conference—often in the context of courses directly related tothe Conference theme—staging student-oriented and student-led events around theConference, and developing teaching aids that use film clips from the Conference. The Camden Conference is a nonpartisan, federally tax-exempt, not-for-profit501(c)(3) corporation. The Board of Directors includes residents of several Midcoasttowns, all of whom volunteer their time, talent, and energy to organize the Conferenceand related programs. Financial support for the Camden Conference comes from attendance fees; mem-berships; individual gifts; and grants from institutions, foundations, and corporations.

EDITING: Emily Lusher, RockportDESIGN: Carol Gillette, Communication Graphics, BelfastPHOTOGRAPHY:Mark Dawson, RockportPRINTING: Saturn Business Services, Waterville© 2015 the Camden Conference

P.O. Box 882, Camden ME 04843-0882

Telephone: 207-236-1034

Email: [email protected]

Website: www.camdenconference.org

CAMDEN CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS 2015 | 1

the 2015 camden conference HIGHLIGHTS

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: The Riddle Inside the Enigma: Origins of Russian Conduct at Home and in the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2Matthew Rojansky

History Matters: The Politics of the Past in Putin’s Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4Nina Tumarkin

Post-Crimean Russia and Prospects for its Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6Nikolay Petrov

The Russian Economy and its Influence on Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8Daniel Treisman

Russia-Ukraine and the Broader Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10Steven Pifer

Europe’s Russia Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12Constanze Stelzenmüller

The Sino-Russian Honeymoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14Lanxin Xiang

Rethinking U.S.-Russian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16Thomas Graham

Russia - 2015: Lost in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18Fyodor Lukyanov

Final Panel Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20Matthew Rojansky, Nina Tumarkin, Nikolay Petrov, Daniel Treisman, Steven Pifer,Constanze Stelzenmüller, Lanxin Xiang, Thomas Graham, Fyodor Lukyanov, Nicholas Burns

Moderated by Nicholas Burns

That Russia is the topic is evidentfrom the front page of every majornewspaper and from radio, TV,

and web programming. The CamdenConference is pleased to have partici-pated in this national deliberation throughits numerous community events through-out Maine, educational programs in manyhigh schools, colleges and universities,and annual three-day Conference. Morethan 900 attended “Russia Resurgent”over the snowy weekend of February20 through 22, 2015, to hear nine distin-guished speakers address a topic im-portant to all of us as we attempt toevaluate Russia’s place in the world. This issue of Highlights distills themessages of those speakers. It is not averbatim record (the Conference can beviewed in its entirety on the CamdenConference Website), rather, it seeks toconvey the sense of each speaker’spresentation—wherever possible, in thespeaker’s own words—and to indicateareas of agreement and disagreementamong the speakers. Every session, fromMatthew Rojansky’s keynote address tothe concluding panel discussion, isincluded here. We hope Highlights addsto your understanding and provides youwith a springboard for further discussion.

2015 Keynote Address

2 | CAMDEN CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS 2015

Rojansky’s theme was taken from a quote from Winston Churchill. “Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Did his Camden Con-

ference keynote address help unravel the enduringChurchill observation? Perhaps not, but the thrust of hisanalysis for understanding the Russian psyche did bringto mind someone else’s memorable tagline—comic RodneyDangerfield’s “I don’t get no respect!” The differences between our two countries, Rojanskycontended, are typically portrayed as sweeping but in reality they are not altogether as vast as we might believe.Both countries are geographically similar with oceans onboth sides of them. Both have an historic parallel in theirbeliefs that a manifest destiny created them. And both nations seek to live and enjoy prosperity, stability and abasic set of freedoms. So what is the source of American—Russian conflictand misunderstanding? According to Rojansky, “Russiaseeks to be Russian. Russians are not interested in being

The Riddle Insidethe Enigma:Origins of RussianConduct at Homeand in the WorldWe need to understand Russia’s view of itself

Matthew Rojansky

MATTHEW ROJANSKY, Director of the Kennan Institute at theWilson Center, is an expert on U.S. and Russian national securityand nuclear weapons policy. His work focuses on relationsamong the U.S., NATO, and the states of the former SovietUnion, particularly Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. From2010 to 2013, he was Deputy Director of the Russia and EurasiaProgram at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.He founded Carnegie’s Ukraine Program, led a multi-yearproject to support U.S.–Russia health cooperation, and createda task force on the Moldova–Transnistria conflict. From 2007 to2010, Rojansky served as executive director of the Partnershipfor a Secure America.


Americans.” Russians want to be respected for their Russiancharacter and their heritage and, Rojansky believes, we getinto trouble when we in their eyes disrespect them by fail-ing to acknowledge and appreciate both their achieve-ments and their sacrifices in the past, especially the costin Russian lives and the economic hardship the countrysuffered in World War II. According to Rojansky, we also fail to believe and appre-ciate that Russians do value freedom. In Russia, personalfreedoms have always come before political freedoms andthat is a distinction that is nearly impossible for Americansto make but one Russians apparently accept. The freedomsto speak, practice religion and travel are considerable forRussians today. Freedom of political speech and protest areclearly limited, if not all but nonexistent. But when weassail Russia over its human rights policies, it sees that asAmerican hypocrisy and asks how we can be critical of ityet tolerant, if not blind, to human rights abuses in othercountries like Saudi Arabia? Further, “Russia has a very non-diversified portfolio andthat makes their experience brittle, unpredictable anduncertain.” Despite the fact that Russians are enjoying abetter standard of living today than they ever did in theSoviet era, it is a country very much reliant on the commod-

ity prices for petroleum and natural gas. Factor in the lifeexperience of those now running things, who rememberwhen the Soviet Union collapsed in the late 1980s, and, wemight better understand why their world still appears to bean insecure and dangerous place. These Russian elites have an additional reason to resentthe West. They harbor resentment about how little sympa-thy was shown for their country’s demise and fall at the endof the Cold War. Plus, they remember bitterly, there waseven celebration in the West on its occasion. “Russians are not willing to sacrifice what they view asRussia’s independent foreign policy solely in order to havepartnership or approval from the West.” Although Rojanskystated that working with the West is Russia’s first choice inits interface with the world there is again the matter of un-derstanding and honoring Russia’s view of itself as entitledto sit unconditionally at the table of the great powers. In therecent past, U.S. administrations have made different failedattempts at improving relations, which for Russia didn’t ad-equately recognize the need, as Rojansky put it, to “feel big.”

President Clinton wanted to recast post-Cold War Russiain our own image. President George W. Bush tried selectivecooperation in an attempt to build a normal relationship.Both misfired, surmised Rojansky, because for Russia theonly relationship it aspires to have with America is a specialone that demands and receives special attention. And when President Obama controversially referred toRussia as a third rate regional power that doesn’t make any-thing; a growing sense of crisis, now badly exacerbated byevents in the Ukraine, all but destroyed the so called “reset”in relations he had hoped to achieve. “Russia at this moment is the only existential threat tothe United States that can obliterate this country and withit the world in under thirty minutes.” And, Rojansky re-minded us, in a refutation of Obama’s claim that Russia isa country we can dismissively wave off, in fact it has globalcapabilities that few countries in the world have and aboveall, is locked with the United States in the ultimate existen-tial relationship we have yet to resolve—two nuclear arse-nals still operational and pointed at each other. Rojansky cited that Russia is the second leading globalexporter of armaments, has a vote on the United NationsSecurity Council and is a part of significant multinationalefforts to solve conflicts around the world. Even if it may nolonger see itself as a power that can unilaterally impose itswill, it still considers itself a primary player and broker in in-ternational affairs. “Russia’s not going away. It really can’t be bludgeoned.That’s likely to produce the kind of counter reaction that wedon’t want to see. “ However badly America might misun-derstand Russia, Rojansky made the point that there is nodoubt the misconceptions may work both ways. Russia mis-guidedly (or maybe not) sees itself as a more rational stateactor than the United States because unlike us, its internalpolitics do not impact its decision making when it comes toforeign policy. “At the end of the day America is bigger, more powerfuland wealthier. But the trump card that the Russians willhave in response is the burning of Moscow. It is the willing-ness to bring the house down around their ears to make thepoint that Russia’s independent interests are inviolable.”And no matter how much we might desire or wish,Rojansky stressed, whether it is Putin or someone else asits leader, there is not going to be a Russian governmentthat will lead to a pro America Russia. So, is there room for hope that our two nations can finda way out of conflict and on to a path toward conciliation?“Our ability to secure cooperation from Russia depends ontaking them seriously.” Rojansky cited the Reagan era ap-proach of “Trust but verify” as a policy that worked in thepast to reduce tensions and that pursuit of reciprocal com-mitments between our two countries would be a positivemeans for rebuilding confidence. And he urged thatAmericans need to make a better effort at educating our-selves as individuals about Russia, its people and its history,imploring us to go see the country and gain our own per-sonal perspective.� Reported by Peter Imber

“Russia at this moment is the only existential threat to the United States that canobliterate this country andwith it the world in underthirty minutes.”


After first expressing tongue-in-cheek gratitude toVladimir Putin for the size of the sold-out CamdenConference audience, Tumarkin launched into an im-

pressive overview of 20th- and 21st-century Soviet andRussian history and its impact on Putin and his mindset.Tumarkin first explained her own “very deep personal con-nection” to Russia, having had parents who were born inSaint Petersburg before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution andemigrated to Berlin, Paris, and then New York before WorldWar II. (In a twist of fate, she noted, they also died in St.Petersburg—Florida.)

“Historical politics,” she said, has enabled Putin’s ap-proval ratings to remain high—even as high as 80 percentat the moment, despite great unrest in Ukraine. As a“scholar of political memory,” Tumarkin has focused on theways that history has been used and/or manipulated, nowand in the past, to gain the support of the Russian people.Tumarkin focused initially on the current Ukrainian crisis,pointing out that the 2014 overthrow of Kiev’s pro-Russiangovernment was “depicted in the Russian press as the veryreincarnation of German fascism”—the sworn enemy de-feated by the Soviets on Victory Day in 1945, an event com-memorated every May 9th since. In the last year, she noted,Putin and others in the Russian government “have contin-ued to call the current Ukrainian government and its sup-porters ‘fascists.’” She stressed that “this is not just somegeneric term for enemies, but rather a specific appeal tothe most powerful symbolic and historic event and mo-ment in the modern Russian experience and politicalmythology. It equates today’s Russia with the victoriousRed Army that defeated Nazism.” Ukrainians are also using this kind of historical lan-guage, as shown when President Poroshenko pointed outon Ukrainian Independence Day in August 2014 that

History Matters: The Politics of the Past in Putin’s RussiaThe Great Patriotic War as a unifying themeNina Tumarkin

NINA TUMARKIN is Professor of History at Wellesley Collegeand a longtime Associate at the Davis Center for Russian andEurasian Studies at Harvard University. Her expertise includescurrent Russian cultural politics; comparative national memoriesof war; and official apologies for historical wrongdoings. She isthe author of several books, including The Living and the Dead: TheRise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (Basic Books, 1995),and Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Harvard UniversityPress, 1997). Her current research project is titled “Coming toGrips with the Soviet Past: The Politics of Historical Memory inRussia, 2005–2012.”


“Ukraine in the Donbas (eastern Ukraine) is engaged in agreat patriotic war” for the survival of the nation.Tumarkin reviewed the way the Soviet-era leaders con-sciously adopted wars and other historical events to swaypublic opinion throughout the nation. Then she seguedinto the way post-Soviet leaders have done the samething—with Putin being a master of historical manipula-tion. “For Russia no event in its modern history has evermattered more than what is called The Great PatrioticWar—June 22, 1941, to May 9, 1945, the Soviet Union’s waragainst Germany and Germany’s allies.” Beginning in 1965, the early Brezhnev era, “Russia hashad a veritable cult of the Great Patriotic War—organizedvenerational worship of an idealized version of the SovietUnion’s experience in the war.” Such veneration, includesrelics, wartime heroes, and a large measure of “redemptivesuffering, which has always been an important part ofRussian Orthodox cultural tradition.” Eternal flames prolif-erated in villages and towns, and newlyweds would oftenplace a wreath or flowers at the local war memorial in com-memoration of the 27 million who had perished in the GreatPatriotic War. At the outset of that war, after decades offorced labor and deprivation, “there was always a sensethat it had to be an inspired battle, a sacred war.” Part ofthat inspiration came from a song composed the day afterthe first troop trains departed for the front. And with that,Tumarkin delivered a stirring rendition of “Holy War”—to around of hearty applause. “This cult was upended,” toward the end of the Sovietperiod, “after Gorbachev rose to power, when many moretruths came out about the war.” Criticisms against Stalinbegan to proliferate, eternal flames were allowed to burnout, and the Soviet Union began to disintegrate. In thefirst years after the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union,

Boris Yeltsin devoted scant attention to the cult of theGreat Patriotic War. He restored the tricolored Russianflag; renamed streets, towns, and cities; and spurred therebuilding of Christ the Saviour Russian OrthodoxCathedral, built in 1883 as a memorial to the 1812 defeatof Napoleon and then dynamited by Stalin in 1931.Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, from the beginning of

his presidency in 2000, “identified himself personally withthe Great Patriotic War,” brought back the old Soviet na-tional anthem and busts of Stalin, and frequently metwith veterans. In 2005, on the 60th anniversary of the endof the Great Patriotic War, and in the wake of the OrangeRevolution in Ukraine, Putin also founded a new Russianyouth movement called Nashi (‘Ours’). In the Soviet era, “the war was commemorated as asource of both grief and pride, a source of loyalty, but nevera source of raw joy and exultation, as it has been in thePutin era, especially in the past 10 years.” Putin’s renewedcult of the Great Patriotic War has become “a celebration ofabsolute good over absolute evil.” He has turned May 9 intoa Russian national holiday, in part “to justify the strength-ening centralization.” The traditional ‘minute’ of silence,once lasting 12 minutes, was cut down to 5 minutes—effec-tively meaning, “We just mourn a little bit and then imme-diately celebrate.” At the 2005 event, Putin’s closing wordswere “Slava Rossiya!”—Glory to Russia! “The Great PatrioticWar cult has grown even more since Putin’s third inaugura-tion in 2012.” In 2014, Russians started wearing black-and-orange-striped ribbons—the so-called Georgian ribbon—notjust for special occasions but as an everyday sign of patri-otism. In 2013, wanting Russia also to be part of World War Icentennial commemorations, Putin began encouraging thebuilding of new war memorials and the organization of spe-cial events related to that war. Whereas the memory ofWorld War I had been largely obliterated in Russia, schoolsnow teach “lessons in bravery, a kind of cult of militarism.”Seventieth-anniversary commemorations of the GreatPatriotic War have now begun in Russia and “they will befascinating to watch.” Tumarkin urged audience membersto go to the website kremlin.ru to follow events in Russia.

“Celebrations of military glory have so penetrated Russianculture now, that they help to explain why Russians are soaccepting of the war in Ukraine.” Concluding, she cau-tioned, “War is now looked at as the policy that works, andthis is what’s most troubling.” � Reported by Kathleen Brandes

“Celebrations of military glory haveso penetrated Russian culture now,

that they help to explain whyRussians are so accepting of the

war in Ukraine. War is now lookedat as the policy that works, and this is what’s most troubling.”


Petrov began by saying about Russia “all the time itcan surprise you regardless of how well you knowwhat is going on.” It “now is a totally new country”

since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The pre-2014 politicalsystem was designed at time of financial well-being. Eventhough he won the election of 2012, Putin concluded thatthe old trajectory was not working and had to change. Now,for example, he doesn’t listen to the political elites; “he ismuch more like a Tsar.” The political system has “changed in a very essential way,the way that Putin is ruling the country.” The elites/rulingclass or “Nomenklatura” (a term from the Stalin era for per-sons who hold key administrative roles in all spheres of gov-ernment activity and who are appointed only with theapproval of the communist party) are “much less capable tomake independent moves.” Under this “Neo-Nomenklatura,”the elites are totally dependent on Putin who demands shortterm time horizons for decisions and total loyalty. In addition,the elites now include corporate leaders or oligarchs such asthe Chairmen of Roseneft and Yukos, the latter of which be-came disloyal and ended up both losing Yukos and spendingyears in jail. There are many problems facing Russia today, the domi-nant of which is corruption. But, with Putin’s move to asym-metric power, corruption and inequality are of less concernto most Russians than in the past. There is a new politicalgeometry in Russia. This is a “more primitive one” that re-places that developed during the late 1990s, a time of finan-cial well-being when most problems could be solved withmoney. One characteristic of this new geometry is a highercenter of gravity, i.e. power, in the person of Putin. Anotheris the sense that the leader is the only source of legitimacyand that the loss of legitimacy is a disaster for the leader (andperhaps the country). Lastly, a greater distance betweenPutin and the elites than in the past. There is more differen-

tiation between groups of elites and buying loyalty does notwork anymore. There are major changes in Russia’s political systemwhich include:

� Liberalism vs. Mobilization. Putin chose mobilization.While the economy seems to work, it is fragile. The polit-ical system is both weak and fragile.

� Hybrid vs. Authoritarian Administrative Systems. Putin’smove is towards authoritarian systems. There is no longerany need for democratic “window dressing.” Managersand corporate leaders are removed for disloyalty. And,Putin has taken control of the media.

� Empire to Nation State. The move is to rebuild Russia asa Nation State. This presents a number of problems. First,it increases the risk of a failure to integrate Crimea and itseconomy. Another is the strong sentiment remaining inUkraine to work with the EU. A third problem is in theCaucasus where there is still much independent thinking.

� Soft Power to Hard Power. Russia is operating with a warmentality. It is being besieged by the West. Increasingly,Putin is using language similar to Hitler. Examples are:“Russia is a great power” and “Might makes Right.”

� Westward (EU and U.S.) to Eastward (China). This movepresents many risks. Historically, the West has been avery important factor in the Russian Economy.

NIKOLAY PETROV is a Professor in the Faculty of Politics at theHigher School of Economics in Moscow and a Senior ResearchFellow at the Centre for Fundamental Studies, Laboratory forQualitative and Quantitative Methods of Analysis of PoliticalRegimes. He is the co-author and editor of The Dynamics of RussianPolitics: Putin’s Reform of Federal–Regional Relations, published in2005, and co-editor (with Maria Lipman) of Russia 2025: Scenariosfor the Future, published in 2013. Petrov is the former chair of theCarnegie Moscow Center’s Society and Regions Project.

Post-Crimean Russia and Prospects for its FutureA new political geometry in Russia

Nikolay Petrov

These changes are not reversible. “Putin is no longer thesubject who can make changes; he has become an objectwho must react to the changes. The pilot no more is capableof changing the trajectory of the plane.” There are several problems existing for Russia. Crimearepresents a large risk for Russia. Strong sentiment remainsfor closer ties to the EU. The economy is in trouble and cor-ruption is rampant. The Crimean Tatars (about 10% of thepopulation) are openly hostile to Russia as evidenced by theirrefusal to be ‘bought off’ by Putin. There is also a problem ofreintegrating Russian troops from service in Ukraine backinto Russian society. Through its actions in Crimea andUkraine, Russia is either cutting off its international ties orhaving them restricted through sanctions or other actions.This reduces access to needed international capital, technol-ogy and imports. Some older challenges remain: theCaucasus are not pacified, there is poor and aging manage-ment throughout Russia, and a lack of competition that con-tinues to plague Russian leadership. In addition, Russia faces some new problems. In orderto maintain legitimacy, Putin sees military victories asneeded. While top level elites are doing well, the lower lev-els are losing the benefits of status. Reduced budgets,even for the military, will soon be a significant issue lead-ing to social tensions. There is no easy resolution inEastern Ukraine. If Putin compromises, he upsets hard lin-ers. If he continues aggression, he risks more sanctionsand military support from the West for Ukraine. There areissues with the treatment of non-ethnic Russians withinRussian boundaries such as Chechnya and outside the bor-der in Kazakhstan.

Given this situation there are two major future scenarios.

In the first, Putin remains in power. “He cannot keep thebalance for much longer.” He has 1.5 - 2 years left. Watchfor new measures such as travel ban for elites; increasedsanctions; increasing disaffection of elites; aging, etc.

In the second, Putin is replaced. The replacement could bea combination of some nationalists and the military/po-lice. Another possible replacement could be the Presidentof Chechnya who is very dynamic and has a great follow-ing. Neither replacement will be better for Russia.

Major problems any successor will have include: contin-ued degradation of institutions, continued degradation of theelites, degradation of the society (the new generations havebeen affected by Putin’s thinking and will have a difficulttime changing) and increased chaos and repression of per-sonal liberties. Since 2012, “Russia has become hostage to the Regime.The Regime has become hostage to Putin. And, Putin has be-come hostage to the irreversible changes he has instituted.”Putin will have less and less influence. The only ‘optimism’ isa bit of Russian wisdom: “A horrible end is much better thanan endless horror.” One of the questions addressed to Petrov was if he feltany pressure from the authorities for openly expressing hisviews. His answer: “The problem in speaking as I have donehere and for the last 15 years is not in speaking or writing butin being listened to. During that time, I have had few listenersand few complaints from the regime.”� Reported by Ward Wickwire


“Russia has become hostage to the Regime. The Regimehas become hostage to Putin.And, Putin has becomehostage to the irreversiblechanges he has instituted.”Putin will have less and lessinfluence. The only ‘optimism’is a bit of Russian wisdom: “A horrible end is much betterthan an endless horror.”


The current flurry to rallyaround Putin is “not basedupon deeper belief in whatPutin stands for, deepersupport for his policies. It’s based on somethingmore fragile, moreevanescent.”

The RussianEconomy andits influenceon PoliticsEconomic Issues havea big impact and thefuture is uncertain

Daniel Treisman

Professor Treisman outlined his presentation to theConference with these opening remarks. “I’m going totalk about the Russian economy and its impact on pol-

itics…(First) about how the Russian economy has changedover the last twenty-five years…(Then) about the current eco-nomic crisis…(Finally) I will say something about the politicalconsequences of this crisis and how economic problems maymanifest themselves in politics.” He noted that primary factors in the performance of theRussian economy included the price of oil, international liq-uidity (funds available to borrow), and various global crisesalong with two crucial internal factors—the legacies of theCommunist era and the actual economic policies followed bythe Russian government. Treisman’s survey of the Russian economy over twenty-five years was anchored on a chart showing the fall and riseof Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the years from 1990 to2014. GDP fell sharply from 1990 to 1998 in the aftermath ofthe break-up of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of theCommunist system in Russia. From 1998 onward, GDP rosesteadily for some years due to an overall recovery in theRussian economy, important market reforms, and sound eco-nomic policies. Putin was led by good advisors to cut taxes,advance selected deregulation, and to curb inflation. From2004 to 2008 the rising price of oil helped to boost GDP amidexcessive borrowing from foreign banks. Economic policiesswung toward rewarding Putin’s friends and favored oli-garchs. The worldwide financial crash of 2008 staggered theRussian economy and GDP growth faltered—not to thedepths of the 1990s but to sluggish growth along with poorpolicy direction. Treisman emphasized that the period from 1990 to thepresent were not “wasted years.” A fundamental moderniza-tion of Russian society was achieved despite often waywardpolicy guidance and external pressures. “Many indicatorsshow how much Russia has changed in that era—really abreakthrough in multiple dimensions of the economy and so-

ciety.” Among the positive developments were: a rise in percapita GDP from $7,000 to $20,000; average annual wagerose from $3,700 to $14,000; widespread personal possessionof computers, cell phones, and personal cars; a doubling ofgraduates from higher education; and twice as manyRussians traveled abroad. The middle class that developed as a result of thisprogress took to the city streets in 2011-2012 to protest elec-tion fraud and other forms of corruption. They were experi-encing the ill effects of the change in “economic policy fromone that was quite sensible and market-oriented at first…toone apparently aimed at helping out certain old acquain-tances of Putin to be able to build palaces.” Conditions gotmuch worse toward 2014.

Treisman noted that the current economic situation is “anextremely severe crisis—the worst since the end ofCommunism in Russia.” GDP has dropped since 2012. Withthe recent sharp fall in the price of oil (Russia’s sole major ex-port is petroleum products) the ruble has also plunged invalue. Inflation has increased. A debt crisis looms with bil-lions owed to foreign banks and agencies. The situation is made more dire due to Western economicsanctions imposed as a result of the Crimea/Ukraine crisis.Some estimates suggest that one-third of Russian banks maycollapse. What seemed ample foreign reserves of the govern-ment could be drained rapidly. GDP could shrink in the com-

…the economic situation is “an extremely severe crisis—the worst since the end ofCommunism in Russia.”

ing year by 10% or more. Government budgets will have tobe cut by at least 10%. Standards of living for nearly allRussians have fallen, although Russians have proved throughthe centuries that they are a long-suffering people who en-dure under duress. Yet Putin’s popularity stayed higher than might have beenexpected. His popularity enabled him to centralize powerand control to a remarkable degree, to reward his friends andto punish his critics and adversaries. His high standing in thepolls was initially sustained by economic progress but as thesituation worsened, more Russians began to blame Putin per-sonally for economic set-backs. By 2013 Putin’s popularitywas “down to 61%.” Most observers agreed that “the only so-lution in economic policy (was) Radical Reform”—to open upthe economy further. Treisman noted that Putin and his friends “turned to anew strategy—war.” Russian troops began to infiltrateCrimea. Although many factors entered into Putin’s aggres-sive moves against Ukraine, the effort to divert attention fromeconomic distress was a central consideration. Putin’s popu-larity surged after the seizure of Crimea but Treismansounded a note of caution: “We should doubt that this popu-larity will be long lasting.” He made reference to other in-stances of “war euphoria” that proved temporary indeed. Thecurrent flurry to rally around Putin is “not based upon deeperbelief in what Putin stands for, deeper support for his policies.It’s based on something more fragile, more evanescent.” In conclusion, Treisman said that more “turbulence” is in-evitable in Russia, although we cannot predict its exactterms and outcomes. Putin is locked in by irreversible deci-sions he has made in recent years. Treisman also observedthat a leader in an authoritarian state for a long time usuallybegins to make mistakes and that the resulting damagemounts up cumulatively. In the end he said of Putin, “I sus-pect that his current popularity could fail during this year asthe economic crisis worsens and/or the situation in Ukrainegets messier.”

A questioner asked what support should be given to thegovernment of Ukraine in the current crisis. Treisman responded that far more funds than have yetbeen offered, much less provided, will be necessary to sus-tain Ukraine in the face of Russian pressure but the funds willhave little good effect unless Ukraine undertakes basic eco-nomic reforms and anti-corruption steps. Therefore condi-tions on support funding should be clear and specific.European governments and the IMF should take the lead butfull U.S. participation is also required. There are no assur-ances of success because the really hard decisions must bemade by the Ukrainian leaders themselves. During the Q&A someone observed that Russians playchess while Americans play video games. As a result, theRussians have patience for a “long game” in strategic termsand Americans do not. Treisman took exception to this par-adigm. “I think there is a big misconception that democracieshave no patience and that authoritarian countries have thisgreat long-term view. I don’t see evidence for that…(Frommany who observe Putin closely) he operates day to day, he’spractical, he doesn’t have a long strategy….(He may be goodat tactics but not at strategy)…A leader in an authoritarianstate has to worry every day whether he is going to surviveto the next day.”� Reported by Jim Matlack


DANIEL TREISMAN is Professor of Political Science at UCLA anda research associate of the National Bureau of EconomicResearch. His work focuses on Russian politics and economics andcomparative political economy. Educated at Oxford and HarvardUniversity, he has published four books and numerous articles inleading political science and economics journals. He has alsoserved as a consultant for the World Bank and the European Bankfor Reconstruction and Development. In Russia, he is a memberof the International Advisory Committee of the Higher School ofEconomics and a member of the Jury of the National Prize inApplied Economics.

Pifer began his presentation with an anecdotal story inwhich he reportedly asked a gathering of prominentprofessionals: “What today is the single greatest

threat to Ukrainian national security?…pause…Ukrainians.”Ukraine’s problem was the inability of the country to set anobjective, to have a strategy to get there, and then to imple-ment that strategy…Ukraine is fragile, it’s vulnerable, it’sweak first and foremost because of bad decisions made bytwenty years of Ukraine’s political leaders. They avoided de-cisions on political reform because they feared the politicalconsequences (and/or) they were far more interested in per-sonal gain and furthering corruption. The West’s broader Russian problem is that it is not justabout Ukraine. “The Kremlin has over the course of the lastyear torn up the cardinal rule of the post war European secu-rity order and that was that you do not use military force tochange borders or to take territory from other countries.”Russia has violated this principle by the taking of Crimea andthe use military force within eastern Ukraine. In addition, Russia has asserted or has claimed ‘the right’to defend ethnic Russians and Russian speakers whereverthey are located and whatever their citizenship. What doesthat mean for Kazakhstan, Estonia and Latvia which are mem-bers of the NATO pact and where one-quarter of the popula-tion of each country is ethnic Russian? Provocativeinteractions between Russian military assets and NATO defen-sive aircraft have tripled over the course of the Ukrainian crisis.When combined with statements coming out of Moscow andwith Mr. Putin’s March 18, 2014 speech following the annexa-tion of Crimea, a huge antipathy, even rancor toward NATObecomes apparent. If the Russians take away from this that thehybrid war within Ukraine is a successful alternative, do theythen conclude that ‘little green men’ will show up in Estoniatriggering a NATO, Article 5 treaty commitment?

The question is, why should America care?The first reason is that over the course of the past twentyyears Ukraine has been a good partner on international rela-tions when the West needed their help. In 1991 when theSoviet Union collapsed, Ukraine had on its territory theworld’s third largest nuclear arsenal. In 1994 Ukraine made adecision, because the United States asked, to give up thatarsenal; the warheads were returned to Russia where theywere dismantled; the silos, bombers, and armaments weredestroyed in Ukraine. In 2003 when American troops reachedBagdad, Ukraine contributed forces to the Coalition Stabiliza-tion Force making Ukraine the fourth largest contingencyforce; not because they had interests in Iraq, but becauseagain the United States asked. The second reason is the Budapest Memorandum onSecurity Assurances (1994) in which the United States,Russia and Britain committed to observe the independence,sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and agreednot to use force or threaten to use force. Russia has violatedall of those commitments and that, Pifer asserts, is an obliga-tion of the United States and Britain to respond to their‘Assurances’ obligations. The third reason is the potential broader threat toEuropean security. If the Russians conclude that their actionsin Eastern Ukraine are a successful tactic because we don’tpush back, will they be tempted to try it somewhere elsewhere we have to respond according to our treaty obliga-tions. Pifer defined the difference between assurances andguarantees in treaty language. Guarantees are what NATOmembers get; guarantees mean the 82nd Airborne.Assurances are something less; Pifer stated that he thinks itmeans we owe the Ukrainians some measure of support inthe current struggle.


STEVEN PIFER is the Director of the Brookings Institution ArmsControl and Non-Proliferation Initiative. He is also a SeniorFellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence,and with the Center on the United States and Europe in theForeign Policy program at Brookings. A former Ambassador toUkraine (1998–2000), Pifer had a long Foreign Service careerthat centered on Europe, the former Soviet Union, and armscontrol and security issues. Pifer is coauthor of The Opportunity:Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms, published in 2012. He is asenior adviser to the U.S.–Ukraine Business Council and amember of the Nuclear Security Working Group.

Russia-Ukraine and the Broader ImplicationsIs there a mutually agreeable way out?Steven Pifer

“What today is thesingle greatestthreat to Ukrainiannational security?…pause…Ukrainians.”

As of now, how has the West responded? In the first place there has been support for Ukraine.There has been a lot of political support; Vice President Bidenhas been to Kiev three times in the last thirteen months andour European allies have been bolstering the internationalstatus of Mr. Poroshenko and his government. In terms ofeconomic support, the U.S. and the EU have been workingvery carefully with the IMF to get Ukraine to initiate neces-sary reforms and to make funding available. Secondly, we have bolstered NATO and upheld the WalesSummit. Forward deployed American and other forces in theBaltic states and Poland exist which are intended to reassureWestern governments that there is in fact backing to theNATO commitment to their defense and to clarify to theminds of the Russians that there is a very clear and very redline as respects NATO’s commitments. Lastly, there have been moves to punish Russia by meansof economic sanctions with the goal of getting Russia tochange its policies toward Ukraine. Sanctions along with thefalling price of oil have caused significant damage to theRussian economy. The theory and the hope are that thesesanctions will have a significant impact on the Russian pop-ulation and that they will become uneasy, thereby erodinginternal support for Mr. Putin. We do not know if that willhappen. Some colleagues have argued that the Russian peo-ple will rally behind Mr. Putin with national fervor and Mr.Putin will push back. Pifer continues his argument with thestatement that Russian behavior has been so egregious thatthere should be punishment from the West.

What might happen in Ukraine?

Option 1:Minsk2, the second cease-fire, actually gets imple-mented, there is a political settlement and Mr. Poroshenkowill actually have some breathing space to focus on his

very difficult reform agenda. “I hope that will happen butI think the chances are unlikely given the actions over thepast ten days.”

Option 2: The worst-case scenario is that the cease-firebreaks down and there is a resumption of all-out fighting;this will mean many more dead on both sides.

Option 3: The most likely scenario is no true cease-fires, con-tinued fighting in places, conversations but no realprogress on a political settlement. This may be Mr. Putin’sgoal which is to cause chaos and instability, thereby mak-ing it much harder for Mr. Poroshenko and his govern-ment to address the issues of reform and to deal with theEuropean Union. If that in fact is the Russian goal, it maybe hard to find a settlement.

What should the United States strategy be?

Part 1: Financial and economic support from the IMF andEuropean Union to Ukraine as long as they are doing thenecessary reforms.

Part 2: Sustaining and applying additional economic sanc-tions on Russia with the objective of getting Russia tochange its behavior.

Part 3: Provide defensive arms to the Ukrainian military sothat they can take away, if not the military option, thecheap military option from Russia and hopefully turnRussia towards a negotiated settlement.

Part 4: The terms of a settlement, which is out there, is a set-tlement in which Pifer believes will allow Mr. Putin toclaim victory, if he wants a way out. Which leaves us withthe question: Does Mr. Putin want a way out?

� Reported by Fred Coulon


“The Kremlin has overthe course of the last yeartorn up the cardinal ruleof the post war Europeansecurity order and thatwas that you do not usemilitary force to changeborders or to taketerritory from othercountries.”

Stelzenmüller began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in1989. “Now” she said, “twenty-five years later we findourselves in the midst of the greatest challenge to our

prosperity, freedom and peace that Europe has seen since1989, indeed in our lifetime. Ukraine aspirations are beingthreatened by subversion and outright aggression…andGermany finds itself a pivotal player in Europe. Europe is thesource of almost all of Germany’s wealth, influence andpower.” She observed that, “Key German politicians are de-claring a shift in their foreign policy from one of deeply en-grained restraint which is rooted in our history to one ofgreater leadership, one which more closely matches its re-sponsibility to its clout.” She said if anyone had Putin’s ear itwould be German Chancellor Angela Merkel. “German lead-ership still means German cheques; nothing much haschanged there. We remain the guarantors of the Eurozoneand of the sovereign debt crisis and we already are paying aprice for sanctions against Russia.” She said that Germansknow they will be underwriting the cost of transformingUkraine and supporting the European economies most vul-nerable to Russian pressure, but also Germans “need to over-come our reluctance to use force.” Germany can no longerget a “free ride on the liberal world order.” Stelzenmüller describes the conflict in Ukraine as a “strug-gle between the West and Russia over a civil society’s rightto chart its country’s own course—over self-determination,over the future of the European Union, of Russia and of theland of the Eurasian continent in between. It is ultimatelyabout competing notions of modernity.” She described the so-called centuries-old special relationship between Germanyand Russia as one of “mutually delusional allure. The regionwhich has set the two powers at odds once more is the ‘Bloodlands’ the scene of the worst atrocities committed by bothAdolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. These memories have beenhardwired into the collective memories of everybody inEurope including Germans. There is cause for concern; thisis about people who are dying on the doorstep of Europe.” “And yet some commentators appear to think that the

biggest problem here is Germany. And I quote here from themost recent issue of Foreign Affairs, ‘the crisis in Ukraine hasre-opened old questions of Germany’s relationship with therest of the West.’ I would say that Germany has answeredthese questions pretty comprehensively. All of the recentevents have produced an historic turn-around of foreign pol-icy in Berlin and created a sense of urgency not seen sincethe fall of the Berlin Wall. Merkel’s government has agreed tothree waves of sanctions despite the opposition of Germanindustry. The Chancellor has said Germany’s strategic rela-tionship with Russia is over for now. This is important be-cause it signifies an end to Germany’s post-war foreign policybased on diplomacy and trade, etc. It testifies to the personalanger of senior leaders over Russia’s bluster and lies. Publicopinion has been harder to convince but the shooting downof the Malaysia airliner and the disrespect shown to the re-mains of the passengers, most of whom were Dutch, weregame changers. National polls show a deep distrust of Russiaand majority support for tough measures.” There are deeper reasons for this shift, “Germany’s eco-nomic dependence on Russia has long been overstated.Germany’s trade with Russia represents less than 4% ofGerman exports. Germany depends on Russia for approxi-mately one third of its oil and gas imports but Russia hasnever been able to turn that into political leverage.” “War has returned to Europe because Ukraine is part ofEurope. Arming the Ukrainians or not arming the Ukrainians;that is the only question that matters right now. We stand be-fore a classically tragic choice where all the choices are bad,our understanding is incomplete and we feel compelled totake a stand.” Stelzenmüller agrees that “Ukraine is the obvi-ous victim of Russian aggression.” But “Ukraine’s legitimacyand its fragile democratic institutions are being underminedby the Ukrainians themselves, particularly the oligarchs whoact like warlords.” About Russia she said “The realists never tire of remind-ing us Russia has the ability to pound Ukraine into submis-sion and to cow the West into watching helplessly. And itwouldn’t stop there. But this would poison its relations withthe West. It is not Russia’s strength we have to fear; it is theirweakness, their inability to compromise with the rest of theworld and to provide decent welfare for its citizens.” Regarding the U.S., Stelzenmüller said it was good thatthe United States has worked very constructively withEurope and Germany and wisely let them take the initiative.“The White House is weighing very carefully the pros andcons of arming Kiev. The question I would ask America ishow far are you willing to go this time?” She asked why theU.S. was not doing more to support a Ukrainian transforma-tion and alleviate a growing Ukrainian humanitarian crisis.

Europe’s Russia ChallengeGermany has a stake in standing up to RussiaConstanze Stelzenmüller


CONSTANZE STELZENMÜLLER is the inaugural Robert Boschsenior fellow with the Center on the United States and Europe atthe Brookings Institution. Previously, she was a senior transatlanticfellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, whereshe directed the influential Transatlantic Trends survey program.Her areas of expertise include: transatlantic relations; Germanforeign policy; NATO; the EU’s foreign, security and defense policy;international law; and human rights. She holds a doctorate in lawfrom the University of Bonn, a master’s degree in publicadministration from Harvard University’s Kennedy School ofGovernment, and a law degree from the University of Bonn.


As for Europe, “All of these questions can be asked withmuch more justification of Europe. These are our neighbors.Our responsibilities are greater and the stakes are infinitelyhigher.” And while she conceded that “Ukraine is a mess byany measure” there are compelling reasons for us to supportthe Ukrainian quest for independence. “It is a civil societyclaiming the right to chart its own course. A failing state withforty million people on our borders could destabilize all ofEurope and threaten its prosperity. Conversely, if Ukrainewere to succeed in emulating Poland’s model of remarkabledemocratic transformation it might develop an extraordinarymagnetic pull reaching even into Russia. That is what Putinand his government fear the most. For why should Russia notbe able to achieve what Poland has done?” Stelzenmüller concluded, “Berlin finds itself in the eye ofa storm. The sense of tension and urgency there is palpable.If the U.S. arms Ukraine, the impact of that decision wouldreverberate across Europe long before it is felt in the U.S.Neither Germany, Europe nor the U.S. has done enough toinvest in the transformation of Ukraine. We must act to-gether. More than five thousand people have been killed.How can we stand idly by while there is so much suffering?Whoever rejects the military option has the burden of proofthat we have done enough in the area of diplomacy and fi-nancial assistance.”

She finished on a personal note telling the story of her fa-ther and his brother who were taken out of school at agesseventeen and nineteen and forced to fight for the Nazis. Shesaid her generation has enjoyed a long period of peace; weowe it to her father and uncle’s generation that we stand upto Russia. Her impassioned conclusion brought the audienceto their feet, “I damn well am not going to let this Europe betaken away from me!”� Reported by David Jackson

“The realists never tire ofreminding us Russia has theability to pound Ukraine intosubmission and to cow theWest into watching helplessly.And it wouldn’t stop there.But this would poison itsrelations with the West. It is not Russia’s strength we have to fear; it is theirweakness, their inability tocompromise with the rest ofthe world and to providedecent welfare for itscitizens.”

Professor Xiang began his remarks with the commentthat the “U.S. has miscalculated and alienated Russiaand China at the same time, so that these two coun-

tries, who historically have nothing in common, hate eachother…never trust each other and never understand eachother are somehow forming some kind of very intimate diplo-matic, economic and geopolitical alignment.” Xiang thinksthis relationship “will last much longer than Western ob-servers tend to believe.” The new relationship is not simply an economic relation-ship with each using the other. “The Russian-Chinese rela-tionship is moving into a very different stage, in which theyare seriously reviving a kind of diplomatic co-ordination vis-à-vis the West.” Xiang reminded the audience that the Chinese have notbeen silent on the subject of Soviet activities in Crimea andUkraine. Chinese President Xi Jinping told Putin, after thestart of the Ukraine crisis, ‘we understand the historic con-text’ and after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, ‘we fully under-stand the complexity and background of why you do this.’“By Chinese standards these are very strong messages” eventhough at the Security Council China only abstained from avote to sanction Russia. During the Cold War, China worriedabout Soviet activities in neighboring countries. It is less con-cerned now; things are changing very rapidly between Chinaand Russia. This change in China’s position can be explained in partby looking at the current leadership in China. Today’s lead-ership represents a new generation. “It is a unique genera-tion—it went through the most tumultuous events of the PRChistory…and understands China’s problems. This is a gener-

ation that is not ultra-nationalistic; it is not necessarily an ide-ologically driven generation…its leaders look at China from amuch broader perspective than previous generations andperhaps than future generations.” Although seriously con-cerned with domestic issues, this leadership focuses moreon its relationships with the outside world than have thosein the past. The China-Russia relationship is influenced in part by thebelief, on the part of the Chinese, that they and Putin are ofthe same generation and view issues of global governancesimilarly. According to Xiang, China and Russia believe theWest has a double standard when determining who is or isnot “democratically elected.” He acknowledged that “sincethe Arab Spring, Chinese are very much obsessed withwhether this kind of thing can take place in China” and can-not accept that you can have two standards as far as politicallegitimacy is concerned. “The key issue is how you define le-gitimacy.” China is concerned with the “restoration of its ownculture and its own governance model” and its leaders be-lieve the Western countries are trying to impose on the worlda single standard for legitimacy, based on Western values ofliberal democracy. “We cannot let that stand.” From a geopolitical perspective, the China-Russia relation-ship today fits well with China’s Eurasian strategy started in2003. China would like a European alliance extending fromWestern Europe to the South China Sea and led by Moscow,Beijing, Berlin, and Paris. These countries, said Xiang, “arenot necessarily lined up with America’s version of global gov-ernance.” China sees an opportunity to build on its Russianrelationship to strengthen this dream of an extended Europe.China has moved from being fearful of the EU to holding it


The Sino-Russian HoneymoonRelationship based on mutual feelings toward the WestLanxin Xiang

up as a shining example because it is “the only part of theWest that seems to China to move beyond itself.” China nowtreats its relations with the EU as a top priority. Xiang summarized China’s Eurasian strategy as one oftrying to “build bridges.” In this regard, he spoke of threebridges: Shanghai Co-operation Organization, or SCO, (aEurasian political, economic and military organizationfounded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.),the China-Russia special relationship, and China’s Strategicrelationship with the EU. “It seems to be working,” he said.China has announced a “New Silk Road” program as part ofthe SCO to provide multiple means for China to move west-ward to Europe. Again, Russia is critical here. Putin is very popular in China, according to Xiang. But atthe same time, the relationship has problems. It is importantto China that Eurasian integration go forward and a healthyRussian economy is critical to that. The Chinese PrimeMinister offered Putin economic assistance but Putin ignoredthe offer, which was seen as an insult to the Chinese. And,the most problematic part of the relationship is Putin’s wayof conducting diplomacy. China’s leadership is “concernedwith the imperial instinct and extraordinary cunning of theRussian diplomacy.” On the domestic front, the Chinese lead-ers see themselves as reformers and are focused on anti-cor-ruption. The anti-corruption campaign is expected to havegreat influence on international relations as well as domes-tically. China and Russia are not compatible when it comesto dealing with corruption and, as Xiang put it, this is not partof China-Russia conversations.

But, from the Chinese point of view, Russia’s involvementin European diplomacy for many centuries can benefit China.Xiang claimed Chinese do not understand and cannot definegreat power diplomacy. China wants to learn from Russia. In summary, Russia-Chinese relations are reaching thestage of becoming very comprehensive, involving “institutionbuilding, personal connections, and economic training. Itlooks like a win-win situation.” In response to the question, does China have a positionon whether Ukraine should join the EU, Professor Xiang, re-sponded, “China has a great relationship with Ukraine. Chinahas no problem whether Ukraine joins EU or not.” But, Chinais concerned that it may have a similar problem internally.Therefore, China cannot legitimize the overthrow of a regimefor domestic reasons. When asked, then, how China took thestand it did on Crimea, Xiang responded, “Crimea is an ex-ception to China’s insistence against outside interference.”� Reported by Judy Stein


LANXIN XIANG has been Professor of International History andPolitics at the Graduate Institute of International andDevelopment Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, since 1996. Hepreviously was Associate Professor in the Political ScienceDepartment at Clemson University. During 2003–2004, Xiangheld the Kissinger Chair of Foreign Policy and InternationalRelations at the Library of Congress. He was a MacArthurFoundation Fellow in Germany in 1989 and an Olin Fellow at YaleUniversity in 2003. Xiang has held chairs at Fudan University inShanghai and China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing.

China’s leadership is“concerned with the imperial instinct and extraordinary cunning of the Russian diplomacy.”

Thomas Graham began his talk saying, “The Ukraine cri-sis has ushered in a new era in U.S.-Russian relations.All the assumptions we made about the inevitable, al-

beit slow, integration of Russia into the Western world havefinally been upended.” Graham said that no reset, no strate-gic partnership, no alliance is going to happen now. What isneeded is “a new approach for a new era.” One that dealswith “the real Russia, not the one we had hoped for.” Graham described five basic aspects of the real Russiaand what challenges these pose for the United States. “First, no matter how much we like to demonize Putin, heis not our problem. Russia is.” Most Russians, including Putin,believe in the “great power school of international affairs.”That essential to Russia’s survival are sovereign states, in-evitable conflict, hard power and balance and “being one ofthe few states that determine the structure, substance anddirection of global affairs.” Putin’s strategic vision of Russia’splace in the world is consistent with that of his predecessors

whether “presidents, general secretaries or tsars.” Grahamsaid that even Boris Yeltsin, who we considered a friend,worked to pursue a closer relationship with Germany andFrance and thus blunt our influence when he realized thatthe U.S. would not concede to Russia’s pre-eminence in theseterritories. And he “reached out to China and India to form aglobal counterweight.” The second basic aspect of the real Russia is that our cur-rent problem is based in a values gap issue that emergedsome 200 years ago after the French Revolution. While acrossEurope the values of the individual and individual freedomwere advancing, Russia remained an absolute autocracy. “Asbefore, the challenge for Europe, for the West more generally,our Russia problem remains ensuring our safety in the loom-ing presence of an essential actor in the European systemwhich can never be fully integrated politically, economicallyor ideologically.” Understanding how Russia thinks about its own security


“The Ukraine crisishas ushered in anew era in U.S.-Russian relations. All the assumptionswe made about theinevitable, albeitslow, integration ofRussia into theWestern world havefinally beenupended.”

Rethinking U.S.–Russian RelationsA new approach for a new era

Thomas Graham

was Graham’s third aspect of the real Russia. He saidRussia’s geographic vastness and population sparsenesshave opened it to invasions throughout history. “To bolsterits security, Russia has pushed its frontiers outward to createstrategic depth, and it has stopped not so much when it raninto formidable physical barriers, of which there are few, aswhen it encountered well-organized, powerful states, that is,the Germanic powers in the West, Great Britain and then theUnited States in the South, and China in the East.” He saidthese frontiers, Russia’s zone of interest and influence, in-clude north central Eurasia and all of the former Soviet terri-tory and the former Russian imperial space minus Finlandand Poland. “In Russian eyes, the choice that faces countries in this re-gion is not Russian domination or genuine independence; itis a choice among great powers vying for influence overthem.” So Moscow will always seek to limit the presence ofother powers in these countries. “Russian primacy in—if notnecessarily control of—that region is vital to its own security.” The fourth understanding about the real Russia, is that“for the past twenty-five years, Russia has done what it canto slow, if not reverse, the unification of Europe.” (Grahamsaid Russia sees itself as a player cooperating with but not apartner with a united Europe.) “Russia could aspire to be theequal of Germany, France or Great Britain. But it could neverbe the equal of a united Europe. So today, we see Russia ex-ploiting the socio-economic and political fissures in and be-tween European countries—and between Europe and theUnited States—to erode support for common action againstRussia over Ukraine.” While there is a great deal of Russian foreign policy con-tinuity across these four points, there is one huge discontinu-ity. “Russia is no longer the dynamic core of Eurasia.” It isstronger and more active on the world stage, but “for the firsttime in modern history, Russia, beyond its traditional geopo-litical space is surrounded by states and regions that aremore dynamic than it is.” This fifth aspect of the real Russiais one that Graham does not think is going to go away.“Resurgent or not today, the future is troubled.” Graham next presented an outline of a new approach con-sistent with today’s Russia. Graham believes we are facing amanageable challenge. “We are not facing a rising revolution-ary power intent on overthrowing the global system. Ratherwe are facing a declining revisionist power seeking to im-prove its standing in the world by recreating the historicalfoundation of its power.” To accomplish a new approach, Graham said first, “Weand our European partners need to put our own houses inorder.” He included mastering short and long term domesticchallenges, restoring self-confidence and regaining respectin Russia. Russia is exploiting these fissures in European so-cieties: first, the “elites failure to treat popular concerns aboutthe European project with due regard and the continuing set-backs in restoring growth after the financial crisis of 2008-2009,” second, the acceptance of capital with dubiousorigins, and third “a less than fully welcoming attitude to-ward ethnic Russian residents.” “In other words, in the Transatlantic Community, the core

of the response to the Russia problem should be socio-eco-nomic.” While there needs to be a military component, “weneed to avoid militarizing our response to the RussiaChallenge.” The second component of a new approach is to “helpbuild competent states and competitive economies alongRussia’s periphery to constrain its illegitimate expansionarytendencies.” Third, we should avoid a radical weakening of theRussian economy. “A liberal, democratic breakthrough is notgenerally the Russian response to extreme domestic unrest.”History shows “a radically weakened Russia will be exploitedby China and others to their benefit and our detriment.”Graham said we must take into account Russia’s relationshipwith Ukraine. “Its interests are too engaged, its importanceto Ukraine’s economy too great and its capacity to destabilizeUkraine too formidable for it to be otherwise.” Graham’s fourth and last component of a new approachfeatures a necessity for the United States to accommodateRussia’s interests more broadly. We should seek balancewithin and across issues. To advance some of our issues, wewill need to help Russia advance some of theirs. “This willnot lead to ideal solutions, but to workable ones that willleave us space to advance our strategic goals over time.” Graham acknowledged that our current generation of pol-icy makers is not prone to accept such an approach. “It lacksthe moral clarity that so many seemingly prize today. It re-quires trade-offs that are easily portrayed as compromises ofprinciples.” But that acceptance of such trade-offs led to amultipolar world during the 18th and 19th centuries. “Wemay lose our moral clarity, but perhaps we should rememberthat the last age of great-power diplomacy was also one ofrelative peace and security, of prosperity and progress.”� Reported by Richard M. Anderson


THOMAS GRAHAM is a managing director at Kissinger Associ-ates, focusing on Russian and Eurasian affairs. He was SpecialAssistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia on theNSC staff from 2004 to 2007 and the National Security Council’sDirector for Russian Affairs from 2002 to 2004. Prior to that, heserved as the State Department’s Associate Director of the PolicyPlanning Staff. Earlier, Graham was a Senior Associate in the Russia/Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-national Peace, and as a Foreign Service Officer, he had two toursof duty at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. Lukyanov began his presentation with some ofthe sly wit that characterized the rest of hiscomments, noting that the large turn-out for the

Conference convinced him that “the U.S. has a broaderpotential for foreign policy thinking than (he had come to)believe from reading some official statements.” He addedseriously, that such citizen interest is important because “theU.S. and Russia are key players in an ongoing process whichwill shape our countries and the whole world.” He explained that the transitions in his talk’s title referredto two that have taken place over the past 25 years: that ofRussia since the Soviet Union’s collapse (a transition he felt“had basically failed”) and the transition of the whole worldorder during that same period, which he said had also failed.Lukyanov rated both as failures because “we are not wherewe had hoped we would be 25 years ago.” Lukyanov referred to this period since 1990 as an“Interregnum” due to the lack of consensual settlement atthe end of the Cold War and the vastly different assumptionson the two formerly contending sides as to what had actuallyhappened, citing the “euphoric arrogance in the West.” Henoted that “the root for many problems between Russia andthe West” is the divergent views as to “whether there was aso-called ‘New World Order’ (NWO) or not.” He pointed outthat when Gorbachev had originated the term in 1986 hewas picturing the “convergence of a transformed Soviet sys-tem and a transformed Western system,” something that“didn’t happen.” George H.W. Bush’s revival of the term fouryears later gave it a “completely different substance” that ig-nored Russia altogether. Therefore, when “the West seesRussia as violating the rules of the NWO, Russia believes thatno rules were agreed to” but that “now is an appropriate timeto discuss such rules.” Another feature of the current Interregnum, Lukyanovnoted, was the gradual erosion of the two-power stability thathad existed during the Cold War. “The Cold War was an uglyperiod, but it also produced unprecedented stability, basedon the two superpowers” and their opposing ideologies.When it ended a certain international “democracy” (indepen-dence) came into international relations that the unilateraldomination of the U.S. and the West was unable to control.

Lukyanov thus contended that “Russian activity in Ukraineshouldn’t have been a surprise because it was taking place inan international system that was no longer stable” and was in-evitable “due to preconditions created both by Russian historyand recent developments.” To illustrate the Russian viewpoint,he quoted a fellow Moscow journalist who summarized theRussian moves as having “destroyed the U.S. monopoly and vi-olations of international laws.” Lukyanov clarified this state-ment by noting widespread Russian resentment of the manyU.S. and NATO interventions in recent years in the Balkansand the Middle East, which Russians viewed as a concerted“destruction of the old principles of international law.” Another important component of the past 25 years’Interregnum was the “profound undermining of the conceptof sovereignty, a core element of the old system,” a processthat Lukyanov attributed to three factors:

� Globalization, undermining the ability of sovereign nationsto control their respective economic and monetary spaces;

� Humanization, the perceived right of international bodiesor other nations to intervene to protect populationsabused by their own governments;

� The success of the European Union.

All these factors “undermined the concept of national bor-ders and created a new international environment. In Russia,and many other places, this weakening of national sover-eignty was not considered a good thing.” In the midst of this, Lukyanov reminded us of the nationaltrauma that Russians had experienced in the past 25 years.They’ve gone from being a respected pillar of internationalstability to being a beleaguered recipient of charity from theirformer adversary. Many parts of the old Soviet Union that had


“Russian activity inUkraine shouldn'thave been a surprisebecause it wastaking place in aninternational systemthat was no longerstable.”

Russia 2015: Lost in TransitionRussia’s search for self-identification

Fyodor Lukyanov

been considered integral parts of the Russian nation have bro-ken away to become independent, while some “20 million(ethnic) Russians woke up one day to find themselves livingin foreign countries.” All these changes in what had been ac-cepted ways of life and thought were traumatic for Russians. He then asked the question: “What happens to Russianow?” He pointed out that Putin was not blind to the contin-uing crisis of the failed transition of Russia and mentioned allof Putin’s efforts since entering his second tenure asPresident three years ago to “find a new conceptual groundfor Russian development.” Lukyanov described Putin’s newconservative identity as part of his attempt to “fill this vac-uum.” Eventually, Russia has to find a suitable self-perceptionand place for itself in the new world in which it finds itself.“It will be a painful process,” he predicted. Lukyanov described this search as a process of self-identi-fication, of deciding “what is Russia and who are Russians?”The events in Ukraine and Russian feelers toward the creationof some sort of Eurasian Economic Union, in which it wouldplay a key role, are all part of this effort at a meaningful self-identification. He felt that Russia will be “forced to rethink itstraditional obsession with the West because the world is differ-ent now.” Three-quarters of Russian territory is in Asia, and anAsia that includes China, is now more potentially important toRussia. Some sort of cooperation with China will be essential. To conclude, Lukyanov said that “the world is changingand hopefully Russia will change with it and the next transi-tion will be more successful.” The old U.S.-Soviet relationshipis no longer possible in a world that has grown beyond it.Perhaps some new Congress of Vienna is needed to createthe next stable world order. He is hopeful, but not necessarilyconfident, that we will find leaders with the needed ‘smart-ness’ to accomplish it.

During the Q&A Lukyanov was asked about his emphasison compromise for strategic solutions that give second prior-ity to creating democracy in Eastern Europe, a top Americanand Western priority. He opened his answer with a quotefrom Winston Churchill that suggested the dubious successof recent U.S. attempts at democracy-building elsewhere:“Whatever your brilliant strategy is, you have to check the re-sults from time to time.” He added that democracy and NATOare both good and proper for Estonia and Latvia but maybenot for Ukraine. So why not compromise on Ukraine? Another questioner said that during his recent visit to Russiahe met many Russians who seemed very Western in their out-looks and technological savvy, fluent with iPhones and hashtags; also expressing a desire to move Russia toward the West.Will these people affect the Russian government’s attitude to-ward the US and West? Lukyanov’s response was that the ques-tioner met a very narrow and unrepresentative segment of theRussian people. Putin represents a large majority of Russiansand your contacts are from a minority he doesn’t worry about.“I would also note that expertise with iPhones and hash tags isnot a precondition for representative democracy.”� Reported by Charlie Graham


“The world is changing andhopefully Russia will changewith it and the next transitionwill be more successful.”

FYODOR LUKYANOV is an international journalist and politicalanalyst based in Moscow. Since 2002, he has been Editor in Chiefof the journal Russia in Global Affairs, published by the ForeignPolicy Research Foundation. He is Chairman of Presidium of theCouncil on Foreign and Defense Policy, the oldest Russian NGO,providing expertise in security and foreign affairs. He is also aPresidium Member of the nonprofit organization Russian Councilon Foreign Affairs. A graduate of the philological faculty ofMoscow State University, he is fluent in German, Swedish, andEnglish, in addition to his native Russian.


Q: Why isn’t Ukraine welcomed into NATOright now?

Pifer:At this point, with Ukraine in an ongoingconflict with Russia, NATO does not want tobring in a country that immediately, from theget-go, is an Article 5 contingency, and is thereforenot willing to consider putting it on a membershiptrack. This is the reason I believe that if Ukraine,as part of a settlement process with the Russians,wanted to say that NATO is off the table, theyaren’t giving up anything meaningful.Burns:We made it clear to every state we’vetaken in since 1997 that if you have a majorterritorial division with one of your neighbors,we just can’t take you in because we don’t wantto invite ourselves into somebody else’s war.

Q: Is there a chance for a genuine regime tran-sition in Russia given the fact that this currentautocratic regime reflects past regimes?Petrov: In my view, the regime can hardlytransform and survive by replacing Putin withsomebody else. The problem I see is con-nected with extremely weak institutions,which will not enable the next regime, or thetransformed regime, to be essentially differentfrom what we have now.

Lukyanov: I think we are gradually movingtowards something like a Franco regime inSpain, which was authoritarian enough, butnot completely. Which was isolated enough,but not fully. And very conservative, but allowed some space for maneuvering. And Ithink Putin will one day, one beautiful day, de-cide whether he would like to follow the Francoexample and find a guy who will not destroythe system, but gradually deconstruct it.

Q: What are the United States’ 2016 presi-dential prospects for improved relations withRussia?Burns: I think foreign policy may be moreprominent than it normally is in 2016.Graham: I don’t think we are going to have adivisive debate about Russia in our presidentialcampaign. Whether things will change oncethat individual actually has the burden of re-sponsibility for protecting and defending theUnited States is another thing.

Lukyanov: I think we should assume that therelationship might turn more productive, ifthe new agenda is there. Sooner or later, wewill need to discuss the Arctic, the MiddleEast and the situation in Asia-Pacific and EastAsia, but in a new way. And then I hope, theAmerican pragmatists will prevail and we willhave a new dialogue.

Q: I’m interested to hear how you see Russia’sview of her role in other conflict parts of theworld and what the chances are that theWest, Russia and China can join together inthe issues of ISIS.Lukyanov: I think there is a good chance toexpect more efforts to find common groundbecause ISIS is a rare case where no one, nonormal person, can have any sympathy. Theproblem is that there is profound disagree-ment over what should be done. A very seri-ous conversation is needed with all involved,Europeans, Americans, Middle Eastern gov-ernments, Russians, Chinese, to try to under-stand how to combat this evil.

Xiang: Russia, China and the U.S. happen tohave common interests in dealing with ISISand the whole idea of Middle East reconstruc-tion. So I think that it is quite a promising area.Pifer: I do think there are a couple of stum-bling blocks. First, Washington and Moscowboth have very different ideas about whathappens with Syria and President Assad. Sec-ond, after 9/11, we found that there weresome hesitations and some lingering Cold Warsuspicions and getting the intelligence agen-cies to cooperate in a way that allowed foraction on intelligence was not so easy. Graham: We conceptualized the terroristproblem in radically different ways. But thequestion I have is where we are as populationsand what has happened to the sympathy wehad for one another that has been damagedover the last twelve months.

Final Panel: Q&AOn Sunday morning, in the final hour and a half of the Conference all speakers returned tothe stage to answer questions from the audience.

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Lukyanov: It’s a very complicated issue, be-cause terrorism is connected to national se-curity and national security is the most delicateissue for each country and each government.

Q: What are the opportunities for individualslike Samantha Smith to make a difference?Rojansky: We are coming off a quarter of acentury of unprecedented connectedness ofRussia to the rest of the world. Technology—Ilive part of my life online now, and get to ob-serve my Russian friends talking to theirRussian friends, and that level of understand-ing was never possible before.

Xiang: People like Samantha Smith actuallychange the context of the conversation. Theyhave a different cognitive framework, so theycan start a conversation that cannot otherwisebe started.

Q: Returning to Ukraine, is it correct thatour policies should balance containment ofRussia with development of Ukrainian insti-tutions, and if so, what should and shouldn’twe do?Pifer: I think the best thing we can do forUkraine is to give them the tools and the helpto build the institutions to become a successfulstate, conditioned on Ukraine making the nec-essary reforms. We also have to help Ukrainedeal with the war in the east. The presidentof Ukraine really needs some space to dealwith problems at home. Treisman: Ukraine needs a large amount ofmoney, but it needs to be delivered in con-junction with a plan of reform which theUkrainians put together. The different politicalforces within Ukraine will come to some con-sensus behind the necessary economic reformsor they won’t. If they don’t then there reallyisn’t any hope for stabilizing the country.

Stelzenmüller: There are two frameworksthat Europe has on offer. One is the member-ship framework. Another is a framework forcountries where we’re not contemplating EUmembership, at least for now, is what we didwith the Balkan Stability Initiative. Rojansky: I think there is a sequence. First youstop the fighting. Second, you make it veryclear that you need to use the urgent sense of threat and turn that into political will to undertake the reforms. Lastly, you’ve got toundertake real internal reconciliation.

Q: You said the West should get its ownhouse in order. What domestic issues shouldthe U.S. address to continue as a globalleader?Graham: We still have the entitlements debate we have to reform. We have to reformour political system, so that we actually get a Congress that represents the people of theUnited States. And I think we need better infrastructure. Pifer: If you look at the challenges industrialcountries are facing—demographics, thingslike that—the United States is better placedthan anyone to deal with those, but we’re notgoing to be able to use those advantages unlesswe can make the political system work. � Reported by Katie Bernhardt

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CAMDEN CONFERENCE

Join us for the 29th Annual Camden Conference

Africa Rising?February 19-21, 2016

A frica is home to the world’s poorest nations, but also has a dozen economies that maintained seven percentgrowth rates over the last decade. Africa is the last major frontier for resource development, while simul-

taneously struggling with some of the world’s oldest, most corrupt and filthiest oil and mining ventures. WhileAfrica suffers from ethnic and religious violence and poverty, it is blessed with rich and creative cultures andvibrant civil societies. These are only a few of the contradictions and conundrums that will frame the 2016 CamdenConference on the theme of Africa, a massive and often mysterious continent. On the economic front, the reasons many countries are making impressive advances include stabilizationafter years of civil war, more effective economic management, transformation to open market economies, andimproved governance. Elsewhere, poverty is sustained by corruption and grievous economic mismanagementunder oppressive governments—not to mention wars and terrorism. What policies can best serve Africa’seconomic performance? What are the most pressing challenges facing Africa in a globalized economy, andwhat should donor agencies do to help? African politics are equally diverse and volatile. Free, peaceful elections have been held in Senegal,Ghana, Zambia and most of Southern Africa, with the notable exception of Zimbabwe. In other countries,elections are rigged by authoritarian regimes—leading to military coups in recent years in Mauritania, Guinea,Niger and Mali. Somalia is still largely a failed state and others approach that status. What makes democracywork in some countries and not others? Can the U.S and Europe intervene effectively to promote democracy? At the same time, Africa’s climate is changing, forcing farmers to adapt their practices or even leave theirland altogether, adding to instability and fueling conflict. What can Africans themselves do to cope, and whatshould the developing nations who created the problem be doing to assist? Should Africa be allowed to foregoenvironmental standards in the name of progress, since “First World” countries didn’t have such standards tocontend with when they were developing economically? Africa is also the source of some major diseases, most notably AIDS and Ebola, that have not only killedmillions of Africans but also spread—or threatened to spread—across the globe. What can be done to con-front these threats? All of this is exacerbating traditional ethnic, sectarian and religious tensions, often leading to violenceand terrorism. The U.S. has military operations in at least 13 Sub-Saharan African states, and the UnitedNations has nine peacekeeping missions. Yet Boko Haram continues to slaughter Nigerians, Al-Shababterrorizes Somalia and Kenya, and South Sudan is beset by civil war. What has peacekeeping and peacebuilding accomplished? What kinds of security does U.S. military engagement bring? The Camden Conference Program Committee will certainly have no shortage of issues to examine as itseeks to bring to Maine better understanding of this great but often beleaguered continent. We look forwardto seeing you here next year to witness and learn from the results.

Check the Camden Conference website for updates on speakers, programs, communityevents, and registration: www.camdenconference.org

from the 28 annual camden conference...c. patrick mundy thomas putnam frederick p. rector, iii louis...

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